joint alaska inland & arctic and western alaska area committee · 2019-05-14 · ds 02-03b •...
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JOINT ALASKA INLAND &ARCTIC AND WESTERN ALASKA AREA COMMITTEE
Alaska Inland Update
INLAND AK PLANNING TOOL
ALASKA INLAND AREA CONTINGENCY PLAN
3
• Approved September 14, 2018
• New contingency planning
framework for the State of Alaska
• ADEC currently hosting all the AK
Area Contingency Plan
• Working towards Area
Contingency Plan web pages with
associated response tools
Alaska Inland Area Committee
EPA
FOSC:
Co-Chair
ADEC Central
Area SOSC:
Co-Chair
ADEC Northern
Area SOSC:
Co-Chair
EPA
FOSC:
Co-Chair
ADEC Southeast
Area SOSC:
Co-Chair
Mission Statement
The Alaska Inland Area Committee (AI-AC) provides the
platform for consistent coordination between federal,
state, tribal and local emergency planners and responders.
Objectives:
1. The AI-AC is the venue for public input on all relevant
government processes and scientific issues related to oil
and hazardous substance spill prevention, preparedness,
planning and response within the Arctic and Western
Alaska.
2. Provide public transparency and communicate widely
the efforts to develop and maintain the Nation’s best
coordinated system of highly trained and experienced
National Response System planners, regulators and
responders from all relevant public and private sector
stakeholders.
3. The AI-AC manages and continuously improves upon the
Area Contingency Plan,
4
Area Steering Committee
ALASKA INLAND AREA STEERING COMMITTEE
5
• Meeting held on April 17th.
• Established Protocols for the
Alaska Steering Committee
• Established Protocols for the ACP
Administration Subcommittee
• ACP Administration
Subcommittee Brief to OSCs.
Inland Area Steering
Committee
ACP Administration Subcommittee
AK Inland Area Committee Protocols
Administration Subcommittee Workplan
Task Description Status
Tech Edit “High level’ editorial review Completed; results of the tech edit informs the ACP
style guide; identified systemic issues to be tracked
to resolution.
Resolve outstanding
Version 1.0 Public Review
Comments
Address / resolve comments from DOI
and ADF&G that were not included in
Version 1
These are still being worked through efforts to
update the ACP.
Incorporate text from
outside (non-Alaska
Unified Plan / SCP) plans,
guidance and other
references.
Assess and include appropriate text or
reference to NCP, agency guidance,
handbooks, manual, and other ACPS,
etc.
Information from the superseded Alaska plans and
guidance are being reviewed for content inclusion or
update into the ACP.
Other government tools and resources are being
considered for inclusion as references and tools.
ACP Revision 1.1 Version 1.1 is to be edited to facilitate
intuitive use by responders, include
references and tools needed to
support response efforts.
Agency planners are coordinating to take the first
hard edit of the plan, to identify tools and
references that may be used to support response,
and to identify continuous improvement
considerations for future revision cycles.
ALASKA INLAND AREA COMMITTEETom DeRuyter, State On Scene CoordinatorMatt Carr, Federal On Scene CoordinatorArea Committee BriefMay 15, 2019
RESPONSE TRENDS
• North Slope Well Subsidence
• Moose Pass Incident
• Trucking
PROBLEM STATEMENT• Crude oil released from two separate well control events
• Loss of well control and the sudden ~3ft rise of 2 separate wellheads
• Incident Management Teams formed • Unified Command structure formed for DS 02-03B event
Well Tree DS 02-03B Well Tree DS 02-02A
DS 02-03B• April 2017
• Surface casing rose abruptly ~3ft above conductor casing
• Well tree collided with well house ceiling causing damage to gauge assembly and flange
• 5 barrels of crude oil released
• Crude misted onto gravel pad outside of well house covering ~0.36 acres
• DS 02-03B was flowing at the time of the incident
• 3-string casing design with 20” surface casing
• Surface casing shoe set in permafrost
DS 02-02A• December 2018
• Surface casing rose abruptly ~3ft above conductor casing
• Well tree collided with well house ceiling
• Damaged master flange source of crude release
• 2 gallons of crude oil released but contained within the well house
• DS 02-02A had been shut in/suspended for over 12 years
• 3-string casing design with 20” surface casing• Surface casing shoe set in permafrost
BPXA HYPOTHESIS: LOCALIZED PERMAFROST SUBSIDENCE MECHANISM
Well goes into production
•Production fluids are high temperature
Ice lenses within permafrost melt
•Meltwater is displaced away from the wellbore
Displaced water replaced
by the upper formation layers
•Results in downward load on adjacent surface casing
POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS
• Location• Both failures occurred on Drill Site 2
• Well design• Two-string casing design vs three-string casing design
• Surface casing shoe set within permafrost
• Casing size
• Localized permafrost subsidence
FINDINGS
8
Casing Design Surface Casing Shoe
in Permafrost
Surface Casing Shoe
below Permafrost
Three-string Design 14 Wells
• Including DS 02-
03B and DS 02-02A
9 Wells
Two String Design (no
intermediate casing)
None Most Prudhoe Bay
Wells
• BPXA identified 23 three-casing string design wells out of approximately 1700 wells in Prudhoe Bay.
