jerome schiller - is the soul a form.pdf

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"Phaedo" 104-105: Is the Soul a Form?

Author(s): Jerome SchillerSource: Phronesis, Vol. 12, No. 1 (1967), pp. 50-58Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4181792 .

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Phaedo04-IO. Is theSoula Form?JEROME SCHILLER

I n his Plato's Phaedo, R. Hackforth notes that the confusions of thefinal argument for the immortality of the soul in the Phaedo aredeepened by a change in Plato's conception of the 'logical status'

of the soul from 'soul as form to soul as possessor of form' in the courseof the argument, probably at 105E10.1 D. Keyt, in a recent articlein Phronesis, adapts Hackforth's view to his aim of locating the fal-lacies in the final argument by commenting that even if Plato does nottake the soul to be an immanent form in the argument, he does treatit as if it were one.2 Although Keyt does not accuse Plato of equivo-cating on 'soul' in the course of the argument, one of the two fallacieshe attributes to him stems from Plato's treating the soul as if it were aform. I should like to defend Plato from both these criticisms byshowing that he never treats the soul as an immanent form in the courseof the argument.The most important evidence that both Hackforth and Keyt citefor their view is the parallelism of the statements at 104 D 1-7 and105 D 3-5. Here are these crucial passages:

A. 104D1-7'Ap'o`v, o K6f3q, -TBset-n av, a O6-av x%-rciaT p'vov &vayx%'sLe , A, , ot ,,,ot\, v

TqV COU 1Ocav Lu-ro a?LV, aO'CBxO'L evocv[ouO?CV2VC ] &L rtVo4;

iQ?sap &p-cL aeyopev. O 9Ooa yap 37ou 5TL a av 1T Tv 'pLcov Loc?ocz &v&yN Uo, ou Ztvov pLav sLVOCa X&oZd pLTT0L.B. 105D3-5

T V el -A t ! n \ el 1/ X 5 I9?XnpocOTL&v ocur&-xrc-azxm sLW ? 's.VO cpOuaX 6AV;"Hxer. tlSVTOL, CyY.

Let us first review the context in which these statements appear. Thediscussants have agreed that a safe principle to be followed in fixingthe cause of anything's having a certain quality is to cite the presenceof a form in the thing (100 C-101 D); that neither the form in nature1 R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedo (Cambridge, 1955), 165.2 D. Keyt, 'The Fallacies in Phaedo 102a-107b,' Phronesis VIII (1963), 169.50

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(the absolute form) nor the form in things (the immanent form) willadmit its opposite and become other than what it was, but sooner woulddepart or perish (102B-103B); that there are things, such as snowand fire, which, though not the forms cold and heat, behave just likethese forms when the opposites of the forms approach: they eitherdepart or perish (103C-103E); that this is true of other things, forinstance, the number three (which will not admit the form even) andtwo (which will not admit the form odd) (103 E - 104 C). Socrates thenposes the question, What sort of things are these? and A is the answer.Between A and B, in addition to a summary of points made previously,we have the observation that we can now name such things as causesof the presence of a certain quality in something: thus fire (and notthe old, 'safe' heat) can be cited as the cause of something's being hot,or fever (and not illness) the cause of someone's being ill (104 D -105 C). B is then presented as an elaboration of an instance of theprinciple just developed: the soul is (parallel to fire) that which causesthe body in which it is to be alive (parallel to its being hot). Theimmortality of the soul is then established by recalling the earlieradmission that things, such as three, which are associated withparticular forms, such as odd, cannot admit the opposite of thoseforms. And just as what cannot admit the even and has no part in theeven is 'uneven' (aCvxpTLov),o the soul, which does not admit death,is 'immortal' (&Oavaoov) (105 D - 105E). (Then Socrates goes on toprove that if it is immortal, it is imperishable [105E-107A], but weare not concerned with this phase of his argument.)Does Plato view the soul, up to 105 E at least, as an immanentform? The soul is introduced as being parallel to certain things - snow,fire, and three - each of which, while being so intimately associatedwith a form that it cannot exist without that form, is never reallycalled a form, and, commonsensically, should not be taken as otherthan a concrete thing. Two points, however, seem to shatter thissimple answer: one of these 'things,' at least, does seem to be identifiedas a form in the course of the argument, namely, three at 104D5-6( VTPvEpOv 'L); moreover, this form is said to occupy (xorOCay-n)something, just as the soul is said to occupy (xc-aXa-) the body at105 D3.Hackforth develops his argument in this fashion: In 103 C 10 - 105 B 4,he claims, Plato is extending to other entities the principle of exclusionof opposites established earlier. These other entities are forms such as'twoness' and 'fieriness'. Though not themselves opposites, they

