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C H A P T E R 3

O R GA N I ZAT I ON T H E ORY A S

ACR I T I CA L SCIE N CE ?F ORMS OF A NA LYS IS A N D 'N EW ORGA N IZAT IONA L F OR M

S'

H U G H W I L L M O T T

Science as a productive force can work in a sa!utary way when it is infused by science as an emancipatory force ...The enlightenrnent which does not break the (mythíc) spell dialectícally, but instead winds the veil of a halfway rationalization only more tightly around us, makes the world divested of deities itself into a myth! (Habermas 1974; 281)

An earlier version of this chapter was presented inthe Department ofManagement at the University ofKeele. I would like to thank participants in this seminar, and especially Simon Lilley, for their comments and criticisrns.

Sections of this chapter draw upoa Willmott (1997) and Alvessoa and Wtllmott (1996). The three year research project associated with this paper is funded by the UK Econornic and Social Research Council Future of Work Programme, grant number Ul.2252038. The project is investigating 'changing organizacional forms and the reshaping of work: It involves a number of in-depth case studies of a variety of organizational forrns, including &anchises, employment agencies., Private Finance Initia tives., partnerships, supply chain relationships, and outsourcing. The full research team is Mick Marchington, Jill Rubety, Hugh Willmott, Jill Earnshaw, Damian Grimshaw, !rena Grugulis, John Hassard, Marilyn Carrol!, Fang Lee Cooke, Gail Hebson, and Steven Vincent.

,•O"-._ .--,,

O R GA N I ZATIO N T H EO R Y AS C RITICAL SCIENCE? 89

'.'!-As knowledge production in the management disciplines has expanded ip._volume and increased in theoretical sophistication, doubts have grown about the coherence alld viability of a conception of science that represents scientific knowledge as

; unified, authoritative, and/or value-free. These concerns are dramatically articu lated in the claim that organizational analysis comprises four incompatible and indeed hostile paradigms founded upon polarized sets of assumptions about

_ science as well as society (Burrell and Morgan 1979; see Willmott 1993; see alsoOrganization Studies 1988).

Critical Theory is identified by Burrell and Morgan as a major, and perhaps the central, tradition within the radical humanist paradigm wherein 'the notion that the individual creates the world in which he lives' is subjected to critique by drawing upon and seeking to combine and develop the insights of diverse radical thinkers, notably Marx, Freud, and Husserl but also, in Habermas's thin.k ing, those who have recognized the importance of language as a focus for social analysis (see Alvesson and Willmott 1996: eh. 3 for an overview). For Critica! Theorists., and especially in the work of Habermas who is the leading contemporacy exponent of Critica! Theory, the critique of ideology has been a recurrent focus. In Habermas's writings, his attention has been directed to the role üf science and technology, in the forro of the domination of instrumental rationality in modem societies.

This chapter presents and applies insights developed by Critical Theory to offer a heuristic framework for appreciating and accom.modating the existence - of competing conceptions of scienti:fic knowledge. Specifically, the chapter commends the contributiGn of Habermas'stheoryof cognitive interests for the develop-

... ·'",.... - .ment of our se1fung -of (our knowledge of) management andorganization. This theory iS illustrated by reference to established areas of organiza tional analysis as well as to more recent research on 'new organizational forms' (NOFs).'

The thinking of Critica! Theorists, and Habermas's theory of cognitive interests more specifically, has been largely overlooked in management and organization studies (but see /Uvesson and Willmott 1992; Lyytinen and Klein 1985; Stablein and Nord 1985); or, if vaguely known about, Habermas's theory of cognitive interests is regarded as somewhat 'old hat', having allegedly been superseded in Habermas's subsequent work, a criticism that is add.ressed later in the chapter. For the moment it is relevant to keep in mind Burrell's (1994) observation that for the past thirty years and more, Habermas 'has fought in a variety of ways against "the present mood" and ali attempts to bring about the downfall of Westem rationality ... Habermas stands against ali varieties of totalizing critique which lead to despair.

' The term 'new organizational fonn' has emerged as a way of anaouncing the claimed presence of emergent and distinctive (e.g. 'post-bureaucratic') organizing practices that depart from established, 'older' forms of organiring (Daft and Lewia 1993) which view the old virtues of specialization and darity as inhibitors of responsiveness to rapidly changing opportunities and demands.

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5,v .1U<..ri W t L LMOTT

For him, the philosopher as "guardian of reason" is also the sentinel of, and for, human hope' (p. 5). ·

Habermas's theory of cognitive interests has continuing relevance for illuminat ing at least three important concerns in organization studies:• the aspiration of management knowledge to be scientific• the fragmentation of methodologies within organization studies

the scope for recognizing and combining the distinctive contributions of different forros of know]edge.

The theory of knowledge-constitutive interests can be taken seriously without necessarily accepting that Critica} Theory in general, or Haberrnas's thinking in particular, offers the most plausible or coherent account of the 'interested' produc tion of knowledge. Toe more modest requirement is a willingness to contemplate the possibility that Habermas's theory of k.nowledge-constitutive interests may behelpful in advancing the self-understandingo f management knowledge as aproduct of scientific investigation.

The chapter begins by locating the claims of Critical Theory in relation to traditions of 'systemic modernism' and 'postmodernism' (Cooper and Burrell 1988) as a basis for showing how Criticai Theory illuminates the normativity of knowledge production (and consumption). A plurality of methodologies within organization studies is then identified and reviewed, using the literature on main stream management theory, employee participation as well as 'new organizational forms' to illustrate the analysis. In a discussion section, attention is then drawn to a number of criticisms levelled against Habermas's cognitive interests theory beforeindicating how these have been addressed by Habermas and others. In conclusion,

ORG A N I ZATIO N TH EORY AS CRITl C A L SCI E NCE? 91

reality inyalue-neutral ways tj:iat facilitate its effec:tive m_anipultin. 'I_'his value-free conception of science harbours no doubts about the ethics of scienti:fic practice, once the decision to embrace the values of science has been made (Weber 1949; for a critique, see Alvesson and Willmott 1996: eh. 2). In contrast, those who challenge what Cooper and Burrell (1988) characterize as the clairns of 'systemic modernism' argue that 'scientific' knowledge is inescapably produced, transmitted, and legitim ized through a variety of power-laden mechanisms of production and control (e.g. resource allocations and refereeing procedures)-mechanisrns that discipline the research process and condition what is to count as 'value-free knowledge' (Hales 1974; Wood and Kelly 1978). According to Whitley (1984),topic selection and assessment criteria are affected by individual and collective values so that what is seen as constituting scientifu knowledge is dependent upon preferences and interests. Secondly, the existence of internai relationships between descriptions of phenomena constituted by everyday meanings and values means that all descriptions and explanations are inevitably permeated by values. (ibid. 384, emphasis added)

