jesus on divorce: how my mind has...

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Jesus on Divorce:How My Mind Has Changed

William A. Heth

William A. Heth is Professor of New

Testament and Greek at Taylor Univer-

sity and has served as a professor at

Taylor since 1986. Dr. Heth has writ ten

extensively on the issue of divorce and

remarr iage. He co-authored with

Gordon Wenham Jesus and Divorce. A

second edition of this work was pub-

lished in 1997.

IntroductionWhat did Jesus mean when he spoke outprophetically against divorce and remar-riage as it would have been understoodand practiced by his first-century hearers?How literally should we interpret thosepronouncements? Did Jesus intend to setforth an exceptionless absolute? Or shouldwe approach his divorce sayings as rhe-torical overstatements intended to empha-size a particular point, but admitting ofexceptions? How would his audiencehave understood those sayings, and whatcan we learn from his earliest disciples’attempts to understand and apply Jesus’teaching to their respective Christian com-munities? Did they faithfully reflect theintent of the one they called Lord and mas-ter, or would Jesus be displeased with howthey had modified his standard? Further-more, how should we, his twenty-firstcentury followers, apply them in our verydifferent socio-cultural contexts? Theseare the kinds of questions that scholars askas they wrestle with the NT records ofJesus’ teaching on divorce and remarriage.

The American edition of Jesus and

Divorce appeared in 1985 with the subtitleThe Problem with the Evangelical Consensus.1

What is that consensus? The majority ofevangelicals believe that Jesus permitsremarriage after divorce for maritalunfaithfulness (Matt 5:32; 19:9) and thatPaul sanctions remarriage when Christianspouses are abandoned by unbelievingmates (1 Cor 7:15). We argued to the con-trary that even though marital separationor legal divorce may be advisable under

some circumstances (persistent adultery,physical or verbal abuse, incest, etc.),Jesus taught that his disciples should notremarry after divorce. In short, remarriageafter divorce for whatever reason—evensexual immorality (Matt 5:32; 19:9)—wasa violation of the seventh commandment,“You shall not commit adultery” (Exod20:14; Deut 5:18).2 How do matters standnow?

The consensus appears to be strongerthan ever. Christianity Today’s 1992 read-ers survey revealed that

The majority believe that fornication(73 percent) and desertion by a non-Christian spouse (64 percent) aretwo scriptural grounds for remar-riage. At the same time, a significantminority believe Jesus taught thatbelievers should not remarry afterdivorce (44 percent) and that Goddesigned marriage to be permanent,and remarriage constitutes adultery(44 percent). Less than four out often believe there may be reason forremarriage other than adultery ordesertion.3

Furthermore, nearly every one of theweighty American commentaries on theGospels written since 1984 essentiallydefends the majority view,4 and so doesevery article in IVP’s reference collectionthat touches on marriage, divorce, remar-riage, and adultery.5 Though we contin-ued to defend our views in the face ofothers’ rejection of our exegesis,6 only twoscholarly monographs and one majorcommentary affirmed Wenham’s and myunderstanding of the divorce texts.7 Forme, personally, this proved troubling. This

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meant that the best of evangelical schol-arship had read our material and found itwanting—scholars that I admired andwho sought to handle these texts as criti-cally and fairly as we attempted to (espe-cially Stein, Carson, and Blomberg).8

As noted in the 1997 appendix to Jesus

and Divorce, no major new interpretationsof Jesus’ teaching have been proposedsince its publication in 1984, and of thesix major interpretive approaches weoriginally surveyed, only two remain asviable options today: (1) the majorityevangelical Protestant view and (2) theminority early church fathers’ or “noremarriage” view. The view that porneia

in the exception clauses should be under-stood to mean marriage within forbiddendegrees of kinship (Lev 18:6-18) and thatit refers to a specific situation facingMatthew’s church in which Gentile con-verts were incorporated into a JewishChristian context, is no longer a viableinterpretive option.9

In what follows I will set forth themajor positions on the crucial texts forboth the majority and minority views andthen explain what caused me to reconsidermy interpretive grid and modify my per-spective over the past nine years. In thechart under the majority view I will sub-stitute some of the more recent argumentsrelated to the OT texts that I have gleanedfrom G. Hugenberger’s work, Marriage as

a Covenant,10 for this is the work that hascorrected my understanding of the natureof the marriage covenant encapsulated in

Genesis 2:24 and the way all ancient NearEastern law codes, including the Bible,have always made a distinction betweenjustifiable as opposed to unjustifiabledivorces. I would like to quote here at theoutset, if not for the reader, at least formyself, R. F. Collins’s reminder in theIntroduction to his erudite study on Di-

vorce in the New Testament:

In the study of the New Testament,there are more than merely method-ological issues which must be con-sidered. Exegesis, the science of theinterpretation of texts, is not anexact science, as chemistry andphysics may claim to be. Exegesis isa matter of the interpretation of data,a matter of sensitivity and judgment.Even scholars viewing the data fromthe same angle often come to differ-ent conclusions. The use of similarmethodology does not always pro-vide the same results.11

And I might also add from my own expe-rience that holding fast to one or twoinaccurate concepts means that severalothers will have to be misconstrued inorder to bring coherence to the whole.

Majority and Minority ViewsThough other considerations could be

noted, the following chart depicts themajor points of contention between themajority who believe that the NT allowsremarriage after divorce for one or morereasons and the minority who believe thatJesus did not want his disciples to remarryafter divorce.

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Issue Majority Minority

The nature ofbiblical covenants

Covenants may be both violated anddissolved.12 The primary sense of“covenant” (berit) is that it is an“elected, as opposed to natural,relationship of obligation establishedunder divine sanction.”13 Covenantswere “the means the ancient worldtook to extend relationships beyondthe natural unity by blood.”14 Minor-ity view’s point about Hos 1:9 iscorrect as far as it goes; but once thecovenant is broken by Israel’s infidel-ity, God can legitimately divorceIsrael such that the people are nolonger acknowledged as “my people”(Hos 1:9). However, the legal rightto disown his people does notpreclude the completely unexpectedand infinitely gracious possibilitythat God may yet establish a newcovenant.

Covenants are binding and cannotbe broken.15 E.g., Hos 1:9 is not

an announcement by God of thedissolution of the covenant compa-rable to divorce. “The covenantnowhere makes provision for suchan eventuality. Covenant-breakingon the part of Israel (unilateralwithdrawal) calls for severepunishment. Israel cannot optout by no longer acknowledgingYahweh. The punishment is notan expression of a broken relation-ship. On the contrary, it is enforcedwithin the relationship; punish-ment maintains the covenant.”16

Gen 2:23 — “This at lastis bone of my bones andflesh of my flesh” &Gen 2:24 — “leave andcleave” and “becomeone flesh”

[Agrees with the Heth andWenham minority view’s points,but qualifies them.]“[T]he ‘relationship formula’ [Gen2:23] is not merely an assertion ofan existing blood tie, ‘but is rathera covenant oath which affirms andestablishes a pattern of solidar-ity.’”17 “Clearly, sexual union isthe indispensable means for theconsummation of marriage both inthe Old Testament and elsewherein the ancient Near East.18 ” Sexualunion probably functioned thisway because it was viewed as theoath-sign that ratified the marriagecovenant.

The marriage covenant is compa-rable to the kinship bond that existsbetween parents and children.The covenanted (“leave” andcleave” are covenant terms; cf.Deut 10:20; 11:22; 13:4; 30:20; Josh22:5; 23:8; Ruth 1:14-16) and

consummated marriage witnessedand joined by God (Mal 2:14; Matt19:6//Mark 10:8b-9) results in thetwo becoming “one flesh,” that is,kin or blood relatives. The kinshipnature of marriage is also indicatedby the Gen 2:23 relationshipformula, “bone of my bones, andflesh of my flesh” (cf. 29:14; 37:27;Judg 9:1-2; 2 Sam 5:1; 19:12-13).19

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Deut 24:1-4 The scholarly consensus is that “theintent of this casuistic law is neitherto authorize divorce, nor to stipulateits proper grounds, nor to establishits requisite procedure. Rather its soleconcern is to prohibit the restorationof a marriage after an interveningmarriage.”20 The v. 4 prohibitioncloses a legal loophole that otherwisemight seem to legitimize a form ofadultery.21 Other reasons have beenoffered also.

The minority view agrees with thescholarly consensus (which alsonotes that there are two types ofdivorce mentioned in vv. 1-3: theone that has just cause [“someindecency”] and the other basedon aversion [“hate”] which hasadverse financial penalties for theoffending husband). Deut 24:4prohibits unjust enrichment (dueto estoppel).22

Mal 2:16–

”I hate divorce”Interpretation is vexed by atranslation problem. ESV is mostprobable: “‘For the man who hatesand divorces, says the LORD, theGod of Israel, covers his garmentwith violence, says the LORD ofhosts ... ‘“ Malachi only condemnsdivorce based on aversion (i.e.,unjustified divorce). “Mal. 2:16shares the same assessment ofdivorce based on aversion asseems to be presupposed for thesecond divorce in Deut. 24:3, withits adverse financial consequencesfor the offending husband.”23

NIV translates: “‘I hate divorce,’says the LORD God of Israel, ‘andI hate a man’s covering himselfwith violence as well as withhis garment,’ says the LORDAlmighty.” This is an absoluteprohibition of divorce.24

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Luke 16:18 This is Luke’s one example ofradicalizing the law, and the wayit is stated admits of no exceptions.The casuistic form is employedfor emphasis and exaggeration: itpresents an ideal like Jesus’s sayingsin Mark 10:11-12. Jesus’ concern is notwith legal definitions but with moralexhortation.25 Alternatively, Lukeuses this saying as an allegoricalstatement on Jesus’ non-abolitionof the Law (v. 17)— the person whoannuls part of the Law in favor ofsome other practice is like a mandivorcing his wife in favor of anotherwoman. Provides no help in deter-mining Jesus’ literal views on divorceand remarriage.26

The introductory “Everyone whodivorces” (pas ho apolyon) employsa legal ordinance form similar toOT casuistic law.27 Jesus teachesa standard (as opposed to an ideal)that he expects his disciples tokeep. Paul apparently followsLuke’s (and Mark’s) unqualifiedform of Jesus’ saying in 1 Cor 7:10-11. Only two alternatives presentthemselves in case of divorce:remain unmarried or else bereconciled.

