joint concept for integrated campaigning executive overvie€¦ · executive overview february 2018...

Joint Concept for Integrated CampaigningExecutive Overview

February 2018

1

“Organize around the problem, don’t organize the problem around the Phasing Construct”

-Famous Strategist

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“A military end state may be a good servant for the construct of an individual operation, but it is an inappropriate master for describing campaigning’s relation to

policy aims.”

-Vice Versa: An Artistic Appraisal of Joint Doctrine’s Expression of Campaigns, Operations, and Objectives

2

We traditionally see ourselves at either peace or war, with war being an undesirable exception.

Peace

War/Conflict

Peace

“The Campaign Effort”

In response, we’re pre-disposed to seek a rapid, conclusive “end” and return to normalcy –even though that is not our historical experience.

At times, the DoD exhibits an incomplete understanding of war/conflict (Ex. our “first battles”). Moreover, we’ve created and maintained a framework to our liking - in the

manner of an ideal of how we would prefer conflict to unfold, but not one reflecting reality.

Within the defense community, this has led to a narrow and inelastic interpretation of operational art and a flawed philosophy and model of campaigning. Doctrine does not have a deep appreciation for the competition occurring on either side of armed conflict.

Model of the Universe of Competitive Int’l Relations and Differing Styles of Warfare How can we leverage new concepts to prevail short of armed conflict, advance/maintain security environments, and prepare for and follow through with future armed conflict?

Do we have adequate theories, concepts, tools, practices, and components of design to campaign effectively across the entire spectrum of conflict and competition? 3

Diplomatic Pressure

Unconventional Measures/WF Traditional / Conventional Warfare

Irregular Warfare

Current, Ongoing, and Future Challenges

• Persistent disorder may be the norm as instability is spread by weak states incapable of maintaining domestic order or good governance

• Wars involving at least one non-state actor will remain common and crises may evolve rapidly

•Revisionist state and non-state actors will contest norms with creative strategies below the threshold of a U.S. military response

•Rivals will influence using ambiguityand exploit vulnerabilities in DoD processes

Countering Coercive GradualismStrategic rivals are employing methods to accomplish objectives in the competitive space between peace and war…typically by remaining below policy makers thresholds for military response

The future security environment can be described by two distinct but related sets of recent and emerging challenges:

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Securing GainsTranslating military success into outcomes. Consolidating gains is an inherent part of armed conflict as well as a key aspect of effective campaigning to enable/achieve policy aims.

“ Not some phase slapped on to the end.”

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5

Is the current “Notional Plan Phasing Construct “ the tool that seeks to account for that universe?

Peace War/Conflict Peace

Whether we meant it to be or not, this Illustration, the description of the phases, and the elements of

operational design have become a substitute campaign model across

DoD.

This model has also become a subliminal “map” of DoD’s

capabilities and created artificial assumptions of under what

circumstances we should employ those tools.

Finally, this model and its associated description has blurred our

understanding of the differences between campaigning and operations

The model and its predecessors are a symptom of trying institutionalize the

“Powell Doctrine” and everything DoD liked about Just Cause and

Desert Storm

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Where/What were the beginnings? – 1992 National Mil Strat (NMS)

NMS 1992. Page 17. “Spectrum of Conventional Conflict”6

Moved away from concepts of containment and guided the force toward organizing for regional conflict – stresses “swiftly”, “quickly”, & “rapidly” and decisively defeating an adversary.

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Where/What were the beginnings? 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR) Both the NMS and BUR cognitive art/pictures represent force planning constructs- over time these ideas and mental maps migrated to become our default campaign/operational constructs

Report on The Bottoms Up Review 1993. Fig. 6, P. 27 “Conflict Dynamics”7

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Report on The Bottoms Up Review 1993. Fig. 6, P. 27 “Conflict Dynamics”

How did this model play out in reality? – 1993 BUR Conflict Dynamics

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- The directed activities within the notion of “peacetime” required almost as much as force as one MRC- The concept of “post-conflict” is a poor description of the inseparable circumstances of armed conflict- Campaigning to translate military success into political outcomes requires a continuing effort & commitment

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Where do we focus our institutional attention?

Peace War/Conflict

DoD’s philosophy, processes, intellectual efforts, focus on and optimize for Phases II and III. Of course for good reasons, but we can account for more.

Peace

JP 5-0, Joint Operational Planning

“Steady-State”?? “Sustained Conflict”? Post-Conflict?

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When do we ‘think’ we actually campaign?


Phase 0 – Shaping JP 1, JP 3-0, & JP 5-0 describe CCMDRs’ actions in this space as “routine and normal activities”

…the model suggests that either DoD is either at peace or waging warfare – but accounts for very little in-between. JP 1.0’s Chapter IV characterizes CCDRs’ duties in a narrow and binary fashion:

“CCDRs are responsible for the development and production of joint plans and orders.During peacetime, they act to deter war through military engagement and securitycooperation activities and prepare to execute other missions that may be required. During a conflict/combat, they plan and conduct campaigns and major operations to accomplish assigned missions.” -JP 1.0

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JCIC’s framework is a function of seven discrete, but mutually supporting ideas. The confederation consists of:

- Cooperation, Competition, and Armed Conflict - An alternative manner of organizing for problems and opportunities. A view of the environment characterizing the US relationship with another actor relative to a specific interest or grouping of interests.

- An expanded definition of campaign/campaigning

- A revised logic for follow through - campaigning throughout the consequences of armed conflict - securing gains and translating success into sustainable outcomes.

- A logic and description for campaigning in competition below traditional armed conflict

- An additive logic for campaigning in cooperation with allies/partners.

- A lexicon beyond existing tactical and UJTL tasks to describe campaigning in cooperation, competition, and armed conflict

- Factors of campaign design – a foundational array of considerations that expand beyond the existing elements of operational design.

The JCIC Framework UNCLASSIFIED

The Logic and Framework of JCIC

Character ofrelations

between the U.S. and an

antagonist or protagonists

Logic #1 – View of the OELogic #2 Revised Definition of

Campaigning

Logic #3 – Additive Logic to the idea of Shaping/Cooperation

L#4 – Logic for Competition

Logic #5 – A Lexicon/Terms for Competition

L#6 – Revised logic for securing gains

Logic #7 – Factors of Campaign Design

Logic #x – TMM/MDB*

Time; in years, maybe decades

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Understanding the Environment:Expanded View of the OE

• From a peace / war paradigm to three overlapping states of strategic reality:

Armed Conflict• Use of violence to satisfy interests or

react to provocation

Competition Below Armed Conflict• Incompatible interests and the

intention to engage in behavior detrimental to other strategic actor’s interests

Cooperation• Mutually beneficial relationships

between strategic actors with similar or compatible interests

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At times, we have had an appreciation for competition. It faded from strategic guidance

between 1993-1996. It was replaced by the intentions/hope of enlargement and inclusion

Supports an effective strategic dialogue with greater descriptive power to inform decision

making up and guidance down

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Campaigning Beyond Armed ConflictSecuring gains and translating success into political outcomes

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Revised Logic for Securing Gains What do we tell ourselves we do after achieving military success?