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exclude forms which are opposites. Hackforth defends his inter-pretation of these other entities being forms (and not things) in thesewords: "Here [104E10-105A1] at least, whatever be the case else-where..., -To-sup is conceived as a form, fieriness, not as a particularfire; not merely because it is mentioned in the same breath with

a&uc, but also because the whole paragraph in which it occurs isconcerned not with things but with forms... Plato defines [theseforms] by reference to the things which they come to 'occupy'(104 D1, 6): and that he should do so is quite natural, since the formwhich he has in mind - the form to which all the illustrations of hisprinciples point - is soul, which occupies a body, and 'brings up' intothat body the form of an opposite, viz. the form 'aliveness' (life) ."3In commenting later on his interpretation of the soul as a form, henotes: Only if soul is regarded as a form "can what is now asserted ofsoul be a corollary, or deduction, or application - whatever one choosesto call it - of the elaborate argument about the exclusion of oppositeforms: provided, that is, that I have been right in regarding thatargument as concerned with forms... And if any doubt still lingers inthe reader's mind, surely the use of the word XoaraGZ-nn 105 D 3 is,despite Burnet's note, conclusive; to my mind, at all events, it isinconceivable that it could mean there anything other than what itmeant at 104 D 1, namely the occupation of a subject by an immanentform."4In light of this last statement, Archer-Hind's comment on araCaxBat 105 D 3 is perplexing: "It is to be noted that the usage of xa-nxa-j&here is different from that in 104 D. The soul does not occupy the bodyin the sense in which IpL&' occupies -pta: the triad is the cause whythree are three, the soul is not the cause why body is body, but thecause why it is alive. The difference lies in this: the triad is the ideaof three; the soul which quickens the body is not the idea of soul, buta particular soul, just as the fever is a particular fever."5How shall we decide between these readings? We might suspectArcher-Hind of sacrificing the parallelism of the passages because heis convinced - on evidence external to the argument - that therecannot be an 'idea of soul,' but only particular souls. But he cannotbe guilty of such prejudice, for he goes on, in this very note, to claimthat the argument commits Plato to an idea of soul - though this is a3Hackforth, op. cit., 156.4 Hackforth, op. cit., 162.5 R. D. Archer-Hind, The Phaedo of Plato (2nd ed. London, 1894), 115-116.52



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'metaphysical monstrosity' - which supplies the idea of life to par-ticular souls, which in turn bear this idea to bodies. Even though thisidea of soul is not mentioned in the argument, he claims that it isnecessitated by 'the elaborate parallel' and supported by otherpassages from early Plato.6I believe that three features of this argument conclusively supportArcher-Hind's reading that the soul functions here as a particularthing, not as an immanent form. First, if Hackforth is correct, Platohas not only equivocated on 'soul,' but he would also be forced toaccept the absurd implication that the body is immortal. Second, theshift in xovraX necessitated by Archer-Hind's interpretation does notspoil the argument, but fits naturally into its development. Third, astudy of the locutions Plato uses for 'three' undermines Hackforth'sreading.Hackforth translates 104 D5-7 of passage A above (olaOo .. 7rept-ToZq)in this way: "You know presumably that anything occupied by thecharacter of three must be not only three but also odd."7 Platocontinues (104D9-10):'E7r.LrO' oLtQov 8", Y04LEV, I EVOCVT'CBea ?XCSLVy)fnUopqPn asxv7OUOiUMpYOCJTOCLOUU7MOT OaV E'XOOL.Here Hackforth translates: "Well, what we maintain is that such athing can never be visited by the character that is opposite to theform which brings that about."8 The second passage clearly indicatesthat the thing occupied by the character of three (ro toLoitov)cannever admit of evenness. Now if xoc-&aX-nere being used in a perfectlyparallel fashion here and at 105 D3, as Hackforth maintains, the thingoccupied in that passage (the body) could never be visited by thecharacter that is opposite to the form which brings life about (death):in other words, Plato would have shown that the body cannot admit ofdeath, that is, that the body is immortal.Three considerations show that the shift in the use of xot&aXj from104 D to 105 D is a natural and expected one. First, the use of xovc(X&aat 105 D3 may be viewed as reminding the reader of a previous partof the argument and not necessarily as asserting any parallels with itsprevious use. It is certainly clear that Plato is pressing the parallel6 Archer-Hind, op. cit., 116.7Hackforth, op. cit., 152.8 Idem.

