japanese torture techniques

8/14/2019 Japanese Torture Techniques

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERSSUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE LLIED POWERSKP 0. 5001 June 1946

Published for the information of all concerned.By command of Genera1 MacARTHUR : -

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P J MUELLER,Major General, United States Army,Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL :C A WTLLOUGHBY,Major General, G.S.C.,Asst Chief o Staff, 6 2.

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ALLIED TRANSLATOR AN DSUPREME COMMANDER FOR

RESEARCH Rl

SUBJECT : JAPANESE METH0I S OF PRISONEROF WAl t INTEREOGAl ION

I G No. 6950

DATE OF ISSUE 1 June 1946 NO. 134

SUMMARY :

1 This report, based on material available to ATIS, GHQ, to19 Kovember 1943, prme~lts vidence that the Japanese Armyhad high regard for intelligence obtained through tho interro-gation of prisoners of war; that iiltegogatio~lw ~conducted atboth the front and rear areas thttt interrog:ation techniquesvaried from khc gentle to the cruel that prisoilers were inter-rogated for the purpose of obtnilling tacticd, technical, andpropaganda i~iformntion and that interrogation w s debailedand thorough.2 The report also givm examples of material obtaiilcd uactual i~~terrogatioae.

RF/WM/jg I. G W LKERColonel v t yDistributioil H Commanding

SOIJRCES : Captured Documeuts.Statements by Prisoners of War.


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CONTENTSp gSection I. TIME AND PLACE OF INTERROGATION 1

1. Geilerd . I2 Interrogation in Forward Areas 13. Interrogat iol l in Rear Axas 1

11. T E C H N I Q U E S O F I N T E R R O G A T I O N . . 24. General 25 I~ltcrrogationwithout Torture . 26. Iilterivgation with Torture S

111. M A T T E R S O F I N T E R R O G A T IO N 57. General 58 Typw of Informalion Sought by Illterrogators : . 5

a 1nfom1:rtion Collcerilli~gTactics and Operations . 5b. Informati011 of Technical Value 5c. Information Useful as Propaganda 6

9. Examples of Intelligence Obtained u Actual Interrogatio~ls 6IV. CONCLUSIONS 10


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Section I TIME AND PL CE OF INTERROGATION

1. GENERALThe importance of ii~terrogating r'sonert

immediately upou capture is emphasized invarious Japanese Army directives.

a. Extract from i~ mimeographed fileciltitled Interrogation of PsW (undated,issuing authority not stated) by CO, ODA-MURA Co."I~lformation obtJ11ed from PSI' isessential in determining the enemy's plail,strength, tactics, organization and equipment.Interrogation is clcarly presented in ' FieldService Regulations.' It is classified into :

Information while under detention.Imniediate interrogatio~lduring opera-

tione.Irnmcdiatc i~lterrogatioi~of severely

~vounded."(ATIS Eilcrny Publication No. 255, page 1).

b. Extract from Service Reg~la t~ionsndPropaganda Strategy of 115 Infantry Regi-ment, dated Julie 1943.

Necessary examination of PsIV must beconducted r r t the place of ctbpturc and theresults will be sent back to Regimental HQ

..Prohibit further examination of PsJVat the place of capture other than for specialpurposes.')(ATIS Current Trauslzbtiolis No. 83, page 8).

c. Extract from regulsttious (undated,issuiilg authority not stated, but internalevidence indicates that t,hcy mcre issued by16 Army. JAVA, 1943).

As soon as pfisoners of war tire captured,they ehould.. .be examined.. .(ATIS Research Report No. 86, page 5 .

2 . INTERROGATIONI N FORWARD AREAS

Examination in forward areas was forimmediate operational information.

a. Extract from handwritten ~lotebookentitled R (sic) Service concerningilltelligence and fifth colulnil operations intotal uar (undated, writer and unit notstated, col~tents presumably copied frommanual).