“Steady-State”?? “Sustained Conflict”? Re-characterization


At issue is - this is where we create

conditions to achieve or enable desirable and

sustainable outcomes.

CCDRs consistently execute tasks normally associated with phases

IV and V throughout Phase Zero.

At times, DoD sees this space as discretionary.

Alternatively, history demonstrates that it’s a

very demanding and essential part of the campaign/conflict.

Assessing this space as “optional” doesn’t

alleviate the risks resonant and posed by these conditions; nor that we won’t have to

conduct missions required in this space.

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In previous versions our joint doctrinal prose, we said the military end state's conditions are used to define termination criteria; in another areas, we continue to say termination criteria defines the military end state – just the opposite. Current JP 5.0 further blurs the distinction. Moreover, in our doctrine we continue to declare “JFC must know how POTUS/SECDEF intend to terminate the joint op…” upfront. Does that reflect reality? Regardless, analysis of our model suggests these two terms are fairly synonymous, but not centered on or tied to achieving a sustainable political outcome or reflect known patterns – more so on simply ending military operations.

Thoughts on Termination and Military End State

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JP 3-0 page I-8 and JP 5-0 page III-19

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An Incongruent TrinityThe Relationship of Military End State, Termination, and Realizing the Aim

- There is an intellectual gap in how DoD theorizes the translation of military success/advantage into sustainable outcomes. Where in the model would you plot Termination?,… Military End State?,… or the point at which we realize the aim or outcome of the policy?

- We need to recognize that we have adopted a poor and ahistorical model to describe that translation, selected bad terms to describe that translation, and defined those terms with even worse descriptions.

-Our current terms don’t account for a achieving a sustainable outcome in our philosophy of campaigning and joint campaign design methodology.

Military End State

Termination

Realize the Aim*

*Aim or Outcome is not a current element of Joint Operational Design

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?

?

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The Incongruent Trinity Plus+ OneMilitary End State, Termination, Realizing the Aim, and “Post-conflict”

Furthermore, where on the current construct would you plot the idea of “post-conflict”? Before, after, or on top of realizing the aim?

Does the idea of “post-conflict” help or hinder our intellectual framework in orienting on outcomes? Do the ideas of Military End State and Termination help us develop successful campaigns? How about in in conditions beyond armed conflict?

Question: Are there adversarial approaches that avoid or are even immune to rapid, decisive operations? What are examples of relevant factors of design that would be useful in crafting campaigns to counter those styles of warfare? How would we describe translating military success in those conditions into outcomes? Again, do the terms we have help? …….How should we begin to re-think our philosophy of campaigning?

*Aim or Outcome is not a current element of Joint Operational Design

Post-Conflict ?

Realize Aim* ?

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X X X X X

Acceptable Security SituationWar/Conflict

Enduring Commitment

Success/Armistice

Re-Characterization Of the Conflict Transition

AdvantageousPolitical

Outcome

“Prepared for what is next”

New and Favorable ConditionsMigration

Bi-lateral partnership

Consolidation Consolidation Consolidation PerpetuationFirst of all, a sustainable outcome is the aim of campaigning, not simply the destruction of the adversaries’

war-making capability, or merely to attain a Military Endstate and then seek Termination. Successful US-led campaigning efforts account for the deep understanding required, amount of force needed, and time necessary to

deliver/enable outcomes as we move beyond sustained conflict to navigating through the competition that follows, beginning with a re-characterization period marked by expanding political stakes that can confound our vision of the

future; to creating favorable conditions; then to acceptable security situations; and later to a partnership and an enduring commitment to perpetuate our gains/realized advantage that prepares us for the circumstances that inevitably follow.

Furthermore, successful campaigning seeks to consolidate gains as they materialize. Consolidation isn’t elective or discretionary, its required and perpetual. Joint leaders can’t wait for an imaginary time/space where conflict and risk are

absent in order to consolidate. Finally, Joint Forces execute tasks from all phases, all the time throughout the campaigning effort. Our current joint campaign construct does not articulate or account for the level of effort and time

required to turn military victory into successful and sustainable outcomes.

Perpetuation

Levels of Regional Competition & Social, Political, and Economic Upheaval

UNCLASSIFIEDHow has the US effectively turned military victory into

achievement of the aim and favorable, sustainable success?

131

11

1

1

14444

3

111

1

1

11

1111

41

15

311

4011

125

198

65

22

77070

1070

625

232

111

336

34

253

213

13

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

Cuba 1898Phillipines 1899

China 1900Panama 1903

Nicaragua 1912Mexico 1914

Haiti 1915Dominican Republic 1916

Cuba 1917Rhineland 1917

Russia 1918Panama 1918

Nicaragua 1926Germany 1941

Italy 1941Austria 1941Japan 1941Korea 1950

Formosa 1950Lebanon 1958Vietnam 1961

Dominican Republic 1965Columbia 1978

El Salvador 1981Lebanon 1982

Sinai 1982Honduras 1983Grenada 1983

Persian Gulf 1987Panama 1989

Iraq 1990Somalia 1992

Haiti 1994Bosnia/Kosovo 1992

Afghanistan 2001War on Terror 2002

Years

Trend of U.S. Consolidation/Commitment Beyond Armed Conflict 1898-2015

ConflictConsolidation/Commitment

* In many instances the conflict phase took only weeks or months to achieve - far less than the "1 year" annotation depicts. Often there was little or no major combat activity and consolidation activities began immediately.

- Effective campaigning prepares the US for consequences of success and the circumstances that inevitably follow. Accomplishing just military objectives doesn’t necessarily lead to political aims or to the termination of military operations in support and sustainment of those policy goals. The aspect of finality is elusive.- Success requires a continued level of military effort beyond sustained conflict to consolidate gains in order to realize/enable the political outcome in the dynamic conditions following military success, and afterwards, perpetuate and sustain that outcome. - History shows that U.S. forces continue to operate long after the cessation of sustained armed conflict, sometimes for years or decades. Joint Force presence enables the other elements of national power.

