Japan’s Roadmap for Technology and Human Resources for LWR Safety

Nuclear Energy Policy Planning Division

Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)

July 7, 2015

1. Promotion of Strategic Development of Technologies and Human Resources

1. Maintaining and developing high-level nuclear technologies and human resources is imperative for smoothly decommissioning aged nuclear power plants, which are expected to increase in the future, as well as TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plants.

2. Because enhancing the nuclear safety in surrounding countries ensures the safety of Japan, maintaining and developing high-level nuclear technologies and human resources which enable Japan contribute to their safety enhancement is essential.

3. GOJ promotes the development of technologies that contribute to safety improvement of LWRs including countermeasures against severe accidents and enhance their reliability and efficiency in order to reduce risks in case of an accident.

4. Under international cooperation, GOJ also facilitates R&D of nuclear technologies that serves the safety improvement of nuclear use, such as high-temperature gas-cooled reactors which are expected to be utilized in various industries including hydrogen production and which has an inherent safety.

＜Description in the Strategic Energy Plan of Japan＞

2

Decided by the Cabinet in April, 2014

3

In response to a request from the Nuclear Power Subcommittee, the Working Group presented

issues from the public perspective, while the Atomic Energy Society of Japan (AESJ) called upon

their expertise to work out solutions and the draft of a roadmap. The roadmap for technology and

human resources for LWR safety was formulated by bouncing ideas off each other.

The objectives of this roadmap are to clarify roles among relevant personnel in academic societies,

government agencies, electric utilities, manufacturers, and research institutes, and to serve as a

common framework for implementing nationwide activities that will lead to improved safety of LWRs

without overlapping efforts.

This roadmap targets technologies that contribute to safety enhancements for LWRs, including the

smooth and safe decommissioning of NPSs. (Note that technologies related to the disposal of

radioactive waste that are the subject of the master plan for basic R&D on geological disposal (the

R&D map) and technologies related to the decommissioning of TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS

are to be included in another roadmap that will be transparent to the public, and hence are not

covered in this roadmap.)

This roadmap will be reviewed at least once a year.

Present solutions and roadmap draft

Present issues from public perspective Working Group on Voluntary Improvement of

Safety, Technology and Human Resource

AESJ Researchers and engineers involved in LWR safety participate in planning as individuals

Requests formulation of

the roadmap compatible

with scenarios depicted in

the Strategic Energy Plan

Share details of the formulation process in a transparent manner

<Structure for formulating the roadmap>

Nuclear Energy Subcommittee

General public/local site community

Confirm Share

1-1. The Roadmap for Technology and Human Resources for LWR Safety

Published on June 16, 2015

4

Method of Evaluating the Priority of Issues based on Their Importance

Eight evaluators selected from industry and academia rate each issue using an evaluation axis having two criteria: (A)

effectiveness in enhancing LWR safety and (B) importance to the maintenance and development of technology and human

resources for contributing to LWR safety enhancements.

The evaluators rate each issue according to three levels of importance: ◎ (very important), ○ (important), △ (less important).

The evaluation axis is examined as part of the rolling process implemented by the AESJ in order to review evaluation items

having overlap, to simplify expressions, and to review the rating method.

(A) Effectiveness in improvement of LWR safety

(Identify issues that are predicted to have effective outcomes)

(B) Importance to maintenance and development of technology and human resources

to improve LWR safety

(Identify issues that contribute to mid/long-term nuclear safety and needs of future

generations)

(2) Its resolution will be relatively effective in reducing risk

(1) Will contribute greatly to resolving issues revealed from the TEPCO’s

Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident (1) May serve as a basic infrastructure shared by many nuclear power entities

(3) May lead to the acquisition and cultivation of young human resources

through the discussions on unprecedented challenges (3) Is relatively cost-effective

(2) May lead to a worldwide breakthrough in the field of LWR safety

<evaluation axis> Each issue is given a rating of 0 to 6 points based on the two criteria (A) and (B) (with two points being allocated for each of (1)–(3)).

The priority of an issue is set based on the importance of issues determined from their ratings.

Draw up the roadmap overview with issues arranged along a time axis based on their resolution timelines.

Draw up the issue survey for issues that categorize each activity of technological and human resource development required for resolving issues

in the roadmap overview into suitable groups. The issue survey includes a summary of the issues, a list of activities, the basis for adopting the

issue, an analysis of the present condition, the anticipated effects, correlations with other issues, the process of implementation, and

implementing and funding entities.

Each issue is sorted into eight groups suggested by the Working Group in accordance with the anticipated effects of their resolution.

Any issue that has not been adequately defined or for which the

stakeholders are not clear is not included in the roadmap.

Formulate the roadmap with priorities assigned to issues

Note: (A) and (B) of the evaluation axis

rate the importance of each issue

from a short-term and a mid/long-

term perspective, respectively.

④ Measures for

minimizing off-site

damage in the event

of an accident

③ Measures for

preventing on-site

damage from

expanding in the

event of an accident

In plant

高性能

蓄圧タンク

非常用冷却ユニット

RWSP RWSP

主蒸気安全弁

低圧注入

ポンプ

2次系減圧弁

補助給水系

大気

制御棒

蒸気発生器

②Reduction of accident

risk of existing light

water reactors, etc.

On site

Off site

To

firmly

establish

ind

epen

den

t efforts fo

r enhan

cing safety

based

on scien

tific basis an

d k

no

wled

ge an

d to

constru

ct a

framew

ork

capab

le of co

ntin

ually

main

tainin

g an

d d

evelo

pin

g

techno

logies an

d h

um

an reso

urces fo

r LW

R safety

while

inco

rpo

rating in

ternatio

nal fin

din

gs.

To

establish

an in

ternatio

nal co

llabo

rative sy

stem b

ased o

n

pub

lic confid

ence in

the fram

ew

ork

and

ind

epen

den

t activities

for safety

enhan

cemen

ts and

to m

ake stead

y in

vestm

ents n

eeded

fo

r ensu

ring safety

while red

ucin

g resid

ual risk

so th

at nuclear

po

wer is u

sed ap

pro

priately

as an im

po

rtant b

ase-lo

ad p

ow

er so

urce in

the en

ergy su

pp

ly-an

d-d

em

and

structu

re.

To

furth

er reduce th

e dem

erits and

enhan

ce the m

erits of n

uclear

po

wer so

that n

uclear p

ow

er play

s a stable ro

le in th

e sustain

able

energ

y su

pp

ly an

d m

easures ag

ainst g

lob

al warm

ing an

d to

pro

vid

e contrib

utio

ns to

the in

ternatio

nal co

mm

unity

in b

oth

techno

logy an

d h

um

an reso

urces.

～2030 ～2050 ～2020

⑤Safe decommissioning of existing reactors

Defen

se in d

epth

International society

General public/ local site community

Continuous revising

⑧ Maintenance and development of

human resources required for safe and

continuous use of light water reactors

Communication

with society

5

① Advancement of utilization of risk information for existing light water reactors, etc.

