joint intelligence support to military operations

20 November 1996

Joint IntelligenceSupport to Military

Operations

Joint Pub 2-01

PREFACE

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1. Scope

This publication establishes doctrinalguidance on the provision of intelligenceproducts, services, and support to jointoperations. It provides the fundamentals ofjoint intelligence operations, addressingorganization of joint intelligence forces,responsibilities, and command relationships.The focus will be joint intelligence support tocombatant commanders revolving around thephases of the intelligence cycle: planningand direction, collection, processing andexploitation, production; dissemination andintegration and evaluation. Finally, personnel,physical, operations and communicationssecurity considerations will be addressed.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared underthe direction of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to governthe joint activities and performance of theArmed Forces of the United States in jointoperations and provides the doctrinal basis forUS military involvement in multinational andinteragency operations. It provides militaryguidance for the exercise of authority bycombatant commanders and other jointforce commanders and prescribes doctrine forjoint operations and training. It providesmilitary guidance for use by the Armed Forcesin preparing their appropriate plans. It is notthe intent of this publication to restrict theauthority of the joint force commander (JFC)from organizing the force and executing themission in a manner the JFC deems most

appropriate to ensure unity of effort in theaccomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance establishedin this publication apply to the commandersof combatant commands, subunifiedcommands, joint task forces, and subordinatecomponents of these commands. Theseprinciples and guidance also may apply whensignificant forces of one Service are attachedto forces of another Service or whensignificant forces of one Service supportforces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication isauthoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP)will be followed except when, in the judgmentof the commander, exceptional circumstancesdictate otherwise. If conflicts arise betweenthe contents of this publication and thecontents of Service publications, thispublication will take precedence for theactivities of joint forces unless the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally incoordination with the other members of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, has provided morecurrent and specific guidance. Commandersof forces operating as part of a multinational(alliance or coalition) military commandshould follow multinational doctrine andprocedures ratified by the United States. Fordoctrine and procedures not ratified by theUnited States, commanders should evaluateand follow the multinational command’sdoctrine and procedures, where applicable.

DENNIS C. BLAIRVice Admiral, US NavyDirector, Joint Staff

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................... vii

CHAPTER I THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN MILITARY OPERATIONS

• Introduction.............................................................................................................. I-1• Intelligence Operations in War.................................................................................. I-3• Intelligence in Military Operations Other Than War.................................................. I-3

CHAPTER II JOINT INTELLIGENCE PLANNING

• Introduction............................................................................................................. II-1• Deliberate Planning.................................................................................................. II-2• Crisis Action Planning............................................................................................. II-3• Campaign Planning................................................................................................ II-13• Multinational Operations........................................................................................ II-15• Conclusion............................................................................................................. II-15

CHAPTER III THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

• Introduction........................................................................................................... III-1• An Overview ......................................................................................................... III-1• The Intelligence Cycle and Joint Operations........................................................... III-3

SECTION A. PLANNING AND DIRECTION........................................................ III-3

• Overview............................................................................................................... III-3• Organizations and Responsibilities......................................................................... III-4• Augmentation Requirements.................................................................................. III-6• Intelligence Requirements...................................................................................... III-7• Evaluation.............................................................................................................. III-9

SECTION B. COLLECTION................................................................................... III-9

• Overview............................................................................................................... III-9• Duties and Responsibilities of the Collection Manager.......................................... III-10• Principles of Collection Management.................................................................... III-11• Collection Management........................................................................................ III-12• Military Collection Requirements......................................................................... III-14• Collection Requirements Management.................................................................. III-15• Collection Operations Management...................................................................... III-23

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SECTION C. PROCESSING AND EXPLOITATION............................................. III-26

• Overview.............................................................................................................. III-26• Processing and Exploitation of Human Intelligence............................................... III-26• Imagery Intelligence Processing and Exploitation................................................. III-27• Signals Intelligence Processing............................................................................. III-28• Measurement and Signature Intelligence Processing.............................................. III-28• Open-Source Intelligence Processing.................................................................... III-29• Evaluation............................................................................................................. III-29

SECTION D. PRODUCTION.................................................................................III-29

• Overview.............................................................................................................. III-29• Products................................................................................................................ III-29• Support to Combatant Commands......................................................................... III-35• Production Responsibilities................................................................................... III-38• Request Management............................................................................................ III-38• Prioritizing Requirements...................................................................................... III-39• Evaluation............................................................................................................. III-40• Additional Information.......................................................................................... III-40

SECTION E. DISSEMINATION AND EVALUATION..........................................III-41

• Overview.............................................................................................................. III-41• Dissemination Methods......................................................................................... III-42• Integration of Intelligence Products....................................................................... III-44• Evaluation............................................................................................................. III-45

CHAPTER IV INTELLIGENCE C4 SYSTEMS SUPPORT

• Introduction........................................................................................................... IV-1• Intelligence Communications Capabilities.............................................................. IV-1• Multinational Force Intelligence and Communications Interoperability.................. IV-1• Establishing Intelligence Communication Systems Requirements.......................... IV-2• Combatant Commander’s Communications Planning............................................. IV-4• Communications and Intelligence Systems............................................................ IV-7• Communications and ADP Systems and Networks.............................................. IV-10• Other Communications Resources........................................................................ IV-14

APPENDIX

A Joint Force J-2 Quick Reaction Checklist......................................................... A-1B Representative Intelligence Requirements......................................................... B-1C Intelligence Disciplines..................................................................................... C-1D Intelligence Estimate........................................................................................ D-1E Security............................................................................................................ E-1F The Department of Defense Shared Production Program................................... F-1

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G Joint Exploitation Centers............................................................................... G-1H Intelligence Cycle Execution Responsibilities.................................................. H-1J References......................................................................................................... J-1K Administrative Instructions............................................................................. K-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms.................................................................... GL-1Part II Terms and Definitions............................................................................... GL-5

FIGURE

I-1 Intelligence Staffs’ Responsibilities................................................................ I-1II-1 Deliberate Planning Phases............................................................................II-2II-2 Crisis Action Planning-Phase I...................................................................... II-4II-3 Crisis Action Planning-Phase II..................................................................... II-5II-4 Crisis Action Planning-Phase III................................................................... II-8II-5 Crisis Action Planning-Phase IV................................................................. II-10II-6 Crisis Action Planning-Phase V.................................................................. II-12II-7 Crisis Action Planning-Phase VI................................................................. II-14II-8 Campaign Planning..................................................................................... II-14III-1 The Intelligence Cycle................................................................................ III-2III-2 Planning and Directing Activities................................................................ III-3III-3 Joint Force Joint Intelligence Staff Organization......................................... III-5III-4 Augmentation Requirements....................................................................... III-7III-5 Request Flow.............................................................................................. III-9III-6 Collection Managers and the Collection Plan............................................. III-10III-7 Collection Management Principles............................................................. III-11III-8 Collection Management Cycle................................................................... III-13III-9 Collection Management............................................................................. III-14III-10 Collection Plan Format.............................................................................. III-16III-11 Assets and/or Resource Availability and Capability Factors........................ III-17III-12 Collection Timeline.................................................................................... III-19III-13 Collection Tasking Worksheet.................................................................... III-21III-14 Guidelines for Requesting National Resource Collection............................ III-22III-15 Collection Operations Management........................................................... III-24III-16 Processing and Exploitation of Intelligence................................................ III-27III-17 Intelligence Products.................................................................................. III-30III-18 General Military Intelligence Concerns...................................................... III-32III-19 Production Responsibilities of Combatant Command, Joint Intelligence

Center, and the Joint Force Joint Intelligence Staff.................................. III-36III-20 Production Requests................................................................................... III-40III-21 Dissemination............................................................................................ III-41III-22 Intelligence Dissemination......................................................................... III-43IV-1 Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence

for the Warrior Concept........................................................................... IV-2IV-2 Joint Force Intelligence Communications Planning Methodology............... IV-4

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IV-3 Joint Intelligence Staff (J-2)/Joint Command, Control, Communications,and Computer Systems Staff (J-6) Communication Planning................... IV-5

IV-4 Joint Intelligence Architecture..................................................................... IV-9IV-5 INTELINK Concept ................................................................................. IV-11IV-6 Department of Defense Intelligence Information System

Intelligence Architecture........................................................................ IV-12C-1 The Intelligence Disciplines.......................................................................... C-1C-2 Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Service (DHS)........................... C-A-3C-3 Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Staff Element (J-2X)............................... C-A-8

C-4 Imagery Intelligence.................................................................................. C-B-6C-5 Imagery Exploitation Phases................................................................... C-B-10C-6 National Security Agency (NSA) Signals Intelligence Support................. C-C-4C-7 Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Requirement Flow..................................... C-C-9C-8 Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) Process

and Players............................................................................................ C-D-4C-9 Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) Service and National

Exploitation Centers.............................................................................. C-D-7E-1 Sample Tactical Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility Operations

Message Format........................................................................................ E-3E-2 National Disclosure Policy Functional Categories of Classified Military

Intelligence................................................................................................ E-6E-3 Exceptions to National Disclosure Policy Committee-Controlled Classified

Information................................................................................................ E-7E-4 Release of Classified Material....................................................................... E-7G-1 Joint Exploitation Centers............................................................................ G-1H-1 Planning and Direction................................................................................. H-2H-2 Collection.................................................................................................... H-3H-3 Processing and Exploitation.......................................................................... H-4H-4 Production - Part One................................................................................... H-5H-4 Production - Part Two.................................................................................. H-6H-5 Dissemination and Integration...................................................................... H-7H-6 Evaluation.................................................................................................... H-8

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

•

•

•

•

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Discusses the Role of Intelligence in Military Operations

Covers Joint Intelligence Planning

Outlines the Intelligence Cycle

Explains Intelligence Command, Control, Communications,and Computer Systems Support

The objective of jointintelligence operations isto provide the joint forcecommander with a timely,complete, and accurateunderstanding of theadversary and theenvironment.

The planning effort mustbe focused to ensure that itis responsive to thecommander’srequirements and therequirements ofsubordinate units and/orelements.

The Role of Intelligence in Military Operations

Joint intelligence doctrine defines the roles and relationshipsof intelligence organizations at the national level, in thecombatant commands, and in the subordinate joint forces. Thegoal is to maximize the impact of intelligence while increasingeffectiveness among the organizations that support the jointforce commander (JFC). Intelligence plays a critical role acrossthe range of military operations from peace to war. Intelligenceenables commanders at all levels to focus their combatpower and resources and to provide force protection for thoseresources. Operations associated with military operations otherthan war focus on deterring war and promoting peace and canhave rules of engagement requiring the adaption of a new andcomplex set of operational responses. Intelligence resourcesat every echelon should be structured to provide supportthat is proactive, aggressive, predictive, and flexible.Successful conduct of information warfare operations alsodemands detailed intelligence support.

The essence of effective planning is the full definition of themission, expression of the commander’s intent, completionof the commander’s estimate (including the intelligenceestimate), and development of a concept of operations withan intelligence annex. The Command Intelligence Architectureand/or Planning Program is a systematic and structured planningprocess that documents the combatant command’s missionlinkage to intelligence requirements, current and required futureintelligence capabilities, and intelligence missions andorganization.

Joint Intelligence Planning

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The different planningprocesses involved aredeliberate,

crisis action planning,

and campaign planning.

The intelligence cyclefocuses on thecommander’s mission andconcept of operation.

The deliberate planning process is primarily conducted inpeacetime and engages the entire joint planning communityin the methodological development of plans for allcontingencies, and the transition to and from war. Deliberateplanning consists of five phases: initiation, conceptdevelopment, plan development, plan review, and supportingplans.

Crisis action planning (CAP) procedures provide for thetransition from planning military operations to actualexecution through the timely flow of intelligence, rapidexecution of military options, and the timely relay of decisionsof the National Command Authorities to supportedcommanders. Crisis action planning and execution areaccomplished within a framework of six phases: situationdevelopment, crisis assessment, course of action (COA)development, COA selection, execution planning, andexecution.

Campaign planning is appropriate when military operationsexceed the scope of a single major operation. It encompassesboth the deliberate and CAP processes. Intelligence supportsall aspects of the campaign plan. A campaign plan describeshow a series of operations are arranged in time, space, andpurpose. The plan focuses on the adversary’s centers of gravity;simultaneous and synchronized employment of land, sea, air,space-based, and special operations forces assets; and the endstate to be achieved.

Each phase of the cycle must be synchronized with thecommander’s decision making and operational requirementsto successfully influence the outcome of the operation. Theintelligence cycle provides a process to understand andorder the many activities involved in intelligence and isuseful for understanding the interrelationships of theintelligence phases. The intelligence process may not continuethrough the entire cycle and there are no firm boundariesdelineating where each phase of the cycle begins or ends.Activities during each phase of the intelligence cycle directlysupport the JFC. Intelligence supports joint operations,focusing on providing multidiscipline intelligence support tothe combatant command, the subordinate Service andfunctional component commands, and the subordinate jointforce.

The Intelligence Cycle

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Executive Summary

While conducted continuously, intelligence planning anddirection normally occurs during and in conjunction withoperation planning and involves task-organizing intelligenceassets; identifying personnel, logistics and communicationsrequirements; developing a collection plan; issuing requestsfor collection and production; and monitoring the availabilityof collection information.

Collection operations acquire information about theadversary and provide that information to intelligenceprocessing and exploitation elements. Collectionmanagement converts intelligence requirements into collectionrequirements; establishes, tasks, or coordinates actions withappropriate collection sources or agencies; and monitors resultsand retasks, as required. Requests for collection resourcesmust be coordinated with the echelon that directs and controlsthem through the chain of command. Collection managersdevelop collection plans based on the intelligencerequirements of commanders and decision makers andshould observe the following principles in all collectionconsiderations: early identification of requirements,prioritization of requirements, multidiscipline approach, andtask organic assets. Collection management has two distinctfunctions: defining what intelligence systems must collect,and specifying how to collect it. Management and validationof collection requirements requests for a theater resides at thecomponent and/or combatant command.

During processing and exploitation, collected data iscorrelated and converted into forms suitable for analysisand production which may be further exploited to gain fullestpossible advantage from it. The exploitation manager mustplan the workload and develop a priority system foraccomplishing the work. This will ensure priority processingand exploitation during periods of high-volume collectionactivity.

Intelligence production is the integration, evaluation,analysis, and interpretation of information from single ormultiple sources into finished intelligence. Production forjoint operations is accomplished by organizations at everyechelon, from national to joint force level. Intelligenceproducts produced by or for the subordinate joint force areindications and warning, current intelligence, general militaryintelligence, and target intelligence. Production centersat all levels are assigned clearly delineated areas ofanalytical responsibility across the range of militaryoperations.

The six phases of theintelligence cycle arePlanning and Direction,

Collection,

Processing andExploitation,

Production,

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Intelligence must be provided in a form that is readilyunderstood and directly usable by the recipient in a timelymanner without overloading the user and minimizing the loadon communications capabilities. Dissemination consists ofboth “push” and “pull” control principles. The “push”concept allows the higher echelons to push information downto satisfy existing lower echelon requirements or to relay otherrelevant intelligence to the lower level. The “pull” conceptinvolves direct electronic access to data bases, intelligence files,or other repositories by intelligence organizations at all levels.The requester must integrate all intelligence obtained fromnational, theater, or organic resources and/or assets intothe decision making and planning process.

The intelligence cycle is evaluated at every phase todetermine the success achieved in meeting the customer’srequirements. The planning and direction phase depends onthe results achieved in the other phases of the intelligence cycle.The collection manager evaluates the collection report(s),ensures that the requesters receive a copy, and determines ifthe requirement has been satisfied. Requester feedbackestablishes customer satisfaction and frees collection assetsand resources to be redirected to satisfy other activerequirements. The processing and exploitation (“sensor”specific) and production (multiple sensors or sources) phasesare evaluated based on customer satisfaction with the productprovided in response to a request. Intelligence personnel atall levels evaluate the production process and the products inan effort to continuously improve support to the requester.Intelligence personnel at all levels assess the success of thedissemination and integration phase of the intelligence cycleand make changes as needed to improve the process.

Communications and automated data processing (ADP)systems provide the basic framework for the timelymovement and transfer of information in each phaseof the intelligence cycle to commanders and other key decisionmakers. Joint intelligence, national agency communicationssupport, and multinational force intelligence andcommunicat ions help wi th command, contro l ,communications, and computer systems support. Keyconcepts of successful intelligence systems are jointinteroperability , streamlined flow of information, andproviding pull-down of intelligence tailored to theneeds of the operating forces. Combatant commanders’

Dissemination andIntegration,

and Evaluation.

Communications andautomated data processingtechnology is undergoingcontinuous evolution,affecting intelligencearchitecture, systems, andapplications.

Intelligence Command, Control, Communications,and Computer Systems Support

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Executive Summary

communication planning consists of architecture planningand system planning.

The joint intelligence architecture encompasses both theJoint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System, theJoint Deployable Intelligence Support System, and otherclient-server environment compliant workstations. Thecommunications and ADP systems and networks includethe Automatic Digital Networks, the Department of DefenseIntelligence Information System, the Secret Internet ProtocolRouter Network, Global Command and Control System,Global Broadcast Service, Migration Defense IntelligenceThreat Data System, Military Intelligence Integrated DataSystem and Integrated Data Base, Joint CollectionManagement Tools, and the Requirements ManagementSystem.

Joint intelligence enables commanders at all levels to focusand protect their combat power and resources through asynchronized cycle of planning and direction, collection,processing and exploitation, production, dissemination andintegration, and evaluation. Successful intelligence systemsmust include joint interoperability, a streamlined flow ofinformation, and provide a pull-down of intelligence tailoredto the needs of the operating forces.

Joint intelligencearchitecture implementscommon procedures,standards, and streamlinedsupport.

CONCLUSION

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CHAPTER ITHE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN MILITARY OPERATIONS

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1. Introduction

a. The objective of joint intelligenceoperations is to provide the joint forcecommander (JFC) with a timely, complete,and accurate understanding of theadversary and the environment.Intelligence staffs must understand the

intelligence requirements of their superior andsubordinate commands and components,identify organic intelligence capabilities andshortfalls, access theater and/or nationalsystems to alleviate shortfalls, and ensure thattimely and appropriate intelligence is providedor available to the JFC and subordinatecommands and components. (Figure I-1) This

“When I took a decision, or adopted an alternative, it was after studyingevery relevant — and many an irrelevant -— factor. Geography, tribalstructure, religion, social customs, language, appetites, standards — all wereat my finger-ends. The enemy I knew almost like my own side. I riskedmyself among them a hundred times, to learn.”

Colonel T.E. LawrenceLetter to Liddell Hart, 26 June 1933

Figure I-1. Intelligence Staffs’ Responsibilities

IntelligenceStaffs Must:

INTELLIGENCE STAFFS' RESPONSIBILITIES

Identify organicintelligence capabilities

and shortfalls

Understand theintelligence requirements

of their superior &subordinate commands &

components

Ensure that timely &appropriate intelligence is

provided or available to thejoint force commander &subordinate commands &

components

Access theater and/ornational systems toalleviate shortfalls

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objective is achieved through thecooperative and comprehensive efforts ofall intelligence personnel during each phaseof the intelligence cycle.

Counterintelligence (CI) plays a keyforce protection role during war andespecially in military operationsother than war (MOOTW). Aneffective CI program uses amultidisciplined approach tocounter an adversary’s all-sourceintelligence and other securitythreats. CI elements from theService components play a lead rolein this multidisciplined effort,conducting the four CI functions ofoperations, investigations,collection, and analysis. CIelements also complement theintelligence disciplines throughfunctions such as analysis andcollection. Additional informationon CI support to operations can befound in Joint Pub 2-01.2, “JointDoctrine, Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for CounterintelligenceSupport to Operations.”

b. Joint intelligence doctrine defines theroles and relationships of intelligenceorganizations at the national level, in the

combatant commands, and in subordinatejoint forces. The National Military JointIntelligence Center (NMJIC), the combatantcommand intelligence officer (J-2) and theJoint Intelligence Center (JIC), and thesubordinate joint force J-2 and JointIntelligence Support Element (JISE) supportthe commander by minimizing the number oforganizations and echelons upon which theJFC must rely in order to accomplishintelligence support missions. The goal is tomaximize the impact of intelligence whileincreasing effectiveness among theorganizations that support the JFC. Robustintelligence resources, methodologies, andproducts should be developed, reviewed, andexercised regularly to directly support everymilitary option and scenario. Significantopportunities and vulnerabilities across thespectrum of military operations are createdas the United States and its adversariesbecome increasingly dependent oninformation, information-based processes,and information systems. Informationsuperiority, achievement of dominance in theinformation environment, is critical if theUnited States is to maintain dominance.Information warfare (IW), affecting adversaryinformation capabilities while protecting ourown, requires detailed intelligence support.

Intelligence helps the combatant commander understand the area ofresponsibility and visualize and develop the battlespace.

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The Role of Intelligence in Military Operations

2. Intelligence Operationsin War

a. Intelligence plays a critical role acrossthe range of military operations from peaceto war. Commanders use intelligence toanticipate the battle, understand thebattlespace, and influence the outcome ofoperations. Intelligence enables commandersat all levels to focus and protect theircombat power and resources and provideforce protection for those resources.

b. Intelligence focuses on the adversarycenters of gravity to provide operational andtactical commanders the information theyneed to conduc t the campa ign .Multidisciplined intelligence gives thecommander the information necessary tosuccessfully plan and execute militaryoperations. Intelligence helps the combatantcommander and/or subordinate JFCunderstand the operational area and visualizeand develop the battlespace. Intelligenceshows where the commander should applycombat power to exploit adversaryvulnerabilities or capitalize on opportunitieswith minimum risk. Joint Pub 2-0, “JointDoctrine for Intelligence Support toOperations,” describes intelligence and therange of military operations.

3. Intelligence in MilitaryOperations Other Than War

a. Operations associated with MOOTWfocus on deterring war and promoting

peace, are very sensitive to politicalconsiderations, and can have rules ofengagement requiring the adaptation of anew and complex set of operationalresponses. The J-2 must modify and tailorthe intelligence response to meet the uniquechallenges presented in each operation. Inaddition, the nature and intensity of a potentialthreat in MOOTW can change suddenly anddramatically. For example, a peacekeepingoperation may abruptly transition to a combatpeace enforcement operation should any ofthe belligerents fail to honor the terms of thetruce. Therefore, intelligence resources atevery echelon should be structured to providesupport that is proactive, aggressive,predictive, and flexible. A significantamount of intelligence resources are dedicatedto supporting joint organizations with acounterdrug mission. Although counterdrugoperations develop rapidly, planning occursover an extended planning cycle.Counterdrug operations must take intoaccount the special legal, operational, andcoordination constraints of counterdrugpolicy.

b. Rapid and continuing advances ininformation technology present US forceswith significant opportunities andvulnerabilities. A growing percentage ofintelligence manpower, technical resources,products and efforts will be dedicated to IWactivities that attack, protect or exploitinformation.

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ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE

In 1992 the Defense Intelligence Agency sought to improve support for futuredisaster relief operations. The initiative was largely a response to OperationSEA ANGEL, a major disaster relief operation in Bangladesh in May 1991 inwhich some 152,000 people were killed by a tropical cyclone. Interviews withSEA ANGEL commanders indicated they had not had adequate intelligenceon Bangladesh’s physical and cultural environment, infrastructure, disasterrelief capabilities, and the potential for further disaster. The DIA initiativeattempted to satisfy these requirements in preparing for disasters.

The most important component of this initiative was the development of anew, all-source, comprehensive finished intelligence product modeled on DIA’sContingency Support Studies (CSS) and Contingency Support Products. Suchproducts originally were designed to provide “off-the-shelf” contingencyintelligence for combat operations and noncombatant evacuation operations.

The new CSS-type product was designed for potential future humanitarianrelief operations generated by natural or technological disasters. In additionto the traditional Essential Elements of Information (EEI) included in studiesthat support the movement and deployment of military forces — such astransportation infrastructure intelligence — the product was designed toinclude EEIs that are unique and yet critical to the planning and prosecutionof disaster relief operations.

SOURCE: G. Ted Constantine, Intelligence Support to Humanitarian-Disaster Relief Operations, Center for the Study of Intelligence,

December 1995

CHAPTER IIJOINT INTELLIGENCE PLANNING

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“If I always appear prepared, it is because before entering on an undertaking,I have meditated for long and foreseen what may occur.”

Napoleon Bonaparte

Execution System (JOPES) provides themeans to respond to emerging crisis situationsor transition to war through rapid, coordinatedexecution planning and implementation.JOPES translates policy decisions intoOPLANs and OPORDs. JOPES formats canbe found in CJCSM 3122.03, “Joint OperationPlanning and Execution System Vol II:(Planning Formats and Guidance),” andCJCSM 3122.04, “Joint Operation Planningand Execution System Vol II: (SupplementalPlanning and Execution Formats andGuidance).”

d. The Command Intelligence Architecture/Planning Program (CIAP) is a systematicand structured planning process thatdocuments the combatant commands’mission linkage to intelligence requirements,current and required future intelligencecapabilities, and intelligence missions andorganization. The CIAP addresses thecombatant commands’ baseline capabilitiesand objective architectures and identifiesshortfalls impeding realization of theobjective intelligence architecture. The CIAPaddresses interoperability needs betweenthe combatant command and echelons abovethe combatant command (e.g., nationalagencies and Service intelligence centers);other command echelons supporting acombatant command; echelons below thecombatant command (e.g., intelligence centersin corps, divisions, wings, and battle groups);multinational forces; and all tacticalcomponents. The mainline CIAP documentsfor each combatant command are theCommand Intelligence Strategy Document,Command Intelligence ImplementationDocument, and Command Intelligence

1. Introduction

a. The essence of effective planning isthe full definition of the mission, expressionof the commander’s intent, completion ofthe commander’s estimate (including theintelligence estimate), and development ofa concept of operations with Annex B(Intelligence). The planning effort must befocused to ensure that it is responsive tothe commander’s requirements and therequirements of subordinate units and/orelements. Sharing operational, communicationsand intelligence information among the J-2,operations officer (J-3), logistics officer(J-4), plans officer (J-5), and command,control, communications, and computer (C4)systems officer (J-6) staffs is essential.

b. Joint operation plans include deliberateplans and crisis action plans. The planningcycle continues by maintaining and updatingplans, as required, until the plan task iscanceled. Deliberate plans include operationplans in complete format (OPLANs),operation plans in concept format(CONPLANs) with or without time-phasedforce and deployment data (TPFDD), andfunctional plans. Crisis action planning(CAP) is conducted for the actual commitmentof allocated forces, based on the currentsituation, when a contingency response isimminent. This planning results in time-sensitive development of joint operation plans(campaign plans) and/or operation orders(OPORDs) for execution.

c. The Joint Pub 5 series providesdetailed information on planning jointoperations. The Joint Operation Planning and

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Architecture Document. CIAP commandunique documents include tactics, techniquesand procedures (TTP) for intelligence supportto joint operations, intelligence planning roadmaps, and subarchitectures for variousintelligence functions and disciplines.

2. Deliberate Planning

Intelligence planners support thedeliberate planning process which preparesfor a possible contingency based on the bestavailable information. Conductedprimarily in peacetime, the deliberateplanning process engages the entire jointplanning community in the methodicaldevelopment of plans for all contingenciesand the transition to and from war. FigureII-1 shows the five phases of deliberateplanning.

a. During Phase I, Initiation , the Servicesprovide information to the supportedcommands on available intelligence forcesand supplies required to support the plan. TheServices also keep the combatant commanderinformed on Service intelligence plans andprograms.

b. Phase II, Concept Developmentinvolves development of the supported

commander’s concept of the operation,documented as the commander in chief ’s(CINC’s) Strategic Concept. The intelligencestaff supports the development of alternativecourses of action (COAs) by collecting andanalyzing already existing information toproduce intelligence on the adversary, terrain,meteorological and oceanographic (METOC)and geographic features that affect friendlyand adversary forces through the jointintelligence preparation of the battlespace(JIPB) process. The CINC’s strategic conceptis forwarded to the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff (CJCS) for review andapproval.

c. The approved CINC’s Strategic Conceptprovides the basis for plan development bythe CINC’s staff. In Phase III, PlanDevelopment, intelligence staffs areresponsible for developing the IntelligenceAnnex and appendices to the basic OPLAN.Intelligence staffs must also identifyintelligence support force and sustainmentrequirements and identify intelligenceshortfalls throughout the planning process forincorporation into the OPLAN. Intelligenceassets must be included in the time-phasedforce and deployment list (TPFDL) to ensureproper movement of critical personnel andequipment. The J-2 must coordinate with the

Figure II-1. Deliberate Planning Phases

DELIBERATE PLANNING PHASES

Phase I Phase II Phase III Phase IV Phase V

ConceptDevelopment

Initiation PlanDevelopment

PlanReview

SupportingPlans

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combatant command J-6 to ensureintelligence communications requirementsare incorporated in Annex K of the CINCOPLAN.

d. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff conducts a final review of OPLANssubmitted by the supported commanderduring Phase IV, Plan Review. This reviewevaluates the plan to determine whethertaskings have been met and whetherresources have been used effectively withinthe constraints of the Joint StrategicCapabilities Plan apportionment guidance.The Joint Staff J-2 reviews the intelligenceannex for the Chairman. A sampleintelligence annex is provided in AppendixD, “Intelligence Estimate.”

e. Phase V, Supporting Plans, deals withmobilization, deployment, employment,sustainment, and redeployment of forces andresources in support of the concept describedin the supported commander’s approved plan.The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffmay be asked to resolve critical issues,including use of intelligence forces and assets,that arise during the review of supportingplans. The Joint Staff may review anysupporting plan on behalf of the Chairman.