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Campaigning through CompetitionReinforcing and Modifying Behaviors

What can we learn from the past?

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Logic for Competition Are our potential adversaries’ approaches unfolding within a gap of

our Joint Campaigning philosophy and construct?


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GCPTCP ?

Chinese SCS Coercion

Russian Aggression

nK Provocation

Iranian Influence

State and non-state adversarial approaches are accomplishing wartime-like objectives beyond the reach, authorization, and effectiveness of existing theater campaign efforts and US law, title, and code but far short of provoking the US toward seeking a legitimate Int’l community charter(such as an UNSCR or NATO Defense Treaty Article) or unilateral response. Our current philosophy of campaigning doesn’t recognize this nuance. An alternative model must enable the US to legitimately campaign in this space to actually counter and defeat adversary approaches characterized by episodic and continual confrontations of narrative, cyber intrusion, influence actions, and ambiguous force without sustained conflict

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An Alternative Display of the same Intellectual Gap…


Chinese SCS Coercion

Russian Aggression

nK Provocation

Iranian Influence

State and non-state adversarial approaches are accomplishing wartime-like objectives beyond the reach, authorization, and effectiveness of existing theater campaign efforts and US law, title, and code but far short of provoking the US toward seeking a legitimate Int’l community charter(such as an UNSCR or NATO Defense Treaty Article) or unilateral response. Our current philosophy of campaigning doesn’t recognize this nuance. An alternative model must enable the US to legitimately campaign in this space to actually counter and defeat adversary approaches characterized by episodic and continual confrontations of narrative, cyber intrusion, influence actions, and ambiguous force without sustained conflict

Competition

Cooperation

Armed Conflict

?

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Modern Russian Approach Compared to DoD’s JOPES Phasing Construct (Bins vs. Phases)

Introduce Non-military asymmetric warfare capblts“To create a Favorable POL/MIL & economic setup”

Destabilize thru propaganda to “Increase discontent,

boosted by the arrival of “bands” of militaries, escalating subversion.”

Coercion & Undermining“Bribe, Intimidate,

Deceive government and military officials”

Bin #1

Bin #2

Bin #3

Bin #4

Bin #5

Commence military action w/ all types, forms, methods, and forces.

Preceded by large scale reconand subversive missions.

Bin #6

Info/Diplomatic Deception“Confuse/Stymie/MisleadAdversary’s understanding

and decision making”

Combine targeted information, electronic warfare & aerospace ops

continuous air force harassment, with the use of high-tech weapons

Bin #7

Roll over the remaining points of resistance and destroy surviving enemy units by special operations

Bin #8Invisible Visible

Establish of no-fly zones over the adversary’s country, impose blockades,

Extensive use of private military companies in close cooperation with

armed opposition units.In the context of employment, these groupings of activities seem more like bins of tool boxes or capabilities

the Russians apply as “appropriate and necessary” as opposed to sequential and mechanical phases. They have simultaneously “presented” all eight – either through employment or unambiguous signaling.

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Ex. The Russian “New Gen” Approach compared to how we prefer conflict to unfold

Peace

War/Conflict

Peace


What the Russians, Chinese, and others are willing to pursue against our and partners’ interests in the space that we want to consider “peacetime” is dramatic.

Many nations, including our possible adversaries don’t have the same bi-furcated view that they are either at peace or war. They see their actions “…as a natural part of the

ebb and flow of international relations “

ver3

Does the current campaign framework help us think through the military’s role and contribution in countering our potential

adversaries’ modern styles of warfare?

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Are we seeing other similar approaches unfolding?

Peace

War/Conflict

Peace


It’s not too hard to intellectually place the Chinese, nK, ISIL, and Iranian unfolding activities in the same space.

ver3

Coercion, Provocation cycle,

Mal-influenceISIL

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• Highlights that the US has a rich history of confronting antagonists and engaging allies and partners in ambiguous and uncertain conditions less than armed conflict to achieve political objectives.

• The study’s criteria for success was whether or not the specific actor(s) behaved in the manner desired by the policy’s aim. Blechman and Kaplan analyze thirty-three substantive cases to determine rates of realization of antagonists’ and protagonists’ desired behavior sought by the U.S. where the policy included a military dimension.

• The study captures the trends and results in terms of percentages(%) positive outcomes for both the short term (6 months) and longer term (3 years).

• Regarding the military dimension’s role in conditions beyond armed conflict, Blechman and Kaplan’s effort may offer insights as to future optimal and effective applications of force.

Engagement Between Peace and WarForce without War – What can we learn from the past?

• In 1978, Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan published the results of landmark study titled, Force without War: U. S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument. Their study chronicled and analyzed over 200 cases occurring since World War II, where the US employed forces to reinforce or modify foreign actors’ behaviors.

• Although several decades old, the study’s context and analysis may be worth considering as we think through how military institutions might adapt to the contemporary environment.

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• Examines three general categories of the US’ discrete and purposeful use of force beyond armed conflict.

• Counter an antagonists use or threatened use of force against an protagonist/neutral actor. • Contest an actor’s support to an antagonistic third party • Reinforce regime/state authority to exercise governance over its own territory.

• In terms of the approach of the US’ commitment of force regarding an incident, the authors describe two primary modes. First, the US force was seeking to reinforce existing behavior:

• to deter the antagonist from behaving in a manner detrimental to US interests; • to assure potential protagonists so that they will continue or abstain from a behavior

relative to US interests. The second is to modify or change a direction of behavior:

• to compel antagonists to either act in a manner or to stop behavior running counter to US interests.;

• to induce a potential protagonist to initiate beneficial or cease harmful actions.

• The study analyzes the US’ military experience and success rate in both direct and indirect involvement.

• Highlights circumstances of using force to alter behaviors in both interstate and intrastate conflicts.

• Examines excursions in how the Soviet Union’s involvement in many of the cases alters the US’ attainment of positive outcomes.

Blechman and Kaplan’s Force without WarForce without War – What can we learn from the past?

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Force without War

Logic #4 - Force without War – What can we learn from the past?

- With effective anticipation, we are successful in maintaining current behavior- Not as successful in changing/modifying behavior once an actor embarks upon a

certain policy shift, or initiates action

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Figure 1. Overview of US’ Success in Affecting Behavior Short of Armed Conflict.

Applications of Force Without WarForce without War – What can we learn from the past?