3.1.2 Anyone for Postmodernism?A strong postmodernist position contends that modemist analysis harbours inher ently oppressive grand narratives that constrain the possibilities of 'conflict, surprise and unpredictability' (Power 1990: 117). At the heart of this critique is the obJection that taken for granted, modernist truths of 1objective knowledge', 'rigor

1

some affi.nities between elements of Habermas's thinking and poststructuralist ous analysis', independent scrutiny', etc., aspire to be totalizing. Postmodernistanalysis advanced by Foucault and by Laclau and Mouffe are signalled.

3.1 MA N A G E M E NT SCI E N CE A

ND EP I S T E M O L O G I CA L AN

G S T

3.1.1 The Claims of Systemic Modernism

Critica} Theory has repeatedly assailed the received understanding that science is unified, authoritative, and value-free, is underpinned by the assumption that reality is 'out there' (e.g. Horkheimer 1937), and that scientific knowledge can capture this

thinking unsettles the 'truths' of modemism in

a way that, in a sense, returns to reality what is repressed by its rationalist vision ... Postmodernism is thus associated with the recognítion and celebration of the value of diverse rationalities and, relatedly, with the charge that the one-dimensional application of a supposedly authoritative (scientific) rationality is indefensible ...the discourse of postmodemism draws much of its plausibility from the inevitable 'failure' of modernism to eliminate indeterminacy and multiplicity. (Willmott 1992: 59-60)

The modernist rejoinder to such criticisms is that the most strenuous of efforts are made to refine and purify their research methods, thereby ensuring that biases ascribed to 'individual and collective values' are minimized and eventually eliminated. Vvhat this defence declines to acknowledge, however, is that the very methods of detecting and demonstrating the reduction of bias are themselves subject to the processes identified by \Nhitley (see above)-namely, the permeation of scientific by particular 'ethnocentric', rather than universal values, preferences, and interests. As a consequence, it is not surprising to find that, despite the best efforts of the Canutes of systemic modernism (e.g. Donaldson 1985; Bacharach 1989) who struggle valiantly to stem the delinquent tide of 'irrationalism' and 'subjectivism'

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(as they might characterize the diverse assaults on the citadel of Science, see_ Bernstein 1976}, their defences have· been· breached (see Marsden 1993) and thewaves are not receding.

3.1.3 The Critical Modernist Alternative<Critica! modemists', Habermas included, share a postmodem scepticism about

value-free knowledge, yet seek to retain and revive the spirit of the Enlightenment in the face of what are regarded as the perversions of Reason, including the power

invested in Scientific Authority by systemic modernism. The rosy view of science as the benevolent agent of enlightenment is challenged by the understanding that modem civilization is mesmerized by the power of a one-sided, instrumental

conception of reason (see quotation that opens this chapter). Beguiled by successes in conquering and harnessing nature, the inhabitants of modem societies are seen to be prisoners of a nexus of systemic modernism that is no less constraining, and is

in many ways much more destructive, than the myopia and deprivations of pre modern traditions. Yet, it is of course these traditions that the enlightening advance of science aspires to replace: <In the mot general sense of progressive thought, the Enlighterunent has always aimed at liberating men from fear and establishing their sovereignty.' Yet continue 'the fully enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant'

(Horkheimer and Adorno 1947: 3)._Symptomatic of this disaster is the relentless andmechanized effort to dominate nature and the widespread environmental destruction and pollution associated with the ruthless exploitation of scarce natural resources.

By deploying the debunking capacities of criticai Reason (e.g. to unmask racist or sexist daims about the innate superiority of particular groups), critical modemists anticipate a progressive demystification and rationalization of communication that moves beyond the 'halfway rationalization' (Habermas 1974: 281) that is (arguably) consequent upon the equating of science with a technical interest in prediction and control. According to critical modernists, the connection of scientific knowledge to an interest in 'liberating men from fear' (Horkheimer and Adorno 1947: 3) is weak.ened as science becomes an instrument of political and economic domination. When decisions are dominated by a technical interest in refining means, based upon seeming incontrovertible 'facts', fundamental questions about politics and ethics are marginalized. Ends are taken as given or beyond rational determination as they arerepresented as a matter of arbitrary value-choice.

In opposition to an exclusively instrumentalist conception of science, criticai modernists seek to mobilize reflective Reason to expose 'unreason', or distorted forms of Reason, and thereby facilitate an overcoming of 'the totalizing control of systemic logic' (Cooper and Burrell 1988: 97). This logic is seen to spawn an

ORG A N I ZATI O N T H EORY AS C R ITICAL SCIEN CE? 93

. "incipiently technocratic forrn of)ife _based up_on _ _seemingly object_ive information produced by experts, rather than a democracy fashioned through an ideal of universal participation in open debate. Critical modemism counterposes to tech nical reason the practical rationality of the institutional frameworks in which technical reason is embedded, and which can be mobilized to contest processes o{ (technocratic) rationalization.

3.2 CR I T I CAL TH E O R Y A N D HA B E R M

A s's TH E O R Y O F CO G N I T I V E l N TE

R E ST S

Thi section places Habermas's thinking on science in the context of the develop ment of Critical Theory. Each type of knowledge-constitutive interest is briefly summarized. They are then illustrated by reference to studies that focus upon 'new organizational forms' in addition to more generalist literatures.

3.2.1 Critical TheoryHaving its institutional origins in the Institute of Social R earc h at Frankfurt

·-"University, Critical T loped by members of the Frankfurt School, as

ecknown, airns to combine social science and philosophy to advance politically and practically committed social philosophy. This mission, as we noted in the previous section, includes a fundamental questioning of the claim that social science can and woúld produce objective, value-free knowledge of social reality. Instead of feeling obliged to discover universal, invariant regularities and law-like pattems in social behaviour (or at least to clress uo empirical findings in

oC..V r:f,.rthese terms), members of the Frankfurt School have Sought to show how seemingly'given' pattems of activity (é.g. consumerisrn, authoritarianism) take shape within specific historical nd societ contexts, and that the methods of representing these patterns are themselves birtrféãmbedded within and coloured by_these con texts.

