1 (Slip Opin ion) OCTOBER TERM, 2014

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be relea sed, as isbeing done in connect ion with t h is case, at the t ime the opin ion is issued.The syllabus const it utes no par t of t he opin ion of t he Cour t bu t has beenprepared by t he Repor ter of Decisions for the conven ience of t he reader . See Un ited Sta tes v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

J ESINOSKI ET UX. v. COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC., ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 13–684. Argued November 4, 2014—Decided J anuary 13, 2015

Exact ly th ree years a fter borrowing money from respondent Country-wide Home Loans, Inc., t o refinance their hom e mortgage, pet it ionersLar ry and Cheryle J esinosk i sen t Count rywide and respondent Bank of Amer ica H om e Loans, wh ich had acqu ired Countrywide, a let terpurpor t ing to rescind the t ransact ion . Bank of Am er ica replied, re-fusing to acknowledge the rescission ’s va lidity. One year and one dayla ter , the J esinoskis filed su it in federa l cour t , seeking a decla ra t ionof rescission and damages. The Dist r ict Court en tered judgment onthe pleadings for respondents, concluding tha t a bor rower can exer -cise the Tru th in Lending Act ’s r igh t to rescind a loan , see 15 U. S. C. §1635(a), (f), on ly by filing a lawsu it with in th ree years of the da tethe loan was consum mated. The J esinoskis’ compla int , filed four years and one day a fter the loan ’s consummat ion , was ineffect ive. The E igh th Circu it a ffirmed.

Held : A bor rower exercising h is r igh t to rescind under the Act need on ly provide wr it t en not ice to h is lender with in the 3-year per iod, not filesu it with in tha t per iod. Sect ion 1635(a)’s unequ ivoca l terms—a bor -rower “sha ll have the r igh t to rescind . . . by notifying the cred itor . . . of h is in ten t ion to do so” (em phasis added)—leave no doubt tha t re-scission is effected when the bor rower not ifies the creditor of h is in -ten t ion to rescind. Th is conclusion is not a ltered by §1635(f), wh ich sta tes when the r igh t to rescind m ust be exercised, bu t says noth ing about how tha t r igh t is exercised. Nor does §1635(g)—which sta tes tha t “in addit ion to rescission the cour t m ay award relief . . . not re-la t ing to the r igh t to rescind”—suppor t respondents’ view that rescis-sion is necessar ily a consequence of judicia l act ion . And the fact tha t the Act modified the common-law condit ion precedent to rescission a t

2 J ESINOSKI v. COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC.

Syllabus

law, see §1635(b), hardly implies tha t the Act thereby codified rescis-sion in equ it y. Pp. 2–5.

729 F . 3d 1092, reversed and rem anded.

SCALIA , J ., delivered the opin ion for a unan imous Cour t .

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1 Cite as: 574 U. S. ____ (2015)

Opin ion of the Court

NOTICE: Th is opin ion is subject to formal revision before publicat ion in t heprelim inary pr in t of t he Un ited Sta tes Repor ts. Readers are requested tonot ify the Repor ter of Decisions, Supreme Cour t of t he Un ited Sta tes, Wash-ington , D. C. 20543, of any typograph ical or other formal er rors, in ordertha t cor rect ions may be made before the preliminary pr in t goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 13–684

LARRY D. J ESINOSKI, ET UX., PETITIONERS v. COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC., ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

[J anuary 13, 2015]

JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opin ion of the Court .

The Truth in Lending Act gives borrowers the r ight to rescind certa in loans for up to three years after the t rans-act ion is consummated. The quest ion presented is whether a borrower exercises th is r ight by providing wr it ten no- t ice to h is lender, or whether he must also file a lawsuit before the 3-year per iod elapses.

On February 23, 2007, pet it ioners Larry and CheryleJ esinosk i refinanced the mor tgage on their home by bor -rowing $611,000 from respondent Count rywide HomeLoans, Inc. Exact ly three years later , on February 23,2010, the J esinoskis mailed respondents a let ter purpor t-ing to rescind the loan. Respondent Bank of America Home Loans replied on March 12, 2010, refusing to acknowledge the validity of the rescission. On February24, 2011, the J esinosk is filed su it in Federal Dist rict Court seeking a decla ra t ion of rescission and damages.

Respondents moved for judgment on the pleadings, which the Distr ict Cour t gran ted. The cour t concluded that the Act requires a bor rower seeking rescission to filea lawsuit with in three years of the transact ion ’s consum-

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mat ion. Although the J esinoskis not ified respondents of their in tent ion to rescind with in tha t t ime, they did not file their first complaint unt il four years and one day after the loan’s consummat ion. 2012 WL 1365751, *3 (D Minn., Apr . 19, 2012). The Eighth Circu it affirmed. 729 F. 3d 1092, 1093 (2013) (per cur iam).

Congress passed the Truth in Lending Act , 82 Sta t . 146,as amended, to help consumers “avoid the uninformed useof credit , and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfa ir credit billing.” 15 U. S. C. §1601(a). To th is end, the Act grants borrowers the r ight to rescind a loan“unt il midnight of the th ird business day following the consummat ion of the t ransact ion or the delivery of the [disclosures required by the Act ], whichever is la ter , bynot ifying the creditor , in accordance with regula t ions of the [Federa l Reserve] Board, of h is in tent ion to do so.”§1635(a) (2006 ed.).* This regime grants bor rowers anuncondit iona l r ight to rescind for three days, a fter which they may rescind only if the lender fa iled to sat isfy theAct ’s disclosure requirements. But th is condit iona l rightto rescind does not last forever. Even if a lender never makes the required disclosures, the “r ight of rescissionsha ll expire three years after the date of consummat ion of the t ransact ion or upon the sale of the property, whichever comes fir st .” §1635(f). The Eighth Circu it ’s affirmance in the present case rested upon its holding in Keiran v. Home Capita l, Inc., 720 F . 3d 721, 727–728 (2013) tha t, un less abor rower has filed a su it for rescission with in three years of the transact ion ’s consummat ion, §1635(f) ext inguishesthe r ight to rescind and bars relief.