Mark 10:11-12 Jesus, a prophetic wisdom teacher,uses rhetorical overstatement todrive home a general point tohostile questioners. Thus Marksimply records Jesus’ emphaticallystated divorce saying withoutintending to specify possibleexceptions. Jesus cannot beconstrued as teaching an“exceptionless absolute” based onMark because both Matthew (5:32;19:9) and Paul (1 Cor 7:15) qualifyJesus’ prohibition of remarriageafter divorce. Alternatively, Jesus’sayings should be understood asgeneralizations that admit ofexceptions.

Yes, Jesus was questioned by thePharisees, but his final word forthem is found in v. 9: “Whattherefore God has joined together,let not man separate.” However,Jesus’ absolute prohibition ofdivorce and remarriage is reservedfor the disciples in the Markanplace of private instruction, “thehouse” (7:17; 9:28; 10:10; cf. 4:34).Jesus is clarifying kingdom stan-dards for his disciples, to whomJesus gives insights into themysteries of the kingdom of God(4:11), not addressing unbelievingoutsiders whom he wants to bringto repentance with a propheticword.

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Matt 5:32 The exception, applied in a legal way,qualifies Jesus’ prophetic pronounce-ment (i.e., a wisdom saying thatshould be read as a prophetic andsomewhat hyperbolic summons toan ideal like the preceding sayingsabout anger and lust).28 The excep-tion reflects the language of Deut 24:1and identifies a valid divorce. Forfirst-century Jewish readers, a validdivorce by definition included theright to remarry.

This saying employs a legalordinance form similar to OTcasuistic law (cf. Luke 16:18a). Thisantithesis cannot be read in light ofthe first two. Jesus sets before thedisciples a standard (as opposedto an ideal) that he wants them tokeep. The exception restricts thestatement “causes her to commitadultery.” It is tautologous: ifone’s wife has already committedadultery, then the husband whodivorces her does not make hercommit adultery. She has madeherself one already. The questionof freedom to remarry after alawful divorce is not addressed.

Jesus’ Orientation

toward Deut 24:1 in

Matthew 19//Mark 10

Matthew sees Jesus as explainingthe meaning of the law.Deuteronomy’s “some indecency”= Matthew’s “sexual immorality.”In the OT, divorce for “someindecency” identified a legallyvalid divorce. Valid divorcesalways included the right toremarry. Jesus demotes Moses’concession in Deuteronomy andsubordinates it to Genesis, butvalid divorces are God’s permis-sive will for some innocent victimsof divorce.

Jesus opposes the way the Phariseesemployed Deut 24:1 and contrastsdivorce with God’s will “from thebeginning.” Jesus would neitherinterpret nor abrogate somethingMoses never legislated. Jesusprohibited what Moses permitted;he did not permit what Mosesprohibited. So Jesus neitherdivinely interprets nor abrogatesDeut 24:1. It was a concession tohuman sinfulness in the OT eraand contrary to God’s will allalong.

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Matt 19:9 and the syntax

of the exception clause

Exceptions are precisely exceptions.That the clause modifies both thedivorce action and the remarriageaction is determined more by theconcept of justifiable divorce than byGreek grammar. The clause, eitherspoken by Jesus himself (Carson,Blomberg) or supplied by Matthewunder the Spirit’s inspiration (Stein,Keener, Hawthorne), clearly justifiesdivorce for immorality and permitsremarriage. True, marriage must not

be dissolved. But if dissolved bypersistent sexual immorality, themarriage covenant is violated.

The placement of the clause after“divorces” but before “and remar-ries” argues that Jesus permitteddivorce for marital unfaithfulnessbut not also remarriage. In aculture that demanded the wifebe divorced for immorality, theexception clause relieves the manof the responsibility for the divorceand its consequences. UnderstandsMatthew’s exception in light of theunqualified form of Jesus’ sayingsin Mark, Luke, and Paul ( i.e.,remarriage after any divorceresults in adultery) and theGen 2:24 “kinship” nature ofthe marriage relationship.

Meaning of “divorce”(apolyo)

Valid divorces always included theright to remarry. Both Jewish andRoman cultural contexts permit-ted, yea even required, divorce foradultery and remarriage couldnaturally follow. Thus Matthew’sreaders would assume that thedivorce Jesus permits for immoral-ity must be the same kind ofdivorce that Jesus’ contemporariespracticed: it included the right toremarry. If it meant separation orlegal divorce only, without theright to remarry, then Matthew’sreaders would not have readilyrecognized this semantic shiftwithout further explanation.

Evidently the bill of divorce doesnot dissolve the marriage sinceJesus states that remarriageamounts to adultery (Matt 5:32b;19:9b). Matthew’s Jesus rejects thePharisees’ proof-text for their“remarriage-assumed” view(Deut 24:1) and instead appeals toGen 2:24 (with it’s kinship under-standing of marriage) as the basisfor his views. Three factors suggestthat Jesus’ reference to “divorce”does not sanction remarriage:(1) the “one flesh” kinship conceptof marriage; (2) the probablyauthentic longer reading of Matt19:9 (“and whoever marriesa divorced woman commitsadultery” [cf. Matt 5:32b]); and(3) Jesus’ response to the disciples’objection in vv. 10-12.

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Matt 19:10-12 & the

“eunuch saying”

Even with the exception, Jesus’position is more daunting thanShammai’s. “This saying” (v. 11)refers to the disciples’ objection inv. 10 that “it is better not to marry.”Jesus recognizes that God enablessome to remain celibate for the sakeof advancing the claims and interestsof God’s kingdom (cf. 1 Cor 7:7,25-38).

“This saying” (v. 11) refers to Jesus’difficult word against divorce andremarriage in v. 9. “Those towhom it is given” are the faithfuldisciples (as opposed to Phariseesand outsiders [cf. 13:11-12]) thatJesus encourages (v. 12) to embracehis difficult word that they shouldremain single after divorce evenfor sexual immorality.

How do Jesus &

Shammai differ?

Jesus is more radical thanShammai. Jewish (and Roman)law mandated divorce for sexualimmorality, but Jesus onlypermits it. This means that brokenmarriages may still be restored.

Jesus is much more radical thanShammai. Shammai mandated

divorce for sexual immorality, butJesus prohibits most divorces andremarriage after divorce for porneia

(i.e., adultery, bestiality, incest,sodomy, homosexuality, etc.)

1 Cor 7:10-11 Paul is talking about divorce insituations other than divorce forsexual unfaithfulness. The believersadvocating asceticism (1 Cor 7:1)wanted to enforce their “no sexualrelations” slogan on the married(vv. 1-7), the widowers and widows(vv. 8-9, 39-40), those advocatingseparation (vv. 10-16), and theengaged (vv. 25-28, 34, 36-38), who,like other singles (vv. 29-35), are stillfree from matrimonial ties and couldlive single if they have the gift ofsexual self-control (vv. 7, 9a; cf. Matt19:11-12).

Studies indicate that Paul’s teach-ing on sexuality, marriage, andsingleness in 1 Corinthians 6 and 7stems from the same tradition ofJesus’ teaching that Matthewrecords in 19:3-12. Yet Paul saysthat if a divorce or separation takesplace, “let them remain unmarriedor else be reconciled.” Where Paulspecifically mentions the possibil-ity of remarriage, in both instanceshe notes explicitly that one ofthe spouses has died (1 Cor 7:39;Rom 7:2-3). Thus Paul follows theteaching of Jesus.29

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1 Cor 7:15–”not enslaved”(ou dedoulotai)

This phrase distinctly frees theinnocent party to remarry.30 Theessential formula in the Jewish bill ofdivorce were the words “you are freeto any man” (m. Git. 9:3). Paulemploys the same formula forbelievers abandoned by unbelievingspouses.31 Douloo (1 Cor 7:15) and deo

(1 Cor 7:39; Rom 7:2) “are related”32

and used interchangeably (unless oneexcludes categories so as to have sofew examples left as to be able toargue whatever one wishes). Bothfree someone who was once marriedto remarry.

Like Matthew’s exception clause,Paul’s qualifier relieves the inno-cent party of the guilt of violatingChrist’s command not to divorce(mentioned 4x in vv. 10-13).Nothing is said about the possibil-ity of remarriage. The followingconsiderations suggest remarriageis not permitted: (1) marriage is acreation ordinance, binding on allirrespective of their faith or thelack thereof; (2) Paul has alreadyspecifically prohibited remarriagein vv. 10-11; (3) when Paul speaksabout the binding character ofmarriage he uses the term deo

(Rom 7:2; 1 Cor 7:39; cf. 7:27, apromise of engagement), not douloo

(1 Cor 7:15); and (4) where heclearly mentions the possibility ofremarriage, Paul also refers to thedeath of one of the marriagepartners (1 Cor 7:39; Rom 7:2).

1 Cor 7:39 & Rom 7:2—“a wife is bound(dedetai) to her husbandas long as he lives”

1 Cor 7:39 involves a real case atCorinth and Rom 7:2 occurs as anillustration of how the Mosaic lawonly has power over people aslong as they live. Paul does nothave in view divorce for sexualimmorality in either place.

Whenever Paul mentions thepossibility of remarriage, in bothcases he notes specifically thatone of the spouses has died. Thisis Paul’s ordinary usage for theindissolubility of marriage as longas a mate is living.

Church Fathers A growing, unbiblical asceticism,especially in sexual matters,distorted and restricted the fathers’interpretation of Jesus and Paul’steaching. Note the asceticismpromoted in 1 Corinthians 7already.33

The historic teaching of thechurch—up to the 6th century inthe East and up to the 16th centuryin the West—stands firmly behinda no remarriage understanding ofMatt 19:9 and 1 Cor 7:15.