“Of the three principle categories of objectives, positive outcomes were most frequent when armed forces were aimed at objectives related to regime/state authority, less frequent when they were aimed at the use of force by another actor, and least frequent when they were aimed at an actor supporting a third party.” (Blechman and Kaplan)

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Applications of Force Without War

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Positive Outcomes were proportionally higher when the US had:

- A clear and easily interpreted narrative led the commitment of force

- A treaty existed that was supportive of an outcome relative to the incident.

- Previous/Demonstrated willingness to engage in armed conflict/war in that region

- The force engaged in recognizable activities germane to the circumstance

- Armed forces were used to reinforce existing behavior before change occurred

Positive Outcomes were proportionally lower when the US:

- Did not have a relevant presence in the region before the circumstance.

- A poor diagnosis of an antagonist’s behavior drove the purpose

- Mis-interpreted a protagonist’s propensity to act in friendly interests

- A statement or narrative merely followed the commitment of force

- Failed to effectively consolidate success; success has a short half life

Patterns and Factors of US’ Successful and Unsuccessful Uses of Force-w/o-War

Assure

Deter

Induce

Compel

Reinforce ExistingBehavior

Modify Behavior

Actors’ Behaviors

Logic for Campaigning in Competition

-Campaign design should account for both maintaining and modifying behaviors.In general, successful campaigning through competition requires success across all four of the Blechman-type circumstances, and probably more.-Many of the current antagonistic approaches are nuanced and limited, but may not be necessarily exercised through proxies. As these issues are matter of great powers in direct competition, the campaign design should consider and account for the entire range antagonists, protagonists, neutral parties, as well as the transregional nature of behaviors.

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Organized around contested issues and employed together, the traditional concepts of assure, deter, induce, and compel are “bins” of tailored and matched national capabilities levied against specific aspects of the problem set.

Assure Deter

Induce

Compel

Reinforce Existing

Behaviors

Modify Behaviors


33MIN

Employ Informed Combinations Of Activities & Measures

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AssureAssure

InduceInduce

DeterDeter

CompelCompel

JCIC’s logic for campaigning in competition describes organizing around specific problems and contested interest(s) by employing combinations of activities and measures toward multiple instances of desired behaviors….. success requires the effective blending of informational, diplomatic, and military power.

The campaign design may have to account for multiple instances of mission areas, each with their own peculiarities and requirements


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JCIC’s logic for campaigning in competition describes organizing around specific problems and contested interest(s) by employing combinations of activities and measures toward multiple instances of desired behaviors. Success requires the effective blending of informational, diplomatic, and military power.

Each “bin” can consist of a tailored and matched mix of national capabilities levied

against a specific aspect of the problem set(s)

Latent, Indirect & Direct uses of Force

Economic Measures

Diplomatic Pressure

Unconventional Meas

A Compel “Mix”

Narrative/Informt’l

Sample

Assure Deter

Induce

Compel


Contest

Contain

Counter

Improve

Deconstruct

Range of Intentions toward the Actors’ Behaviors

35MIN

MAX

Apply Informed Combinations Of Activities & Measures

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AssureAssure

InduceInduce

DeterDeter

CompelCompel

JCIC’s logic for campaigning in competition describes organizing around specific problems and contested interest(s) by employing combinations activities and measures toward multiple instances of desired behaviors. Success requires the effective blending of informational, diplomatic, and military power…to contest, contain, counter, improve, or even deconstruct the antagonistic behavior and circumstances – based on policy intentions.

The campaign artists’ design must be in the context of a flexible and adaptable range of political ambitions/intentions, not finite “end states”


Contest

Contain

Counter

Improve

Deconstruct

Range of Intentions toward the Actors’ Behaviors

36MIN

MAX

Apply Informed Combinations Of Activities & Measures

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JCIC’s logic for campaigning in competition describes organizing around specific problems and contested interest(s) by employing combinations activities and measures toward multiple instances of desired behaviors. Success requires the effective blending of informational, diplomatic, and military power…to contest, contain, counter, improve, or even deconstruct the antagonistic behavior and circumstances – based on policy intentions.

JCIC Competition Mechanisms-In addition to the Blechman Study examples-

Strengthen. To develop alliances and partnerships and reward actors for siding with friendly forces.

Create. To produce a condition where it does not already exist, and its existence could positively impact achievement of national interests or may be essential.

Preserve. To prevent deterioration of a stable situation. Although, there is no assumption of immediate malign intent by other actors, if ignored this condition could lead to the rise of an adversary.

Weaken. To recognize, understand, and impose a change in a competitor’s behavior using physical & informational aspects of power.

Position. To increase access, influence, and strategic understanding in the environment.

Inform. To develop a shared perspective with partners and identify areas where cooperation would be of mutual benefit

Persuade. To shape partners’ objectives and competitor behaviors while remaining flexible in the pursuit of secondary objectives.

Campaign artists recognize they must work toward flexible policy ambitions that change in accord with a fluid strategic environment; attempting to adhere to fixed "military end states" is likely to produce a rigid mindset that is unresponsive to policy

Competition Mechanisms within the Alternative View of the OE



antagonist or protagonist

Cooperative or Protagonistic

Competitive or Antagonistic

Adversarial

Designated Enemy


-Deconstruct

-Improve

-Counter

-Contain

-Contest

In a state of continual ebb and flowwhere the Joint Force should have alogic to campaign to advance/protect a specific or grouping of interests

Levels of Intentions

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Logic and relevant terms for campaigning in competition against antagonistic behaviors

Combinations Of Activities & Measures

Campaigning through CooperationIn Pursuit of Mutually Beneficial Interests and Conditions

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IO

SSAFIDFMO

HA/DR

MIL Engagement

UW

CT1206

COIN/SFA

Intel Sharing

Counter WMD

Strategic Deploy

Personnel Recovery

What are the Joint Forces’ capabilities and range of activities within in the theater campaign’s current description?

Public Affairs

Coop w/ NGOs Missile Defense

Precision StrikeMISO

MIL Deception

Detect Threat Networks R&S

NEO

Raids

EW

MN Exercises

ISR

Civil Affairs

What do our bins of capabilities look like? What should the bins look like? Are these “tools” really integrated or synchronized within a coherent model for campaigning beyond traditional

armed conflict? Are these just functional activities employed wherever they can be “squeezed in”, toward loosely or ill-defined objectives? Can we organize, authorize, and arrange these

capabilities to counter the adversaries approaches we see currently unfolding?

IAD

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How has previous doctrine tried to define shaping?