⑥Countermeasures for nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security

⑦Development of innovative technologies applicable to light water reactors, which are beyond conventional ideas

Conceptual image of the coverage of the roadmap

Arranging management measures to minimize risks and

organizations and schemes for them (S101M101L102_z01,M101L101_a02, M103L101_a04)

Continuously developing and maintaining human resources that actively act in the risk management fields within Japan and overseas

Internationally sharing latest knowledge on risk information and safety targets to contribute to worldwide nuclear safety (S110M106L103_d02)

Through attentive discussions, continuously reviewing

safety targets so that they can socially be agreed (S101M101L102_z01)

Having attentive discussions with society about risk reduction

targets of nuclear facilities (S103M102L101_b01)

Reducing risks by improving management and decision-making

based on latest risk information (M103L101_a04, S102M101_a01)

Arranging scheme and knowledge basis to effectively utilize risk

information(S101M101L102_z01,S110M106L103_d02, S103M102L101_b01)

Continuously taking actions to utilize effective risk reduction measures for designing and to design world-standard nuclear plants in which risks are minimized(S111M107L103_d42 ,S111M107L104_d10, L103_d16)

Internationally sharing risk information in which

uncertainty is limited and methods of utilization thereof (M104L103_c06, S103M102L101_b01)

Based on latest knowledge and technologies, continuously

grasping and refining all risks including those due to large-scale

natural disasters (M104L103_c06, S103M102L101_b01)

Utilizing risk information to heighten skills for local and broader area

disaster prevention (S104_b04, S104M101L102_b02-1&2&3)

Preparing methods and data to grasp risk information (S111_d13)

Har

dwar

e S

oftw

are

Hum

an

reso

urce

deve

lopm

ent

Gra

spin

g va

rious

ris

ks

Within Japan, developing human resources that are good at

handling risk information

Internationally sharing lessons learned from 1F accident (S110M106L103_d02)

Advancing analysis methods and utilizing latest technologies to refine information on risks of earthquakes and tsunami (S106_c04, S106_c05)

Grasping all risks of natural disasters and accidents other than

earthquakes and tsunami and reviewing importance of measures (S106_c03)

Tak

ing

mea

sure

s ba

sed

on r

isk

info

rmat

ion

Sha

ring

risk

info

rmat

ion

with

soc

iety

Utilizing risk information for management and decision-making (S111_d29, S102M101_a01, S102_a09)

Having attentive discussions with society about risks of nuclear

facilities (S103M102L101_b01)

Continuously accepting overseas trainees to training courses with regard to risk management

Arranging scheme and knowledge basis to accelerate risk reduction (S101M101L102_z01, S110M106L103_d02)

Developing human resources that can broadly observe various

fields related to risks including frequency of occurrence of natural

disasters

Continuously executing studies to obtain information on risks related to safety targets (S101M101L102_z01 , S103M102L101_b01)

Considering 1F accident to voluntarily reset safety targets (S101M101L102_z01 )

Continuously developing equipment that effectively reduces risks

including large-scale natural disasters that very rarely occur, and

utilizing the knowledge for designing (S111M107L103_d42)

Introduction and development of equipment utilizing information on

risks due to large-scale natural disasters (S110_c10)

Introduction and development of equipment utilizing knowledge

obtained from 1F accident (S111M107L103_d42)

Utilizing risk information to continuously heighten skills for local and broader area disaster prevention (S101M101L102_z01, S104M101L102_b02-1&2&3, M102L101L104_b08)

Roadmap for “①Advancement of utilization of information on risks of existing light water

reactors, etc.”

4.71,4.43 ◎ 4.71,4.43 ◎ 3.86, 3.71 ○

4.75,4.50 ◎ 4.63, 4.30 ◎

4.86,3.86 ○

4.43, 4.57 ◎

4.71,4.29 ◎ 3.86, 3.71 ○ 4.71,4.29 ◎ 3.86, 3.71 ○

3.88,3.25 ○

4.50,4.00 ◎ 4.50, 4.00 ◎ 4.63,5.13 ◎ 4.25, 4.25 ◎ 4.50,4.00 ◎

4.71,4.43 ◎ 3.50, 3.13○ 4.71,4.43 ◎ 3.50, 3.13 ○ 3.86, 3.71 ○

4.50,4.38 ◎ 4.43, 3.43 ○ 4.00, 2.88 ○ 4.25,3.13 ○ 4.43, 3.43 ○

3.86,3.71 ○ 3.86,3.71 ○ 4.71,4.43 ◎

4.71,4.43 ◎ 4.00, 2.63 ○ 4.25 3.13 ○

4.13,3.13 ○ 4.25, 2.75 ○ 4.5, 2.25 ○ 4.38, 2.38 ○

3.50,3.13 ○ 3.50,3.13 ○

4.71,4.43 ◎ 4.25, 2.75 ○ 4.5, 2.25 ○ 4.38, 2.38 ○ 3.25, 4.13 ○

Stage1 Stage2 Stage3

6

Stage1 Stage2 Stage3 A

lway

s

inco

rpor

atin

g ne

w

know

ledg

e

into

saf

ety

mea

sure

s

Pre

vent

ing

oper

atio

nal t

roub

les

Human resource

development

Realizing safe operation

Obtaining and maintaining on-site workers

Impr

ovin

g w

ork

envi

ronm

ent

Improving reliabilities of nuclear plant systems

(S111M107L103_d42)

Advancing operational performance (M107_d25)

Realizing high operation rate and long-term stable

operation (S111M107_d24)

Advancing plant technologies and operational

management to prevent troubles

(S111_d29, S111_d30)

Developing state monitoring technologies for

reduction of exposure and reducing loads to

environment

(S111_d32, S111_d33-1)

Improving fuel reliability (Taking measures for fuel that

does not cause core meltdown)

(S111M107_d18-1&2,)

Advancing cores and improving their reliabilities

(S111M107_d24)

Further clarifying behaviors of reactor cores and

cooling water (S111M107_d17-1)

Optimizing operation management and reducing loads

to operators to ensure safe operation (M107_d34)

Through technical innovation, reducing risks of exposure

and loads of maintenance and operation to ensure safe

operation (L104_d35-1, L104_d35-2)

Tak

ing

mea

sure

s

agai

nst d

egra

datio

n ov

er

time

Further heighten performances of plant building

structures and materials (M107_d38)

Advancing safety against earthquakes (M106_d40-2,

M106_d40-1)

Improving reliabilities of nuclear plant facilities

(S111M107_d36)

Advancing methods to evaluate material degradation

(S111_d37)

Continuously improving reliabilities of nuclear plant

facilities (S111M107_d36)

Continuously improving reliabilities of nuclear plant

systems

(S111M107L103_d42)

Improving fuel reliability (Taking measures for fuel that

does not cause core meltdown) (S111M107_d18-1&2,

M199L199_d20)

Advancing cores and improving their reliabilities

(S111M107_d24 , M199L199_d19)

Drastically improving reliabilities of nuclear plant systems

(S111M107L103_d42)

Realizing safe operation by very long-life plants

(L104_d41)

Efficiently using fuel with improved reliability

(M199L199_d19, M199L199_d20)

Maintaining human resources that can manage plants

based on knowledge of phases from designing and

construction to decommissioning

Developing international human resources that have

knowledge and skills necessary for stable and safe plant

operation

4.50, 4.00 4.50, 4.00

4.50, 4.00

4.50, 4.38 3.63, 2.50 3.63, 3.88

4.00, 4.50 3.13, 4.13

2.50, 4.38 3.88, 4.38

4.13, 4.00

3.13, 4.13

4.13, 4.00 3.88, 4.38

3.13, 4.13 2.50, 4.38

3.50, 5.00

3.50, 4.50

3.50, 5.00

3.00, 5.00

3.50, 3.00 3.38, 3.00

3.50, 3.88

4.38, 4.5 4.38, 4.5 3.50, 2.75 3.25, 3.88 4.00, 4.50

Roadmap for “ ②Reduction of accident risk of existing light water reactors, etc.”

7

Reviewing SA measures based on latest international knowledge (S110_c10, S111_d13,

S110M106L103_d02)

Through utilization of innovative

technologies and latest knowledge including

those for large-scale disasters, designing

world-standard light water reactors that

drastically reduce accident risks to

contribute to worldwide nuclear safety

(S111M107L104_d10,M199L199

_d19)

Man

agem

ent

Org

aniz

ati

ons,

etc

.