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Initial Doubts aboutMy Minority View

I found my own “no remarriage”understanding of Jesus’ teaching ondivorce challenged when I first read C. S.Keener’s book . . . And Marries Another inthe fall of 1992.34 For the first time since1982—the year I wrote my Th.M. thesison divorce and remarriage—I began towonder if the defense for my “no remar-riage” position was as exegetically soundas I had thought.

In November of 1994 I presented apaper at the annual meeting of the Evan-gelical Theological Society responding toKeener’s exegesis. I revised it and pub-lished it as “Divorce and Remarriage: TheSearch for an Evangelical Hermeneutic.”35

It was that spring that Gordon Wenhamand I were finalizing the appendix to Jesus

and Divorce for the Paternoster reprint thatfinally appeared in 1997; but to be honest,my heart was not fully into writing it.I had begun to feel the weight of themajority position’s arguments. I had writ-ten and read so much about this subjectthat I felt jaded and numbed by the wholeissue. Nevertheless, I held out hope that Istill might be right and did as much as Icould to keep defending our “no remar-riage” view in that appendix.

When people would ask whether or notI still held my view, I simply said, “I don’tknow what to believe any more.” I had toface the fact that the key articles in IVP’sDictionary of Jesus and the Gospels (by R. H.Stein) and Dictionary of Paul and His

Letters (by G. F. Hawthorne) were inessential agreement with Keener’s book.I knew my own intellectual limitationswell enough not to presume that “I alonemust be right,” and one personal conver-sation with Bob Stein at a professionalmeeting convinced me that he was as

eager as I was to follow Jesus’ teachingwherever it might lead. I wanted to un-derstand why the best defenders of themajority view were not persuaded by myarguments to the contrary.

Rethinking 1 Corinthians 7:15Early on in my study of the biblical

teaching on marriage and divorce I wasinfluenced greatly by G. Bromiley’s littlebook, God and Marriage. Bromiley devel-ops a theology of marriage patternedafter God’s relationship with Israel andChrist’s relationship to the church andpaints the kind of “big theological picture”that helps one see the forest of God’sdesign for marriage through the some-times ambiguous exegetical trees.36 I waspuzzled, however, why Bromiley agreedwith me that Matthew’s exceptions did not

clearly permit remarriage, but did believethat Paul allowed remarriage to the Chris-tian deserted by an unbeliever (1 Cor7:15).37 If Jesus had taught that marriageis for life, and that remarriage after divorcefor whatever reason amounts to adultery,how could Paul permit remarriage afterdivorce in a situation that seemed “lessserious” (depending on one’s viewpoint)than the remarriage after divorce forimmorality that Jesus disallowed?38

About ten years later when I read inKeener’s statement that Paul’s “not underbondage” (KJV) “distinctly frees the inno-

cent party to remarry” and that “If Paulmeant that remarriage was not permitted,he said precisely the opposite of what hemeant,”39 I found myself initially agree-ing with his straightforward analysis ofPaul’s language.40 Keener argued that theessential formula in the Jewish bill ofdivorce, “You are free to marry any man”(m. Git. 9:3), functions in precisely thesame way as Paul’s “not being enslaved”

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in 1 Corinthians 7:15. However, I went onto challenge Keener’s arguments that “notbeing enslaved” is different from being“free” to remarry both lexically and con-ceptually.41 Without going into all thedetails here, having just reread myresponse to Keener after ignoring it for thepast six years, I do not see how I missedthe fact that Paul’s negative formulation(“In such cases the brother or the sister isnot enslaved”) was making precisely thesame point as the positive formulation inthe Jewish bill of divorce (“You are free tomarry any man”). That Keener was not atall persuaded by my counter argumentsis evident by the italicized word in thefollowing 1 Corinthians 7:15-related state-ment I recently found in his 1999 commen-tary on Matthew: “Paul’s words recall theexact language for freedom to remarry inancient divorce contracts, and his ancientreaders, unable to be confused by mod-ern writers’ debates on the subject, wouldhave understood his words thus…”42 Thismeant that if Paul made an exception toJesus’ seemingly absolute prohibition ofdivorce and remarriage in 1 Corinthians7:15, then it was certainly possible that onecould interpret Jesus’ exception clauses inMatthew in similar fashion.43

Nevertheless, I knew that both Jesusand Paul adopted viewpoints quite theopposite of their surrounding culture, andthat where Paul did mention permissionfor remarriage, in both places he alsoexplicitly refers to the death of one of thespouses. G. D. Fee had also highlightedthe similarity between the language ofRomans 7:2-3 and Paul’s statement in1 Corinthians 7:39: “A wife is bound to herhusband as long as he lives. But if herhusband dies, she is free to be married towhom she wishes, only in the Lord.” Feeadds that “the language ‘bound to a

woman (= wife), ‘…is Paul’s ordinaryusage for the indissolubility of marriageas long as a mate is living (v. 39; Rom.7:2).”44 He also makes a telling commentabout 1 Corinthians 7:39, one that wavesa caution flag in the face of attempts to fillin the answers to nagging interpretivequestions by appealing indiscriminatelyto known first-century cultural back-grounds: “The first statement, ‘A womanis bound to her husband as long as helives,’ runs so counter to Jewish under-standing and practice at this point in his-tory that it almost certainly reflects Paul’sunderstanding of Jesus’ own instructions(see on v. 10). As such it is a final wordagainst divorce and remarriage.”45

To sum up, I had relied quite heavilyon 1 Corinthians 7:39 and Romans 7:2-3as evidence that Paul followed Jesus’understanding of marriage as a “oneflesh” kinship relationship that could notbe dissolved. I also believed that Paul wasreflecting Jesus’ sayings in 1 Corinthians7:10-11 when he allowed the divorcedbeliever only two options: “remainunmarried or else be reconciled.” How-ever, I had to admit that Paul may nothave had divorce for sexual immoralityin view in any of those statements. Cer-tainly at Corinth Paul was addressing asituation where divorce was being advo-cated by those who claimed to be believ-ers, and the ascetic party was trying toforce their views of sexual abstinence (cf.1 Cor 7:1) on both the married and theformerly married (vv. 1-16, 39-40) as wellas those pledged to be married and thenever-before-married (vv. 25-38).46 Thisled me to reconsider again the possibilitythat Jesus’ teaching on divorce involvedeither generalizations or rhetorical over-statements that were never intended to beunderstood as exceptionless absolutes.

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Rethinking the Form of Jesus’Divorce Sayings

I have just come off of a fall semesterwhere I was asked to teach the Gospelscourse at Taylor University to fill in for acolleague on sabbatical. Never havingread Blomberg’s NAC commentary onMatthew from beginning to end, I choseit as one of my texts for the course. I thor-oughly enjoyed the opportunity to workthrough his entire exposition of Matthew’smessage and his many insightful practi-cal applications. On a number of occasionsI drew my students’ attention to his cau-tious avoidance of interpretive extremes.47

I was impacted, too, by his very balancedtreatment of Jesus’ teaching on divorce.As a result, he gained my trust.

Though it almost seems too obvious tomention now, when the Pharisees askedJesus where he stood on the matter of di-vorce (Matt 19:3//Mark 10:2), the pro-nouncements he made were not ad-dressed to friendly disciples who wereeager to obey fully his every word.Blomberg’s warning caught me off guard:“The specific historical background thatinformed this debate, the particular wayin which the question is phrased, and theunscrupulous motives behind the Phari-sees’ approach all warn us against thenotion that Jesus was comprehensivelyaddressing all relevant questions aboutmarriage and divorce.”48 Thus it is quitelikely that we should not treat “Jesus’words as if they were the objective, refer-ential language of jurisprudence seekingto convey a legal precept.”49

The sayings in both Mark 10:11-12and Luke 16:18 give the impression thatunder no circumstances would divorce orremarriage be possible. However, thereare two ways to understand the form ofJesus’ divorce saying. It is either an exag-

geration (Stein, Keener, Hawthorne, Col-lins) or “a generalization which admits ofcertain exceptions.”50 The former viewemphasizes that Jesus referred to himselfas a prophet (Matt 13:57), taught as a wiseman (Matt 12:38-42), and spoke out pow-erfully against the religious hypocrisy andinjustices he observed (Matthew 23).Therefore, if Jesus wanted to drive homea particular point in the midst of a hostileaudience, “his omission of any qualifica-tion may be understandable.”51 Daviesand Allison note that

Jesus’ saying about divorce was,when first delivered, probablyintended to be more haggadic thanhalakhic; that is, its purpose was notto lay down the law but to reassertan ideal and make divorce a sin,thereby disturbing then currentcomplacency (a complacency wellreflected in Hillel’s view that awoman could be divorced even forburning food: m. Git. 9.10). Jesus wasnot, to judge by the synoptic evi-dence, a legislator. His concern wasnot with legal definitions but withmoral exhortation (cf. 5:27-30).52

On the other hand, I would prefer toclassify Jesus’ sayings as generalizations,even though the exposition is essentiallythe same under either category. I just thinkwords like “exaggeration,” “hyperbole,”and “rhetorical overstatement” conveythe wrong idea. Based on what I haverecently learned, I now find myself inagreement with Blomberg:

Few try to make the pronounce-ments in various other controversyor pronouncement stories absolute(cf. e.g., Matt 19:21, 9:15, and esp.13:57, a particularly interesting par-allel because of its similar exceptionclause . . . ), so one should be equallywary of elevating 19:9 (or Mark10:11-12) into an exceptionless abso-lute. The casuistic legal form (“who-ever”) does not undermine this

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claim; parallel “sentences of law”(e.g., Matt 5:22, 27, 39, 41) also con-tain implicit qualifiers.53