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between the soul and three. Thus at 104E1 ff. he claims successivelythat the even never visits three (O86no'Te i"s), that three has no part(o`4otpa)in the even, and that it is thus uneven (iv0ap'ro4).At 105 DlOff. he notes that the soul will never admit (ou' .o$no'r 8r6-iqto)death,that we now (v5v) agree to call that which does not admit the even,the uneven (v6p4rtov);so we should call the soul immortal (iOOvourov).But between these two passages Plato introduces his extension of thecausal principle (105B-C). The later use of xmrx-Zn may thusi bejustified as welding together two parts of the argument. It preservesthe continuity by being 'a simple military metaphor' which 'impliesno metaphysical theory.'9A second reason for thinking the shift in the use of xoo&a/yr o be aneasy one lies in the translation of 104D1-3. Alternatetranslationsofthis part of passage A above (TAp'o'v... -uvO4;) demand very differentdegrees of parallelism in the two uses. Contrast Hackforth's translationwith Tredennick's: Hackforth: "Must they not be those which compelthe object which they come to occupy to have not only its owncharacter, but also the character of a certain opposite, which it willnever lose?"10 Tredennick: "Well, then, Cebes, would this describethem - that they are things which are compelled by some form whichtakes possession of them to assume not only its own form but in-variably also that of some other form which is an opposite?"11

No doubt Hackforth's translation conforms well to the Greek,but things can be said for Tredennick's rendering which perhaps over-weigh this. First, it makes the reference of X in D 1 consistent with thatin D5 as 'things occupied.' Secondly, it obviates Burnet's note on theshift from the plural (1) to the singular (octu'ro5)n the reference to theoccupying things.'2 (Of course this note is also obviated in Hackforth'stranslation with ai&ro5 eing taken as referring to the thing occupied.13)9John Burnet, Plato's Phaedo (Oxford, 1911), 123.10 Hackforth, op. cit., 151.11 Hugh Tredennick, 'Phaedo,' in Last Days of Socrates, reprinted in E. Hamiltonand H. Cairns, eds. CollectedDialogues of Plato (New York, 1961), 86.3 Burnet, op. cit., 119-120.13 Tredennick's or Burnet's translation of uT-rO in which it refers to the occu-pying form - "forces the thing occupied to assume the form of the occupier" -when coupled with Hackforth's interpretation of the parallels of 104 I) and105 D, may appear to lead to an even greater paradox than that of the body'simmortality, namely, the paradox that the body is really a soul. Thus, followingthe lead of 103E3 and 104A2 where things other than forms are said to receivenames of forms, it might be argued that the object occupied wouild lhave to54



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As Burnet notes, 'the pronouns are a little puzzling' in this passage ;14perhaps in such a situation the advantages of Tredennick's translationoutweigh those of Hackforth's.If we do adopt Tredennick's reading, there seems to be less demandfor parallelism in the use of xcetaCXq t 104 D and 105 D. The 'things'which behave like opposites are things occupied by forms and notforms which actively occupy. Thus it is an object occupied by the formof three, and not the threeness which occupies it, which, not acceptingthe opposite of the form that accompanies threeness, is said to beuneven (104E). The stress on these things which passively receivetheir properties de-emphasizes xcnaz-p in its first appearance, whilepaving the way for a soul which is immortal, just as three is uneven.