Human resource

development

Gra

spin

g im

pact

s

of d

isas

ters

incl

udin

g na

tura

l

disa

ster

s

Developing leaders and workers who are good at responding to accidents

Enhancing local disaster prevention skills against nuclear accidents through improvement of

disaster prevention plans (S104M101L102_b02-1, S104M101L102_b02-2,

S104_b04)

Grasping impacts of disasters occurring outside of plant including natural disasters and aircraft

crashes except earthquakes and tsunami and evaluating risks (S106_c03, S106_c07)

Establishing technologies for evaluation of impacts of earthquakes including fault displacements and

slope failures. Systematizing tsunami-proof engineering (S106_c04, S106_c05)

Pre

vent

ing

acci

dent

from

bro

aden

ing

Enh

anci

ng d

isas

ter

prev

entio

n sk

ills

of

soci

ety

Strengthening collaboration between plant and society, improving local nuclear

disaster prevention skills, and expanding the skills for broader-area disaster

prevention

(S104M101L102_b02-3, S104M101L102_b02-1,

S104M101L102_b02-2, M103L101_a04)

Arranging technologies and schemes for observation and prevention of natural disasters

(S105_a05, S107_c08)

Continuously improving methods to grasp and evaluate various behaviors

including those due to large-scale disasters to reduce uncertainty related to

evaluation (S101M101L102_z01, S103M102L101_b01)

Developing instruments and equipment used to better grasp the plant condition at time of

occurrence of an accident (S111_d11-2, S111_d32, S111_d14)

Developing, diversifying, and appropriately maintaining facilities and equipment to prepare for

accidents (S111_d33-1 , S111_d11-1, S111_d14, S104_c02, S111_d13,

S111_d30)

Improving training manuals and training methods to advance training courses for preparation for

accidents (S104_c02)

Kno

wle

dge

and

tech

nolo

gies

Improving analysis codes and evaluation tools used to analyze behaviors during accidents

including severe accidents (S112M107_d08)

Optimizing management including improvement of management such as improvement of methods

of communication with leaders and workers and introduction of new management methods

(S105_a05, S102_a12)

Enhancing functions of emergency support organizations including

introductions of new technologies and arrangement of schemes

(M101L101_a02)

Strengthening collaboration between plant and society (S104M101L102_b02-2,

S104M101L102_b02-1, S104_b03)

Arranging a scheme for introduction and utilization of dosimetry instruments that are available even

in case of a broader area disaster in order to exactly grasp condition around plant at time of an

accident (S104_b04)

Utilizing nuclear disaster prevention skills

including use of external emergency support

organizations that have been enhanced, in

order to enhance various, local and broader-

area disaster prevention skills (M101L101_a02,S104M101L102_b02-1,

S104M101L102_b02-2,

S104M101L102_b02-3, M103L101_a04)

Developing human resources that can show leadership and lead multiple

organizations to respond to accidents

Developing human resources that can

internationally act with regard to response to

accidents

Making efforts to increase human resources that can utilize scientific knowledge including that

about natural disasters for improvement of nuclear plant safety Developing and retaining human resources that continuously study knowledge about large-scale disasters and accidents that rarely

occur and can utilize the knowledge for safety improvement

Continuously optimizing observation schemes for observation based on latest

knowledge and technologies

Gra

spin

g im

pact

s fr

om

outs

ide

of p

ower

pla

nt

Impr

ovin

g sk

ills

to r

espo

nd to

acc

iden

ts w

ithin

pow

er p

lant

D

isas

ter

prev

entio

n sk

ills

(out

side

of p

lant

)

Developing technologies and schemes for

observation and prevention of natural disasters to

contribute to improvement worldwide natural disaster

prediction

Drastically reducing impacts of large-scale

disasters that very rarely occur and

uncertainty of risks (M104L103_c06)

Utilizing innovative technologies and

external emergency support organizations

to arrange management that can minimize

impacts to outside of power plant even in

case of severe accidents including large-

scale disasters

Through international standardization of

management, contributing to worldwide

nuclear safety (M101L101_a02,

M103L101_a04,

S110M106L103_d02)

Including accident management to designing to lead to development of innovative

technologies(S111_d12,M199L199_d20,M106_d06,S111M107L1

04_d10)

Designing light water reactors that drastically reduce accident risks(S111M107L104_d10)

Optimizing organizational structure and functionality to enhance risk management skills of

organizations (S104_c02, S102_a03)

Renewing latest knowledge about large-scale disasters including large-scale

earthquakes and large tsunami that very rarely occur, improving methods for

measurement of their impacts and evaluation of their risks, and continuing studies

to reduce uncertainty (M104L103_c06)

Based on international trends, improving severe accident

management including that for large-scale accidents that

very rarely occur to continuously reduce risks

(M103L101_a04,M106_d07,S110M106L103_d02)

4.43, 4.57 ◎ 3.75, 3.38 ○

4.75,4.50 ◎ 4.63, 4.30 ◎

4.50, 4.00 ◎ 3.00. 2.63 ○

4.71,4.29 ◎ 4.71,4.29 ◎

5.00,4.88 ◎

4.63,5.13 ◎

4.63, 4.00 ◎ 3.88, 4.38 ○ 3.13, 2.88△ 4.63, 5.13 ◎ 4.63,5.13 ◎ 2.50, 4.38 ○

4.71,4.43 ◎ 3.86, 3.71 ○

4.75,4.13 ◎ 4.38, 4.50 ◎4.25, 2.88 ○

4.38,4.50 ◎ 4.63, 3.75○ 4.25, 2.88 ○

5.00,3.38 〇 4.86, 3.86 ○ 3.63, 2.50 △

4.50,4.00 ◎ 3.13, 3.25 △

3.88, 3.25 ○ 4.86,3.86 ○ 3.50, 3.13 ○

5.00,3.38 ○

5.00,3.38 ○ 3.50,2.75 △

4.25,3.13 ○ 3.38, 2.63 △ 3.50, 3.13 ○

4.00,2.63 ○

4.00, 2.63 ○ 4.25,3.13 ○ 3.50, 3.13 ○

4.50,2.25 ○ 4.25, 2.75 ○ 4.13, 2.13 ○

4.13,3.13 ○

4.25,2.75 ○ 4.50, 2.25 ○ 4.13, 3.13 ○ 4.38,2.38 ○ 4.25, 2.75 ○ 4.50, 2.25 ○ 4.25, 3.13 ○ 4.00,2.63 ○ 4.25, 2.75 ○ 4.50, 2.25 ○

4.38,2.38 ○ 4.25, 3.13 ○

Continuously designing light water reactors that drastically reduce accident risks

(S111M107L104_d10) 4.63,5.13 ◎

Stage1 Stage2 Stage3

Roadmap for “③Measures for preventing on-site damage from expanding in the event of an accident” and “④Measures for minimizing off-site

damage in the event of an accident”

8

Stage1 Stage2 Stage3 C

rea

tin

g a

sch

em

e fo

r

eff

icie

nt

de

co

mm

issio

nin

g

pro

ce

ss

Intr

od

ucin

g a

nd

de

ve

lop

ing

tech

no

log

ies fo

r sa

fe

dis

ma

ntle

me

nt

Co

ntr

olli

ng

wa

ste

s s

afe

ly

Human

resource

development

Considering methods for efficient decommissioning

(S113_d43)

Developing technologies for safe dismantlement

(S113_d44)

Using technologies and ideas used in foreign countries

and at 1F site (S113_d44)