I think a good case can be made thatJesus himself uttered the exception clause.I formerly held that the disciples’ incre-dulity (v. 10) in the face of Jesus’ sayingon divorce in v. 9 could only be explainedif Jesus had prohibited all remarriageafter divorce, even divorce for sexualimmorality. Stein, too, admitted that“Even in the Matthean account the reac-tion of the disciples seems best under-stood in the light of a total prohibitionagainst divorce (see Matt 19:10-12). Sucha reaction would be surprising if Jesus haduttered the ‘exception clause’ since thiswas essentially the position of the schoolof Shammai.”54 I think there is a thirdalternative. From Jewish writings outsidethe Bible, we know that first-century pre-rabbinic marriage and divorce practiceinfluenced Jewish custom on severalpoints. Not only had the discussions ofHillel and Shammai turned the concessionof Deut 24:1 into a right to be claimed (cf.Matt 5:31), a veritable “husbandly privi-lege,”55 but first-century Judaism had dis-torted the intent of the Mosaic command

found in Deuteronomy 24:4. This prohi-bition of a man returning to his first wifeafter she had remarried and divorced asecond time (or her husband had died)was cast in the extreme so that a husbandwas prohibited from ever returning to hiswife if she had sexual relations in any formwith another man. She had to be divorced(cf. Joseph and Mary in Matt 1:19), even ifshe was an innocent victim of rape.56 IfJewish law mandated divorce for sexualunfaithfulness and prohibited a wife fromever returning to her husband after shehad been unfaithful, Jesus may be coun-tering both of these notions via the excep-

tion clause, which would permit divorcefor immorality and might even encourage

offended spouses to forgive and takeback unfaithful mates.57 I am convincedthat Jesus’ goal would parallel Yahweh’srelentless pursuit of unfaithful Israelthroughout the OT and that he would tryto save a marriage at all costs. Thus theexception clause means that Jewish mar-riages may still be kept together even ifdivorce for porneia occurs (cf. the forgive-ness requirement in Matt 18:21-35 and themodel of the father in Luke 15:11-32). Thiswould have been shocking to first-centuryJews, suggesting that Jesus’ view is morestrict than Shammai’s—the radical loveof God does unexpected things—andadequately explains the disciples’ horri-fied reaction to Jesus’ teaching in Matthew19:10.58

Rethinking the Meaning of“Divorce”

The major criticism of the minorityview that Jesus did not permit remarriageafter divorce, even divorce for sexualimmorality, has always been that in thefirst-century world a legitimate divorceincluded the right to remarry. C. S. Mannstates the point emphatically: “The notionthat Jesus was allowing separation, butnot divorce, cannot be sustained—asJudaism had no such custom, he wouldperforce have had to explain it.”59 I triedseveral times to argue that Jesus had madeit sufficiently clear that he was investingapolyo (“I divorce”) with a differentsemantic content,60 but my argumentshave not proved convincing. I knew thesyntactical argument we employed onlyopened the door to harmonizing Matthewwith an absolute reading of Mark, Luke,and Paul.61 Further, I have always taughtmy Greek exegesis students that when it

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comes to validating exegetical problems,grammar gets you into the ball park, andsometimes gets you on base, but it willnever get you to home plate.62 So why didI persist? Why did I continue to think thatJesus must be using the word “divorce”with a new sense?

It seemed very clear to me. Jesusbrushes aside the Pharisees’ Deuteronomy24:1-based concept of “divorce” andreplaces it with the Genesis 2:24-basedconcept that husband and wife become“one flesh.” After quoting Genesis 2:24 inMatthew 19:5//Mark 10:7-8a, Jesus reit-erates the significance of the two becom-ing one flesh by saying, “So they are nolonger two but one flesh. What God hasjoined together let no one separate” (Matt19:6//Mark 10:8b-9). This meant thatthe “one flesh” concept in its OT contextwas the basis for whatever Jesus wassaying about the permanence of marriage.Yet none of the books or articles on divorceand remarriage—I had collected around100 by then—ever nailed down this con-cept.63

Then in the midst of doing research formy 1982 Th.M. thesis, I stumbled acrossan obscure yet impressive doctoral disser-tation done by A. Isaksson at the Univer-sity of Upsala, Sweden.64 This is where Ilearned two concepts that steered myexegesis from that point on (cf. minorityview of Gen 2:24 in the chart above):“leave” and “cleave” were covenant termsand were later employed to refer toGod’s covenant with Israel, and “oneflesh” in Genesis 2:24 was an abbreviationof Adam’s remark in Genesis 2:23. To besomeone’s bone and flesh was a commonOT expression to denote kinship and fam-ily solidarity. Since (1) I assumed God’scovenant with Israel could not be broken(cf. Rom 11:28-29), (2) that the fidelity of

Yahweh towards Israel, whom he hadjoined with himself in a covenant (berit),is implicitly put forward as a model forhusband and wife in Malachi 2, and (3)that kinship relationships cannot beundone, then marriage must be a cov-enant-based kinship relationship thatlasts until death.

There was only one problem. I wasmissing two crucial details about biblicalcovenants and the nature of that Genesis2:24 “one flesh” relationship: (1) biblicalcovenants can be violated and dissolvedand (2) the “one flesh” marital-kinshipunion is not a literal flesh and blood rela-tionship. (I have already incorporatedboth of these points in the top two boxesin the chart under the majority view.)

Rethinking the Meaning of“One Flesh” and the Nature ofBiblical Covenants

Gordon Hugenberger’s Marriage as a

Covenant: Biblical Law and Ethics as Devel-

oped from Malachi is the most comprehen-sive study of its title’s focus to date. Healso draws upon all the pertinent ancientNear Eastern and related biblical legaland narrative material touching onbetrothal, marriage, divorce, and sexualoffences.65 This study supplied the final“programming” that I needed to resolvethe cognitive dissonance on the subject ofremarriage after divorce that I have expe-rienced for the past ten years. On myformer “no remarriage” view of Jesus’teaching, what proved most troubling tome all along (though I did have an answerfor it) was that Jesus would be labeling asadultery the remarriage of someonewhose spouse’s unrepentant sexualimmorality or subsequent remarriage hadmade the restoration of the original mar-riage impossible. This just did not sound

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like the God “who practices steadfast love,justice, and righteousness in the earth”(Jer 9:24).

Hugenbeger notes from the start that“the relationship between biblical mar-riage law and covenantal concepts hasbeen left largely unresolved and, much ofthe time, virtually ignored.”66 He addsthat a study of the covenantal nature ofmarriage could help resolve some of theremaining difficulties in comprehendingthe biblical ethics and practice of mar-riage; and one such difficulty is thedissolubility of marriage, i.e., whatconstitutes covenant breaking. Some saythat if marriage is a covenant, then it mightbe possible to break the covenant bydivorce.67 Others argue that not divorce,but only sexual infidelity “breaks” thecovenant. P. F. Palmer, on the other hand,claims that covenants, unlike contracts,are inherently “inviolable” and “unbreak-able.”68 The data in my head began toreformat when Hugenberger respondedto Palmer ’s “unbreakable” covenantnotion by saying that “in terms of Hebrewusage covenants may be both violated anddissolved—with both of these conceptsexpressed by the same underlyingHebrew expression which is customarilyrendered ‘broken’ in most English ver-sions…”69 I knew immediately that myno remarriage view had been placed injeopardy.70

I learned that the primary sense of“covenant” (berit) is that it is an “elected,as opposed to natural, relationship ofobligation established under divine sanc-tion.”71 Covenants were “the means theancient world took to extend relationshipsbeyond the natural unity by blood,”72 and“berit is nowhere employed of naturallyoccurring relationships and the ordinaryobligations which attend them, such as

those which exist between parents and achild or between blood brothers (cf. Gen.4:9).”73 I had argued that the covenant andconsummation of marriage made twototally unrelated people as closely relatedas they will be to their own flesh and bloodchildren. However, the unity betweenunrelated persons established by themarriage covenant is not the same as a ver-tical blood relationship between a parentand a child nor the horizontal blood rela-tionship that exists between siblings. TheGenesis 2:24 phrase, “they become oneflesh,” refers “to the bondedness whichresults from and is expressed by sexualunion” and “refers to the establishmentof a new family unit” (cf. Gen 29:14; 37:27;Lev 18:6; 2 Sam 5:1; Isa 58:7).74

As already noted in our chart above,“leave” and “cleave” in Genesis 2:24 areclearly covenant terms, as Hugenbergeralso argues,75 and there are four essentialingredients in the OT understanding of“covenant” (berit): “it is used of 1) a rela-tionship 2) with a non-relative 3) whichinvolves obligations and 4) is establishedthrough an oath.”76 The scholarly consen-sus is that an oath is indispensable for rati-fying a covenant, and God is invoked inany ratifying oath to act as “the enforcer”of the covenant.77 The marriage covenant,as opposed to a contract, involves threepersons—the bride, the groom, and God.Furthermore, “covenant-ratifying oathsoften consist of verba solemnia, that is, asolemn declaration of the commitmentbeing undertaken—solemn because thedeity was implicitly invoked as a wit-ness.”78 These oaths were not just verbal

(nor primarily so), but were frequentlysymbolic: they consisted of “oath-signs”(sharing in a meal, the giving of a hand,etc.).79 Adam’s verbal oath-sign is foundin Genesis 2:23: “This is now bone of my

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bones and flesh of my flesh” (NIV).Far from being a “jubilant welcome”addressed to Eve, Adam addresses thesewords to God as witness, says Hugen-berger: “[T]hese words appear to be asolemn affirmation of his marital commit-ment, an elliptical way of saying some-thing like, ‘I hereby invite you, God, tohold me accountable to treat this womanas part of my own body [cf. Eph 5:28].’”80

So what role, then, does sexual unionplay in the formation of the marriagecovenant? Hugenberger argues “thatsexual union (copula carnalis), whenengaged in with consent (i.e., both paren-tal, in the case of dependent daughters,and mutual), was understood as amarriage-constituting act and, corre-spondingly, was considered a requisitecovenant-ratifying (and renewing) oath-sign for marriage, at least in the view ofcertain biblical authors.”81 “Clearly,” saysHugenberger, “sexual union is the indis-pensable means for the consummation ofmarriage both in the Old Testament andelsewhere in the ancient Near East.”82

It should be obvious now that sexualinfidelity is a particularly grave violationof the marriage covenant, a sin againstboth the covenant partner and againstGod,83 and if covenants can be violatedand dissolved, this sin strikes at the mar-riage covenant in a unique way. As Carsonnoted years ago in his commentary onMatthew:

. . . sexual sin has a peculiar relationto Jesus’ treatment of Genesis 1:27;2:24 (in Matt 19:4-6), because the in-dissolubility of marriage he defendsby appealing to those verses fromthe creation accounts is predicatedon sexual union (“one flesh”). Sexualpromiscuity is therefore a de factoexception. It may not necessitatedivorce; but permission for divorceand remarriage under such circum-

stances, far from being inconsistentwith Jesus’ thought, is in perfect har-mony with it.84

Though I was cognizant of Carson’s pointthe year his commentary was released, afew other possibly misconstrued pieces ofbiblical data (see above) caused me tobelieve that marriage was “‘till death dous part.” What ultimately caused me todo an about face was a series of OTpassages that were lumped together overseveral pages in Hugenberger.85

I was struck with the gravity of the sinof adultery in the eyes of both God andman. Hugenberger noted that “the OldTestament appears to presuppose a gen-eral moral consciousness in man, sharedeven by pagans, which acknowledgesadultery as a heinous wrong committednot only against the injured husband, butalso against God” (cf. Gen 20:6, 9, 10).86

God exclaimed to Abimelech, a Gentile,that if he did not return Sarah to Abraham,“know that you shall surely die, you, andall who are yours” (Gen 20:7). The seri-ousness of the sin of adultery was obvi-ous to Joseph too. When Potiphar’s wifesaid, “Lie with me” (Gen 39:7), Josephexclaimed: “How then can I do this greatwickedness and sin against God” (39:9).87

If this is how offensive God viewed asexual violation of the marriage covenant,then how could I continue to believe thatJesus, God’s son, would not view thatsame sin similarly?

To conclude, the Genesis 2:24 “oneflesh” relationship that results from thecovenant of marriage ratified by sexualconsummation is not an indissolubleunion, just one that should preeminentlynot be dissolved, and a sexual sin likeadultery is the preeminent violation of themarriage covenant. When we realize thatancient Near Eastern and OT (Deut 24:1,

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3; Mal 2:16) divorce law distinguishedbetween divorce without justification(“hate and divorce” in Deut 24:3; Mal 2:16)and divorce with grounds (“some inde-cency” in Deut 24:1),88 it seems most prob-able that the exception clause in Matthewpoints to divorce with just cause, a validdivorce that would permit remarriage,89

and Jesus limits that just cause to porneia.

Pastoral ImplicationsWhat does all of this mean for the

application of the biblical teaching ondivorce and remarriage now that I havecome to believe that Paul’s (1 Cor 7:15) andJesus’ (Matt 5:32; 19:9) words point to ajust cause for divorce? As I mentionedearlier, under my “no remarriage” viewI felt odd about saying that Jesus wouldforbid remarriage to the innocent personwhose spouse’s unrepentant sexualimmorality or subsequent remarriage hadmade the restoration of the original mar-riage impossible. This has now beenresolved in my mind. Second, in the caseof the genuine exceptions, after innocentparties have made all reasonable attemptsto save the marriage, neither the churchnor mission agencies should stigmatizeone’s subsequent decision to remarry orto remain single. Third, if we factor in ourown contemporary cultural differences,reflect on the accumulated canonical wit-ness to God’s merciful dealings with hispeople, take seriously the call to model theforgiveness we received from Christ at thecross and the call to imitate our heavenlyFather as his beloved children (Eph 5:1-2), then we should know not to applyJesus’ and Paul’s exceptions in exactly thesame way their first-century hearerswould have applied them. Their culturemandated divorce for sexual immorality.Both Jewish and Roman law, “required a

husband who learned of his wife’s affairto divorce her immediately,” and if he didnot do so, “Roman law allowed him to beprosecuted for the offense of lenocinium—

pimping”90 Today I think Jesus wouldlabel as unforgiving someone whodivorced their spouse for a “one nightstand.”

Though we do not have any NT ex-amples illustrating the precise way Jesus’(or Matthew’s) and Paul’s exceptionsmight be applied, at least two paradigmsteach us to be gun shy of getting trigger-happy with them. First, though Yahwehhad the legal right to disown his peopledue to their infidelity (cf. Hos 2:2a//1:9),he only threatened Israel with divorce.However, “just as the threatened covenantof dissolution in Hosea 1 is followedby an unexpected promise of covenantrenewal in Hos 2:1-3 [ET 1:10–2:1], so alsothe threatened divorce in Hos. 2:4ff. [ET2ff.] is followed by an unexpected prom-ise of a new marriage in Hos. 2:16ff. [ET14ff.].”91 God’s gracious covenant loveultimately overcomes Israel’s infidelity.Second, I agree with R. B. Hays that “theChrist/church typology [cf. Eph 5:21-33]presents an extraordinarily high standardfor marriage; if marriage truly reflects thelove between Christ and the church, itshould be characterized by infinite loyaltyand self-sacrificial love.”92

What, then, do the two exceptions inthe majority view have in common, andwhat can we learn from them about howto handle divorce cases today? At thispoint in my study, I would secondKeener’s summary of Blomberg’s insight-ful comparison of the two. The principlesthat unite both Jesus’ (or Matthew’s) andPaul’s exceptions are: (1) both sexualimmorality and abandonment violate oneof the two fundamental components of

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marriage (either the “leaving and thecleaving” or the “one flesh” unity); (2)“Both leave one party without any otheroptions if attempts at reconciliation arespurned”; and (3) “Both recognize theextreme seriousness of divorce as a lastresort and as an admission of defeat.”93

Might there be additional legitimategrounds for the dissolution of a mar-riage?94 Here one must be cautious. Somedo feel that physical abuse justifiesdivorce, and I am sympathetic with thissuggestion.95 Even on my former “noremarriage” view, I taught that in a homewhere a parent was abusing the childrenor a spouse was being abused, commonethical sense dictates that Jesus would notrequire the concerned parent to stay. Iagree with Keener that both Jesus andPaul would “would advise the one par-ent to take the children and leave, at leasttemporarily.”96 However, incompatibilityand fits of anger would not fit under thebanner of porneia. Also, provision for aspouse’s food, clothing, and housing,affection, communication, spiritual lead-ership, and a host of other qualities, are,no doubt, important requirements in mar-riage—but failures in these matters do notjustify divorce. I am leery, too, of appeal-ing to verses like 1 Corinthians 7:9 (“It isbetter to marry than to be aflame withpassion”), which Paul addresses to wid-owers and widows (vv. 8-9), and then turnthis into a basis for remarriage becauseone’s sexual needs go unfulfilled if aspouse invalidly divorces them andchooses not to remarry. Paul is quite clearthat believers are to remain unmarried orbe reconciled in this situation (1 Cor 7:10-11; cf. Matt 5:32b//Luke 16:18b). Also, theOT stories of Joseph and Potiphar’s wife(Genesis 39) and David and Bathsheba(2 Samuel 11) imply that God has given

us control over the sexual area of our livesand that we are not slaves to bodily pas-sions. Furthermore, my never-before-mar-ried single friends are quite suspicious ofarguments that seek to justify remarriageprimarily to satisfy unfulfilled sexualdesires. Certainly, as a lesser of two evils,it would be better to marry than to com-mit sexual immorality, but this raises otherquestions I cannot address here.

If we have understood Paul correctlyin 1 Corinthians 7:15, willful desertion byan unbelieving spouse who subsequentlyremarries makes the restoration of thatmarriage impossible, and I would see nobarrier to remarriage (unless, perhaps, forconscientious reasons the abandonedbeliever desires to remain single). Butwhat if the unbelieving deserter does notremarry? In time and with great assurancethat the marriage cannot be restored, itwould seem that the Christian couldremarry. Just how long one should waitwould be determined by one’s theologi-cally informed conscience and whether ornot God providentially brings along aChrist-centered believing partner.

One or two writers find in Paul’scounsel in 1 Corinthians 7:27-28 explicitpermission for divorcees to remarry. I amquite confident that Paul is not here mak-ing a blanket statement that “remar-riage—like the marriage of a virgin—hasproblems, but also that it is not sinful.”97

This makes Paul explicitly approve ofremarriage after divorce without qualifi-cation. The ESV now helps clarify Paul’sintent: “Are you bound to a wife (dedesai

gynaika)? Do not seek to be free (me zetei

lysin). Are you free (lelysai) from a wife?Do not seek a wife. But if you do marry,you have not sinned, and if a betrothedwoman (he parthenos) marries, she has notsinned.” There is a growing consensus,

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though not without its problems, that Paulis speaking to the concerns of some en-gaged couples in vv. 25-38 (cf. NIV, NRSV,RSV translations of vv. 36-38).98 The menwere asking Paul whether or not to fol-low through with their promise to marry(cf. deo in v. 27) in view of the ascetic teach-ing they had come under in Corinth.99

Paul’s initial (vv. 25-28) and final (vv. 36-38) remarks in this section are directedspecifically to these couples.100 ThoughPaul personally prefers the single state, hewants them to know—contrary to whatthe ascetics probably taught—that it is not

sinful to go through with their plans tomarry (vv. 28, 36). Thus 1 Corinthians 7:27-28 should not be brought into discussionsof the NT teaching on the ethics of remar-riage after divorce.

I would like to comment on one finalimplication of the biblical teaching ondivorce and remarriage for church lead-ers, namely pastors/elders/overseers,deacons, and deaconesses. The mostrecent studies of “the husband of onewife” requirement (1 Tim 3:2, 12; Titus 1:6)argue that it is a typical ancient way ofsaying “faithful to one’s marriage.” Pauldoes not prohibit from church office thosewho, against their own wishes, have beenabandoned or sexually betrayed, but thosewho are unfaithful to their marriage.101

Thus divorcees should not automaticallybe excluded from leadership positions inthe church, nor should those who haveremarried after the very limited cases inwhich the NT permits remarriage afterdivorce (i.e., divorce with just cause).