A strong thread links the ideas of the Frankfurt School to the views of left. Hegelians whÕsemost influential member was Marx (see Jay 1973). Member.s of the School have identified themselves with the critica}, emancipatory intent of the Marxian tradition. But, instead of focusing upon the revolutionary potential ascribed by Marx to the working class of which they were sceptical, their attention ;:::

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has been directed to anyand ali individuals who-feeling frustrated, oppressed, andconfused by the contradictory claims, perverse priorities, and divisive effects ofro9-dern capitalist societies-are potentially receptive to the revitalization of an"'in.tiffn'.níêíít&nception of Criticai Reasou as a Ilêlã'riJof exposing and removingforms of mystification and oppression engendered by a modem, scientistic culture.

3.2.2 Knowiedge and Human InterestsAccording to Habermas, a forgetting of the critical, emancipatory role of modem science in discrediting prescientific dogmas is syrnptomatic of a contemporary failure to appreciate how scientific activity is embedded in the hwnan 'self formation process' through which di.fferent kínds of 'interest' guide the generation of knowledge. 'The methodology of the sciences', Habermas (1972: 5) argues, is inextricably 'intertwined with the objective self-formation proces.s' made possible

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by humanity's cultural break with nature. Released from the secure tyranny ofinstinctual demands, human beings are cornpelled to organize forros of knowledge or 'cognition' through 'Wh.ich a precarious 'management' of social and natural phenomena is accomplished.

The interests that are constitutive of knowledge are described by Habermas as 'quasi-transcendental'. On the one hand, their origin is understood to lie in the universal, transcendental human condition of world-openness; but, on t1..e otherhand, their realization is historically and culturally mediated within Giiffiãriênt

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a i:·;:f"lllests accommodates and values diverse forros of knowledge production, 2 and Habermas argues that the most basic challenge for contemporary scientific endeav our is to re-member the diverse cognitive interests released by the cultural break with nature; and then to mobilize these interests in the emancipatory project of developing more fully, as contrasted with 'halfway' (see earlier), rational social institutions and reiations.

Three cognitive interests, Habennas contends, underpin the production of distinctive forros of knowledge (and associated types of science): a technical

interest in production and control; a practical (historical-hermeneutic) interest in mutual understanding; and finally an interest in emancipation (See Table 3.1).

Everyday human action is understood to involve combinations of these cognitive interests. For heuristic and emancipatory purposes, however, it is helpful to

appreciate how human interests are constitutive of different kinds of knowledge. More particularly,

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the partitioning of human interests facilitates an appreciation of how the. three· ·cogilitive interests-technical, practícal, and emancipatory and related types of

science--contribute more fully and self-consciously to the human self-formation process.

3.3 TH E TH R E E KN O W L E D G E -CO NS T I T U T IV E lN TE R E ST S A N D TH E I R A R TI C U LA T I O N AS

Ü R GA NI ZAT I O N TH E O R Y

,,,..····3.3.1 The Technical Interest

When the technical interest is engaged or articulated, it impels the production of knowledge ína way that improves the efficiency and/or effectiveness of the means of fulfilling current ends. The world is then represented as a set of given, objectified elements and processes over which human beings seek to establish and extend their controL When motivated by a 'technical' interest, these elements and processes are apprehended as independent phenomena that can be manipulated in a continuous process of design, intervention, and feedback. ln its scientific manifestation, the technical cognitive interest represents the world as a complex set of interdependent variables. Wage-payment systems, for exarnple, are a typical product of such knowledge in which material and symbolic rewards are geared to the measured outputs of productive effort. It is understood that increases in productivity can, in principie, be predicted and controlled-for example, by changing the reward system, or by refining the organization of intemal labour markets. Such interven tions rnay achieve the desired results. However, from the perspective of the practical interest (see below), this is because such interventions are consistent with the particular meanings attributed by employees to (changes in) their work, and not as a direct consequence of the redesign of their jobs. A vast literature has been spawned by a technical interest in enhancing the prediction and contrai of people in work organizations. It comprises two key strands. The first is overtly problem solving and prescriptive; the second is ostensibly investigative and descriptive.

The most celebrated example of the overtly prescriptive literature is Taylor's Principies of Scientzjic Management (1911), a model of instrumental reason that has been reinvented or recast by numerous other management thinkers, including the contemporary champions of business process re-engineering. A more thoughtful and penetrating example of prescriptivism is Barnard's The Functions of the

ORG A N I Z ATION TH EORY AS C R ITICAL SCJ E NCE? 97

\· ú};;(ecutive (1934) '°".'hose ghost _haunts so much 'progressive' management thinking, jncluding the influential Excellence literature (e.g. Peters and Waterman 1982). This strand of prescriptionism identifies a 'new' factor-'culture'-that, when managed_ effectively, is deemed to ensure predictable and continuing improvements in performance. More recently, recipes for managing 'chaos' have joined, and are perhaps poised to supplant, prescriptions for controlling 'culture':

Today scientists are developing poerful descriptions of the ways complex systems-from swa,rms of mosquitoes to computer programs to futures traders in commodity markets cope effectively with uncertainty and rapid changê ...The new rules of complex behaviour that cutting-edge scientific research describes have intriguing parallels with the organiza tional behaviours many companies are trying to encourage. (Freedman 1992: 26)

An emergent prescriptive literature on 'new organizational forros' advises managers to pursuc particular courses of action-generally couched in terms of the need to remove 'old' rigid, bureaucratic practices-as a means of enhancing performance. 'Flexibility' is wide1y canvassed as the key to success in a 'hypercompetitive' envir onment (Volberda 1996). The 'transgression of boundaries is commended as a means of allowing greater fluidity of movement throughout the organization' (Ashkenas et aL 1995: 4). ln each case, managers are enjoined to identify a critica! variable that, once controlled effectively, will yield the predicted improvements inperformance.