3. Crisis Action Planning

a. The basic planning process is adaptedto execute joint operations in crisis situations.CAP procedures provide for the transitionfrom planning military operations to actualexecution through the timely flow ofintelligence, rapid execution of militaryoptions, and the timely relay of decisionsof the National Command Authorities(NCA) to supported commanders.

b. Deliberate planning and CAP for anyparticular joint operation are interrelated bythe degree to which deliberate planning hasbeen able to anticipate and prepare for thecrisis. Every crisis situation cannot be

anticipated, but detailed analysis andcoordination accomplished during thedeliberate planning period may greatlyexpedite effective decision making andexecution planning during crises andunanticipated contingencies. Therefore, jointintelligence support for CAP should alwaysbegin with a thorough exploitation of relevantdeliberate plans.

c. CAP and execution are accomplishedwithin a framework of six phases asdescribed in Joint Pub 5-0, “Doctrine forPlanning Joint Operations.” Discussed beloware the processes and procedures pertinent tojoint intelligence planning during CAP.

• Situation development is a dynamicprocess that evolves simultaneously withpolicy. Proper situation developmentdemands that staffs be able to provideimmediate advice (within approximately12 hours) to commanders based ondeliberate planning. A principal task ofthe combatant command’s J-2 is to helpdevelop the commander’s situationassessment. (Figure II-2) The intelligenceeffort focuses on intelligence collectionand production to illuminate the situationfor the combatant commander,components, subordinate JFCs, NCA,and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff. The command J-5, with theassistance of the J-2, reviews existingplans to determine if the particular eventhas been considered in deliberateplanning. If an existing plan does notapply, the commander will need todevelop priority intelligence requirements(PIRs) tailored to the mission early inthe planning process to assessintelligence i n f o r m a t i o n g a p s .Prel iminary recommendations on theappropriate joint task force (JTF)composition should be considered at thispoint. The combatant command J-2should notify the Defense IntelligenceAgency (DIA), the National Security

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Agency (NSA), the Central ImageryOffice (CIO), the Defense MappingAgency (DMA) , t he De fenseInformation Systems Agency (DISA),the Joint Staff J-6, and any other relevanttheater and national activities ofrequ i rements fo r intel l igence,communications support, a n dm a n p o w e r a n d e q u i p m e n taugmentation. The command J-2should coordinate closely with thecommand J-3 and J-6 to ensure that thesecommunications requirements receivesufficient priority in the command plan.Working with the command J-6, thecommand J-2 develops a subordinatejo in t fo rce J -2 communicationsarchitecture that achieves interoperabilityla te ra l l y, ver t i ca l l y, and w i thmultinational forces. It is also criticalthat intelligence planners work closelywith their J-3, J-4, and J-6 counterparts

to ensure priority for an early intelligencecapability in support of deployed forces.Intelligence personnel, equipment, andcommunications paths must be part ofthe lead element in deployments toprovide the commander with the bestintelligence possible throughout theoperation. The situation developmentphase ends when the CINC’s assessmentis submitted to the NCA and theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

• During Phase II, crisis assessment, theNational Security Council (NSC), NCA,and the Chairman and other membersof the Joint Chiefs of Staff analyze thesituation assessment and determinewhether a military option should beprepared. This phase requires increasedintelligence gathering and analysis,particularly with respect to potentialstrategic lift destinations. Therefore, the

Figure II-2. Crisis Action Planning - Phase I

CRISIS ACTION PLANNING - PHASE I

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Develop situation assessment

Orchestrate intelligencecollection and production

Make staffing recommendationsfor subordinate joint force J-2

Coordinate with theater andnational intelligence agencies

Coordinate communicationsequipment and transportationsupport with J-6

Coordinate with otherjoint elements for personnelrequirements

Coordinate transportationsupport with J-5

Supporting Plans

NCA

CJCS

Combatant Command

IntelligenceAnnexes

Joint IntelligenceStaff (J-2)

Commander'sAssessment

Transition from Planning to Execution

National CommandAuthorities Decisions

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combatant command J-2 must workclosely with national agencies to helpdefine and then answer the emergingintelligence requirements of the seniorleadership and answer thecommander’s PIR. (Figure II-3) Thecrisis assessment phase ends with adecision by the NCA to return to the pre-crisis state or to have military optionsdeveloped for consideration andpossible use. The NCA decisionprovides strategic guidance for jointoperation planning and may includespecific guidance on the COAs to bedeveloped. The responsibilities of thetheater J-2 during Phase II are as follows:

•• As required, the J-2 should nominatea subordinate joint force J-2 forconsideration by the subordinate JFC.Once identified, the subordinate jointforce J-2 then needs to coordinate with

the combatant command J-2 and beginorganizing, equipping, and preparing forthe impending mission. Joint Pub 1-0,“Doctrine for Personnel Support to JointOperations,” provides doctrine onassigning personnel to meet combatantcommand and United Nations (UN)mission-related temporary dutyassignments. Procedures include thecombatant commander requestingintelligence personnel from the JointStaff Manpower & Personnel Officer(J-1); the Director of Military Intelligenceand the Military Intelligence Boardvalidating and recommending resourcingof the requirement; and meeting crisisrequirements by higher priorityallocations for personnel fill. Reservesshould be included in sustainmentp lans for long term joint forcerequirements such as Opera t ionPROVIDE PROMISE.

Figure II-3. Crisis Action Planning - Phase II

CRISIS ACTION PLANNING - PHASE II

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Define and answer information requirements ofNational Command Authorities and the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Nominate subordinate joint force J-2Identify intelligence support requirements to

theater and national activitiesCoordinate crisis-related message traffic

distributionIdentify and coordinate foreign disclosure and/or

release requests with Defense Intelligence AgencyEstablish intelligence points of contact with

coalition forces



National CommandAuthorities Decision

Commander'sAssessment

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Coordinate with Defense Intelligence Agency J-2staff for national intelligence support teamaugmentation

Coordinate with National Security Agency andCentral Intelligence Agency for national intelligencesupport team augmentees

Coordinate with defense human intelligence servicefor human intelligence augmentation

Coordinate with US Transportation Command forintelligence support and deployment planning

Combatant Command

Pre-crisis Stateor Military Option

Strategic guidance

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•• Coordinate with the combatantcommand Defense Intelligence SupportOffice (DISO), NSA and/or CentralSecurity Service (CSS) Representative,Cryptologic Support Group (CSG),Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)representat ive, DMA and CIOrepresentatives to ensure that they areinformed of the NCA decision and theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’splanning guidance directive.

•• Coordinate with US TransportationCommand (USTRANSCOM) J-2 andJIC to ensure that required intelligenceis provided to transportation planners.Coordinate with the J-4 and J-5 todetermine the effect that transportationinfrastructure status has on deploymentplanning for intelligence assets as earlyas possible in the planning effort.

•• Coordinate with Joint Staff J-2 forNational Intelligence Support Team(NIST) augmentation, if required. Beprepared to define NIST mission, thesupported command, required teamcapabilities, number of teams required,geographic locations for deployment, andrequired deployment data.

•• Coordinate with the Defense HumanIntelligence (HUMINT) Service (DHS)for HUMINT augmentation. Thecommand HUMINT Support Element( H S E ) i s t h e c o n d u i t f o r t h i scoordination.

•• Coordinate with the CounterintelligenceSupport Officer (CISO) for initiation ofcritical predeployment activities,realignment of ongoing CI support, andaugmentation from the Services.

•• Notify all relevant theater and nationalactivities of possible requirements forintelligence collection, production,

p rocess ing , repor t i ng , and /o rdissemination assistance. Be preparedto state what assistance will be required,when it will be needed, and the durationof the requirement.

•• Implement and enforce procedures forrequesting support from theater,Department of Defense (DOD) and non-D O D o rg a n i z a t i o n s , a n d a n ymultinational forces. Identify problemsand sensitivities. Requests for sensitivesupport will be coordinated with andprocessed through J-3 operationschannels in accordance with (IAW)DOD Directive S-5210.36, “Provision ofDOD Sensitive Support to DODComponents and Other Departmentsand Agencies of the US Government.”All intelligence and other governmentagencies affected by or involved withsensitive support must also be keptinformed.

•• Place the combatant command J-2 ondistribution for all crisis-related trafficgenerated by theater and nationalintelligence activities. Ensure that thecombatant command J-2 has access toany compartmented message traffic.Review the command’s statements ofintelligence interest (SIIs), which are keyto receipt of intelligence traffic andspecial requests for documents.Coordinate changes with DIA.

•• Identify, in coordination with the J-3and J-4, requirements and/or requestsfrom foreign countries for assistance orinformation. If required, begincoordinating requests for foreigndisclosure and/or release with DIA.Consult with the Joint Staff J-2 on thestatus of possible UN actions andassociated intel l igence supportrequirements.

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•• Establish points of contact withcoalition forces. Determine if any speciallanguage or translation requirementsexist which will necessitate linguistaugmentation.

•• Coordinate with US Space Command(USSPACECOM) for Joint SpaceSupport Team (JSST) augmentation.USSPACECOM will deploy task-organized JSSTs to the supportedcommand to provide space-derivedintelligence, and ensure that support isprovided. Information requiredincludes: specific support teams, wherethey will be located, what is required,and approximately when the teams arerequired to be in place.

•• Coordinate with the Joint Commandand Control Warfare Center (JC2WC) foraugmentation and intelligence support toIW and/or command and control warfare(C2W).

• Phase III, COA development, beginswith a CJCS Warning Order activatingthe designated JTF. It implements anNCA decision or CJCS planning

directive to develop military options.This directive and required actions aredescribed in Joint Pub 5-0, “Doctrinefor Planning Joint Operations,” andJoint Pub 5-00.2, “Joint Task ForcePlanning Guidance And Procedures.”The supported commander analyzeseach COA and providesrecommendations to the NCA andChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.Figure II-4) This phase ends withsubmission of the supportedcommander’s estimate, which includesthe intelligence estimate (Appendix D).

•• To this point, planning forsubordinate joint force J-2 operations hasbeen centered in the combatant

(supported) command J-2. DuringPhase III, the subordinate joint force J-2 staff begins forming a JISE andassumes leadership for J-2 CAP. A JISEwill provide the JFC with completeintelligence on the air, space, ground, andmaritime adversary situation.

•• Subordinate joint force J-2 mobilityconsiderations include the following:

The sequenced arrival of J-2 personnel and equipment, including NISTassets, needs to be planned and coordinated early.

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J - 3 a n d / o r J - 4 o n J - 2movement requirements. Requestingcommands must logistically support theNIST and other external augmentationelements. If required, formal requestsmust be submitted for support from CIOand DISA. DISA requests must becoordinated with the J-6.

•• Key planning actions of thecombatant command J-2 incoordination with or as requested bysubordinate JTF J-2, are as follows: (1)Ensure that the supported commanderreceives all the intelligence supportneeded from the command J-2 todevelop the COA for the commander’sestimate. (2) Brief the subordinate jointforce J-2 personnel on missionobjectives and guidance contained inthe warning order. Ensure that allmembers of the subordinate joint force

Figure II-4. Crisis Action Planning - Phase III

CRISIS ACTION PLANNING - PHASE III

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Formation of joint intelligence support elementProvide intelligence support for development ofcommander's estimateBrief personnel on WARNING ORDERPrepare collection priorities and requirementsfor joint force supportRequest Tactical Exploitation of NationalCapabilities Program supportReview interoperability requirementsCoordinate request for foreign disclosure and/orreleaseEstablish Air Intelligence Groups for joint forceJ-2Adhere to Director of Military Intelligenceguidance on avoiding duplication ofintelligence productsIdentify and request communications supportReport shortfalls in information and capabilitiesRequest Armed Forces Medical IntelligenceCenter support

NCA

CJCS

Combatant Command



National CommandAuthorities Decisions

Military Option

Planning Guidance

Estimate Course of Action

Mobility requirementsIdentify J-2 requirements for transportation

Plan and coordinate sequenced deployment of J-2 personnel and equipment!

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(1) The supported command forms asubordinate joint force, with planningcentering on the issues of mobilizationand sustainability for the joint force. J-2requirements for transportation are enteredinto JOPES during this phase. Input mustinclude anticipated requirements forattachments such as NIST andaugmentation to HUMINT OperationsCell (HOC) and to the Task ForceCounterintelligence CoordinatingAuthor i ty (TFCICA). (2) Thesubordinate joint force J-2 should keepJOPES managers up-to-date onintelligence personnel and equipmentmovement requirements. The sequencedarrival of deployed J-2 personnel andmateriel, including NIST assets, needs tobe planned and coordinated early. Pointsof contact (POCs) should be identifiedto work with the combatant commandJ-3 and/or J-4 as well as joint force

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multinational interoperability problems.Coordinate with the agencies andorganizations involved. (9) Continue tocoordinate requests for foreign disclosureand/or release issues with DIA, asappropriate. Obtain waivers if required.(10) Establish new addressee indicatorgroup (AIG) for receiving and sendingpertinent subordinate joint force J-2message traffic. Arrange to put thesubordinate joint force J-2 on distributionfor message traffic, intelligence products,and reports. Review and adhere topolicies on assigning precedence tointelligence messages, especially forsummaries. (11) Eliminate duplicativeintelligence and avoid unnecessaryredundancy in the re-transmittal orrebroadcast of intelligence information.(12) Identify combatant command,Service, or subordinate joint force J-2requirements for communications support.Coordinate all requirements for systemsand frequencies with the combatantcommand and subordinate joint force J-6.Forward requests for national-levelcommunications support through thecombatant command J-6 to the Joint StaffJ-2 for validation and the Joint Staff J-6 fortasking. (13) Coordinate a Joint RestrictedFrequency List with the command J-2, J-6, and NSA. (14) Report major capabilitylimiting factors (shortfalls) in any area forpossible inclusion in the commander’sestimate. (15) Request a current profile ondisease and environmental hazards fromthe DIA Armed Forces MedicalIntelligence Center.

•• Review the checklist found in JointPub 5-00.2, “Joint Task Force PlanningGuidance and Procedures,” Appendix C,Annex B. This checklist covers thequestions that the J-2 must consider forthe subordinate joint force OPORD.

• Two critical events highlight Phase IV,COA selection: selection of a COA by

J-2 staff review theater TTP, Joint Pub2-0, “Joint Doctrine for IntelligenceSupport to Operations,” and Joint Pub2-02, “National Intelligence Support toJoint Operations,” and understandtheir responsibilities and requiredactions. (3) Evaluate systems, supply,and equipment requirements associatedwith each COA. Mobility planningrequires a decision on what to ship tothe subordinate joint force location inwhat priority. Identify external theaterand/or national intelligence andcommunications systems required tosupport subordinate joint forceoperations. Include this information inthe commander’s estimate. (4) Briefcombatant command J-2 staff on thewarning order. If appropriate, advisethem of potential requirements foraugmentation (personnel and/orequipment). Based upon subordinatejoint force J-2 stated requirements, thejoint force J-1 will resource additionalpersonnel through the combatantcommand J-1. (5) Prepare generalcollection priorities and requirements forsubordinate joint force support andcoordinate requirements with thecombatant command J-2. The combatantcommand J-2 coordinates with nationalcollection authorities at DIA, NSA, CIO,DMA and the Central IntelligenceAgency (CIA) to notify them ofimpending requirements and determineavailability of resources. (6) If required,request Tactical Exploitation ofNational Capabilities (TENCAP)support. The J-2 can request additionalTENCAP support, including prototypeand demonstration systems, throughService TENCAP offices. (7) Reviewfacility security requirements. Preparerequest(s) for accreditation of facilities,if required. (8) Continue to reviewrequirements for systems interoperabilityand/or interconnectivity, and report onposs ib le mul t i -Serv ice and/or

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NSA, CIO, and/or CIA). Submit allsupport requests to Joint Staff J-2 viathe combatant commander for validationand subsequent action. Follow-up on anyrequests submitted earlier in the planningprocess.

•• Ensure that all subordinate jointforce J-2 personnel understand theorganizational structures, command,support and multinational relationshipsestablished for the mission. Joint forceJ-2 personnel should be briefed on keycommand and control relationshipsaffecting their specific responsibilities.

•• Finalize communications support forthe subordinate joint force J-2. Developback-up procedures, in coordination withthe J-6, for maintaining support tocustomers if primary communicationsare lost.

the NCA and initiation of executionplanning. (Figure II-5) The Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviews andevaluates the combatant commander’sestimate and prepares recommendationsand advice for the NCA. The NCAselects a COA and directs that executionplanning be accomplished. An alertorder implements the NCA decision andcontains sufficient detail to allow the JFCto conduct detailed planning. A CJCSplanning order could be issued to initiateexecution planning before the NCAselects a COA. The subordinate jointforce J-2 planning action focus shifts tothe COA selected by the NCA. Inaddition, the subordinate joint force J-2will act as follows:

•• Coordinate with Joint Staff J-2 forNIST and other augmentation fromnational intelligence agencies (DIA,

Figure II-5. Crisis Action Planning - Phase IV

CRISIS ACTION PLANNING - PHASE IV

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Shifts focus to selected course ofaction

Requests national intelligencesupport, team support and otheraugmentation, and follow-up

Review J-2 checklistsBrief personnel on intelligence

architecture and command, control, andcommunications relationships

Implement procedures for requestingsupport from theater, Department ofDefense (DOD) and non-DODorganizations, multinational forces andallied nations

Develop essential elements ofinformation (operation order)

Submit prioritized collectionrequirements

Coordinate facility accreditationrequirements

Resolve foreign disclosure and/orrelease issues

Combatant Command



Military Option

Selects course of actionALERT ORDER

Estimate Course of Action

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Finalize communications support for joint forceDevelop back-up communications planSubmit final addressee indicator group lists to J-6 staff! Coordinate remaining support requirements withappropriate staff element

NationalCommandAuthorities

Chairmanof the

Joint Chiefsof Staff

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•• Prepare and publish the PIR pertinentto the upcoming mission. PIR areformally published in the OPORD duringPhase V.

•• Publish and distribute the concept ofoperations for the subordinate joint forceJISE. The JISE evolves and is sized tomeet the specific crisis or contingencywith an intelligence structure thatmatches the mission.

•• Submit AIGs to J-6 for sending andreceiving message traffic.

•• Ensure that requests for theater andnational augmentation (personnel andequipment) are formally submitted andtrack response. Coordinate with J-1 toensure that logistical preparations forlocating and housing augmentees areunderway.

•• Coordinate final personnel, systems,supply, equipment and communicationssecurity materials requirements withsubordinate joint force J-1, J-3, J-4, J-5,and J-6, and submit them per commandprocedures for inclusion in JOPES andthe TPFDD.

•• Submit prioritized collectionrequirements for validation by theaterand national authorities. Informcombatant command reconnaissanceplanners and schedulers of required startdate for theater-based reconnaissancesupport.

•• Submit and track the request forfacility accreditation to ensure that adecision is made.

•• Resolve foreign disclosure and/orrelease procedures. Inform allsubordinate joint force personnel ofprocedures for handling disclosure and/or release of intelligence to foreign

nationals. Requirements and proceduresf o r s h a r i n g i n t e l l i g e n c e w i t hmultinational forces must be finalizedand specific products to be shared mustbe identified in the JISE concept ofoperations and in the OPORD.Coordinate with the Joint Staff J-2 forsupport being provided to multinationalforces through the UN, North AtlanticTreaty Organization (NATO), or otherinternational organizations.

• Phase V, Execution Planning, beginswith receipt of the alert order or planningorder from the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. The approved COA istransformed into an OPORD. Detailedplanning occurs throughout the jointplanning community. If required, thesupported commander will initiatecampaign planning or refine a campaignplan already developed. The supportedcommander develops the OPORD andsupporting TPFDD by modifying anexisting OPLAN, expanding an existingCONPLAN, or developing a new plan.(Figure II-6) This phase ends with anNCA decision to implement theOPORD. In those instances where thecrisis does not progress toimplementation, the Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff provides guidanceon continued planning using eitherdeliberate or CAP procedures.

•• The planning emphasis during thisphase sh i f ts to t ranspor ta t ionrequirements and the building ofmovement schedules. The supportedcommander and subordinate joint forceJ-2 track these developments closely.The status of J-2 movement requirementsshould be included in every status reportand briefing prepared during the planningof joint force operations.

•• Appropriate subordinate joint forceJ-2 planning actions during this phase

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include the following: (1) Brief thesubordinate joint force J-2 staff, DISO,National Security Agency/CentralSecurity Service Representative (NCR),CSG, HSE, CISO, CIO, DMA, and CIArepresentatives on the alert or planningorder. (2) Finalize any remaining Phase

IV or previous actions that werecompressed due to fast-paceddevelopment of the crisis situation. (3)Review Appendix C in Joint Pub 5-00.2,“Joint Task Force Planning Guidanceand Procedures,” and Appendix B ofthis publication, “Represen ta t i ve

Figure II-6. Crisis Action Planning - Phase V

CRISIS ACTION PLANNING - PHASE V

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Track transportation requirementsand build movement schedules

Complete Phase IV actionDevelop Intelligence Annex to

operation order (OPORD)Review joint intelligence support

element (JISE) operations concept andcommand, control, andcommunications relationships

Practice and deconflict JISEprocedures

Brief combatant commander onintelligence capabilities and limitations

Update adversary situation affectingcourse of action selected

Brief personnel on completedOPORD

! Brief staff and DISO, NCR, HSE, CIA,CIO, DMA, and CISO representatives onALERT ORDER

Combatant Command



Campaign Plan

Military Option

National CommandAuthoritiesDecision

ALERT ORDER

Operation Order

Chairmanof the


ImplementationOPORD

THEATER INTELLIGENCE

The primary focus of intelligence operations, particularly during OperationDESERT SHIELD, was to provide the theater and component commanders withan accurate picture of Iraqi capabilities and intentions. To do so, the theater-level intelligence structure made extensive use of national capabilities as wellas a wide array of deployed Service and component capabilities. In somecases, collection platforms and systems organic to tactical units were taskedfor missions that did not directly support their parent organizations. Althoughsome shortfalls surfaced, theater-level intelligence efforts met the requirementsof CINCCENT and his component commanders.

SOURCE: Final Report to Congress Conduct of the Persian Gulf W ar,April 1992

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Inte l l igence Requirements,” whichlist general intelligence responsibilitiesassociated with a subordinate joint force.Develop the OPORD's Annex B(Intelligence) according to CJCSM3122.04, “Joint Operation Planning andExecution System, Vol II: (SupplementalPlanning and Execution Formats andGuidance).” (4) Ensure that all personnelhave reviewed and understand the JISEoperations concept. Ensure that C4systems relationships have beendefined for support to majorcomponent forces of the subordinate jointforce. (5) Ensure that JISE proceduresaffecting highly time-sensitive andmission-critical operations and/orintelligence interfaces are thoroughlypracticed and deconflicted. Highly time-sensitive interfaces usually includespecial operations forces (SOF)operations, targeting, and the Joint Searchand Rescue Center. Other interfaces maybe created depending upon how thesubordinate joint force is constituted.Requests for SOF and other specializedtime-sensitive operational support will becoordinated through J-3 operations andmay requ i re spec ia l ca tegorycommunications procedures. (6) Apprisethe supported commander of the currentstatus of intelligence capabilities andlimitations. (7) Enumerate changes, ifany, in the adversary’s situation that couldrequire a change in the COA selected.(8) Brief subordinate joint force J-2personnel on the completed OPORD.

• If the NCA decide to execute the selectedCOA, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff issues an execute order duringPhase VI, Execution. The executeorder directs the employment anddeployment of forces, defines the timingfor initiation of operations, and conveysguidance not provided in earlier CAPorders and instructions. This phasecontinues until the crisis or mission

ends and force redeployment hasbeen completed. If the crisis isprolonged, the process may be repeatedcontinuously as circumstances changeand missions are revised. If the crisisexpands to major conflict or war, CAPwill evolve into and be absorbed withinthe larger context of implementationplanning for the conduct of the war. Thesubordinate joint force J-2 providesintelligence critical to current and futureoperations, planning, targeting, andforce protection. Collection, analysisand reporting must answer thecommander’s PIR and provide predictiveintelligence and assessments, withemphasis on intelligence involving themovement and disposition of hostileforces. Adversary movements of interestto SOF are among the top joint forcereporting priorities throughout Phase VI.The supported command J-2 must beprepared to assume this reportingresponsibility until the subordinate jointforce J-2 has reached operational statusat the deployed location. (Figure II-7)

4. Campaign Planning

The theater campaign plan embodies thecombatant commander’s vision of relatedmajor operations required to attainstrategic objectives. Campaign planning isappropriate when military operationsexceed the scope of a single majoroperation. It encompasses both the deliberateand CAP processes. Intelligence supports allaspects of the campaign plan. (Figure II-8)

a. A campaign is a series of relatedmilitary operations aimed to achieve strategicand operational objectives. A campaign plandescribes how a series of these operationsis arranged in time, space and purpose. Theplan focuses on the adversary’s centers ofgravity; simultaneous and synchronizedemployment of land, sea, air, space-based, andSOF assets; and the end state to be achieved.

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Figure II-8. Campaign Planning

CAMPAIGN PLANNING

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Adversary Centers of GravityAdversary Forces and CapabilitiesEmployment of Intelligence AssetsSpecial Operations Support

Theater Campaign PlanDeliberate Planning

Crisis Action Planning

Intertheater Coordination

TheaterOperations

Intelligence Focus

Approvedcourse of

actionIntelligence

Estimate

Approvedplan

JICJISENIST

GuidanceApproval

AlertOrder

IntelligenceAnnexes

NCA

CJCS

Figure II-7. Crisis Action Planning - Phase VI

CRISIS ACTION PLANNING - PHASE VI

Intelligence support to current andfuture operations, planning, targeting,and force protection

Collection, analysis and reporting toanswer PIR

Predictive intelligence andassessments

Movement and disposition ofhostile forces

Special operations forces'request for information

Combatant Command

Joint Intelligence Staff(J-2)


PIRCampaign Plan

Military Option

Deploy NationalIntelligence

Support Team

Operation Order

Chairmanof the


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It serves as the basis for subordinate planning.A campaign plan provides the NCA and theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff withthe information needed for intertheatercoordination at the national level.

b. Campaign plans guide the development ofsupporting OPLANs and OPORDs. COAs aredeveloped and forwarded in the commander’sestimate for approval by the NCA. Thecombatant commander finalizes the campaignplan based on a CJCS alert order, using theapproved COA as the centerpiece. Intelligenceefforts in support of the campaign plan, includingthe intelligence annexes, focus on identifying anyadversary forces and capabilities in the area ofresponsibility (AOR) and/or the joint operationsarea (JOA) and the adversary’s strategic andoperational centers of gravity.

5. Multinational Operations

There is a strong likelihood that militaryoperations will take place under bilateral,

multinational, or UN auspices. JointPub 2-0, “Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Supportto Operations,” discusses intelligencesupport for multinational operations anddescribes the intelligence principles thatguide the JFC and J-2 in organizing andsharing intelligence with multinational forces.

6. Conclusion

The time required to plan subordinate jointforce J-2 support depends largely upon howmuch can be adapted from already existingdeliberate plans and the total time requiredfor the CAP process in a given situation. Insome cases, events could cause planning toskip directly to the execution phase. Toprepare for this eventuality, combatantcommand J-2s should create their own crisisplanning checklists and exercise them.Appendix A, “Joint Force J-2 Quick ReactionChecklist,” provides a starting point forchecklist development.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IIITHE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

III-1

1. Introduction

a. Intelligence operations follow theintelligence cycle. The intelligence cyclefocuses on the commander’s mission andconcept of operation. Intelligence operationshave to be integrated into overall jointoperations to achieve the JFC’s objectives.

b. The intelligence cycle conceptual modeldescribes the process used to produceintelligence. There are no firm boundariesdelineating where each phase of the cyclebegins or ends. The intelligence cycleprovides a process to understand and orderthe many activities involved in intelligenceand is useful for understanding theinterrelationships of the intelligence phases.The intelligence process may not continuethrough the entire cycle. For example, duringthe processing and exploitation phase datamay be passed directly to the user from anunmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) or othersource, instead of being processed or exploitedfirst.

c. Activities during each phase ofthe intelligence cycle (Planning andDirection, Collection, Processing andExploitation, Production, Disseminationand Integration, and Evaluation) directlysupport the JFC. (Figure III-1) The JFCdepends on timely, accurate intelligence onan adversary’s strategy, tactics, intent,objectives, strengths, weaknesses, values, andcritical vulnerabilities.

d. Joint intelligence operations begin witha need for intelligence regarding the adversaryor environment in the AOR/JOA. The J-2, in

“... that no war can be conducted successfully without early and goodintelligence, and that such advices cannot be had but at very great expense.”

The Duke of Marlborough 1650-1722

coordination with other staff elements,develops proposed PIR early in the deliberateplanning process. PIR are those critical piecesof intelligence that the commander must knowabout the opponent and the operationalenvironment by a particular time in order toplan and execute a successful mission. PIRare identified at every level, from tactical tonational, and are drafted for the commander’sapproval by the intelligence staff. PIR arebased on guidance obtained from thecommander’s mission statement, the OPLANobjectives, and the commander’s intent.

2. An Overview

a. The intelligence requirement providesthe direction for current and future intelligenceoperations during the Planning andDirection phase, where the requirement isprioritized by the collection requirementsmanagement (CRM) staff. The combatantcommand and/or the subordinate joint forceJ-2 provides the focus and direction forcollection requirements to support thecombatant command or subordinate jointforce.

b. The next phase, Collection, involvestasking appropriate collection assets and/orresources through the collection operationsmanagement (COM) staff to acquireintelligence information to satisfy collectionobjectives. Collection includes theidentification and positioning of assets and/or resources to satisfy collection objectives.

c. Once the data that might satisfy therequirement is collected, the intelligenceprocess enters the Processing and

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Exploitation phase. The collected data isexploited and transformed into a product thatcan be readily used in the analysis andproduction of intelligence. Processing andexploitation must be prioritized andsynchronized with the commander’s PIR.

d. The Production phase involvesintegrating, evaluating, analyzing, andinterpreting information from single ormultiple sources into a finished intelligenceproduct. Time constraints and demands ofthe modern battle tend to make the processingand production phases indistinguishable.

e. A product enters the Dissemination andIntegration phase of the intelligence cycleand is formatted to meet the requirement.