Military Operations Other Than War focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities in response to domestic crises; Use of military forces in peacetime helps keep the day-to-day tensions between nations below the threshold of armed conflict or war and maintains US influence in foreign lands.

- JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (16 June 1995)

Peace operations are conducted in a dynamic environment shaped by a number of factors andvariables that strongly influence the manner inwhich operations can be conducted. Successfulcommanders grasp the importance of these variables.The critical variables of peace operations areThe level of consent, the level of force, and the degree of impartiality.

- FM 100-23 Peace Operations (December 1994)

Historically, we have focused on indirectly describing some components of shaping. Absent from doctrine is a comprehensive way to think about how operations other

than war fit in the larger specific strategic objective and the overall campaign plan—we just say that it is important.

The national security and national military strategies establish an imperative for engagement. The US will remain politically and militarily engaged in the world and will maintain military superiority over potential adversaries. Engagement elevates to mission status the role of the US armed forces in shaping an international environment that promotes and protects US national security interests, before the threat of conflict arises. Forward basing, forward presence, and force projection enhance the ability of Army forces to engage other nations—their people, governments, and militaries

- FM 3-0 Operations (June 2001)

Military participation in security cooperation activities to support fragile states, avert crisis, or prepare for future operations; Activities in the shaping phase primarily focus on continued planning and preparation for anticipated stability operations in the subsequent phases.

-JP 3-07 Stability Operations (29 December 2011)

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• Steady-state operations and activities, which encompass shaping activities (including shaping elements of contingency plans)… (JP 5-0 pg. II-22)• Developing the Operational Approach…What will be the likely consequences as we seek to shape the operationalenvironment toward a desired set of conditions? (JP 5-0 pg. III-14)• Stability Mechanisms…Combinations of stability mechanisms produce complementary and reinforcing effects that help to shape the human dimension of the operational environment more effectively and efficiently than a single mechanism applied in isolation. Stability mechanisms may include compel, control, influence, and support. (JP 5-0 pg. III-30)• Ensure success by shaping perceptions and influencing the behavior of both adversaries and partner nations, developing partner nation and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, improving information exchange and intelligence sharing, and providing US forces with peacetime and contingency access.

- JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning (11 December 2011)

Our current doctrine focuses on what types of activities are included under ‘shaping’. The definitions largely refer to themselves. The closest doctrinal

discussion of operational approach occurs in JP 5-0, which describes a desired set of conditions.

How do we currently attempt to define ‘shaping’?Current Joint Publications

• Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence. These ongoing activities establish, shape, maintain, and refine relations with other nations.• Security cooperation is a key element of global and theater shaping operations.• A TCP is based on planning guidance provided by the GEF and JSCP. A TCP operationalizes CCDR functional and theater strategies. Campaign plans focus on the command’s steady-state (Phase 0) activities, which include ongoing operations, security cooperation, and other shaping or preventive activities for the next 5 years.

- JP 1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (25 March 2013)

• Shape phase missions, task, and actions are those that are designed to dissuade or deter adversaries and assure friends, as well as set conditions for the contingency plan and are generally conducted through security cooperation activities. Joint and multinational operations and various interagency activities occur routinely during the shape phase. • Since the focus of the shape phase is on prevention and preparation, any stability operations in the JFC’s proposed operational area might continue, and combat (offense and defense) may be limited or absent.• Considerations for Shaping: JFCs are able to assist in determining the shape and character of potential future operations before committing forces…enhance bonds between potential multinational partners, increase understanding of the region, help ensure access when required, strengthen future multinational operations. and prevent crises from developing.

- JP 3-0 Joint Operations (11 December 2011)

UNCLASSIFIED

• Currently, DoD describes activities in conditions less than conflict as Shaping and Deterring. Additionally, DoD has a broad array of tools and methods to employ. However, we don’t really have a description or model or coherent logic that really helps the joint community think through designing efforts whereby “shaping” through military actions/activities is synonymous with the idea of campaigning and therefore links and leads to desirable conditions or outcomes.

• A current joint theory of shaping doesn’t exist and the doctrine’s description is open to broad interpretation. Furthermore, we don’t have a joint organizing framework to plan and execute the concept of “Shaping.” On the other hand, each service, joint, and OSD communities have published volumes on cooperation, just not in the context of campaigning – namely because its not armed conflict. Therefore, we initially proposed five DRAFT distinguishable aspects of campaigning in cooperation – beyond just actions within a theater of war, to realize favorable conditions in the context of pursuing strategic guidance and US interests. These were:

• Advance • Create • Change• Maintain• Restore

These aspects underpin and characterize proactive, competitive methods and measures within our revised philosophy to promote favorable conditions.

A Condition

Beyond Shaping: An Alternative Description and Framework

Initial Campaigning Construct for Cooperation

The Differing/Range of conditions the joint force seeks to realize when campaigning in cooperation with allies and partners

Advance Maintain Change Create RestoreThere is some level of existing condition that aligns w/ our interests, but not at the level which meets our OBJ or purpose.

The desired condition exists, and we want to neither degrade to increase significantly, where increasing would risk changing the condition unfavorably. In contrast to ‘Restore’, no large shock has occurred to disrupt this condition.

The existing condition is not malignant nor counter to U.S. interests, but it has the potential to positively align w/ U.S. OBJs. There is no assumption of malign intent.

The condition does not exist, and its existence could positively impact achievement of national interests.

Some condition that was aligned w/ US interests existed, but a shock (e.g. natural disaster, conflict) happened to significantly alter it. It is w/in US interest to return to some state that resembles the condition before the shock. Examples:

• NATO structure and military capabilities exist, but we wish to increase readiness and capabilities of member state contributions in order to meet an objective of deterrence

• NATO member states’ defense budgets already exist, but we desire for them to meet 2% GDP minimum goal.

Examples:

• Sustainment and medical infrastructure and US military posture in Europe are satisfactory – where return of entire Cold War land force levels might have negative impact on partner, domestic, or adversary behavior

• ROK-US and Japan-US bilateral defense treaties remain supported by host-nation representative government. Insisting that either ROK or Japan govt’salter their bilateral treaties with the US to such an extent that they become trilateral mutual defense treaty (ROK-Japan-US) may have negative impacts on status quo behavior of either govt. towards their US bilateral treaties.

Examples:

• Non-aligned state (e.g. India during Cold War) has the military capability to withstand Soviet coercion

• Countries along northern distribution route to Afghanistan tolerate delivery of cargo through their territory, based on agreed caveats, but their governments do not actively align their foreign policy with coalition objectives.