V/e now tum to consider a second major strand of thinking, also guided by atechnical interest, that is more scholarly and less explicitly prescriptive. Here we find 1iterature concerned with the construction and testing of theory that is ostensibly distanced from 'the real world' preoccupations of organizational design and performance improvement. The Hawthorne experiments, for example, correl ated employee productivity with changes in various 'environmental factors'. Like wise, the Aston studies measured and compared the performance of organizations operating in different contexts with different structures and patterns of behaviour (Pugh and Hickson 1968), where the latter are understood to be reactive to the contingencies of the former. An opposing, 'action theoretic' stance ascribes adapta tions of structure and behaviour to the particularities of the accumulated compe tencies and recipes that inform pro-acti.ve, strategic choices (Child 1972) made by managers who enact and shape the contexts of their actions-for example, byenteríng into alliances.

More recently, students of 'new organizational forros' have called for the com bining of 'reactive' and 'proactive' models of change in a 'co-evolutionary' frame work that considers 'the joint outcomes of managerial adaptation and environmental selection' where the emergence of new forms of organization are examined as an interaction of managerial intentionality and environmental effects (Lewin and Volberda 1999: 523). The call is for research that abandons the focus upon unidirectional causalities founded upon a dependent-independent

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variable distinction in favour of a framework that studies ho _'changes in any.:,-one variable may be·caused endogenously by changes in others' (ibid. 527). How ever, the preoccupation with mapping and measuring variables that will render

organizations more predictable and controllable is extended rather than suspended. The call to abandon research aimed at discovering unidirectional causalities points

towards an alternative approach where the concern to appreciate howpeople in organizations actively interpret, construct, negotiate, and accomplish their

organizing practices, including those practices identified as exemplifying 'new

ORGA N I ZATIO N TH EORY AS C RITICA L SCI E NCE? 99

{'itfrest is tenned 'praical' because the process of making sense of the world is àderstood to be a precondition of anyform of social action, including the prediction rid . control of objectified processes (see previous section). The identification d" measurernent of variables, it is argued, is irremediably dependent upon 'the

'.1Jr:ior [rame of referenc to hich they are affixed' (Haberm_as 1972: 308). Knoledge:_:gúided by the pract1cal mterest addresses the quest1on of how 'vanables' iiâre identified and operationalized in order to develop insights into the social

3

organizational forms: Such research addresses the question of how knowledge of ,}Qtganization of empirical-analytic knowledge production. The type of science

'organizations' as well as their 'envíronments' is developed within particular schema that are productive of the very distinctions and relations--between 'organ izations' and 'environments', for example-that they aspire to illuminate. Some limited attention to this process is evident in Dijksterhuis and Van den Bosch's 'v\lhere Do New Organizational Forros Come From?' (1999), in which it is argued that 'perceived environment characteristics derived from shared schemas of top management trigger strategic design actions that may lead to new organization forros' (ibid. 571, emphasis added); and where it is suggested that this 'shared set of beliefs' comprising the schema not only 'functions as a context' for strategic design actions but 'is also reproduced in these actions' (ibid.). This formulation of the relationship between 'environments', 'strategic design actions' and 'forms' incorp orates some appreciation of how 'schemas' are productive of the characteristics ascribed to environments; and also notes how design actions are at once 'triggered' by the schemas and reproductive of them. Such analysis does not, however, extend to an appreciation of how the identification of 'forms' and 'strategic actions' by managers and commentators is itself an expression of a particular interpretive framework, and not a more or less accurate reflection of the reality that such sensemaking see.ks to penetrate and conquer. The analysis remains rooted in an empirical-analytic conception of knowledge production in which the self-evidence of the distinctions made between 'environment', 'design actions', and 'forms' is assurned; and in which minimal attention is paid to the question of how the ex.istence ascribed to 'forms' and 'strategic actions' is enacted. To consider how knowledge of organizations, or organizing processes, including their allegedly 'new' forms, can be differently constituted, it is necessary to consider research guided by an altemative, practicaI interest in mutual understanding.

3.3.2 The Practical Interest

The practical interest anticipates and pursues the possibility of attaining mutual understanding between people. When knowledge production is guided by this interest, the pressing concern is not to predict or control but, rather, to facilitate communication so that mutual understanding is reached, or at least advanced. This

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/-:'-ihat discloses and appreciates, rather than takes for granted, such socially organized·-- :frames of reference is termed 'historical-hermeneutic' because such 'practical' 'kiiowledge

necessitares the mobilization of historically mediated processes of inter pretation.When addressing the issue of employee participation, for example, knowledge

.guided by a practical interest in mutual understanding might begin with the question of how employees currently make sense of their work, and then exploreho.,such sensemaking is historically and culturally embedded within a wider set of ,/'/ Scial practices, norms, and values (e.g. Gouldner 1954; Dalton 1959; Watson 1994). / It may be shown how increased participation, for example, is viewed by employees

different and shifting ways-as a means of removing petty rules and/or as a more \.... subtle form of management control, for example. Toe purpose of knowledge guidedby a practical knowledge is to appreciate how persons enact their situation(s), and thereby aspire to develop a better understanding of their respective orientations.

1n the 'new organizational forros' literature, Sydow and Windeler (1998), forexample, call for an approach to their study, and more specifi.cally the development of inter-firm networks, that 'focuses on organizational and interorganizational practices and, at the sarne time, takes the interplay of action and structure, as well as power, sense-making and legitimacy issues involved in economic practices into account' (ibid. 265, emphases added). Sydow and Windeler examine the network practices of a group of 900 financial advisors, led by MLP-Finanzdienstleistungen AG, Heidelberg, who offer financial services to high incarne customers.4 The branches not only provide support services for the advisors but 'are strongly involved in the process in which the symbols, interpretive schemes, knowledge, norms, understandings and ways of doing business are reproduced' (ibid. 267). It is to an exploration and explication of these 'schemes, knowledge, norms, under standings and ways of doing business' that the practical interest in mutual understanding is directed. The schemes, etc. are understood to be media of organ izing, as are appeals to values and ostensibly rational courses of action signalled by

3 This form of knowledge may also be directed at gaining a better, refl.exive understanding of how its own fonn(s) of know!edge (e.g. about the practices of empirical-analytic science) are accomplished.

4 ln addition to the advisers, the hub firm of MLP indudes its own life insurer and an information services provider as well as stable relationships with insurance cornpanies, banks, and investment funds.