The product is disseminated to the requester,who integrates the intelligence into decisionmaking and planning processes.

f. Intelligence personnel at all levelsEvaluate how well the intelligence phaseswork throughout the intelligence cycle.

g. If the intelligence provided to therequester is complete, timely, and in a usableformat, the requirement is satisfied andsubsequently closed. A requirement is notsatisfied when resulting intelligence does notmeet the above criteria; if time permits, therequirement can be retasked. When a satisfiedrequirement results in a new request, a newrequirement is generated and the process isrepeated.

THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

PLANNING ANDDIRECTION

DISSEMINATIONAND

INTEGRATIONCOLLECTION

PROCESSINGAND

EXPLOITATION

PRODUCTION

MISSION

Figure III-1. The Intelligence Cycle

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3. The Intelligence Cycle andJoint Operations

Intelligence supports joint operations,focusing on providing multidisciplineintelligence support to the combatantcommand, the subordinate Service andfunctional component commands, andsubordinate joint forces. The remainder ofthis chapter discusses each phase of the cyclein detail (the evaluation process is addressedunder each phase) and describes theintelligence activities that occur in each phase.Intelligence cycle execution responsibilitiesare depicted in Appendix H, “IntelligenceCycle Execution Responsibilities.”

SECTION A.PLANNING AND DIRECTION

4. Overview

The first phase of the intelligence cycle isplanning and direction. While conductedcontinuously, intelligence planning anddirection normally occurs during and inconjunction with operation planning. JIPBhelps the joint force J-2 focus and direct thisphase and the remaining phases of theintelligence cycle. Planning and directinginvolves the activities shown in FigureIII-2.

PLANNING AND DIRECTING ACTIVITIES

Task organizingintelligence

assets

DevelopingPIR

Identifyingpersonnel,

logistics, andcommunications

requirements

Issuingrequests for

collection andproduction

Monitoring theavailability of

collectioninformation

Developing acollection plan

Identifyingintelligence

product formatand timeliness

Figure III-2. Planning and Directing Activities

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5. Organizations andResponsibilities

The supported combatant commanderestablishes command relationships among allelements made available to the joint operation.Sharing and mutual support are essential tointegrating all resources and capabilities into aunified system that will best fulfill the prioritizedintelligence needs for joint operations.

a. Nat iona l -Leve l In te l l igenceOrganizations. The DIA J-2 NMJIC is thefocal point for intelligence activities in supportof joint operations. Joint force intelligencerequirements are forwarded through thecombatant command JIC to the NMJICwhere appropriate national assets aretasked. Joint Pub 2-02, “National IntelligenceSupport to Joint Operations,” details thestructure of national-level support to jointoperations and describes the functions ofnational-level entities and the NMJIC.National-level agencies include DIA, NSA,CIA, the National Reconnaissance Office(NRO), the Defense Airborne ReconnaissanceOffice, CIO, DMA, the Department of State,and the national-level intelligence elementsof the military Services.

b. Unified Command. The unifiedcommand’s JIC is organized IAW combatantcommander prerogatives, but normallyperforms the general functions described inJoint Pub 2-0, “Joint Doctrine for IntelligenceSupport to Operations,” and specific unifiedcommand intel l igence TTPs. Theresponsibility for providing intelligencesupport to military operations rests withthe JIC. If the JIC cannot meet the combatantcommander’s requirements, the JIC forwardsrequests to the NMJIC or to subordinatecommand levels through established channels,using standard command procedures. Insome cases, the JIC may also seek to ensuretimely support by approving in advance adirect communication path betweenrequesters and outside producers, so long as

the JIC is informed of all requests as they aremade. This method is most appropriate whenoperators require products and services thatare not routinely produced by the JIC.

c. Subordinate Joint Force

• Within the context of a geographiccombatant command, individuals u b o r d i n a t e j o i n t f o rc e J - 2organizational structures will besituation and mission-dependent, asdetermined by the JFC. All subordinatejoint force J-2s, however, will at aminimum require a core element ofanalytical and administrative capabilities.Joint Pub 1-0, “Doctrine for PersonnelSupport to Joint Operations,” governs theuse of intelligence personnel assigned tomeet combatant command and UNmission-related duty requirements.

• The subordinate joint force J-2 providesadministrative support to augmentationforces and the JISE, including personnel,information, and physical security.Capabilities of the JISE include orderof battle (OB) analysis, identificationof adversary centers of gravity,analysis of C4, targeting support,collection management, and maintenanceof a 24-hour watch. In coordinationwith the theater J-2, a joint force J-2counterintelligence and/or humanintelligence staff element (J-2X) mayalso be activated. This concept isdesigned to integrate HUMINT and CIby combining the HOC with theTFCICA, both of whom comprise theJ-2X. The J-2X is responsible forcontrolling and coordinating allHUMINT and CI collection activitiesand keeping the joint force J-2 informedon all HUMINT and CI activitiesconducted in the joint force AOR.

• In addition to declared hostilities,MOOTW may require the deployment

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and assistance of theater intelligenceelements to include humanitarian aidmissions, disaster relief operations,counterdrug actions, and terrorist andhostage events. In every case, theconcept of preplanned, dedicated jointforce J-2 intelligence support (NIST,DHS, or other joint force J-2 intelligencesupport) keyed to a wide variety oftheater support options provides a soundfoundation to respond to crisisrequirements.

• An example of a possible subordinatejoint force J-2 organizational supportpackage is shown in Figure III-3. Thishypothetical structure should only beused as a point of departure whenplanning and organizing a subordinatejoint force JISE. The nature andmagnitude of the crisis will dictate theactual size and configuration of the JISE.

Figure III-3. Joint Force Joint Intelligence Staff Organization

JOINT FORCE JOINT INTELLIGENCE STAFFORGANIZATION

Administration

JointIntelligence Staff

J-2XJoint IntelligenceSupport Element

Systems

Watch

CollectionManagement

TargetsBattle Damage

Assessment

Air Order ofBattle

Ground Order ofBattle

Missile Order ofBattle

Naval Order ofBattle

National IntelligenceSupport Team

CryptologicSupport Group

= Coordination/Consultation

Task Force

CoordinatingAuthority

Counterintelligence

HumanIntelligence

Operations Cell

SSO/Security

RFI

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6. Augmentation Requirements

a. Optimum use of available intelligenceassets is essential to ensure quality support inmeeting the proliferation of customerrequirements. The demand for additionalintelligence support increases significantlyduring crisis and wartime operations. Notonly are more intelligence personnel neededin the AOR and/or JOA, but the intelligencepresence increases at all command levels.Locating additional personnel and knowinghow to obtain their services is vital. Personnelaugmentation requirements should be inaccordance with CJCS Instruction 1301.01,“Policy and Procedures to Assign Individualsto Meet Combatant Command MissionRelated Temporary Duty Requirements,” andreflected in the combatant command’s jointtable of mobilization and distribution (JTMD).The JTMD should reflect the need for eitherindividual mobilization augmentees (IMAs)or individual ready reserve (IRR) personnel.An IMA is preassigned, trains annually at thesame activity to which assigned in acontingency, and requires knowledge of theintelligence mission. An IRR augmentee doesnot require an in-depth knowledge of thecombatant command’s intelligence mission,and may have never trained or been assignedto an intelligence organization. When anoperation is anticipated or commences,personnel requirements should be refined andrequests initiated. Reserve personnelrequirements can usually be identified inadvance by exercising the OPLAN or theintelligence portion of the OPLAN.

b. In a crisis, the JFC states therequirements, including personnel needed tosupport military operations. The supportedcommand, through its Service components,takes the lead in augmenting its staff and thejoint force. The Joint Staff takes the lead inaugmenting the NMJIC intelligence staff.Augmentation requirements are depicted inFigure III-4.

• Normally, active duty intelligencepersonnel are reassigned to supportthe operation on a temporary basiswithin-theater through establishedpersonnel management channels.

• On a national level, the NCA can directactive duty assets to new assignments insupport of the joint force. Additionally,teams of intelligence personnel can bepositioned for crisis deployment(NIST, HOC, or other teams ofintelligence personnel) upon receipt ofa requirement from the supportedcombatant command. Each of theServices and intelligence communityagencies have established channels todeploy mission-specific intelligenceteams and support personnel. Requestingcommands must be prepared to supportlogistically the NIST and other externalaugmentation elements.

• During a national emergency or aresponse to lower-level requirements,reserve intelligence individuals or unitsmay be called to active duty. Reserveunits and individuals in all four Servicesare trained and experienced in a numberof key duties, such as collectionmanagement, dissemination management,imagery intelligence (IMINT) andsignals intelligence (SIGINT) analysis,languages, and CI. Reservists may serveat any time on voluntary active dutyorders or may be ordered involuntarilyto active duty under either a PresidentialSelected Reserve Callup or partial or fullmobilization. The extent and period ofreserve augmentation depends onrequirements and funding availability.

c. A combatant command may make arequest to the NMJIC for specific nationalintelligence agency capabilities. The NMJICwill evaluate and coordinate combatantcommand requirements with the J-3/J-5 and

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national intelligence agencies and tailor thecomposition of the deployment packages tomeet those needs. The combatant commandJ-2 may integrate these supporting capabilitieswith the command’s JIC and the subordinatejoint force JISE. The deployment packages,including NIST and HOC, provide access tothe entire range of capabilities resident in thenational intelligence agencies and can focusthose capabilities on the JFC’s intelligencerequirements.

7. Intelligence Requirements

Successful intelligence support to militaryoperations demands that some universalprinciples be understood and applied.

a. The J-2 participates fully in theplanning and decision making process,contributing knowledge concerning thebattlespace and the threat and receivingguidance to help focus the intelligence effort.The intelligence planner examines tasks andsubtasks, then determines what intelligencesupport and information will be required toachieve mission success.

b. In the course of mission analysis, theintelligence planner keeps in mind thekinds of intelligence required. Missionanalysis leads to the development of thecommander’s PIR, as recommended by theJ-2. The categories, types, and level of detailrequired for intelligence analysis differ from

AUGMENTATION REQUIREMENTS

Combatant commandintelligence support

requirements

National

National Military JointIntelligence Center

CombatantCommand

Joint IntelligenceCenter

SubordinateJoint Force

Joint IntelligenceSupport Element

Temporary DutyPersonnel

Reserve Units orIndividuals

Teams, e.g.,National Intelligence

Support Team

Requesting command provides logistic support for allaugmentation intelligence personnel

Components

ComponentIntelligence Elements

Figure III-4. Augmentation Requirements

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echelon to echelon. Intelligence necessary tosupport a theater-level mission might beinappropriate for a smaller-sized element inthe field or at sea, while intelligence valuableat the national level might be irrelevant fora combatant command. With some exceptions,the higher echelon commander’s intelligencerequirements are a less detailed subset of thesubordinate commanders’ requirements,although they are of a much broader scope.An intelligence planner who tries to useintelligence beyond what is required to supportthe organization may overburden the intelligenceinfrastructure with too much information andneedlessly complicate the commander’s decisionmaking process.

c. Requests for information (RFI)respond to customer requirements, rangingfrom dissemination of existing productsthrough the integration or tailoring of onhandinformation to scheduling originalproduction. The information must be timely,accurate, and in a usable format. Theintelligence office translating the customer’srequirement and the primary intelligenceproducer determine how best to meet thecustomer’s needs. If it is determined that new,finished intelligence derived from originalresearch is required to satisfy all or a portionof the RFI, then that need is expressedformally under Department of DefenseIntelligence Production Program (DODIPP)as a production requirement (PR).

• Requirements that cannot be satisfied aresubmitted as RFIs or collectionrequirements to the next echelon. Eachechelon is responsible for validating,prioritizing and, if possible, satisfyingthe RFI or collection requirement beforeforwarding it to the next level. (FigureIII-5) RFIs should be satisfied at thelowest level. If the informationrequired to satisfy an RFI does notexist, the requester is informed and adecision is made to initiate collection and/or production. Decisions to expend

collection resources should be made atthe lowest level possible.

• Validation, a process associated with thecollection and production of intelligence,confirms that a requirement isappropriate and has not been previouslysatisfied. Information copies of therequirement should be forwarded tosupporting intelligence organizations to

Special Operation ForcesIntelligence Requirements

SOF intelligence requirements areheavily mission- and situation-dependent. SOF supports theServices in special reconnaissance,combating terrorism, counterdrug,and combat search and rescue and/or personnel recovery missions.SOF missions applying directmilitary force concentrate onattacking or collecting informationon critical targets. SOF indirectmissions include unconventionalwarfare, foreign internal defense,psychological operations, civilaffairs, security assistance, andhumanitarian assistance and/ordisaster relief and peacekeepingoperations.

SOF intelligence needs focus onleveraging the social, economical,po l i t i ca l , and psycho log i ca lconditions within a targeted countryor area to US benefit. Developmentand maintenance of a good rapportwith host-nation governments andindigenous population groupsare essential to successful missionaccomplishment. To establish thatrapport, SOF soldiers requireextensive knowledge of the localpopulace and its culture, language,religion, and customs. Unconventionalwarfare requires information on thepresence and viability of subversivemovements, including thepopulace’s likely response togovernment actions.

III-9


alert potential respondents to therequirement. This provides them additionaltime to prepare a response and allowsthose with partial answers to contribute.

8. Evaluation

The success of the planning and directionphase can only be determined by the resultsachieved in the other phases of theintelligence cycle. The efforts of the unifiedcommand and/or subordinate joint force J-2sduring planning and direction can positivelyaffect the rest of the cycle.

SECTION B. COLLECTION

9. Overview

a. Collection operations acquireinformation about the adversary andprovide that information to intelligenceprocessing and exploitation elements.Collection management, which occurs at alllevels of intelligence, converts intelligencerequirements into collection requirements;establishes, tasks or coordinates actions withappropriate collection sources or agencies; andmonitors results and retasks as required. The

REQUEST FLOW

Requester Component/JTF

TheaterCollector

Collector

Res

pons

e

RFI

Combatant Command

Response

RFI

Res

pons

e

RFI

JIC

DIA NMJIC

Validated and tasks/forwards DIACIODMACIA

NSAStateTreasuryFBI

Central Intelligence AgencyCentral Imagery OfficeDefense Intelligence AgencyDefense Mapping AgencyJoint Intelligence CenterJoint Task ForceNational Military Joint Intelligence CenterNational Security AgencyRequest for information

CIACIODIADMAJICJTFNM JICNSARFI

Figure III-5. Request Flow

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foremost challenge of collection managementis to maximize the effectiveness of limitedcollection resources within the timeconstraints imposed by crisis or wartimeoperations.

b. The terms “collection asset” and“collection resource” need to be clarified inorder to understand the collectionmanagement process and the appropriatetasking procedures. A collection asset or acollection resource is a collection system,platform, or capability. A collectionasset is subordinate to the requesting unit orechelon, while a collection resource is not.Requests for collection resources must becoordinated with the echelon that directsand controls them through the chain ofcommand.

10. Duties and Responsibilitiesof the Collection Manager

a. Collection m a n a g e r s d e v e l o pcollection plans based on the intelligencerequirements of commanders and decisionmakers. Intelligence analysts support thecollection management process by identifyingintelligence gaps and collection opportunities.The collection manager’s task is to obtainthe necessary information in response tothe requirement. To do this the collectionmanager ensures the following: (1) Developsand manages a collection plan that integratesrequirements with target characteristics. (2)Compares the plan to the capabilities andlimitations of the available organic collectionassets. (3) Develops a collection strategy tooptimize collection availability and capability

Figure III-6. Collection Managers and the Collection Plan

COLLECTION MANAGERS AND THECOLLECTION PLAN

Capabilities andLimitations of

Resources

CollectionStrategy

ForwardTasking

Requirements

IntelligenceDissemination

COLLECTIONPLAN

III-11


to collect against the target. (4) Incoordination with the J-3, forwards collectionrequirements to the component commanderexercising tactical control over the theaterreconnaissance and surveillance assets. Thecomponent will then task the asset to satisfythe JFC requirement. (5) Identifies collectionrequirements that cannot be met by organicassets and forwards them up the chain ofcommand for validation and tasking ofintelligence resources. (6) Directs processingand dissemination of collected data. (FigureIII-6) Collection managers must understandthe capabilities and limitations of each disciplineand the procedures for ensuring target coverageby the appropriate collection asset and/orresource. Collection managers should keeprequesters informed of collection status andcapabilities so that there are realistic expectationsof what can be collected and what level ofconfidence can be placed in the information.

b. The mission may require additionalintelligence resources not organic to thetheater or the components that are part ofthe subordinate joint force. Acquiring theuse of unique or limited intelligencecollection systems, such as UAVs and theJoint Surveillance Target Attack RadarSystem with ground station module, requirescoordination with theater, Service andnational agencies. Requests should be fullycoordinated with components, subordinatecommands, JTF J-3 and J-2, the combatantcommand J-3 and J-2, the Services, and theJoint Staff J-3 and J-2. The Joint Staff J-3and J-5 recommends approval of the requestto the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,who signs the formal approval message ordocument upon Secretary of Defenseapproval.

11. Principles of CollectionManagement

Collection managers should follow fourprinciples in all collection considerations.(Figure III-7)

a. Early Involvement. Collectionmanagers should be involved early in theidentification of requirements. Earlyconsideration of collection factors enhancesthe ability to respond in a timely manner,ensures thorough planning, and increasesflexibility in the choice of disciplines andsystems.

b. Prioritization. Prioritization assignsdistinct ranking to each collectionrequirement. Collection decisions can bemade rationally only if requirements areprioritized and the resulting trade-offs are fullyunderstood. Time constraints and the finitenumber of collection, processing, andproduction assets and/or resources mandateprioritization of collection requirements.Prioritization, based on the commander’sguidance and the current situation, ensuresthat limited assets and/or resources aredirected against the most critical requirements.

c. Multidiscipline Approach. Collectiondisciplines complement each other, and thecollection manager must resist favoring orbecoming too reliant on a particular

Figure III-7. CollectionManagement Principles

COLLECTIONMANAGEMENT

PRINCIPLES

!

!

!

!

Early Identification ofRequirements

Prioritize Requirements

Task Organic Assets

Multidiscipline Approach

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Flexibility in collection coordination is key to good management; the tools ofintelligence collection should be utilized to the best of their ability.

discipline or system. Each discipline’slimitations can be mitigated through thecapabilities of the others, as different systemsprovide additional insights into therequirement. While a sensor, discipline, and/or system may seem to be an obvious choiceto satisfy a requirement, flexibility is the key.Rigid dependence on a single source mayresult in mission failure, especially if thatsource becomes unavailable. Lack of amultidiscipline approach may also result indiscernible patterns that may play into thea d v e r s a r y ’s C I o r c a m o u f l a g e ,concealment, and deception (CCD) efforts.T h e H U M I N T, I M I N T, S I G I N T,measurements and signature intelligence(MASINT), and open source intelligence(OSINT) disciplines are described inAppendix C, “Intelligence Disciplines.”

d. Task Organic Assets First. Use oforganic collection assets allows a timely andtailored response to collection requirementsand serves to lessen the burden on collectionresources controlled by other units, agencies,and organizations. However, if requirementscannot be satisfied by organic assets, thecollection manager should not hesitate torequest collection support from higher,

adjacent, and subordinate units, agencies, andorganizations.

12. Collection Management

Depending on the size of the collectionmanagement element, the CRM and COMfunctions may not be organizationallydistinct. Although considered separatelyto facilitate understanding of their differentobjectives, in practice the distinction betweenthem may disappear. There must be aconstant dialogue between the two. Thecollection management model is used todepict and better understand the processof collection management. (Figure III-8)

a. Collection management has twodistinct functions: CRM — defining whatintelligence systems must collect; and COM— specifying how to collect. CRM focuseson the requirements of the customer, is all-source oriented, and generally interacts withproduction elements. COM focuses on theselection of the specific intelligencediscipline(s) and specific systems within adiscipline to be used to collect informationaddressing the requirement. COM is lessconcerned with the content of what is collected

III-13


than with determining how to collect againstthe requirement (collection strategy). COMis conducted by organizations within thevarious intelligence collection disciplines andis accessible to the operators of the collectionsystem. (Figure III-9)

b. COM and CRM are performed at alllevels of the intelligence community. Eachlevel interacts with the levels above and below,and among units, agencies, and organizationson the same level. The further up the chain,the broader the perspective and scope ofresponsibility; the lower, the more specific thefunction and narrow the scope. Organizationspossessing collection assets and/or resourcesperform COM.

Relationship Between CollectionManagement and Operations

The JFC controls all theaterreconnaissance through thecollection management function, ifrequirements exceed availableassets. The JFC’s collectionmanager priorit izes collectionrequirements and determines theappropriate asset to be assigned tocollect against a particular target.The collection manager, incoordination with the J-3, forwardscollection requirements to thecomponent commander exercisingtactical control over the theaterreconnaissance and surveillanceassets. A mission tasking ordergoes to the unit selected to beresponsible for the accomplishmentof the collection operations. Theselected unit makes the final choice

Figure III-8. Collection Management Cycle

COLLECTION MANAGEMENT CYCLE

CollectionOperations

Management

CollectionRequirementsManagement

Commander'sMission Statement

and OtherGuidance

PIR

RFI

RFIPIR

Request for InformationPriority IntelligenceRequirements

InitialCollection

Plan

CollectionPlan

Update

ReceiveRequirements

Requester Satisfaction

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collection requirements, includingmanaging time-sensitive, ad hoc high interestand crisis-related all-source collectionrequirements for the Department of Defense.The DO develops all-source collectionpostures, strategies, policy and procedures,including providing advice on these subjectsto the Director, DIA and Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff as required for crisisresponse, intelligence issues, and otherspecial events; evaluates the results ofcollection activities; and develops andmaintains collection requirements data basesand associated management systems.

b. The DO provides liaison andrepresentation to facilitate cooperationwith other intelligence agencies. The DO isthe intelligence collection managementinterface with the Joint Staff ReconnaissanceCenter for the review, coordination, andconduct of sensitive reconnaissance

of specific platforms, equipment,and personnel based on suchoperational consideration asmaintenance schedules, training,and experience.

13. Military CollectionRequirements

Responsibility for military collectionrequirements management at the nationallevel rests with the DIA Directorate ofOperations (DO). The DO ensures that all-source collection requirements andcapabilities are tasked to provide operationalpolicy and intelligence support to the NCA,Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Office of theSecretary of Defense (OSD), the Services,combatant commands, and their components.

a. To carry out these responsibilities, theDO coordinates and validates military

Figure III-9. Collection Management

COLLECTION MANAGEMENT

IntelligenceCommunity

CollectionRequirementsManagement

Process convertsintelligence requirements

into collection requirements

CollectionOperations

Management

Resource

Assets

AssignedAttached"Owned"

Request Coordinate

III-15


operations program missions worldwide.Another function of the DO is to provide DODand DIA representation on national-levelforums charged with collection managementand oversight responsibilities, such as theSIGINT Committee, as well as theirsubcommittees and working groups.

c. In the event of war or periods of crisis,the President may direct the military toexercise greater responsibilities for taskingof collection systems. When directed,national intelligence collection taskingauthority may pass from the DCI to theSecretary of Defense. When this occurs, theDO manages this collection tasking authority.This collection tasking authority approvescollection requirements, determines collectionpriorities, and resolves conflicts betweencollection priorities.

d. Joint Staff J-2. The other principalmilitary member in collection at the nationallevel is the Joint Staff J-2. The J-2coordinates the tasking of nationaltechnical reconnaissance systems andnat ional ly-subordinated mannedreconnaissance platforms and sensors. Asconsolidated authority for central HUMINTtasking, the J-2 coordinates and levies DODHUMINT tasking and coordinates with otheragencies responsible for SIGINT, IMINT,MASINT, and other special collectionprograms as required. The J-2 also respondsto RFIs submitted by subordinate elementsand commands.

e. Operations Management. Each of theintelligence collection disciplines has aseparate infrastructure to manage operations.

f. Theater Collection Management. Thetheater J-2 must be kept apprised of allintelligence collection requirements beinglevied on assets and resources within thecombatant command’s AOR. The theaterJ-2 retains full management authority (i.e.,

to validate, to modify, or to nonconcur) overall intelligence collection requirements againsttargets and objectives within the AOR.This authority may be delegated to asubordinate JFC. Collection requirementsmust be satisfied at the lowest possible level.Requirements that cannot be satisfied, and thathave been validated by the command’scollection manager or J-2, must be forwardedto the next higher echelon for action. Thisprocess continues until the requirement issatisfied, the intelligence is no longer needed,or it is determined that the requirement cannotbe satisfied. Validated collection requirementsand collection requests for theater and nationalsystems will be forwarded for action to thetheater intelligence collection managementoffice. Validated collection requirements fromcomponents will become part of the theatercollection plan and will be collected by theatercollectors or forwarded to the DO.

14. Collection RequirementsManagement

Management and validation of collectionrequirement requests for a theater residesat the combatant command level. Thevalidation process parallels that for RFIs andis responsive to operational requirements. TheJIC validates and submits collectionrequirements to DIA if requirements cannotbe satisfied by organic or subordinateresources.

a. Requirements. The combatantcommand J-2 validates or modifiesstanding collection requirements submittedby subordinate joint force or componentcommands. The subordinate joint force J-2validates collection requirements and submitsrequests for additional collection assets to thecombatant command J-2. The JIC tracks thestatus of research, validation, submission andsatisfaction of all collection requests received,including subordinate joint force and othertheater command requirements.

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b. Collection Planning

• The compi la t ion of co l lect ionrequirements is the basis of the collectionplan. Collection planning is acontinuous process that coordinatesand integrates the efforts of allcollection units and agencies. TheCRM cycle begins with initial efforts toanswer the commander’s PIR establishedduring the planning and direction phaseof the intelligence cycle. Based on thePIR, intelligence analysts prepare RFIs.In the context of collection management,RFIs are queries to see if the informationalready exists and, if not, they form thebasis of a collection requirement and/oranalysis. The collection manager checksany ongoing collection operation thatmight contribute to satisfying therequirement. This requires that collectionmanagers remain cognizant of previousand ongoing collection efforts. Whenpreviously collected information will notsuffice, collection requirements will bedeveloped. When the RFI managerpositively determines that theinformation is neither available norextractable from archived information

or from lateral or higher echelons, anintelligence gap is identified. It becomesthe responsibility of collectionmanagement to obtain the information.

• The collection plan may be either asimple hardcopy or automated worksheetused solely by the intelligence staff or amore formal document, depending on thecomplexity of the requirements to besatisfied. The collection plan includesstatements of information desired,when the information is needed, whois to receive the finished intelligence,and how it is to be used. The answerscollected to satisfy these requirementsanswer the PIR. The completedcollection plan forms the basis for furthercollection actions. (Figure III-10)

• After establishing a collection plan, astrategy is created to obtain theinformation. The CRM transforms eachrequirement from the plan into a specificeffort that ensures optimum employmentof limited collection capabilities. Forefficient management of collectionrequests, it is important to create aregistry of active, prioritized

Figure III-10. Collection Plan Format

COLLECTION PLAN FORMAT

Period Covered: From_____ To_____

PIR or OtherIntelligence

Requirements

Indications SpecificInformation

Sought

Assets tobe

Tasked/Resources

to beRequired

Place andTime toReport

Remarks

III-17


requirements and to continuously updateand monitor it from inception tosatisfaction or termination.

c. Resource Availability and Capability.After defining the requirement, the collectionmanager determines the availability andcapability of collection assets and resourcesthat might contribute to requirementsatisfaction. The information sought is

examined for discrete elements, calledspecific information requirements (SIRs). Arequirement may have more than one SIR. Foreach SIR, a set of key elements is developedthat can be used to compare characteristics ofthe requirement’s target with thecharacteristics of available assets or resourcesto determine collection suitability. Capabilityfactors are shown at Figure III-11.

Figure III-11. Asset and/or Resource Availability and Capability Factors

ASSET AND/OR RESOURCE AVAILABILITY ANDCAPABILITY FACTORS

Locate Where Identify

Range to Target

Search Model

Type WhenSpecific InformationKey Element Setsor Requirements

Time Until of No Value

Target Characteristics

Weather and/or LightConditions

Geography

Enemy Activity

Frequency Speed Altitude

Platform and Sensor Rangeand Standoff Capability

Nadir ECMAsset and/or

ResourceAvailability and

Capability

Boresight Focal Length

System Timeliness

Characteristics ofSensor

Platform and Sensor Limitationsto Weather and/or Light

Platform and SensorLimitations to Terrain Masking

Threat to Platform andSensor

Selected Discipline orSensor or System

Correlate

Correlate

Correlate

Compare

Compare

Compare

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• Key Element Sets. Key elements arethe parameters o f the target ’scharacteristics that can be compared withthe characteristics of the availableassets and/or resources and serve asdiscriminators in discipline and/orsensor selection. A complete set of keyelements provides the basis foridentifying sensors fully capable ofperforming the collection task. The keyelements commonly considered are:

target characteristics, range to thetarget, and timeliness.

•• Target characteristics are thediscernible physical, operational, andtechnical features of an object or event.These characteristics may be observableand/or collectible. Observables are theunique descriptive features associatedwith the visible description of the target,whether it is specific units, equipment,or facilities. Collectibles are the uniquedescriptive features associated withemanations from the target. Observablesare associated with IMINT andHUMINT/CI, collectibles with SIGINT,and both are associated with MASINT.One or more target characteristics may

be associated with a specific informationrequirement, and these characteristics canbe compared to a sensor(s) capability tocollect. By continuing this process foreach of the collection disciplines, acomplete key element set is developedfor the target.

•• Range is measured as distance froma predetermined reference to thetarget location. The range to the target

can be used to quickly eliminate fromconsideration both those standoff sensorsthat are unable to cover the target areaand those sensors on penetrationplatforms not capable of reaching thetarget area. In HUMINT/CI, theanalogous consideration would be sourceaccess.

•• Timeliness is when the informationrequested must be received in orderto be of value.

• Collection Capabilities Factors. TheCRM translates the capabilities andlimitations of the available sensors,systems, or disciplines into a set ofcollection capability factors that can be

A collection manager may determine that the risks involved in intelligencecollection dictate the use of an unmanned aerial vehicle.