Examples:

• Establishing NATO alliance in the aftermath of WWII

• Bilateral defense treaties between US-ROK, US-Japan -

• Formal coalitions (KFOR, ISAF, SFOR)

• Building dual-purpose host-nation infrastructure (e.g. C-17 capable airfields, deep-hull capable port facilities)

• Training professional security forces where none existed before

• Partner nations are willing to contribute forces and resources within the established coalition structure

Examples:

• Marshall Plan, Tsunami assistance, Pakistan earthquake assistance all work to restore the economic and infrastructure viability of the recipient states to a level approaching their pre-shock level

• Post-war (Civil War, WWII) transition from occupation to reconciliation to full restoration of relations between populations.

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Campaigning Construct for Cooperation (1 of 5)

The Differing/Range of conditions the joint force seeks to realize when campaigning in cooperation with allies and partners

Selective

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Exercising Relationships Understanding The Character of Relationships

Control Coerce Cooperative Reinforce Inspire

This involves direct influence over

actor(s) who would normally be aligned

counter to our desired

condition/behavior.

Like ‘control’, this is normally applied to those actor(s) who would align counter

to our desired condition/behavior.

While it may not involve direct

influence as with ‘control’, it implies that we have the

means and the will to apply that level of

influence if necessary.

When an actor(s) is not clearly

supportive nor counter to our

overall interests or objectives, but may

have a specific interest which

aligns with ours, we may choose to co-

opt that actor.

At times, independent actor(s) may

already have taken action , of their own accord, that aligns

with our interests. In these cases, we seek to support

their actions, and do not necessarily need to take the lead (though that may change with

continual assessment).

Examples:

• U.S. military occupation of defeated territory and populations at the end of the Civil War and World Wars I and II

• U.S. occupation of Haiti 1915

• Operation Just Cause in Panama 1989

Examples:

• Military mobilization combined with maritime interdiction during the Cuban Missile Crisis

• Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti (1994-95)

• Sailing an aircraft carrier through the Strait of Taiwan

Examples:

• Local power-brokers seek to move their products to market on the same main supply route as our forces, and desire to avoid attacks on the infrastructure that allow goods to flow.

• Supplying the forces of the Soviet Union in our aligned interest of defeating Nazi Germany.

Examples:

• French in Mali.• Supporting Great Britain with Lend Lease during their struggle with Nazi Germany before U.S. entry in 1941 • Providing logistical and sustainment support to French forces in Mali• Sending trainers to advise and assist the Ukrainian national guard in 2015.

Examples:

• The Allies training and deploying expatriates as resistance fighters within occupied Europe in WWII

Broaden

In contrast to ‘reinforce’, in this

case potential actor(s) have not yet taken action,

but there is potential that they

could be inspired to initiate action that would be aligned with our interests.

Establish

When we have an established

relationship with an actor, but realize

that we must further our relationship

without coercion to achieve our desired condition/behavior. In other words, we

must strengthen the good terms of our

relationship.

We realize that we do not have a

relevant relationship with an actor and must establish a

germane relationship with

them.

Examples:

• Commodore Perry establishing relations with the Japanese 1853-1854.

• Operations with the Afghan Northern Alliance in 2001.

Examples:

• Sale of and training on M1 tanks to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

• Saber Junction exercises to promote interoperability between NATO military members


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State of Partners’ National Power & Propensities to Align with our Interests

System/Power base is weak and

under duress from both internal and external opposing sources of power

System and Power is established

either by extortion of the country’s resources and

GDP or by paying of key sectors of the population. Maintained by

internal security institutions,

masked legitimacy, and

fear.

System is durable and evolving &

advancing slowly.Credible & effective

institutions

Interests:

• Near-term survival• Willing to accept outside assistance

Interests:

• Establishing and maintaining stability to consolidate power and authority

Interests:

• Control of populations• Resistant to outside influence

Interests:

• Clear identity• Focused on maintaining status quo• Perception of Legitimacy• Maintaining Relationships • Conservative Regional engagement

Interests:

• Increasing International Trade/broadening markets• Joining Alliances• Limited Foreign Policy objectives

Signified by established systems of governance,

education, and justice. Mature institutions that can accumulate

economic, diplomatic,

informational power

On occasion, established systems are

incentivized to change. This can

be from state controlled

economies to market

economies, from representative and pluralistic govt’s

to autocratic systems.

Mature systems with broad and

resilient elements of national power and competitive/

comparable advantages

Interest:

• Employ their advantages internationally and reap the benefits.• Moderate to aggressive foreign policy objectives to further advance and protect their advantages.

Interests:

• Balancing continuity and change; established and accepted norms with introducing progressive reforms

Contested FragileIn

TransitionMaintaining

Stasis Growing/Expanding

Pursuing External Interests

Kleptocracy/Clientelism

System/Power base is functional,

but weak and threatened by internal and

external influences


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DoD Security Cooperation Focus Areas (In revision, but by and large these functions continue under different names)

• Capacity building• Operational capacity and capability building• Human capacity and/or human capital development• Institutional capacity and/or security sector reform• Support to institutional capacity and/or civil-sector capacity building• Combined operations capacity, interoperability, and standardization• Facilitating access and relationships• Operational Access and Global Freedom of Action (U.S. Defense Posture)• Intelligence and information sharing• Assurance and regional confidence building• International armaments cooperation• International suasion and collaboration

The portfolio of authorities and lines of funding are always evolving. By itself, describes unique efforts but was is a poor guide to campaigning in cooperation


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State ofRelationships

Partners’ Propensity

A deep understanding of all six of these aspects leads to good choices and realistic expectations.

Issue & Consequences

“Always Evolving”


Required Conditions

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USG Inter-agency relationships

- Varying Interests- Their Objectives

- Priorities



Required Conditions

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- Priorities

US Foreign Assistance ($33.9 B FY2017)Current and Imminent Lines of Funding

- Over 100 Countries- 20 Different USG Agencies- Global Peace, Security, Development- 9x major categories, 52 Sectors- http://beta.foreignassistance.gov/



Required Conditions

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http://beta.foreignassistance.gov/







- Priorities

US Foreign Assistance ($33.9 B FY2017)Current and Imminent Lines of Funding

- Over 100 Countries- 20 Different USG Agencies- Global Peace, Security, Development- 9x major categories, 52 Sectors- http://beta.foreignassistance.gov/

The Joint Force can conduct detailed /relevant “interest mapping” Identify and align common interests and facilitate efforts toward creating the necessary conditions, minimize wasted effort, reduce risk of alienating a partner from their power base, and avoid actions that run counter to our’s /partners’ long-term interests. - Additionally, this helps the Joint Force empathize with a partner, understand their calculus, and vision of the future. - Aids in estimating the range of possible futures – both good and bad.