Obtaining people’s understanding of the way of waste

disposal (S103_b06)

Considering schemes and methods to reduce and

reuse wastes (S103_b05)

Developing human resources that can predict the

ways of use of nuclear power that are consistent with

decommissioning plan and the relationship with the

energy policy

Standardizing decommissioning plan

(S113_d43)

Considering use of site (M107_d48)

Developing technologies to construct disposal sites

(S113_d45)

Considering better reactor designs from

decommissioning (M107_d47)

Standardizing dismantling technologies

(M107_d47)

Operating and managing disposal sites

(M107_d46)

Continuously maintaining human resources that can

manage the safe decommissioning process

Developing human resources that can contribute to safety

of light water reactors by entirely grasping plant life cycle

from designing through operation and maintenance to

decommissioning

Operating sites while getting consensus

(L103_d49)

2.75, 3.00

4.00, 3.00

3.00, 3.50

3.00, 3.50

3.63, 4.13

3.63, 4.13

3.50, 3.13 3.38, 2.63

2.88, 3.13

2.88, 3.13

2.25, 2.50

2.50, 2.38

Roadmap for “⑤Safe decommissioning of existing reactors”

9

Stage1 Stage2 Stage3 Im

pro

vin

g p

lant

desig

ns

from

vie

wpoin

t of security

Impro

vin

g s

chem

es o

f pla

nt

opera

tion a

nd m

anagem

ent

from

vie

wpoin

t of security

Giving enlightenment and education to countries newly

introducing nuclear power plants, mainly in Asia, and

supporting establishment of education organizations (centers

of education: COE)

Contr

ibuting t

o inte

rnational

eff

ort

s for

non

-pro

lifera

tion a

nd

nucle

ar

security

(E

ducating a

nd

develo

pin

g h

um

an r

esourc

es)

Introducing concept of resistance against nuclear proliferation

and considering improvement of safeguard effectiveness by

designing and improvement of difficulty of radioactive material

diversion

(S109M104L103_d26)

Incorporating nuclear security measures into designs to expect a

synergistic effect of reduction of accident occurrence risks

(S109M104L103_c12,

S109M104L103_c11)

Developing technologies and schemes to detect nuclear

security threats

(S109M104L103_d28)

Grasping computer security state (S109M104L103_d27)

Deriving performance standards for designs with high resistance

against nuclear proliferation and demonstrating their

effectiveness

(S109M104L103_d26)

Continuously improving both nuclear security measures and

safety measures

(S109M104L103_c12,

S109M104L103_c11)

Through efforts for non-proliferation and nuclear security at

facilities within Japan, obtaining reliability from people and

international society

Arranging a scheme to effectively developing human resources

that are responsible for plant operation, etc. based on mutual

understanding of safety and security

Analyzing computer security threats to continuously advance the

protection measures

(S109M104L103_d27)

Supporting independence of education systems in countries newly

introducing nuclear power plants, mainly in Asia, and establishing a

network with education organizations (COE)

Establishing nuclear plant management systems

dedicated for no nuclear security risk and for peaceful

use

(S109M104L103_c12，S109M104L103_d28 ,

S109M104L103_d27, S109M104L103_c11,

S109M104L103_d26) Establishing technologies and schemes to reduce risks by nuclear

security threats as much as possible

(S109M104L103_d28)

Japan should actively contribute to international problems of non-

proliferation and nuclear security

Making efforts to educate and develop human resources by

qualifying systems with regard to nuclear security education, etc.

While the international framework is advanced for

measurements for non-proliferation and nuclear security,

human resources from Japan should highly contribute to

the operation of it

Establishing and developing an unremitting network

with education organizations (COE) in countries newly

introducing nuclear power plants and other countries

2.88, 3.50

3.88, 3.25

3.38, 3.00

3.88, 3.25

3.38, 3.00

2.88, 3.50

3.50, 3.38 3.50, 3.38

3.13, 3.38 3.13, 3.38

3.88, 3.25

3.50, 3.38

3.13, 3.38

3.38, 3.00

2.88, 3.50

Roadmap for “⑥Countermeasures for nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security”

10

Stage1 Stage2 Stage3

Through technical innovation, reducing

exposure risks and loads to maintenance and

operation to ensure safe operation

(L104_d35-1, L104_d35-2)

Through utilization of latest knowledge

including that for large-scale disasters,

designing international-standard light water

reactors that drastically reduce accident risks

in order to contribute to international nuclear

safety

(S111M107L104_d10, M199L199_d19,

M199L199_d20,)

Realiz

ing a

nd m

ain

tain

ing s

afe

opera

tion

by

innovation o

f desig

ns a

nd technolo

gie

s

Introducing innovative technologies into plants while continuously improving reliability of nuclear plant systems (S111M107L103_d42)

Human

resource

development

Developing young resources from medium- and long-term viewpoint to retain resources that are responsible for future nuclear safety

Establishing nuclear plant management systems dedicated for no nuclear security risk and for peaceful use

( S109M104L103_c12，S109M104L103_d28，S109M104L103_d27, S109M104L103_c11, S109M104L103_d26)

Developing state monitoring technologies for reduction of exposure and optimizing operation

management to reduce loads to maintenance and operation staff and to ensure safe operation

(S111_d32, S111_d33-1, M107_d34)

Improving fuel reliability (Taking measures for fuel that does not cause core meltdown)

(S111M107_d18-1, S111M107_d18-2, S111M107_d24, S111M107L104_d10, M199L199_d19)

Incorporating accident management into designing to lead to development of innovative technologies

(S111_d12, M106_d06, S111M107L104_d10, M199L199_d20,)

4.50, 4.00

4.63,5.13 2.50, 4.38 3.88, 4.38

4.63, 4.00 3.13, 2.88 4.63,5.13 3.88, 4.38

4.13, 4.00 4.13, 4.00 3.13, 4.13 4.63,5.13 2.50, 4.38

4.38, 4.5 4.38, 4.5 3.50, 2.75 3.25, 3.88 4.00, 4.50

3.88, 3.25 3.50, 3.38 3.13, 3.38 3.38, 3.00 2.88, 3.50

Roadmap for “⑦Development of innovative technologies applicable to light

water reactors, which are beyond conventional ideas”

11

（Ref.） Results of priority rating for each issues (AESJ) ①

① ② ③ ① ② ③

S101M101L102_z01 Safety goal setting and risk recognition in light of the Fukushima Daiichi accident 4.71 4.43 ◎ 1.71 1.57 1.43 2.00 1.29 1.14

S102_a03 (During normal operation) Optimization of organizational structure/functional division 3.50 2.75 △ 1.13 1.13 1.25 1.75 0.50 0.50

S102_a09 Sophistication of organizational management toward risk information utilization 4.00 2.88 ○ 1.50 1.25 1.25 1.63 0.63 0.63

S102_a12Framework building and human resource development toward comprehensive decision making based on

risk information (including uncertainty)3.13 3.25 △ 1.38 0.88 0.88 1.50 0.63 1.13

S102M101_a01

・Launching an examination of a structure for utilizing risk information (including related human resource

development)

・Establishment of a structure for utilizing risk information (standardization of sophisticated risk

4.43 3.43 ○ 1.57 1.57 1.29 1.57 0.71 1.14

S103M102L101_b01 Conduct of communication utilizing risk information 3.86 3.71 ○ 1.57 1.00 1.29 1.86 0.71 1.14

S104_b03 Efforts for smooth cooperation between on-site SA countermeasures and off-site emergency preparedness 4.13 2.13 ○ 1.63 1.13 1.38 1.50 0.25 0.38