PsW ct~pturcdat the front line shouldprefcrtbbly be interrogated at the spot onmatters requiring the pi il ti ag out of the:bctual ground."(ATIS Eiiemy Publictrtioil No. 271, page2


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ection II TECHNleUES OF lNTERRO6ATlON

4 . GENERALThegeneralinterrogatorypatterntoachieve

t,beaforementioned objectivm is epitomizedin a series of captured Japanese manuals.The iilterrogatioil officer is iilstructed toapproachtheprisoilerof warsympatheticallyin ordertoillstillin himafeelingof security,to overcomchis hostility, to takeadvantageof his youth by ueing flattery, and, withwomen, to profit by their ~ia turalhyness.

a. Extract from a captured bookletentitled Illstructions on How to Inter-rogate published in Daily IiltelligenceEx-tracts, HQ 10Air Force, 18 August (yearnot given).

Main point i i l t e r r ~ ~ t i o ~ lf of prisonerof war is to secure truth of everythingprisoner of w B knows,butprisoner may beptriotic. Needless to say, prisoners of warinsist on their rights and duties ill :kccord-a i~cewith internationd law, and i t i sdifficultto make them say anythingagaivsttheir ~latioilaliiltereats. On the whole,iilterrogatioilof prisoilersof war is not likethatof criminals. Foradisposition,tangible.proof is needed,butitisalmostimpossibletojudge authenticity, for thereareno limitstithe scope of hisknowledge,and if hesays'don't know' forcemay notbeused.to get astronger statement from him."(ATIS ResearchReportNo. 86(Suppl. No.11, Page 3 .The seeming iiljui~ctioalagainstduress ismerely a verbal coixcessio~lo propriety; in fact,Japanese ordersaredistinguishedbythefactthattherule and how tocircumventtherule are simultaileously stated. Thus theinterrogating officer is iilvited to use originality and zeal.. . to securetruthandfull details." Lest the meanh gof origi-ninlity and neal" be misconstrued, themanual coiltiilueswiththeadumbratioilthat you must nol gec excited even with theP$Wwho are arrogailt and always answer' don't know.' Alwaysremaincalm. Youmust be care'ful when using i i~vect iw,rebukcsor torture, for it wiII causehim tolie and make a fool of you."(ATIS Research Report No. 86(Suppl. No.11, Page 3 .

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5. INTERROGATIONWITHOUT TORTURE

To obviate situations which require com-pulsion against prisouers, the iilterrogatiilgofficerisurged to exhaust all psychologicaln~sm. The specific psycllological approachis preceded by the well-reasoned techniqueof segregating prisoners to prevent theirfabricating spurious information. begre-gation embraces the additional advailtageof permitting the iilterrogator to ascertaii~the reliabilily of the prisoners. Kllowilinformation, articles and papers on theprisoaer's person arc to be applied as ad-ditional chech. Thecoilfusioiland distressattendiiig a ntwly-captured prisoiler grantsthe interrogator ail opportunity to elicitreplies with greater ease, inasmuch as theprisonerhrisnotthecomposure todissemble.The examining officer is wanled that ifthe prisoiler looks repeatedly and inquisi-Civcly at the interrogator's face and stealsa glance athis eyes, this is asign thatthePW is concealingvittkl knowlodgc+."(AY'IS Enemy Publicatioi~No. 271,page23 .

To overcoiue the pri80ner's reluctailce todivulgeinformation, the interrogator is ,en-joined to underlniile his morale. Varyingthe trpproach according to the nationalityof the prisoaer, the questioacr isiustructedto employ the followiilg tech~liques

a. Extract from captured booklet In-structionsoilHowto Interrogate publishedll Ddly Inhlligence gxtracts, HQ 10 AirForce, 18 August (year ]lotgiven). Infuseanti-warsentiments. Militaryob-jectiveofENGLANDand AMERICAisanti-religious. Theydo lotseekpeaceorfreedom.Recallciljoyable existencc ofpre-war days.Showcorruptionof public morals,deficiei~cyof materials and frequellcyof strikesin theirowncountry. With British troops-heri-call atrocitiesto women in England. WithAmerican troops-state of vromen's anti-warmovement in AMERICA.. ..Arousehatredand weariile~sof war, e.g., do you knowwhere your wife now lives... that districtwasheavilybombedbyGERMANYreceutly.Do you know to what area she hasbeenevacuated BRITAIN is retreating from