III-19


directly compared to the key elementsets. The capabilities and limitations ofvarious disciplines and systems areconsidered, together with theiravailability, to decide whether or not theyshould be tasked. Sensor capabilityfactors are technical or performancecharacteristics, range, dwell time, andtimeliness.

•• Performance characteristics areconcerned with the system’s ability tocollect the requested information, outputquality, and location accuracy. (1) Asystem within a particular discipline mayor may not be able to collect informationon a particular target. For example,SIGINT collection systems operate indiscrete frequency ranges, so that if theadversary system being sought operatesoutside those ranges, that particularcollector is not viable as a potentialsource. (2) The data quality relates tothe level of detail that can be derived fromthe collected information. For example,different imagery systems providevarying degrees of image resolution. (3)The importance of location accuracydepends on the planned use of theinformation collected. For example,information collected for targeting

purposes demands greater locationalaccuracy than information collected forupdating OB.

•• Range deals with the system’s abilityto provide target coverage. For airbornesystems, range is determined byconsidering the actual range capabilities ofthe sensor to provide detailed informationsufficient to satisfy the requirement and therestrictions placed on the airborne platform.The CRM assesses combinations of thesevarious range factors in order to determinea sensor’s potential to meet operationalrequirements.

•• Dwell time is the length of time agiven collector can maintain access to thetarget, an important consideration inmonitoring and/or changing detectionscenarios.

•• Timelines consider the time requiredto complete each collection event, and iscalculated or estimated for each availablesensor based on the tactical situationand the local circumstances. (FigureIII- 12) Times vary depending onmission priority assigned, specificsystem availability, time required to planthe mission, and related information

Figure III-12. Collection Timeline

COLLECTION TIMELINE

Asset /ResourceSelection

Tasking and/orRequest

Transmission

MissionPreparation

CollectionMission

Processing /Exploitation /

Analysis

Dissemination

T T1 T2 T5 T6 T7

Time ofEmployment

Receipt

Time OverTarget T4

InformationReceived

Timeliness = T+T1+T2+T3+T4+T5+T6+T7If timeliness is less than or equal to NLT time information required, then collection effort is of valueIf timeliness is greater than NLT time information required, then collection effort is of NO value

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processing and dissemination means.These times are added to find an overallelapsed time, then compared with the latesttimeliness information stated by the user.If the system’s timeliness exceeds the latesttime of receipt when the informationcollected will be usable, then it fails tocontribute to satisfying the specificrequirement and should not be consideredfor collection planning purposes.

• Correlation. Correlation is the processwhich associates and combinesindependent data on a single subjectto improve the reliability or credibility .Key element sets are compared withcollection capability factors to provide apreliminary list of sensors that aretechnically able to collect the desired datawithin the range to the target and timerequired.

• Environmental Factors. After correlation,the candidate sensors are compared withenvironmental factors to support finalsensor selection. Environmentalfactors are the threat, terrain, andweather that might influence theparticular discipline or sensor selection.Depending on the environmental factors,a technically capable sensor may bedropped from consideration.

•• Sensor vulnerability is the degreeto which adversary countermeasureswill affect sensor selection and dependson the vulnerability of the sensorplatform. In general, the platforms ofpenetrating sensors are the mostvulnerable, stand-off sensors less so, andsatellite sensors the least vulnerable.Threat assessment is an evaluation ofrisk (military risk and politicalsensitivity) versus intelligence gain.

•• Weather and light conditions are aconsideration, particularly with IMINTsensors. Weather conditions in and

around the collection area affect thesensor capability to collect and exploitdata.

•• Terrain is also a consideration. Itmay mask a target, thereby dictating thedirection a sensor must point.

• Availability. The list of viable collectiondisciplines, systems, and sensors isreviewed for current availability and theaddition or deletion of capabilities.Coordination with adjacent and higherheadquarters will determine theavailability of theater and nationalresources.

d. Task Assets or Request Tasking ofResources

• The collection manager begins byconsidering the highest priorityrequirement, then proceeds through theactive requirements list to determine howeach request can be satisfied. (FigureIII-13) CRM transmits to COMrequirements and recommendationsfor planning, scheduling, and controlof the prioritized list. The resultingtasking provides specific guidance thatidentifies the activity to undertakecollection operations, the target to becovered, the date-time the mission is tobe accomplished, and the place and timedata is to be reported. Collection taskingincludes processing and exploitationtasking, guidance, and instructions.

• Collection to satisfy the requirementmay occur at any level. For example,if a combatant commander determinesthat the information needed to answer aRFI is unavailable, the commander maytask organic collection assets or those ofa subordinate organization or requestcoalition or national-level support tosatisfy the requirement. When preparingthe tasking and/or request, consideration

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The Intelligence C

ycleFigure III-13. Collection Tasking Worksheet

COLLECTION TASKING WORKSHEET

Organization: Registration Number:

DTG: Collection Manager:

Specific Information Requirements: ____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Time:________________ Target Range:_________________________

Characteristics: ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Assets/Resources

Range Timeliness Characteristic Weather Geography Threat Capability Remarks

HUMINT

CI

IMINT

COMINT

ELINT

MASINT

OSINT

Assets/Resource Selected HUMINT: _________ COMINT:_____________ MASINT:___________ CI:____________

IMINT:____________ ELINT:____________ OSINT:____________

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should be given whether to integrate therequirement into an ongoing, planned, ornew mission. This subject is discussedfurther below, under intelligencecollection strategy.

• Tasking request forms or messages aredependent on the tactical situation,type of sensor, and type of asset orresource (i.e., organic, supporting,theater, national, or multinational).Many specific data elements in theserequests and the transmission procedures

are classified. In the case of organic anddirect support assets, requesters followcombatant command instructionsprovided in the OPLAN or OPORDintelligence annex, or by message. Inaddition, the Joint-Service TacticalExploitation of National Systems Manualand the DIA 58-series manuals provideguidance for requesting support fromnational resources. In preparing requestsfor national resources, the collectionmanager should consider the guidelinesin Figure III-14.

Figure III-14. Guidelines for Requesting National Resource Collection

GUIDELINES FOR REQUESTING NATIONALRESOURCE COLLECTION

Areas of Interest National systems are best employed againsthigh-priority targets outside the range of organic ortheater sensors, beyond standoff collection range,and/or in high threat areas.

Exploitation and/orAnalysis Timeliness

Targets must be chosen such that, under applicabletimeliness constraints, exploitation reports will reachthe commander in time to react or influence decisionmaking.

Justifications Request justifications must fully explain the need forinformation and support the priority assigned by therequester.

Sensor Capabilities Target descriptions must place minimum restrictionson systems' use.

Sensor Accessibility The targets' accessibility must be determined whenpossible before a collection request is forwarded.

Exploitation and/orAnalysisRequirements Clarity

Exploitation and/or analysis requirements must beconcise, explicit statements of the actual informationneeded.

Exploitation and/orAnalysis RequirementPurpose

Exploitation and/or analysis requirements must statethe purpose of the information desired when it willbenefit the interpreter and/or analyst.

Preplanned Collection Preplanned target sets submitted in advance of anoperation can relieve the workload and must beconsidered where the tactical situation permits.

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• Intelligence Collection Strategy

•• A collection strategy is a systematicscheme to optimize tasking of all capableand available collection assets and/orresources against requirements. Thecollection strategy considers alloutstanding intelligence requirements,their relative priority, and the immediatetactical situation.

•• Resource integration is a processwhereby a new collection requirementis integrated with current or plannedmissions to increase the efficiency ofthe overall collection effort. By taskinga mission already in progress, it may bepossible to reduce timelines, makecollection more responsive to the request,and decrease cost and risk. This isweighed against the priority of scheduledtargets that may have to be dropped toaccommodate new targets and the impactof a mission change on the effectivenessof the ongoing mission. When othermeans of collection are unavailable orimpractical, a new mission should beplanned based upon the new request.

•• While one source may be suitable tocollect against different requirements, insome cases multiple sources arenecessary to satisfy a single, high priorityrequirement. Cueing is the use of onediscipline or sensor to target collectionby another sensor. Cueing could bewithin the same discipline, where a wide-area sensor tips off to a point-targetsensor, or it could be cross-discipline,where one discipline tips off anotherdiscipline.

•• Asset mix and/or redundancy usesa combination of assets of differingdisciplines (asset mix) or similardisciplines (asset redundancy) againsta high priority target. When theprobability of success of one sensor to

completely satisfy the requirement islower than acceptable, the use of multiplecapabilities of different systems ordisciplines increases the likelihood ofsuccess. Asset mix or redundancy placesgreater demands on the limited assetsand/or resources available and has to beclearly justified by the potentialintelligence gain.

e. Evaluate Reporting. The evaluationprocess tracks the status of collectionrequirements and provides feedback to therequesters. Monitoring outstandingrequirements ensures that orders and requeststo collection activities are understood and theright information is being sought. When thecollection results are provided, the collectionmanager evaluates the report(s) forcompleteness, ensures that the requestersreceive a copy, and determines if therequirement has been satisfied. Requesterfeedback establishes customer satisfaction,permits tasker deletion and frees collectionassets and resources to be redirected to satisfyother active requirements.

f. Collection Plan Update. Based on therequester ’s assessment of requirementsatisfaction, the collection manager reviewspriorities for currency . The collection planis updated to include retasking (if therequirement is not satisfied), adding newrequirements, or canceling satisfiedrequirements.

15. Collection OperationsManagement

The COM process organizes, directs,and monitors the equipment and personnelthat actually collect the data to satisfyrequirements. COM develops strategies forcollection against requirements in cooperationwith CRM; predicts how well a system cansatisfy requirements; evaluates theperformance of the collection systems;allocates and tasks collection assets and/or

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resources and processing and/or exploitationsystems; and monitors and reports theoperational status of collection systems.(Figure III-15)

a. Collection Mission Planning

• Planning is concerned with theidentification, scheduling, andcontrolling of collection assets and/orresources. The operations plannerreviews mission requirements for sensorand target range, system responsiveness,timeliness, threat, weather, and reportingrequirements. These elements areconsidered with the detailed technical,administrative, and logistical data of thecollection system to identify anddetermine asset and/or resourceavailability and capability. Therequirements are then translated intospecific mission tasking orders.

• Effective coordination is vital inmission planning operations. Withaircraft collection platforms in particular,many different staff elements areinvolved: operations, weather, maintenanceand logistics, and communications mustall be closely integrated into the missionplanning effort. Intelligence sensorplanners and managers of processing andexploitation elements must fullyunderstand the requirements and missionprofile. It is strongly recommended thatCOM personnel and resources be locatedin proximity to the operations staffelements which are responsible forreconnaissance assets.

b. Execution. A mission tasking ordergoes to the unit selected to be responsible forthe accomplishment of the collectionoperation. The selected unit makes the finalchoice of specific platforms, equipment, and

Figure III-15. Collection Operations Management

COLLECTION OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

Mission TaskingOrder

Collection MissionPlanning ASSET

ExploitationElement

Update Plan

Exploitation andDissemination

J-3Operations

Coordination

Execution

Plan

Control

Schedule

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d. Collection Planning Update. Followingexploitation, the report or processed datais disseminated to the requester. If the datais insufficient, the requester coordinates withthe collection manager for additionalcoverage. At this point, the processedrequirement transitions back to the CRMfunction. The collection manager and theexploitation manager, in coordination withrequesters, continually assess how collectionoperations quality and timeliness may beimproved. This effort relies heavily on thosesupporting organizations and other units oragencies that own and operate collection andexploitation assets or resources.

personnel based on such operationalconsiderations as maintenance schedules,training, and experience.

c. Exploitation. Exploitation of collectedinformation is closely associated with themanagement of collection assets andresources. Generally the staff allocated acollection capability also controls the sensor-unique processing, exploitation, and analysisequipment. Exploitation is discussed furtherin Section C and dissemination in Section Eof this chapter.

THE CAPTURE OF THE GERMAN ROCKET SECRETS

Early in 1929, German engineers had begun studying rocket and jet propulsionto be used for transporting mail. In 1933, when Adolf Hitler became Chancellor,these studies were shifted to military uses, and the scientists were instructedto explore all ideas, however fanciful. Huge sums were made available to theSpeer Ministry, where Dr. Wernher von Braun and a group of scientistsconducted rocket research. The research enabled the “doomsday” weaponsof the era to be produced, the best known of which were the V-1 and V-2missiles.

In the Spring of 1945, as the outcome of WW II in Europe became more andmore apparent, a principal focus of US intelligence units in Europe was tocapture all possible information pertaining to rocket weapons. Accordinglythese units followed closely behind advancing Allied forces, particularly inthe Black Forest area where technical personnel with key documents from theSpeer Ministry had scattered under heavy pressure of aerial bombing in Berlin.It was up to the intelligence units to find these individuals and gain informationfrom them. The search began by interrogating the Germans who were incustody as a result of the Allied advance.

This method of collection, while painstaking, proved fruitful. Through suchinterrogations US intelligence officers learned that the former director generalof German rocket production, George Richkey, was in captivity, working in asalt mine in the Black Forest. The following is the account of Norman Beasley,who told the story of his brother, Colonel Peter Beasley, the senior intelligencecollection officer in the area.

“‘I’ve got a job for you that is different than working in the salt mine,’ ColonelBeasley told Richkey at the first interrogation. ‘I want you to begin right nowwriting out a full description of yourself and all the activities of the V-2 factory.’

When Richkey’s report was completed, Colonel Beasley made it clear, ‘weaccept you as an official of the German Government; we have patience and

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time and lots of people—you have lost the war and so as far as I am concernedyou are a man who knows a lot about rockets. As an American officer, I wantmy country to have full possession of all your knowledge. To my superiors, Ishall recommend that you be taken to the United States.’

Richkey nodded his assent, explained he was a scientist and wanted only todevelop his knowledge in pleasant surroundings, such as the United States,and agreed to tell where the records were hidden, and to show the colonel theplace.

Only hours later, under a heavily armed escort, Richkey led Colonel Beasleyinto the Black Forest to a cave, 5 feet wide and 5 feet high, running 300 feetinto a mountain. There, records were found intact. Upon examination, therecords disclosed basic blueprints, worksheets, engineering tables, andadvanced plans for virtually every secret weapon in the possession of Germanscientists.”

SOURCE: Norman Beasley, The Capture of the German Rocket SecretsMilitary Intelligence: Its Heroes and Legends, compiled by Diane L. HammUS Army Intelligence and Security Command History Office, October 1987

SECTION C. PROCESSINGAND EXPLOITATION

16. Overview

a. During processing and exploitation,collected data is correlated and convertedinto forms suitable for analysis andproduction. In this step the data may befurther exploited to gain fullest possibleadvantage from it. Processing remainsdistinct from the production phase of theintelligence cycle in that the data is not yetfully subject to analytical assessment.

b. At the combatant command level, theJ-2 manages theater processing systemsand capabilities. The J-2 should be preparedfor system interoperability problems that maybe experienced in a multinational environmentand in operations with non-military andnongovernmental organizations and beflexible in developing work-aroundprocedures. Processing elements should beprepared to set up both US only and coalitionsegments. At the subordinate joint force level,the deployable intelligence processingelements oversee interoperability of systems

and manage assignment of joint capabilitiesas required to support the JFC.

c. Processing and exploitation of collectedinformation by tactical units is closelyassociated with the management of collectionassets. Normally, the collection operationelement also controls the sensor-uniqueprocessing, exploitation, and analysisequipment. Various exploitation capabilitiesexist to service several different collectionsystems. The exploitation manager mustplan the workload and develop a prioritysystem for accomplishing the work. Thiswill ensure priority processing andexploitation during periods of high-volumecollection activity. (Figure III-16)

17. Processing and Exploitationof Human Intelligence

Processing of HUMINT/CI informationprimarily involves report preparation bycollection activities at both the joint forceand component levels. At the joint forcelevel, this processing may also beaccomplished within the J-2X. Furtherprocessing of human resource reporting is

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Figure III-16. Processing and Exploitation of Intelligence

PROCESSING AND EXPLOITATION OFINTELLIGENCE

Open SourceIntelligence

HumanIntelligence

ImageryIntelligence

SignalsIntelligence

Measurement& SignatureIntelligence

conducted by the JIC and joint force analyticaland/or production activities; this primarilyinvolves analyzing HUMINT/CI reporting forinclusion in all-source production and/or fordata base maintenance. Additionally,components of the joint force may considerdocument exploitation and translation asHUMINT processing activities IAW Servicedoctrine. Exploitation of HUMINTinformation provides knowledge of“intentions of key personnel/leadership” andCI can be used for indications andwarning (I&W) and force protection.

18. Imagery IntelligenceProcessing and Exploitation

The JIC processes and exploits imageryin theater. The theater facility processes thedigital signal and displays the downlinkedimagery on a workstation in softcopy formfor immediate exploitation. The imagerycan also be stored on tape, sent to a digitalarchive for later use, or laid down on film forexploitation on a light table. The results ofthe exploitation and the annotated imagesmay be incorporated into an all-source

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HUMINT AND TARGETING

Identifying military targets was difficult [during DESERT STORM]; however,information acquired by HUMINT operations improved targeting anddestruction of significant military facilities in Baghdad, including the MODand various communications nodes. In addition to blue prints and plans,HUMINT sources provided detailed memory sketches and were able to pinpointon maps and photographs key locations, which subsequently were targeted.

Sources detailed the locations of bunkers underneath key facilities, includingthe Iraqi Air Force headquarters, which was composed of several mainbuildings and five underground bunkers, and the Iraqi practice of stringingcoaxial communication cable under bridges rather than under the river bedsin Baghdad and southern Iraq. This information was the deciding factor in thedecision to target key bridges in Baghdad. Sources identified thecommunications center in Baghdad; less than 12 hours later, this facility wasdestroyed. Information obtained from EPWs also helped planners directeffective air attacks against troops and logistics targets.

SOURCE: Final Report to CongressConduct of the Persian Gulf W ar, April 1992

product focusing on a given target or targettype, topic, or activity. The IMINT data mayalso be used to update a data base. The resultof the non-time-dominant exploitation maybe a hardcopy report, tape media mailed orcouriered to the user, or a softcopy.

19. Signals IntelligenceProcessing

SIGINT support to joint operations includescommunications intelligence (COMINT),electronics intelligence (ELINT), and foreigninstrumentation signals intelligence.COMINT processing is accomplished byNSA/CSS elements either assigned to or insupport of the joint force mission.Depending on the level required forsubsequent analysis and reporting, processingmay be performed by assigned units in theoperational area, at the regional JICs, or byspecialized Service component or Defenseactivities. ELINT processing in support ofa joint force may come from a number ofsources including: assets attached to the jointforce, national ELINT centers, the JC2WC,and combatant command JICs. A request

through the theater J-2 to the NMJIC willresult in tasking of appropriate organizations.

20. Measurement andSignature IntelligenceProcessing

MASINT tends to be a processingintensive collection discipline. It requirestranslating events (seismic, acoustic, radiofrequency, infrared, and other events) intotargeting intelligence (e.g., location, type oftarget). The Central MASINT Office andService intelligence centers process MASINT.The Service scientific and technicalintelligence (S&TI) centers provide a criticalrole in processing, analyzing, and exploitingMASINT data. They develop the initialprocessing techniques, validate theperformance and accuracy of these techniques,and then create signature profiles of thedesired targets. The targeting intelligence isthen provided to the warfighter. Currently,neither the theater JICs nor thesubordinate joint force elements have thecapability for MASINT processing.

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21. Open-Source IntelligenceProcessing

OSINT processing transforms (converts,translates, and formats) text, graphics, sound,and motion video in response to userrequirements. For example, at the nationallevel, the Foreign Broadcast InformationSystem provides translations of foreignbroadcast and print media.

22. Evaluation

Processing and exploitation, whiledifficult to evaluate separately fromproduction, are “sensor” specific.Production, even sole source, is based onmultiple sensors or sources.

SECTION D. PRODUCTION

23. Overview

a. Production is accomplished in responseto expressed and anticipated user requirementsand within assigned AORs and/or JOAs.Intelligence (in the form of both products andservices) responds to: the chain of commandand the decision making authority it supports;US policy decisions and military operationalrequirements; and changes in strategy, tactics,equipment, and overall capabilities of US andforeign military forces. Fused jointintelligence assessments, such as militarycapabilities assessments, military-relatedsubjects assessments, or adversary COAassessments, are also frequently used topresent the commander with the mostthorough and accurate description andanalysis of adversary status and intentions.

b. Intelligence production is theintegration, evaluation, analysis, andinterpretation of information from singleor multiple sources into finishedintelligence. Intelligence productionmust be coordinated and directed by the J-2

to provide non-duplicative all-sourceintelligence products to the requester.Production for joint operations isaccomplished by organizations at everyechelon from national to subordinate jointforce level. Effective productionmanagement ensures that the combatantcommander and/or JFC receives theintelligence products and services required toaccomplish the assigned mission. Automateddata base systems provide current tailorabledata appropriate to the mission.

24. Products

Intelligence products produced by or forthe subordinate joint force are describedbelow and in Figure III-17.

a. Indications and Warning

• The I&W process analyzes and integratesoperations and intelligence informationto assess the probability of hostileactions and provides sufficient warningto preempt, counter, or otherwisemoderate their outcome. The focus ofI&W varies at each echelon, and is mostspecific at the operational and tacticallevels.

• Subordinate joint force I&W relies on tip-offs from all sources at all levels. Anintegrated and responsive intelligencearchitecture must be established to satisfytheater requirements. I&W intelligencerequirements include the following:

•• Local o r regional governmentcapability to deal with the situation.

•• Adversary intentions, capabilities,preparations, deployments and relatedactivities, and possible methods of attack.

•• Adversary motivations, possibletriggering events, goals and objectives.

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•• Changes in adversa ry fo rcedispositions, military activities, andmobilization status.

•• IW capabilities in the region.

•• Required m i l i t a r y a n d c i v i lmobilization preparations prior tomilitary action taking place.

•• Non-military activity that could alterthe situation, such as drastic changes in

either friendly or opposing forces’political, economic or social situations.

•• Status of other military forces in theJOA.

b. Current Intelligence

• Current intelligence involves producingand disseminating all-source intelligenceon the current situation in a particulararea. It is similar to I&W in that both

Scientific andTechnical Intelligence

Adversary weapon system capabilities andvulnerabilities.

Medical capabilities and health servicesavailable in the JOA.

CurrentIntelligence

Indications& Warning (I&W)

INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS

TargetingGeneral MilitaryIntelligence

Tailored to specific mission:Political, economic and social aspectsof countries in the JOA. Information on

organization, operations, and capabilities offoreign military forces in the JOA. CI on foreign

intelligence activity and terrorism whichimpacts on the force protection mission.

Formats:Military Capabilities Assessment

Military-Related Subject AssessmentAdversary Course of Action Estimate

Basic target graphics from theateroperation plan and/or operation plan in

concept format.Quick response graphics to support

contingencies and crises.Theater target data bases and country

target materials.

Military and political events of interestfrom joint intelligence center (JIC), jointintelligence support element (JISE) and

national sources.Reports on joint force operations.

Summaries and briefings by JIC, JISE, andnational organizations.

Open source intelligence in the JOA.

Current intelligence reports from organicassets, theater I&W support, and correlationof force movements in the joint operations

area (JOA).National level provides tip-off and warnings

of imminent or hostile activity.

Figure III-17. Intelligence Products

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depend upon continuous monitoring ofworld events and specific activities inthe combatant command’s AOR/JOA.The subordinate joint force receivescurrent information from all levels of theinte l l igence communi ty. Thisinformation consists of message trafficon military and political events ofinterest generated by the combatantcommand JICs, the subordinate jointforce JISE, and national sources; real timereporting of operational situations bysubordinate joint forces; summaries andbriefings prepared by JICs, JISEs, andnational-level organizations; and radioand television broadcasts in the JOAmonitored by the subordinate joint force.

• During the warning and planning phasesof an operation, the subordinate jointforce J-2 should assess the adequacy ofintelligence provided by the combatantcommand JIC and available throughnetworked data bases and submitprioritized RFIs to satisfy immediateintelligence needs and gaps in coverage.Once the operation begins, thesubordinate joint force’s collection assetswill be supplemented by theater andnational support, to provide the jointforce with current intelligence for use inintelligence assessments. Informationrequired includes, but is not limited tothe following:

•• Adversary intentions and will to usemilitary force, where, when, in whatstrength, and with what forces andweapons.

•• The adversary’s operational plans.

•• The adversary’s centers of gravity.

•• The adversary’s vulnerabilities.

•• Analysis of the operational areaincluding terrain, hydrology, infectious

disease and environmental factors,manmade features, and demographics.

•• Current and forecast METOCconditions which include the entirerange of atmospheric phenomenaextending from the earth’s surface (cloudcover, precipitation, winds, and otherMETOC conditions) into space (spaceweather), as well as all of the marineenvironment from the bottom of theocean to the air and/or sea interface (surf,sea conditions, or other sea interfaces).

•• Military and political events.

•• Status of strategic transportationnodes, to include major airfields,seaports, and surface networks.

• Current intelligence and general militaryinte l l igence (GMI) effor ts areinterdependent. The intelligence gainedduring development of currentintelligence forms the basis for the GMIeffort.

c. General Military Intelligence

• GMI includes pertinent informationconcerning the political, economic, andsocial aspects of foreign countries aswell as all information on the organization,operations, and capabilities of selectedforeign military forces. GMI is tailoredto specific subordinate joint forcemissions. Specifically, GMI deals withinformation on the items listed in FigureIII-18.

• Fused joint intelligence assessments arelisted below.

•• Military Capabilities Assessment.Determining the adversary’s potentialmilitary capability includes theidentification of forces and dispositions,an evaluation of the adversary’s

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Figure III-18. General Military Intelligence Concerns

GENERAL MILITARY INTELLIGENCECONCERNS

Adversary training, doctrine, leadership, experience, moraleof forces, state of readiness, and will to fight

Adversary's strengths and weaknesses, force composition,location, and disposition, including command, control,communications, computers, and intelligence, logistics andsustainment, force readiness and mobilzation capabilities

Basic infrastructure (power, resources, health, populationcenters and public institutions)

Hydrographic and geographic intelligence, including urbanareas, coasts and landing beaches, troop landing zones,and geological intelligence

Capability and availability of all transportation modes in theoperational area

Military materiel production and support industries

Military economics, including foreign military assistance

Insurgency and terrorism

Military-political and/or sociological intelligence

Location, identification, and description of military-relatedinstallations

Survival, escape, resistance, and evasion

Government control

vulnerabilities, and an assessment of theadversary’s ability to employ militaryforce to counter the objectives of friendlyforces. The combatant command JICis the subordinate joint force’sprimary source for all types of militarycapabilities assessments. Subordinate

joint force components continuouslyprovide information to the joint forceJISE to update military capabilities databases. The five major components of anopposing force addressed in theassessment are as follows: (1)Leadership and Command and

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Control (C2). An assessment of theadversary’s ability to direct forces toaccomplish a designated mission. Includesinformation on C2 nodes, lines ofauthority and reporting chains, andbiographical data on key personnel. (2)Order of Battle. Identifies forcecomponents and assesses the strengths,structures, and dispositions of thepersonnel and equipment of the opposingmilitary force, to include weapons ofmass destruction. (3) Force Readinessand Mission. Assesses the adversary’sreadiness, as well as the doctrine it would

follow and strategy and tactics it wouldemploy, to achieve its objectives. (4)Force Sustainability. Assesses theability of the force to logistically maintainthe level and duration of combat activity(i.e., industrial, transportation andmilitary infrastructure, supply status,attrition rates, and the adversary’smorale) necessary to achieve objectives.(5) Technical Intelligence. Assesses thetechnical sophistication of forces, units,and weapon systems, as well as theircapabilities, constraints, vulnerabilities,and countermeasures.

•• Military-Related Subjects Assessment.This type of assessment can provideindicators of an opposing force’scapabilities and vulnerabilities,including its warfighting sustainability.Examples are as follows: (1) C4Systems. An assessment of the adversary’sC4 systems (i.e., telecommunicationsnodes and networks) to determineavailability, connectivity, andvulnerabilities. (2) Defense Industries.An assessment of industrial productioncapacity, available stockpiles of goodsand raw materials, natural resources, and

reconstitution capability. (3) Energy. Alisting of power sources and distributionnetwork locations and capabilities. (4)Military Geography. A study of theimpact that geographic features mayhave on planned operations, forcedeployment, and movement within theJOA. (5) Demography. Understandingthe dispersion and cultural compositionof the population (i.e., language,religion, socio-economic status, andnationality or ethnic groups) in the JOAcritical to the nature of the operations tobe conducted. (6) Transportation. The

The subordinate joint force J-2’s first priority is to provide intelligenceconcerning the adversary.

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security threats. Analysis focuses on theJFC’s ability to sustain forwardoperations and protect lines ofcommunications and main supply routes.Multidisciplined CI analysis includesdetailed input to JIPB.

•• Intelligence Estimate. Once a basicunderstanding of the threat and pertinentmilitary-related subjects has been gained,it is necessary to try to view thesituation through the adversary’s eyes,visualize which COA are available to theadversary, analyze the advantages anddisadvantages of each from theadversary’s perspective, and estimatewhich is the most likely option to bechosen. The joint force JISE and thecombatant command JIC are the primarysources of information in support of theseestimates.