S104_b04 Provision of external event information useful for effective emergency preparedness measures 4.13 3.13 ○ 1.75 1.38 1.00 1.63 0.50 1.00

S104_c02Sophistication of emergency procedures and training for responding personnel (strengthening of response

capabilities to accident, etc.)5.00 3.38 ○ 1.88 1.63 1.50 1.63 0.75 1.00

S104M101L102_b02-1Strengthening of cooperation between nuclear emergency response organizations/structures (including

involvement with local emergency preparedness)4.25 2.75 ○ 1.75 1.25 1.25 1.63 0.50 0.63

S104M101L102_b02-2 Efforts for smooth information linkage between on-site and off-site emergency preparedness 4.50 2.25 ○ 1.88 1.38 1.25 1.63 0.25 0.38

S104M101L102_b02-3・Preparedness for nuclear emergency response that takes into account wide-area emergency

preparedness (promotion of on-site and off-site cooperation)4.38 2.38 ○ 1.88 1.38 1.13 1.50 0.38 0.50

S105_a05Sophistication of criteria for information sharing and decision making in emergency response

(sophistication of environmental impact assessment and event progress prediction) and training on4.50 4.00 ◎ 1.75 1.38 1.38 1.75 1.00 1.25

S106_c03Early identification of risks caused by external events other than earthquakes and tsunamis, and extraction

of external events to be examinated continuously4.43 4.57 ◎ 1.71 1.57 1.14 1.71 1.57 1.29

S106_c04Establishment of techniques for assessing safety/securing safety for nuclear plant against tsunamis

(systematization of tsunami-protection engineering)4.75 4.50 ◎ 1.75 1.63 1.38 1.75 1.50 1.25

S106_c05Establishment of a technique for earthquake impact assessment used for risk assessment (including

assessment of risks such as fault displacement and slope failure)4.63 4.25 ◎ 1.50 1.63 1.50 1.88 1.13 1.25

S106_c07Operation control that takes into account external events (occurrence prediction technique, impact

assessment technique, etc.)3.75 3.38 ○ 1.13 1.38 1.25 1.50 1.00 0.88

S107_c08 Establishment of a structure for surveying/monitoring low-frequency external events 3.00 2.63 △ 1.00 1.13 0.88 1.13 1.00 0.50

S110_c10 Achieving a framework for continuous efforts for new findings on external events (natural phenomena, etc.) 3.88 3.25 ○ 1.25 1.38 1.25 1.63 0.88 0.75

S110M106L103_d02

・Participation in formulation of IAEA standards, etc. concerning external events in light of the Fukushima

Daiichi accident

・Contribution to formulation of IAEA standards, etc. concerning external events

3.50 3.13 ○ 1.38 1.25 0.88 1.50 0.88 0.75

S111_d11-1 Diversification and sophistication of the final heat sink 4.63 3.75 ○ 1.88 1.63 1.13 1.63 1.00 1.13

S111_d11-2Diversification and sophistication of SA instrumentations and SA equipment, and equipment design

technology4.75 4.13 ◎ 2.00 1.38 1.38 1.63 1.38 1.13

S111_d12Fundamental improvement of accident controllability through efforts for design that comprehensively

considers layers 1 to 3 (design) to layer 4 (AM countermeasure) and layer 5 (emergency preparedness) of4.63 4.00 ◎ 1.88 1.63 1.13 1.63 1.13 1.25

S111_d13 Improvement of the risk assessment method and its application to SA countermeasures 4.86 3.86 ○ 1.86 1.43 1.57 1.57 1.00 1.29

S111_d14 Optimization/sophistication of operation management of SA components 4.25 2.88 ○ 1.75 1.38 1.13 1.50 0.75 0.63

S111_d29 Sophistication of maintenance/operation control through risk information utilization 4.50 4.38 ◎ 1.25 1.63 1.63 2.00 1.00 1.38

(B)

ID Corresponding title in the task survey sheet

(A) Effectiveness of

safety improvement

for light water

reactors

(B) Technological /

human resource

maintenance /

development that

contributes to safety

improvement for light

water reactors

Overall

assessment of

importance

(A)

12

13

（Ref.） Results of priority rating for each issues (AESJ) ②

① ② ③ ① ② ③

S111_d30 Establishment of maintenance control of SA components 3.63 2.50 △ 1.75 0.88 1.00 1.25 0.63 0.63

S111_d32Sophistication of state surveillance/monitoring techniques (precursor monitoring/diagnosis, remote

monitoring/diagnosis, etc.)4.38 4.50 ◎ 1.13 1.88 1.38 1.75 1.25 1.50

S111_d33-1Sophistication of exposure reduction technologies (water quality management technology, remote

operation/robot technology, radiation protection technology)4.38 4.50 ◎ 1.50 1.50 1.38 1.50 1.50 1.50

S111_d37 Increase in reliability of structural material 3.50 4.50 ○ 0.75 1.50 1.25 1.75 1.25 1.50

S111M107_d17-1 Sophistication of technique for assessing core/thermal-hydraulic design 4.00 4.50 ◎ 1.13 1.63 1.25 2.00 1.00 1.50

S111M107_d18-1 Reliability improvement and sophistication of fuels 4.13 4.00 ◎ 1.25 1.63 1.25 1.63 1.00 1.38

S111M107_d18-2Reliability improvement of fuels (establishment of fuel standards, etc. and clarification of safety margin

assessment method)4.13 4.00 ◎ 1.13 1.63 1.38 1.88 0.88 1.25

S111M107_d24 Sophistication of plant operation technology and core design control 3.13 4.13 ○ 0.38 1.38 1.38 1.75 0.75 1.63

S111M107_d36 Sophistication of ageing assessment method/countermeasure technique 3.50 5.00 ◎ 0.63 1.50 1.38 2.00 1.38 1.63

S111M107L103_d42 Reliability improvement and sophistication of systems, structures and components (SSC) 4.50 4.00 ◎ 1.75 1.63 1.13 1.50 1.13 1.38

S111M107L104_d10 Establishment of global-standard light water reactor design with strengthened resilience 4.63 5.13 ◎ 1.88 1.63 1.13 1.75 1.63 1.75

S112M107_d08 Sophistication of the safety analysis method 5.00 4.88 ◎ 1.88 1.63 1.50 2.00 1.13 1.75

M101L101_a02Strengthening of the response capabilities of the emergency organization for minimizing the risk of the

whole plant (strengthening of external support, etc.)4.00 2.63 ○ 1.63 1.13 1.25 1.38 0.63 0.63

M102L101L104_b08Establishment of an innovative technology and a light water reactor system that will achieve waste and

TRU reduction3.25 4.13 ○ 0.63 1.63 1.00 1.13 1.25 1.75

M103L101_a04 Establishment of risk governance for responding to large-scale natural disasters 4.25 3.13 ○ 1.75 1.25 1.25 1.63 0.75 0.75

M104L103_c06・Continuous contribution to reduction of uncertainties concerning findings on low-frequency external events

・Continuation of research on reduction of uncertainties concerning findings on low-frequency external4.71 4.29 ◎ 1.57 1.71 1.43 1.86 1.14 1.29

M106_d06 Deepening and implementation of defense in depth according to the safety improvement 3.13 2.88 △ 1.13 1.13 0.88 1.63 0.50 0.75

M106_d07Development of specific criteria for judging whether or not to restart operation after external events such as

earthquakes, and their sophistication3.38 2.63 △ 1.00 1.00 1.38 1.75 0.75 0.13

M106_d40-1 Maintenance control tied with assessment of seismic safety (buildings) 3.38 3.00 △ 1.13 1.25 1.00 1.63 0.50 0.88