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INTERROGATION WITH TORTURE

00 to 00 ; if she is on defeated you willbe able to return to your wife and child,who are saying ' come quickly.' Take thisline particularly with thoae who have a wife,and children.(ATIS Research Report No. S i (Suppl. No.11 Page 3 -It is further suggested that the demortili-zation of the prisoaer may be facilitatedwhen a PW who has been previously cap-tured or one-who is of the same nationalityand is already in the enemy's hands call belnadc to contact him.6 INTERROGATION

WITH TORTUREIf the prisoner persists in his obduracy,

thi-ats of grave physical discomfort$ shouldbe made. With utter disregard for the pro-hibition of brutality, it is proposed, euphc-mistiwlly to be sure, that skillful methodsbe applied. Skillful methods )' are notdefined, but torture is succinctly described.111 quaint Japanese circumlocution, brutaldirectives are disguised in the form ofapparently factual statements.

a. Extract from captured booklet eatitledInstructions on How to I ~ l t e r r o ~ t epub-

lished in Daily Intelligence Extracts, Hq.10 Air Force, 18 August (year not given).Measures to be normally adopted.... ...

Torture (GOMON) emnbraccs, beating, kicking,rtud till coilduct iilvolviag physical suffer-ing. I t is the most clumsy methodand 0111~to be used when all else fails.(Specidly marked in lext.) When violenttorture is used, change interrogatioil officer,and it is bencficial if u new officer questionsin sympathetic fashion.Threat's. As a hint of pllybical discom-forts to come, e.g. murder, torture, starving,deprivation of sleep, solitary coafiuement,etc. Mental discomforts to come, e.g., illnot receive same treatment as other prisonersof war ; in evelit of exch:rilge of prisoners hewill bc kept till Itist ; he will be forbidden tosend letters; will be forbiddell to inform hishome he is a prisoaer of war, etc.(ATIS Research Report No. 86 (Suppl. No.I , pige 3).

b. Extract from handwritten ilotebooktitled R l (sic) Servicc M concerningintelligeuce and fifth columu operations iutotal war (undated, writer and unit notstated).

During tlie que'stioniug, if the PW com-plains repeatedly that he is thirsty and de-mands water, this is a sign that he is in agony

such as one experieilces just before confes-sing matters of a vital uature.

Ii~terrogationshould preferably be cou-ducted in such a manner. that the PW isled on to talk. However, when the situatioildemands speed, methods in which pain isinflicted on the PW may be u8ed as well.I11 either case, consideratiou must be givento future use and influences.(ATIS Enemy Publication No. 271, page 26).

Japanese sources tifford too few insta~~cesof the actual application of their iuterroga-tory technique, but those that are availablerequire no footnotes. Iu a Japanese diarycaaptured at KWAJALEIN, the diarist dc-scribes all iaterrogation of three Americanair PsW, climaxed by :I beating administ6redto till officer who would not reply as askeduiltil that damned officer fiadly let out ascream.(JICPOA Tr:inslation, Item No. 6437 (dateuaknown), page 3 .

c. Extract from stntemeilt of Prisoner ofWar (JA (USA) 100060,)captured tit KORA:KO, 22 April 1944.

At KORAKO, about 20 March 1944, PWsaw US airman tied to a tree and ques-tioned by Lt. SE T0 (since killed). A~lswerswere ui~satisfiictory. Japs in area lined upand beat Allied PW with clubs. He wasrevived after becoming ui lco~~scious~ l dwasagain beateu. Following day : JapaneseW0, nicknamed SAMPANG (crooked legs)by Javanese, made three at tm pts to beheadAllied I'W. Head did not come off.Another Japanese named INOUYE cut offthe hcad after third attempt. Several Java-nese witnessed the deed.(ATIS Iilterrogatioil Report No. 416, SerialNo. 667, page 4).d. Extract from statement of Dr. I. GBRAUN, Missioll Hospital at AMELE, nearMADANG, NEW GUINEA.

One officer said that the .policy was. totie up the captured airmen, quustion thempleasailtly until they mould give no furtherinformation, and the11 require them to kneelwith a broomstick inside the knee-joints. Hestated that after one or two hours of this' most of them would talk.' After the seconclinterrogation was finished, they would bebeaten and executed,usually by decapitation.(Report of AC of S, G-2, ALAMO Force,dated 8 May 1944).