•• Intelligence Support to MilitaryOperations. The subordinate joint forceJ-2’s first priority is to satisfy warfighters’requirements. The J-2 should provideintelligence concerning the adversaryand the environment needed by theJFC for determining objectives,selecting options, planning andconducting operations, and evaluatingthe effects of operations. Thesubordinate joint force J-2 should fuseinformation from the combatantcommand JIC with subordinate jointforce components’ event-by-eventreporting obtained during contact withopposing forces into a timely, coherentproduct describing how the operation isunfolding and providing an estimate ofwhat actions the adversary will likelytake in the following 48-96 hours.Longer term estimates should be madewhen practicable.

lines of communications (i.e., locationand capacities of airports, ports, andharbors; types, locations and capacitiesof roads, bridges, railways, andwaterways) and equipment required bymilitary, civil-military related activities.(7) Environmental Considerations.Oil dumping, ignition of oil field fires;diseases and health threats, such ascontaminated areas and availability ofwater supplies; and other environmentalfactors that could affect militaryoperations. (The combatant commandJIC is the primary source for the latestintelligence assessments of environmentalconsiderations.) (8) Medical. Availabilityof medical facilities, equipment, andsupplies as well as professional medicalpersonnel to treat casualties. Preventivemedicine efforts, their effectiveness andimpact on force readiness should beassessed. (The subordinate joint forceitself and the combatant command JICare the primary sources of informationin support of these assessments.) (9)METOC Support to Military Operations.Climatology and METOC patterns thatcould affect friendly and adversarymilitary operations. Understanding theopposing force’s ability to assessMETOC data is important in how theadversary may plan and conductoperations. (The combatant commandJIC and the Joint METOC OperationsCenter or designated theater METOCunit are p r imary sources fo rassessing climatology and METOCpatterns and the adversary’s METOCcapabilities.)

• • M u l t i d i s c i p l i n e d C I .Multidisciplined CI threat analysisevaluates all foreign intelligence andsecurity services disciplines, terrorism,foreign-directed sabotage and related

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area; and the threat, to includestrategy and force disposition ofmilitary, paramilitary, or otherindigenous forces and security orpolice forces of danger to USelements. The TIP must also containcurrent imagery of the target andJOA as well as accurate GeospatialInformation and Services (GI&S)products.

e. Scientific and Technical Intelligence.S&TI looks at foreign scientific andtechnical developments that have warfarepotential. This includes medical capabilitiesand weapon system characteristics,capabilities, vulnerabilities, limitations, andeffectiveness, research and developmentactivities related to those systems, and relatedmanufacturing information.

25. Support to CombatantCommands

a. Combatant command, Service, andDefense agency production centers willprovide the Defense Intelligence ProductionFunctional Manager with periodic statusreports on their respective center’s capabilityto meet assigned tasks. Production-relatedresponsibilities of combatant command J-2s(Figure III-19) include the following:

• To serve as overall shared productionprogram (SPP) managers for theirrespective production center.

• To identify, consolidate, and validatecommand intelligence requirements forwhich intelligence production must besatisfied by maintenance and entry ofdata in SPP or command automated databases.

• To participate in production programreviews and other forums.

CI Threat Estimates and/orVulnerability Assessments identifyfriendly weaknesses andvulnerabilities that may be exploitedby an adversary. A personalities,organizations, installations andincidents data base providesindications to the motivations andideology of those who may comeinto contact with or influence thejoint force’s operational area.Investigative reports provide insightinto potential weaknesses. Acommander can request and use CIinformation to protect personnel,equipment, and facilities.

d. Target Intelligence. All-sourceanalysis provides comprehensive targetingintelligence required for the commanderto achieve operational objectives. Targetingintelligence includes fixed and moving targets ignatures. Target ing product ionrequirements include the following:

• Adversary means, methods, goals,opt ions, object ives, s t rengths,weaknesses, values, and critical nodes.

• Target threat characteristics andvulnerabilities.

• Adversary centers of gravity.

• Analysis of information warfare andother non-lethal weapons.

• Precise target location information andtarget signatures.

The target intelligence package (TIP)is developed by the theater JIC. TIPscontain timely, detailed, tailored, andfocused multi-source informationdescribing the target; the climate,geography, or hydrography; thedemographic, cultural, political, andsocial features of the operations

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• To coordinate the tasking and assignmentof production responsibilities to theproduction center within the command’schain of command. For areas outsidethe theater JIC capabilities andresponsibilities, forward a request forproduction to the appropriate command,Service or DIA.

• To develop command architectures withthe necessary capacity, connectivity, andprocessing power to host, manipulate,and exchange intelligence required tosupport command operations.

• To oversee activities of the commandproduction center to ensure provision of

timely, accurate intelligence to theaterconsumers and/or operators.

• To deconflict production requirementpriorities.

b. A combatant command’s intelligenceproduction is performed by a productioncenter, or JIC, which is assigned directly tothe combatant command in support of theateror specialized forces. The JICs are thecornerstones for fulfilling the intelligencerequirements of the geographic combatantcommanders and their subordinatecommanders. The JICs provides tailored,finished intelligence products in support oftheater mission planning and execution.

PRODUCTION RESPONSIBILITIES OF COMBATANTCOMMAND, JOINT INTELLIGENCE CENTER, AND THE

JOINT FORCE JOINT INTELLIGENCE STAFF

CombatantCommand

JointIntelligence Center

Joint Force JointIntelligence Staff

Manage Shared Production ProgramValidate command requirementsRepresent command in production forumsCoordinate production tasks with jointintelligence centerSubmit production requirements when neededDevelop command intelligence architectureOversee joint intelligence center

Current or indications and warning intelligence,order of battle, joint intelligence preparation of thebattlespaceForeign military force's training and readinessGeography and/or environment in area ofresponsibilityTargeting supportSupport to joint planning and/or exercisesTailor published intelligence for the commandTactical intelligence for US and multinational forces

Intelligence support to targeting

Figure III-19. Production Responsibilities of Combatant Command, Joint IntelligenceCenter, and the Joint Force Joint Intelligence Staff

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Production-related responsibilities of the JICinclude analysis and production of thefollowing:

• Current and/or I&W intelligence forforces deployed in the command’s AOR.

• Potential adversaries’ OB and associatedfacilities and installations assignedunder the SPP, to include assessing thegeneral military capabilities of thoseforces.

• Foreign military forces’ unit-leveltraining and/or operational readiness.

• Physical environment information(including development of terrainanalysis products) in areas of potentialoperations.

• JIPB in support of joint operationplanning and ongoing operations.

• Target support, including development oftarget materials, battle damage assessment(BDA), and SOF targeting support.

• Information to support command-sponsored joint planning and exercises.

• Predeployment support and tailoredintelligence produced elsewhere to meetthe specific requirements of thecommand’s customers.

• Background and tactical intelligence forcustomers within the theater, includingUS and multinational forces.

c. Detailed intelligence is a criticalrequirement for conducting targeting.Responsibility for targeting resides with theJFC. However, JFCs normally will delegatethe authority to conduct execution planning,coordination, and deconfliction associatedwith targeting and will ensure that theprocess is also a joint effort involving

applicable subordinate commands. TheJFC’s guidance directs and focusesoperation planning and targeting tosupport the concept of operation. The jointforce J-2 is responsible for intelligencesupport to targeting. The targeting processselects targets (geographical areas,installations, activities or facilities plannedfor capture, disruption or destruction bymilitary forces) and matches the appropriateresponse to them, taking into accountoperational requirements and capabilities.Targeting entails the analysis of adversarysituations relative to the mission objectives.A detailed description of joint procedures forintelligence support to targeting is found inJoint Pub 2-01.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques,and Procedures for Intelligence Support toTargeting.”

d. Combat assessment (CA) is thedetermination of the overall effectivenessof force employment during militaryoperations. Intelligence production supportfor CA includes detailed assessments ofdamage to the adversary’s combat capability,summaries of adversary actions, predictionsof adversary intent, and recommendations forfuture operations. The J-3, with input fromcomponent commanders and the J-2, hasprimary responsibility for CA. During theplanning and execution of joint operations, acritical responsibility of the J-2 is toaccumulate, consolidate, and report battledamage inflicted on the adversary as aresult of combat operations. Timely andaccurate BDA is a primary driver of combatoperations. BDA incorporates assessmentsof physical, functional, and target systemdamage. The JFC requires continuous feedbackon the status of mission objectives, and operatorsneed BDA input to determine the relative successof completed attacks, the necessity and timingof restrikes, and the selection of follow-on targets.More information on CA can be found in JointPub 2-01.1, “Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques,and Procedures for Intelligence Support toTargeting.”

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e. IW targets information, information-based processes, and information systems.The information system components consistof human factors, links and nodes. OffensiveIW attacks an adversary’s informationinfrastructure, erodes confidence in theinformation it provides, and enablescommanders to operate within the adversary’sdecision making cycle. Defensive IW protectsthe friendly information systems, maintainsconfidence in its ability to support operations,and shortens decision cycles. C2W employsvarious techniques and technologies toattack or protect a specific target set - C2.DIA and the national S&TI centers providetechnical analytical support and parametricdata base information to the combatantcommands in a variety of recurring and adhoc documents and reports. Combatantcommanders, subordinate componentcommanders, and JFCs plan and execute IW/C2W.

26. Production Responsibilities

a. Production centers at all levels areassigned clearly delineated areas ofanalytical responsibility across the rangeof military operations. These centers supportthe efficient use of production communityresources, prevent duplication of effort, andprovide timely support to customerrequirements. The production communityincludes all DOD military intelligenceproduction and activities except for NSA.

b. The DODIPP is structured tocapitalize on the analytical and productionresources of the entire DOD IntelligenceProduction Community (DODIPC) tofocus expertise and maximize output to theconsumer. The structure is an explicit, logicaldivision of activities, responsibilities, andaccountability among national, Service, andcombatant command production centers,and by the national-level military intelligenceforums. SPP structure and proceduresfacilitate central management and

decentralized execution of defenseintelligence production. SPP is describedmore fully in Appendix F, “Shared ProductionProgram.”

c. The combatant command J-2sidentify and validate command operationalrequirements. The command’s productioncenter (JIC) schedules and accomplishesproduction activities for the theater, focusingon producing tailored, finished intelligence insupport of theater mission planning andexecution.

d. At the subordinate joint force level,production focuses on the fusion of all-sourceintelligence from components, the combatantcommand JIC, and national sources tosupport the joint force mission andoperations. The combatant command JICreceives information from all echelons andperforms all-source analysis and production.It is the primary source from whichsubordinate joint forces receive intelligenceand intelligence products on their areas ofinterest.

e. Lower echelons request, or pull, thetailored intelligence products they needfrom intelligence data bases electronicallyavailable at intelligence centers at alllevels. This concept allows joint forcecommanders to acquire relevant intelligence,based on their mission and the specific phaseof the ongoing operation, using intelligencedata bases physically maintained at otherechelons and locations. The combatantcommand J-2 remains responsible for thecoordination of intelligence information in-theater and manages the flow of intelligencethrough direct communication with eachcommand and Service. The push and pullconcepts are discussed further in Section E.

27. Request Management

a. Customers communicate requirementsto their supporting intelligence office, an

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existing military element or individual thatserves DODIPC customers, which articulatesthe customers’ needs as an RFI. RFIs statequestions the customer wants answered orcontain other specific intelligence needs,such as countries and topics required, in databases, target materials, and hardcopy or otherproduction media. RFIs also specify thevarious levels of detail required as well as theperiodicity of production and updates. An RFItemplate is contained within the CommunityOn-Line Intelligence System for End-Usersand Managers (COLISEUM). COLISEUMautomates the DODIPP procedures forregistration and assignment of RFIs andsubsequent tracking of the RFI.

b. After the supporting intelligence officesurveys local resources and completed orscheduled production for duplication, itcompletes the PR in accordance withDOD-0000-151C-YR, “Department of DefenseIntelligence Production Program: ProductionProcedures (U),” and submits the PR to thevalidation office (VO) at the next level in theService, combatant command, or DIA chain.The DIA Directorate for IntelligenceProduction (DI), each Service, and eachcombatant command has a VO to process andvalidate the PRs submitted by theirorganizations’ supporting intelligence offices.

c. Upon validation, the VO assignsproduction responsibility for the PR based onDOD-0000-151A-YR, “Department ofDefense Intelligence Production Program:Production Responsibilities (U).” The VOtransmits the assigned PR to a primaryproduction center and information copies topossible co l l abo ra t i ng p roduc t i oncenters. Simultaneously, an informationcopy is sent to the Defense IntelligenceProduction Functional Manager (Director,DI).

d. Once requirements are assigned to aprimary production center, the centercoordinates the efforts of all collaborating

production centers for the designatedproduct. All centers schedule the productionof each PR consistent with other assignedprojects and DODIPP priorities containedin DOD-0000-151B-YR, “Department ofDefense Production Program: ProductionPriorities (U).” The commander and/ordirector of each production center isresponsible for submitting a binding, for-the-record assessment of the center’s ability torespond to each PR.

e. After coordination with collaboratingcenters, the primary production officeprovides a written interim response to thecustomer, stating the format and type ofdocument it will produce and citing a finalresponse date. Copies of the response aresent simultaneously to the assigning VO(s),the collaborating production centers, and theDefense Intelligence Production FunctionalManager.

28. Prioritizing Requirements

a. All peacetime, crisis, and wartimerequirements must be identi f ied,documented, and prioritized. Wheneverpossible, customer requirements should besatisfied with either existing intelligenceproducts or modifications to existing productsto prevent duplication of effort. Intelligenceproducts must be in a format that the customercan understand and apply.

b. The subordinate joint force J-2 is thefocus for all intelligence requirementsgenerated within the joint force staffs and/or at lower echelons. These requirementsare satisfied by the joint force J-2 throughinformation the J-2 holds or can access viadata bases, or that can be acquired by organiccollection assets. If internally generatedrequirements cannot be satisfied by thesubordinate joint force, the J-2 must passthem to the combatant command JIC througha controlled flow of RFIs. This includes RFIsthat can be satisfied only by national agencies

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and which may become PRs, before beingforwarded from the combatant command. Thesubordinate joint force J-2 validates andprioritizes these requirements, along withthose of the subordinate joint force, andsubmits them as a request to the combatantcommand JIC. When the combatant commandJIC cannot satisfy these RFIs, it will forward themdirectly to the NMJIC. Once RFIs and/or PRshave been submitted and accepted at anyechelon, collection action is initiated asnecessary. While the status of the RFI/PR ismanaged at each echelon, the subordinate jointforce J-2 is responsible for tracking the status ofjoint force and component RFIs and ensuringfeedback to components on theirrequirements. (Figure III-20)

29. Evaluation

The production process is evaluatedbased on customer satisfaction with theproduct provided in response to a request.Intelligence personnel at all levels evaluatethe production process and the products in aneffort to continuously improve support to therequester. Evaluation includes the transitionfrom the processing and exploitation phase,meeting production standards, improvingprocesses, and customer feedback.

30. Additional Information

For additional information on intelligenceproduction, see Joint Pub 2-0, “Joint Doctrine

PRODUCTION REQUESTS

NationalAgenciesCombatant

command jointintelligence center

Subordinate jointforce joint

intelligence staff

Existing productModified product

New product

Organic or accessibledata bases

Organic collection assets Componentcommands

PIR

PRs

RFIs

RFIs

Production Requirements(PR) - COLISEUM

Production RequirementValidation Office

Push vs Pull

INTELINKData Bases

RFI = Request for Information

Figure III-20. Production Requests

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for Intelligence Support to Operations” andDOD-0000-151-YR, “Department ofDefense Intelligence Production Program.”

SECTION E. DISSEMINATION AND

EVALUATION

31. Overview

a. The J-2, at each echelon, manages thedissemination of intelligence to the user.Intelligence must be provided in a formthat is readily understood and directlyusable by the recipient in a timely mannerwithout overloading the user and, at thesame time, minimizing the load oncommunications capabilities. It is alsoimportant to provide for maximum possible

release of appropriate classified reporting,analysis, and targeting data to multinationalforces.

b. Dissemination consists of both “push”and “pull” control principles. (FigureIII-21) The “push” concept allows thehigher echelons to push intelligence downto satisfy existing lower echelonrequirements or to relay other relevantinformation to the lower level. This includeswarning data initially received only at thenational or theater level; other critical,previously unanticipated material affectingjoint operations; intelligence which satisfiesstanding information requirements by asubordinate unit; or specially prepared studiesrequested in advance by the subordinate jointforce J-2. The push concept is managed

Figure III-21. Dissemination

DISSEMINATION

Allows the higher echelons topush information down to satisfyexisting lower echelonrequirements or to relay otherrelevant information to the lowerlevel

Involves direct electronic accessto data bases, information files, orother repositories by intelligenceorganizations at all levels

PUSH

PULL

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d. A key to operational success is thetimely and accurate dissemination ofintelligence to deployed units. Thedissemination manager manages thedissemination of intelligence products to theuser. A dissemination program manager(DPM) works with the dissemination systemsto get the product to the user. Disseminationmanagers, in cooperation with the combatantcommand’s DPM, must ensure thatappropriate mailing addresses, AutomaticDigital Network (AUTODIN) messageaddresses and routing indicators, and SpecialSecurity Office (SSO) security accreditationare requested and established for those units.This administrative information must becommunicated to and validated by thecommand DPM, who will provide theinformation to DIA and other supportingnational agencies. Further, the subordinatejo in t force J-2 should coord inatecommunications requirements with the jointforce J-6 during the planning phase of theoperation. (Figure III-22)

32. Dissemination Methods

a. Hardcopy Dissemination. Moderndissemination systems have overcome manyhistoric dissemination problems. However,the capability to deliver intelligence by fax,message, or courier in hardcopy remains arequirement. In any operation involvingallied or coalition forces, this is especially trueas US intelligence equipment and systemarchitectures are often not compatible or atthe same security level.

• Combatant commands manage themovement of hardcopy intelligence todeployed subordinate joint forces incoordination with the J-3, the commandlogistics staff, the DPM, and thedissemination manager. Past operationsand communicat ion l imitat ionsassociated with transmitting large formatand/or color products have validated thecontinuing requirement to ship some

through the Defense In te l l igenceDissemination System (DIDS). DIDScontains the intelligence consumer’s SII.When a producer wants to push an intelligenceproduct to the consumer, they query the DIDSdata base and create a distribution list. The“pull” concept involves direct electronicaccess to data bases, intelligence files, orother repositories by intelligenceorganizations at all levels. An increasingnumber of intelligence pull products areavailable on INTELINK or INTELINK-S(col lateral version), INTELINK-C(Commonwealth version), INTELINK-P(Policynet), and other national and theater fileservers. The pull method is far quicker, andmore preferred, than RFI/PR submission,provided the desired information alreadyexists in a usable form. However, a judiciouspush may be needed to avoid overloading thelower, support headquarters. The GlobalBroadcast Service (GBS) also provides agreatly enhanced capability to distributemultiple kinds of data, including bandwidthintensive video and imagery, to all levels ofcommand.

c. During operation planning, the J-2 willcoordinate with the J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6 andcomponent commanders to ensure thatspecific transportation assets, personnel,equipment (especially communications) andprocedures (e.g., in-theater courier aircraft,vehicles, liaison teams, networked intelligenceworkstations, facsimile [fax], voice, and otherprocedures) are available for disseminatingintelligence and intelligence products withinthe AOR and/or JOA. The J-2’s involvementduring campaign and operation planningensures his understanding of the intelligenceproducts needed, required timeliness,consumer locations, and logistics andinfrastructure assets available to supportintelligence dissemination. This is particularlyimportant during conditions of MOOTWwhen air, ground, and sea assets may belimited and lines of communications (LOCs)extended.

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Figure III-22. Intelligence Dissemination

INTELLIGENCE DISSEMINATION

Multiple Methods ofDelivery

Push versus Pull

HardcopySoftcopy

Electronic dissemination via:JWICS, JDISS, DIN, OSIS, INTELINK,

other means

CommunicationsRequirements (J-6)

DINJ-6

JDISSJWICSOSIS

Defense Intelligence NetworkJoint Command, Control, Communications,

and Computer (C4) Systems StaffJoint Deployable Intelligence Support SystemJoint Worldwide Intelligence Communications SystemOpen Source Information System

critical hardcopy products, such as basictarget graphics, to consumers.

• From the beginning of any operation, thecombatant command, or subordinatejoint force J-2(s), establishes a dedicatedprocedure for moving hardcopyintelligence from the production centersto the theater and distributing it withinthe AOR and/or JOA. This includesnominating priorities to the JFC relativeto available air and/or sea lift resourcesfor delivery of hardcopy intelligencesupport products.

b. Softcopy Dissemination

• An increasing number of intelligencecommunity products are prepared in

electronic form and are candidates forsoftcopy dissemination. Publicationproducers and consumers a retransitioning toward an all electronicproduct environment to improve thetimeliness of intelligence disseminationand to reduce the amount of hardcopydistribution required. Reporting andarchiving using electronic methodsincrease the intelligence community’scapability to use electronic means todeliver intelligence to operationalforces. With the advent of thecommunications tools Joint WorldwideIntelligence Communications System(JWICS), Joint Deployable IntelligenceSupport System (JDISS), DefenseIntelligence Network, Open SourceInformation System (OSIS), Global

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Command and Control System (GCCS),INTELINK and/or INTELINK-S,Integrated Broadcast Service via theGBS communications pipe, and GBS,dissemination capabilities are beingexpanded to deliver intelligencewhenever and wherever adequatecommunications can be extended.

• JWICS or other sites that have electronicpublishing capability and sensitivecompartmented information (SCI)connectivity can pull electronic products.INTELINK is the intelligencecommunity architecture for sharingand disseminating intelligence,allowing organizations to have the abilityto produce their own documents orcontribute (collaborative publishing) tothe creation of other documentsthroughout the electronic publishingcommunity. Once a user accesses theelectronic publishing application,options would be available to view andindex, access help menus, scan images,or open standard format templates.Standards are being established for fileformats, naming conventions,directories, software applications, andgraphic applications.

• Each J-2 site routinely has access toseveral daily current intelligencedocuments, including the MilitaryIntelligence Digest, the NMJICExecutive Highlights, and DefenseIntelligence Reports. Other documents(current and finished intelligence) as wellas intelligence information reports andimagery are also being posted to servers(e.g., INTELINK, OSIS - unclassifiedonly) for access by the combatantcommands and subordinate joint forces.Other softcopy products includemessages and intelligence data basesmaintained by national-level agencies ortheater JICs.

• Electronic documents disseminationmedia varies (e.g., softcopy, compactdisk-read only memory [CD-ROM]),depending on the requirements of the enduser. For example, JICs with INTELINKdissemination capability can pass thefinished intelligence documents to theirsubordinate sites and/or create tailoredintelligence products using CD-ROM orelectronic publishing technology.

• Much of the material on INTELINKis available to anyone with access toan INTELINK terminal. With manydocuments already located onINTELINK, it may only be necessary fora site to tell the requester where thedocument exits. Requests for otherexisting electronic documents should bemade directly via INTELINK or, if notdirectly accessible, pass the request to theappropriate DPM to satisfy the request.The softcopy document will in turn beplaced either on the dissemination serverfor requester pull or electronic push.

• The Services and combatant commandsare integrating softcopy disseminationtechnologies into their intelligencearchitectures. The subordinate joint forceJ-2 should quickly assess the equipmentassets and training levels of all assignedforces to ensure timely dissemination ofintelligence to all users.

33. Integration of IntelligenceProducts

The requester must integrate allintelligence obtained from national,theater, or organic resources and/or assetsinto the decision making and planningprocesses. The subordinate joint force J-2 isresponsible for this integration process,updating the situation assessment andadvising the JFC on any changes to the COAavailable to the adversary.

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34. Evaluation

The intelligence dissemination andintegration process needs to becontinuously evaluated. Intelligencepersonnel at all levels assess the success ofthe dissemination and integration phase of theintelligence cycle and make changes as needed

to improve the process. The evaluation looksat the transition from the production phaseand into the next iteration of the intelligencecycle; the achievement of disseminationstandards; performance improvements of bothpersonnel and the process; and customerfeedback.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IVINTELLIGENCE C4 SYSTEMS SUPPORT

IV-1

1. Introduction

a. Communications and automated dataprocessing (ADP) systems provide the basicframework for the timely movement andtransfer of intelligence in each phase of theintelligence cycle to commanders and otherkey decision makers. Communications andADP technology is undergoing continuousevolution, affecting intelligence architecture,systems, and applications. This presentschallenges regarding operator familiarization,integration and compatibility of systems, andefficient utilization of available resources.These challenges can be overcome throughdedicated, professional training and hands-onexperience.

b. Developers, installers, and other ADPprofessionals must continuously raise thethreshold of dynamic support to commandersby successfully creating and refiningcommunications and ADP systems.However, in tegra l to a l l sys temdevelopment and application is the needfor utility — technology is not an end in itself,but the means to process and pass intelligencein support of the commander and the mission.Technological development must berealistically tempered by the limitations offielded and deployed systems and of theconsumers themselves.

2. Intelligence CommunicationsCapabilities

a. Joint Intelligence. Joint intelligencearchitecture implements common procedures,

“The success of any crisis deployment hinges on the existence of a reliablecommand and control system and of a flexible, reliable system for gathering,analyzing, and disseminating strategic and tactical intelligence.”

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA, USCINCCENT,Operation DESERT STORM, 1991

standards, and streamlined support, andcontinues to evolve in concert with theCommand, Control, Communications,Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) for theWarrior Concept. This broadly connectedjoint system provides total battlespaceinformation to the warrior, and establishes aglobal C4I capability for the warfighter to“plug in” anytime, anywhere, for any mission.(Figure IV-1)

b. National Agency CommunicationsSupport. As discussed in Joint Pub 2-0,“Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support toOperations,” the Director, DIA, establishescapability and interoperability standardsfor joint and Service intelligence activities.The Director coordinates planning andprogramming of intelligence resources,including those for selected ADP systems,telecommunications, and survivability. DIAhas established a standard communicationsarchitecture that supports joint intelligenceoperations. The geographic combatantcommand then takes this standard “package”and, in coordination with DIA, builds atheater intelligence architecture based on themission, CINC guidance, and commandrequirements.

3. Multinational ForceIntelligence andCommunicationsInteroperability

a. Multinational operations are now thenorm for military operations, makingintelligence-sharing with the allies

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increasingly important. A multilevel securitysystem does not currently existthat can easily facilitate sanitization anddissemination of intelligence to US andallied and/or coalition operationalcommanders. Combatant commands andsubordinate joint task forces can request thatintelligence reports be made releasable tocoalition and/or allied nations as necessary.INTELINK, available on JDISS, providessome uniform methods and tools forexchanging intelligence.

b. A subordinate joint force should beinteroperable with, and have access to,theater-ADP systems and data bases, aswell as allied and/or coalition force andcomponent command systems such as Linked

Operational Intelligence Centers Europe(LOCE). LOCE is the primary automatedsystem for exchanging intelligence withNATO allies. A similar interoperability existsin Korea with the Pacific ADP Server Site-Korea.

4. Establishing IntelligenceCommunication SystemsRequirements

a. A wide range of national, theater, andcomponent intelligence and communicationsystems are available to a JFC. The continuingevolution of the primary Department ofDefense Intelligence Information System(DODIIS), including the JWICS and theJDISS or client-server environment (CSE)

COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS,COMPUTERS, AND INTELLIGENCE FOR THE

WARRIOR CONCEPT

Global Commandand Control System

Global Internet(Defense Information

Systems Network)

NationalStrategic

Theater

Tactical

Army

Marine Corps Navy

AirForceJoint Task

Force

SOF

Figure IV-1. Command, Control, Communications, Computers, andIntelligence for the Warrior Concept

IV-3

Intelligence C4 Systems Support

compliant workstation, enables the design andimplementation of a robust and flexiblecapability for a subordinate joint force. Theexistence of this capability does not, however,ensure that intelligence and communicationssystems can be deployed without significantplanning and coordination. Supportingcommunications paths will probably have tobe procured or extended to link the JFC withthe Defense Information Systems Network(DISN). The theater J-2 must understandcurrent systems sufficiently to tailor anarchitecture integrating intelligencesensors, processors, dissemination systems,data bases, and ADP and communicationssystems. The J-2 needs to maximize the useof the in-theater communication resources andthen deploy ancillary equipment to extend thecommunications links from the DISN to thewarfighter. Since the preferred equipment orcommunications paths may not be availablefor a quick reaction to a contingency,alternative systems and/or subsystems andcommunications paths may have to be usedor procured. The subordinate joint force J-2must effectively coordinate communicationsarchitecture requirements with the J-6 andcoordinate with the J-4 and other logisticselements for the timely delivery andinstallation of intelligence and communicationssystems. In addition, communications systemsrequirements for national-level connectivity forNIST support should be forwarded to Joint StaffJ-2 for validation and tasking. The combatantcommand or the joint force J-6 should coordinatewith the NIST for their communicationsplanning and support. Interoperability problemsneed to be addressed and resolved during theplanning phase.

b. Key concepts to successful intelligencesystems support are joint interoperability,streamlined flow of information, andproviding pull-down of intelligence tailoredto the needs of the operating forces. Theability to provide the tactical commander withreal/near real time intelligence continues tobe a critical factor. (Figure IV-2)

• In planning a communicationsarchitecture, step 1 includes identifyingthe type of mission, the concept ofoperations, joint and Service doctrine,and the specific mission requirements.Step 1 functions are developed to meetspecific mission objectives of the JFCand each of the subordinate commandersand an operational scenario for themission. Step 1 products include lists ofthe subordinate joint force compositionand the assets assigned from national,theater, and Service levels, and a specificactivity timeline for operations plannedby the JFC and each subordinatecommander.

• In step 2 the specific communicationintelligence support plan for the jointforce is determined by the mission andthe intelligence support conceptdeve loped by the componen tcommanders in the theater of operation.This model identifies the intelligencefunctions required to support thesubordinate joint force commander andthe intelligence information flowsrequired to support each function.

• Step 3 compiles the intelligenceinformation flows from step 2 into anode-to-node layout of intelligenceinformation transactions. Nodes areused to represent the headquarters andthe external supported and/or supportingorganizations. This is done by numberingthe nodes of interest and developingneedlines. A needline represents the flowfrom one node to another.

• During step 4 the joint force J-6 staffwill determine the communicationssupport plan for requirements identifiedin step 3. The requirements developedby the J-2 planning staff can either beanalyzed separately or combined withsimilar inputs from the J-1, J-3, J-4, J-5and J-6 staffs at each security level.

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5. Combatant Commander’sCommunications Planning

a. Architecture Planning

• In the past, planning for externalsubordinate joint force exchanges wasaccomplished by multiple organizations,resulting in redundant communications.Interoperability was hindered by a lackof governing architecture, resulting indissemination requirements not beingsatisfied. CINCs planned theirconnectivity to the subordinate jointforce, and the national intelligenceagencies planned their connectivity to theNIST at the subordinate joint force.These requirements should be plannedcollectively prior to operationaldeployment rather than independently,thus ensuring that an integratedcommunications support plan is

developed for the subordinate jointforce(s).