M106_d40-2 Maintenance control tied with assessment of seismic safety (components) 3.50 3.00 ○ 1.00 1.38 1.13 1.63 0.63 0.75

M107_d25 Sophistication of running performance (event progress suppression, shutdown function, L/F, etc.) 3.63 3.88 ○ 0.88 1.50 1.25 1.88 0.88 1.13

M107_d34Reduction of burdens on maintenance staff/operators through streamlining and labor saving of

maintenance/operation control3.50 2.75 △ 0.50 1.38 1.63 1.63 0.38 0.75

M107_d38 Sophistication of building structures and materials 3.50 3.88 ○ 1.13 1.38 1.00 1.50 1.25 1.13

M199L199_d19Pursuit of life extension of fuels by developing an innovative technology (material development, etc.) and

reviewing the fuel concentration2.50 4.38 ○ 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.50 1.63 1.25

M199L199_d20 Development of a fuel/control rod resistance to accidents 3.88 4.38 ○ 1.75 1.25 0.88 1.38 1.75 1.25

L103_d16Development of a design technology/maintenance control method for minimizing the whole plant risk posed

by external events4.25 4.25 ◎ 1.38 1.63 1.25 1.75 1.13 1.38

L104_d35-1Application of an innovative technology (automation of maintenance/operation, etc.) that increases the

effect of maintenance and supports operation3.25 3.88 ○ 0.88 1.38 1.00 1.63 1.00 1.25

L104_d35-2Application of an innovative technology (remote operation, robot technology) that minimizes the exposure

risk4.00 4.50 ◎ 1.50 1.50 1.00 1.50 1.38 1.63

L104_d41Development of an innovative technology (material development, etc.) for ultra-long life plant operation

(operation for over 60 years)3.00 5.00 ○ 0.63 1.13 1.25 1.63 1.63 1.75

(A) (B)

ID Corresponding title in the task survey sheet

(A) Effectiveness of

safety improvement

for light water

reactors

(B) Technological /

human resource

maintenance /

development that

contributes to safety

improvement for light

water reactors

Overall

assessment of

importance

13

（Ref.） Results of priority rating for each issues (AESJ) ③

① ② ③ ① ② ③

S103_b05 Achievement of clearance cycle 2.75 3.00 △ 0.50 0.75 1.50 1.63 0.63 0.75

S103_b06 Securing of disposal sites 4.00 3.00 ○ 1.13 1.50 1.38 1.88 0.75 0.38

S113_d43Establishment of a method for establishing a decommissioning plan based on the past record of

decommissioning, and its review based on the past record of decommissioning3.00 3.50 △ 0.63 1.00 1.38 1.75 0.63 1.13

S113_d44 Disassembly of components with high radioactive level 3.63 4.13 ○ 0.75 1.63 1.25 1.63 1.00 1.50

S113_d45 Improvement of social acceptance by establishing technique for designing/assessing disposal sites 3.50 3.13 △ 0.88 1.38 1.25 1.38 0.63 1.13

M107_d46 A rational method for managing L3 disposal facilities for decommissioning 3.38 2.63 △ 0.63 1.25 1.50 1.50 0.63 0.50

M107_d47 Reflecting the past record of decommissioning in the plant 2.88 3.13 △ 0.38 1.13 1.38 1.38 0.75 1.00

M107_d48 Reuse of buildings/sites after plant component removal 2.25 2.50 △ 0.38 0.75 1.13 1.63 0.50 0.38

L103_d49 Support for site release after plant component removal 2.50 2.38 △ 0.38 1.00 1.13 1.25 0.63 0.50

S109M104L103_c11

・Mitigation and minimization of the impact of sabotage (formulation of a crisis management/emergency

response plan, etc.)

・Mitigation and minimization of the impact of sabotage (establishment/assessment of a structure )

・Mitigation and minimization of the impact of sabotage (internationalization)

3.38 3.00 △ 1.13 1.38 0.88 1.75 0.63 0.63

S109M104L103_c12

・Assessment of the impact of the strengthening of nuclear security measures on the safety measures

・Examination of the safety risk posed by man-made hazards

・Integration of safety and nuclear security in “defense in depth”3.88 3.25 △ 1.13 1.63 1.13 1.75 0.75 0.75

S109M104L103_d26

・Examination of applicability of the nuclear proliferation resistance concept

・Derivation and demonstration of the effectiveness of a design basis with high resistance to nuclear

proliferation

・Application of a design basis with high resistance to nuclear proliferation

2.88 3.50 △ 0.50 1.38 1.00 1.50 0.88 1.13

S109M104L103_d27

・Computer security - analysis of threat and defense from it

・Computer security - sophistication of defense

・Computer security - further sophistication of defense3.13 3.38 △ 0.38 1.38 1.38 1.63 0.88 0.88

S109M104L103_d28

・Development of a method for detecting nuclear security threats

・Development of a monitoring/detection system using big data

・Management with nuclear security threat risk reduced to the extent possible3.50 3.38 △ 0.63 1.50 1.38 1.38 1.13 0.88

ID Corresponding title in the task survey sheet

(A) Effectiveness of

safety improvement

for light water

reactors

(B) Technological /

human resource

maintenance /

development that

contributes to safety

improvement for light

water reactors

Overall

assessment of

importance

(A) (B)

14

Appendix

Nuclear power is an important base-load power source as a low carbon and quasi-domestic energy source, contributing to stability of energy supply-demand structure, on the major premise of ensuring of its safety, because of the perspectives;

i. superiority in stability of energy supply and efficiency,

ii. low and stable operational cost and

iii. free from GHG emissions during operation.

16

＜Description in the Strategic Energy Plan of Japan＞

1. Nuclear Energy Policy in the New Strategic Energy Plan of Japan

Decided by the Cabinet in April, 2014

Dependency on nuclear power generation will be lowered to the extent possible by energy saving and introducing renewable energy as well as improving the efficiency of thermal power generation, etc. Under this policy, GOJ will carefully examine a volume of electricity to be secured by nuclear power generation, taking Japan’s energy constraints into consideration, from the viewpoint of stable energy supply, cost reduction, global warming and maintaining nuclear technologies and human resources.

＜Description in the Strategic Energy Plan of Japan＞

○GOJ has started discussion on the energy mix in the Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy and established a new experts’ Working Group to examine cost of each power source. The draft proposal on the energy mix has just been shown by the Advisory Committee in the end of April 2015 and this proposal will be further discussed toward the final conclusion.

17

1-1. Dependency on nuclear power generation

3.1 2.1 1.0

12.1 5.8 8.5 7.6

3.0 3.8~ 11.4

17.9 23.9

1.1 2.2 0.6 3.3

1.7 0.6

3.4

5.1 2.3 12.8

4.2

2.6~ 7.7

3.0

3.4

1.7 2.3

1.5 5.5 10.8

21.0

21.7

15.6~ 17.5

24.7~ 30.1

3.0 1.3

2.5

1.6

2.5

0.3 1.3

0.04 0.02 6.0

6.0 0.2

2.8

1.6

0.01

3.3

2.1

0.03

0.03

0.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

25.0

30.0

35.0

40.0

Nuclear Coal LNG Wind Geothermal Hydropower Small- &

medium-

hydraulic

Biomass Oil Solar

(10kW more)

Solar

(less than

10kW)

Gas

cogeneration

Oil

cogeneration

Policy related

cost

Accident risk cost

CO2

Fuel

Operation & manage-

ment

Additional safety

measures cost

Capital

Legend

Yen/kWh

Nuclear Coal LNG Wind Geother-

mal Hydropo-

wer

Small- & medium- hydraulic

Biomass Oil Solar

(10kW more)

