JOHN D;4;':EY PilhGLATISX: TiiILOSOPXY AS EDUCATION

*ALL PHILOSOL-'HY I S EIIILOSOYHY O F %DUCATIOIJ"

Bachelor of A r t s , Simon Braser University

a t Burnaby, 3ri t ish Columbia, 1967

for the

Frederick J. Brown Yh.B. Senior Supervisor

E ; ' - - - -

Thomas J. Biallinson T1h.D. -- Sxamining Commi t tee

I

li. Patricia Hindley M.S. I I Y , , ... - - - , . - r- ' -- 1 l ~ x a m i n i n ~ Commit tee -

/ /

I

PARTTAL COPYRIGIIT LICENSE

I he reby g r a n t t o Simon F r a s e r U n i v e r s i t y t h e r i g h t t o lend

my t h e s i s o r d i s s e r t a t i o n ( t h e t i t l e of which i s shown below) t o u s e r s

o f t h e Simon F r a s e r U n i v e r s i t y L i b r a r y , and t o make p a r t i a l o r s i n g l e

c o p i e s o n l y f o r s u c h u s e r s o r i n r e s p o n s e t o a r e q u e s t from t h e l i b r a r y

of a n y o t h e r u n i v e r s i t y , o r o t h e r e d u c a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n , on i t s own

b e h a l f o r f o r one of i t s u s e r s . I f u r t h e r a g r e e t h a t pe rmiss ion f o r

m u l t i p l e copying of t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be g r a n t e d

b y me o r t h e Dean of Graduate S t t ld ies . It is unders tood t h a t copying

o r p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l n o t be a l lowed

w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n pe rmiss ion .

T i t l e of T h e s i s / ~ i s s e r t a t i o n :

A u t h o r :

( s i g n a t u r e )

(name )

( d a t e )

iii

It has o f t e n been observed that the demolit ion of f a l l a -

c i e s i s the necessary s t a r t i n g po in t of cons t ruc t ive e f f o r t .

iiowhere i s the t r u t h of t n i s observat ion more evident than i n

a comprehensive examination of Deweyan pragmatism. Indeed, t o

m y knowledge, no philosophy has su f fe red such apparent misread-

ing and c o n f l i c t i n g analya ia as hias pragmatism. T h i s t h e s i s

found i t s genes is i n the need t o r e s t a t e and defend the axioms

of Seweyan thought, t o demolish the f a l l a c i e s that have turned

pragmatism from the hope f o r a n a t u r a l te leo logy, based on an

understanding and a p p l i c a t i o n of the methods of sc ience , i n t o

a phi losophic c u r i o s i t y . Gddly, pragmatism i s usua l ly seen as

a philosophy con jo in t with timerican cap i t a l i sm or as a r e j e c t -

ion of Chr i s t i an thought. i t i s a g r e a t misfortune that the

epistemological and pedagogical con t r ibu t ions of Dewey have

been allowed t o s l i d e i n t o confusion, midunderstanding and

4 oblivion. uemey's philosophy o f f e r s the p o s s i b i l i t y of a me-

thod of educat ing that could change the d i r e c t i o n of pedagogy

from the worried i:rinl;ing of hands t o a d i r e c t i o n bo th i n t e l -

l i g e n t and s o c i a l . 1 ~ meaningful.

Pragilatism must be seen as a comprehensive and f u l l y de-

veloped philosophy and a s a simple educat ional methodology. I -

The f i rs t sec t ion of this t h e s i s , t he re fo re , w i l l be aimed a t

o u t l i n i n g i n some depth the major axioms of pragmatic e p i s t o -

mology, ontology and axiology. 1 shall d e a l w i t h the concept

of freedom, s o c i a l and inciiviaual; tlie p e r t i n e n t ideas on know-

ledge, t r u t h and value, and the on to log ica l assumptions t h a t

umbrella the Deweyan morld-view. Special emphasis w i l l be

placed on the notion of r e a l i t y s o a s t o expl ica te the s o c i a l

character of man's world,

The second sect ion w i l l serve a s a means t o make c l ea re r

the f a l l a c i e s o f common c r i t i c i s m leveled agains t pragmatism.

In shor t , t o p u l l together the loose ends remaining from the

previous discussion. Three questions w i l l be more f u l l y ex-

amined: the i ssue of freedom as a constant ly evolving and

changing s t a t e ; the r e j ec t ion of t r a d i t i o n a l "e ternal" t r u t h ,

and the use of inquiry a s a method of so lu t ion i n questions

of value.

The t h i r d sect ion w i l l take up the question of the r e j ec t -

ion or misunderstanding o f Dewey's theor ies i n education.

Since such re jec t ion h s been t o some extent a& hominem, I

s h a l l be obliged t o exonerate krofessor Uewey from h i s r o l e a s

an educational ogre. Overall , the s o c i a l ro l e of education

w i l l be s t ressed , hopefully t o shoiv t h a t contemporary educators

are confused about aims r a the r than methods. Xy concluding

remarks w i l l revolve around the issue of education o r d r a s t i c

soc ia l change, and the pragmatic hope f o r the former,

IU.AILar ING COmIljltPi& . . . . . . . . . . . . ii & S T i U C T S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

. . . . . . . . . I On the Xature of 2reedom 9

&owledge, dynamism, choice and ac t ion Law and custom: "the cons t i tu t ion o f things'' Ontology and the Uew cosmology

. . . . . . . I1 On Inquiry, Truth and Knowledge 26

The knowing-doing dua l i t y The control led process of knowing Truth and knowledge defined

. . . . . . . . . N o t e s t o p a r t t w o . . 3 4

. . . . 111 On Value and the Cr i t ic ism o f 2 e l i e f s 36

The reason-belief dua l i t y The genesis of value The i d e n t i t y o f good

U o t e s t o p a r t t h r e e . . e . . . . . . . 4 1

The capacity t o achieve s a t i s f a c t i o n Instrumental universals "The gnawing tooth of time"

. . . . . . . . . . Notes t o Section Two 48

The charges against Ueweyls pedagogy aeweyts hopes for education The reasons for rejection of pragmatic pedagogy 2duca tion and social change

When the i d e n t i t y of the moral process with the processes of s p e c i f i c growth i s r e a l i z e d , the more...education of ch i ld- hood w i l l be seen t o be the most economical and e f f i c i e n t means of s o c i a l advance and reorganiza t ion , and i t w i l l a l s o be evi - den t that the t e s t of a l l the i n s t i t u t i o n s of a d u l t l i f e i s t h e i r e f f e c t i n f u r t h e r i n g continued education. Government, bus iness , a r t , r e l i g i o n , a l l s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s have a meaning, a purpose. T h a t purpose i s t o s e t f r e e and t o develop the ca- p a c i t i e s of himan ind iv idua l s without r e s p e c t to race , sex, c l a s s o r economic s t a t u s . And t h i s i s a l l one w i t h saying t h a t the t e s t of t h e i r v d u e i s the e x t e n t t o which they educate every i n d i v i d u a l t o the f u l l s t a t u r e of his p o s s i b i l i t y . Demo- cracy has many meanings, but i f i t has a moral meaning, i t i s found i n resolv ing t h a t the supreme t e s t of a l l p o l i t i c a l i n - s t i t u t i o n s and i n d u s t r i a l arrangements shall be the con t r ibu t ion they make t o the a l l -a round growth t o every member of soc ie ty .

John Dewey, i ieconstruct ion i n Philosophy, 1920.

The p r i n c i p l e s of Demeyan pragmatism must be seen f i rs t

and foremost a s an indictment o f t r a d i t i o n a l educat ional prac-

t i c e s . By r e j e c t i n g or misapplying the educat ional philosophy

of pragmatism, the p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r a b e t t e r , more meaningful

and r i c h e r educat ional system have a l l b u t disappeared, and

l i t t l e remains save an outmoded and l a r g e l y i n c o ~ p e t e n t i n s t i -

t u t i o n , a f a c t noted by the r ecen t H a l l Hoyal Commission on

Education f o r the I-rovince of Ontario. Linked t o this f a i l u r e

i s the o u t r i g h t r e j e c t i o n of the educat ional system by many of

our most g i f t e d chi ldren . The c u r r e n t r e b e l l i o n , from simple

"dropping out" t o the a t tempts t o take over the schools , i s not

so much a proclamation of se l f -express ion and s e l f - d i r e c t i o n a s

i t i s behavior stemriiing from tne misd i rec t ion and o f t en non-

d i r e c t i o n , of p resen t day educators.

Education, a s Dewey so of ten observed, i s the l e a s t under-

stood term i n a l l of human a f f a i r s . I n i t s f u l l e s t poss ib le

sense education i s a t o t a l process, the development of a l i f e -

s t y l e based on a l l experience, whether taught i n a formal man-

ner o r learned wi th in the socio-psycho-genic environment; only

i n the most l i m i t i n g may can education be confined to a c l a s s -

room o r l e c t u r e h a l l . A s Radlmkamal Lukerjee contends i n his

s tudy The Dimenaons ofsuman Evolution:

EIanis b i o l o g i c a l he r i t age i s over l a in and obscured by his s o c i a l he r i t age of values and symbols i n his evolu t io- nary development. The value-and-symbol system no t only determines the s t r u c t u r e and funct ions of s o c i e t y and d i - r e c t s i t s evolut ion, but i s i t s e l f subjected t o an evolu t io- nary process...This...socio-genic mechanism i s s t r u c t u r e d and systematized i n t o , and i d e n t i f i e d n i t h tne communitvts moral- order and v a l u e ~ h i e r a r c h y , which i s p a r t l y i n t e r i o r - i s e d and indeed i n h e r i t e d a s the conscience of the indiv id- --7

u a l , and p a r t l y l e a r n t , taught and t ransmi t ted as the ex- t e r n a l s o c i a l her i tagee l

I t i s n o t too f a r fe tched t o suggest that many of our

c h i l d r e n a r e a c t i n g out the dilemla that i s i m p l i c i t i n Luker-

j e e t s statement. There i s l i t t l e doubt t h a t the " i n t e r i o r i s e d "

i s o f t e n a t odds with the " l e a r n t ; " f o r example, the Judeo-

Chris t i a n inher i tance of our s o c i e t y loudly proclaims "thou

s h a l t n o t k i l l " bu t e v e r y evening on C.B.C. News there i s an

obvious and b r u t a l r e j e c t i o n of that coma~ancIment. The rap id

growth of f ree-schools , of u n i v e r s i t i e s divorced from t r a d i t i o n -

a l s t r u c t u r e s and adminis t ra t ions , and the a l l consuming d e s i r e

t o b u i l d "whole" s o c i e t i e s f i t t i n g the needs of a l l i t s c i t i z e n s

give ample evidence t h a t our c h i l d r e n cannot accept the r a t i o n -

a l of a world i n flames, b u t n e i t h e r can they r e j e c t a centur ies-

o ld t r a d i t i o n . Consequently, s ince "man's b i o l o g i c a l he r i t age

i s o v e r l a i n and obscured by his s o c i a l h e r i t a g e of values," i t

becomes of paramount importance t o have a method w i t h which

t o cons tan t ly re-examine, and i f necessary, r econs t ruc t such

values. And t h a t , simply, must be the r a i s o n d l e t r e f o r our

Generally, the i n e q u i t i e s of formal educat ion, and i t s

s t u l t i f y i n g e f f e c t s on the young were seen by Uewey a s long

ago a s the 1890's. H i s concern was l a t e r summarized i n Human

Nature and Conduct where he wr i t e s :

The i n e r t , s tup id q u a l i t y of c u r r e n t customs p e r v e r t s l e a r n i n g i n t o a wi l l ingness t o fol low where o the r s po in t the way, i n t o conformity, c o n s t r i c t i o n , surrender of scept ic i sm and experiment. Jhen we th ink of the d o c i l i t y of the young we f i rs t th ink of the s tocks of information a d u l t s wish t o impose and the ways of a c t i n g they want t o reproduce. Then we th ink of the i n s o l e n t coercions, the ins inua t ing b r i b e r i e s , and the pedagogic so lemni t ies by which the f reshness of youth can be faded and i t s v i v i d c u r i o s i t i e s dul led. Education becomes the a r t of tak ing advantage of the he lp lessness of the young; the forming of h a b i t s becomes a guarantee f o r the maintenance of hedges of custom.2

Clear ly , Dewey was aware t h a t one of the fundamental problems

confront ing s o c i e t y was the s tup id and was tefu l way i n which

ch i ld ren were being moulded t o "guarantee...the maintenance

of hedges of c u ~ t o m , ~ H i s many books make i t abundantly c l e a r

t h a t this app l i e s as 7.17ell t o the l a r g e r p i c t u r e of s o c i a l growth

and d i r e c t i o n : formal educat ion i s b u t a p a r t of the at tempt

t o maintain what i s thought t o be "o ld , and the re fo re good."

This t h e s i s found i t s genesis i n the above concerns. The

t a s k I have a e t myself may be seen a s an at tempt t o examine the

ideas contained i n deneyls phi losophica l work i n order t h a t I

might look more c r i t i c a l l y , anci I hope more cons t ruc t ive ly , a t

the s t a t e of present day education. A s opgosed t o the usual

comentary , which i s o l a t e s Demeyts pedagogy from i t s proper

context , I in tend t o look a t the methods of an o v e r a l l ph i lo -

sophy. I cannot make this po in t too s t rong ly , The unfor tunate

t r u t h i s t h a t many educators , when looking i n t o Deweyan pedago-

gy, do no t see pragmatism a s a f u l l y developed philosophy, b u t

r a t h e r a s a simple educat ional methodology,

Therefore, the f irst sec t ion of this paper shal l be used

t o synthesize the major axioms of pragmatic thought on the , I)

rZ

L ' . k .

nature of freedom, r e f l e c t i v e thought a s a method of c r i t i c a l

' . . i nqu i ry , and the theory of value, Although ontology forms the

- base u p o n v ~ h i c h a n y p h i l o s o p h y i s b u i l t , I a h a l l n o t a t t e m p t a\ '

t o d e a l with i t separa te ly , b u t r a t h e r make the pragiiatic con-

cept ion of r e a l i t y e x p l i c i t and comprehensible i n connection

with both epistonology and axiology. I t should be c l e a r that

I in tend t o confine my explora t ions p r imar i ly t o Dewey, w i t h

the pragmatic o r instrumental phi losophica l p o s i t i o n providing

the c e n t r a l argument of this paper, I w i l l , however, draw

upon scho la r s such a s Charles S . Pe i rce , .;illiam James and

George H. &ad, who nere instrumental i n the development of

pragmatism.

Following the f i r s t sec t ion I a h a l l a t tempt t o answer

common c r i t i c i s m s l eve led a g a i n s t pragmatism. To an e x t e n t

sec t ion two ill serve as a swmmry of s e c t i o n one, b u t only

the more perplexing po in t s e a r l i e r ou t l ined w i l l be emphasized.

-3s t o c r i t i c i s m , a t y p i c a l corntent i s found i n ??illiam YfBytels

book The Craanizat ion Kan, iIe wr i t e s :

. . . to this day many of the most thorough-going pragmatis ts i n business ~ ~ o u l d r e c o i l a t being grouped with the i n t e l - l e c t u a l s , But the two move~nents were i n t i m a t e l y r e l a t e d .

... they provided an i n t e l l e c t u a l framework that would complement, r a t h e r than i n h i b i t , the f u r t h u r growth of b i g o r g a n i ~ a t i o n , ~

I hope t o d i s p e l such misunderstanding by drawing heav i ly upon

the l i t e r a t u r e of pragmatism, a l i t e r a t u r e that amply i l l u -

s t r a t e s t h a t only i n the most s i m p l i s t i c nay can pragmatism be

seen as a synonym f o r p r a c t i c a l . The s o c i a l philosophy of

Dewey was a v i r t u a l dec la ra t ion of w a r on b i g organizat ions

s ince he saw the nge of &chines, and by impl ica t ion b i g indus-

t r i a l complexes, a s a very g r e a t obs tac le t o h m n progress -- a view hard ly shared by organizat ion men. "But without passage

through a machine age, " wrote Dewey, "mankind's hold upon what

i s needful a s the precondit ion of a f r e e , f l e x i b l e and many

colored l i f e i s so precarious...tilat competit ive scramble f o r

a c q u i s i t i o n and bhe] f renzied use of the r e su l t s . . . for purpos- 4

es of e x c i t a t i o n and d i s p l a y w i l l be perpetuated."

The concluding p a r t of t h i s paper i s aimed a t explaining

i why Dewey has y e t t o f i n d favor mith educators. I do no t i n -

: tend t o analyze i n depth the pedagogy of pragmatism; the method I

i s obvious within the philosophy. Overa l l , the t h i r d sec t ion

w i l l provide some of the reasons a s t o p-hy D e ~ e y has su f fe red

the f a t e of obl ivion. It i s my hope t h a t by br inging prag-

m a t i s m i n t o the l i g h t of day some f u t u r e educator might be

moved t o challenge the cu r ren t p r a c t i c e s i n educat ion; and

t h a t pragmatisn w i l l provide the methodology t o make the chal-

lenge meaningful.

Clear ly, new s o c i a l and educat ional d i r e c t i o n i s needed

if ever we wish t o escape a ~ a o r l d agonized by ever expanding

and hideous wars, ha t reds , j ea loua ies and hunger, and move to-

ward a world that w i l l "manifest a f u l l n e s s , v a r i e t y and f ree -

don of possession [wi th] enjoyment of meanings and goods un- 5

known i n the contiguous as soc ia t ions of the past ."

In t roduct ion

1 *%dhakaml Kukerjee, T h e Dimensions of -Human Evolut ion

(Bombay: Eacmillan, l964) , p, vii,

2 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (Uew York: Uodern

Library, 1957) , pp. 60-1,

3 i Ha .Jhyte, The O r g a n i z a t i ~ n Lan (Sew York: Double-

day, 19561, pp. 22-3.