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concepts such as 'profitability, return on capital, stockholder value, _fa_i,rness, reputation, innovativeness, adaptive capacity', etc. They ali serve to evoke a context within and through which action is accomplished. 5

O R G A N I ZAT IO N TH EORY AS CRITIC AL SCIE NCE? 101

._;i.'.ifôw patterns of behaviour and meaning are embedded in oppressive structures of\<dOroination that, potentially, are open to challenge and change. ln Habermas's":.:< ( ) words, critical social science seeks 'to determine when theoretical state

3.3.3 The Emancipatory Interest

Whereas the technical and practical interests are conceived to be endemic to human existence, the emancipatory interest is understood to be stimulated by conse quences flowing from ideas and actions guided by the other two cognitive interests. This interest is provoked when, for example, employees esist techniques and lampoon ideo.!Q& that purport to 'empower' them, yet are experienced as an·1ntensificãtion of their work without appropriate or sufficient compensation. lnelucidating the emancipatory interest, Haberrnas (1986) explains that

what Imean is an attitude which is formed in the experience of suffering from something man-made, which can be abolished and should be abo!ished. This is not just a contingent value-postulate: that people want to get rid of certain sufferings. No, it ís something so profoundly ingrained in the structure of human societies--the calling into question, and deep-seated wish to throw off, relations which repress you without necessity-so intimately built into the reproduction of human life that Idon't think it can be regarded as just asubjective attitude which may or may not guide this or that piece of scientific research. It is more. (ibid. 198)

Habermas points to the experience of (unnecessary) frustration and suffering which, he contends, stimulates, yet also frustrates, a desire to 'throw off relations' that 'repress without necessity' (my emphasis). For Habermas, critica! science reson ates with, and indeed is fuelled by, a desire to assert (the possibility of) greaterautonomy and responsíbility

6 in the face of institutions and practices that are

sensed to impede unnecessarily their contemporary expression and extension. ln contrast to the <empirical-analytic' and 'historical-hermeneutic' sciences, which each regard existing social fonnations and patterns of meaning as giverz objects of prediction and control or of interpretation, critical science stxives to expose the unreasoned, politicãl basis of this gívenness. For example, instead of seeking to identify covariance between observable events (the project of empírical-analytic science) or stxiving to interpret the development of particular meanings (the concern of historical-herrneneutic science), critical science is concerned to reveal

5The study incorporates consideration of the practical, negotiated process of organizational realicy

production as a means of advancing our understanding of how 'organizational and interorgan.iza. tional practices' are accomplished. Criteria used for evaluating organizations and interorganizational networks are, from this perspective, 'necessarily contextuaily embedded social constructions' (ibid. 273, emphasis in original). There is, however, disappointingly little illumination of how these sensemakingpro6cesses are learned, developed, and changed through processes of communication.

Later, I question Habermas's unreflective use of these terms.

1972·ments grasp invariant regularities of social action as such and when they expressideologically frozen relations of dependence that can in principle be transformed'{ibid. 310).

To consider once more the case of employee participation, knowledge guided by an emancipatory interest goes beyond the 'mere' appreciation of employee orienta rions (e.g. towards participation) to show how these understandings are structuredwithin relations of power and domination-relations that are potentially open to (radical) transformation that dissolve 'frozen relations of dependence' and thereby ellininate forros of socially unnecessary suffering associated with these relations. From this perspective, :findings that indicate employee indifference or hostility towards a participation scheme may be interpreted as symptomatic of a structure of social and industrial relations where, historically, participation has either been exduded (e.g. by the adoption of a top-down approach to organization and job design) or introduced cynically as a means of achieving some other, often undis closed, purpose-such as greater flexibility. Employee hostility towards, or scepti cism about, participation schemes is then viewed, from the standpoint of criticai science, not as evidence of worker apathy or negativity per se but, rather indicative of institutionalized relations of dependence in which employees have been histor ically excluded from participation in key decisions. Precisely because such attitudes are located in a particular structure of dependency relations, they are understood to be rnutable: they can be changed by transforming the structures in which such attitudes are fostered and reproduced.

An academic body of knowledge guided primarily by an emancipatory interesthas emerged only comparatively recently inthe field of management and organiza tion studies. Forester (1992), for example, applies Habermas's analysis of the pragrnatics of communicative action 'to show how much more than instrumental action ...takes place in ordinary practice and what difference this makes for questions of power and powerlessness, community and autonomy' (ibid. 47). Forester's analysis illuminates how hierarchy operates to exclude or marginalize the contribution of subordinate actors to decision-making processes, thereby depriving them of full involvement in the institutions through which their sense of identity and purpose is constituted. This deprivation is understood not just as a loss to the individual, but simultaneously as a loss for the group or community. The wider community forfeits the benefit of subordinates' immediate contribution; there is also a loss of the- future benefits of skills and a sense of collective responsi bility that can develop through active participation in decisíon-making.

ln Forester's analysis, capitalists (e.g. property developers), senior planners, and managers are identified as (highly compensated) participants in a structure of power relations that they struggle to secure and sustain. Highlighting the

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102 H UG H WI L L MOTT

interdependence of individuals and the wider community, he sh9ws how those who are understood to occupy privileged positions of relative autonomy·and power are themselves frequently oppressed by a burden of responsibility which they routinely contrive to evade. Superficially, this representation of the privileged as victims would seem to affirrn conservative arguments for further compensatory hikes in their material and symbolic compensation. However, criticai analysis turns this proposal on its head. The (critically) rational solution to problems of irresponsi bility and apathy ascribed to disadvantaged citizens and employees, on the one side, and the excessive responsibility and stress suffered by an elite of decision-makers, on the other side, it is argued, is not to strengthen the existing system of control and rewards. Rather, the more enlightened way forward is to promote a wider diffusionof power and responsibility through the democratization of economic, as well as political, institutions.