Particulrirly revoltilig tortures t extractinformation are described as follows

e. Extract from COIS Eastern Fleet, Ab-stract of Enemy Information No. 6 (dated 8August 1944).


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JAPANE4E METIIODS OF PRISOXER OF W 4R INTERROGA TION

The victim's storntrcls is filled with waterfrom a hose placed in .the thmrvt. A plailkis t,heil placed across the distended stomach,and Japanese, onk on each end, then ' see-saw' thus forcii~gout the water from thestomach. Mawy of the victims die underthis torture.

The victim's thumbs are tied togetherand he is hitched by them to a motor carwhich proceeds to pull him r~rouild in ncircle nuti1 ho falls exhausted. This is re-peated at two-or thrm-day intervals.'' When KEMPEI officers become physi-cally tired flvm the beating-up of a victim,a secoild victim is brought in. Each victimis given stick and they are set to belabor-ing each other.(ATIS Research Report No. 72 (Suppl. No.11 page 23).f Cruel treatment of PsW of all branches. of our service has been tlloroughlyproven in our War Crimi11:d Tr ids. How-ever, there i s some illdicatioi~ that harshand brutal trea$ment.was applied more to

air than $0 groulid troops. In additiou. tothe statement of Dr. I G Braun citedabove, there is other evidence that airmenwere siugled out for harsher treatment.Hiroshi FUJII, formerly a doctor at theOMORI PW Camp, stated at an interviewin Sugamo Prisoil that :

. ...in cont~.aveiltionof ail order issuedverbally by Col. SAKABA, tho C%mpCom-mandant, that Special POW B-29 air crew&were not to receive medicd t~strtment,hesecretly performed :nl operation on a SpecidPOW for hemorrhoids.. .

Special POWs, B-29 crew members, re-ceived ollly hdf rations or two-thirds rationson orders of Col. SAKABA ...........When he requested the Colollel toallow hilrl to fill out death certificate (for aSpecial PW ,this was refused by SAKABAonthe g~wuilds hat special prisoilers need not betreated the ssme as other POWs

(Report No. 489 of Investigatioa Jlivision,Legal Section, GHQ,, SCAP).


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JAPANESEMETISODSOFPRISONER OF WAR Ilr'TERROGAITION(1) Effect of our own propaganda,

especially in regard to dissensionbetween American and Australiantroops, native revolts an d the ex-tent to which all types of home-front unrest in AMERICA (orAUSTRALIA) have affected thefront line troops.

(m) Sad plight of nurses and thewomen's auxiliary army."

(ATIS Enemy Yublication No. 225, page 1).I t is clear from the foregoing examples

that some of the leads used in interrogationfor propaganda purposes were the re~lult freaaonabb accurate, though by no meanscomplete, knowledge of coilditions amopgthe Allies. Other leads, obviously, werevague and inaccurate, beiilg no more thanthe offshoots of rumor or the results ofmere supporsitioa, if not of absolute misill-formation. In particular, the reference tothe sad plight of nurses and the women'sauxiliary army arouses curiosity, not onlybecause of its quaii~twordi~lg, ut also be-cause of its probable meanii~g.

I t is not the objective of this paper to in-vestigate the ways in which this materialwas employed as propaga~~dar the extentto which its use proved effective. What isof present importance is the fact that thegathering of such ii~formation was con-sideked a vital phase of prisoner interrogation.9. EXAMPLESOFINTELLIGENGE

OBTAINED INACTUALINTERROGATIONS

Four documents which record actualiilterrogatioils of prisoners of war providestartling evideilce of the thoroughlless ofquestioning and the significa~lce of theillformatioil elicited. It must be made clear,however, that them documents cannot becoilsidered completely typical, nasmuch as fewothers are available for comparison. I t mustalso be mentioned that the surprising detail ofthe testi~noily may be the result of morethan a skillful elicitation of information bypurely legitimate methods. Nowhere dot*heserecords mention the means by whichprisoners were stimulated to divulge valuablefacts, but in the light of our knowledge ofinstructiolls given to iilterrogators, it isjustifiable to assume that torture may havebeen employed, or at least that threats weremade. But i t is also justifiable, sinceevidence is lacking, to assume that theprisoners, in violatioll of their traiilii~ginstructions, spoke freely. The possible

reasons for such ~uninhibitecl disclosures ofvital knowledge are numkrous : a desire toimpress the ellemy with Allied superiority,a failure to appreciate the ability of theenemy to use their statements, a hope ofcomforts or concessions to be granted inreward for their testimony, an apathy towardthe war and everything coiiilected with it,or a panic fear resulting from capture.Whatever the reasons may have been, theinformtttion was given with what seems attimes to be a11 unilecessary completeness.