4 John Dewey, The Publ ic and i t s Problems ( ~ e n v e r : Alan

Swallow, 19543, p. 216,

5 Dewey, Publ ic , p a 217

d2CTIOiT O&

Freedom, Heflec t i v e Thowht and the Theory of Value

One of the c e n t r a l t e n e t s of John Ueaey's philosopny i s

the pragmatic not ion of freedom. Xore than any o ther s i n g l e

concept i t i s the touchstone of pragmtism. I n the conclu-

ding pages of Breedom i n the Godern '70rld, he expresses the I

convict ion t h a t ,

.,. the p o s s i b i l i t y of freedom i s deeply grounded i n our very beings, P t i s one with our i n d i v i d u a l i t y , our being

1

uniquely what we a r e and not i m i t a t o r s and p a r a s i t e s of othere. However, l i k e a l l other p o s s i b i l i t i e s , this pos- s i b i l i t y has t o be ac tua l i zed ; and, l i k e a l l o the r s , i t can only be ac tua l i zed through i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h object- i v e condi t ions, The question of p o l i t i c a l and economic freedom i s not an addendum or a f t e r though t , much l e s s a devia t ion or excrescence, i n the problem of personal f r e e - dom, ;'or the condi t ions that form p o l i t i c a l and economic l i b e r t y a r e requi red i n order t o r e a l i z e the p o t e n t i a l i t y of freedom each of us c a r r i e s w i t h h i m i n his very s t r u c t - u re , Constant and uniform r e l a t i o n s i n change and a know- ledge of them i n ' laws, ' a r e no t a hindrance t o freedom, bu t a necessary f a c t o r i n coming t o be e f f e c t i v e l y t h a t which we have the capaci ty t o grow i n t o , Soc ia l condi t ions i n t e r a c t with the preferences of an i n d i v i d u a l ( t h a t g r g his i n d i v i d u a l i t y ) i n a vay favorable t o a c t u a l i z i n g f r e e - dom only when they develop- i n t e l l i g e n c e , n o t a b s t r a c t know- ledge and a b s t r a c t thought, b u t power of v i s i o n and r e f l e c - t i o n , For these take e f f e c t i n making preference, d e s i r e , and purpose more f l e x i b l e , a l e r t and reso lu te . Freedom has too long been thought of as an indeterminate power operat ing i n a closed and ended world. I n i t s r e a l i t y , freedom i s a reso lu te v i l l opera t ing i n a world i n some respec t s i n d e t e r ~ i n a t e , because i t i s open and moving to- ward a nevi f u t u r e .l

It would appear that f o r t y years a f t e r tne above was w r i t -

t en the p o s s i b i l i t y of freedom h2s s t i l l t o be ac tua l i zed , Free-

dom remains an a b s t r a c t , a " r i g h t , " a " p r i v i l e g e , " a bromide

reserved f o r p o l i t i c a l rhe to r i c , a v a i l a b l e only i n America o r

the U.S .S .H., depending on one ' s a l l eg iance . Indeed, the agon-

i z i n g confusion over the nature of freedom i s r e f l e c t e d i n at-

t i t u d e s as various a s the cry f o r "s tudent power" t o the world-

vide dec l ine of the church, That g r e a t numbers of Ca tho l i c

p r i e s t s would quest ion a papal order on b i r t h c o n t r o l i s c l e a r - I

l y an ind ica t ion t h a t the ancien regime no longer f i r m l y holds

the r e i n s of au thor i ty . That men, even the most r e l i g i o u s of

men, r e j e c t the old way i s evidence enough of the profound need

f o r new ind iv idua l and s o c i a l freedoms. I n tu rn , our schools

and u n i v e r s i t i e s a r e d is rupted by s tuden t r a d i c a l s who p r a c t i c e

what i s roughly described a s "confrontat ion p o l i t i c s " aimed a t

making our i n s t i t u t i o n s " f ree , " b u t a s y e t l i t t l e has been

achieved beyond the propagation of s logans and the quickening

of tempers. I n terms of long-range cons t ruc t ive change the

s o c i a l d i s rup t ions of today matter l i t t l e ; who o r what i s under

challenge mat ter even l e s s ; w h a t does mat ter i s the impossibi l -

i t y of r e s o l u t i o n so long a s the p r i e s t o r the s tuden t cont in-

ue t o seek out an a b s t r a c t .

';ihich r a i s e s the quest ion, i s i t poss ib le that an i n t e l -

l i g e n t theory and philosophy of s o c i a l science, i n t i m a t e l y re-

l a t e d t o educat ional p r a c t i c e , xould make needless any such

confronta t ions? That i s , could confronta t ions be avoided i f

from the s t a r t of a c h i l d ' s schooling the a b i l i t y t o a s c e r t a i n

the na tu re of freedom and a c t upon i t was developed as a n i m -

p o r t a n t p a r t of the l ea rn ing process? Xithin the body of this

paper the genera l i s s u e s of t h i s ques t ion w i l l be examined.

I do n o t in tend t o argue tne coun t l e s s r ami f i ca t ions of freedom,

r e f l e c t i v e thought and value. The f i r s t s e c t i o n , made up of

three p a r t s , w i l l provide tile contextual gu ide l ines so as t o

make poss ib le an understanding of pragmatism, and i n t u r n , t o

make c l e a r the major reasons f o r the misappl ica t ion and m i s -

understanding o f pragmatic pedagogy.

On the Uature of 3reedom

There a r e two c e n t r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t o the pragmatic

concept of freedom. 2or one, freedom i s always dependent upon

knowledge. I n - Human Iiature and Conduct Dewey expla ins that

" the road t o freedom m y be found i n the knowledge of f a c t s

which enables us t o employ them i n connection w i t h d e s i r e s

and aims. A physician or engineer i s f r e e i n h is thought and

his a c t i o n i n the degree i n which he knorts what iie dea l s with. 2

Poss ib ly we f i n d here tne key t o any freedom." iind second,

freedom i s dynamic: "i?reedom f o r an ind iv idua l means growth, 5

ready change when modif iczt ion i s required. " But the opera-

t i o n of bowledge and dynamism i s baseh on the pragmatic con-

cept ion of r e a l i t y , Faomledge and knowin,: a r e centered with- I ~ i n the e x i s t e n t i a l mat r ix of s o c i e t y , a s i s the examination of I - r e a l th in@ i n everyday l i f e o r sc ience , "not a b s t r a c t know-

ledge o r a b s t r a c t thought." Dynamism i s based on a view of

the world a s a cons tan t ly c i m n ~ i n g and boundless p a t t e r n ,

Pragmatism holds no absolu tes o r e t e r n a l s i n any t r a d i t i o n a l

sense. Nothing i s f ixed and f i n a l . The dynamic na ture of f r e e -

dom means that i t i s bo th temporal and contextual , that i t must

be seen as r e l a t i v e t o a given s i t u a t i o n .

The i s s u e of r e a l i t y , and i t s impl ica t ions i n terms of

the concept of freedom, i s an important po in t t o follow. Dewey

i s n o t unaware of the major components of freedom according

t o the r a t i o n a l i s t and empi r i c i s t phi losophies w i t h which his 4

on to log ica l p o s i t i o n i s i n c o n t r a s t , and he a n t i c i p a t e s c r i t i - - i I

cism from this quar ter . I n an essay e n t i t l e d "The Need f o r a 1

Recovery of Philosophy," he defends the pragmatic not ion of

r e a l i t y .

I t i s o f t e n s a i d that pragmatism, unless i t is 60n- t e n t t o be a con t r ibu t ion t o mere methodology, must deve- l o p a theory o f Real i ty . But the c h i e f c h a r a c t e r i s t i c t r a i t of the pragmatic not ion of r e a l i t y i s p r e c i s e l y t h a t no theory of Aea l i ty i n ~ e n e r a l . . . i s poss ib le or needed... It f i n d s t h a t ' r e a l i t y ' i s a denota t ive term, a word used t o designate i n d i f f e r e n t l y everything t h a t happens. Lies , dreams, i n s a n i t i e s , decept ions, myths, theor ie s a r e a l l of them j u s t the events wliich they s p e c i f i c a l l y a r e . %rag- m a t i s m i s content t o take i t s s tand with sc ience ; f o r s c i - ence f i n d s a l l such events t o be the subject-matter f o r d e s c r i p t i o n and inqu i ry . . . l t a l s o takes i t s s tand wi th d a i l y l i f e , which f i n d s t h a t such things r e a l l y have t o be reckoned with a s they occur interwoven i n the t e x t u r e of events.. . the r e t e n t i o n by philosophy of a not ion of a Aeal i ty , . . superior t o the events of everyday occurrence i s the chief source of trle inc reas ing i s o l a t i o n of phi lo- sophy from common sense and science...philosophy i n dea l - ing with r e a l d i f f i c u l t i e s f i n d s i t s e l f s t i l l hampered by reference t o r a a l i t i e s more r e a l , more u l t ima te , than those which d i r e c t l y happen. 5

It follows t h a t the concept of freedom i s pos tu la ted i n

d i s rega rd of theologica l dogmas or p o l i t i c a l o r moral impera-

t i v e s : freedom i s n o t given, but i s achieved through i n t e l -

l i g e n t observat ion and s c e p t i c a l examination of those th ings

"as they occur interwoven i n the t e x t u r e of events." Since

knowledge promotes the p o s s i b i l i t y of freedom, t o know our

world e x i s t e n t i a l l y i s a f i r s t s t e p i n understanding the

na ture of freedom. But only a f i r s t s t e p , f o r within the con-

t e x t of knowledge and dynamism there a r e o the r components r e -

l a t i n g t o the a c t u a l i z a t i o n of freedom; components inc luding /-

- -- -. ---

/ "e f f i c i ency i n a c t i o n , a b i l i t y t o c a r r y out plans, the absence

of cramping and thwarting obstacles . . . I t a l s o includes capac- I

i t y t o vary p lans , t o change tile course of a c t i o n , t o exper-

ience n o v e l t i e s . ~ i n d again.. .it s i g n i f i e s the power of d e s i r e 6

-.- and choice t o be f a c t o r s i n events."

Vithin the above quotat ion there a r e two o v e r a l l assump-

t i o n s , that the power t o a c t and the a b i l i t y t o choose a r e

c e n t r a l t o a r e a l i z a t i o n of freedom. I n dea l ing w i t h t he r o l e

of choice, Dewey i s c a r e f u l t o po in t out t h a t e a r l y i n the

h i s t o r y of thought the not ion of choice became involved w i t h

the ideas of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and blame. This involvement cloud-

ed the i s s u e s , he claimed, s ince blame and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y were

used t o support c e r t a i n s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n s which were i r r e l e v -

a n t t o a cons idera t ion of the impl ica t ions of choice. In Free-

i r dom i n the Eodern 7or ld Dewey e w a i n e s the question of iden- \ '

--.--- - -- - ,

1 t i f y i n g choice ni$h de-sirable s o c i a l ends+;. and expla ins the I --" r '

r e s u l t s .

The t h e o r e t i c a l formulation f o r the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of choice a s the h e a r t of freedom becarile.,.imvolved a t an e a r l y t i ~ e w i t h o ther i n t e r e s t s ; and they. . .determined the form taken by a widely prevalent philosophy of f r e e - dom...philosophy of the na ture of choice a s freedom de- veloped as an apologia f o r an e s s e n t i a l l y l e g a l i n t e r e s t : l i a b i l i t y t o punishment. The outcome was the doc t r ine known a s freecorn of ~ ! i l l . . .So e s t a b l i s h e d d i d this way of viewing choice become, that i t i s s t i l l comonly supposed that choice. and the a r b i t r a r y freedom of w i l l a r e one and the same th ingo7

Thus me introduce the f a v o r i t e argument of freshmen and

professors of Logic: the i s s u e of " f ree -wi l ln versus "determ-

inism. " Dewey contends that the t r a d i t i o n a l argument i s

nothing more than an a b s t r a c t word game and i s therefore of

no r e a l value i n terms of the so lu t ion of human problems -- i n

this case the achievement of freedom. The importance of the

argument i s i n i t s end r e s u l t . The impl ica t ions of holding

e i t h e r f r e e - w i l l or determinism t o be of major importance i n

mat ters of human conduct fo rces man i n t o a paradox, On the one

hand his d e s t i n y i s c o n t r o l l e d by some unknown power, which

renders h i m impotent, and on the o ther , i f he must claim r e s -

p o n s i b i l i t y f o r his a c t i o n s , he can only be " f r e e " t o the

ex ten t t h a t s o c i e t y w i l l a l low, a l s o rendering him impotent.

Dewey makes the argument concrete by s h i f t i n g the emphasis of

, inquiry from antecedents t o - -- consequ_eqcga*" - - -

The doc t r ine of ' f r e e - w i l l ' i s a desperate at tempt t o escape from the consequences of the doc t r ine of f i x e d and immutable Being. J i th d i s s i p a t i o n of trat dogma, the need f o r such a measure of despera t ion vanishes. Prefer - e n t i a l a c t i v i t i e s cha rac te r i ze every ind iv idua l a s i n d i - v idua l or unique. I n themselves these a r e d i f f e r e n t i a l i n a d e f a c t 0 sense, They become t r u e choices under the d i r e c t i o n of i n a i g h t . Znowledge , i n s t ead of r evea l ing a world i n which preference i s an i l l u s i o n and does n o t count o r make a d i f fe rence , pu t s i n our possession the ins t rumenta l i ty by means of which preference may be an i n t e l l i g e n t or i n t e n t i o n a l f a c t o r i n cons t ruc t ing a f u t u r e by wary and prepared actison. Faowledge of s p e c i a l con- d i t i o n s and r e l a t i o n s i s i n s t r w e n t a l t o the a c t i o n which i s i n t u r n an instrument of proOuction of s i t u a t i o n s hav- i n g q u a l i t i e s of added s ign i f i cance and order. To be czpable of such a c t i o n i s t o be f r e e .8

This, of course, openo the way f o r the c r i t i c s of prag-

m a t i s m t o charge t h a t Dewey denies f r e e - a i l l , and consequently

i s t i e d t o a de terminis t philosopiiy. On the cont rary , r a t h e r

than r e j e c t i n g f r e e - r i l l , w h a t he does deny i s the e f f i c a c y

of f r e e - w i l l t o provide any meaningful causa l explanat ions f o r

human conduct. He does not deny the p o s s i b i l i t y of the e x i s -

tence of f r e e - w i l l ; he just denies i t s u t i l i t y i n exp la in ing

consequences. The attempt t o seek out f i r m , f i n a l and usable

d e f i n i t i o n s of a b s t r a c t s tha t remain a b s t r a c t , l i k e f r e e - w i l l

o r determinism, s o as t o answer ques t ions of human d i f f i c u l -

t i e s caused by such a b s t r a c t s , ha rd ly seems a worth-while task .

It i s simply a n exercise i n asking t a e vronz questiona. The

d iscuss ion on f r e e - w i l l i s typ ica l of the consequences brought I

about by the separa t ion of m o r a l s from human nature. The dan-

gerous s ign i f i cance of the c l a s s i c a l argument over f r e e - w i l l

i s t h a t i t re in fo rces this separa t ion of moral a c t i v i t y from 10

nature and pub l i c l i f e . I Dewey could be seen as a de te rmin i s t , bu t the term i s

used r e l u c t a n t l y , f o r want of 2 b e t t e r one. 5is "determinism"

then, must be seen only i n a q u a l i f i e d sense. i tather than

I c r e d i t i n g unseen fo rces , superior orders o f ex is tence or t r an -

scendental laws of the universe, he s e e s the d e s t i n y of man

,- con t ro l l ed by s o c i a l condi t ions. Cut s ince he a l s o sees soc-

i a l condi t ions as uncertain and c h a n ~ i n g , there can be no

assumptions about what a f u t u r e s o c i e t y k:ay b r ing , o r the r o l e

man w i l l p lay i n it. I n essence, Dewey's determinism i a simply

an awareness of the power and p r i v i l e g e of s o c i a l au thor i ty .

Dewey f requen t ly uses the phrase " p r e f e r e n t i a l s e l e c t i o n "

i n connection -nith choice; i t roeam s i r r ~ ~ j l y that the v a i e d

experiences of humans provide then1 wi th $references from which

t o s e l e c t , "Choice.. . then p resen t s i t s e l f a s one preference

among and out of preferences; not i n the sense of one p re fe r -

ence a l ready made and s t ronger than o t h e r s , b u t a s the form-

a t i o n of a

This i s an

t i n c t i v e l y

11 new preference out of a c o n f l i c t of preferences."

important p o i n t , not because i t i n d i c a t e s the d i s -

human a b i l i t y t o measure, judge and a c t upon the

good or bad of e x i s t e n t i a l c i rc~uns tances , b u t because i t b r ings

up the quest ion of the genesis of preference. ":Ye don ' t use

the p resen t t o con t ro l tne future. ;!Te use the f o r e s i g h t of

the f u t u r e t o r e f i n e and expand p resen t a c t i v i t i e s . I n t h i s 1 2

use of d e s i r e , d e l i b e r a t i o n and choice , freedom i s ac tua l i zed . "

Preference then, vhen seen within the c o n t i n u ~ u ~ of p a s t , pre-

s e n t and f u t u r e , i s the unwritten h i s t o r y of an ind iv idua l .