• The combatant command J-2 and J-6should set up adequate communicationspaths for the JFC and/or subordinatejoint force intelligence needs priorto operational deployment. (FigureIV-3) The joint force should useestablished wide area networks as thebasis for planning its communications,ADP support, and dissemination to thejoint force component commanders atthe Top Secret and/or SCI and Secretlevels. In coordination with the J-6,the J-2 builds a tailored, integratedarchitecture that incorporates sensors,processors, and dissemination systems withADP and communications systems (e.g.,JWICS). This architecture links thesubordinate joint force with the Servicecomponents and coalition or allied units

STEP2:

STEP1:

STEP3:

STEP4:

Joint Force Intelligence CommunicationsPlanning Methodology

Develop mission objectives and operationalscenarios

Identify intelligence functions required tosupport operation plan and information flow

Design layout of intelligence informationtransactions on a node-to-node basis

Determine communication support plan

Figure IV-2. Joint Force Intelligence Communications Planning Methodology

IV-5


as well as with the combatant commandsand the NMJIC. The major componentsof the joint intelligence architecture provideconnectivity between the joint force andthe national and component levels.This tailored architecture includesprototype equipment and units withdifferent or unique systems. Once thearchitecture is defined, the J-2 workswith the J-3 and J-4 to update theTPFDD and TPFDL. The J-2 and J-6 shouldsolve any interoperability problems prior toresource deployment.

b. System Planning

• Organic communications assetrequirements must be identified to the

J-6. As soon as the subordinate jointforce J-2 determines operational anddissemination requirements, the J-2requests support from the subordinatejoint force J-6 for the necessarycommunications systems, communicationssecurity (COMSEC), applicationsoftware, and communications bandwidthneeded to provide simultaneoustransmission of secure, interactive videoteleconferencing; dissemination ofselected products using graphics, desktoppublishing, data, and secondary imagery;and secure voice. Shortfalls incommunications support are identifiedand submitted to higher headquarters forresolution.

JOINT INTELLIGENCE STAFF (J-2) / JOINTCOMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS,

AND COMPUTER SYSTEMS STAFF (J-6)COMMUNICATIONS PLANNING

J-2

Determine intelligenceoperational requirements

Coordinate with J-6 forcommunications systems,software, and bandwidth

Coordinate with JointOperations Staff and JointLogistics Staff to updatetime-phased force anddeployment data and time-phased force anddeployment list

Identify shortfalls

J-6

Defense InformationSystems Agency-leasedcommunications

Other non-organic theatercommunications assets

Intell

igenc

e

Commun

ity

SatelliteMicrowave

RadioLandline

Local AreaNetwork

Figure IV-3. Joint Intelligence Staff (J-2)/Joint Command, Control, Communications, andComputer Systems Staff (J-6) Communications Planning

IV-6

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Joint Pub 2-01

• Subordinate joint force communicationslinks include satellite, microwave,radio, landline, and local areanetworks (LANs). The subordinate jointforce J-2 and J-6 identify the properfrequencies, communications protocols(bit rate, parity, and other communicationsprotocols), network security managementrequirements, encryption devices, andprocedures for the architecturecomponents. The resulting communicationscapability interfaces with the globalintelligence infrastructure, i.e., thenational intelligence community, thecombatant command JIC, the subordinatejoint force and components, and alliesand/or coalition partners.

• Requests to the combatant commandJ-6 for DISA-leased or non-organictheater communications resourcesmay become complex. For example, ifrequesting a wide-area network (WAN)service such as DISN, JWICS, or GCCS,the subordinate joint force will likelyneed Joint Staff and DISA coordinationand DIA and/or NSA requirementvalidation. The J-6 requires detailedinformation for formal requestdocumentation. Special provisions existto expedite service under emergencyconditions, including telephonic requestsfollowed by confirming documentationwithin 48 hours. Information requiredincludes the type of telecommunicationssupport required, proposed location, timerequired to be operational, duration,funding and justification. For a circuitrequirement, the request should indicateterminal types at all locations; estimatedintelligence traffic volumes; precedenceand security levels; types of availableencryption; (common-user or sole-user);specific locations; point-of-contact; anyrecommended restoration priority; usageduration; and type of circuit specialconsiderations. The subordinate jointforce prepares a telecommunications

request for service and submits it to theappropriate command or J-6 validatingauthority. This process can be completedin advance by establishing contingencyor on-call circuitry activation inaccordance with an approved OPLAN.

• The standard tactical entry point (STEP)makes this process easier, using existingDefense Satellite CommunicationSystem strategic earth terminals toprovide warfighters with a standardizedset of pre-positioned circuits for entryinto the DISN. STEP serves as a C4Icommunications hub to maximizesatellite resource efficiency and accessto services.

c. Planning Considerations

• Joint intelligence is rapidly evolving andtesting “pull down” concepts. The“pull” concept allows JFCs to acquirerelevant intelligence when needed,based on their mission and the specificphase of the ongoing operation, usingintelligence data bases physically locatedand maintained at various locations.The theater JIC should determine thelocation of the desired intelligence andpush the necessary information directlyto all echelons requiring that intelligencein order to control the intelligence flow.

• Every subordinate joint forceoperation requires planning for theexchange of intelligence within adeployed joint force and between thedeployed joint force and supportingintelligence organizations. Intra-subordinate joint force communicationsshould support the exchange of situationdata, RFIs, intelligence, and tasking oforganic collection resources among themajor elements of the deployed jointforce and supporting intelligenceorganizations worldwide. Theseexchanges include the following:

IV-7


•• Intelligence exchanges within andbetween each Service and functionalcomponent assigned or attached to thesubordinate joint force. Each Serviceand functional component should deploywith an organic tactical communicationscapability that meets intra-Serviceexchange requirements. However, thiscapability may not support exchangerequirements to other Servicecomponents’ subordinate joint forceelements.

•• Exchanges between the headquartersof the subordinate joint force and, ifdesignated, the headquarters of theService and functional components.Any intra-subordinate joint forcerequirements for intelligence exchangesat lower echelons can either be routedthrough these headquarters or identifiedas special requirements that must beplanned separately.

•• Connectivity requirements of theJFC to the combatant commander andto the national intelligence supportagencies (e.g., connectivity for the NISTthat may deploy to support the JFC), toother supporting commanders and, inspecial cases, to other subordinate jointforces.

•• Connectivity requirements from theassigned components to Serviceintelligence centers in theater and thecontinental United States (CONUS)must also be addressed.

• The requirement to exchange largequantities of perishable data amongdispersed forces places special demandson many communications networks.Addit ionally, the planner mustunderstand the possible adverse effectlarge volumes of intelligence data mayhave on a limited bandwidth transmissionsystem. Communications systems do

not have an infinite capacity. Joint Pub6-0, “Doctrine for Command, Control,Communications, and Computer (C4)Systems Support to Joint Operations,”states: “Combatant commanders willdetermine the priorities of C4 systemsand allocate communications circuits andchannels (bandwidth) within thegeographic or functional area ofresponsibility of their commands,including those required by componentand other subordinate commands.”

• Required communications capabilitiesconsidered by J-6 and J-2 plannersincludes channel capacity, defined asthe maximum rate at which informationcan be sent over a communicationchannel without error. Imagerytransmission requirements are ofparticular concern because of their highbandwidth requirements, which aredirectly proportional to the degree ofresolution desired (i.e., the higher theresolution, the longer the transmissiontime via a given bandwidth). The J-6and J-2 planners must ensure that highbandwidth transmissions such asimagery do not preclude or delay thereceipt of other transmissions (e.g.,messages), affecting the operation.Wideband circuits required to resolvethis problem are costly and not alwaysavailable in tactical locations. Whilesatellite transmission systems offer highvolume and broad coverage (comparedto landline and line of sight radiosystems), overall transmission capacityis limited to the radio frequencyspectrum. Landline system capacity islimited by the amount of wire or fiber inplace throughout the system.

6. Communications andIntelligence Systems

The joint intelligence architectureencompasses both the JWICS and the

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A SIGNALMAN’S ODYSSEY

In January 1946, 4 months out of Japanese prison camp, Technical SergeantMichael Maslak arrived at Arlington Hall Station—headquarters of the SecondSignal Service Battalion. The battalion, along with its worldwide detachments,had played an instrumental role in helping to secure the Allies’ victory overJapan. The young soldier brought with him a most adventurous story. Thefollowing is one facet of that story.

“The first radio intelligence (RI) job [in the Philippines] was the intercept ofthree types of communications: transmissions from and to the Japanesereconnaissance planes which were frequently observed; traffic of the air-ferrying commands in the Philippines area; and reports from Japanese weatherstations scattered about the islands.

Our setup was makeshift, of course. Our antennas were outside and reachedthe receivers via a very long lead-in. For receivers, we had two Super-Pros—all we could ask for in the way of reception and as many as the initial four ofus could man. All of us did intercept, but Lieutenant Brown and LieutenantGelb also had to evaluate the traffic and make translations (there was muchplain-text), coordinate our results with G-2, and perform liaison. We were alsoin direct telephone contact with the Navy, which had an RI setup in the Navytunnel near Monkey Point. A naval officer helped us a great deal in plain-texttranslations.

When the Japanese bombers started using radiotelephone, we obtained twointerpreters, a Filipino and a Japanese-American to read the enemy’s voicetransmissions for us. The Japanese-American, despite his being highly trusted,could go about only under the guard of an American officer, lest he be mistakenfor an enemy.

We knew the transmitting frequencies of almost all the air bases from whichplanes came over. The type of traffic they sent was always the tip-off of animpending raid. Special frequencies were used for bombing; they alone werean invaluable source of intelligence for us. We came to know planes’ callsigns by heart as well as the pilots’ nicknames or codenames; they would useinformation as to their intentions, but they also kept us well informed of theirresults. They would report their losses and casualties, bombing or observationoutcome, and what US batteries got the planes that were shot down, etc. Theywould then attempt to knock out the US batteries responsible for inflictingthe damage."

SOURCE: Michael Maslak, Signalman’s OdysseyMilitary Intelligence: Its Heroes and Legends, compiled by Diane L. HammUS Army Intelligence and Security Command History Office, October 1987

IV-9


JDISS and other CSE compl iantworkstations and strives to enhance jointinteroperability by using common procedures,standards and streamlined support to provideintelligence to joint commands. (Figure IV-4)

a. Joint W or ldwide In te l l igenceCommunications System. A JWICScontainerized and mobile capability has beendeveloped to support contingencyrequirements through the use of military orcommercial satellite or terrestrial earthterminals. The containerized JWICS isdesigned with six containers of video andcommunications gateway equipment. Themobile JWICS system is the JWICSMobile Integrated CommunicationsSystem (JMICS). JMICS provides a

scaleable, deployable JWICS that is self-contained on a heavy high mobilitymultipurpose wheeled vehicle for rapiddeployment in all-weather, austereenvironments. Key features include satelliteconnectivity, facsimile, collateral and SCILAN-capable workstations, JDISS networkservers, capability for two simultaneous videoteleconference sessions, T-1, TROJANSpecial Purpose Intelligence RemoteIntegrated Terminal II or commercialinterface, and other key features. The JointStaff J-2-controlled JWICS will be deployedin support of NIST or joint force requirementsas well as other CJCS missions.

• JWICS is a smart multiplexer-based,secure (Top Secret and/or SCI), high

Figure IV-4. Joint Intelligence Architecture

JOINT INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE

National LevelSupport

NATO, CoalitionPartners

MultinationalSystems InterfaceCommander In Chief

Theater Joint IntelligenceStaff

Joint Intelligence Center

Joint Task ForceJoint Intelligence Staff

Joint Intelligence Support Element

SERVICE AND/OR COMMERCIAL COMMUNICATIONSAir Force Combat

Intelligence SystemArmy All-SourceAnalysis System

Navy Joint MaritimeCommand Information

System

Marine Corps Air-Ground Task Force C4I

System

Special OperationsIntelligence Vehicle Man

Transportable SOCRATES

Joint DeployableIntelligence Support

System uses Low to HighSpeed Communications

BROADCAST

National & Tactical Sensors

Standards

Joint Chiefs of StaffJoint Intelligence

StaffNational MilitaryJoint Intelligence

Joint Worldwide IntelligenceCommunications System

High Speed Pipe

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Joint Pub 2-01

speed mult imedia intel l igencecommunications network designed tosupport intelligence production anddissemination as well as crisismanagement operations. JWICS meetsthe requirements for dedicated,interactive, and high bandwidth video-capable communications for the Defenseintelligence community. JWICS servesthe NCA, Joint Staff, combat supportagencies, all combatant command JICsand components, the Service intelligencedepartments, scientific and technicalintelligence production centers, andselected military and civilian Federalexecutive agencies. Further, JWICSconnectivity has been extended todeployed land-based and afloat sites aspart of the NIST crisis contingencysupport concept for regional militaryoperations.

• The strategic objective of JWICS is toprovide for inter operable, seamless,and responsive intelligence communicationsconnectivity for the military intelligencecommunity to support operations. Thiseffort has included the development ofJWICS in three modes, i.e., fixed,containerized, and mobile, with thecapability of supporting a joint force orNIST in a building and/or field site.

• The complementary architecture ofJWICS (data and/or video) and JDISSworkstations (data) spans national,operational, and tactical levels. Themajor JWICS applications are:e lec t ron ic pub l i sh ing ; v ideoteleconferencing; bulk data transfer,including very large-file imagery; andvideo telecasting such as the defenseintelligence network (DIN). The DINuses JWICS technology to accomplishlive, broadcast dissemination of the latestintelligence developments worldwide.

b. Joint Deployable Intelligence SupportSystem. JDISS bundles commercial off-the-shelf hardware and softwareapplications in a standard desktopenvironment. JDISS provides a field-deployable office automation suite built uponthe system security infrastructure provided byclient-server environment system services.JDISS also allows electronic mail and chatterbetween intelligence echelons via the site’sexisting communications architecture. JDISSprovides access to theater, Service, andnational intelligence resources, such as databases, basic imagery analysis anddissemination capabilities, specific analyticaltools, and support functions required toexecute the intelligence mission. JDISS isthe preferred method of providing secondaryimagery dissemination to the combatantcommanders and subordinate JFCs. JDISSinterfaces with GCCS.

c. INTELINK. INTELINK is a principalelectronic means for intelligence productdissemination. INTELINK builds onongoing architectural initiatives at theTop Secret and/or SCI and Secret andUnclassified classification levels. (FigureIV-5) INTELINK provides a comprehensiveset of tools to query, access, and retrieveinformation. INTELINK permits collaborationamong policy developers, analysts, and users,and will simplify access to a wide variety ofservices. The J-2 should assess the availabilityof INTELINK access among assigned and enroute forces. The J-2 should also ensure thatusers have adequate system training and areaware of available products, content, andaccess procedures.

7. Communications and ADPSystems and Networks

The “Communications Handbook forIntelligence Planners (U)” and Joint Pub6-02, “Joint Doctrine for Employment of

IV-11


Operational/Tactical Command, Control,Communications, and Computer Systems”provides more information on the systemsbriefly described below.

a. Automatic Digital Network is anautomatic store-and-forward messageswitching network which provides hardcopyand softcopy message dissemination to users.The Defense Message System, which operateson the strategic and tactical level, will replaceAUTODIN and other message-handlingsystems. It is designed to interface with thecommercial and allied message and datasystems.

b. Department of Defense IntelligenceInformation System is the intelligencecomponent of the DISN, the DODtelecommunications infrastructure thatsupports military operations. DODIIS definesthe standards for intelligence system andapplication interoperability. The DODIISconcept provides, within limits, an integratedstrategic and tactical user environment forperforming identical intelligence supportfunctions on compatible systems. DODIISprovides a robust and flexible intelligencecapability for the subordinate joint force aslong as supporting communications lines areavailable. DODIIS tools support the

INTELINK CONCEPT

INTELINK

TextProductsGeospatial Information

Images GraphicsMultimedia

Joint WorldwideIntelligence

CommunicationsSystem

Networks

SIPRNET

National SecurityAgency Net

CommunicationsCarriers

Defense Information SystemsNetwork, Global Grid,Telephone Companies

User S

ystems

or Workstations

Pro

vide

r S

yste

ms

or W

orks

tatio

nsProducts

Requestsand

Information

!

!

!

!

!

ImagerySignals IntelligenceEconomic AnalysisBiographiesOpen Source

Products

Figure IV-5. INTELINK Concept

IV-12

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Joint Pub 2-01

movement of intelligence between DIA, thecombatant commands, the Services, and otherintelligence production and customeractivities worldwide. This program includeshardcopy products, digital or “softcopy”products, on-line access to data bases, theability to “push” or “pull” files of informationbetween producers and countries, CD-ROMstorage, document imaging, electronicpublishing, and networked (via internal LANsor JWICS) corporate mass storage devices tocontain large volumes of digitized intelligenceinformation. Figure IV-6 identifies theDODIIS information architecture.

c. The SECRET Internet ProtocolRouter Network (SIPRNET) is the Secret-level WAN, with a worldwide backbonerouter system. Various DOD router services

and systems are migrating onto the SIPRNETbackbone router network to serve the long-haul transport needs of the users. Thisnetwork supports national defense C4Irequirements.

d. Global Command and ControlSystem

• GCCS is being implemented inaccordance with the C4I for the Warriorconcept. GCCS is a highly mobile,deployable C2 system that supportsforces for joint and combinedoperations throughout the range ofmilitary operations anytime andanywhere in the world with compatible,interoperable, and integrated C4Isystems. GCCS incorporates policies,

Figure IV-6. Department of Defense Intelligence Information SystemIntelligence Architecture

Voice

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCEINFORMATION SYSTEM INTELLIGENCE

ARCHITECTURE

TargetAnalyst

CollectionManager

Indications andWarning Analyst

GeospatialInformation

Graphics Imagery

CurrentIntelligence

Analyst

Specialized Data

Formatted Data Target Analysis

Video

IV-13


procedures, reporting structures, trainedpersonnel, automated informationprocessing systems, and connectivity toprovide up to Secret-based informationnecessary to plan, deploy, employ, andsustain forces.

• GCCS meets the C2 requirements of theNCA through the subordinate joint forceby encompassing four main communities:National (NCA, the NSC, CJCS, andService Headquarters); Theater(supported CINCs and their componentcommanders); the subordinate JFCs andtheir component commanders; andsupporting groups (supporting CINCs

and their component commanders,Service major commands, combatsupport agencies, UN and alliedcommands, and other US governmentagencies such as the Department ofTransportation [the US Coast Guard], theDrug Enforcement Administration, theFederal Emergency ManagementAgency, the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation, and the Department ofState). The system provides analyticaltools, information processingtechnologies, and real time informationacross an array of functions that will

enable CINCs and subordinate JFCs tomonitor operations in support of ongoingmilitary operations. The system depictsa fused, near real time, true representationof the battlespace. At all user levels, thesystem normally provides information ona pull basis, so that the user can tailorinformation requirements. Push updatesautomatically distribute critical changesto ensure that the operator receivescurrent information and intelligence. Theintent is to meet multiple users’requirements by providing conciseinformation tailored to the users’ needson a single system that eliminatesmultiple platform displays.

e. GBS is an information service thatuses commercially developed directbroadcast technology to provide a widerange of information, including intelligenceand intelligence products, to the warfighter.This simplex broadcast system is initiallyusing leased commercial satellite capacity toprovide high bandwidth capacity for broadcastof information such as imagery, video,environmental data, logistics, and warning toall command levels.

f. Migration Defense IntelligenceThreat Data System (MDITDS) provides

Global Command and Control System supports joint and combined forcesand is highly mobile and deployable.

IV-14

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Joint Pub 2-01

an automated environment in support ofthreat analysis and warning for DODcommands, services and agencies. MDITDStracks and/or assesses capabilities, intentions,methods and operations of countries, groups,organizations and individuals who pose athreat to US interests. Specific productionwithin MDITDS includes counterterrorism,CI, weapons proliferation I&W, and defenseindustries. The MDITDS automatedenvironment includes a single entry to reviewa variety of government and commercialinformation sources and provides theconsumer with the ability to manipulate,analyze, produce, coordinate and disseminateintelligence and warning products.

g. Military Intelligence Integrated DataSystem/Integrated Data Base (MIIDS/IDB)provides sets of data elements and the capabilityto relate items of intelligence information withother items within the data base itself; forexample, relating OB information toinstallations. The Modernized Integrated DataBase replaces the MIIDS/IDB.

h. Joint Collection Management Tools(JCMT) provides the collection managerwith an automated means of taskingnational and theater collection resourcesand/or assets in support of operations.Rapidly accessible data bases allow the userto review resource and/or asset capabilities,ensure efficient tasking of those resources, andtrack the status of the tasking. JCMT supportsCRM through the use of platform and targetarea coverage along with timelines for plannedmissions. System functions include resourceand/or asset capability and availabilityanalysis, message processing of over thirtymessage types and/or formats, full-duplexaccredited communications, data basemanagement of and interactive operation withover twenty data bases (target, contact,references, and symbology), and systemsecurity administration.

i. Requirements Management System(RMS) provides the national and DODimagery communities with a uniformautomated collection requirementsmanagement system. Further informationon RMS is available in Appendix C,“Intelligence Disciplines.”

j. The Joint Communications SupportElement (JCSE). The JCSE is a uniquecommunications organization. JCSE providescontingency and crisis communications tomeet the operational and support needs of theJCS, Services, combatant commands, Defenseagencies and non-Defense agencies. Requestsfor support should be completed IAWCJCSI 6110.01, “CJCJ-Control TacticalCommunications Assets.” The JCSE providestactical communications support for twosimultaneously deployed subordinate jointforces and two joint special operations taskforces. The JCSE possesses a wide range ofcommunications capabilities tailored to meeta variety of contingency missions, includingintelligence.

8. Other CommunicationsResources

a. National Intelligence Support TeamCommunications Support Elements(NCSE). The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff authorized the designation of existingintelligence communications units as NCSEto meet the need for timely communicationsconnectivity between deployed NISTs andtheir national support infrastructure. TheseNCSE activities provide direct JWICSconnectivity to the national supportinfrastructure. The NCSE activities operateunder Joint Staff J-3 tasking as validated byJoint Staff J-2 in coordination with the JointStaff J-6. The combatant command J-6 hasthe responsibility to provide frequenciesfor NIST satellite communications(SATCOM) activities. NCSE activitiesinclude the following:

IV-15


• NSA/O55 maintains, issues, or deployssmall fly-away NIST communicationssystems, including tri-band SATCOM, tosupport contingency or first-out NIST teamneeds. NSA/O55 also maintains, deploys,and operates light-sized transportable NISTcommunications systems including tri-band SATCOM, as well as medium-sizeddrive-away NIST communicationssystems, including redundant tri-bandSATCOM in support of unique NIST orsubordinate joint force requirements. Allsystems provide direct JWICS connectivityand include secure voice and data (JDISS)capability.

• The Army maintains, deploys, andoperates TROJAN SPIRIT IIs and

JMICS in support of joint requirementsfor intelligence support to subordinatejoint forces and NIST. These systemsprovide up to 1.544 megabytes persecond communications connectivity tosupport full JWICS, JDISS data, securevoice, and other unique intelligencecommunication needs.

b. Liaison with other agencies or Serviceelements with communications capabilities,such as NSA or a Public Affairs group, mayreveal existing or available communicationslinks in place. While these organizations havetheir own requirements, in a crisis the J-2 mayarrange to temporarily share their circuits tomeet critical needs.

IV-16

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Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX AJOINT FORCE J-2 QUICK REACTION CHECKLIST

A-1

Overview

This checklist is an effort to assist asubordinate joint force J-2 and staff byproviding a quick reference guide for a crisissituation. This is a guideline or point ofdeparture, and should not be construed as all-inclusive. Depending upon the nature of thecrisis (war or MOOTW), many of thesevariables may or may not apply. Otherconsiderations not listed may also becomefactors.

ESTABLISH MISSIONS AND/ORTASKS

• Clarify and prioritize the subordinatejoint force J-2’s missions, tasks andrequirements with input from thesubordinate joint force J-3, and confirmwith the subordinate JFC.

• Assist the J-3 in document ingintelligence requirements based onoperational priorities and/or capabilitiesand mission requirements.

• Work with the J-3 in the development ofmission objectives.

• Ensure distribution as appropriate,complete understanding of the taskingand guidance from the commander, andthat it has been analyzed and applied toregional and/or theater assessments.

• Ensure that regularly updatedintelligence collection and productionpriorities are passed throughout theentire chain of command, includingcomponents and supported commands.

• Determine theater intelligence architecturefor flow of responsibilities for satisfying

PIR, RFI/PR (i.e., theater intelligenceassets). Intelligence responsibilities mustbe clearly delineated among subordinatejoint force, combatant command, andnational levels. Determine whether anysubordinate joint force units (SOF inparticular) require intelligence supportfrom the combatant command or nationallevel that the theater JIC cannot provide.

• Determine theater intel l igencearchitecture for f low of securecommunications, collection, dissemination,and ADP assets. Identify problems ofcoordination, interoperability of systemsor supply and/or sensitivity issues.

• Determine status (number, type,readiness condition) of subordinate jointforce’s organic intelligence collection,production, exploitation, disseminationand communications assets.

• Conduct liaison, supervise, andcoordinate other intelligence-relatedfunctions with appropriate staff elementsand subordinate and supportingcommands. Specific responsibilitiesinclude the following:

•• IW, including C2W (J-3). Subsets ofC2W are as follows: (1) Electronicwarfare (EW) (J-3, or EW Officer whenassigned). (2) Mi l i tary decept ion(J-3) . (3) Psychological operations,to include an e st imate of conditionsa n d vulnerabilities of prospective targetgroups; an estimate of the effectivenessof friendly and adversary psychologicaloperations; and planning assistance andsupervision of training activitiesconcerning defense against adversarypropaganda (J-3). (4) Operationssecurity (J-3). (5) COMSEC (J-3/J-6),

A-2

Appendix A

Joint Pub 2-01

communications electronics officer and/orNSA. (6) Information security program(J-6).

•• Counterintelligence (J-2 and/or CI).

•• Reconnaissance (J-3).

•• Counterterrorism (J-3).

•• Antiterrorism and/or force protection(J-3).

•• Handling of enemy prisoners of war(EPW), detainees, and captureddocuments and materiel (J-1/J-4).

•• Debriefing of EPW and refugees,exploitation of captured documents andequipment (J-2).

•• Transportationi n t e l l i g e n c e(USTRANSCOM/J-2).

•• Adversary employment of specialweapons (nuclear, biological, andchemical [NBC]) (J-3 and/or NBCofficer).

•• Combat assessment, to include BDA,munitions effectiveness assessment, andmission assessment (J-3).

•• Medical intelligence (Surgeon and/or DIA).

•• Civil affairs (J-3).

•• Barrier and denial operations (J-3).

•• Survival, evasion, resistance, andescape (J-3).

•• Language capabilities of subordinatejoint force personnel (J-1).

•• Classified courier issues (J-1).

•• Geospatial Information and Services(GI&S Officer).

IDENTIFY SUPPORT NEEDED

• Intelligence Services and/or Products

•• Identify available intelligence assetsin-theater, including ADP systems and/or tools.

•• Determine whether there is arequirement for Service, theater ornational intelligence agency support, e.g.,NIST, JWICS.

•• If so, identify entities to be tasked andmix of skills and capabilities needed.Identify proper chain of command forrequests.

• Personnel. Ensure that required and/oradditional expertise is available, withs u ff i c ien t pe rsonne l to mee twatchstanding, courier, security andliaison requirements.

•• Identify any requirements forpersonnel augmentation, to includeregional or functional experts, linguists,and/or reservists (prior and/or advancejoint training is a key factor forconsideration).

•• Determine augmentation support thatcan be obtained from theater assets.Coordinate tasking for those assets throughthe combatant commander’s staff.

•• Determine augmentation support thatmust be obtained from outside the theater.Coordinate with the J-1 as early aspossible in the planning process torequest support from external sources.

•• Assume that the operation for whichthe subordinate joint force was

A-3

Joint Force J-2 Quick Reaction Checklist

established will continue for an extendedperiod of time, then make plans to requestand accommodate rotation of staff andsupport elements and additionalaugmentation.

•• Identify any need for a deployableelement to support the subordinate jointf o r c e ’s e f f o r t s i n : c o l l e c t i o nmanagement, HUMINT collection,Service expertise, communications,tactical or in-depth analysis, debriefing.

• Logistics

•• In concert with the combatantcommand J-2 and the subordinate jointforce J-4, ensure that transportationrequirements for high priority personneland materiel are documented andprioritized. If this is an unforeseencontingency or crisis, there will not be aprecut time-phased deployment plan forpersonnel and materiel, and the J-2 mustassist the J-4 to ensure that intelligenceneeds are documented and met.

•• Ensure that transportation requirementsfor high priority intelligence personneland or materiel are in concert with J-3requirements. For example, targetmaterials should be close to bombs intransportation priority if the former areto be of any use.

• GI&S Support. Shortfalls of criticalGI&S products and digital data severelyrestrict the planning and analysis phasesand may become a war stopper duringthe execution phase. No command canafford to conduct military operations withoutdated or missing geospatial data forits forces or weapon systems.

•• Initiate single GI&S POC. Notifysubordinate forces of correct requisitionprocedures for predeployment maps,charts, and digital data.

•• Notify combatant command GI&Sstaff of the GI&S support POC in thesubordinate joint force.

•• Identify subordinate joint staff GI&Srequirements to the combatant commandGI&S staff with respect to forcesdeploying and the operational area.Include map production quantities,personnel and equipment to operate amap depot, and staff support personnel.

•• Request the following from thecombatant command GI&S staff: theproduction schedule; status of productsand digital data required and date of firstshipment; status of host-nation supportfor GI&S products, digital data andcapabilities; and the status on disclosureand/or release of geospatial informationto coalition forces.