s. The first of thew documents is the( Interrogtttiol~Report of an American NavyFlier Shot Dotvu land Captured (24 Septem-ber 1944) near CEBU." A brief of thecontents indicates the extent of the interroga-tion. The comparative detail with which theiaformation was given can best be illustratedby an excerpt from the report itself.

(1) A brief of the conteilts includes thefollowing :

(a) A history of the prisoner, witha record of his training and histransfers.

(b) A record of the tactical move-meuts of the prisoner, with in-formatioil regarding operations

. participated in and losses andmovements of carrier forces.(c) Information regarding the or-

gauizatiou of Task Force 38under the followillg headings :1. Composition of 3 Fleet2. Orgaaization of the LEX-

INGTON3. Number of airplanes nd

personnel on a carrier4. Names of American wrriers6. American carrier cayouflage

(with sketches).(d) Information on matters pertain-

iilg to mesaage security, withreference to frequency used, callwords, terminology

(ATIS Enemy Publicatioil No. 402, page A .(2) Extract from ultrasecret telegram NO.282342 containing additional iilfonnation

from pilot ensign of carrier LEXINGTON(interrogation conducted at HQ), %;thwestArea Fleet, date of r h o r t 20 October 1944.

(a) Recent movemellts and or-ganization of the task force :1. Commartder of Task Force 38 is

Adm MITSCHER. Four gou ps are com-posed of two regular aircraft carriers andtwo coin~~tedruiser carriem each, total-ing 16 ships, plus destroyer escorts.

2. The following types of ships (at-


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EXAMPLES O INTELLIGENCE OBTt\lNED IN ACTUAL INTERROGATIONStached to 3 Fleet) are assigned to . thegroups

Groups and 2- two t threebattlmhips and three to four cruisers.

Group 3- four to five battleshipsand four to five cruisers.

Group 110 batkleships, four tofive cruisers.3. Adm HALSEY-- CommandiugOfficer of PHILIPPINES Area NavalForce."

(ATIS Enemy Publication No. 402, page 2).Note Examination of independent sources verifies

the substantial accuracy of information obtained byJapanese methods of interrogation)

b. The second of these documeilts is amimeographed booklet eatitled Tactics ofthe US Air Forces (KUGUN) in theSOLOMONS Area." I t bears the followingnotation: I view of the present battlesituation, this booklet requires immediatedistribution. I t was prepared from inter-rogation of an Allied PW. Reliability ' A.'The significance of the words, immediatedistribultionyJ' s clear enough, but an ex-amination of the contents makes it oillymore evident that the material was of highimportance. Although it is impracticablehere to quote ex%ensively rom the document,it is possible to present a list of the maintopics in the table of contents and to quotean excerpt which will convey the extent ofthe detail. I t must be emphasized that the~nformationgiven under each topical head-ing in the table of contents is strikinglydetailed and frequently accompanied by dia-grams, maps, and sketches.

1) Extract from mimeographed bookletentitled Tactics of the US Air Forces(KUGUN) in thc SOLOMONS Area" (issuedby 6 Field M P Unit and reproduced byOperations Section, 6 Flyiilg Division, dated7 February 1944).

(a) Formations and Co-ordinated Opera-tions.Fighter and bomber formations.Ratio of fighters aild bombers incombination.Combined use of different types offighter planes.Co-ordinated attack by differenttypcs of bombers.Co-ordinated attack of ground andcarrier based bombers.Essentids in co-ordinated operatioilswith the fleet.Co-ordinated operations with tlieAir Force in NEW GUINEA.(b) Bomber Tactics.Measurm against Japanese fighters.

Low, medium, and high altitudebombing.Bombing by waves.Attacking ships.Attacking against AA fire.Time and routes of attacks onRABAUL. .Destruction of RABAUL.Attack by medium bombers.