The a b i l i t y t o choose f i n d s i t s genes is i n this h i s t o r y ,

The manifes ta t ion of preferences becomes a ' func t ion ' of an e n t i r e h i s t o r y . To understand the a c t i o n of a fel low clan we have t o know something of tile course of h is l i f e . n man i s s u s c e p t i b l e , ' s e n s i t i v e , t o a v a s t v a r i e t y of condi t ions and undergoes var ied and opposed experiences -- a s lower anzmals do not . Consequently a man i n the measure of the scope and v a r i e t y o f h i s p a s t experiences c a r r i e s i n h i s preserlt cepaci ty f o r s e l e c t i v e response a l a r z e s e t of var ied p o s s i b i l i t i e s . That l i f e h i s t o r y of which h i s present preference i s a func t ion i s complex. Xence the p o s s i b i l i t y of cont inuing d i v e r s i f i - c a t i o n of behavior; i n ehor t , the d i s t i n c t i v e e d u c a b i l i t y of menolg

Thus the ind iv idua l i s placed square ly i n r e l a t i o n t o

h i s environment, I n order t o a c t e f f e c t i v e l y , be i t climbing

a mountain o r i s o l a t i n g a nea bio-chemical s t r a i n , he must

u t i l i z e a s much of h i s experience a s he can. Tize r e l a t i v e

success , a s xe have noted e a r l i e r , depends upon the degree of

c o r r e c t information that the ind iv idua l possesses , and h is

a b i l i t y t o evalua te such i n f o r m t i o n . A s a simple i l l u s t r a -

t i o n , a n ind iv idua l may be f r e e t o walk, b u t i f such an a c t

held as consequence h i s f a l l i n g off a c l i f f and being crushed

t o dea th , the idea of freedom through preference i s simply

untenable, Unless, of course, the idea of freedom i s so ab-

s t r a c t and f i n a l t ha t i t appl ies t o the dead a s well as t o the

l i v ing ,

The Rousseauian idea that freedom prevailed before laws

and customs circumscribed i t i s a l s o severely c r i t i c i s e d by

Dewey, The consequences of such a notion would appear t o be

t ha t i f present laws were l i f t e d , freedom would be assured.

But freedom i a "not obtained by mere abo l i t i on of law and i n -

s t i t u t i o n s , but by the progressive sa tura t ion of a l l laws and

i n s t i t u t i o n s w i t h g r ea t e r and grea te r aclmowledgment of the 1 4

necessary laws governing the cons t i tu t ion of things," The

"const i tu t ion of thingsi1 r e f e r s i n this case t o the soc i a l

interconnection of pa r t s , t o shared experience throughout

socie ty , the common concerns of a l l c i t i z e n s , The bas ic human

need t o be protected and respected, a need stemming i n p a r t

from the shared experience of violence of a l l s o r t s , br ings

laws and i n s t i t u t i o n s i n t o being, and only to the extent t h a t

t h i s need is met w i l l lams remain viable. The p l igh t of the

American negro a p t l y i l l u s t r a t e s the reason why l e g i s l a t o r s

must acknowledge the "const i tu t ion of things." It i s impera-

t i ve t o the survival o f America t ha t i t s c i t i z e n s confront the

f a c t t h a t a l a rge segment of t h e i r soc ie ty has been dea l t out

of the soc i a l s t ructure . But t o l i f t o r change the laws o r

i n s ti tu t ions without changing the sys tern cannot br iny about

freedom f o r those outside the system. There must be an under-

s tanding on the pa r t of the designers of laws and i n s t i t u t i o n s

t h a t u n t i l a way i s found t o be responsive to a l l c i t i z ens ,

the black people of ~ m e r i c a w i l l , qui te understandably, burn

down the i n s t i t u t i o n s and viola te the laws.

L a w loses i t s meaning when i t becomes an abs t r ac t , It

was o r ig ina l ly an imminently p r a c t i c a l means of s o c i a l con-

t r o l and protection. Zven Je f fe rson ' s phrase "Laws above menM

was fundamentally p rac t i ca l , but when i t came t o mean volumes

of Precedence and T o r t s ra ther than protect ion againat s o c i a l

anarchy following the Revolution, the "necesesqy laws govern-

ing the cons t i tu t ion of things" f e l l i n t o the j ud i c i a l waste-

basket.

In essence, Dewey argues that freedom i s d i r e c t l y r e l a t ed

t o custom and t r ad i t i on , that law reaches out of custom. Thus,

i f repression is a common her i tage , i t w i l l remain p a r t of

the present soc ia l fabr ic . A concrete example o f this asser-

t ion i s seen i n the development o f modern nations, It i s hard-

l y probable t ha t freedom could be assured for those sa tura ted

by a s t rong s o c i a l t r ad i t i on , and even l e s s probable where the

s t reng th of t r a d i t i o n i s reinforced by re l ig ious o r p o l i t i c a l

res t r i c t iveness . It i s no accident t h a t the Soviet Union i s

lacking i n freedoms a s we i n the western world know them, The

h i s t o r i c a l shoulders upon rahich modern Aussia r e s t s dates from

the au toc ra t i c Byzantine Zmpire, through the repressive Czar-

i s t times, and ends with the "d ic ta to rsh ip of the p r o l e t a r i a t e f t

To superimpose a p o l i t i c a l philosophy upon a nat ion o r s t a t e

t ha t i s soc i a l l y and psychologically unprepared fo r i t would

be d i f f i c u l t indeed. The Anglo-Saxon world often fo rge t s

t ha t what freedoms we possess a r e based upon nine h~mdred

years o f s o c i a l d i rec t ion t h a t held sacred the idea of human

r igh ts .

In his study Freedom i n the Xodern Vorld, Dewey summarized

his p o s i t i o n on the pomer t o a c t . Like choice, tne power t o

a c t i s c a s t within the s o c i a l and e x i s t e n t i a l ma t r ix of l a w

and custom.

The not ion t h a t men a r e equa l ly f r e e t o a c t i f only the same l e g a l arrangements apply equal ly t o a l l -- ir- respec t ive of d i f f e rences i n educat ion, i n command of c a p i t a l , and the con t ro l of the s o c i a l environment which is furnished by the i n s t i t u t i o n of proper ty -- i s a pure absurd i ty , as f a c t s have demonstrated. dince a c t u a l , t h a t i s , e f f e c t i v e , r i g h t s and demands a r e products of i n t e r - a c t i o n s , and a r e n o t found i n the o r i g i n a l and i s o l a t e d cons ti t u t i o n of human na tu re , whether moral o r paycholo- g i c a l , mere e l iminat ion of obs t ruc t ions i s n o t enough. The l a t t e r merely l i b e r a t e s fo rce and a b i l i t y a s that happens t o be d i s t r i b u t e d by p a s t acc iden t s of h i s t o r y . T h i s ' f r e e t a c t i o n operates d i s a s t r o u s l y a s f a r as the many a r e concerned. The only poss ib le conclusion, bo th i n t e l l e c t u a l l y and p r a c t i c a l l y , i s that the at ta inment of freedom conceived a s power t o a c t i n accord w i t h choice depends upon p o s i t i v e and cons t ruc t ive changes i n s o c i a l arrangementsel5

C lea r ly , t o b r ing about the p o s s i b i l i t y of freedom, bo th choice

and a c t i o n must be combined. And al though the b e s t combination

of the two depends upon cons t ruc t ive s o c i a l change, the empha-

sis must be placed on i n d i v i d u l a choice and a c t i o n , so t h a t

such changes can be ac tua l i zed . I n o the r words, i t requ i res

ind iv idua l understanding of the na ture of freedom t o b r i n g

about s o c i a l freedoms.

The c e n t r a l problem i n understanding the na tu re of f r e e -

dom i s the r e l a t i o n s h i ~ between choice and a c t i o n : "There i s

an i n t r i n s i c connection betneen choice as freedom and power of I

a c t i o n asFreedom. B choice which i n t e l l i g e n t l y manifests i n d i -

v i d u a l i t y en larges the ranGe of a c t i o n , and this enlargement

i n t u r n confers upon our d e s i r e s g r e a t e r i n s i g h t and fore- 1 6

s i g h t , and makes choice rc:ore i n t e l l i g e n t . " To choose and a c t

with i n t e l l i g e n t temporal author i ty , hoaever, requires i n t e r -

ac t ion with objective conditions, and since Dewey's def in i -

t ion of w h a t cons t i tu tes "objective conditionst1 i s t o be found

within the pragmatic concept of r e a l i t y , the ontological quea-

t i on must be examined. Jewey's a s se r t i ons on the nature of

objective conditions a l so involves the in te r - re la ted cosmolo-

g i c a l question, i n order then, t o avoid excessive qua l i f i ca t i ons ,

I w i l l r e f e r t o the overal l concern a s cosmo-ontological.

This c l a s s i c a l pre-occupation of the philosophers, the

speculat ion on the re la t ionship between the nature of the uni-

verse and manta place i n i t , i s gaining new i n t e r e s t today.

For many years the question seemed t o be ignored o r thought

worthless o f inves t igat ion, but w i t h the wide advances i n s c i -

ence, pa r t i cu l a r ly b iological science, the question has again

gained currency. The problem only began t o have genuine force

when Darwin put man back i n t o nature a s a part of i t s contin- 17

uwn. Lkn l o s t his superior and independent ro le when he could

no longer claim a spec ia l s t a t u s removed from nature. Obvious-

l y the question seeking an answer i s whether na tura l laws, now

applicable t o man, a r e the r e s u l t of determined or ig in beyond

man's control , o r whether such laws depend upon an e s s e n t i a l l y

unplanned universe where man's in te l l igence imposes order?

The f i r s t p a r t of the question hinges on the Darwinian con-

tent ion t h a t man i s an in t eg ra l p a r t of nature. Dewey would

r e j e c t the notion that na tura l law i s determined by forces be-

yond our control . To accept such a theory i s , i n e f f e c t , t o

accept a notion tha t places man i n a paradox. Xe i s forced t o

l i v e a dual ro l e , s ince the force i n con t ro l i s " a p i r i t u outside

of nature. 'IT3hen the h ie ra rch ica l ascent of nature t o mind

and to i dea l forms was disturbed by the conviction tha t the

subject-matter of natura l science i s exclusively physical and

mechanistic, there arose the d u a l i s t i c opposition o f matter

and s p i r i t , of nature and ultimate ends and goods.. . [and]. . . Since man was on the one hmd a p a r t of nature and on the oth-

e r hand a meuber of the realm of s p i r i t , a l l problems came t o 18

a focus i n h i s double nature." Any f ixed cosmological no-

t i on denies the e x i s t e n t i a l nature of human discovery. I n

his book The Quest f o r Certainty Dewey explains the need t o

transcend the f ixed and l imi t ing concepts of nature.

The conditions and processes of nature generate uncer- t a i n t y and i t s r i s k s a s t r u l y a s nature af fords s ecu r i t y and means of insuraiice agains t p e r i l s . Xature i s charac- t e r ized by a constant mixture of the precarious and the s tab le . T h i s mixture gives poignancy t o existence. If existence were e i t h e r completely necessary o r completely contingent, there would be ne i ther comedy nor tragedy i n l i f e , nor need of the v i l l t o l i ve . The s ignif icance of morals and p o l i t i c s , of the a r t s both technical and f i n e , of r e l i g ion and of science i t s e l f a s inquiry and discovery, a l l have t h e i r source and meaning i n the union i n Nature of the s e t t l e d and the unset t led , the s t ab l e and the haz- ardous. npar t f r o m this union, there a r e no such things a s 'ends' e i t h e r a s c o n s ~ a t i o n s or a s those ends-in- view me c a l l purposes. 'ihere i s only a block universe, e i t h e r something ended and admitting of no change, o r e l s e a predestined march of events. There i s no such thing a s fu l f i l lment where there i s no r i s k of f a i l u r e , and no de- f e a t where there i s no promise of possible achievementalg

I t i s apparent v i t h i n the above quotation t h a t the idea

of man imposing order is equally troublesome. Such a notion

f i nds i t s beginning i n the attempt to explain men and the a f -

f a i r s of men i n terms of science. AS the argument goes, if we

can explain a l l of nature by reduction t o physical laws, we can

sure ly understand man, since he too must conform t o the sane

laws. This curious quest fo r a new kind of c e r t a i n t y was i n i -

t i a t e d by an a c c e l e r a t i n g succession of d i scover ie s i n sc ience ,

which i n t u r n provided the means t o quest ion the a l r e a d y f rag-

menting o ld orders of Ohurch and S t a t e , But unl ike the e a r l i -

e r modela of man's place i n the universe , say, the Hearth of

Zeus o r the Great Chain of Being, the nea cosmology l e f t out

s o c i a l d i r e c t i o n , Z t h i c a l not ions, inc luding the na tu re of

freedom, were neu t ra l i zed by the misappl ica t ion or misunder-

s tanding of n a t u r a l l a m , In his book I n s i g h t and Outlook,

Arthur icoestler contends t h a t " I t bhe new cosmology7 may be

descr ibed a s a shif t from 'guidance from above ' t o 'guidance

from below.''' He goes on t o say:

I n p r e s c i e n t i f i c times the world was explained, and man's a c t i o n s were guided from 'above, ' through the agency of anthropomorphic c l e i t i e ~ . Yhe gods ae rz upward p r o j e c t - ions of the human ima,e, ex t rapo la t ions of humanity on an ascending s c a l e , ;Jut the sqectsrcuiar success of the new methods of n a t u r a l science brought a dec i s ive change, f o r molecules and atoras nere ex t rapo la t ions on a downward s c a l e , Destiny from 'above ' had been both an explanat ion of the world and a guide t o conduct; des t iny fro[:! 'below, determined by e l e c t rons and quanta, was an explanat ion b u t no longer a guide.20

Yhe ~ c t of Greation and a o s t i n In the same s tudy, as wel l a s .,-

the Uchinir, Koest ler poin ts out that s c i e n c e ' s e t h i c a l neu-

t r a l i t y , coupled m i th i t s prover? tae tllodolo&y, provides the

b e s t means thus far devised t o e ~ t u b l i s h a " n a t u r a l " s y s t e a of . .

s o c i a l and e t h i c a l d i r e c t i o n , - -oest ler was hopeful , a s ;vas

3ewey, t h a t "tile s p l i t be tveen reason and b e l i e f F~iliJ h e a l and

Xatural Law w i l l resume i t s o r i g i n a l meaning a s both a guide 21

t o understand in^ and a guide t o conduct, "

Like Xoes t le r , deaey sees temporal a u t h o r i t y born out of

of the metho& of sc ience , and they shared the hope that tile

f a c t s of science nould provide tile means with which s o c i e t y

could reach toward freedom, no t w i t h sc ience a s a panacea but

as a t o o l t o e s t a b l i s h new and more enduring s o c i a l values.

I n t e r a c t i o n w i t h object ive condi t ions cannot be achieved w i t h -

i n a universe beyond man's c o n t r o l , nor i n a universe where

"guidance from below" precludes the p o s s i b i l i t y of a n a t u r a l

te leology. I n s h o r t , the "objec t ive condi t ions" determined by

s c i e n t i f i c and common-sense observat ion can a l s o a a t t o d e t e r -

mine the t r u t h or f a l s i t y of s o c i a l value s t r u c t u r e s .

Some t h i r t y years before Koest ler wrote the above s t a t e -

ment, Dewey summed up h i s p o s i t i o n on the value of s c i e n t i f i c

me thodology as an instrument t o develop human understanding.

It i s n o t pretended that a moral theory based upon r e a l i t i e s of human nature and a s tudy of the s p e c i f i c connections of those r e a l i t i e s with those of phys ica l science would do away wi th moral s t r u g g l e and de fea t . I t would n o t make a moral l i f e as simple a mat ter as wending one 's way along a wel l l i g h t e d boulevard. A l l a c t i o n i s an i n n s i o n of the f u t u r e , o f the unknown. Conf l ic t and uncertainty a r e u l t imate t r a i t s . But morals based on concern with f a c t s and de r iv ing guidance from them would a t l e a s t l o c a t e the po in t s of e f f e c t i v e endeavor and would focus a v a i l a b l e resources upon them. It would ~ u t an end t o the impossible a t temut t o l i v e i n two unre la ted worlds. It would des t roy f ixed d i s t i n o t i o n between the human and the phys ica l , a s we l l as t h a t be- tween the moral and the i n d u s t r i a l and the p o l i t i c a l . A morals based on study of human nature i n s t e a d of upon d is regard f o r i t would f i n d the f a c t s of man continuous with those of the r e s t o f na ture and aould thereby a l l y e t h i c s wi th physics and biology. It would f i n d the na ture and a c t i v i t i e s of one person coterminous with those of other human beings, and the re fo re l i n k e t h i c s 22 wi th the s tudy o f h i s t o r y , sociolo*y, law and economics.

( i t a l i c s added)

The i k p o s s i b i l i t y of l i v i n g i n both an i d e a l and r e a l world

i s the g r e a t e s t s ingle b a r r i e r t o the zchievement of freedom.

The separa t ion of reason and b e l i e f ruakes choice and a c t i o n

a b s t r a c t i o n s , ideas unrelated t o the f a c t s of human nature.

And the i ~ p l i c a t i o n s a re profound, f o r " i f - the -:~orld i s a l r eady

done and done f o r , i f i t s cha rac te r i s e n t i r e l y achieved s o

that i t s behavior i s l i k e that of a nan l o s t i n a r o u t i n e ,

then the only freedom f o r which a man can hope i s one of e f -

f i c i e n c y i n over t ac t ion . But if cha.nge i s genuine, i f ac-

counts a r e s t i l l i n process of making, and i f ob jec t ive uncer-

t a i n t y i s the s t i ~ u l u s t o r e f l e c t i o n , then v a r i a t i o n i n a c t i o n , 23

novel ty and experience, have a t r u e meaning.''