But though the way is prepared for an easy transition to thedifferent use of xo&aXy, one further step is required: to associate theseobjects, hitherto characterized primarily in a passive fashion, withsome sort of activity. The transition is accomplished by making thesethings into causes. Thus, according to the new, refined answer to thecausal question, it is not heat which makes a body hot, but fire; notillness which makes a body ill, but fever. But this observation will notconvince anyone who takes the fire or fever of 105 C to be forms, andnot to be examples of things occupied. I suggest that Plato shows, inanother difficult passage, 105 A 3-5, that the latter is the more plausibleinterpretation.As we have seen above, such things as three do not admit theopposite of the form accompanying their occupying form. Until104 E 10 these things are not characterized as engaging in any activityfurther than this refusal to admit forms. At 104E7-105A1, however,they not only do not admit (axeLroc) the opposite, but they bringforward (Ernpepet)the opposite they contain against the intrudingform, as three brings forth oddness against the even, two brings forthevenness, and fire, heat. In his next breath, Plato elaborates theirreceive the name of the occupying form, so that, assuming the parallelism of thetwo passages, the body would have to be named 'soul' in conformance with itsoccupying form.But there are two reasons for not pressing this paradox. First, the reference ofmuTro5s not at all clear. Second, even if Tredennick's translation is correct,Plato need not be taken as saying that the thing occupied must receive thename of the occupying form as its substantial name, but only as an attribute.Thus heat causes an object to be hot, not to be heat; life causes it to be alive,not life; so soul would cause body to be besouled, perhaps, and not soul.14Burnet, op. cit., 119.

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activity in another direction: not only will opposites not admitopposites, but (105A3-5):xalt ?XE6VO, O V k7r!typpf tL &VOCVTLOVX'LVW, p' OTC V OC'r6 t. aurTO ?7rvppOV VVO Lc7p[LSVOU VVLXV87OT S7tOt ?e a'XCaOC .Fowler translates this passage thus: "nothing which brings an oppositeto that which it approaches will ever admit in itself the oppositeness ofthat which is brought."'5 Note the important shift here. The contextclearly indicates that the 'things' being discussed are the same entities(such as three) which were first characterized as not admittingopposites, and then were said to bring forth an opposite against anapproaching opposite. Now they are said to bring an opposite to some-thing which they approach (Xcp'-r xv cc&r6. Though Plato proceedsto sum up his argument at 105 A8ff. by noting that these objects willnot admit (ou taerxL) opposites, he almost immediately utilizes theirnewly acquired activity in his refined theory of causes. He does notsay explicitly that fire and fever cause bodies to be hot and ill bybringing an opposite to them, but this mechanism becomes obviousin his parallel treatment of the soul. Just before the passage we havecalled B above, Plato establishes that it is the soul which alwayscauses the body in which it is to be alive. He then relates cause andactivity in these words (in Hackforth's translation) B: "Then soulalways brings life along with it to anything that it occupies.'"16This sentence seems simply to relate 105A3-5 to the soIl. In105A3-5 something is said to bring something opposite (ea7rp6pn-nSpvaw'tov)to what it approaches (sup' oa ocv&'CU-6 ). Here the soulbrings life ("xze cppouao Ccov) to what it occupies (xartas). Themilitary overtones of & c 1 are caught in the xoavraaX?nf the secondpassage. The use of xcxra'C^n at 105 D 3 in a fashion not perfectlv

16 H. N. Fowler, Plato with an English Translation, Vol. 1 (London, 1914), 361.Hackforth translates the passage thus: "if any form brings up one of twoopposites into that which it itself enters, that form itself will never admit thecharacter opposite to the one brought up." (Hackforth, op. cit., 152-153)Fowler's 'oppositeness' is a bit clumsy, but Hackforth's 'form' is clearly notindicated in the Greek, and prejudices the discussion. Fowler's translation seemsalso preferable to Tredennick's, which underemphasizes the thing's activity.(See Tredennick, op. cit., 86.)16 Hackforth, op. cit., 159.17 See Hackforth, op. cit., 152 n. 4; Burnet, op. cit., 121.56