(c) Fighter Tactics.Missioils of fighters. ,Attack by fighter planes.Weaknesses of Japapese figh&ersasseen by t'he US Air Force.Attacking formations.Attacking bombers.

(d) Action of the Air Force before andafter La~ldi~i~gcperations.Reconnaissance before landing.Bombardment before landing.Coucealment of laildiilg plans.Co-ordillation with the laildiagforce during landing.Bombing after a successful landing.

(e) Guerrilla Tactics.Lo altitude surprise attacks.Use of fighters as decoys when a ttacking.Suq ri ss attack from behind moun-tains or hills.Battle of nerves at night.Surprise attack at night from ex-tremely low altitudes.Night 1.idingfrom several directionsat the same time.Attack against returning enemyplanes.Confusing enemy radar.Deceiving the enemy with lights."

(ATIS Enemy Publication No. 173, pagesB and C .

2) Extract from mimeographed bookletentitled Tactics of the US Air Forces(KUGUN) in the SOLOMONS Area" (is-sued by 6 Field MP Unit and reproducedby Operations Section, 6 Flying Division,dated 7 February 1944).

Reconnaissance before laiiding TheNavy's PB4Y and VDI (photographing unit)make a detailed recoiinaissance of the area*where the landing is planned. Reconnais-sance is begun two to three months beforethe planned operation. Weather permitting,reconnaissance is carried out every day.Reconnaissailce is carried on in t.he mowingfor 30 to 40 minutes, when it is clear.Altitude is from 22,000 to 34,000'ft. Recon-nd s~an ce s continued until approximatelyone week before the actnal operation. The


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J P NESE METHODS OF PRISONER O WAR INTERROG TIONenemyposition and enemy terrain are in-vestigatedin det'ail. Enemy plans are'based on this 1.econ-

naissanceand information from intelligenceorgai~izationsdispatchedbeforehand. Detailsoftheactivitiesof the iiltelligenceorgai~izationsarefew. Mcnarelanded near

theiilvasionpointbysubmarine. Theyseekinformation 11 enemy strecgth, dispositionof air forces, coilditioll of terrain a'udshipping......(ATISEnemyPublicationNo. 173,page14).

c. The th ird document in the sameEnemy Publictttioll is a mimeographedbooklet entitled Interrogation'Report (No.7) of an Allied Prisoner of War." It con-tains data on airfield construction andsurveyforces,aiqplanemaii~tenance,grouildforces and Marines in the SOLOMON8Area, enemy ,airplane communication, mc-teorological 0bse~vatio11,billets, rest andallowa~lces,hospital ships,circumstni~cesofPW's crash, etc.(ATIS Enemy Publication No. 173,,pagcs17-32).

d. Thefourthdocument m o n g theseex-amplesof actual interrogations is a mimeo-graphed file 6f iiltelligence reports on theinterrogation of American aircrewprisonersof war. A11 extract from the brief of thispublication indicates the @copeof the in-terrogation. All extract from one of theinterrogations is of interestpartly s 'ailex-ample of actual question-and-answer, butmostlybecauseof two parentheticalremarksby the recorder of theinterrogation. Tllefirstof thesethrows light upon the condi-tion of the priaonerduringexamillation andsuggeststhepossibilitythatotherthaugentlemethods were being employed to extractiaformation. The secoildis interesting bothbecause it is a reflection of Japailcse psy-chology and because it provides a basis forconjecture concer~linghe significaace oft,heclause, Wetried to make him guess."

(1) Extract frombriefof EnemyPublica-ti011No. 280, presenting contentsof mimeo-graphed file of i~ltelligei~ceeports 1 1. i~lterrogationof American aircrewprisonersof war (issued 16 December 1942to3 June1943by GO Gp(SHUDAN)Staff Section).' Informatioa contailled in interrogation-reports includes circumstai~cesof capture;.

personal history andtraillingof PsW; routetaken fromAMERICAtoSWPA; conditionof airfields; typcs, numbersand capabilitiesof American planes in useor being built;organizatio~lof FifthAirForce; methods ofbombingandeffectivel~essf RABAUL AA

fireand searchlights; coilditioilsinAMEB-ICA alid public att it ~~d eoward thc war;Auskalia~l-Americanelatioi~s,tc."(ATISEnemyPublication No. 280,pagcA).