• AOGCC ordered a North-Slope-wide assessment of all wells and found no other wells with similar
3-string casing designs.
• AOGCC confirmed three-casing string well designs can lead to sudden catastrophic failures.
• Two-casing string designs are not necessarily more secure.
• AOGCC concluded BPXA does not have sufficient evidence that permafrost subsidence
loads applied to two-casing string well designs will not lead to sudden catastrophic
failures.
PLAN FORWARD
9
• AOGCC ordered BPXA to plug and abandon wells.
• 14 three-casing string designed wells that have casing shoe in permafrost.
• AOGCC ordered further investigations for three string casing designed wells.
• BPXA will continue a study to determine permafrost thaw behavior on its existing pads.
• Permafrost soil types and ice contents are believed to be highly irregular and
localized.
• BPXA plans to undertake an independent geotechnical study at Drill Site 2 to
understand permafrost loading across casing strings.
• Areas of uncertainty include:
• Implications of surface casing placement relative to permafrost depth.
• Implications of surface loads on the 20” surface casing vs. smaller casing.
• An unknown variability in rock properties in geologic strata within permafrost
zone.
CASE SUMMARY – MOOSE PASSTHE HUMAN SIDE OF SPILL RESPONSE
• On March 13, 2019 the principal of a family owned business was killed in a motor vehicle accident that resulted in spilling up to 300 gallons of diesel fuel into the Kenai Lake drainage.
• Accident occurred on Forest Service land. USFS supported the response.
• ADEC conducted containment and recovery, assessment and investigation support. Monitoring continues.
Incident response cost recovery is not being pursued against the family business due to their devastating personal loss.
CASE SUMMARY – MOOSE PASS (CON’T)
CASE SUMMARY – COLVILLE FRANKLIN BLUFFS TANKER ROLLOVER• Background;
• Occurred on August 24, 2018 near Dalton Highway Milepost (DHMP) 382.5.
• Departed highway and rolled on to tundra with standing water.
• Driver killed during incident.
CASE SUMMARY – COLVILLE FRANKLIN BLUFFS TANKER ROLLOVER, CONT.
• Tanker carrying 9,716 gallons at time of
incident:
• 7,937 gallons lightered by another tanker
• 1,779 gallons released to tundra
• 1,413 gal recovered by vaccum truck
from standing water
• 93 gal by sorbent material
• 273 gal unrecovered during initial
response actions
CASE SUMMARY –COLVILLE FRANKLIN BLUFFS TANKER ROLLOVER, CONT.
• Product released on to BOTH Alyeska Pipeline Service Company (APSC) fuel gas line right-of-way and fiber optic lines owned by AT&T, Inc. (AT&T) and General Communications Inc (GCI).
• Initial site investigation during September 2018, but soil removal actions occurred in November 2018 to allow for less saturated soils and design of earthen ramps over APSC gas line.
CASE SUMMARY – COLVILLE FRANKLIN BLUFFS TANKER ROLLOVER
Approx 120 cyds of affected
soils removed using
excavators, water knife, and
vaccum trucks.
Presence of fuel gas line and
fiber optic lines complicated
cleanup, since soil removal
could only be conducted to
certain depth above and
around fuel gas, and only
hand tools and water knife
was allowed around fiber
optic.
CASE SUMMARY – COLVILLE DHMP219.4 TANKER ROLLOVER
• Incident occurred on February 12,
2019, when tanker departed
highway and travelled approx.
70ft down an embankment only
<500ft from Dietrich River.
• Tanker carrying 10,003 gal of ULSD,
only 2gal released from cracked
hatch on top of tanker
compartment.
• Several factors would have
complicated cleanup:
• Record snowfall in area
• Steep embankment
• Cold ambient temperatures
(<-40°) during response effort.
CURRENT VOLUME AND TYPE OF PRODUCT TRANSPORTED NORTH TO SUPPORT OIL FIELD• Estimated 30,000,000 gallons of refined
petroleum transported north of Fairbanks via road, to the oil field, per year.
• Colville successfully landed barge off West Dock during the summer of 2018 to offload in to Deadhorse tank farm.
• Five major transporters:• Colville: Five 10,000gal tankers/day;
90%ULSD, 5% JetA, 5% Gasoline (5.13.2019)
• Lynden/Alaska West Express:
• Northern Oil Field Services:
• Big State Logistics:
• Carlile:
QUESTIONS?ADEC Area Planning website:
http://Alaska.gov/go/7EKN
Contact us:
Fuel farm, Utqiagvik
JOINT ALASKA INLAND &ARCTIC AND WESTERN ALASKA AREA COMMITTEE
Public Comment
JOINT ALASKA INLAND &ARCTIC AND WESTERN ALASKA AREA COMMITTEE
Q&A
JOINT ALASKA INLAND &ARCTIC AND WESTERN ALASKA AREA COMMITTEE
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