To conclude this exnlora t ion i n t o the pragmatic na ture of

freedom, an i s sue t h a t w i l l be aga in touched upon i n oonjunc-

t i o n with the Tneory of Inquiry and of Value, I w i l l o u t l i n e

my own evalua t ions of the Deweyan phi losophica l overview. A e

I o r i g i n a l l y claimed, freedon: i s trle touchstone of pragmatism,

bu t I have taken pains t o shox thzit t h e notion of freedom is

i n t i m a t e l y r e l a t e d t o the o v e r a l l philosophy of pragmatism,

So t o sum up, pragmatism o f f e r s an o p t i m i s t i c outlook

tempered by a n honest recognit ion of tne c h a r a c t e r of p resen t

knowledge and experience, I do n o t hold t h a t acience w i l l

solve a l l problems b u t nor do the pragmatis ts . The c e n t r a l

f e a t u r e of pragmatism i s t h a t i t does no t o f f e r un ive r sa l and

e t e r n a l so lu t ions t o a l l of human a f f a i r s , but this d e t r a c t s

n o t one w h i t from i t s usefulness i n dea l ing w i t h the world,

e i t h e r phys ica l ly or metaphysically, Yragmatisn represents

a long awaited weaning from a c h i l d i s h quest f o r c e r t a i n t y

and f i n a l i t y ; the r e j e c t i o n of the d u a l i t y of r e a l and i d e a l

i s a e t e p t h a t goes far toward opening up l a r g e r v i s t a s f o r

I- the inf luence of man. I n e f f e c t , the r e s u l t of holding the \

\ 1 pragmatic view i s e f a i th that d isposes one t o maximize what t

\ i s inheren t ly human. l l n i s p a r t of n s t u r e and s o a l s o a r e 5-

c o n s i s t e n t r e l a t i o n s . To the e x t e n t that man becomes aware

of these r e l a t i o n s through inqui ry , and i n t u r n d i r e c t s them

t o his ovm d e s i r e s i n s i d e of experience, he f u l f i l l s himself

i n his world. W l l i a m James once remarked that l i f e i s o f

' l i t t l e account i f man i s l imi ted by what he cannot know. Sub-

' mission t o a l i f e - s t y l e d i r e c t e d from f o r c e s outs ide of ex- I

I per ience, i s , p l a i n and simple, a s u b t l e kind of s lavery .

&ether or n o t man's r o l e i n the universe i s f i n i t e and minia-

cu le may be answered i n the f u t u r e , b u t u n t i l the answer i s

known i t would seem pragmatic t o p lay t h a t r o l e w i t h s t r e n g t h ,

courage and the abundant i n t e l l i g e n c e now a v a i l a b l e t o man,

Sect ion One: p a r t one

1 John Dewey, On Expgrience , S a t u r e , and P'reedom, ed. Richard

J. Berns t e i n ( ~ e w York: Bobbs-Kerril l , 1960 ) , pp. 286-87.

2 John Dewey, Human - i lature and Conduct (ilew York: Eodern

Library, 1957) , p. 278.

3 John Dewey, Reconstruction i n Y h i l o s o ~ h ~ (3oston: Beacon

Press , 1965) , p. 207.

.-- 4 Uewey, n ixpe r i ence , chap. dli .

5 John Dewey, "The Xeed f o r a iiecovery of rhi losophy,"

c r e a t i v e - --- I n t e l l i ~ e n c e ---- (ilei-~ York: Eenry Xolt , 1917 ) , pp.

55-6.

Section One: p a r t one

XC'i'AS -- (cont , )

6 Dewey, Human Xature, pp. 278-79.

7 Dewey, On ijxperience, p. 263.

8 John Dewey, The Q,uest f o r Certainty ( ~ e w York: Capricorn

Booksy 19601, p. 250.

9 AS Dewey explains i n Quest f o r Certainty:

7e a r e f r e e i n the degree i n which we a c t knowing what we a re about. The iden t i f i ca t i on of freedom with "f ree- dom of ~ v i l l " locates contingency i n the wrong place. Con- tingency of w i l l would mean tha t uncertainty was uncer- t a i n l y d e a l t with; i t would be a r e s o r t t o chance f o r a decision. The business of " s v i l l " i s t o be resolute ; t h a t i s , t o resolve, under the guidance of thought, the inde- terminateness of uncertain s i tua t ions . Choice wavers and i s brought t o a head a r b i t r a r i l y only when circwnstan- ces compel ac t ion and ye t we have no i n t e l l i g e n t clew as t o how t o ac t . p. 250.

10 9eweyY Human Liature, pp. 8-9.

11 Uetvey, On Experience, p. 266.

15 Lewey, On Lmgrience, pp. 271-72

17 John Dezqey, "The influence of Uarwinism on l'hilosophy , 'I

Sect ion One: p a r t one

ilOrJXS (cont . )

Class ic American Yhiloso-~hera, ed, b h x H. Fiech ( ~ e w York:

Appelton-Century-Crof $8, 1951 1, pp. 336-44.

1 8 Dewey, w e s t , p. 53.

1 9 Dewey, ~ u e s t , pp. 243-44,

20 k r t h u r Koest ler , Insight and C:utlook - (Zew York: hkacmillan,

19491, p. 231.

21 Koest ler , Ins igh t , p. 234,

22 Yewey, Human l a t u r e , pp. 12-3.

23 Dewey, -n I h t u r e , p. 284.

On Inquiry. Truth and lhowledae

- i I

Dewey's Theory of Inqui ry l e a d s us back t o the e a r l i e r I

1 discuss ion on the c l a s s i c a l d u a l i t y o f r e a l and idea l . A s w e 1 4

have seen, man at tempts t o l i v e i n two unre la ted worlds i n a

' number of mays. One of the more important mani fes ta t ions of

, this d u a l i t y can be observed i n the separa t ion of "knowing"

a from "doing." fieason i s seen as a n a c t of "mind" divorced -.

from the vulgar and conscon world of the p r a c t i c a l . The i d e a

t h a t knowing i s a passive and h igher a c t , one of man's l o f % i e r

endeavors , has become incorporated i n t o the t r a d i t i o n a l de f in -

i t i o n of reason. The p resen t day concept of science is a re- +*

f l e c t i o n of this d e f i n i t i o n . But i t has a long h i s t o r y , begin- 1

ning w i t h the Greeks who were the f i r s t t o separa te theory

from prac t i ce . To them the s tudy of s c i e n t i f i c phenomenon was - -

bo th a cosmological puzzle and a s o r t of h ighly soph i s t i ca ted

game enjoyed by the l e i s u r e c l a s s . To the Greek phi losophers

, the p r a c t i c a l ar ts and c r a f t s were thought t o be outs ide o r \

beneath t h e i r concern. Yheir world vas more s u i t e d t o a pre- \ i i --occupation w i t h e t h i c s , music and matherilatics. Lince the

g r e a t inf luence of the Greeks has been acknowledged and chron-

i c l e d by the h i s t o r i a n s of philosophy and sc ience , i t mould

seem redundant t o d e t a i l the acceptance of the Greek world-

view from anc ien t t o ~ ~ e d i a e v d and modern times. Professor

:';bi tehead s famous rermrlc that I' the s a f e s t genera l charac ter -

i z a t i o n of the Zuropean phi losophica l t r a d i t i o n i s that i t

c o n s i s t s i n a a e r i e s of footnotes t o P l a t o , " i s a s v a l i d today

a s i t was on the day i t was w r i t t e n , Koest ler claims i t should

be amended t o read "science, up t o the Renaissance, cons i s t ed 1

i n a s e r i e s of footnotes t o A r i s t o t l e . " Suf f i ce i t t o say t h a t

modern epistomology s t i l l s u f f e r s from the Greek conception of

science. --,

i There a r e three c e n t r a l d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t stem from the

;\ i; : ,, - ., . . , .- I

-- knowing-doing d u a l i t y , For one, "knowledge" became the means

of seeking ou t and confirming the exis tence of an u l t imate

Being. Indeed, the o r i g i n a l on to log ica l argument was devel-

oped a s a method t o prove the ex i s t ence of a Erime Uover, and

soon became the Chr is t ian argucaent f o r the exis tence of God,

The second, the process of "knowing," became the mere ga ther -

, i ng of information without purpose. And t h i r d , the conception - I

of "mind" was born, no t an a c t i v e , changing and ever chal leng-

, ! i ng mind, b u t a passive r e c i p i e n t of previous "knowledge. " L?.

Dewey claimed t h a t a l l three could be descr ibed as the ~ p e c t a -

t o r theory of knowledge.

\ I n c o n t r a s t , 3emeyts apistomology sees knowing gg doing, 1 !

The process of knowing c r e a t e s more problems f o r knowing. ns L

a n i l l u s t r a t i o n , suppose a problem i n l i t e r a t u r e was t o be ex-

amined, say the cha rac te r of the 2001 i n King Lear. '+':ith the

f i r s t reading the s tudent i s normally confused, he doesn ' t

"know" the Pool b u t some ifipressions have l e f t t h e i r mark.

J i th a second reading those f i r s t impressions, i n conjunction

w i t h secondary impressions, may leave h i m l e s s confused b u t

with more problems f o r knowing, s ince the Foo l ' s cha rac te r i

becomes r i c h e r v i i t h f a m i i a r i t y and a s s o c i a t i o n , say, w i t h the

Pool i n TwelFth Xight, or s i t t i n g a t the next desk. &en i f

the " l a s t word" on the Fool k s been s a i d , o ther a spec t s of

the p lay w i l l become sub jec t mat ter f o r examination, They .

too w i l l become problems f o r knowing. The ques t i s on-going,

never ending and never f i n a l . Iiowever, the reading i t s e l f

remains worthless if i t remains passive. If the reading i s

unapplied the s tuden t i s merely ga ther ing informa ti on, and thus

i s c o n c d d i n g t o the spec ta to r theory of knowledge. If app l i ed ,

i n l e t us say, the development of a deeper understanding of

human behavior, and i n turn ac ted upon, h i s knowledge of s e l f

and s o c i e t y w i l l broaden. Only t o the e x t e n t t h a t a c t i o n i s

undertaken v i l l his a b i l i t y t o a c t u a l i z e i n d i v i d u a l freedoms

be widened.

Yhere i s a cons tant r econs t ruc t ion o f problems through 2

tile i n t e r a c t i o n of the knower and h i s s u b j e c t matter . A r e -

cons t ruc t ion that can take place on any l e v e l of cogni t ion:

emotionally, as i n l i s t e n i n g t o a symphony or viewing a f i l m ;

i n work, as a mechanic at tempts t o r e p a i r a f a u l t y f u e l pump;

or i n t e l l e c t u a l l y , a s a mthemat ic i an works on a problem i n

ca lcu lus .

kragnat ic inqui ry i s the c o n t r o l l e d proceas of knowin&.

It i s e x i s t e n t i a l l y based on tile experimental and p r a c t i c a l

i n s t r u m e n t a l i t i e s of science ~ n c . common endeavor, The gen-

e r a l d e f i n i t i o n of inqu i ry i s provided by dewey i n Logic: The

Theory of Inauiry. - Inqui ry i s the d i r e c t e d or con t ro l l ed t ransformation

of an indeterminate s i t u a t i o n i n t o a d e t e m i n a t e l y uni- f i e d one. The t r a n s i t i o n i s achieved by rrleans of oper- a t i o n s of two kinds whicn a r e i n func t iona l corresrjoil- dence with each other . One kind of okera t ion dea l s wi th

idea t iona l or conceptual subject-matter. This subject- matter stands f o r possible ways 2nd ends of resolut ion, . . .The other kind of operation i s made up of a c t i v i t i e s involving the techniques and organs of observations, Since these operations a r e e x i s t e n t i a l they modify the p r i o r e x i s t e n t i a l s i t ua t ion , b r ing i n t o high r e l i e f con- d i t i o n ~ previously obscure.. ,The ground and c r i t e r i o n of the execution of t h i s work of emphasis, se lec t ion and arrangement, i s t o de l imi t the problem i n such a way tha t e x i s t e n t i a l mater ia l may be provided with which t o t e a t the ideas t h a t represent possible modes of solut ion. Symbols, defining terms and propositions, ca r ry forward

ea t iona l and ex i s t en t i a suhject-matters i n order problem may be

The c r u c i a l fea ture of Dewey's epistemology then i s i d e n t i f i -

ca t ion and formation of the problem within an e x i a t e n t i a l

matrix -- f r o m which the problem i s given and taken -- and an

i so l a t i on of the remaining doubtful and p ~ p l e x i n g fea tures ,

i n terms o f a desired end,

The f i rs t condition necessary t o s t imulate inquiry i s an

indeterminate s i t u a t i o n , o r more simply, doubt. But doubt i s

continuous because of the nature o f r e a l i t y , which a s we have I ' seen, i s a boundless, changing, i n i t i a l l y undif ferent ia ted i e

experience, a p t l y ldkned t o an ocean. Out of t h i s ocean r e l a - - A

t ions become e x p l i c i t , thereby a l loa ing subjects and objects

t o develop. But they remain undif ferent ia ted u n t i l an inquiry

i s underway, f o r " things i n t h e i r immediacy a r e unknown and

unknowable, not because they a r e remote o r behind some impene-

t rab le v e i l of sensation of ideas , but because knowledge has

no concern with them, For knowledge i s a memorandum of con-

d i t ions of t h e i r appearance, concerned, t h a t i s , w i t h sequen- 4

c es , co-existences, re la t ions , " From t h i s conception of r ea l -

i t y the per t inen t pragmatic assumptions about t ru th , f a l s i t y

and the worth of inquiry a r i s e .

Charles Peirce, Dewey's i n t e l l e c t u a l mentor, wrote exten-

s ive ly on the worth of inquiry a s a method of proof, "The

i r r i t a t i o n of doubt i s the only immediate motive f o r the strug-

g le t o a t t a i n b e l i e f , " He goes on t o say:

It i s c e r t a i n t l y b e s t f o r us t h a t our b e l i e f s should be such a s may t r u l y guide our ac t ions so a s t o s a t i s f y our des i r e s ; and t h i s r e f l ec t ion w i l l make us r e j e c t every b e l i e f which does not seem to have been so formed a s t o insure this r e s u l t , But i t w i l l only do so by c rea t ing a doubt i n the place of that b e l i e f . Xith the doubt, therefore , the s t ruggle begins, and with the cessat ion of doubt i t ends, Hence, the so le object o f inquiry i s the set t lement of opinion. .de may fancy t h a t this i s not enough f o r us, and t h a t we seek, not merely an opinion, bu t a t rue opinion, But put t h i s fancy t o the t e s t , and i t proves groundless; f o r a s soon as a f i r m be l i e f i s reached we a re e n t i r e l y s a t i s f i e d , whether the b e l i e f be t rue or f a l s e , And i t i s c l ea r that nothing out of the sphere of our knowledge can be our object , f o r nothing which does not a f f e c t the mind can be the motive f o r mental ac t ion, The m o s t t ha t can be maintained is , that we seek f o r a be l i e f t h a t we s h a l l think t o be true. But we think each one of our b e l i e f s t o be t rue , and, indeed, i t is nere tautology t o say soo5

In the same essay Eeirce examines t r a d i t i o n a l philoso- 6

phical methods used t o s e t t l e opinion, making i t c l ea r that

inquiry based on the p rac t i ca l methodology of science, i s by

f a r the bes t system. In order t o j u s t i f y t h i s claim, however,

he makes h i s assumptions about r e a l i t y e x p l i c i t , and ou t l ines

the methodology of science, IIe a s s e r t s t ha t p r ac t i ca l ly aAd

experimentally science must dea l with r e a l things, the v e r i f i -

able , object ive f a c t s of c o m m o n O ~ , t h a t the process

i s i n no way sure of f i n a l r e s u l t s , only of 2ossible r e su l t s .

I n science, a s i n comnon sense, "we seek f o r a be l ie f t h a t we

s h a l l think to be true."

H i s answer to the old philosophical conceit on the exis-

tence or non-existence of " rea l" things, sums up the essence

of pragmatic ontology. He asks us t o consider what e f f e c t s

of a p r a c t i c a l nature we want the objects of our conception

t o have, i n this case " r ea l s , " and then points out t h a t the

conception of theae e f f e c t s i s the mhole of the conception o f

the object . A l l e l s e i s spectula t ive and outside proof, both 7

"antecedent t o r e f l ec t ive inquiry and independent of it.

Yeirce, by claiming an e x i s t e n t i a l ontology a s a base

f o r his concept o f " r ea l s , " i s able t o subs tan t ia te inquiry

aa the b e s t avenue t o t r u t h -- but t r u t h of a functional na-

ture , which a s we shall see , means the ve r i f i ab l e and nothing

e lse . A s he wri tes :

It may be asked how 3: know there a r e any iieals.. .The reply i s th is . . . . I f inves t igat ion cannot be regarded a s proving t h a t there a r e dea l things, i t a t l e a s t does not lead t o a contrary conclusion; bu t the method and conception on which i t i s based remain ever i n harmony. So doubts of the method, therefore, necessar i ly a r i s e from i t s practice...The fee l ing which gives r i s e t o any method of f ix ing b e l i e f i s a d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n a t two re- pugnant propositions. But here a l ready i s a vague con- cession t h a t there i s some = thing, which a propzsition should represent. Uobody, therefore , can r e a l l y doubt t h a t there a r e not Heals, f o r , i f he d id , doubt aould not be a source of d i s sa t i s f ac t ion . The hypothesis, therefore, i s one which every mind admits. So tha t the soc i a l impulse does not cause men t o doubt i to8

Yeircels contentions do not pretend t o be the keys to

f i n a l i t y or ce r ta in ty . The "contrary coilclusion" tha t he notes

implies t ha t the end of inves t iga t ion cannot be regarded as

i r r e fu t ab ly proving the case one way or the o ther ; i f "proofN

must equal "absolute , I t then the method i s inadaquate. Jhen

t h i s i s recognized i t becomes c l e a r that the Theory of Inquiry,

although avoiding contradict ion, i s simply not s a t i s f ac to ry

f o r those seeking cer ta in ty . Peirce does not make any claims

f o r ce r t a in ty , bu t he does very d e f i n i t e l y make the claim of

u t i l i t y f o r inquiry i n the f i xa t ion of be l i e f . A claim perfect -

l y consis tent with a philosophy t h a t ontological ly f i xes on a

recognition of the temporal and changing nature of man's world.