ConclusionIt may sound odd for me to say this

now, but my switch to the majority viewcould be wrong. Nevertheless, I have triedto enumerate the conceptual, theological,

and exegetical reasons for my shift at thistime in my life, and the reader will haveto decide for himself or herself whetheror not I have made the right decision. Ithink there are some excellent argumentsto be made in favor of the minority view.Yet I have found that scholars like Collins,Davies and Allison, Hagner, and Hays,whose exegesis leads them to believe thatJesus categorically prohibited divorce andremarriage, eventually speak of Jesus’divorce sayings as an ideal that must berealistically applied in this “not yet” era.Their suggested modern applications arealmost identical to what we find amongproponents of the majority view. Bothmajority and minority views want toavoid extremes in their application of theNT teaching. Minority view proponentsmay unfortunately prohibit what Godwould permit,102 and majority viewproponents may permit what God wouldprohibit. The latter is the danger in a cul-ture that emphasizes “self-actualization,”personal fulfillment, and “being true tooneself” rather than being true to theattendant commitments and obligationsof one’s marriage covenant. Hays writes:

[T]he church must recognize andteach that marriage is grounded notin feelings of love but in the practice oflove. Nor is the marriage bond con-tingent upon self-gratification or per-sonal fulfillment. The church hasswallowed a great quantity of poppsychology that has no foundation inthe biblical depiction of marriage; . . .. When the marital union is rightlyunderstood as a covenant, the ques-tion of divorce assumes a very dif-ferent aspect. Those who have madepromises before God should trustGod for grace sufficient to keep thosepromises, and they should expect thecommunity of faith to help them tokeep faith, by supporting them andholding them accountable.103

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Let’s teach God’s word, preach to hisglory, and disciple and equip God’speople so that they find their greatestsatisfaction and enjoyment in beingobedient to Jesus. Only as we seek toplease the Lord and imitate our heav-enly Father as his dearly loved chil-dren (Eph 5:1) will we please oneanother—and that includes spouses.“He who loves his wife loves himself.For no one ever hated his own flesh,but nourishes and cherishes it, just asChrist does the church” (Eph 5:28b-29).104

ENDNOTES11W. A. Heth and G. J. Wenham, Jesus

and Divorce: Towards an Evangelical

Understanding of New Testament

Teaching (London: Hodder &Stoughton, 1984; Nashville: ThomasNelson, 1985; updated ed.; Carlisle:Paternoster, 1997). In the ten yearupdate we added a 34 page appen-dix and over 350 additional biblio-graphical entries, most of themappearing since 1984.

22ESV and so throughout unless indi-cated otherwise.

33Haddon Robinson, “CT ReadersSurvey: Sex, Marriage, and Divorce,”Christianity Today, 14 Dec 1992, 31.Over two-thirds of the 1,500 read-ers surveyed—primarily churchleaders—responded. This was oneof the highest responses in twodecades of subscriber research.Only one out of ten respondentswere divorced.

44D. A. Carson, “Matthew,” in The

Expositor’s Bible Commentary, ed.F. E. Gaebelein (Grand Rapids:Zondervan, 1984); W. D. Davies andD. C. Allison, Jr., The Gospel accord-

ing to Saint Matthew, 3 vols. (Inter-national Critical Commentary;Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1988-95);C. S. Mann, Mark (Anchor Bible 27;Garden City: Doubleday, 1986); C.M. Blomberg, Matthew (New Ameri-can Commentary 22; Nashville:Broadman, 1992); R. H. Stein, Luke

(New American Commentary 24;Nashvil le : Broadman, 1992) ;J. Nolland, Luke 9:21–18:34 ( WBC35B; Dallas: Word, 1993); D. L. Bock,Luke, 2 vols. (Baker Exegetical Com-mentary on the New Testament;Grand Rapids: Baker, 1994-96); C. S.Keener, A Commentary on the Gospel

of Matthew (Grand Rapids: Eerd-mans, 1999). The exceptions areR. H. Gundry, Mark: A Commentary

on His Apology for the Cross (GrandRapids: Eerdmans, 1993) and D. A.Hagner, Matthew, 2 vols. (Word Bib-lical Commentary 33; Dallas, TX:Word, 1993-95). This sample is notintended to be exhaustive.

55R. H. Stein, “Divorce” in Dictionary

of Jesus and the Gospels, ed. J. B. Greenand S. McKnight (Downers Grove,IL: InterVarsity Press, 1992) 192-199;G. F. Hawthorne, “Marriage andDivorce, Adultery and Incest,” inDictionary of Paul and His Letters, ed.G. F. Hawthorne and R. P. Martin(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsityPress, 1993) 594-601; C. S. Keener,“Marriage, Divorce and Adultery”in Dictionary of the Later New Testa-

ment and Its Developments, ed. R. P.Martin and P. H. Davids; DownersGrove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1997)712-717; C. S. Keener, “Adultery,Divorce” in Dictionary of New Testa-

ment Background, ed. C. A. Evansand S. E. Porter (Downers Grove, IL:

InterVarsity Press, 2000) 6-16.66G. J. Wenham, “Matthew and Di-

vorce: An Old Crux Revisited,” Jour-

nal for the Study of the New Testament

22 (1984) 95-107; “The Syntax ofMatthew 19.9,” Journal for the Study

of the New Testament 28 (1986) 17-23;“Divorce,” in The Oxford Companion

to the Bible, ed. B. M. Metzger andM. D. Coogan (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1993) 169-171.W. A. Heth, “The Meaning ofDivorce in Matthew 19:3-9,” Church-

man 98 (1984) 136-152; “Matthew’s‘Eunuch Saying’ (19:12) and ItsRelationship to Paul’s Teaching onSingleness in 1 Corinthians 7"(unpublished doctoral dissertation;Dallas Theological Seminary, 1986);“Divorce and Remarriage,” inApplying the Scriptures: Papers from

ICBI Summit III, ed. K. S. Kantzer(Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1987)219-239; “Unmarried ‘for the Sakeof the Kingdom’ (Matthew 19:12) inthe Early Church,” Grace Theologi-

cal Journal 8 (Spring 1987) 55-88;“Divorce, but No Remarriage,” inDivorce and Remarriage: Four Chris-

tian Views, ed. H. W. House(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsityPress, 1990) 73-129; “The ChangingBasis for Permitting Remarriageafter Divorce for Adultery: TheInfluence of R. H. Charles,” Trinity

Journal 11 ns (1990) 143-159;“Divorce and Remarriage: TheSearch for an Evangelical Herme-neutic,” Trinity Journal 16 ns (1995)63-100.

77A. Cornes, Divorce and Remarriage:

Biblical Principles and Pastoral Prac-

tice (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993);Warren Carter, Households and Dis-

24

cipleship: A Study of Matthew 19-20

(Journal for the Study of the NewTestament Supplement Series 103;Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press,1994); Hagner, 549. Cf. also M.Bockmuehl, “Matthew 5.32; 19.9 inthe Light of Pre-Rabbinic Halakah,”New Testament Studies 35 (1989) 291-295. Others not dependent on usinclude R. H. Gundry, Survey of the

New Testament, 3rd ed. (Grand Rap-ids: Zondervan, 1994) 191; J. C.Laney, The Divorce Myth (Minneapo-lis: Bethany, 1981); “No Divorce &No Remarriage” in Divorce and

Remarriage: Four Christian Views, ed.H. W. House (Downers Grove:InterVarsity Press, 1990) 15-54. Arecent survey and affirmation of ourbook is D. Warden, “The Words ofJesus on Divorce,” Restoration Quar-

terly 39 (1997) 141-153.88See also Blomberg’s article “Mar-

riage, Divorce, Remarriage, andCelibacy: An Exegesis of Matthew19:3-12,” Trinity Journal 11 ns (1990)161-196.

99Wenham and Heth, Jesus and

Divorce, updated ed., 205-209. Thedemise of the forbidden degreesof kinship view is the first of fourtrends we identified as emergingin the decade following the publi-cation of our study. Another recentcritique of this view appears inD. Janzen, “The Meaning of Porneia

in Matthew 5.32 and 19.9: AnApproach from the Study ofAncient Near Eastern Culture,”Journal for the Study of the New Testa-

ment 80 (2000) 66-80, esp. 69-70.10G. Hugenberger, Marriage as a

Covenant: Biblical Law and Ethics as

Developed from Malachi (Supple-

ments to Vetus Testamentum 52;Leiden: Brill, 1994; Grand Rapids:Baker Books, 1998). I would like toexpress my deep appreciation to Dr.Hugenberger for several e-mailexchanges and the assistance heprovided in the midst of his busyschedule as pastor of the historicPark Street Church in Boston and asadjunct professor of OT and semiticlanguages at Gordon Conwell Theo-logical Seminary.

11R. F. Collins, Divorce in the New Tes-

tament (Good News Studies 38;Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press,1992) 6-7. See my review of Collinsin Journal of the Evangelical Theo-

logical Society 39 (1996) 676-678.Collins’s approach is thoroughlyhistorical-critical: Matthew is datedin the late 80s; he is a collector oftraditions; the form of the exceptionin 5:32 is pre-Matthean (from hiscommunity); and the one in 19:9 isMatthew’s formulation.

12Cf. Hugenberger, 3, n. 25.13Ibid., 174.14D. J. McCarthy, Treaty and Covenant,

1st ed. (Analecta biblica 21a; Rome:Biblical Institute, 1963) 175.

15Cf. P. F. Palmer “Christian Marriage:Contract or Covenant?” Theological

Studies 33 (1972) 617-665.16F. I. Anderson and D. N. Freedman,

Hosea (Anchor Bible 24; New York:Doubleday, 1980) 221.

17Hugenberger, 165.18Ibid., 269.19Cf. BDB, “bsr,” 142, #4; N. P. Brat-

siotis, s.v. “bsr,” TDOT, 2:327-328.20Hugenberger, 77.21Ibid., 77, n. 144.22Cf. R. Westbrook, “The Prohibition

on Restoration of Marriage in

Deuteronomy 24:1-4,” in Studies in

the Bible 1986 (Scripta Hieroso-lymitana 31; Jerusalem: Magnes,1986) 387-405, adopted by Heth,“Divorce, but No Remarriage,” 82-87.