Tuming, finally, to consider studies of <new organizational forms', it is relevant to take up once more Sydow and Windeler's (1998) study of organizing and evaluating inter-firm networks. Network performance measures applied to the financial ad visers studied by Sydow and Windeler included 'the ratios of prospective clients, of prospective to actual customers, and of the revenue realized to the revenue planned' (Sydow and Windeler 1998: 275). Of particular relevance is their observation that evaluations of the performance and effectiveness of the MLP network were not the product of impartial calculations so much as the outcome of political processes of domination that presented themselves as rational decision-making. Resources at the command of those occupying the hub firm of the MLP network are seen to be mobilized to establish and institutionalize particular criteria of evaluation, includ ing the acceptability or normalcy of criteria supportive of the reproduction of their position of dominance within the netwnrk. To the extent that there is compliance amongst network members with the evaluation criteria, then the use of resources to marshal and maintain the network serves to augment the assets at the disposal of the hub, thereby stabilizing the structure of domination. It is noted, for example, how what can be made to count as 'the adequate inforrnation' is dependent upon agents' 'power to impose the corresponding concept on the individual, on the organization or on the network'.7 <Network effectiveness', Sydow and Windeler (ibid. 275) contend, is thus 'an expression of distinct modes of domination, inher ent in the organizing practices'. From a critica! standpoint, network effectiveness is not simply a matter of reducing inefficiencies, facilitating expansion, or negotiating

7There is, however, little consideration of how the process of 'imposition' is accomplished or

indeed how certain kinds of information are privileged (and widely accepted?) as reliable and legitimate indicators of effectiveness. Within what interpretive frameworks are such demands p!aced, and how are these frameworks forged and reproduced? Sydow and Wmdeler are large:ly silent on such issues, despite their contention that 'studying inter-6.rm networks ingeneral and strategic networks in particular requires the analysis of concrete, context:ually embedded (network) practices· in a way that 'renounces convenrional hypothesis-testing' (1998: 280).

ORG A N I ZATION TH EO RY AS CR ITI CAL SCIE NCE 103

t\tshared definition of the situation wherein the evaluation c.riteria are :viewed as ':.:normal and reasonable. More fundamentally, it is about organizing forros of·-·tconomic activity that rnaintain a situation in which 'the greater proportion'/9f:the surplus generated by the network as a whole is 'appropriated by the hub·.• rum' (ibid. 276J.

This darker side of new organizational forms has been noted by Victor andStephens (1994) who acknowledge that they may be effective at generating surplus, t'educing costs, leveraging competitive advantage, etc., but that their 'radical design . . .entails losses as well as costs'. They note, for example, how the security of a role anchored in an organization with a well-defined boundary and codi:fied inâ job description is being supplanted by stress-ridden, 'hyperflexible workplaces'where roles are defined by the task of the moment, and where rights become ephemeral as everything is driven by the demand to be adaptive and innovative. These 'high velocity' workplaces, Victor and Stephens contend, <offer no ongoing relationships, no safe haven, no personal space' (1994: 481). Everything is negotiableand disposable.

This unremittingly dark picture tends to overlook how the very existence and exploitation of relations of dependence ferments the possibility of counterdiscourses and practices that expose and challenge oppressive institutions. Hints of this are present when Sydow and Windeler describe network processes being 'full of tensions and contradictions and a dialectic of control that only to some extent and for some time can be tamed by an appropriate govemance structure' (1998: 280). They note, for example, that the hub firm is 'highly interested that the advisors see themselves as "independent"' ( sic) even though their scope for acting independently of the ner.vork is, in some respects at least, 'almost as restricted as that of some employees in vertically integrated firrns' (ibid. 272). It is implied that those in the hub firm mobilize their resources to promete a definition of the advisers' situation that is intended to distance the self-understanding of the latter from that of employees. This stratagem proved to be contradictory, however, when the advisers exercised their sense of independence to mount a successful challenge to pressures to change their client quota. In this way, the attribution of independ ence that was intended, according to Sydow and Windeler, to obfuscate their capture by the network's performance indicators had the contradictory conse quence of emboldening advisers to exercise their power as key players within the network upon whose continued cooperation and delivery of client revenues the hubfirm depended.

When knowledge is guided by an emancipatory interest, questions are posed that bring to the surface the suffering-in terms of anxiety and stress, for example-t1.1.at are associated, in Sydow and Windeler's study, with the use of performance indica tors and the means of maintaining the subordination of the advisers within the network. Is it asked, for example, if the measures devised jointly and democratically by those to whom they were applied, or were they imposed by fiat by the hub finn? ;:::;

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To the extent that advisers complied with, or even consented to,_ the application of the perfon:hanc"e indicators, does thÍs imply that their cooperation was a consequence of making an informed decision, or was it because they calculated that the benefits (e.g. opportunity to eam bonuses) associated with advisory work out weighed the costs (pressures, job insecurity)? To what extent had the methods and criteria of assessing the job of advisers been coditioned by the high value placed upon material wealth in our society? The thrust of the emancipatory interest is to raise questions of this kind as a way of problematizing what is suspected to be an unreasoned basis for decision-making, such as career choice. Upon reflection, the conclusion may be reached that compliance with, or even consent to, evaluation procedures institutionalized within the MLP network is an •expression of ideologically frozen relations of dependence' (Habermas 1972: 310)-of advisers on the hub firm in particular-that can be transformed.

One kind of transformation would be for a group of advisers to establish their own, rival network. A more radical transformation rnight involve pressures from advisers to transform the network into a mutual company or a cooperative inwhich decisions about the distribution of the surplus are made by the policy-holders or by the partners within the cooperative. Less ambitiously, advisers might organize to shift the centre of gravityaway from the hub finn towards the advisers by organizing 'microemancipatory' forms of resistance to the repressive and/or precariously maintained pressures to produce a surplus. As Sydow and Windeler (1998: 275) usefully poínt out, the place of those occupying a dominant position within a hierarchy is rarely, if ever, unassailable. Changes of circumstances, such as shifts in distribution mechanisms (e.g. moves towards the remete distribution of finan cial services through the internet), can disturb prevailing structures of domination and relations of power; and ultim.ately those occupying such positions are depend ent upon others who generate the surpluses. It was this dependence that enabled some MLP advisers-presumably, the ones with the most affluent client base successfully to resist pressures by the hub firm to change the average number of clients that an adviser was allowed to serve. One rnay speculate that the prospect of disaffected advisers and their possible departure (with their clients) to establish acompetitor network to MLP was sufficient to dissuade those in the hub to persist in their efforts to renegotiate the client quota.

3.4 D I SCUSS I O N

It would be inconsistent to conclude this chapter without briefly addressing some criticisms of Habermas's Critical Theoretic Formulation of cognitive interests.

ORG A N I ZATI O N TH EO RY AS CR ITIC A L SCI E NC E? 105

:Íticism has been directed at his characterization of the_ ontological status·-jjf .hurnan interests as 'quasi-transcendental'. vVhen responding to the criticism{thát he fudges his position by refusing to say whether the interests are historical)/€ÍJlllllanent) or universal (transcendental), Haberm defends his original, ambiva lint formulation of the dialectical development of human nature and its interests: ih.e .interests, he contends, are a condition of 'the cultural break with nature' (see

• .''.lier), but they are also a consequence of this break. Without interests in either0

tinderstanding or controlling nature and society, knowledge that facilitates the '-· ·':t'ealization of this project would not be generated. But the realization of these

- Ülterests is always mediated by the specific contexts of theír articulation. It is· erefore erroneous to suggest that the interests are transcendental or immanent·since, in practice, they are both.