Truth and knowledge a r e s imi la r ly f r e e from absolute

def in i t ion . Relative t r u t h and r e l a t i v e knowledge hold the

hope of a changing, growing and more timely system of s o c i a l

d i rec t ion. In Reconstruction i n l ? h i l o s o ~ h ~ Jewey asks t ha t we

r e j e c t the Greek concept of absolute knowledge and replace i t

with e x i s t e n t i a l and p rac t i ca l meaning; erase the Ar i s to te l i an

footnote, so t o speak. An a c t that would allow us t o turn

philosophy i n t o a c r i t i c a l and ac t ive pa r t i c ipan t i n human #

a f f a i r s .

m e n the pract ice of knowledge ceased t o be d i a l e c t i c a l and became experimental, knowing became pre-occupied with changes and the t e s t of howledge became the a b i l i t y t o br ing about c e r t a i n changes. Ihowing, f o r the experi- mental sciences, means a ce r t a in kind 02 i n t e l l i g e n t l y conducted doing; i t ceases t o be contemplative and be- comes i n a t rue sense prac t ica l . iiow this implies t h a t philosophy, unless i t i s t o undergo a complete break with the authorized s p i r i t of science, must a l so a l t e r i t s nature. It must ae sme a p rac t i ca l nature.. .9

And i n his major study on epistemology, Ax~e-rience and Hature,

he def ines the term t ruth . ''Truth i s a co l lec t ion of t r u t h s ;

and these const i tuent t ru ths a r e i n keeping with the b e s t

ava i lab le methods of inquiry and t e s t i n g a s t o matters-of-fact ; 10

methods, which a r e , when col lec ted under a s ingle name, science."

There i s , i n f a c t , l i t t l e d i f ference between t r u t h and

knowledge except i n the temporal sense: one gives b i r t h t o tne

1 other. Knowledge i s a constantly evolving process that i s , i n \ '

\ e f f e c t , on the way t o becoming t r u t h I n short, knowledge i s

i n t e l l i g e n t doinc, where t r u t h i s the r e s u l t of i n t e l l i g e n t - -

f - \ doing, Knowledge then, once the ob-iect of science, i s used i n

a more d i r e c t and universa l sense, t o achieve the consummation

of in tent ion. Only t o the extent t h a t i t accom~l i shes this

consummation can i t be sa id t o demonstrate t ru th .

To sum up, the means of accomplishment a r e r e l a t i v e l y

simple and imminently p rac t ica l . It begins with a problem

f o r knowing, which causes perplexi ty , doubt and confusion, an

"indeterminate s i tuat ion." The second s t e p cons i s t s o f ex-

amining the immediate p o s s i b i l i t i e s , of i s o l a t i n g the problem.

The th i rd , a ca re fu l study of a l l f ac to r s surrounding the

problem, a compilation of f a c t s , o f t r u t h s per t inen t t o i t , i n

order t o br ing about deeper understanding, Fourth, the devel-

opment and widening of a tenat ive hypothesis f o r preois ion and

consistency, t o allom f o r speculative examination i n a broader

context, F i f t h , a declara t ion of ac t ion spec i f i ca l l y aimed

a t ex i s t ing , e x i s t e n t i a l a f f a i r s , and, t o t e s t the hypothesis, 11

the ac t ion i t s e l f , The fou r th and f i f t h s teps represent the

experimental and instrumental d i r ec t ion of the inquiry. To

s top before these s teps a r e taken i s t o guarantee a t r i a l and

e r ro r inquiry w i t h s l i g h t chance of success. These f i v e s teps -

- could be ca l led the "theory" of inquiry, o r a properly d i rec - \

- I t g d r e f l e c t i v e experience. Gut as I have shown, every one of

the s t eps involved i s i n some way in te r - re la ted with the prag-

matic notions of knowledge, experience, the nature of r e a l i t y

and t r u t h and f a l s i t y , Only through a comprehensive under-

standing of these terms can inquiry be consis tent ly ;vorkable.

Those who doubt the v a l i d i t y of inquiry as a universa l ly

applicable means t o s e t t l e opinion, base t h e i r doubt l e s s on

the above outl ined s y s t e ~ thm on mhat they see t o be a l i m i t -

a t i o n of scope, The argument goes, a s a me thodology inquiry

could be qui te successful , so long a s the subject matter

remains within science, But when Dewey speaks of t r u t h a s

"processes of change s o d i rec ted t h a t they achieve an intended

cons~mmation,~ he deals out morality, Dewey an t ic ipa ted such

react ion; "To general ize the recognition t h a t [truth] means

the ve r i f i ed and means nothing e l s e placea upon men the respon-

s i b i l i t y f o r surrendering p o l i t i c a l and moral dams, and

subject ing t o the t e s t of consequences t h e i r most cheriahed 12

prejudices ." The crux of most human perp lex i t i es i n everyday a f f a i r s

i s the angry juxtaposi t ion of values. Dewey, instead of ne-

g lect ing values, pointed the way f o r es tab l i sh ing new values

i n the face of change. H i s ins is tence t h a t m n s top the --

f u t i l e attempt t o l i v e i n two unrelated worlds, forced the L

issue of values out of the dark of metaphysical spectula t ion

and i n t o the hard l i g h t of day.

Section One: p a r t two

Arthur Koestler, The dleepval&rs: A History of Nan's

Chawing Vision of the Universe (Hew York: Grosset and - Dunlap, 1963), pa 53.

John Dewey and nrthur F. Bentley, Xhowini;r, and the Known

( ~ o s t o n : Beacon Press, 1949), c h p , 5.

Sect ion One: p a r t two

11OrTZ5 -- (cont . )

3 John Dewey, L o ~ i c : The Tneory of Inau i ry ( ~ e w York: H o l t ,

Hinehart and Vinston, 1960), pp. 104-05.

4 John Dewey, 3xperience and ITature (Xew York: Dover Pub-

l i c a t i o n s , 1958) , p. 86.

5 Charles Yeirce, "The Fixa t ion of B e l i e f , " P h i l o s o ~ h i &

m i t i n e s - of ke i rce , ed. Sustus Euchler (liew York: Dover

Publ ica t ions , 1955) , pp. 10-11.

6 Pe i rce , P h i l o s ~ ~ i c a l .:ritings, pp. 15-17.

7 John Dewey, The Quest f o r C e r t a i n a (New York: Capricorn

Books, 1 9 6 0 ) ~ p. 69.

8 k e i r c e , khi losoahica l ; ' iritings, pp. 18-19,

9 John Dewey, i ieconetruction i n 2hilosoi;hy ( ~ o s t o n : Beacon

Press , 1965), p. 121.

10 Dewey, i i x ~ e r i e n c e and Xature, p. 410

12 Dewey, Heconstruction, p. 160

On Value a q u h e Cri t icsm of B e l i e f s

Both Dewey and Yeirce regarded the end of inqu i ry t o be

the f i x a t i o n of b e l i e f s or the e l imina t ion of doubt, an idea

usua l ly mis in terpre ted as a l i m i t a t i o n of the u t i l i t y of in -

quiry when c o n t r o v e r s i s l hurran values a r e involved. Inquiry

i s seen a s u s e f u l only i n s e t t l i n g quest ions of t r u t h o r

f a l s i t y , as a kind of wordy, complex and soph ia t i ca ted Venn

Diagram. But i n no way can inqui ry be seen i n so l i m i t e d a

l i g h t . Inquiry i s used a s a method t o c r i t i c i z e and c l a r i f y

meaning; not t o f i x c e r t a i n t y or f i n a l i t y , b u t t o ex i s t en -

t i a l l y examine human a f f a i r s . I n E x ~ e r i e n c e and iqature Dewey

a s s e r t e d that " the realm of meanings i s wider than t h a t of

true-and-false meanings; i t Bhe c l a r i f y i n g of meanin4 i s

more urgent and more f e r t i l e . ' ' He then went on t o say,

When the claim of meanings t o t r u t h e n t e r s i n , then t r u t h i s indeed pre-eminent. But th is f a c t i s o f t e n confused w i t h the idea that t r u t h has a claim t o e n t e r evsryvhere ; t h a t i t has a monopolistic j u r i s d i c t i o n . Poe t i c meanings, moral memings, a l a r g e p a r t of the gooda of l i f e are matters of r i chness and freedom of meanings, r a t h e r t h n of t r u t h ; a l a r g e p a r t of our l i f e i a c a r r i e d on i n a realm of meanings t o nhicri t r u t h and f a l s i t y as such a r e i r r e l e v a n t . And t h e claim of phi lo- sophy t o r i v a l o r d isp lace sc ience as a purveyor of t r u t h seems t o be mostly a compensatory ges ture f o r f a i l u r e t o perform i t s proper t ask of l i b e r a t i n g and c l a r i f y i n g meanings, including those s c i e n t i f i c a l l y au then t i ca ted .l 4s we have seen e a r l i e r , h1o::lin;; -- the means t o con t ro l -

' ' l e d change -- i s tile r e s u l t of making e x p l i c i t an opinion

about sonething and t e s t i n g i t e x i s t e n t i a l l y . It matters

l i t t l e whether the opinion t o 'ne t e s t ed i s na tu r a l or super-

na tu r a l , s ince a l l opinions a r e rooted i n hurilan a f f a i r s and 2

a r e products of experience. Thus inquiry i s a s va l id a

system i n h i s t o r i c a l and l i t e r a r y examination a s i t i s i n

b io log i ca l or mathematical theorizing. '' khd dif ference i n

subject-matters i s not incompatible with the existence of a 3

common p a t t e r n kf i n q u i r d i n both types."

The connection of knowledge w i t h b e l i e f i s fundamental

t o the pragmatic not ion of value, and again the question of

t r a d i t i o n a l dualism i s ra ised . "As a n a t u r a l h i s t o r y of ,

mind [the not ion that mind and nature a r e s epa ra tq i s wholly \ <

mythological. A 1 1 knowing and e f f o r t t o know starts from

some bel ief . . . In every ins tance , from passing query to e lab-

o ra te s c i e n t i f i c undertaking, the a r t of knowing c r i t i c i z e s

a b e l i e f which has passed current as genuine coin , w i t h a view 4

t o i t s rev i s ion , "

This "wholly mythological" not ion, stemming from the

separa t ion of b e l i e f from reason, f i nds i t s phi losophical

beginnings i n the severance of subjec t from object ive r e a l i t y . -

In con t ras t , Dewey holds t h a t tne subjec t ive s ide of the sub- I

i jec t -objec t r e la t ionsh ip i s i t s e l f a p a r t of nature. Opin-

ions about what i s the t r u t h are equal ly as v e r i f i a b l e a s i s

t r u t h i t s e l f , and i n this sense philosophy becomes the c r i t i -

cism of b e l i e f s . Philosophy does not have tne t ru th . There

i s no reason t o bel ieve t h a t the imminent domain of t r u t h i s

i n the "mind" of the philosopher, or f o r that mat ter , i n the

" s p i r i t " of the theologian.

This view i s of ten c r i t i c i z e d a s taking away the d ign i t y

of philosophy; that philosophy by jo in ing with cor ion concerns

and p r a c t i c a l p o l i t i c s becomes simply a n instrument of s o c i a l

reform. But s u r e l y the common concern of a 2 men, inc luding

philosophers and theologians, must be s o c i a l reform. If the

philosopher wishes t o r e t a i n his world of Olympian a loofness ,

t h a t i s q u i t e a l l r i g h t , b u t his wisdom should t e l l him that

s o c i a l d i s a s t e r i s a very g r e a t p o s s i b i l i t y ; d i s a s t e r of such

magnitude t h a t i t would take with i t b o t h the va l l eys of

vulgar concern and Olympus. ~ n d i n this sense philosophy must

become the c r i t i c i s m o f b e l i e f s .

The c e n t r a l reason f o r the subjec t ive-objec t ive confusion

i s the r e t r e a t of most ph i losop l~ ies i n t o the p o s i t i o n that

s u b j e c t i v i t y i s no t open t o sc ience , that the only s c i e n t i f i c

method worth t h a t name i s q u a n t i t a t i v e measurement. As Dewey

warns i n Zxperience and Cature :

Desi res , b e l i e f s , ' p r a c t i c a l ' a c t i v i t y , values are a t t r i b u t e d exc lus ive ly t o the h w n s u b j e c t ; this d i v i - s i o n i s what makes s u b j e c t i v i t y a snare and a p e r i l . The case of b e l i e f i s c r u c i a l . For i t i s admitted t h a t b e l i e f involves a phase of acquiescence o r a s s e r t i o n , i t p resen t s q u a l i t i e s which involve personal f a c t o r s ; and.. .value. A sI?i?rp l i n e of demarcation has theref ore t o be drawn between b e l i e f and knowledge, f o r t h e l a t - t e r has been def ined i n terms of pure o b j e c t i v i t y . The need t o con t ro l b e l i e f i s admit ted; knowledge f i g u r e s , even though according t o these t h e o r i e s only per g&- cidens , a s the organon of such con t ro l . P r a c t i c a l l y then, i n e f f e c t , knowledge, sc ience , t r u t h , i s the met- hod of determining r i g h t p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n b e l i e f s on the p a r t of personal factor^.^

Clear ly , j u s t a s knowledge which has come t o be considered

"ob jec t iveH a r i s e s from r e a l i t y , s o too does value. Value i s

only outs ide of experience when human ideas a s t o good and 6

i bad a r e considered t o be outs ide of r e a l i t y . i)eweyVs p o s i t i o n , . I L of course, r e j e c t s the not ion that va lues a r e somehow " e t e r n a l "

,--

' o r " i r r e f u t a b l e , " that they a r e ends i n themselves. But I i

shall have more t o say on t h i s i n b o t h s e c t i o n two and three .

Dewey's conception of r e a l i t y , that a l l mant s experience

l i e s wi th in i t and has reference t o i t , thereby producing

va lues , allows the a s s e r t i o n that i n q u i r y i s u n i v e r s a l l y ap-

p l i c a b l e . A s i n a l l human a f f a i r s , however, the re i s the

quest ion of end r e s u l t s . But t o seek out c e r t a i n t y i n value

i s as f r u i t l e s s a t a s k a s it i s i n sc ience , f o r l i k e sc ience ,

the ques t i s never ending, The methods o f i nqu i ry promise

only t o c l a r i f y meaning and t o c r i t i c a l l y examine b e l i e f .

The means of c l a r i f y i n g quest ions of value were i n t r o -

duced e a r l i e r i n ny d iscuss ion on choice. Pragmatical ly , t o

hold t h a t something i s of value i s no t only t o perceive some

i n t r i n s i c q u a l i t y of ''good" b u t t o perceive g r e a t e r q u a l i t y

i n r e l a t i o n t o o thers : 'not i n the sense of one preference

a l r eady made and s t ronger than o the r s , b u t a s tne formation 7

of a new preference out of a c o n f l i c t of preferences." I

i 1 (>- Through the operat ion of inqui ry man i s ab le t o make the d i s - i/;'-

t i n c t i o n between ob jec t s and s i t u a t i o n s vinich a r e immediately

good and those which a r e even tua l ly good. " O f i m e d i a t e

values.. .which occur and which a r e possessed and enjoyed,

there i s no theory a t a l l ; they j u s t occur, a r e enjoyed, pos- 8

sessed; and that i s a l l . " Zventual good, or i t s a p p r a i s a l ,

must involve inqu i ry :

The moment we begin t o discourse about, . .values, t o de f ine and genere l i ze , t o m.ke d i s t i n c t i o n s i n kinds, we a r e passing beyond value-ob jec ts themselves ; we a r e en te r ing , even i f only b l i n d l y , u2on an inqu i ry i n t o causa l antecedents and causa t ive consequents, w i t h a view t o appra i s ing the ' r e a l , ' t h a t i s the eventua l , goodness of the th ing i n question. Je a r e c r i t i c i z i n g ,

n o t f o r i t s ovm sake, bu t f o r the sake o f i n s t i t u t i n g and perpetua t ing more enduring and extensive values,

9

Dewey does n o t speak of ob jec t s and s i t u a t i o n s which a r e

apparent ly good and thoae which a r e r e a l l y good, s ince he sees

such a d i s t i n c t i o n as quest ion begging. Arguments t h a t l e a d

t o d i s t i n c t i o n s i n kind simply do n o t go f a r enough or d i g

deep enough, ..,'ithin b o t h r e l i g i o n and p o l i t i c s the f a c t that

an ob jec t i s bel ieved i n , i s of fered as reason t o s u b s t a n t i a t e

the b e l i e f , b u t such an argument i s only prel iminary t o the

quest ion o f the genes is of the b e l i e f and i t s p resen t value,

The a l l - impor tant mat ter i s v ~ h a t l i e s back of [the be- l i e f i n something a s a good and causes acceptance and r e j e c t i o n ; whether o r no the re i s a method of discr imina- t i o n and assessment nhich makes a d i f fe rence i n w h a t i s assented t o and denied, Yro2ert ies and r e l a t i o n s that e n t i t l e an objec t t o be found good i n b e l i e f a r e ex t ran- eous t o the q u a l i t i e s that a r e i t s immediate good; they a r e causa l , and hence found only by sea rch i n t o the an te - cedent and the eventual. The conception t h a t there a r e some ob jec t s o r some p r o p e r t i e s o f ob jec t s which c a r r y t h e i r onn adequate c r e d e n t i a l s upon t h e i r face i s the snare and delusion of the whole h i s t o r i c t r a d i t i o n re - garding knowledge

Thus immediate good and eventua l good can be d i s t ingu i shed

only i n terms of r e l a t i o n a l aspects . k good a r r i v e d a t through

inqui ry d i f f e r s from an immediate good only t o the e x t e n t that

i t i s he ld good i n r e l a t i o n t o o ther goods, The ex ten t i s

measured by r e l y i n g u2on an e x i s t e n t i a l a p p r a i s a l of i t s ante-

cedents and consequences. Goods e s t a b l i s h e d through inqu i ry

a r e f r e e r and more enduring s inca they r e f l e c t e x i s t e n t i a l .

condit ions; the re fo re , i n no way do they s t i f l e the c r e a t i v e 11

genius of man. On the cont rary , by applying the methods of

inqu i ry t o b r i n g about new human values, we xould be immeasura-

ab ly enriched.