23Hugenberger, 83.24Note: As I recall, neither Heth nor

Wenham ever advocated this viewof Mal 2:16.

25C. S. Keener, . . . And Marries Another:

Divorce and Remarriage in the Teach-

ing of the New Testament (Peabody,MA: Hendrickson, 1991) 26-27.

26Blomberg, “Matthew 19:3-12,” 162,n. 5.

27J . A. Fitzmyer, Luke X–XXIV

(Anchor Bible 28a; New York:Doubleday, 1985) 1120.

28Keener, Marries Another, 23.29Cf. Heth, “Matthew’s ‘Eunuch Say-

ing,’” 255-266.30Keener, Marries Another, 61.31Keener, “Adultery, Divorce,” 6.32Stein, “Divorce,” 194.33Cf. Blomberg, Matthew, 292-293.34I first met Craig in July of 1992

when Christianity Today brought ustogether at O’Hare Airport for a CTInstitute on divorce (see the Dec. 14,1992 issue, pp. 26-37). Craig gaveme a copy of his book at that time.

35Heth, “Divorce and Remarriage.”36See R. B. Hays, The Moral Vision of

the New Testament (Edinburgh: T&TClark, 1996) for a more recent briefbut excellent canonical synthesis(361-376) after his exegesis of therelevant texts (349-361).

37G. Bromiley, God and Marriage

(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980) 67-68. So also F. F. Bruce: “presumablyremarriage would not be com-pletely excluded for the believer”

25

(1 and 2 Corinthians [New CenturyBible; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,1971] 70; and his Hard Sayings

of Jesus [Downers Grove, IL:InterVarsity Press, 1983] 61); W. F.Orr and J. A. Walter: “The desertedpartner, then, is free to marry again”(1 Corinthians [Anchor Bible 32;New York: Doubleday, 1976] 214);Stein, “Divorce,” 198; Hawthorne,“Marriage and Divorce, Adulteryand Incest,” 599; T. R. Schreiner,Paul, Apostle of God’s Glory in Christ:

A Pauline Theology (Downers Grove,IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001) 431. In1979 Stein was more nuanced aboutthe intent of 1 Cor 7:15: “One can-not be dogmatic and claim that thebeliever ‘no longer being bound’(7:15) implies the right to remarry,but it would be equally wrong to bedogmatic and say that it excludesthe right to remarry” (“Is It Lawfulfor a Man to Divorce His Wife?”Journal of the Evangelical Theological

Society 22 [1979] 120).38The answer to this question will be

found under “Pastoral Implica-tions” section in the words of Blom-berg (Matthew, 293), seconded byKeener (Matthew, 191-192, n. 96).

39Keener, Marries Another, 61. Keenerstill stands firmly behind this asser-tion: “The basic element of the Jew-ish divorce contract was the phrase‘you are free,’ permitting the wife’sremarriage (m. Git. 9:3; CPJ, 2:10–12§144); Paul employs the same for-mula for believers abandoned byunbelieving spouses (1 Cor 7:15; see

DPL, Marriage and Divorce, Adul-tery and Incest)” (“Adultery,Divorce,” 6).

40This was true despite the seven

arguments I had advanced to thecontrary in Jesus and Divorce, 140-144. I also knew, however, what G.D. Fee had said about 1 Cor 7:15b:“. . . several converging data indi-cate that Paul is essentially repeat-ing his first sentence: that thebeliever is not bound to maintainthe marriage if the pagan partneropts out. . . . Remarriage is not anissue at all; indeed, it seems to bequite the opposite. In a context inwhich people are arguing for theright to dissolve marriage, Paulwould scarcely be addressing theissue of remarriage, and certainlynot in such circuitous fashion” (The

First Epistle to the Corinthians [NewInternational Commentary on theNew Testament; Grand Rapids:Eerdmans, 1987] 302-303).

41Heth, “Divorce and Remarriage:The Search,” 84-89. Ph.D. student,R. G. Olender, seconds and extendsmy arguments in his “The PaulinePrivilege: Inference or Exegesis?”Faith and Mission 16 (1998) 94-117.Olender adopts a preterite-typeview of Matt 19:9.

42Keener, Matthew, 191.43Cf. Bock, 2:1358, n. 27.44Fee, First Corinthians, 331; cf. 295-

296, 303, 355-356.45Ibid., 355.46This is why Paul reminds them

twice in this section that “it is nosin” to marry (1 Cor 7:28, 36).

47Blomberg, Matthew, 111, 190, 198,204, 342-343 (especially relevant toJesus’ saying in 5:32), 377-378.

48Ibid., 289-290. Cf. G. D. Fee, “Issuesin Evangelical Hermeneutics, PartII: The Crucial Issue–AuthorialIntentionality: A Proposal Regard-

ing New Testament Imperatives,”Crux 6:3 (1990) 41.

49Stein, “Divorce,” 197.50Blomberg, “Marriage, Divorce,

Remarriage, and Celibacy,” 162. Cf.W. Barclay, Introduction to the First

Three Gospels (Philadelphia: West-minster, 1975) 63: “The form of thesesayings [“If any man ...,” “Who-ever,” or “Whenever”] makes themgeneral rules and principles, . . . “

51Stein, “Divorce,” 194. “Matthew, ledby the Spirit (Jn 16:13, 15), hasinterpreted Jesus’ words and shownthat Mark 10:11-12 and Luke 16:18are overstatements addressed to ahostile audience and that Jesus didnot intend in a single sentence toestablish a law which would coverever conceivable situation” (Stein,“Divorce,” 194-195).

52Davies and Allison, 1:532; cf. 95-96.I find it precarious to maintain thatJesus always spoke in this manner.Thus I disagree with Davies andAllison’s assessment that “Matthewmust be found guilty of misunder-standing Jesus” when he includedthe exception clause because it“betrays a halakhic interpretation:it turns the Lord’s logion into a com-munity regulation” (532). See fur-ther Heth and Wenham, Jesus and

Divorce, updated ed., 218-219.53Blomberg, “Marriage, Divorce, Re-

marriage, and Celibacy,” 162-163.Blomberg also notes, contrary to therhetorical overstatement approach,that the exception clause in v.9need not be understood as “a later,inspired addition. It is rather morelikely a portion of Jesus’ originalteaching which Mark omitted andMatthew restored” (163, n. 8).

26

54Stein, “Is It Lawful,” 118. Stein doesadd that “Matthew goes furtherthan the school of Shammai, how-ever, by relativizing Deut 24:1 asbeing given ‘due to the hardness ofmen’s hearts’” (ibid.).

55Gundry, Mark, 530.56Cf. Bockmuehl, “Matthew 5.32;

19.9,” 291-295. Also Carter, House-

holds and Discipleship, 56-89. Nearlyevery one of the premishnaic textsthat Bockmuehl works with werealready discussed by A. Tosato,“Joseph, Being a Just Man,” Catho-

lic Biblical Quarterly 41 (1979) 547-551 (Jub. 33:7-9; 41:20; 1 QapGen20:15; cf. Tg. Ps.-J. 22:26).

57This is different than saying Mat-thew inserted the clause in orderto bring Jesus’ teaching in line withthe then current practice in theMatthean community (older histori-cal critical view). It also differs fromCollins’s view that the Matt 5:32form of the clause, with its allusionto Deut 24:1 (cf. Heth and Wenham,Jesus and Divorce, 168), suggests thatthe exception served as a conscienceclause for those Jewish Christianswho felt themselves duty-bound todivorce adulterous wives, either tobe faithful to God’s will or to obeythen current Jewish (and Roman)law, which demanded they divorceadulterous spouses (Divorce, 212).

58Interestingly, Collins (120-126) fol-lows the minority view on Matt19:10-12, but believes that divineenablement to remain single isgiven to those who divorce or havebeen divorced for reasons other than

unchastity (v. 9). Collins’s exegesis isseconded by Hays, 376-377, n. 17.

59C . S . Mann, 388 . Cf . S te in ,

“Divorce,” 193; Blomberg, Matthew,111.

60Heth, “The Meaning of Divorce,”136-152; “Divorce and Remarriage:The Search,” 94-97. Gundry alsoproposes, based on the reaction ofthe disciples in Matt 19:10 (cf. 5:31-32 where remarriage goes unmen-tioned), that Jesus allowed anexception with respect to divorcebut not remarriage. “If so and if theyunderstood Jesus correctly, he rede-fines divorce as a dissolution of mar-riage without the right to remarry”(Survey, 191).

61Heth and Wenham, Jesus and

Divorce, updated ed., 116-120, 227-229; Wenham, “Matthew andDivorce,” 95-107; “The Syntax,” 17-23. Jonathan Tripple, one of myformer Greek students in my Gos-pels’ course, recently noted in oneof our conversations about hisexcellent 28 page paper on Matt19:3-12: “To say that the majorityview would have been affirmedwithout a doubt if Matthew hadplaced the exception clause afterthe verb ‘remarries’ rather thanbetween ‘divorces’ and ‘remarries,’is really an argument from silence.”For the most recent critique of thesyntactical argument, see Janzen,“Meaning of Porneia,” 70-71.

62“ . . . we can feel confident that noreasonable writer would seek toexpress a major point by leaning ona subtle grammatical distinction—especially if it is a point not other-wise clear from the whole context(and if it is clear from the context,then the grammatical subtlety playsat best a secondary role in exegesis)”(M. Silva, God, Language and Scrip-

ture: Reading the Bible in the Light of

General Linguistics [Grand Rapids:Zondervan, 1990] 15).

63For example, S. A. Ellisen repeatedlystates that the sin of adultery“breaks” or “dissolves” the one-flesh union of husband and wife(Divorce and Remarriage in the Church

[Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1977]52, 53, 58, 68, 72, 97, 98, 99), andmentions “one flesh” at least fivetimes, but never once tells us whatit signifies and in what sense it isdissolved. Ten years later I readKeener’s Marries Another, and wasconvinced he still did not knoweither. He says that “husband andwife become one flesh when theyare united sexually” (Marries

Another, 40), that “They becomeone flesh in marriage (Gen. 2:24)because they were originally maleand female (1:27) and began as oneflesh (2:23); for the Hebrew idiom,cf. 29:14; Judg. 9:2; 2 Sam. 5:1; 19:13;1 Chr. 11:11” (160, n. 18), and that“Jesus uses this image of spiritual

unity [italics mine] to argue thatmarriage should not be dissolved bypeople, not to argue that it can notbe” (41).