Second, Habermas has been criticized for bis representation of the self UJi derstanding of the empirical-analytic sciences. The objection is that his account refies upon an outdated, idealized representation of natural scientific practice (Hesse 198::!.). lt can be readily conceded, as Habermas (1982: 274 et seq.) has dane, fuat not all empirical-analytic scientists are unreflective empiricists in the way that his representation of their work may suggest. Fortunately, thís admission is not particularly damaging to Habermas's theory of cognitive interests. It is possible to acknowledge the existence of post-empiricist philosophies of (social) science whilst, at the sarne time, contending that in many fields of investigation, including the field of management, the conduct of 'normal science' proceeds; for the most part, blissfully unaware of and/or unconcerned by post-empiricist philosophical debates. It is precisely this complacent sleep that the theory of cognitive interests aspires to disturb-a prospect that is not dirninished by Habennas's positive valuing of empirical-analytic science v'lithin this theory.8

Habermas has also sought to strengthen the basis of his argument by abandoning a philosophy of consciousness in favour of a philosophy of language.9 It is worth stressíng that this 'linguistic tum' does not nullify the theory of cognitive interests or make it 'old hat'.tº By rooting his analysis in the universal properties of language, Habermas attempts to show-although not persuasively, inmy view-how the very (transcendental) structures of language anticipate a consensus based upon dialoguerather than force.n

s With specific reference to ernpirical-analytic science, Haberrnas has argued that 'no matter how perverted', its findings 'remain a piece with commined reason' (Habermas 1974: 270).

9- The basic difference betwe-en these formulations is that, in the philosophy of language, Habermas's claims are grounded intersubjectively in what he terms the 'universal pragmatics' of language use, rather than intrasubjectively in the consdousness of each human being.

'º Burrell (1994: 8) has noted how, in Habermas's !ater work, induding The Theory of Communicative Actfon, 'some of the key conceptualization of knowledge interests not only remain but grow in importance. They are part and parcel of Habermas's linguistic tum ...'.See also 'Nhite, 1988: 27 andHonneth and Joas, 1991: 19.

11 That said, the plausibility or otherwise of Habermas's daims is of relevance for my argument.This chapter is not concerned primarily with the role of the theory of cognitive interests in providing a

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I am not persuaded that it is possible to separate knowledge from relations of power within an 'ideal speech Situation' in.the manner that Habermas (counter factually) claims. Instead, I am drawn to a Nietzschean or postmodemist positionwhich warns that there can be no escape from power relations; and that despite all

O R GA N I ZATIO N T H EO RY AS C RIT IC AL SCI ENCE?107

,ilservative, effects than either a refusal to do so and/or a commitment to showing\W such distinctions are solely 'immanent to particular discourses' rather than in yway being a condition of ali forms of discourse (Freundlieb 1989; see also Power

the fine words surrounding Critical Theory, its proponents' refusal to fully acknow oJ.j{wever, if ít is the case that what passes for truth is historically contingent, atledge that the idea of emancipatory reasou is historically constructed, not onto- · 0

until 'the ideal speech situation' has been realized rather than simply invokedlogically given, leads to a suppression of pluralism and playfulness as its authority isuncritically privileged. In response to this criticism, Habermas retorts that postmodernist thinking leads inexorably to nihilism and despair. Deeply sceptical about the progressive claims of postmodernists (e.g. Lyotard 1986), Habermas (1987b) argues that the postmodern inclination to relativize (modernist) rationality de values and squanders the emancipatory potential of Reason as a resource for exposing and removing fonns of mystification and oppression.

Against Habermas's criticism of postmodernist thinking, it can be questioned whether his aspiration to provide a rational grounding for normative standards is a coherent project. Its coherence is suspect if all forms of knowledge-including the idea of the ideal speech situation and communicative action-are articulations of power and, inescapably, exert a subjugating effect upon those who identify them as truth. The objection here is that the Habermasian position is insufficiently self retlective and self-critical about his own preconceptions-notably, the assumption that (radical humanist) ideas about 'autonomy' and 'responsibility' are unequivo cally propitious for humankind. Such a view is also potentially dangerous, insofar as it implies that what is clone in the name of emancipation is somehow exempt from (its own kinds of) oppressive effects (Knights and Willmott 2002). The risk isone of 'reason' being invoked to deny or mystify forms of subjection that ostensibly it claims to expose and remove.

Haberrnas's response to this criticism has been to concede that Critica! Theory cannot escape this risk. He then seeks to tum the tables on his critics (see Poster 1989) by inviting them to reflect upon what, for him, are the far more serious consequences of abandoning any basis for differentiating the true from the false, and the rational from the irrational. In its absence, Habermas (1992: 209) argues, 'All validity daims become immanent to particular discourses. They are simultaneously absorbed into the totality of some one [ sic] of the blindly occurring discourses and left at the mercy of the "hazardous play" amongst these discourses as each over powers the other.' In part, Habermas seems to be responding constructively to the poststructuralist contention that consideration must be given to the consequences of adopting particular kinds of discourse, and not just to the way their clairns are grounded. Habermas's defence of Critica! Theory is based on the claim that efforts to differentiate the truth from the false are less damaging in their, apparently

foundation for Critica! Theory. My concern is instead with the heuristic value of this theory indifferentiating types of science.

5:a counter-factual, then the plausibility of truth claims is conditional upon the?7tontext of their assessrnent, and not upon their alleged universal veracity. If this[:>koint is accepted, it then follows that even if we were to be convinced by Habermas's·:;:'.:.füeory of universal pragmatics, our convíction would tell us more about the\_:$'ength of our cultural receptivity to such ideas-which, of course, does not.:logically exclude the possibility of the theory being true-than about their veracity. 1n which case, forms of critica! thinking that reject a Habermasian (transcendental) preoccupation with grounding truth claims become more appealing. More specif ically, such scepticism enhances the appeal of approaches that attend to, and build.upon, the (immanent) identification of opportunities for exposing and dissolving fonns of oppression; and this is not least because they are compatible with com mending Habermas's theory of cognitive interests as a heuristic device for appreci ating the presence and potentially emancipatory contribution of different forros ofscience.