Sect ion Ong: p a r t th ree

NOTES

1 John Dewey, E x ~ e r i e n c e and Xature (New York: Dover Yub-

l i c a t i o n s , 1958), pp. 410-11.

2 John Dewey, Logic: The -xheor?r of Inqui ry ( ~ e a York: Holt ,

3 i n e h a r t and -Jinston, l96O), pp. 116-17,

- 4 Dewey, ~ x p e r i e n c e and Uature, pp. 428-29

5 Dewey, Experience and l iature, pp. 429-30. I 1

6 In the chapter on "bxis tence as Precar ious and as S tab le , " 1

i n Lxmrience and i i a t u a , Sev~ey p resen t s w h a t I see t o

be the b e s t argument I ham encountered thus far f o r the

r e j e c t i o n of c l a s s i c a l d u a l i t y : pp, 68-71.

.. -. 7 John dewey, OnZxperience, i;lature, and Breedom, ed. Xichard

J. irlernstein (Eev~ York: Bobbs-kierrill , l 9 6 0 ) , p. 266,

8 2ewey, Lxperience and Eature, p. 403. 1 I

9 Dewey, ~ x p e r i e n c e and Lhtuxe, p. 403.

LO Dewey, ..ixperience aan_ddiTs$u=, pp. 404-05.

11 John Uewey, Kecons t r u c t i o n i n Lh i lossh .v ( ~ o s t o n : Beacon

Press , 1-965), pp. 212-13,

On tile conclu.diug p a ~ e s of Lecorls tr uct ion Uewey sums

up h i s hope f o r d more meaningful s o c i a l d i r e c t i o n based

Sect ion One: p a r t three

iiO'ILS (cont . )

on a n a t u r a l te leo logy:

Poetry, a r t , r e l i g i o n a r e precious th ings . They can- n o t be maintained by l i n g e r i n g i n the p a s t and f u t i l e l y wishing t o r e s t o r e what the movement of events i n s c i - ence, indus t ry and g o l i t i c a has destroyed. They a r e an o u t - f l o w e ~ i n g of thought and d e s i r e s thzt unconsciously converge i x l o a d i s p o s i t i o n of imagination as a r e s u l t e l LhousanGs and thousands o f d a i l y episodes and contac t . They canilot be wi l led i n t o exis tence o r coerced i n t o be- i n The wind of the s p i r i t bloweth anere i t l i s t e t h 2nd. tne kingdom of God i n such things does n o t come w i t h observation. Zut virile i t i s impossible t o r e t a i n and recover by d e l i b e r a t e v o l i t i o n old sources of r e l i g i o n m d a r t that have been d i s c r e d i t e d , i t i s poss ib le t o expedi te the developnent of the v i t a l sources of a r e l i - gion and a r t t h a t a r e y e t t o be. iJot indeed by a c t i o n d i r a c t l y aimed a t t h e i r production, b u t by s u b s t i t u t i n g f a i t h i n the a c t i v e tendencies o f the day f o r dread and d i s l i k e of them, and by the courage aria i n t e l l i g e n c e t o fol low whither s o c i a l and s c i e n t i f i c changes d i r e c t s us. bye a r e weak today i n i d e a l ma t t e r s because i n t e l l i g e n c e i s divorced froril a s p i r a t i o n . The bare fo rce of circum- stance coz!ipels us onmrds i n the d a i l y d e t a i l of our be- i i e f ' 3 and a c t s , b u t our deeper thoughts and d e s i r e s t u r n bzckuards. .dhen philosophy s h a l l have co-operatea d t h t r ~ e course of events and made c l e a r and coherent the rzea~ling of the d a i l y d e t a i l , science and emotion w i l l i r l . terpenetrate, p r a c t i c e and imagination w i l l embrace. I-oc-Lry and r e l i g i o u s f e e l i n g w i l l be the unforced flowers 3 2 . To f u r t h u r t h i s a r t i c u l a t i o n and r e v e l a t i o n df ci~e meanind of the c u r r e n t course of events i s the t h d k and problem of philosophy i n days of t r a n s i t i o n .

S C T I O K T./ii

Furthur Observations -------------- on >'reedom, Inaui ry and Ontology

Since pragmatism began, three major phi losophical c r i t i c -

i s m s have been d i rec ted aga ins t it. The f i r s t r e j e c t s the

pragmatic concept of freedom; the second r e j e c t s the Theory

of Inquiry a s a viable too l with which t o dea l w i t h value;

and the t h i rd r e j e c t s Dewey's e x i s t e n t i a l ontology. I have

d e a l t a t sorue l eng th with most of the c e n t r a l i s sues of a l l

t h r ee ; however, i n order t o niake the pragmatic pos i t ion more

c l e a r l y d i sce rn ib le , 1 s h a l l r e s t a t e some of the more t roubl ing

points .

It may be asked, i s freedom reducible t o a capaci ty t o

achieve s a t i s f a c t i o n or t o a d i spos i t i on t o explore consequen-

ces? There a r e two questions here and the l a t t e r must be re-

jec ted out of hand. Dewey's concept o f freedom i s more than

mere d i spos i t ion of any kind. 20 define freedom as an explor-

a t o r y d i spos i t ion implies a kind of l o f t y indulgence i n d i l e t -

t an te caprice: back t o the heights of Clympus. Only i f freedom

were seen a s a very pa r t i cu l a r i zed and ac t i ve d i spos i t ion , and

I, use the term r e luc t an t l y , v~ould such a d e f i n i t i o n have mer i t .

Je saw e a r l i e r t h a t a c t i on i n r e l a t i o n t o choice i s i n t r i n s i c

t o freedom; consequently, no mat ter w h a t our d i spos i t i on

might be, unless we have both the a b l i i t y t o a c t and choose

i n accord w i t h our d i s p o s i t i o n , we cannot begin t o achieve - freedom. As an i l l u s t r a t i o n , we m y wish t o explore the con-

sequences of changing the course of a r i v e r , and f i n d through

our explora t ions t h a t t o &o so vould g r e a t l y enhance the f o r -

tunes of the comolunity served by the r i v e r . But a f t e r choos-

ing t o do so , un less we have the power t o a c t , the r i v e r w i l l

remain unchanged. The same arguuent a p p l i e s when considering

the " r i g h t " t o vote. If the re i s no p a r t y or person represen-

t a t i v e of an i n d i v i d u a l ' s view, o r the p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e i s

so con t ro l l ed that a l l p a r t i e s a r e v i r t u k l l y the same, one

must s e t t l e f o r the i d e a l o f the r i g h t t o vote , which, a l though

very noble i n p o l i t i c a l appearance, does l i t t l e t o f o s t e r r e a l

change. Hichard Eerns te in expla ins t h a t I' . . .Dewey t e l l s us

[that]. . . lmere e l iminat ion of obs t ruc t ions i s no t enough t o

secure r i g h t s and achieve freedom.' h n ' s freedom i s n o t a

f a c t , i t i s a p o s s i b i l i t y . 'But l i k e a l l o the r p o s s i b i l i t i e s ,

this p o s s i b i l i t y has t o be a c t u a l i z e d ; and l i k e a l l o the r s ,

i t can only be a c t u a l i z e d through i n t e r a c t i o n with ob jec t ive

conditions. ' If man i s t o achieve genuine freedom and i n d i -

v i d u a l i t y , i t i s necessary t o counter the n a t u r a l tendency of

a technologica l soc ie ty . Present s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s must

be recons t ruc ted so that they w i l l encourage the r e a l i z a t i o n

of c r e a t i v e i n d i v i d u a l i t y . iiow this i s t o be achieved cannot

be answered i n a wholesale uanner, f o r i t i s a mat ter of 1

s p e c i f i c reforms i n p a r t i c u l a r s i tua t ions . ' '

If the quest ion, ''Is freedom reducib le t o the capac i ty t o

achieve s z t i d f a c t i o n ? " were proper ly q u a l i f i e d , the answer

would be yes. The c e n t r a l q u a l i f i c a t i o n would be that satis-

f a c t i o n cannot be intended as a f i n a l s t a t e , There i s no

f u t u r e po in t i n time a t nhich i t could be s a i d that t o t a l

sat is ,dfact ion would be achieved. Preedom, l i k e a l l . of human

a f f a i r s , nas a temporal and contextua l dimension. It i s

meaningless f o r one t o s t a t e t k ~ t he i s f r e e : he i s e i t h e r

f r e e t o d o something, o r f r e e fro& something, b u t never j u s t

f r e e . S imi la r ly , he may be f r e e t o do something now, b u t

there i s nothing which insures that he w i l l have the same f r e e -

don? i n the f u t u r e , i; man re leased from pr i son i s n o t a " f r e e f i

man, he i s f r e e from pr ison . lie has g r e a t e r choice and g r e a t -

e r power of a c t i o n , g r e a t e r p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r the achievement

of freedom, b u t i f he uses these p o s s i b i l i t i e s t o again vio-

l a t e the law, thus jeopardizing the freedom of o the r s , he w i l l

f i n d himself soon deprived of even the p o s s i b i l i t y of freedom.

There i s , of course, a s o c i a l argument here. n s we saw

e a r l i e r , the not ion of choice became involved w i t h responsi-

b i l i t y and blame, Deviant s o c i a l behavior , tneref ore, i s

l a r g e l y misunderstood s ince i t i s seen i n terms of blame and

subsequent punishment. But there i s ample evidence t o show

t n a t n o amount of punishment w i l l ckmnge the consequences of

a man's h i s t o r y , a h i s t o r y w r i t t e n v i t n i n e x i s t e n t i a l exper-

ience. Kot w i t i l genuine a t tempts t o change the laws and

i n s t i t u t i o n s of soc ie ty have come about, at tempts t h a t r e f l e c t

e x i s t e n t i a l condi t ions , w i l l crime and c r i m i n a l i t y be under-

stood and reduced.

i n surii?, i f the tern s a t i s d f a c t i o n means that dynamic

s t a t e of a f fa i r s nhicll i u t e l l - i ~ e n t h y atierrlpts t o brink about

the mximum expansion and hamony of ind iv idua l needs, and i f

such a s t a t e of a f f a i r s i s put under the constant sc ru t iny

of inquiry, then I would have t o agree t h a t freedom i s the

capacity t o achieve s a t i s i f a c t i o n ,

It may a l s o be asked, "Is i t not possible f o r two people

t o agree on the consequences of an a c t and s t i l l disagree on

i t s value?" O f course, But as was pointed out e a r l i e r , Dew-

ey makes no claims t o the contrary, There i s no suggestion

t h a t the cessat ion o f a l l con f l i c t w i l l be achieved through

the use of inquiry, .:hat i s suggested i s t h a t inquiry i s

the b e s t method t o deal with con f l i c t of a l l so r t s . On this

point l e t me repeat one of Dewey's e a r l i e r contentions:

I I It i s no t pretended t h a t a moral theory based upon

I r e a l i t i e s of human nature and a study of the spec i f i c

I connections of these r e a l i t i e s w i t h those of physical science would do away w i t h moral s truggle and defea t , It would not make the moral l i f e a s simple a matter as wending one's way along a well-lighted boulevard, A l l ac t ion i s an invasion o f the fu tu re , of the unknown, Conflict and uncertainty a r e ul t imate t r a i t s , But morals based upon concern w i t h f a c t s and deriving guid- ance from knowledge would a t l e a s t locate the points of e f fec t ive endeavor and would focus avai lable resour-

I ces upon them,2

To the extent t ha t resolut ion can occur, i t i s b e s t brought

about through a recognition of the consequences of the con-

f l i c t , determined by the use of inquiry.

The pragmatic r e j ec t ion of "e te rna l" t r u t h i s another bone

i n the throat t o the t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s o f philosophy, Dewey

admits t o t r u th s that a r e i n u sense *out1' of time, t h a t could

be ca l led e ternal . The universals whose existence and value

have been apparent and puzzling t o philosophers t,hrough the

centur ies a r e not denied by him, f o r physics gives example of

such s t a b i l i t y and pervasiveness , Certainty, changelessness,

insubs tan t ia l i ty , "e te rna l so nhich clzaracterize the Greek's

idea l s , a r e a t t r i b u t a b l e t o instrumental universals , not

hypothesized i n t o a superior order of existence or transcen-

denta l laws of the universe. A s Dewey wri tes i n Bx~er ience

and Hature :

Timeless laws, taken by themselves, l i k e a l l univer- s a l s , express d i a l e c t i c i n t e n t , not any matter of f a c t existence, But t h e i r ul t imate implication i s appl ica t ion ; tney a r e methods, and when applied as methods they re- gulate the precarious f l o w of unique s i t ua t ions , Objects of na tu ra l science a r e not metaphysical r i v a l s of h i s to r - i c a l events; they a r e means of d i r ec t ing the l a t t e r . Events change; one individual gives place t o another, But individual ly qua l i f i ed things have some q u a l i t i e s which a r e pervasive, common, s table . They a r e out of time i n the sense t h a t a pa r t i cu l a r temporal qua l i ty i s i r r e l evan t t o them. I f anybody f e e l s re l ieved by c a l l i n g them e t e rna l , l e t them be ca l l ed e te rna l . %ut l e t no t ' e te rna l1 be then conceived a s a kind of absolute per- during existence or Being. It denotes j u s t what i t de- notes : i rrelevance t o existence i n i t s temporal qua l i t y . . .=is such they b t e r n a l d a r e too l s , ins t rumenta l i t i es . . , h i s t o r i c events regulate t h e i r course .g

Eterna l e x i s t e n t i a l t r u th s about the a f f a i r s of men a r e impos- 4

s ib l e . To hold this posi t ion i s to repeat the claim that

t r u t h i s the ve r i f i ed and nothing e l se . It would t e s t the

resources of the b e s t l l i b r a r y on the s o c i a l sciences, o r f o r

t ha t matter , the Library o f Congress, t o f i nd any e te rna l8

within the temporal world of man and his a f f a i r s . The import-

an t f a c t , however, i s t h a t we possess more and t rue r t ru th s

today than ever before, and our recognit ion that these t ru th s

a re not e t e rna l does not a f f e c t t h e i r r e l i a b l i t y i n the l e a s t .

Despite the f a c t t h a t present theor ies concerning the o r ig in

and development of the universe a r e subject t o i n f i n i t e mod-

i f i c a t i o n and ref i%ent , these theor ies a r e f a r t rue r than any

of the mythical exp ldna t ions which they have replaced.

Luch more i s known about tile face of the e a r t h than was

known by any previous generation. Je know f o r example t h a t

the base l i n e used to e s t a b l i s h a l t i t u d e measurement i s not

somehow b u l l t i n t o the s t ruc ture of the ea r th , o r given by

the gods o r i n t u i t i o n , bu t is chosen f o r i t s e f f icacy i n i n t e -

gra t ing the i n t r i c a t e pa t te rn of land measurements. The

choice of a common measure i s made necessary by the funct ional e

requirments of co l lec t ive soc i a l a c t i v i t i e s . In p rac t i ca l A

human terms, including "sub jec t ivet ' values a s well aa 'lob jec t -

ive" f a c t s , the choice w i l l survive only so long a s i t remains

functional. Thus Dewey wr i tes , "Anything which can e x i s t a t

any place and a t any time occurs aubject t o t e s t s imposed

upon i t by surroundings, which a r e only i n p a r t compatible

and reinforcing. These surroundings t e s t i t s s t reng th and

measure i t s endurance...The s t a b l e s t thing me can speak of i a

not f ree from conditions s e t to i t by other things.. . n th ing

may endure secula s e c u l o r ~ and y e t not be ever las t ing ; i t

w i l l crumble before the gnawing tooth of time, a s i t exceeds II 5

a ce r t a in measure. Gvery existence i s an event.

Section Two

1 aichard J. Bernstein, On Experience, lTature, and Freedom

(xew York: Bobbs-herril l , l 9 6 0 ) , p. x i i i .

2 John Dewey, IIurnan Nature and Conduct (dew York: hodern

Library, 1957), p. 12.

Section Two

IiOPiS (cont. )

3 John Dewey, Zxperience and Ja ture (New York: Dover Publi-

ca t ions , 1958), pp. 148-49.

4 T o r an excel lent appra i sa l of instrumental universal8 see:

Harold C, Brom, "Inte l l igence and lathe ma tic^,^ Creative

In te l l igence (Hem York; Henry Holt, 1917), pp. 118-75.

Also: S t e r l i ng Y. Lamprecht, "P;Taturalism and Keligion,"

Naturalism ---- and the IIum.a~,S~iriL (Eew York: Columbia - University Press, 1945), pp. 17-39.