Required Conditions

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http://beta.foreignassistance.gov/

Alternative View of the Contemporary Environment






Adversarial

Designated Enemy


-Advance

-Maintain

-Sel Engagement

A perpetual state or circumstance Where the Joint Force must“campaign” to advance/protect a specific or grouping of interests

Levels of Intentions

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Levels of intentions or ambitions for campaigning to pursue mutually beneficial interests

Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning

Factors of Joint Campaign DesignFebruary 2018

Coherent Arrangement – Putting it all together

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Across JCIC’s competition continuum, there are common considerations to keep in mind when designing campaigns. Joint doctrine currently describes thirteen elements of operational design which collectively enable Joint leaders to design operations aimed at defeating adversaries’ war-making capability in armed conflict (JP 5-0). These design elements are still valid for individual operations, but insufficient to enable Joint leaders to campaign in cooperation, competition, and armed conflict. The JCIC addresses this shortfall through the proposed use of the Factors of Campaign Design.

The factors of campaign design connect with, respond to, and inform evolving policy. A campaign design factor is an element that influences or contributes to a particular result or outcome. These factors provide an additive array of thought to enable the Joint Force to campaign through the application of military force in concert with the other instruments of power. Collectively, they:

- Guide the development and execution of campaigns across the competition continuum.

- Aid design and understanding the relationship between civilian guidance and objectives

- Facilitate collaboration with essential USG and international partners.

- Improve the application of operational art beyond a narrow conception of armed conflict.

- Provide an intellectual mooring, framework, and feedback loop between the strategic discussion and development and refinement of the operational-level logic and mechanism used to pursue the chosen policy.

The factors work in conjunction with existing methodologies to assist the Joint Force in achieving U.S. policy aims.

Introduction to the Factors of Campaign DesignUNCLASSIFIED

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Diagnosis. Though difficult to achieve, commanders and staffs should aspire to achieve a true empathy that attunes them to the sources and behavioral vectors of all relevant actors: their perspectives, the underlying logic of their actions; and the fundamental issues being contested.

Anticipate consequences. Successful campaigning requires commanders and staffs to maintain and continually update a realistic appraisal of the range of possible outcomes and consequences. The complexity of a contested operating environment makes it likely that in most cases these assessments will span a range of mixed favorable and unfavorable consequences.

Effective civil-military dialogue. In broad terms, the Joint Force furnishes recommendations and alternatives; civilian policymakers provide initial guidance and subsequent modifications. In practical terms, civil-military interactions occur within a continual round of engagement featuring discussion, feedback, adaptation and refinement of policy and actions to achieve an evolving set of desired strategic outcomes.

Outcomes. Successful campaigning requires a comprehensive vision of the necessary conditions and behaviors the Joint Force must enable to achieve and sustain acceptable strategic outcomes.

Follow through. In order to translate military success into acceptable and sustainable strategic outcomes, commanders and staffs must develop and implement a long-term approach that maintains the focus of the campaign over time. One implication of the expanded operating environment is that terms like post-conflict are dangerous when they cause the Joint Force to artificially break what should be thought of as a single effort into distinct phases of “war” and “peace.”

The Twelve Factors of Campaign DesignUNCLASSIFIED

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Benefits and Risks. Joint Force actions are guided by an appreciation of the short- and long-term opportunities of both success and failure and the risks of employing military force against the specific circumstance.

Narrative. As part of campaigning, the Joint Force develops and employs a principal and cascading narrative reflecting policy aims. This narrative gives coherence to military actions and activities, shapes other actors’ conditions and behaviors, and, ideally, undermines and delegitimizes adversaries’ narratives.

Empowerment. When properly arrayed, authorizations enable the effective complementary employment of the various instruments of national power. As much as physical capabilities, authorities are an essential means. Commanders and staff must understand how and when authorizations must be available to enable specific aspects of the campaigning effort and articulate the risks of their absence.

Alignment. Organizational boundaries often make full integration of the instruments of national power an unachievable goal. A more realistic goal is to align efforts to achieve acceptable and sustainable strategic outcomes, which in most cases will be sufficient. The nature of alignment varies with the situation, but the Joint Force can capture best practices in doctrine, teach them in PME, and practice them regularly in exercises and operations.

Resourcing. Successful campaigning requires synchronized, prioritized, and de-conflicted resourcing. With many competing demands for resources, this is difficult at any given time. Over the extended period of an integrated campaign, it is even more challenging. Nonetheless, achieving sustainable strategic outcomes requires sustained effort of a broad range of essential resources – not simply units.


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Prevailing Logic. An overarching prevailing logic allows the commanders and staffs to arrange military operations, activities, and actions so that they produce the desired conditions, behaviors, and outcomes. Though the prevailing logic guides the campaign, it is not static but continually assessed and updated as required in response to changes within the operating environment.

Force Architecture. The proper force architecture enables the necessary command and control of Joint Force required resources and capabilities. There is already a substantial body of operational doctrine and practice that can guide the development of this force architecture. New methods, however, might be required to address transregional, multi-domain, and multi-function challenges. Whatever the nature and the scale of the problem, an architecture should enable each contributing component to play its designated role.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

These twelve factors are essential to the initial and ongoing logic of effective campaign design and adaptive execution in all conditions the Joint Force may face. They allow for an informed application of Joint Force capabilities and strengthen the alignment of the instruments of national power. Moreover, the factors orient on outcomes beyond just military success, while recognizing that definitive political guidance is rare and develops overtime throughout the course of the circumstance. As conditions morph and political situations unfold, the factors help leaders respond to evolving policy.

Additionally JCIC and the factors appreciate that clear conclusion and finality are elusive while campaigning across any condition. The factors guide Joint Force leaders’ and institutional thinking regarding the follow through that must occur to consolidate gains, translate military and non-military successes into sustainable outcomes, and formulate the enduring commitment required to perpetuate those outcomes.


Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning

Factors of Joint Campaign DesignFebruary 2018

Coherent Arrangement – Putting it all together

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Expanded Definition of Campaigning The blurred distinction between Campaigning and Operations

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Joint doctrine blurs the differences between these two terms in several ways.