From a (self-critically) critica! modernist perspective, postmodemist analysísmay have the beneficial consequence of renewing and extending the critica! strand of modemism. By prompting reflection upon assumptions and methods that are otherwise shielded from scrutiny by disciplinary complacency, blinkered self referentiality, and/or intellectual pride, it may encourage deeper questioning of whether, for example, Critical Theory, and the work of Habermas especially, is excessively preoccupied with the universal justification of its own truth claims, to the neglect of exploring what can be done to challenge everyday forms of subjuga tion, oppression, and repression by appealing to extant local understandings and traditions (Alvesson and Willmott 1996). To this extent, at least, there is some common cause in postmodemist and critica! modernist critiques of systemic IIlodemism; and in this regard, it is worth quoting briefly from the (later) vVritings of Foucault who, though often identified with the postmodem camp, arguably straddles the critical modemism-postmodemism divide: 'the thread that may connect us with the Enlightenment is ...the permanent reactivation of an atti tude-that is, of a philosophical ethos that could be described as a permanent critique of our historical era' (Foucault 1984: 42). Foucault's understanding of (the) Enlightenment, which he prefers to characterize as an attitude rather than as a period or a project, is remarkably similar to that of Habermas. But a key point of difference remains: profound Foucauldian scepticism that there is an authoritative basis for critique and transformation. This anti-foundationalism denies the need to make highly problematical claims about an essential human autonomy or even the '

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embeddedness of autonomy in the structure of language. Co.ntra Habennas, the pursuit of freedom and equality is nót, aS it were, guanteed or privileged by a foundational principle, whether its location is posited in the structure of language or in the depths of human nature. Rather, as in Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) thinking, the possibility of freedom and equality is understood to be conditional upon the development and continuing existence of discourses that attribute value to ideas of i freedom and equality and the institutions that support their articulation and :facilitate their realization. As Laclau and Mouffe (1990: 124) note, the absence of

>,,-

ORGA N I ZATIO N T H EO R Y AS C R ITICA L SCI EN CE?109

'oéi.pation by means of enlightenment is replaced by instruction in·control over object_,r .objectified forces. Socially effective theory is no longer directed towards the con... ;ness of human beings who tive together and discuss matters with each other, but to the-'aviour of human beings who manipulate. As a productive force of industrial develop-

t, it changes the basis of human life, but it no longer reaches out critically beyond this

;is to raise life itself, for the sake of life, to another level.

evertheless, and crucially, Habermas's theory of cognitive interests admits and

any apodeictic certainty that one type of society (or organization) is better than 'another' does not prevent us from reasoning politically and of preferring, for a variety of reasons, certain political positions to others. In a passage that echoes Habennas's anticipation of the ideal speech situation, without becoming encum bered by the baggage that seeks to justify it as a touchstone of objective truth, Laclauand Mouffe commend an approach to the production of knowledge and the transformation of relations that

tries to found itself upon the verisimilitude of its condusions, is essentially pluralist, becauseit needs to make reference to other arguments and, since the process is essentially open, these can always be contested and refuted. The logic of verisimilitude is, in this sense, essentially public and demcx:ratic. (Ladau and Mouffe 1990: 125)

From this perspective, it makes little sense to deny that methodologies favoured bycritica! science exert disciplinary effects that can be constraining as well as enabling-an observation that takes on board elements of the postmodernist critique ofCritica] Theory.

3.5 CON CL U SI ON

With the benefit of Habermas's theory of cognitive interests, it is possible to appreciate how, for example, a technical interest in prediction and control dominates the production of knowledge about management and organization. Ideas about improved quality of working life, better communications, employee involvement and empowerrnent, for example, are routinely formulated interms of their contribution to organizational effectiveness, to the exclusion of their contribution to a questioning of established objectives and priorities, or to the develop ment and application of knowledge that reaches out beyond these limits. Commenting upon the weakness of the (acknowledged) connection betweenknowledge and praxis within empírical-analytic science, Habermas {1974: 254-5)observes:

\Idebrates the (yet to be fully realized) potential of the technical interest in predic'1Íóil and control to enable human beings to develop ways of organizing and:_'iiianaging that are safer and less wasteful of human and natural resources. Haber

Pfuasian thinking does not deny the value and power of empirical-analytic science ')-bµt, rather, seeks to recall its criticai, emancipatory potential. Habermas's theory ofr;;:'.cignitive interests also recalls and celebrates how the capacity to develop mutual,; .. understanding through the use of language can enable people to cooperate more

,., effectively.·In the absence of the catalyst of critica! reflection upon the historical

conditions lll which technical and practical knowledge is generated and applied, however, l<nowledge remains the servant, rather than the debunker, of power (Baritz 1960).

.Movement away from a narrowly instrumental, politically conservative, socially 'divisive and ecologically destructive use of knowledge, as Fischer (1990) has argued, demands the adoption of <a methodological framework that not only includes but Iogically transcends empirical analysis by interpreting the meaning of its data in both the context of action and a larger critique of society' (p. 217).

Habermas's exploration of the connectedness of knowledge and human interests is of considerable value in exposing and changing the division of science from ethics and the damaging consequences, social and ecological, of ascribing neutrality to the principles and practices of management that embody and sustain this division. As the Enlightenrnent connection of scientific knowledge with the reduction of suffering is remembered, it may be hoped that the calamitous illusion of ethically neutral value-free knowledge will be progressively dispelled.

Those unsympathetic to such a project have complained that it contravenes the understanding that 'decisions about good and evil and the rneaning of the universe cannot have any scientific foundation' ( Kolakowski 1978: 394, cited in Tsoukas 1992: 643). Even if it is the case that moral positions can never be conclusively validated, Habermas's theory of cognitive interests, and the recogni tion and pursuit of critica! science in particular, can nonetheless help us to identify, question, and hopefully_ dissolve some of the prejudices which place unnecessary constraints upon our collective capacity to wrestle with moral and metaphysical questions. The claim here is not that rationality should be redesigned from scratch or that it should replace morality that has developed through a process of cultural evolution (see Tsoukas 1992: 644). Rather, the more modest hope is that the human reason of modemity has been, and can continue to be, a force in the critique and ,v-.

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transformation of moral rules-for example, the ru!es that legitimize and sustain ,the sanctityof managerial prerogatives, the necessity of functional imperatives and/

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