•• Verify and/or submit OPORD AnnexM to J-2.

•• Request that supporting forcesprovide GI&S distribution plan. Ensurethat combatant command and joint forceGI&S staffs are provided a copy of alldistribution plans.

•• Send message reminding forces aboutaccuracies, datums, and coordinates ofGI&S products and digital data.

•• Coordinate shipment of deploymentstock to the map depot (unit line number).Obtain weight, cubic feet, number of463L pallets and ready-for-shipment datefrom the combatant command GI&Sstaff. Forward unit line number to thecombatant command GI&S staff.

•• Establish map depot inventoryquantities to include reorder levels.Report results to the combatant commandGI&S staff via AUTODIN message,electronic mail, or JDISS.

A-4

Appendix A

Joint Pub 2-01

•• Request that the combatant commandGI&S staff have DMA publish specialoperation catalog.

• METOC Support. METOC support canhelp optimize intelligence support in avariety of ways (assisting in collectionmanagement, helping to anticipateadversary actions). Coordinate with theJoint Force METOC Officer through theJ-3, if applicable, for needed METOCproducts and services and for the transferof METOC data received throughintelligence resources that couldsupplement the METOC data base.

ESTABLISH A JISE

• Determine whether a JISE is required tosupport the subordinate joint force;establishment of a JISE will be theaterand/or situation dependent.

• If a JISE is to be established, considerthe following:

•• Facility location and physical securityrequirements.

•• Personnel requirements, includingaugmentation.

•• JISE structure requirements for:(1) Joint Captured Materiel ExploitationCenter (JCMEC); (2) Joint Interrogation andDebriefing Center (JIDC); (3) JointDocument Exploitation Center; (JDEC)(4) Collection Management Section;(5) Intelligence Support Section;(6) Targeting Support and BDA Section;(7) Other intelligence production;(8) Communications and ADP support;(9) Soft-copy and/or electronic andhard-copy product dissemination tocomponents; (10) Receipt, processingand exploitation of imagery andproduction of imagery-based materials;(11) Establishment of subordinate joint

f o r c e J I S E r e l a t i o n s h i p s a n dconnectivity to component, combatantcommand, and national intelligence;(12) Supplies needed for a lengthydeployment, if a JISE or otherintelligence element is forward deployed;(13) Security; and (14) Militarydeception.

• Develop intelligence communicationsarchitecture with reporting andrequesting channels.

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTIONMANAGEMENT

• In concert with the combatant commandJ-2 and the subordinate joint force J-3,e n s u r e t h a t a l l i n t e l l i g e n c ecollection requirements are identifiedas early as possible.

• Develop and publish intelligencecollection requirements. Establish timeschedule for updates.

• Identify organic collection capabilitiesand status of all component andsupporting units as well as those en routeto the operational area.

• Identify any shortfalls in collectioncapabilities. Ensure that collectionrequirements to cover such shortfalls aredeveloped and forwarded through thecombatant command JIC to the NMJICfor subsequent national resource tasking.

• Ensure that collection activities arecoordinated with the Defense CollectionCoordination Center through thecombatant command JIC and the NMJIC.

• HUMINT collection

•• Establish the need for a subordinateJ-2X to manage, coordinate anddeconflict HUMINT, CI, Country

A-5


Team and/or SOF collection activities.Coordinate with the combatant commandJ-2, HSE and CISO for requestingrequired resources from DHS and theServices and appointment of HOC andTFCICA.

•• Establish the need for a JIDC to satisfysubordinate joint force and combatantcommand PIR. Request staffing from thecomponents and DHS, as required.

•• Establish the need for and requestfurther HUMINT collection augmentationand support from DHS.

• IMINT collection

•• Obtain emergency disseminationauthority for imagery and imageryproducts. Emergency disseminationauthority is a powerful tool, designed tosupport military operations, includingthose involving allies.

•• Tailored imagery should be requestedas soon as a target is identified. Allimagery should be forwarded torequester.

•• Establish the need for and requestfurther IMINT collection augmentationand support from the Services or nationalimagery agencies.

• SIGINT collection

•• Coordination of SIGINT support forJTF operations should be accomplishedthrough the commands organiccryptologic support division in concert withthe respective CSG and command NCR.

•• Establish the need for and requestfurther SIGINT collection augmentationand support from the Services or NSA.

• All other intelligence disciplines.

INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTIONMANAGEMENT

• Coordinate with theater JIC to determinewhether PIR have already beenestablished for current situation. PIRshould be built around commander’srequirements.

• As needed, in concert with J-3 and theaterJIC, tailor PIR for current situation.

• K e e p P I R c u r r e n t a n d u p d a t eperiodically.

• Develop or acquire a completeintelligence assessment of the situation.

•• Periodical ly update situationassessment.

•• Submit completed situation assessmentto the commander and chain o fcommand.

• Ensure regional and threat assessmentsare current.

• Ensure key friendly and neutral forceshave been identified.

• Coordinate the theater and nationalassessments and provide copies tosubordinates and components.

• Ensure all required intelligence annexeshave been incorporated into the OPLANor OPORD.

• Closely track intelligence collection andproduction requirements to completion.

C4 SUPPORT (FOR SUBORDINATEJOINT FORCE INTELLIGENCE)

• The J-2 should establish and maintainregular dialogue with the combatantcommand J-2 and the Service component

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Joint Pub 2-01

intelligence staff officers.

• Request JCSE support/augmentation.

• As soon as possible, coordinate with theJ-6 to ensure communications lines areavailable.

• Know the capacity of communicationspaths serving the subordinate joint force,between the subordinate joint force andits components and with allied orcoalition units.

•• Assess the C4 capabilities andrequirements of all assigned intelligenceelements and those en route to theoperational area.

•• Intelligence exchange with allied and/or coalition units may require a liaisonwith secure portable communications andADP support.

•• Minimize. Keep communicationspaths open by eliminating extraneoustraffic. Units with global missionsroutinely subscribe to numeroussummaries from all theaters. Assignlowest possible precedence on summarymessages. Cancel summaries for thesubordinate joint force staff andcomponents and rely on tailored supportfrom the JIC.

• Fully apprise subordinate joint force andsenior commanders of all relevantcurrent events.

• Ensure subordinate joint force J-2s’ ADPequipment is compatible with theaterand subordinate systems. For coalitionsubordinate joint forces, ensure systemsare compatible.

• Ensure communications lines havesufficient baud, rate capacity orbandwidth.

• If necessary, establish a tactical SCIfacility (SCIF).

• Identify COMSEC and determineavailability.

• Ensure all router tables are updated.

• Ensure all AUTODIN AIG are updated,complete and used.

• Eliminate duplicate data beingdisseminated to the same users bydifferent means.

• Ensure ADP security measures areemployed properly.

• Determine reporting/production timesand types of reports.

MULTINATIONAL INTERACTION

• Establish liaison between joint andmultinational force intell igencestructures.

• Ensure procedures have been establishedand reviewed to expedite sanitization andsharing of US-generated intelligenceproducts with allies.

• Ensure friendly objectives, intentions,and plans are fully communicated toappropriate intelligence organizations.

• Ensure interoperability of C4 systems.

• Be aware of, and remain sensitive to,cultural and/or religious differencesamong coalition members. In someinstances, these may result in periods ofincreased vulnerability for the joint force,or may require scheduling changes formeetings and/or briefings.

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CI/COUNTERTERRORISM

• In coordination with the J-3 and coalitionintelligence and/or CI elements, developand implement CI and counterterrorismplans to support requirements.

• The J-2 should appoint a TFCICA.

• Ensure CI is incorporated into planningas a force protection measure.

• Ensure CI is included in collectionmanagement planning.

• Advise component CI organizations andbegin planning coordination with theJoint CI Support Branch and othercombatant command CISOs for national-level joint CI assistance.

• Ensure intelligence security guidelineshave been developed and disseminated.

• Ensure development and requiredapproval of CI Force Protection SourceOperations umbrella concept.

SECURITY

• Ensure personnel and informationsecurity measures, including thoseapplying to ADP, are enforcedthroughout the joint force.

• Enforce need to know criteria for releaseof all information related to theoperation.

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Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX BREPRESENTATIVE INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

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Overview

An illustrative table of intelligencerequirements is provided as a starting point fordeveloping a mission specific list. This reflectsthe probable intelligence needs of a combatantcommander. The list is representative of themajor concerns of a commander at any level,but is not offered as a definitive, exhaustivecompilation of every possible concern. Acombatant command J-2 or subordinate jointforce J-2 preparing PIR for the commander’sapproval can use this table to stimulate ideasand to identify information gaps, especially sincedifferent Service and/or functional componentsmay require more detailed information thanoutlined in the intelligence requirementsprovided below. The mission-specific list shouldbe prioritized to ensure that collection decisionscan be made rationally and that the intelligenceeffort remains focused on responding to themost important requirements first.

INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

• Assess Damage 1. Assess impact ofexecution of psychological operations.

• Assess Damage 2. Assess extent of softor hard damage to adversary combat unitsin order to plan restrike and follow-onphases of the operation.

• Assess Damage 3. Assess status andadversary ability to repair, reconstitute,r e c u p e r a t e , o r r e l o c a t e v i t a linfrastructure, weapon systems andforces. Provide data which allowsassessment of mission results againstoverall campaign objectives and tactics.

• Assess Damage 4. Determine whichmilitary units have sustained significant(30%) casualties.

• Beach Defenses. Determine adversarybeach defenses; provide timelysurveillance; locate and/or identifycoastal defense units (priority on artillery,mechanized infantry, and armored units).

• Casualties. Predict number of friendlyand adversary casualties and chemical,biological, or radiation injuries toestimate transportation, hospital spaceand medical support required.

• Commercial Traffic 1. Identify air, seaand ground commercial routing, traffic,and density within the operations area.Identify commercial air corridors.

• Commercial Traffic 2. Provideinformation on all shipping to includesuspected carriers of contraband, majorports of debarkation, historic shippingdensity data, and daily operationsummary of expected departures,arrivals, and schedules. Identify typesof vessels.

• Counterintelligence. Describecountry’s awareness or knowledge of,and countermeasures to, US intelligenceactivities.

• Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)1. Identify survival, evasion, resistance,escape, and recovery procedures, andselected area for evasion (populationcharacteristics; culture; location;approaches; contact recovery points andprocedures; security hazards; cover andconcealment).

• Combat Search and Rescue 2. Identifyand locate allied and/or coalition partnerpersonnel for rescue. Determine

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adversary knowledge, reaction, ormovement to CSAR operation area.

• Demographics/Culture 1. Identifylanguages, dialects, ethnic composition(both national and target area).

• Demographics/Culture 2. Describecustoms (social, weapons, religious,cultural, mores).

• Demographics/Culture 3. Identifytensions (regional and national; causes,intensity, degree, and exploitability bythe United States or opposition).

• Demographics/Culture 4. Identifyforeign influences (sources, leaders,themes, influence on government,unions, students, insurgents and generalpublic).

• Demographics/Culture 5. Characterizeattitude of civilians and civilian groupsto US involvement (friendly, unfriendly,or neutral), and for planned USoperations (support, oppose, tolerate).

• Demographics/Culture 6. Estimateassistance available to US forces (extentand capabilities, laborers, linguists,liaison, analysts, administrators);determine attitude of neutral populationtoward host country, threat policies, andactions.

• Demographics/Culture 7. Determineprobable reactions of leadership andpopu la t ion in coun t ry to USunconventional warfare or other SOFactivities. Determine how country willtreat those indigenous personnel whoparticipated in wartime unconventionalwarfare or SOF activities in postconflictenvironment.

• Demographics/Economics 1. Assesscivilian economy and war sustaining

infrastructure; include communitystructures, industrial base and complexes,resources and strategic reserves,petroleum production, storage and/ordistribution, weapons systems and/ormunitions, research and development,stockpiles, electr ic power, andtransportation.

• Demographics/Economics 2. Estimateavailable labor force (location, numbers,equipment, skills).

• Demographics/Economics 3. Assesseffect of any UN and/or internationalsanctions on the country’s ability to wagewar.

• Demographics/Economics 4. Identifyciv i l ian supply shortages. Listcommodities available for potential use byUS forces. Determine status of local foodor market distribution system. Identify foodstocks, stockpiles, and warehouses.

• Demographics/Information 1.Describe information or propagandaservice, apparatus, or organization (keypersonnel, attitude toward the USGovernment, whether usable by USforces) and employment of propagandaand disinformation (current, futurecapabilities).

• Demographics/Information 2.Determine if military personnel haveaccess to commercial radios and/ortelevisions; automated informationmanagement systems; type of printedmaterial they carry, literacy rate,languages used. Provide samples.

• Demographics/International 1.Describe country diplomatic activity.

• Demographics/International 2. Listmembership in international organizations(UN) or groups (Red Cross).

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Representative Intelligence Requirements

• Demographics/International 3.Characterize human rights history(friendly and threat countries); and USpolicy toward country’s human rightsactions.

• Demographics/International 4.Describe country’s government orpopular support of regional insurgencies(groups, movements, type of support).

• Demographics/International 5.Identify foreign military or politicalagents of influence within country.

• Demographics/Medical 1. Determine thehealth threat to friendly forces. Describelocal diseases, extreme environmentalconditions, locally available illegal drugs,and flora and fauna which may contributeto the health threat.

• Demographics/Medical 2. Determinelocal public health facilities status andneeds, to include level of staffingavailable; specific health servicesprovided; health and sanitationconditions; major health-relatedproblems; shortages of medicines,pharmaceuticals, or equipment includingtransportation.

• Demographics/Miscel laneous.Miscellaneous (including currency,holidays, dress, customs, and foreigninfluences).

• Demographics/Political 1. Oppositionto existing US forces, facilities, orinterests (general population andsignificant groups and forces).

• Demographics/Political 2. Describeadversary nation’s political leadershipstructure and dynamics, with particularemphasis on command and controlfacilities. Describe country’s political

structures, parties, and leadershiporganizations.

• Demographics/Political 3. Describecountry’s internal groups (indigenouselements who are members, level ofpopular support, group’s support or non-support of governing regime).

• Demographics/Political 4. Providebiographical sketches of all significantpolitical leaders and advisors and militaryleaders down to d iv is ion leve l(background, education, talents,connections, political affiliations,orientation, US training).

• Demographics/Political 5. Describeanti-government opposition groups orresistance forces (names, organization,leaders, political affiliation, size,support ) ; mi l i tary capabi l i t ies(organization, equipment, training,ability to conduct sabotage, subversion,deception); and communications.

• Demographics/Political 6. Determinethreat to US personnel from oppositionor resistance groups.

• Demographics/Political 7. Identifymilitary or civilian leaders withinpotential insurgent groups who willsupport coalition efforts.

• Demographics/Political 8. Identifymilitary or civilian leaders withinpotential insurgent groups who wouldmake acceptable post-hostility leaders.Identify military and civilian leaders,whom, if protected, would enhance post-hostility restructuring.

• Demographics/Political 9. Assessvulnerabilities of objective countrygovernment to insurgent attack(prioritize).

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• Demographics/Political 10. IdentifyUS-provided materials or servicesurgently needed or required bycooperating indigenous military,paramilitary, resistance forces, or localnationals.

• Demographics/Population. Describearea population characteristics.

• Demographics/Refugees. Estimatenumber of dislocated civilians, disruptionto civilian infrastructure, and refugeemovement. Identify and locate campsand camp managers. Determine supportrequirements (shortages of food,medicine, shelter, clothing).

• Demographics/Religion. Describe keyreligions and impact on ethical ordecision making processes. Identify keyreligious leaders, factions, and groups.

• Demographics/Social Conditions 1.Describe civil disturbance and riotcontrol training (units and theircapabilities).

• Demographics/Social Conditions 2.Determine status and needs of localpublic administrat ion and lawenforcement. Can local, regional, ornational administrators continue essentialfunctions? Identify key leaders of thevarious civil agencies or departments.Status of jails and prisons.

• Demographics/Social Conditions 3.Determine status and capability of power,telecommunications, water, sewage,refuse collection, fire-fighting, and publictransportation services. Are facilitiessecured (by whom)? Identify capabilityto transport water (trailer, tanker). Is localwater potable?

• Environment. Describe adversaryintentions and capabilities to conduct

environmental warfare (oil dumping,ignition of oil field fires, release oftoxins).

• Geography 1. Characterize objectivearea, including country(s), geographiclimits of objective area (geographic orun iversa l t ransverse mercatorcoordinates), and plan or operation(number and name).

• Geography 2. Describe and state thesignificance of objective area.

• Geography 3. Describe geographicterrain features (general description, keynatural and manmade features).

• Geography 4. Describe flora and fauna.Include information of tactical value, e.g.,plants and animals that would impede orassist movement routes, rates, massing,dispersal, identification and acquisitionof forces; the effects on weaponcapabilities; and security considerations.

• Geography/Approaches. Avenues ofapproach into objective area (road, rail,waterway, air) with most likely approachof reinforcements; obstacles, chokepoints, terrain features; special conditions(seasonal variations); fording sites(depth, width, type bottom); trafficability(transit).

• Geography/Hydrography 1. Providehydrographic data (coastal, waterways,lakes), to include tidal activity; currents;temperatures; special conditions(seasonal variations); and depths andunderwater obstacles.

• Geography/Hydrography 2. Identifywater sources (type, source, location,capacity).

• Geography/Hydrography 3. Providedetailed terrain and/or hydrographic data

B-5


on landing beaches within the objectivearea to include nearshore and/or offshorebathymetric data (currents, tides, waveheight, depth, reef conditions, locationof sandbars, beach gradients, frontage,composition, obstacles).

• Geography/Geospatial Informationand Services 1. Provide terrain data (i.e.,prominent geographical or manmadestructures that could be used asnavigational aids for aircraft, troops,cruise missiles or precision-guidedmunitions [PGM]; and characteristics ofslope, soil analysis or surface material)to determine trafficability.

• Geography/Geospatial Informationand Services 2. Provide terrain maps,charts, overlays, imagery or pictomapsin both printed and digital form.

• Geography/Geospatial Informationand Services 3. Provide ocean chartsfor deploying naval forces.

• Geography/Meteorology andOceanography 1. Describe METOCconditions to support air, ground, andnaval operations, artillery, surface-to-surface missile, cruise missile, PGMs,reconnaissance, surveillance andcommunications operations.

• Geography/Meteorology andOceanography 2. Provide historicalMETOC data (including unusualconditions such as sandstorms,blizzards).

• Geopolitical/Allies and CoalitionPartners. Assess true capabilities andvulnerabilities of non-US multinationalforces.

• Geopolitical/Intentions. Determinecountry’s strategic intentions. Identifycountry’s criteria for success.

• Geopolitical/Reaction 1. Determine thereaction of potentially hostile, allied, orneutral international, political, civilian,military, and paramilitary elements toinsertion of US forces into the AOR and/or JOA before or after initiation ofhostilities. Will a third party intervene?

• Geopolitical/Reaction 2. Identifyneighboring countries that have taken anymeasures or may attempt to disrupt USairlift and/or sealift operations. Describetheir capabilities, e.g., units, tactics.Determine which resources will be used.

• Geopolitical/Reaction 3. Identifycountries en route to or in the AOR and/or JOA which will or may deny USoverflight, landing rights, or dockingprivileges.

• Geopolitical/Reaction 4. Determinewhich potential hostile and/or targetcountries in the AOR and/or JOA havedetected US preparations to conduct orsupport military operations in the AORand/or JOA. Estimate their reaction.

• Host-Nation Support. Describelogistics infrastructure existent within thecoalition area for use by US and/orcoalition forces. Estimate level of host-nation support that US forces can expect.

• Host-Nation Support/Logistics. Identifysuitable beaches and/or terrain available forjoint logistics over-the-shore operations.

• Host-Nation Support/Ports 1. Describesea ports (port infrastructure, operationalconsiderations, fuel, cargo handling,transshipment, security).

• Host-Nation Support/Ports 2. Describeairports (type, status, activity), defenses(friendly and unfriendly), combatoperations, facilities, infrastructure,support facilities.

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• Host-Nation Support/Transportation1. Describe transshipment ortransportation capability from air and seaports. Identify major obstacles, chokepoints, limitations, and alternative routes.

• Host-Nation Support/Transportation2. Identify critical C4 and transportationnodes which, if destroyed, would havean adverse impact on USTRANSCOM’sability to deploy and sustain US combatforces.

• Indications and Warning 1. ProvideI&W of potential hostile attacks such asmovement of aircraft to dispersal bases;unusual out of garrison deployments;distribution of wartime stores andsupplies; changes in readiness, alert, andmobilization postures.

• Indications and Warning 2. I&Windicators of preparation by the objectivecountry or opposition forces for actionwithin a 24-hour period for the following:attack, withdraw without engaging,reinforce, defend, delay, conduct specialor NBC operations.

• Infiltration. Identify and describepotential landing zones and drop zones,navigation landmarks and characteristics;availability to US forces; limitations onoperations; choke points betweeninsertion points and objective; andadversary forces threat information atzone and along route.

• Information Warfare/Offensive.Identify and describe offensive IWcapabilities.

• Information Warfare/Defensive.Identify and describe defensive IWcapabilities.

• Intelligence/Adversary Capability.Identify, locate, and describe country

intelligence and CI capabilities by type(SIGINT, HUMINT, IMINT), withparticular emphasis on key facilities,surveillance measures, and night visioncapabilities; include agency, means,effectiveness, biases.

• Lines of Communications 1. Describerailways, to include status, description ofnetwork (graph, overlay, chart), andfactors limiting use. List bridges, tunnels,ferries, locomotives, rolling stock, signaland control systems, railway gauge,terminals.

• Lines of Communications 2. Describeroadways to include status, descriptionof network (graph, overlay, chart), factorslimiting use, and bypass routes. Listbridges, tunnels, ferries, fords, highwaymaintenance, vehicle types.

• Lines of Communications 3. Describewaterways (graph, overlay, chart);beaches suitable for amphibious landing(beach length, configuration, usablelength); interruptions and obstacles; typeof coastline; backshore, foreshore, andnearshore description (width, gradient,composition).

• Lines of Communications 4. Listprimary and exploitable modes oftransportation (trucks, buses, river craft— government, public and commercial).

• Lines of Communications 5. Describepetroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL)(sources, reserves, natural gas stream,production, refining, storage, pipelines,pump and compressor stations, controls,storage tank farms, shipping terminals,distribution), to include developmentcompany and/or nation, vulnerabilities andexploitability by United States for its forces.

• Lines of Communications 6. Describepower grid (generating and distribution

B-7


networks, facilities, loads, maintenance,transmission lines, sources of energy,controls, blackout history, governmentorganizations associated, developmentcompany and/or nation) to includevulnerabilities and exploitability by USforces.

• Lines of Communications/Airfields.Describe airfields (graph, overlay, chart— type, location, capacity, POL, parkingareas, aircraft, base operations andfacilities, development company and/ornation) and factors limiting use and/oravailability.

• Lines of Communications/Information1. Describe public information mediaand telecommunications to includestatus, controlling authority, signalallocation; radio and televisionbroadcasts; print and newspapers;communications network, technologies,equipment and operations.

• Lines of Communications/Information2 . De te rm ine s ta tus o f c i v i ltelecommunications systems; identifyexisting links. Are sufficiently trainedpersonnel available to fully man andoperate the systems? Identify specificskill shortages. Are facilities secured (bywhom)?

• Lines of Communications/Seaports.Describe the threat country’s seaports(port infrastructure, operationalconsiderations, fuel, cargo handling,transshipment, security, developmentcompany and/or nation). Identifyvulnerabi l i t ies, port operat ion,commercial and military shipping traffic.

• Military Assistance 1. Identifycountries committed to providingmilitary assistance (legal, de facto);military advisors, and other personnelalready present (noncombatants, medical,

engineers, by country, location, type ofassistance); combatants or paramilitary(strengths, locations).

• Military Assistance 2. Identify foreigntechnologies (communicat ions,computers, software) or contractorservices, and construction (type of work,frequency, purpose, equipment, location,country or company); and foreign non-weapons military materiel (trucks, heavyequipment).

• Military Assistance 3. Identify foreignor US materiel and services required bythe threat nation. Can the country operatesystems, forces, industries withoutforeign personnel, equipment, orsupplies? How long? What is the impactof cutoff of foreign support? Status ofLOCs.

• Military Capabilities/Air Defense 1.Assess the capabilities and readiness,doctrine, tactics, vulnerabilities,intentions, location, disposition, andsustainability of air defense forces(surface-to-air missile [SAM], anti-aircraft artillery [AAA], radar, sensors)and their support facilities.

• Military Capabilities/Air Defense 2.Identify countries in AOR and/or JOAwhich show indications of preparingair defense forces to intercept US and/or allied air operations. Describe thelong-range fighter interceptcapabilities of the potential threat airdefense forces (adversary andneighboring countries).

• Military Capabilities/Air Defense 3.Locate and identify capability to supportground forces with combat air and airdefense resources (en route to and withinthe objective area), particularly at oraround the forward edge of the battlearea.

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• Military Capabilities/Air Defense 4.Detect, locate, and identify SAM andAAA threat emitters and associatedweapons along ingress and egress routesand within the objective area; determineoperational status, readiness and dutycycle of air defense radars withinobjective area of influence.

• Military Capabilities/Air Defense 5.Detect SAM launch.

• Military Capabilities/Air Defense, EW,and/or ground control intercept (GCI)Radars. Determine precise location andstatus of EW and/or GCI radar sites.

• Military Capabilities/Air Operations1. Assess the capabilities, readiness,sortie rates, munitions, doctrine, tactics,vulnerabilities, intentions, location,disposition (count, track, identify,classify) and sustainability of threat airforces.

• Military Capabilities/Air Operations2. Detect, identify by type, and locatethreat aircraft launch event in operationalarea and determine type of onboardmunitions.

• Military Capabilities/Air Operations3. Track inflight threat aircraft withinthe operational area.

• Military Capabilities/AntimissileDefense/Adversary 1. Detect andidentify any antimissile defense systems,especially those that could affect cruisemissiles along flight path. Determineoperational status of each such system.

• Military Capabilities/AntimissileDefense and/or Adversary 2. Detect,identify by type, and locate antimissilelaunch event.

• Military Capabilities/C4I 1. Detect,locate, classify, characterize and identifycommand posts and/or bunkers by typeunit, computers, communicationsarchitecture and critical C4I nodes.

• Military Capabilities/C4I 2. Describecountry communications profile (type ofinformation on circuit, type ofcommunications, communications tableof organization and equipment, patternof employment, COMSEC equipmentand methods, location), includingcomputer connectivity.

• Military Capabilities/C4I 3. Detectwartime reserve mode usage andanticipated countermeasures.

• Military Capabilities/C4I 4. Determineadversary vulnerability to C2W; listcommunications of military significanceincluding computers and susceptibility toC2W actions.

• Military Capabilities/C4I 5. Assessadversary C2W C2-attack and C2-protectcapabilities and indications ofemployment.

• Military Capabilities/Camouflage,Concealment, and Deception 1. Detect,identify, locate and characterizeadversary CCD techniques withemphasis on use of decoys.

• Military Capabilities/Camouflage,Concealment, and Deception 2.Determine the deception techniques theadversary will most likely accept as truth.Assess the adversary’s ability to pierceUS CCD plan.

• Military Capabilities/Electronic Orderof Battle. Assess the adversary’selectronic resources (including country

B-9


high value airborne resources, EW, GCI,fire control, tracking, and acquisitionradars) capabilities. Evaluate resourcelocation and disposition, sustainabilityand vulnerabilities.

• Military Capabilities/EW. Assesscapability to perform EW, C2W,suppression of enemy air defenses,beaconing, interference, jamming andintrusion, and electronic protection toinclude location, platform, type,specifications, and parametrics ofequipment.

• Military Capabilities/Ground Orderof Battle 1. Determine strength, status,location and identification of adversaryforces with particular emphasis on armor,mechanized infantry, artillery, airdefense, infantry, theater missile, nuclear,biological and chemical warfare units andmunitions.

• Military Capabilities/Ground Orderof Battle 2. Identify, describe and locatefront-line adversary troop movements.

• Military Capabilities/Ground Orderof Battle 3. Detect, classify and locatepossible assembly, staging, dispersal,repair and resupply areas with emphasison mechanized and armored vehicles.

• Military Capabilities/Ground Orderof Battle 4. Detect, locate, classify,identify and determine composition ofhostile forces capable of reinforcing thearea and identify likely reinforcementroutes. Identify, locate and describeadversary follow-on forces and resupplycapability.

• Military Capabilities/Ground Orderof Battle 5. Detect, locate, and identifyby type anti-armor and antipersonnelmines, ditches, barriers, antitank traps,obstacles, field defensive positions, and

night vision capabilities along potentialassault routes and within vicinity ofobjective area.

• Military Capabilities/Logistics 1.Locate and identify combat service andsupport units, to include: transportationunits; forward logistics bases; repair andrepair facilities; ammunition supplypoints and storage areas; and POL sites.

• Military Capabilities/Logistics 2.Identify military units which areexperiencing equipment or logisticsproblems and identify the causes. Assesshow these problems are affecting the unitmission.

• Military Capabilities/Naval 1. Identify,describe, detect and locate threat navalforces (including coast guard andmaritime border guard) to include type,number, capability, equipment, weapons,readiness, doctrine, tactics, munitions,vulnerabilities, disposition and status.

• Military Capabilities/Naval 2. Identifyall surface, subsurface or air contactswithin 150 nautical miles of battle group.

• Military Capabilities/Naval 3. Detect,identify, classify, and track adversarysurface warships.

• Military Capabilities/Naval 4. Detect,identify, classify, and track adversarysubmarines.

• Military Capabilities/Naval 5. Detect,classify, identify, locate, and track (time,position, course, speed) designated navalsurface targets within adversary navaltask force (include target description data,such as size, shape, and compositionneeded for weaponeering).

• Military Capabilities/Naval 6. Detect,locate, and characterize all other vessels

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capable of defending the target within 50nautical miles of the target vessel, or otherobjects that may inhibit missileacquisition of the target.