5 >ewey, Xxperience and Uature, pp. 70-71,

SL C !i! 103 TiLXiG

Dewey: The Eost Dangerous Man Since H i t l e r

In the preface to Lx~er i ence and Zducation Dewey expressed

the conviction tha t "it i s the business of an i n t e l l i g e n t

theory of education t o a sce r t a in the causes f o r the c o n f l i c t s

t h a t e x i s t and then, ins tead of taking one side or the o ther ,

t o ind ica te a plan o f operations, proceeding from a l e v e l deep-

e r and more comprehensive than i s represented by the p rac t ices 1

and ideas of the contending pa r t i e s , " Few i t seems would quar-

r e l w i t h his objective, bu t considering the number of e f f o r t s

being made toward "newt' educational d i r ec t ions which have not-

ably f a i l e d , Dewey was being supr is ingly optimist ic . Clearly,

e x i s t e n t i a l consequences have shom~ t h a t his plan of operations \

have not ye t helped matters noticeably,

ifithout c i t i n g evidence or au thor i ty X w i l l presume t h a t

c o n f l i c t about our educational system i s a t l e a s t a s wide-

spread a s i t was i n 1938, the publicat ion date of Axperience

and Xducation. In f a c t , i t appears t h a t recent world events

make the con f l i c t even more acute, Soviet technical success

has been d i f f i c u l t t o explain away, If our system, so much

longer i n operation than the iiussian, cannot maintain a wide

lead i n achievement, then the reason i s c l e a r , the "progressiveM

education of Dewey has destroyed Jestern education. The charge

may sound somewhat overstated and paranoid, bu t i t i s not w i t h -

out foundation; a s j u s t one example, Gortimer Adler, i n a

nat ional magazine, ca l led dewey "the most dangerous man s ince 2

Hit ler ," It mould follow t h a t by forswearing Dewey and h i s

fellow pragmatists we may f i nd the way back to a successful

pedagofzy

But f o r a number of reasons the d i f f i c u l t i e s cannot f a i r l y

be blamed on 3ewey and h i s followers, To begin with, the g r e a t

majority o f schools i n both Canada and the United S ta tes have

never been anything l i k e progressive schools; indeed, moat of

the so-called progressive schools and educators a r e not Dewey-

an i n any sense. A l s o , the problem before us i s not e s sen t i a l -

l y one of methods but of aims, meaning that the bulk of the

controversy adout d i sc ip l ine , problem-solving, cognitive deyel-

opment, learning process, t o name a few, i s not immediately

relevant . The value questions involved a r e general. In no

way can they be r e s t r i c t e d t o education alone. Je are con-

fused about aims of individual and soc i a l l i f e ; thus the ques-

t ions have t o do with philosophy as well a s pedagogy.

In the reading I have done, from Jacques Barzun's The

House of I n t e l l e c t t o the most recent a r t i c l e s i n The American

Teacher there appears an almost hopeless recognit ion that ---9

present day education i s a t b e s t f u l f i l l i n g some of the econ-

omic needs o f socie ty , and a t worst, i a a huge and impersonal

wdchine unwilling or unable t o seek out new ways of maximizing

and making re levant the experience of the child. Eut t o imply

tha t the present s t a t e of education i s the r e s u l t o f Deweyan

pedagogy i s very l i k e blaming the problems of nmerican soc ie ty

on i k r t i n Luther Xing. 4

It must be admitted that Yewey d i d con t r ibu te i n profound

measure t o the theory and p r a c t i c e of l ea rn ing and teaching, as

Ains te in d i d i n the f i e l d of physics. However, aewey i s no

more respons ib le f o r our dec l ine i n c u l t u r a l and t echn ica l

s k i l l s than i s E i n s t e i n respons ib le f o r our s u i c i d a l atock-

p i l e of atomic death. Less so, s ince i n most cases Dewey's

work has y e t t o be d i r e c t l y incorporated i n t o our i n s t i t u t i o n s .

In the schools t b t dewey planned the c h i l d was t o become

"the sun about which the appl iances o f educat ion revolve... 3

the cen te r about which they a r e organized." Schools l i k e the

i d e a l home w i t h teachers l i k e the pa ren t s of such a home,

organized and educated s o t h a t inqu i ry could and would take

place i n an atmosphere of s t a b i l i t y . Phys ica l ly the school

was t o be in t ima te ly r e l a t e d t o the community, f o r the c h i l d

would "come t o school w i t h a l l the experience he had got out-

s ide the school , and leave i t mith something t o be immediately 4

used i n his everyday l i f e . " I n place of the s t a t i c "you

l i s t e n , I t a l k " teaching, and the f ixed equipment provided t o

f a c i l i t a t e this kind of teaching, was t o be s u b s t i t u t e d b o t h

furn ish ings and a c d t i v i t i e s r e l a t e d t o " f i e l d , f o r e s t and

fac tory , ' ' and of course t o the home.

These a r e n o t romantic dreams, b u t necessary components -- -

through which the c h i l d could recedve the re l evan t experiences

needed t o make education something more than a bor ing or f e a r -

f u l task. If the re was a romantic element i t was unfor tuna t ly

introduced by the l a t e r progressives , b u t the unforgivable

bromides of contemporary free-schools , l i k e ' ' i t i s the a d u l t s

t h a t a r e d u l l , " o r "the teacher i s t o nurse the divine na ture

of the c h i l d , this i s the method of a l l educat ion," cannot be

charged t o Dewey. The s logans a r e E'ri jbelts and come from

Schel l ing ' s philosophy. Aa Berns te in observes, "Dewey never

advocated t h a t educat ion ought simply t o c a t e r t o the needs

and w h i m s of the ch i ld . . .he c r i t i c i z e d the chi ld-or ienta t ed

theory of educat ion by a c u t e l y not ing that i t harbors a formal

and empty concept of development. The c h i l d i s expected t o

'work th ings out f o r h i m e l f ' without r ece iv ing the proper

guidance. Advocating complete freedom of the c h i l d r e f l e c t s

a ' sen t imenta l i d e a l i z a t i o n of the c h i l d ' s niave capr ices and

p e r f o r ~ a n c e s and i n e v i t a b l y r e s u l t s i n ' indulgence and s p o i l -

ing.' Both c r i t i c s and defenders of Dewey have o f t en neglected

h is c r i t i q u e of the l a i s s e z - f a i r e approach t o education. This I

c r i t i q u e i s developed and explained throughout his wr i t ings .

?ie t e l l s us that 'doing as one p leases s i g n i f i e s a r e l e a s e

from t r u l y i n t e l l e c t u a 2 i n i t i a t i v e and independence,' and that

when unl imited f r e e expression i s allowed, ch i ld ren 'gradual-

l y tend t o become l i s t l e s s and f i n a l l y bored, while there i s

an absence of cumulative, progressive development of power

and of a c t u a l achievement i n r e s u l t s . ' In opposi t ion to this

view, Dewey argues f o r the n e c e s s i t y f o r d e l i b e r a t e guidance, - d i r e c t i o n and order. Lducation is, o r ought t o be, a cont in-

uous process of recons t ruc t ion i n which the re i s progressive

movement away from the c h i l d ' s immature immediate experience

t o experience which beconies more pregnant - d t n meaning, more 5

systematic and ordered. '' Apart frorrl the learning-through-pla;r cor rupt ion o f Jev~ey ' s

pedagogy, what of the captur ing of our schools by his theor ie s?

How many schools do we have t h t approach the pragmatic pat tern?

Out of the thousands of schools i n the c i t i e s of Canada and

the United S t a t e s , there i s not more than a handful where Dewey,

or Fr'dbel f o r that matter, would be pleased with what they saw,

The g rea t majori ty of our urban schools azs drab and crowded

places, f i l l e d with f ixed desks, and permeated with a d i s t i n c t

i n s t i t u t i o n a l f e e l and smell. The s t a f f , although well-rcean-

ing, a r e underpaid and under-educated, s t i l l maintaining d i s -

c ip l ine by au thor i ty and teaching "lessons" that would not

seem p a r t i c u l a r l y novel t o t h e i r grandfathers. The pic ture i s

no more hopeful i n the r u r a l areas ; i f anything i t i s worse,

The reasons t h a t Deweyan pedagogy d id not become an i m -

portant element i n most of our schools a r e f a i r l y simple. I n

the f i r s t place this type o f schooling i s expensive, Uew

d i s t r i c t s would see f i t t o spend the kind of money on educa-

t ion t h a t would provide anything l i k e what Dewey had i n mind.

So long a s our soc i a l p r i o r i t i e s remain what they a re -- three n

times a s much money i s spent an.yally on cosmetics and alcohol

a s i s spent on education -- l i t t l e p o s s i b i l i t y f o r a change

i n the present s t ruc ture can be foreseen. Secondly, Dewey i n

the main enunciated and explicated a p h i l o s o ~ a and t h e o x of --

education, a theory d i f f i c u l t to ass imi la te and one tha t would

take time t o work out i n pract ice. Few of the thousands who

earnes t ly absorbed education courses l abe l l ed with Dewey's

name have more than a vague notion of what he was ta lk ing

about, There i s i n Uewey'a books a deceptive seeming of the

commonplace. It i s easy t o read through ;Iuman Sature and Con-

duct , nod i n understandind a t most paragraphs, and close the

volume w i t h only a dim and f l e e t i n g grasp of the very s u b t l e

and profound reasoning j u s t encountered,

Other works a r e very much more t e c h n i c a l and d i f f i c u l t .

H i s Guest f o r Cer ta in ty , Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, T&

Public and i t s Problems and Xx-mrience and Mature, comprise a

corpus i n comprehension and t echn ica l genius equal t o the

g r e a t e s t philosophers. It i s sa fe t o say that many yea r s of

work w i l l be requi red t o a s s i m i l a t e his ideas i n t o our common

he r i t age . Cut even the genera l pedagogic ideas which stemmed

fro^ The School and S o c i e w , I n t e r e s t and L f f o r t i n Zducation --- and Bemocracy and :ducat- a r e such as t o r equ i re much time

and experimental e f f o r t t o be put i n t o p r a c t i c e , i a n y of the

methods which a r e now being used or introduced as a r e s u l t of

extensive experiment were i n s p i r e d , thougn usua l ly unknown-

ingly , by Deweyan i n s i g h t s . ~ ~ n d they rep resen t r e a l and e f fec -

t ive a p p l i c a t i o n of his theor ie s . Yhe example t h a t immediately

comes t o mind i s the model schools mentioned i n the H a l l i teport,

..hen such schools become more widespread, and have been t r i e d

and observed over an extended period of time, then we can

d i scuss more f u l l y tne successes and f a i l u r e s o f deweyan edua-

t ion , Unt i l t h a t time, however, we should not denigra te 3ewey

f o r the r e s u l t s of acbooling that has n o t been deweyan.

As was e a r l i e r suggested, our educat ional t roub les do no t

o r i g i n a t e i n education. On the con t ra ry , they reach i n t o the

schools from outs ide , a s a r e s t ~ l t of' the tens ions , schisms and

c o n f l i c t s extending tk~oug;l the stnole of soc ie ty . lco system

of popular education can p o s s i b i l y succeed without the support

of comn~unit~, and government. Ilespect, esteem, p r e s t i g e , econ-

omic rewards given t o the educated, economic support t o the

s tuden t , a secure r o l e assured t o the graduate , these a r e

n o t j u s t p leasan t things t o wish f o r , b u t a r e indispensable

i f the young a r e t o become i n t e r e s t e d i n l e a r n i n g and i n main-

t a i n i n g a s o c i e t y t h a t s t i l l holds democratic change as the

b e s t method t o achieve s o c i a l j u s t i c e .

If our t roub les a r e n o t i s o l a t e d t o the classrooms, where

must we t u r n t o s e t i n motion changes t h a t w i l l l e a d t o a

b e t t e r educat ional system? On the one hand there a r e those

who would l i k e t o see the r e s t o r a t i o n of an 18th century

l a i s s e z - f a i r e , a u t o c r a t i c and " respec t fu l " system, b u t h i s t o r y

seldom accommodates dreams, no mat ter how comforting, On the

o ther hand there i s change through revolu t ion , bloodless or

bloody, b u t I doubt i f revolu t ion , no mat ter how j u s t i f i e d ,

w i l l see objec t ive education a s a paramount p r i o r i t y . Uewey

had a stubborn b e l i e f t h a t "a f u t u r e new s o c i e t y of changed

purposes and d e s i r e s may be crea ted by a d e l i b e r a t e humane

treatment of the impulses of the young. This i s the meaning

of educat ion; f o r a t r u l y humane education c o n s i s t s i n a n i n t e l -

l i g e n t d i r e c t i o n of na t ive a c t i v i t i e s i n the l i g h t of the pos- 6

s i b i l i t i e s and n e c e s s i t i e s of the s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n . " Since

there a r e i s s u e s y e t t o be explored, however, the quest ion of

e i t h e r education o r d r a s t i c s o c i a l c-knge w i l l be examined a t

the conclusion of t h i s paper,

2evreyts ontological a s s e r t i o n s a r e c e n t r a l t o the r e j e c t -

ion of pragmatic pedagogy. But before expanding t h i s conten-

t i o n , a few words on the mult i tude of c r i t i c i s m s leveled

a g a i n s t Dewey. Fron Larx i~ t t o l o c i c a l p o s i t i v i s t Dewey was

condemed f o r crimes a s various a s materialism t o natural ism

t o subjec t ive idealism. I s h a l l not , therefore , attempt t o

deal w i t h a l l his c r i t i c s , s ince t o do so would embroil me i n

an almost impossible task. A s an ind ica t ion of the depth o f

such a t a sk l e t me o f f e r the following observation, The m i s -

reading and confusion over 2eweyts philosophy i s r a the r wel l

i l l u s t r a t e d by the f a c t t h a t C*L.L. Joad thinks t h a t liarx's

theory of knowledge i s congenial t o Dewey's instrumentalism

because, wr i t es Joad, Dewey holds the human mind always 7

changes w h a t i t knows i n the courve of knowing it." This, i t 8

happens, i s tne fundamental reason why h r x i s t s r e j e c t Dewey,

Zonsequently, s ince there a r e so many contradic tory reasons

f o r denying the value of pragmatism, I shall re-exarnine, with-

i n an educat ional context , only the major question and i t s

i ssues : Dewey's view of the nature of man's place i n the uni-

verse.

D r , Albert Lynd, i n h i s book duackers i n the kublic Schools,

addresses the question squarely i f incons i s ten t ly , &though

not i n agreement witn 3eweyan ontology, he d id understand some

of tne confusion over 3eneyan pedagogy, and was j u s t i f i a b l y

angry w i t h the nonsense that passed a s progressive education.

The t r a n s i t i o n from Housseau and romanticism t o Dewey and s c i e n t i f i c pragmatisn i s remarkable. Lven more re - mzrkable i s the invocation of Dewey's name by d i s c i p l e s who have elaborated those nieaningless incanta t ions , those 'emotive, ques tion-begging words and phrases ' about grow- t h and joy and r ichness and the rest of the s t u f f which passes f o r pioneer thinking i n so much of the l i t e r a t u r e of the Eew education. Lost remarkable of a l l i s the dog- matic gse of 9eweyts name by many 5duca t i ona l i s t s as a charm within tine profession and a exorcism without. This i s an i n t e r e s t i n g f a t e f o r a philosopher who was the cen- t u r y ' s most cons i s ten t enemy of dogmatism.,

But Lyndls sympathy and understanding does not extend t o

Yeweyan ontology: %iany of tne p rac t ices of progressivism make

l i t t l e sense when i so l a t ed by l imi ted understanding from the

bas ic philosophical assumptions of Professor Dewey. VJhen

t e l l i g e n t l y r e l a t ed t o those assumptions, they may make a

grea t deal of sense, if you a re prepared t o go along w i t h 10

in -

M r . Dewey's views on the nature of man and h i s universe.'

Since Lynd's book i s addressed t o parents of school-age

children, w h a t he says i n essence i s t h a t the Peweyan method

might make a good deal of sense, bu t only i f the parent i s

wi l l ing t o agree w i t h pragmatic ontology. Ee a l s o claims that

"the important question here i s not whether Dewey's view~l of

the nature of man and h i s universe a r e r i g h t or wrong. That 11

is a s you please." The troublesome implicat ion of these

atatementa i s the ra ther groas re legat ion of r e spons ib i l i t y

away from the educator and toward the parent. It i s absurd t o

ask the parent t o read Sxperience and Nature and School and

Society, plus :,kitehead, i iussel l , Xegel, k n t , St. Thomas,

Ar i s to t l e and Pla to , and then vote a decision. Stripped o f

i t s dross, Lynd's b e l i e f s would read, " the question i s not

whether Dewey was r i g h t or wrong, but ra ther of what people

think." Clearly, t h i s i s a declara t ion f o r a continuation of

the impasse i n education, t h a t schools should pass on unchn&

the values now current . The present ~ t t i t u d e s , hab i t s and

b e l i e f s of the majority apparently becon;e the norm over-riding;

dewey's in ten t ion t i ~ t ne, i n e f f e c t , l e s rn t o think together

and i n t e l l i g e n t l y i n order t o 1,:odify t h i s vale of t ea r s nearer

t o human needs and des i res .

A s noted Lynd makes the claim t h a t Dewey's ontology, whe-

ther r i g h t o r wrong, i s of no importance and ye t he goea on

t o show why i t is of the utmost importance, and even of the

utmost danger. In his arguments he touches on most of the

cen t r a l questions responsible f o r the re jec t ion , misapplication

or misunderstanding of the Deweyan posi t ion. Thus I s h a l l

follow his points one by one.

The f i rs t issue w i t h Lynd i s Dewey's r e j ec t ion of e t e rna l

t ru ths . But as we have seen Dewey d id accept the idea that

i n appearance and function there a r e ce r t a in q u a l i t i e s which

a re s t ab l e and pervasive. As an i l l u s t r a t i o n , the Pla tonic

notion was once held t h a t we can approach perfect ion i n ac tua l

measurement. Today i t i s necessary t o qual i fy even a simple

one-half inch, t o the neares t l / lp00 o r 1/10,000 o r to ahat-

ever degree of accuracy i s needed. The ordinary science

student knows t h a t an absolute one-half inch i s a log i ca l ab-

surdi ty. +,hat i s absolute i s the funct ional concept. This

is indeed perfect , and our r e a l measurements approach i t only

asymptotically. I ts purely funct ional character i s c l ea r when

we r ea l i ze t ha t , as a u n i t of measurement, i t needn't be a

half inch a t a l l ; i t could j u s t as well be half the length of

a box of Xddy ;l;atches. A s was e a r l i e r pointed out, the choice

of a cornon measure i s made necessary by the funct ional require-

ments of co l lec t ive a c t i v i t y .

d imi lar ly , i n s o c i a l terns this i ' functional necessi ty" i s

one of the fundamental reasons behind re l ig ious or p o l i t i c a l

s trength. Scholars from Levy-Bruhl, Lurkheim and Lalinousky

to ilrthur Koestler, von Ler ta lanffy and 2ug11 i)uncan have

supported the claim t h a t the choice of a common d e i t y or b e l i e f ,

p o l i t i c a l or otherwise, f i l l s the same needs i n man f o r func- 12

t i o n a l s o c i a l d i rec t ion . Yithout I' t r u t h s " held i n common,

whether mythical or no t , communities and s o c i e t i e s would fade

i n t o obl ivion or r i p themselves t o p ieces i n anarchy. V i t h

func t iona l commonality a s a qua l i f i c a t i on , there a r e *e ternal t '

t r u th s , bu t they a r e constants only i n an instrumental sense;

i f you l i k e , instrumental universals .