2) Extractfrom Allied PW Iutcrmga-tion Repoil," dated 23 Febru:ny 1943, 81Navy Garrison Unit (KEIBI) GO ForceStaff Section. (The prisoner was capturedon the shore south of RABAUL HANA-BUKI(TN: I'AVURVUR)Mt.byDestroyerMAKINAMI.) Q. What did you thil ~kof doing

after bailing out from pourairplane?

A. I thought of escaping. However,after beinginken a PW,I wantedto be sent back.

Q. If we were to returnyou,wherewould you go, AMERICA orPORT MORESRY?

"A. AMERICA. (PW eobbed for awhile.)

Q. n o thet roo p]nowatMORESBYlikewar?

A. Allof them ha k war.Q How aboutyouA Naturally, I hate war. Q. Do youhate the Japanese?( 'A. As I have never spoke11 to a

Japanme, I do not know. I donot even know if they are strongorweak.

Q. Are any citations given to air-crewswho returnfromRABAULair raids?

"A. Thosc who perform especiallymeritoriousdeedsaregivenmedals.

l 4. Are there allywho have receivedsuch medals

A. There are those who probablyreceived them, but I have neverreceivedany. Q. Do you believe that AMERICAwillwin?

A. I don't kilow about the future.(Naturallywe do not kmw w h t tho fut~lreholds. We tried tomake himguess,buthepersisted;he did not know.)

(ATIS Enemy Publication No. 280 pages16-17).

Further evidenceof the thorouglmewwithwhichi~lterrogatio~l carriedout can beasfou11din the following:ATIS Enemy Publication No. 76, pages6-7

ATISBulletinNo. 1283,ItemNo. 4, pages3-5 (mimeographed p'amphlet entitled 111formatioil on Enemy High-Speed (PT)


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EXAMPLE OF INTELT; CGE?ICE O BT A IN E D N ACTUAL INTERROGATIONSBoat, presenting data obtained from crew- 9-14members) ATIS Enemy Publication No. 145, PartATIS Bulletin No. 1250, pages 1-2 (Allied ( Intelligence Reports, Maps, and SketchesPW gives informa$ion on P51) Operations in NEW GUINEA, April 1943

SOPAC Translation No. 0685, pages 7-15 t August 1943), pages 35-46 Records(report on interrogation of 'US aviator) of American and Australian Prisoners )

SEATIC Tra~lslationReport No. 17 Item ATIS Bulletin No. 2068, tem No. 8, pagesNo. 609, pages 17-19 15-22 (mimeographed record of interrogationSEATIC Trta~lslationReport No. 19, gages of American Iilftultry Officer).


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Section V CONCLUSIONS

1 The Japanese Army had a high regardfor inteUigei~ceobtained through the iuter-rogation of prisoners of war.

2. Interrogatioil was conducted at thetime and place of capture for the purposeof obtaining information of immediate ope-ratioual importance. Later and more detailedinterrogation was carried on in rear areas.

3 Interrogation techlliques proceeded fromthe gentle t the cruel with the distinctcondoaement of torture and with a tendencytowards greater harshuess in treatment ofairmen.

4. Prisoners were interrogated for thepurpose of eliciting information of tacticaland operational value infomati011 oftechnical nature and illformtition useful aspropaganda.

5 Interrogation w s detailed andt horough.

a

Cruel treatment of sW of all branchesof our sen4ce has beell thoroughly provenin our War Crimizld Trials. However thereis some illdicatioll that harsh and brutalt.reatment during illterrogatioa often endingwith decapitation was appIied more to airthan to ground troops. Our air forces initial-ly turned the tide and assisted all of ouroperation s by gainii~gair superiority and cog-tributed greatly toward obtaining Navalsuperiority ; both of which were so essentialto the succees of our amphibious operations.Perhaps the brutd treatment of captured airme11 is at least partially explained by Japa-nese realization of this and a desperatede~ireo obtain all possible illformation withwhich to combat it: Evidence indicatesthat such treatment cemmenced i n the earlySouthwest Pacific Campaigns-

japanese torture techniques

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