- First, doctrine defines both terms with exactly the same purpose.

- Second, within those synonymous definitions, joint publications use imprecise and undefined terminology.

- Third, doctrine articulates that designing both campaigning efforts and major operations are primarily the purview of a commander.

- Fourth, through doctrine, the joint community has “pushed up” tactical and operational constructs and terms to levels that exceed their meaning, capacity, and utility.

- Finally, doctrine states that campaigns and operations reach their points of conclusion in the same manner, within the same paragraphs.

The overall effect is joint doctrine pulls the idea of campaigning down toward tactics when it should ensure the function of campaigning connects to evolving policy aims and highlights the joint forces’ contributions to statecraft.

Expanded Definition of Campaigning Delineation – Current Definitions

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Joint doctrine relationally ties both campaigns and major operations to the realm of armed conflict; constraining the character of both terms

Major Operation (Current)— 1. A series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area. 2. For noncombat operations, a reference to the relative size and scope of a military operation. See also operation. (JP 3-0) (Joint Doc categorizes Major Operations as “large scale combat operations”; does not define Noncombat ops)

Campaign Plan (Current)— A joint operation plan for a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space. See also campaign.

Campaign (Traditional) — A series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. See also campaign plan. (JP 5-0)

New JP 5.0 divorces itself from the notion that its simply a series of major operations: Campaign (New in JP 5.0/DoDDMAT) — A series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. (SOURCE: JP 5-0)

Although the definition is favorably modified to a certain extent, the vast majority of joint doctrine’s prose continues to articulate that campaigns are a series of “large” operations –

occurring in armed conflict - which is incomplete relative JCIC’s concept of campaigning

Expanded Definition of Campaigning Delineation – Revised Definitions

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Integrated Campaigning (New)- Joint Force and interorganizational partner efforts to enable the achievement and maintenance of policy aims by integrating military activities and aligning non-military activities of sufficient scope, scale, simultaneity, and duration across multiple domains.

Campaign (Revised): A framework to orchestrate and synchronize simultaneous activities and operations (major or otherwise) aimed at accomplishing or enabling policy aims; the joint forces’ intellectual guide and construct for the informed application of force; the aggregate contribution to a policy regarding armed conflict, competition, and cooperation.

Major Operation (Revised): A series of tactical actions which may include combat conducted by individual or joint forces, coordinated in time and place, to achieve a logical series of tactical objectives within and across multiple domains in an operational area. Within a campaign’s construct, successful results may lead to attaining an operational-level objective.

JCIC emphasizes campaigning as an action verb over the static noun

Wrap up and Concluding Remarks

The Logic and Framework of JCIC



antagonist or protagonists

Logic #1 – View of the OELogic #2 Revised Definition of

Campaigning

Logic #3 – Additive Logic to the idea of Shaping/Cooperation

L#4 – Logic for Competition

Logic #5 – A Lexicon/Terms for Competition

L#6 – Revised logic for securing gains

Logic #7 – Factors of Campaign Design

Logic #x – TMM/MDB*


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Joint Concept for Integrated CampaigningExecutive Overview Brief

February 2018

63

“Organize around the problem, don’t organize the problem around the Phasing Construct”

-Famous Strategist

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February 2018

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Back-Up Slides

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65

Currently we view the operating environment (OE) through the lens of joint doctrine’s notional plan phasing construct. Originally, this model’s precursor was a force planning construct used throughout the 1990s to “count” the force and its attributes for possible scenarios. Overtime, it migrated to become an operational construct.

This model offers a seductive story such as a clear distinction between peace and war, ample political decision space, sanctuary and sufficient time for force deployment to a conflict; where the conflict is contained within a region and boundaries of our choosing. Moreover, the model suggests that success in armed conflict is merely a matter of military effort and concludes when we decide. In short, the model and our current view of OE suggests that conflict unfolds on our terms and timeline. The current phasing construct is a modern day symptom or function of joint doctrine’s attempt to institutionalize both the idealistic dogma of Powell’s generation and everything we came to like about JUST CAUSE and DESERT SHIELD/STORM.

Current View of the EnvironmentUNCLASSIFIED

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Our current lexicon leans heavily on the idea of a military end state to describe the ideal conclusion of both operations and campaigns. Moreover, joint doctrine characterizes the term as a point of primary accomplishment. One doctrinal theme running throughout the joint publications is attaining a military end state naturally leads to a favorable political outcome. However, the description of how this occurs is ambiguous. What is clear is an unrealistic expectation of a transition of responsibility to another enterprise. The contrived notion of a military end state provides a poor articulation of success and worse indicator of conclusion relative to a policy outcome. This flawed element of operational design creates an intellectual void within joint doctrine’s description of the military’s contribution to a policy and the historical follow through required to realize the aim of that policy. In fact, the artificiality of a military end state almost single-handedly distorts and corrupts our understanding of the relationships between policy/strategy, campaigns, operations, and their objectives.

Consolidating and maintaining gains is an integral part of campaigning that requires a continuing opportunity cost of military effort. Any notion of completeness or resolution suggested by a military end state can be completely irrelevant. Ironically, a military end state may be a good servant for the construct of an individual operation, but it makes for an inappropriate master for describing campaigning’s relation to policy aims. This notable difference is in stark contrast to joint doctrine’s current commentary on either term. By orienting on a military end state, campaign design can miss the magnitude and character of effort required to achieve the appropriate measures of success, translate that success into political outcomes, and prepare for the repercussions of success. Moreover, focusing on short-sighted notions of achievement can mask the risks inherently associated with the known patterns of armed conflict. History documents that “Military establishments repeatedly find that war’s aftermath has its own…unique and lasting consequences for both the victor and vanquished (alike) as clear conclusion and finality are elusive.”* It should come as no surprise at this point, but joint doctrine does not define military end state, but the influence of this flawed term resides throughout every joint publication.**

**Vice Versa: An Artistic Appraisal of Joint Doctrine’s Descriptions of Campaigns, Major Operations, and Objectives (Final Draft for pub. 1 Dec 2017)

Military End State: The Vanishing Point

*“Review of Force without War: U. S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument and Implications for future Doctrine and Education.” Page 1. (ARCIC Unpublished Working Paper Aug 2016)

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Alternative View of the Contemporary Environment UNCLASSIFIED

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Levels of intentions/ambitions for campaigning in competition against antagonistic behaviors







Adversarial

Designated Enemy


February 2018

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Further Discussion

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joint concept for integrated campaigning executive overvie€¦ · executive overview february 2018...

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