Solar (less than

10kW)

Gas cogener-

ation

Oil cogener

ation

Capacity Factor Operation Year

70％ 40 years

70％ 40 years

70％ 40 years

20％ 20 years

83％ 40 years

45％ 40 years

60％ 40 years

87％ 40 years

30・10％ 40 years

14％ 20 years

12％ 20 years

70％ 30 years

40％ 30 years

Generation Cost Yen/kWh

１０.１～ (８．８～)

１２．３ （１２．２）

１３．７ （１３．７）

２１．６ （１５．６）

１６．９ （１０．９）

１１．０ （１０．８）

２３．３ （２０．４）

２９．７ （２８．１）

３０．６ ～４３．４ （３０．６

～４３．３）

２４．２ （２１．０）

２９．４ （２７．３）

１３．８ ～１５．０ （１３．８

～１５．０）

２４．０ ～２７．９ （２４．０

～２７．８）

Deduction of

heat value

(7.7~9.3)

Deduction of heat value (6.3~7.0)

※３ () : Costs without policy related cost

※２ Capacity factor in 2011 calculation Coal:80％、LNG:80％、Oil：50％、10％

※１ The result of the sensitivity analysis of the change in fossil fuel price.

(Ref.) Evaluation of Nuclear Power Generation -Economic Efficiency

【Source】 Extraction (preliminary translation) from documents released in the 7th Working Group on Verification of Power Generation, Long-term Energy Supply and Demand Outlook Subcommittee, Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy, METI 18

The impact of the 10% change of the fossil fuel price（Yen／kWh）

Coal

±０．４

LNG

±０．９

Oil

±１．５

Sensitivity analysis of the fossil fuel price change

Additional safety measures cost doubles Decommissioning cost doubles Decommissioning and compensation cost increases by 1TYen Reprocessing and MOX Fuel fabrication cost doubles

Sensitivity analysis

＋０．６

＋０．１

＋０．０４

＋０．６

＜Projected costs of generating electricity (2014 model plant)＞

The nuclear power generation cost is estimated with consideration not only for cost directly related to power generation, but also for future cost such as decommissioning cost, nuclear fuel cycle cost including cost for permanent disposal of radioactive waste, accident risk cost including damage compensation cost and decontamination cost, social cost, namely policy related cost including subsidies for power plant siting and R&D expense for “Monju” and etc.

Accident risk cost (0.3Yen/kWh～) ・The accident response cost of the Fukushima Daiichi accident is estimated 12.2TYen which can be corrected to 9.1TYen in consideration of power output of model plant and etc.

・The lower limit of the estimated value is presented because the damage compensation cost can increase in the future. The accident risk cost will increase 0.04Yen/kWh as decommissioning and compensation cost increases 1TYen.

Policy related cost (1.3Yen/kWh) ・The cost contains 345BYen (2014FY) subsidy for power plant siting （130BYen/year） and R&D cost for “Monju” （130BYen/year） and etc.

Additional safety measures cost (0.6Yen/kWh) ・Add 60.1BYen which is the estimated cost for additional safety measures for new regulation

Nuclear fuel cycle cost (1.5Yen/kWh) ・The half of spent fuel is stored for 20 years and reprocessed after that, and the other half is stored for 45 years and reprocessed after that.

・The cost contains front-end cost (0.9Yen), back-end cost (total: 0.6Yen, reprocessing : 0.5Yen, high-level radioactive waste：0.04Yen）.

Capital cost 3.1Yen

Operating and maintenance cost

3.3Yen

Nuclear fuel cycle cost 1.5Yen

Policy related cost 1.3Yen

Accident risk cost 0.3Yen～

Additional safety measures cost 0.6Yen

Nuclear power

generation cost

10.1Yen/kWh～

Capital (3.1Yen/kWh) ・Building cost (0.37MYen/kW（440BYen/plant）), fixed asset tax (1.4％)、decommissioning cost (71.6BYen)

Socia

l cost

Pow

er g

enera

tion c

ost

※Capacity: 1.2GW Operating rate: 70％ Discount rate: 3％ Operating period of plant: 40 years

Operating and maintenance cost (3.3Yen/kWh) ・Employment cost (2.05BYen/year), repair cost (2.2％), overhead cost (8.44BYen/year)

19

(Ref.) Evaluation of Nuclear Power Generation -Economic Efficiency

【Source】 Extraction (preliminary translation) from documents released in the 8th Long-term Energy Supply and Demand Outlook Subcommittee, Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy, METI

2030

Solar 74.9 7.0%

Wind 18.2 1.7%

Geothermal 10.2～11.3 1.0～1.1%

Hydropower 93.9～98.1 8.8～9.2%

Biomass 39.4～49.0 3.7～4.6%

Composition of electrical sources

and electricity generation（billion kWh）

2030

Oil 31.5 3%

Coal 281.0 26%

LNG 284.5 27%

Nuclear power 231.7～216.8 22～20%

Renewable energy 236.6～251.5 22～24%

Total 1065.0 100%

2030

Renewable energy

22~24% (approx.)

LNG

27% (approx.)

Coal

26% (approx.)

Oil 3% (approx.)

LNG 27%

Oil 12%

Coal 24%

Average in the

last 10 years

before 3.11

Nuclear

power

27%

Renewable energy 11%

Nuclear power

22~20% (approx.)

※All the numbers are approximate

(Ref.) Energy Best Mix – Outlook of Composition of Electric Power Sources

【Source】 Extraction (preliminary translation) from documents released in the 8th Long-term Energy Supply and Demand Outlook Subcommittee, Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy, METI 20

Period up to the completion of decommissioning measures (30 to 40 years in the future)

Phase 3 Efforts to stabilize the NPP

Phase 1 Phase 2

Period up to the start of the fuel removal from the spent fuel pool (within 2 years)

Period up to the start of the fuel debris removal (within 10 years)

The current Roadmap was revised in June, 2013. The Government of Japan is now in the process of the revision, taking account of

the “Strategic Plan” which NDF has just released on April 30.

Fuel Removal from Spent Fuel Pools of Unit 1-4

Fuel Debris Removal from Unit 1- 3

③ ②

Dose Reduction, Leakage Identification & Stop Leakage, Technology Development for Debris Removal

Fuel Debris Removal

Present

Unit 1

Unit 4 （Removal was completeｄ）

Steps for Spent Fuel Removal ; ①Rubble Removal & Dose Reduction ②Installing Fuel Handling Machine ③Fuel Removal

①

Unit 2

Unit 3

Preparing for rubble removal

Dose reduction is underway

Rubble removal & dose reduction is underway

Cold shutdown achieved • Achieve cold shutdown • Significantly reduce

radiation releases

Dec. 2011 Nov. 2013 Dec. 2021 30 to 40 years in the future

21

1-2. Mid-and-Long Term Roadmap towards the Decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi NPPs

Installation of Fuel Debris Removal Equipment

22

2-③ Investigation and

Analysis inside Reactor

2-② Water Confinement

of PCV

2-④ Retrieval of

Fuel Debris

3. Radioactive Waste

Management

NARAHA Remote Technology

Development Center

（Mock-Up Test Facility）

OKUMA Analysis and Research Center

（Radioactive Material Analysis and Research Facility）

1. Spent Fuel

Management

2-① Decontamination

inside R/B

1-2. R&D Activities for Decommissioning

Governmental total budget from FY2011 to FY2016 for decommissioning and contaminated water management is 189.2 BY.

‒ Remote grouting

etc.

‒ Robot machine

etc.

‒ Robot investigation

‒ “Muon” detection

‒ SA code analysis

etc.