That was error . Sect ion 1635(a) expla ins in unequivocal ——————

* Following the events in th is case, Congress t ransfer red the au thor - ity to promulga te ru les implement ing the Act to the Con sumer F inance Protect ion Bureau. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protect ion Act , §§1061(b)(1), 1100A(2), 1100H, 124 Sta t . 2036, 2107,2113.

3 Cite as: 574 U. S. ____ (2015)

Opin ion of the Court

terms how the r ight to rescind is to be exercised: It pro-vides that a borrower “sha ll have the r ight to rescind . . . by notifying the creditor , in a ccordance with regula tions of the Board, of h is in tention to do so” (emphasis added). The language leaves no doubt that rescission is effected when the borrower not ifies the creditor of h is in tention to re-scind. It follows tha t , so long as the bor rower not ifies with in three years after the t ransact ion is consummated, h is rescission is t imely. The sta tute does not a lso requirehim to sue with in three years.

Noth ing in §1635(f) changes th is conclusion. Although§1635(f) tells us when the r ight to rescind must be exer -cised, it says noth ing about how that r ight is exercised. Our observat ion in Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Ba nk, 523 U. S. 410, 417 (1998), that §1635(f) “govern[s] the life of the under lying r ight ” is beside the point. Tha t case concerned a borrower ’s a t tempt to rescind in the course of a foreclo-sure proceeding in it ia ted six years after the loan’s con-summat ion. We concluded only that there was “no federal r ight to rescind, defensively or otherwise, a fter the 3-yearper iod of §1635(f) has run,” id ., a t 419, not that there was no rescission unt il a suit is filed.

Respondents do not dispute tha t §1635(a) requires only wr it ten not ice of rescission. Indeed, they concede that wr it ten not ice suffices to rescind a loan with in the fir st three days after the t ransaction is consummated. Theyfur ther concede that wr it ten not ice suffices a fter that per iod if the par t ies agree tha t the lender fa iled to makethe required disclosures. Respondents argue, however,that if the par t ies dispute the adequacy of the disclo-sures—and thus the cont inued ava ilability of the r ight torescind—then wr it ten not ice does not suffice.

Sect ion 1635(a) nowhere suggests a dist inct ion betweendisputed and undisputed rescissions, much less that a lawsuit would be required for the la tter . In an effor t to sidestep th is problem, respondents point to a neighbor ing

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provision, §1635(g), which they believe provides supportfor their in terpretat ion of the Act . Section 1635(g) states merely that , “[i]n any act ion in which it is determined thata creditor has viola ted th is sect ion, in addit ion to rescis-sion the cour t may award relief under sect ion 1640 of th ist it le for violat ions of th is subchapter not relat ing to the r ight to rescind.” Respondents argue that the phrase “award relief ” “in addit ion to rescission” confirms tha t rescission is a consequence of judicia l act ion. But the fact that it can be a consequence of judicia l act ion when §1635(g) is t r iggered in no way suggests tha t it can onlyfollow from such act ion. The Act contempla tes var ious situat ions in which the quest ion of a lender ’s compliance with the Act’s disclosure requirements may ar ise in alawsuit—for example, a lender ’s foreclosure act ion in which the borrower raises inadequate disclosure as anaffirmat ive defense. Sect ion 1635(g) makes clear that acour t may not on ly award rescission and thereby relievethe bor rower of h is financia l obliga t ion to the lender, bu t may also grant any of the remedies available under §1640 (including sta tutory damages). It has no bear ing upon whether and how bor rower-rescission under §1635(a) may occur .

Finally, respondents invoke the common law. It is t rue that rescission tradit iona lly required either tha t the re-scinding party return what he received before a rescissioncould be effected (rescission at law), or else that a court affirmat ively decree rescission (rescission in equity). 2 D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies §9.3(3), pp. 585–586 (2d ed. 1993). It is a lso t rue tha t the Act disclaims the common-law condit ion precedent to rescission at law that the bor -rower tender the proceeds received under the t ransaction. 15 U. S. C. §1635(b). But the negat ion of rescission-at -law’s tender requirement hardly implies that the Act codifies rescission in equity. Noth ing in our jur isprudence,and no tool of statutory in terpreta t ion, requires that a

5 Cite as: 574 U. S. ____ (2015)

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congressional Act must be const rued as implement ing itsclosest common-law ana logue. Cf. Astor ia Fed. Sav. & Loa n Assn. v. Solimino, 501 U. S. 104, 108–109 (1991). The clear impor t of §1635(a) is tha t a bor rower need onlyprovide wr it ten not ice to a lender in order to exercise h is r ight to rescind. To the extent §1635(b) alters the tradi-t iona l process for unwinding such a unilatera lly rescinded t ransact ion, th is is simply a case in which sta tutory lawmodifies common-law pract ice.

* * *

The J esinoskis ma iled respondents wr it ten notice oftheir in tent ion to rescind with in three years of their loan’s consummat ion. Because th is is all tha t a bor rower must do in order to exercise h is r ight to rescind under the Act ,the court below erred in dismissing the complaint . Accord-ingly, we reverse the judgment of the Eighth Circu it andremand the case for fur ther proceedings consistent with th is opin ion.

It is so ordered.