This may appear t o be a r e j e c t i o n of metaphysics, b u t

Dewey never claimed c e r t a i n t y one way or the other on matters

of metaphysics. ',hat he d id say i s t h a t we now h o w more about

the nature of sureness. Thus metaphysics, l i k e a l l of human

a f f a i r s , must be examined c r i t i c a l l y i n the l i g h t of the f a r

t r u e r t r u t h s we now have a t our d isposal .

In his concern over e t e rna l s , Lynd i s a l s o f e a r f u l t h a t

W the Deweyan rnethod would sweep r e l i g i o n out of the schools,

In f a i rne s s t o Lynd, however, he does admit t ha t r e l i g ion , a s

i t i s p resen t ly maintained i n the schools, i s v i r t u a l l y innoc-

uous. But he suggests that i r r e l i ~ * . i o n should no t be taught ,

and s ince he sees Deweyan pedagogy a s i r r e l i g i o u s , i t must be

re jec ted . To which the obvious r e t o r t i s t n a t the f a i t h of

educator must be i n teaching the t r u t h , i n physics, biology

o r geography, a s i n h i s t o r y -- even i f the f a c t s o f that h i s to ry

c o n f l i c t w i t h the f a c t s of our r e l i g ious ideologies . This i s

not nea r ly so an t i - r e l i g ious and dogmatic as i t may sound.

The body of current theory and observation i n , say, biology or

anthropology, i s susported by evidence these d i s c i p l i n e s ,

i t i s and nus t rermin autonomous. Any deformation of da ta o r

theory caused by ex te rna l agencies, p o l i t i c a l or re l ig ious , i s

simply dishonest, I f , i n the study of h i s to ry , the Bible i s

found t o be a compilation of mythical explanations common t o

most of the t r i b e s i n the Eesopotamia bas in , thus cas t ing

doubt on the Bible a s revealed t ru th , should such information

be supressed?

The same appl ies with the teaching of c r i t i c a l thought,

of methods of inquiry, The cor rec t way t o approach questions,

whether technical , humanistic o r theological , i s through pro-

gressive experience i n problem-solving and through progres-

s ive acquaintance with the relevant h i s to ry of man i n a tempo-

r a l , e x i s t e n t i a l s e t t i ng . "History i s a bad teacher" i s a

worn out old cliche. "History i s taught badly" i s c loser t o the

t ru th , It i s in t e r e s t i ng t o note that s o c i a l philosophers

and psychologists of a l l s t r i p e s i n s i s t that t o knox a man i t

i s necessary t o know h i s h i s to ry , and y e t tne same demand f o r

h i s t o r i c a l knowledge i s not placed upon the young of a nat ion

or race , Ve fumble i n our own h i s to ry , c a l l i t bunk and con-

tinue the k i l l i n g , a k i l l i n g not l imi ted t o physical death,

I f thinking i s t o be proscribed because the wrong conclusions

a r e t o be d r a m , we have indeed reached f u l l c i r c l e . This i s

not the f i r s t time t h a t the schools have been to ld t h a t reason

i s a dangerous thing. Papal i n f a l l i b i l i t y , Fuehrerprinzip,

the -.-isdom of the Party, a r e a l l of tneru excuses f o r not think-

ing.

The danger i s not t h a t the young throu&h f a i t h i n reason

may come t o question the f a i t h i n t h e i r fa thers . Iiaving l o s t

such f a i t h anyway, and not having the m a n s of inquiry t o f ind

new guidance, they w i l l s t rugg le hopeless ly i n the swamp of

unce r t a in ty u n t i l they a r e challenged by some brazen-lunged,

paranoid "s tudent leader" whom they w i l l fol low because any

f a i th i s b e t t e r than none. Aimlessness i s unbearable f o r long.

As Koest le r so b e a u t i f u l l y puts i t : "An inc reas ing number of

s c i e n t i s t s , au thors , and phi losophers , s i zed by panic , advocate

a r e t u r n t o d o c t r i n a i r e r e l i g i o n , t o the worship of an anthro-

pomorphic God, The f a c t t h a t m i l l i o n s i n o u r day s t i l l f i n d

comfort i n p e t r i f i e d doct r ine proves khat-] the human craving

f o r self- t ranscendence bill be purchased a t any p r i c e , even a t

the p r i c e of i t s reg ress ion t o a f i x a t i o n a t an i n f a n t i l e l e v e l .

Pure myticism i s equal ly u n f i t t o provide a solu t ion . The

q u i e t i s t mystic and his ant ipode, the p o l i t i c a l f a n a t i c , s i n in

opposite d i r e c t i o n s : the second through d e n i a l of the oceanic

f e e l i n g , the f i r s t through n o t harnessing i t t o s o c i a l in t eg ra - 13

tion."

'?hich b r i n g s us t o the added accusa t ion t h a t Qewey d id

no t be l i eve i n God and the soul . It i s remarkable t h a t such

c r i t i c i s m should s t i l l remain cur ren t i n the l i g h t of modern

theologica l thought. Since tile genes is of C h r i s t i a n i t y the re

have been wide and b i t t e r divergencies i n tile i n t e r p e r t a t i o n s

placed upon the concepts of Sod an& soul . I n f a c t , l i b e r a l

Chr i s t i an thought today very o f t e n desc r ibes God i n terms 14

which a c t u a l l y owe much t o 3ewey. I t i u t r u e t h a t Dewey's

God was perhaps more l i k e the over-soul of Lmerson, anchored

t o human s o c i e t y and v i t a l i z e d by comunica t ion . Clear ly n o t

the grand b u t a b s t r a c t and remote God of d t . Thomas or Luther,

o r the bearded impassioned J t e r n a l of the Hebrew P a t r i a r c h s ,

or the i n f i n i t e l y and natura l - te leological ly evolving "mind"

of Hegel, or "matter" of Urx. But without being f ixed o r

immutable, it was s t i l l a God, The notion t h a t God is one and

the same f o r a l l displays a ra ther curious l ack of sophis t i -

ca t ion i n matters of theology.

Besides, the unfairness i s compounded by the f a c t t h a t

what i s being c r i t i c i z e d here i s a philosophy and a pedagogy,

not a theology. Some may want t h e i r educational system design-

ed and administered by theologians, bu t I doubt t h a t the major-

i t y do. However, t o close the argument on the p o s s i b i l i t y of

theological concensus: *;bitehead has t h i s t o say about the con-

cept of God i n metaphysics:

A r i s t o t l e ' s metaphysical t r a i n of thought...did not lead him very f a r towards the production o f a god ava i l - ab le f o r r e l i g ious purposes. It may be doubted whether aQg properly general metaphysics can ever, without the i l l i c i t introduction of other considerations g e t much fur thur than . % r i ~ t o t l e . ~ ~

A r i s t o t l e 1 s god was, of course, merely the "prime mover," the

power which s t a r t e d things going, a requirement i n h i s philo-

sophy, 'Xhether a "thicker" f a i t h can be reached by log ic

i s a very old question, and one I doubt w i l l ever be answered.

P a r a l l e l considerations apply t o the soul. Dewey did

not bel ieve i n the s o u l a s a subs tan t iz l bu t immaterial e n t i t y

i n the t r a d i t i o n a l sense, a s a thing separate from the body.

He never denied, however, t h a t a person i s more than j u s t a

body; t h a t the more i s not physical, but, generalized, i s a

man's u n i ~ u e way of enter ing in to in te rac t ion v i t h other

things, and t h a t the cu l t i va t ion o f those hab i t s and i n t e r e s t s

t h ~ t may lead t o t h i s unique in te rac t ion should be man's high-

e a t a i m . Again, t o hold one view of the s o u l , or conscious-

ness , o r mind -- s o u l has been descr ibed w i t h these and many

more synonyms -- i n d i c a t e s a curious narrowness i n theology

and philosophy.

In awn, D r . Lyndts argument would read: Dewey was a f i n e ,

courageous and b r i l l i a n t philosopher w i t h the h ighes t in t en -

t i o n s , b u t the a p p l i c a t i o n of his t h e o r i e s i n pedagogy l e a d s

inexorably t o implanting i n our c h i l d r e n the a t h e i s t i c and

r e l a t i v i s t i c p r i n c i p l e s which a r e fundamentally c h a r a c t e r i s t i c

of his philosophy. An important p o i n t t o note is t h a t Lynd

assumes the e f f i c a c y of education i n has tening s o c i a l change. -- It would appear that t h i s i s p r e c i s e l y what he is a f r a i d of.

I s h a l l conclude t h i s paper on the i s sue of s o c i a l change.

R.X. Hutchins i s su re t h a t " r e l a t i v i s m , sc ient i sm, scept ic i sm

and a n t i - i n t e l l e c t u a l i s m , the four horsemen o f the phi loso-

p h i c a l apocalypse, have produced the chaos i n education which 16

v i l l end i n the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of the Yest," Although e l s e -

where i n the same speech he quest ions ", . ,whether and t o what

e x t e n t the s t a t e of mind of the publ ic i s or can be the r e s u l t 17

of i t s educat ional system,l1 He i s a l s o sure t h a t Dewey "re- 18

made the American educat ional system i n f o r t y years ." Gxcept

t o say that Hutchins i s thought t o be an important spokesman

of educat ion, I a m a t a l o s s f o r words. iiutchins a l s o holds

the opinion t h a t the Llemeyan .- hope f o r educat ion, that i t may .___ _ - '-

peace fu l ly accomplish s o c i a l change, i s f a l l a c i o u s . This i. -

"doct r ine of s o c i a l reform" i s unsound because, wr i t e s Hut-

ch ins , "The s o c i a l reformer i s l i m i t e d t o adapt ing the r i s i n g

genera t ion t o s o c i a l changes a l r eady agreed upon. IIe i s l i m i t -

ed t o meeting needs t ha t a r e sanctioned by the society. He

can hope t o make himself f e l t i n the educational system only 1 9

a f t e r he has won over the society." Dewey, according t o

Hutchins, made himself f e l t because he succeeded i n winning

over soc ie ty , and because the soc i a l ideas he favored were

those general ly popular i n the ljnited S ta tes . IIe and 3r. Lynd

seem a t odds on this point . However, I think I have shown

tha t ne i the r Zutchins o r Lynd need concern themselves over

Deweyan pedagogy, which can hardly be a t h r ea t before i t i s

a f ac t .

The issue of education as an instrument of change i s a

very old one indeed, beau t i fu l ly s t a t ed by Plato. The answer

t o the question o f revolut ion or education probably i s that

there a r e no ei ther/or conclusions t o be drawn. It i s my hope, -

as i t was Dewey's, t ha t education w i l l i n i t i a t e the kind of

a t t i t u d e s f o r reform t h a t would make revolut ion unnecessary.

But I am not s o naive t o suggest t h a t education w i l l auto-

mat ica l ly br ing about the conditions of a democratic socie ty , I

and ne i the r was Dewey.

ihweyan pragmatism has willed t o educational pract ice

three - major concepts t h a t have ye t t o be ac ted upon with any

r e a l force : the necessi ty of physical, manipulative a c t i v i t y

t o be a pa r t of learning; the creat ion o f a hab i t of inquiry

based on the proven sys t em i n science; and the very grea t

need t o see and v i t a l i z e the soc i a l ro l e o f education. Unti l

these views a r e understood and acted upon by educators, we

can hope f o r l i t t l e b e t t e r than w h a t we have. Final ly , the

h o w of Professor dewey f o r the d i rec t ion of a new educational

system, and s ince the e d u c a b i l i t y of man extends t o a l l of

human a f f a i r s , f o r the bet terment of mankind.

Xecause i n t e l l i g e n c e i s c r i t i c a l method app l i ed t o goods of b e l i e f , apprec ia t ion and conduct, s o a s t o con- s t r u c t , f r e e r and more secure goods, turn ing a s s e n t and a s s e r t i o n i n t o f r e e cormiunication o f s h a e a b l e meanings, turn ing f e e l i n g i n t o ordered and l i b e r a l sense, turn ing reac t ion i n t o response, i t i s the reasonaSle ob jec t of our deepest fa i th 2nd l o y c l t y , the s t a y and support of a l l reasonable hopes. Yo u t t e r such a s tz tement i s n o t t o indulge i n ronant ic i d e a l i z a t i o n . L t i s n o t t o a s - s e r t t h a t i n t e l l i g e n c e w i l l ever dominate the course of events ; it i s no t even t o imply t h a t i t w i l l save from r u i n and des t ruc t ion . The i s s u e i s one of choice, and choice i s always a quest ion of a l t e r n a t i v e s . 'Ahat the method of i n t e l l i g e n c e , thought fu l va lua t ion w i l l ac- complish, i f once i t be t r i e d , i s f o r the r e s u l t of t r i a l t o determine. ~ i n c e i t i s r e l a t i v e t o the i n t e r s e c t i o n i n exis tence of hazard and r u l e , of contingency and o rde r , fa i th i n a wholesale and f i n a l triumph i s f a n t a s t i c . But sone procedure has t o be t r i e d ; f o r l i f e i s i t s e l f se- quence o f t r ials. Carelessness and r o u t i n e , Olympian a loofness , secluded c o n t e m ~ l a t i o n a r e themselves choices. 2'0 claim -- t ~ a t --. _ in te l l igence- i s a b e t t e r method than its a l t e r n a t i v e g , a u t n o r i t y , i m i t a t i o n , capr ice and i w o r a n c e , pre,iudice and wassion ,- i s ha rd ly an excessive claim. These procedures have been t r i e d and have worked t h e i r w i l l . The r e s u l t i s n o t such a s t o make i t c l e a r t h a t the method of i n t e l l i g e n c e , the use of science i n c r i t i c i - z ing and r e c r e a t i n g the casual goods of na ture i n t o i n - t e n t i o n a l and conclusive goods of a r t , the union of know- ledge and va lues i n production, i s n o t v ~ o r t h t rying. 'There may be those t o nhox i t i s t reason t o th ink of philosophy as the c r i t i c a l method of developing methods of c r i t i c i s m . b u t i f this conception of philosophy a l s o n a i t s t o be t r i e d , and the t r i a l which s h a l l apgrove or coiide~m l i e s i n the eventual i s sue . The import of such lmoi,~ledge as we have acquired and such exgerience as has been quickened by thought i s t o evoke and j u s t i f y the t r i a l .

( i t a l i c s added) 20

Sect ion Three

NO%S

1 John Dewey, Emer ience and Zducation ( ~ e w York: ~ c m i l l a n ,

1938) , p. v i i .

Z Lortimer Adler, 'Lime lIa~azi..qg, Larch 1 7 , 1952.

3 John Dewey, "Job Dewey's Gssays on Xducation," Contem-

porary Theories i n Xducation, ed. Howard L. Browing

(New York: Wcmil lan , l 9 6 2 ) , p. 197.

4 John Dewey, 'r23ssays on Lducation, ' I C o n t e m ~ o r a r ~ Theories,

P O 199.

5 Richard J. Berns te in , ed. On Zxperience, lcature, and Pree-

dom - (Xew York: Bobbs-Lerr i l l , 19601, pp. x-xi.

6 John Dewey, I-Iwzan iiature and Conduct (ii819 York: Lodern

Library, 1957), p. 92.

7 C .U.Z. Joad, Essays i n F h i 1 ~ s o ~ h . v ondo don: Hutchinson,

1959) , p. 67.

8 The one exception among iarxists i s J o b Lewis. In h i s

In t roduc t ion t o lihilosoohy (London: Lawrence and 'dishart , ----- ---- 1954), he i s m o s t understanding of pragmatism, though no t

overjoyed.

9 s l b e r t iynd, ,uczckery i n t g e > ~ & i c S @ ~ ~ o l s (Xew York:

L i t t l e Ljrown, l 9 3 9 ) , p. 112.

Section Three --- UO!D3S (cont.)

10 Lynd, Quackery, p. 114.

11 Lynd, Quackery, p. 109.

12 In his discuss ion o f tne s e l f i n Lind, S e l f , and Society,

Eead says:

&in's behavior i s such i n his s o c i a l group that he i s i s ab le t o become an object himself , a f a c t which con- s t i t u t e s h i m a more advanced product of evolut ionary de- velopment than a r e the lover animals. Pundamentally i t i s this s o c i a l f a c t -- and no t his a l l eged possession of a soul or mind w i t h arhich he, as an individual , has been mysteriously and supernatura l ly endowed, and w i t h which the lower animals have not been endowed -- that d i f f e r - e n t i a t e s h i m from them.

L a d , Se l f , and Society (chicago: Universi ty of Chicago

Press , 19341, p. 137.

13 Arthur Hoest ler , Ins igh t and Outlook (new York: Wcmillan,

1949), p. 228.

14 See : John Dev~ey, A Comon Ta i th - (n'ew Iiaven: Yale University

Press , 1934).

15 *Alfred IJorth irhi tehead, Science in-she Lodern 7Jorld ( ~ e w

York: E a c ~ i i l l a n , l95'i'), p. 125.

1 6 LL.L. Hutchins, Sreedom, Zduc-z-sion agd the bLund (l~ew Pork:

Leridan 13ooks, 19563, p. 17.

S e c t i o n I r _ @ s

NOTES (cont. )

1 9 Hutchins, Freedom, p. 16.

20 John Dewey, Experience and Kature (Xem York: Dover Books,

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. "Decrassifying Dewey," P h i l o s o ~ h ~ of Sc i -

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