‒ Remote retrieval system

‒ Criticality control

‒ Transfer & Storage

etc.

1-3. Existing Light Water Reactors

○On the premise that safety comes before everything else and that every possible effort is made to resolve the people’s concerns, judgment as to whether nuclear power plants meet the new regulatory requirements will be left to the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA).

○In case that the NRA confirms the conformity of nuclear power plants with the new regulatory requirements ,which are of the most stringent level in the world, GOJ will follow NRA’s judgment and will proceed with the restart of the nuclear power plants.

＜Description in the Strategic Energy Plan of Japan＞

23

PWR

BWR

Tomari

Ohma

Onagawa

Fukushima Daini

Hamaoka

Tokai

Fukushima Daiichi

Kashiwazaki Kariwa

Sendai Ikata

Genkai

Shimane

Shika

Tsuruga

Takahama

Ohi

Mihama

Higashidori(Tokyo)

Higashidori(Tohoku)

ABWR

２９ ２４ ２１ ２０ ２５ １８ １７

２１ ９

２８

３８

３６ ３５ ２３ ２２

４０ ３９ ３０ ２９

２６

３４ ２１ １７

２５ ２３ ５

３７ ３３ ２０

２１ １０

３２ ３１ ２７ ３０

３６

３１ １９ １３

９

２７

３０ ２９

Reactor-type

Under NRA Review for

basic design and concept

(Total 25 Units）

Age

Capacity

(Applied Date for NRA Review)

Not Start Operation

→ Permitted in Feb. 2015

→ Permitted in Sep. 2014

(Ref.) Nuclear Power Plants in Japan (As of July 1, 2015)

24

**Based on “the Basic Act on Disaster Control Measures” and “the Act on

Special Measures concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness”

Preparation and enhancement of the disaster prevention and evacuation plan

*Not required by the nuclear reactor law

Safety Reviews and Inspections process of NRA

Local acceptance process * No legal requirements Local acceptance process

Disaster prevention and evacuation plan

*Not a legal

prerequisites for restart

Date Reactor Applicant

Sep. 10 2014

Sendai NPS, Unit 1 and 2

Kyusyu Electric Power

Feb. 12 2015

Takahama NPS, Unit 3 and 4

Kansai Electric Power

Permitted reactors

Review of basic design and

concept (for permission of reactor

installment license change)

Review of detailed

design (for approval of

construction works plan)

Assessment of Operation

management systems, etc.

(for approval of operational safety programs

(Ref.) Outline of processes for restart of NPPs

25

Date Reactor Applicant Date

Mar. 18 2015

Sendai NPS, Unit 1 Kyusyu

Electric Power

May 27 2015 May 22

2015 Sendai NPS,

Unit 2

Approved reactors

【Promotion of the nuclear fuel cycle policy】

1. GOJ will make efforts to reduce the volume and harmfulness of radioactive waste and create a nuclear fuel cycle that contributes to effective utilization of resources while adequately taking the past history into consideration and continuing to seek the understanding of relevant municipalities and the international community and will promote reprocessing and plutonium use in LWRs.

2. Specifically, GOJ will promote plutonium use in LWRs, and proceed with such measures as completion of the Rokkasho reprocessing plant, construction of a MOX fuel processing plant, and completion of the Mutsu interim storage facility on the underlying premise of ensuring safety. GOJ remains committed to the policy of not possessing reserves of plutonium without specified purposes. Also GOJ will promote R&D of fast reactors, etc., through international cooperation with the U.S. and France etc.

3. GOJ will position Monju as an international research center for technological development, such as reducing the amount and toxic level of radioactive waste and technologies related to nuclear nonproliferation. GOJ will take necessary measures for issues to be overcome , such as the re-establishment of systems to implement the above mentioned actions on its own responsibility.

＜Description in the Strategic Energy Plan of Japan＞

26

1-4. GOJ’s Stance on Spent Fuel Management (Nuclear Fuel Cycle Policy)

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

(Ref) Current situation of Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant

Water Tests

Chemical Tests

Active Tests

Uranium Tests

Apr.2001 Sep.2004

Nov.2002 Dec.2005

Dec.2004 Jan.2006

Mar.2006

Ste

p1

Ste

p2

Ste

p3

Ste

p4

Ste

p5

Mar.2016

(Planned)

Completion

(Planned)

In January 2014, JNFL applied for a conformity assessment with the new safety

standards which were enforced in December 2013.

JNFL now plans to complete the RRP in March 2016.

27

(Ref) Current Situation of MOX Fuel Fabrication Plant

Maximum fabrication capacity 130 ton-HM / year

Products MOX fuel assembly for domestic Light

Water Reactors（BWR and PWR）

Size of main building 85 m x 85 m

3 basements, 2 elevated

Location place Neighborhood of

Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant

Construction cost 210 billion yen

Although JNFL started construction work of MOX Fuel Fabrication Plant in October 2010,

construction work was interrupted temporarily by the influence of the earthquake etc.

In January 2014, JNFL applied for a conformity assessment with the new regulations

which were enforced in December 2013.

JNFL now plans to complete the MOX Fuel Fabrication Plant in October 2017.

Progress of construction: 8.6%

(September 2014)

28

29

General arrangement “GENERAL ARRANGEMENT ON THE ASTRID PROGRAM AND SODIUM FAST REACTOR COLLABORATIONBETWEEN THE FRENCH COMMISSARIAT A L’ENERGIE ATOMIQUE ET AUX ENERGIES ALTERNATIVES, THE JAPANESE MINISTRY OF ECONOMY, TRADE AND INDUSTRY AND THE JAPANESE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE, SPORTS, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY” was signed on May 5th, 2014 (Termination: Dec. 31st, 2019).

Implementing Arrangement “IMPLEMENTING ARRANGEMENT ON THE ASTRID PROGRAM AND SODIUM FAST REACTOR COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE FRENCH COMMISSARIAT À L’ÉNERGIE ATOMIQUE ET AUX ÉNERGIES ALTERNATIVES, AREVA NP, JAPAN ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD., AND MITSUBISHI FBR SYSTEMS, INC. ” was signed on August 8th, 2014 (Termination: Dec. 31st, 2019).

Japan and France are cooperating SFR development, including ASTRID program in the area of plant system design and R&Ds (Component and analysis code development, Measures for severe accident, Fuel).

General Arrangement Signing Ceremony at Palais de l'Élysée

(May 5th, 2014)

(Ref.) Japan-France Cooperation on ASTRID Project

- Outline of Cooperation -

Radioactive wastes shall be disposed by the methods described below based on the radioactive

level and type.

Nuclear power plant Reactor internals , control rods and etc.,

The radioactive level is not higher

than clearance level.

（In this case, wastes don’t need to

be clarified as the radioactive waste.

Origin of waste

Rad

ioactiv

e level

Low

High

Dismantled concrete and metals

Reprocessing facility※2 Vitrified Waste

High level radioactive waste

※2： Geological disposal only from reprocessing facility

Geological

disposal

Waste fluid, filter, expendable suppliers

such as gloves

50m

0m

300m

Reference: Prepared by ANRE based on the release from Nuclear Regulation Authority

and 2007 Report of Advisory Committee on Energy and Natural Resources

0.01％ (※1)

0.2％ (※1)

2.2％ (※1)

97.6％ (※1)

※1：Waste amount and rate based on the example of BWR(1100MW) Plant

Near surfaces trench disposal (L3)

Near surfaces pit disposal (L2)

Intermediate depth disposal (L1)

Generated weight of waste：537k ton（※１）

(Ref) Situation of Radioactive Waste Disposal etc.,

30

Spent Fuel