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parallel to its earlier use at 104 D is thus natural and required by thedevelopment of the argument."8The third support for Archer-Hind's interpretation is Plato's mode ofreferring to numbers in 104-105. We saw above that Hackforth feelsthat this mode of reference actually supports his interpretation: thusa reason for thinking that rO7Up is a form at lOSA1 is "that it ismentioned in the same breath with n aua&.'.But I think Hackforth ismistaken. The most noteworthy feature here is Plato's studied in-difference to the locutions by which he refers to numbers. Thus heexplains, at 104A7ff., that n rpr.&4,and half of numbers in general(o %uavUq'o0 &pLO0,oii&7rtCo) are odd though not identical to the odd,'and in the same way' (xc' cx') r'c3o and all the other series of numbers(OC7=ao -TpOG o U a-TLZoqro5 OpLOV?o5)re even, though not identical toevenness. But if rpL&4 nd Ta&36o are equaUy parts of the numberseries, so similarly, we might expect, would be TL0C pLoC and n 8uG.Indeed, Plato's easy moves from r-' tptL to n 'pLacq at 104C1-5 and104E3-5, which indicate no obvious change in his reference, supportthis view.

In light of this situation Hackforth's notes at 104C2 and 104E3can only be misleading. At 104C2 he writes "-o&-cpLas not of coursethree things, but (as is evident from the immediate substitution of'rptoc in C5) immanent 'threeness'"';19 at 104E3, "here again themeaning of ro-crpca is determined by the substitution of - rpLmqnES."20 I would certainly agree with Hackforth, as against Archer-Hind, for instance, that ra' tpLoc t 104E1, does not refer to threethings.21 But I cannot accept his implication that it thus must refer to'threeness.' It seems plausible, in this argument at least, to see it asreferring to the number three, which is different both from things(which it occupies) and threeness (which occupies it). Plato explicitlyrefers to threeness only once in the argument ( '&v TpLWV Be'a at104 D5-6) in stating that this form occupies 'things' in such a way18 Hackforth himself notes the importance of 105 A3-5 as an amplification of theearlier argument (Hackforth, op. cit., 152 n.). But he reads it as an explanationof the &vayxaCe,tof 104 D 1-3 to the effect that the form wlich possesses thingscarries an accompanying form and will not allow either itself or the thing itoccupies to admit the opposite of this accompanying form. But I believe thatmy interpretation better prepares us for the causal account to come.19 Hackforth, op. cit., 151 n.20 Hackforth, op. cit., 152 n.21 Archer-Hind, op. cit., 113 n.

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that they must be odd as well as three. The things possessed, whichhave no part in the even and are uneven, are the r& ptoacn trp6xqf104E1-5, that is, the number three.

The use of the alternate forms ppcq and TrcXpLto or the numberthree seems to support this intermediate status between forms andthings. I do not wish to comment further on this suggestion, either totry to clarify the nature of such 'intermediates' or to argue for theirappearance in other Platonic writings. I want merely to emphasizetheir seeming difference from rv rptv 'am and thus change whatseems to be a support for Hackforth's position to a support for ourinterpretation.22In conclusion, the paradoxical consequence of Hackforth's inter-pretation, the plausibility of the new use of xovmaxn at 105D3, andthe evidence of Plato's references to numbers in 104-105 force us toaccept Archer-Hind's interpretation that the soul is construed as athing in this argument, and not as a form as claimed by Hackforth andKeyt.23 We might have to agree with Archer-Hind that the argumentimplies the existence of that metaphysical monstrosity, an idea of soul.But such an idea is never used in this argumenit. And thus we can atleast free Plato from the logical monstrosity of equivocation whichHackforth claims he commits.Washington University, St. Loutis, Missouri22 The parallel between the number three (uneven) and soul (immortal) whichassures the support has been developed above. Keyt seems also to rely tooheavily on 104 D5-6 as setting the tone for all references to three (Keyt, op. cit.,168 n.).23 I should perhaps note that Archer-Hind offers a translation of 104 D 1-3close to Hackforth's. I find, however, that this makes the transition betweenthe two uses of xor&axnmore difficuilt to accept.

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