64A. Isaksson, Marriage and Ministry

in the New Temple. A Study with Spe-

cial Reference to Mt. 19.13 [sic]-12 and

1 Cor. 11.3-16, trans. N. Tomkinsonwith J. Gray (Acta seminarii neo-testamentici upsaliensis 24; Lund:Gleerup, 1965).

65Among other surprises, Hugen-berger calls into question the tradi-tional view, largely based on Lev20:10; Jer 29:23, that within the OTa married man could not commitadultery against his wife if he had

27

sexual relations with an unmarriedwoman (313). “[T]here are, in fact,no texts which condone a husband’ssexual infidelity,” and “a number oftexts, including Job 31:1; Hos. 4:14;and particularly Prov. 5:15-23, makeclear that, whether or not there wasan legal obligation, there definitelywas a moral obligation for exclusivefidelity on the part of husbands”(338). This view finds its mostexplicit support from Lev 20:10 andJer 29:23.

66Hugenberger, 1.67Cf. D. J. Atkinson, To Have and To

Hold. The Marriage Covenant and the

Discipline of Divorce (London:Collins, 1979) 91. Cf. Blomberg,Matthew, 111 (on Matt 5:32b).

68Cited in Hugenberger, 3.69Hugenberger, 3, n. 25. Cf. also R. W.

Pierce, “Covenant Conditionalityand a Future for Israel,” Journal of

the Evangelical Theological Society 37(1994) 27-38.

70Blomberg was referring to someonelike me when he wrote that “mar-riage is best described as a covenant,which tragically can be broken,rather than as an indissoluble, mys-tical union that remains even afterdivorce (as traditionally held byRoman Catholics, and, curiously, bysome very conservative Protes-tants)” (Matthew, 290, n. 6). Oneweek after reading Hugenberger, Ichecked Jesus and Divorce (103-104)and realized that I had quoted fromPalmer the very “binding and invio-lable” portion with which Hugen-berger had taken issue. I had usedPalmer to identify the two crucialparts in the formation of ancientNear Eastern marriage covenants:

oaths and witnesses.71Hugenberger, 174. This sense is

operative in Mal 2:14 (“the wife ofyour covenant”) where the imme-diately preceding context (v. 15,“Did he not make them one . . . “)contains a reminder of the “oneflesh” nature of marriage in Gen2:24 (cf. Hugenberger, 124-167).

72D. J. McCarthy, Treaty and Covenant

2nd ed. (Analecta biblica 21a; Rome:Biblical Institute, 1981) 175, cited inHugenberger, 11; cf. 164, n. 161 &p. 180.

73Hugenberger, 180.74Ibid., 162-163.75Ibid., 159-160.76Ibid., 184.77Cf. ibid., 11-12, 193, 215.78Ibid., 278.79Ibid., 215.80Ibid., 165.81Ibid., 248.82Ibid., 279.83Cf. ibid., 281-294.84Carson, 417.85Hugenberger, 288-294.86Ibid., 291.87In addition to the Abimelech and

Joseph narratives, B. S. Childs addsthat the seriousness with whichIsrael viewed adultery is also seenwhen King David “falls under thedeath sentence for his adultery withBathsheba. In the other portions ofthe Old Testament adulterers arecommonly linked with murderers(Job 24.14f.) and treacherous men(Jer. 9.2) who misuse God’s name(Jer. 29.23) and oppress the widow(Mal. 3:5)” (The Book of Exodus [OldTestament Library; Philadelphia:Westminster, 1974] 422). Cf. Heb13:4: “Let marriage be held in honor

among all, and let the marriage bedbe undefiled, for God will judge thesexually immoral and adulterous.”

88 See the Westbrook bibliographicalreference in the chart at Deut 24:1-4. “Some indecency” would refer to“a cause serious enough to permitthe husband to divorce his wifewhile avoiding any financial pen-alty. Cf. also, e.g., M. G. Kline, Treaty

of the Great King, 115 (cited inHugenberger, 81, n. 154).

89This is the burden of the article byJanzen, “Meaning of Porneia,” 66-80.He understands the Pharisees’ ques-tion in Matt 19:3 to be “is divorcewithout just cause permissible? Cana husband divorce ‘for every kindof reason’?” (78). Janzen argues thatthe Matthean Jesus is much morestringent than his Pharisaical con-temporaries. “Not only does he notpermit divorce without just cause,but he limits just cause to sexualoffenses, a much narrower interpre-tation than that found in the Mish-nah” (79).

90Keener, “Adultery, Divorce,” 9. Thisconcern to avoid the charge of“legalized adultery (closing a pos-sible loophole in the prohibitionagainst adultery)” may well be theultimate reason for the prohibitionin Deut 24:4. In support, Hugen-berger cites J. Calvin, Commentaries

on the Four Last Books of Moses

arranged in the form of a Harmony, III,94: “The reason of the law is, that,by prostituting his wife, he wouldbe, as far as in him lay, acting like aprocurer” (Marriage as a Covenant,77, n. 144).

91Hugenberger, 233.92Hays, 364. Hays writes: “Once mar-

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riage is construed within the storytold by Scripture, divorce—even ifit is permissible in some narrowsense—is seen to be antithetical toGod’s design for male and female”(351).

93Blomberg, Matthew, 293. Cf. Keener,Matthew, 191-192, n. 96. Blombergadds: “These observations seem toleave the door open for divorce as afinal step, as perhaps the lesser oftwo evils, when all else has failed,similar to excommunication ofunrepentant sinners. To open thisdoor of course means that some willabuse their freedom and walkthrough it prematurely. And undueattention to the exception clause ofv. 9 risks losing sight of Jesus’ over-all point that divorce is never desir-

able. Married people should alwaysbe seeking ways to improve andenhance relations with spousesrather than wondering how they canget out of the commitments theyhave made. Those who divorce and/or remarry on any grounds mustadmit failure, repent of the sins thatled to the dissolution of their mar-riage, and vow to remain faithful toany subsequent relationships.”

94Blomberg (Matthew, 293), Hays(372), and Keener all answer thisquestion in the affirmative. Keenerwrites: “Assuming that Jesus’ teach-ing on the subject is a general prin-ciple meant to admit exceptions (asMatthew and Paul demonstrate),and acknowledging the probabilitythat his teaching is hyperbolic, wemay allow some exceptions notaddressed by Matthew or Paulbecause they were not specificallyrelevant to the situations these writ-

ers addressed” (Marries Another,105).

95G. P. Liaboe, “The Place of Wife Bat-tering in Considering Divorce,”Journal of Psychology and Theology 13(1985) 129-138.

96Keener, Marries Another, 61.97Ibid., 63. Cf. also Keener, Matthew,

191; “Marriage, Divorce and Adul-tery,” 714.

98Cf. H. Chadwick, “‘All Things to AllMen,’” New Testament Studies 1(1954-55) 267-268; G. Schrenk, s.v.“parthenos,” TDNT 3:60-61; O. L.Yarbrough, Not Like the Gentiles:

Marriage Rules in the Letters of Paul

(Society of Biblical Literature Disser-tation Series 80; Atlanta: ScholarsPress, 1985) 101-102, nn. 35-36; Heth,“Matthew’s ‘Eunuch Saying,’” 206-235, 267-286; D. F. Wright, “Sexual-ity, Sexual Ethics,” in Dictionary of

Paul and His Letters, 874; Schreiner,418. Sexual desires improperlychanneled are the common factor inPaul’s teaching in both 1 Cor 7:36-38 and in 1 Thess 4:3-8.

99Cf. J. K. Elliott, “Paul’s Teaching onMarriage in 1 Corinthians: SomeProblems Considered,” New Testa-

ment Studies 19 (1973) 219-225. LikeFee, I understand the “virgins” in v.25 as a term “that the Corinthiansused in referring to some youngbetrothed women who along withtheir fiancés were being pressuredby the pneumatics and were notthemselves wondering whether togo through with the marriage.Paul’s response is basically from theman’s point of view because it wasthe cultural norm for men to takethe initiative in all such matters.This assumes the influence of

Roman culture since by the time ofthe early Empire it was commonfor men to act on their own behalf,without the father acting as patria

potestas as in earlier days” (Fee,First Corinthians, 327). Cf. also J. F.Gardner, Women in Roman Law and

Society (Bloomington: Indiana Uni-versity, 1986) ch. 3.

100“ . . . the situation in vv. 27-28 seemsto be reflecting a real concern in thecommunity that is finally particular-ized in vv. 36-38” (Fee, First

Corinthians, 315).101Keener, Marries Another, ch. 7, “Can

Ministers Be Remarried?—1 Timo-thy 3:2”; S. Page, “Marital Expecta-tions of Church Leaders in thePastoral Epistles,” Journal for the

Study of the New Testament 50 (1993)105-120; Keener, “Husband of OneWife,” AME Zion Quarterly Review

109 (Jan 1997) 5-24. J. E. Smithfocuses on another related issue:Does sexual immorality per-manently disqualify one fromleadership? He concludes that thePastoral Epistles’ leadership quali-fications are concerned with thecurrent, not the past status of aleader’s character, that fallen lead-ers can be restored if both their lifeand their reputation inside and out-side (cf. Rom 2:24) the church canbe rehabilitated, but that this maybe very difficult (“Can Fallen Lead-ers Be Restored to Leadership?”Bibliotheca sacra 151 [1994] 455-480).

102Most readers of my work on thissubject did not know that I havealways applied my no remarriageview in almost the same way as adiligent proponent of the majorityview.

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103Hays, 372.104I would like to thank my colleague,

Ted Dorman, for reading this articlein an earlier draft and offering help-ful editorial suggestions.

jesus on divorce: how my mind has...

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