• Military Capabilities/Naval 7.Identify, locate and describe countryshore-based defensive positions, toinclude fixed and mobile antiship cruisemissile systems, beach defenses, coastalartillery, coastal defense units, andcoastal surveillance networks.

• Military Capabilities/Paramilitary.Describe country’s paramilitary and/orindigenous forces, internal securityforces or police (tables of organizationand equipment, strength, type, number,capability, equipment, weapons, nightoperations).

• Military Capabilities/Rear Area Issues1. Determine presence, location,strength, status, and identification ofconventional forces isolated in friendlyrear areas. Focus on those forces nolonger controlled by higher headquartersthat could continue combat operationsoutside adversary’s intent.

• Military Capabilities/Rear Area Issues2. Detect, identify and locate anti-USsubversive elements within coalitionforce nations.

• Military Capabilities/Rear Area Issues3. Describe adversary or sympathizersability to infiltrate US deployment basesto conduct sabotage or subversiveoperations or attacks.

• Military Capabilities/Rear AreaIssues 4. Detect presence, identity,location, strength, and activity of drugforces in the operational area.

• Military Capabilities/Rear Area Issues5. Describe coalition and/or host nation

foreign intelligence and security services’abilities to effectively collect andwillingness to provide threat informationin support of force protection efforts.

• Military Capabilities/Rear Area Issues6. Describe the intelligence collectionthreat to friendly forces from foreignintelligence and security forces.

• Military Capabilities/SOF-Adversary1. Determine presence, location,strength, doctrine, tactics, status andidentification of country specialoperations forces. Include paramilitaryforces and elements which engage insabotage, espionage, terrorism.

• Military Capabilities/SOF-Adversary2. Determine country special operationsand psychological operations (PSYOP)plans, programs, and capabilities.

• Military Capabilit ies/Space 1.Describe country’s access to space-basedintelligence systems or products. Identifytypes of products or systems and whichcountry and/or consortium provides theaccess and/or products. Locate groundstation downlinks.

• Military Capabilities/Space 2. Assesscountry’s ability to deny US use of spacesystems.

• Military Capabilities/Surface-to-Surface Missiles (SSM) 1. Describe,detect, classify by type, identify, anddiscriminate SSM or theater ballisticmissiles (TBM), particularly those withmobile launchers within range of theobjective area.

• Military Capabilities/SSM 2. Detect,identify by type, and locate missile (SSM,TBM) launch event (friendly, threat,unknown): (a) locate, identify and trackinflight theater missiles; (b) discriminate

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warhead type; (c) project impact point;(d) impact time and/or place, effect.

• Military Capabilities/SSM-Antiship.Detect, identify, classify, and trackcountry SSM and/or antiship missileswithin range of the naval task force.Detect and identify antishipping launcheswithin the AOR and/or JOA.

• Military Capabilities/Training andReadiness 1. Assess general traininglevel of country military units. Assessgeneral level of military equipmentmaintenance and/or repair.

• Military Capabilities/Training andReadiness 2. Describe the readinessposture of military forces, both hostileand friendly, in the AOR and/or JOA.

• Military Capabilities/Weapons.Describe weapon systems and majormilitary equipment items (bothindigenous and foreign). Include type,availability, performance characteristics,strengths, vulnerabilities, maintenanceand logistic capabilities, suppliers,training.

• Military/General. Describe uniformand equipment markings of adversary,coalition, UN.

• Military/Intentions or Strategy 1.Assess adversary force leadership’sintentions (attack, defend, withdraw,reinforce, or delay). Determineadversary commander’s campaign plan.Describe adversary’s military strategy.

• Military/Intentions or Strategy 2.Assess adversary radical employment of“last ditch” weapons or tactics.

• Military/Occupation Policy. Identifymeasures mi l i tary forces have

implemented in occupied areas forphysical and operations security and tocontrol the local population andresources. Identify incidents which haveoccurred between occupation forces andthe local population.

• Noncombatant Evacuation Operation.Update noncombatant evacuationoperation personnel information andadversary counter-tactics. Determinepermiss ive or non-permiss iveenvironment.

• Personnel/Allied. Locate, identify anddetermine status of allied prisoners ofwar, hostages, and diplomats.

• Personnel/EPW. Estimate how manyadversary troops will surrender. Describetheir general medical condition, availablefood supplies, morale, and ability or willto resist EPW controls.

• Personnel/Morale 1. Determine thehealth of opposing forces. Describedegree of nutrition, affects of localdiseases, extreme environmentalconditions and flora and fauna whichadversely affects their health. Determinethe causes and impact of health issuesupon their unit’s mission and capabilities.

• Personnel/Morale 2. Determine moraleof invading military forces; thoughtsabout the war; opinion of their militaryand political leadership; opinion ofmilitary capability and resolve of the US.Determine the impact of this morale uponunit mission and capabilities.

• Personnel/Morale 2. Identify militaryunits which are experiencing disciplineproblems and determine the causes.Assess how this will impact theirmission.

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• Personnel/Morale 3. Identify social,cultural, ethnic, religious, or politicalfriction or animosities which exist amongadversary military personnel.

• Personnel/Morale 4. Determine whatthe civilian and military personnel of thehost nation think of the United Statesand of the military forces in their country.Describe any incidents of internalsubversion against US forces orpersonnel.

• Personnel/Neutrals. Locate, identifyand determine status of US travelers,businessmen.

• Psychological Operations. Identifyitems of US or other friendly PSYOP towhich the adversary forces have beenexposed. Assess the reaction of militaryforces to those materials.

• Public Affairs. Determine releasabilityof operations information (unclassified)to the media.

• Sea Mines and Obstacles 1. Describemine warfare capability.

• Sea Mines and Obstacles 2. Detect,locate, and classify by type and number,surface, subsurface, or land mines andobstacles within vicinity of naval taskforce or designated landing beaches.

• Sea Mines and Obstacles 3. Locate andtrack untethered live sea mines.

• Special Operations Forces/US 1. Providesupport to prioritize SOF targets andselection of ingress and/or egress routes.

• Special Operations Forces/US 2.Determine possible effective PSYOPtechniques.

• Space. Determine if threat nation isexploiting US satellite systems for anymilitary-related system.

• Strategic Lift. Determine the status ofLOCs connecting US and/or coalitionforces with allies and/or supply nodes.

• Targets 1. Determine country strategicand operational centers of gravity.

• Targets 2. Identify, describe, prioritizeand locate fixed and mobile targets.Include critical strategic, operational andtactical facilities, airfields, offensive anddefensive weapons systems, C4Ifacilities, troop concentrations and otheritems of interest.

• Targets 3. Assess target vulnerabilities.

• Targets 4. Determine effect (possiblepolitical, economic, or sociologicalimpact) of damage or destruction of thetarget on the populace or the country’swarmaking potential.

• Targets 5. Provide comprehensive listand geographical position of all protectedfacilities such as hospitals, religiousshrines, art treasures.

• Targets 6. Determine which specifictransportation, media, industrial,communications, or other infrastructuresneed to be protected for intelligencepurposes, for the restoration and/orrestructuring phase, or for use by US and/or coalition forces.

• Targets 7. Provide target identification,including target name, mission number,Basic Encyclopedia number, targetcoordinates, category codes, safe areanumber, and country.

B-13


• Targets 8. Provide contingencytargeting and associated planningmaterials, to include imagery, maps,charts, and target descriptions. Provideupdates during conflict.

• Targets 9. Nominate target sets basedupon violations of war terminationagreements (postconflict).

• Targets/Acquisition. Identify uniquecharacteristics in target appearance andobjects in target vicinity that contributeto or inhibit accurate scene generation fortarget acquisition (include varyingweather, lightning, and seasonalconditions).

• Targets/Area Activity. Describe areaactivity on target (daily, weekly, monthly,seasonal, operational routine), and intarget vicinity (daily, weekly, monthly,seasonal, operational routine in civilianneighborhood, industrial complex,business).

• Targets/Communicat ions andInformation Infrastructure. Describetarget communications and informationinfrastructure to include type (telephone,radio, satellite communications, data fax,computer to computer); informationsecurity methods and procedures; visualsignals or noise; and facilities (switches,power, antenna arrays, cables,personnel).

• Targets/Physical Description 1.Describe target physical layout orfunctional organization key componentlist, critical damage or stress point.

• Targets/Physical Description 2.Describe target facility construction, typematerial, strength of walls, depth of walls,and effects of different types of munitionson facility.

• Targets/Power Sources. Describetarget, primary and alternate powersources (number, type, location, conduitslocation and type); associated facilities(transformers, switches, yards, relays,spares); fuel supply (types above andbelow, or partially below, groundlocation).

• Targets/Security. Locate target securityposts, bunkers, trenches, and describetarget security procedures to includepatrols, lighting, detection systems,barriers and obstacles, entry, internalprocedures and personnel access.

• Targets/Security Forces. Describeadversary ground reaction capability todefend target, to include dedicated orincidental capabilities (strength,equipment, training, weapons, reactiontime).

• Terrorism/Narcotics. Describeterrorist- or narcotics-related threats thatjeopardize combatant commandOPLANs. Include adversary orsupporting groups and organizations;likely areas of operation or targets; tacticsand methods; training areas; andhideouts.

• Threat 1. Determine threat to USpersonnel and advisors.

• Threat 2. Identify safe houses(disposition, size and location).

• Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)1. Determine if the country possessesand if it will use WMD.

• Weapons of Mass Destruction 2.Identify and classify facilities used forproduction or storage of WMD. Locate,identify, and classify threats, precise

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Joint Pub 2-01

location of suspected weapon fabrication,assembly, and storage required.

• Weapons of Mass Destruction 3.Describe the posture and disposition ofcountry NBC munitions, deliverysystems, and units. Confirm or denypresence of, and locate and identify, NBC

warfare-capable units. Characterize anddetermine types and quantities of NBCmunitions possessed by the country.

• Weapons of Mass Destruction 4.Identify threat forces NBC protection,decontamination facilities, andcapabilities (locations and types).

APPENDIX CINTELLIGENCE DISCIPLINES

C-1

This appendix is a classified supplement provided under separate cover. The classifiedAppendix expands on information contained in Joint Pub 2-01, “Joint Intelligence Support toMilitary Operations.” Annexes have been included for each of the intelligence collectiondisciplines: HUMINT, IMINT, SIGINT, MASINT, and OSINT.

ANNEX A Human Intelligence (HUMINT) (U)ANNEX B Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) (U)ANNEX C Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) (U)ANNEX D Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) (U)ANNEX E Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) (U)

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Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX DINTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

D-1

The intelligence estimate is an appraisal of available intelligence on a specific situationused to determine the courses of action open to the adversary and the probability of theiradoption. The format for the intelligence estimate is included below.

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SAMPLE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE FORMAT

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Originating Section Issuing Headquarters*Place of IssueDay, Month, Year, Hour, Zone

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER**

( ) REFERENCES: a. Maps and Charts.b. Other relevant documents.

1. ( ) Mission. State the assigned task and its purpose. The mission of the command asa whole is taken from the commander’s mission analysis, planning guidance, or otherstatement.

2. ( ) Adversary Situation. State conditions that exist and indication of effects of theseconditions on adversary capabilities and the assigned mission. This paragraph describesthe operational area, the adversary military situation, and the effect of these two factors onadversary capabilities.

a. ( ) Characteristics of the Operational Area. Discuss the effect of the physicalcharacteristics of the operational area on military activities of both combatants. If ananalysis of the area has been prepared separately, this paragraph in the intelligenceestimate may simply refer to it, then discuss the effects of the existing situation onmilitary operations in the area.

(1) ( ) Military Geography

(a) ( ) Topography

* When this estimate is distributed outside the issuing headquarters, the first line of theheading is the official designation of the issuing command, and the ending of the estimate ismodified to include authentication by the authorizing section, division, or other officialaccording to local policy.

** Normally, these are numbered sequentially during a calendar year.


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Intelligence Estimate


1. ( )Existing Situation. Describe relief and drainage, vegetation, surfacematerials, cultural features and other characteristics in terms of their effecton key terrain, observation, fields of fire, obstacles, cover and concealment,avenues of approach, lines of communications, and landing areas and zones.

2. ( )Effect on Adversary Capabilities. Discuss the effect of topographyon broad adversary capabilities such as attack and defense, describinggenerally how the topography affects each type of activity. The effect onemployment of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons;amphibious, airborne, or air-landed forces; surveillance devices and systems;communications equipment and systems; electronic warfare; psychologicaloperations, operations security and military deception; logistic support; andother appropriate considerations should be included.

3. ( )Effect on Friendly Course of Action (COA). Discuss the effects oftopography on friendly forces’ military operations (attack, defense) in thesame fashion as for adversary capabilities in the preceding subparagraphs.

(b) ( ) Hydrography

1. ( )Existing Situation. Describe the nature of the sea and the coastlinewithin the amphibious objective area; adjacent islands; location, extent,and capacity of landing beaches and their approaches and exits; nature ofthe offshore approaches, including type of bottom and gradients; naturalobstacles; surf, tide, and current conditions.

2. ( )Effect on Adversary Capabilities. Discuss the effects of the existingsituation on broad adversary capabilities.

3. ( )Effect on Friendly COAs, Discuss the effects of the existing situationon broad COAs for friendly forces.

(c) ( ) Climate and Weather

1. ( )Existing Situation. Describe temperature, cloud cover, visibility,precipitation, light data, and other climate and weather conditions and theirgeneral effects on roads, rivers, soil trafficability, and observation.

2. ( )Effect on Adversary Capabilities. Discuss the effects of the existingclimate and weather situation on broad adversary capabilities.

3. ( )Effect on Friendly COAs. Discuss the effects of the existing climateand weather situation on broad COAs for friendly forces.


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(2) ( ) Transportation

(a) ( ) Existing Situation. Describe roads, railways, inland waterways, airfields,and other physical characteristics of the transportation system; capabilities ofthe transportation system in terms of rolling stock, barge capacities, and terminalfacilities; and other pertinent data.

(b) ( ) Effect on Adversary Capabilities. Discuss the effects of the existingtransportation system and capabilities on broad adversary capabilities.

(c) ( ) Effect on Friendly COAs. Discuss the effects of the existingtransportation system and capabilities on broad COAs for friendly forces.

(3) ( ) Telecommunications

(a) ( ) Existing Situation. Describe telecommunications facilities andcapabilities in the area.

(b) ( ) Effect on Adversary Capabilities. Discuss the effects of the existingtelecommunications situation on broad adversary capabilities.

(c) ( ) Effect on Friendly COAs. Discuss the effects of the existingtelecommunications situation on broad COAs for friendly forces.

(4) ( ) Politics

(a) ( ) Existing Situation. Describe the organization and operation of civilgovernment in the operational area.

(b) ( ) Effect on Adversary Capabilities. Consider the effects of the politicalsituation on broad adversary capabilities.

(c) ( ) Effect on Friendly COAs. Consider the effects of the political situationon broad COAs for friendly forces.

(5) ( ) Economics

(a) ( ) Existing Situation. Describe industry, public works and utilities, finance,banking, currency, commerce, agriculture, trades and professions, labor force,and other related factors.

(b) ( ) Effect on Adversary Capabilities. Discuss the effects of the economicsituation on broad adversary capabilities.


D-5



(c) ( ) Effect on Friendly COAs. Consider the effects of the economic situationon broad COAs for friendly forces.

(6) ( ) Sociology

(a) ( ) Existing Situation. Describe language, religion, social institutions andattitudes, minority groups, population distribution, health and sanitation, andother related factors.

(b) ( ) Effect on Adversary Capabilities. Discuss the effects of the sociologicalsituation on broad adversary capabilities.

(c) ( ) Effect on Friendly COAs. Discuss the effects of the sociological situationon COAs for friendly forces.

(7) ( ) Science and Technology

(a) ( ) Existing Situation. Describe the level of science and technology in theoperational area.

(b) ( ) Effect on Adversary Capabilities. Discuss the effects of science andtechnology on broad adversary capabilities.

(c) ( ) Effect on Friendly COAs. Discuss the effects of science and technologyon broad COAs for friendly forces.

b. ( ) Adversary Military Situation (Ground, Naval, Air, Other Service)

(1) ( ) Strength. State the number and size of adversary units committed andadversary reinforcements available for use in the operational area. Ground strength,air power, naval forces, NBC weapons, electronic warfare, unconventional warfare,surveillance potential, and all other strengths (which might be significant) areconsidered.

(2) ( ) Composition. Outline the structure of adversary forces (order of battle)and describe unusual organizational features, identity, armament, and weaponsystems.

(3) ( ) Location and Disposition. Describe the geographic location of adversaryforces in the area, including fire support elements; command and control facilities;air, naval, and missile forces; and bases.


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(4) ( ) Availability of Reinforcements. Describe adversary reinforcementcapabilities in terms of ground, air, naval, missile, and NBC forces and weapons,terrain, weather, road and rail nets, transportation, replacements, labor forces, prisonerof war policy, and possible aid from sympathetic or participating neighbors.

(5) ( ) Movements and Activities. Describe the latest known adversary activitiesin the area.

(6) ( ) Logistics. Describe levels of supply, resupply ability, and capacity ofbeaches, ports, roads, railways, airfields, and other facilities to support supply andresupply. Consider hospitalization and evacuation, military construction, laborresources, and maintenance of combat equipment.

(7) ( ) Operational Capability to Launch Missiles. Describe the total missilecapability that can be brought to bear on forces operating in the area, includingcharacteristics of missile systems, location and capacity of launch or delivery units,initial and sustained launch rates, size and location of stockpiles, and other pertinentfactors.

(8) ( ) Serviceability and Operational Rates of Aircraft. Describe the total aircraftinventory by type, performance characteristics of operational aircraft, initial andsustained sortie rates of aircraft by type, and other pertinent factors.

(9) ( ) Operational Capabilities of Combatant Vessels. Describe the number, type,and operational characteristics of ships, boats, and craft in the naval inventory; baselocation; and capacity for support.

(10) ( ) Technical Characteristics of Equipment. Describe the technicalcharacteristics of major items of equipment in the adversary inventory not alreadyconsidered (such as missiles, aircraft, and naval vessels).

(11) ( ) Electronics Intelligence. Describe the adversary intelligence-gatheringcapability using electronic devices.

(12) ( ) Information Warfare. Describe the adversary offensive and defensive IWcapabilities.

(13) ( ) NBC Weapons. Describe the types and characteristics of NBC weapons inthe adversary inventory, stockpile data, delivery capabilities, NBC employmentpolicies and techniques, and other pertinent factors.

(14) ( ) Significant Strengths and Weaknesses. Discuss the significant adversarystrengths and weaknesses perceived from the facts presented in the precedingsubparagraphs.


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c. ( ) Adversary Unconventional and Psychological Warfare Situation

(1) ( ) Guerrilla. Describe the adversary capability for, policy with regard to, andcurrent status in the area of guerrilla or insurgent operations.

(2) ( ) Psychological. Describe adversary doctrine, techniques, methods,organization for, and conduct of psychological operations in the operational area.

(3) ( ) Subversion. Describe adversary doctrine, techniques, methods, organizationfor, and conduct of subversion in the operational area.

(4) ( ) Sabotage. Outline adversary organization and potential for and conduct ofsabotage in the operational area.

3. ( ) Adversary Capabilities

a. ( ) Listing each adversary capability that can affect the accomplishment of theassigned mission. Each adversary capability should contain information on thefollowing:

(1) ( ) What the adversary can do.

(2) ( ) Where they can do it.

(3) ( ) When they can start it and get it done.

(4) ( ) What strength they can devote to the task.

b. ( ) In describing adversary capabilities, the J-2 must be able to tell the commanderwhat the adversary can do using its forces in a joint environment. First, of course, the J-2 must assess the adversary’s ground, naval, and air forces. It is customary to enumerateseparately the NBC and unconventional warfare capacities. Hypothetical examplesfollow.

(1) ( ) Ground Capabilities

(a) ( ) The adversary can attack at any time along our front with an estimated6 infantry divisions and 2 tank divisions supported by 24 battalions of artillery.

(b) ( ) The adversary can defend now in its present position with 7 infantry divisionssupported by 2 tank divisions and 16 battalions of medium and light artillery.

(c) ( ) The adversary can reinforce its attack (or defense) with all or part ofthe following units in the times and places indicated:


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UNIT PLACE TIME315th Airborne Div Vic RESOGA 8 hrs after

starting time

41st Motorized Vic CARDINAL 6 hrs afterstarting time

(2) ( ) Air Capabilities

(a) ( ) Starting now, and based on an estimated strength of 300 fighters and100 medium bomber aircraft, the adversary can attack in the operational areawith 240 fighter sorties per day for the first 2 days, followed by a sustained rateof 150 sorties per day, and 60 bomber sorties per day, for 1 day followed by asustained rate of 48 sorties per day.

(b) ( ) Using airfields in the vicinity of , the adversary has sufficienttransport sorties to lift one regiment in a single lift to airfields in the vicinity of____ and ____ within 4 hours’ flying time.

(3) ( ) Naval Capabilities. Starting now, the adversary can conduct sustained seaand air operations in the entire area with 6 DDs, 4 FFs, 1 CV, 7 SSNS, a mine forceof 20 craft, and 70 gunboats and smaller craft now on station in the area.

(4) ( ) Nuclear Capabilities. The adversary can employ at any time and in anypart of the operational area an estimated 40 to 60 nuclear weapons of yields from 2to 50 kt delivered by cannon and rocket artillery, guided missile, and aircraft.

(5) ( ) Biological and Chemical Capabilities. The adversary can employ thebiological and chemical agents , , and in the operational area at anytime delivered by air, cannon, and rocket artillery and by guided missile.

(6) ( ) Unconventional Warfare (UW) Capability. The adversary can conductUW operations in the area within 10 days after starting the operation using dissidentethnic elements and the political adversaries of the current government.

(7) ( ) Joint Capabilities. The adversary can continue to defend its present positionwith 6 infantry divisions, supported by 16 artillery battalions and reinforced by 3mechanized divisions within 8 hours after starting movement. Adversary defensealso can be supported by 150 fighter sorties daily for a sustained period and bycontinuous naval surface and air operations employing 6 DDs, 4 FFs, 7 SSNS, and1 CV.


D-9



4. ( ) Analysis of Adversary Capabilities. Analyze each capability in light of the assignedmission (considering all applicable factors from paragraph 2 above) and attempt todetermine and give reasons for the relative order of probability of adoption by the adversary.Discuss adversary vulnerabilities. In this paragraph, examine the adversary capability bydiscussing the factors that favor or militate against its adoption by the adversary. Whenapplicable, the analysis of each capability should also include a discussion of adversaryvulnerabilities attendant to that capability; i.e., conditions or circumstances of the adversarysituation that render the adversary especially liable to damage, deception, or defeat. Finally,that analysis should include a discussion of any indications that point to possible adoptionof the capability, as in the following:

a. ( ) Attack now with forces along the forward edge of the battle area ....

(1) ( ) The following factors favor the adversary’s adoption of this capability:

(a) ( ) ....

(b) ( ) ....

(2) ( ) The following factors militate against the adversary’s adoption of thiscapability:

(a) ( ) Road and rail nets will not support large-scale troop and supplymovements necessary for an attack in the area.

(b) ( ) Terrain in the area does not favor an attack.

(3) ( ) Adoption of this capability will expose the adversary’s west flank tocounterattack.

(4) ( ) Except for minor patrol activity in the area, there are no indications ofadoption of this capability.

b. ( ) Delay from present positions along the River line ....

(1) ( ) The following factors favor the adversary’s adoption of this capability:

(a) ( ) There are several excellent natural barriers between the Riverand the Mountains.

(b) ( ) The effectiveness of the water barriers will improve, and trafficabilityon the upland slopes of the terrain barriers will deteriorate with advent of themonsoon.


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(2) ( ) The following factors militate against the adversary’s adoption of thiscapability:

(a) ( ) ....

(b) ( ) ....

(3) ( ) In the adoption of this capability, the adversary’s lines of communicationswill be restricted by a limited road and rail net that can easily be interdicted.

(4) ( ) The following facts indicate adoption of this capability:

(a) ( ) Aerial photography indicates some preparation of barriers in successivepositions.

(b) ( ) Considerable troop movement and prepositioning of floating bridgeequipment along the water barriers have been detected.

5. ( ) Conclusions. Conclusions resulting from discussion in paragraph 4 above. Include,when possible, a concise statement of the effects of each capability on the accomplishmentof the assigned mission. Cite adversary vulnerabilities where applicable. This paragraphcontains a summary of adversary capabilities most likely to be adopted, listed in the orderof relative probability if sufficient information is available to permit such an estimate. Ifappropriate, it should also include a concise statement of the effects of each adversarycapability on the accomplishment of the assigned mission. Exploitable vulnerabilitiesshould also be listed, where applicable.

a. ( ) Adversary Capabilities in Relative Probability of Adoption

(1) ( ) Defend in present locations with ....

(2) ( ) Delay from present positions along ....

(3) ( ) Reinforce the defense or delay with ....

(4) ( ) Conduct UW operations in the area ....

b. ( ) Vulnerabilities

(1) ( ) Adversary left (west) flank is open to envelopment by amphibiousassault ....

(2) ( ) The adversary’s air search radar coverage is poor in the left (west) portionof its defensive sector ....


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(Signed) _________________________

J-2

(The staff division chief signs the staff estimates produced by that division. If the estimate isto be distributed outside the headquarters, the heading and signature block must be changedto reflect that fact.)

ANNEXES: (By letter and title) Annexes should be included where the information is ingraphs or of such detail and volume that inclusion makes the body of theestimate cumbersome. They should be lettered sequentially as they occurthroughout the estimate.

DISTRIBUTION: (According to procedures and policies of the issuing headquarters)


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Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX ESECURITY

E-1

1. Overview

a. Security doctrine and proceduressafeguard and protect lives, informationsources, and operations, and facilitate thetimely movement and/or flow anddissemination of raw data and finishedintelligence. All phases of the intelligencecycle are dependent upon the properimplementation and enforcement of securityprocedures to prevent violations andcompromises, and to provide valuable time-sensitive intelligence to commanders. In acrisis situation, especially in a multinationalenvironment, the J-2 must continue tomaintain and enforce thorough and effectivesecurity procedures.

b. The J-2 makes a major contribution tothe success of operational missions throughpeacetime security planning and preparationof tailored support to potential operations aswell as careful consideration of possiblesecurity-related contingencies. Thispreplanning is especially significant duringMOOTW involving multinational forces,which complicates dissemination andreleasability procedures. In all environments, theJ-2 must consider and assess such issues as:

• Properly classifying and/or sanitizingintelligence material to ensure the timelyflow of critical intelligence to the requester,while considering the security implicationsof intelligence exchanges; and

• Using effective CI to enhance deceptionplanning and operations.

2. Personnel Security

a. Among intelligence professionals,vigilance is the watchword, and periodic

security training for all personnel is themethod used to stress awareness and rectifyprocedural deficiencies and shortcomings.Personnel security standards have been metif there is no reasonable basis for doubtingthe person’s loyalty to the US Government.Unified commanders and/or their designeesare authorized to grant, deny, or revokepersonnel security clearances (Top Secret,Secret, Confidential, and Limited AccessAuthorization) for personnel who havenever been determined to be eligible for aclearance; revocation or denial of aclearance can only be done by thecomponent that originally granted theclearance. Unified commanders can grantinterim clearances, administrativelywithdraw clearances, and grant or denyaccess to classified information per theguidelines contained in DOD 5200.2-R,“DOD Personnel Security Program.” TheServices’ senior officials of the intelligencecommunity (SOICs) or their designees maygrant SCI access for their respectiveMilitary Departments. The Director,DIA is responsible for OSD, Joint Staff,the Defense Agencies, and DOD FieldActivities (less NSA/CSS and NRO).

b. An interlocking and mutuallysupporting series of program elements(e.g., need to know, investigation, bindingcontractual obligations on those grantedaccess, security education and awareness,and individual responsibility) providesreasonable assurances against compromiseof classified information. The primarysecurity principle in safeguarding classifiedinformation is to ensure that it is accessibleonly by those persons with an appropriateclearance, access approval, clearlyidentified need to know, and an appropriateindoctrination (for SCI).

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3. Sensitive CompartmentedInformation Facility

Before SCI can be handled, processed, orstored, a SCIF must be accredited based onestablished physical security guidelines. TheSSO is the POC for information onaccreditation authorities and SCIF physicalsecurity guidelines.

a. Establishing and Accrediting a SCIF

• Temporary and/or Emergency SCIFs

•• A SCIF at any level of accreditationmay be established upon the verbal orderof a general and/or commander duringdeclared hostilities or general war.Reconciliation of SCIF activation andoperational data will be made no morethan 180 days after SCIF activation.

•• For operational contingencies, and withprior DIA coordination, a SOIC mayapprove a temporary SCIF for up to 60 days.DIA will assign a SCIF identificationnumber and retain authority to cancel,extend, or change the accreditation. Thereare no specific physical requirements forsuch a SCIF, although sound attenuationproblems should be addressed, the SCIFshould be staffed around-the-clock, andappropriate guards should monitor and/orpatrol the area.

•• A tactical SCIF is a military fieldoperation established during crisis,contingency, or exercise. A tactical SCIFcan be set up and temporarily accreditedby a SOIC. This authority may be furtherdelegated in writing to one lower levelof command. The local approvingauthority may require use of a localtactical deployment checklist. Theelement authorizing establishment of atactical SCIF notifies the accreditationauthority and DIA by message before

starting SCIF operations. The messageformat is shown in Figure E-1.

•• A tactical SCIF may be operatedwithin a randomly selected structure forthe duration of an exercise. If reusedwithin 36 months for SCI discussion, atechnical surveillance countermeasuresevaluation is recommended. During crisisand hostilities, there is no restriction overSCI discussion within a tactical SCIF.

•• A temporary secure working area(TSWA) is a temporarily accreditedfacility used no more than 40 hours permonth for handling, discussing, orprocessing SCI. SOICs and unifiedcommand senior intelligence officers(SIOs) may approve TSWAs for all levelsof SCI. SOICs, SIOs and DIA mayapprove electronic processing of SCI ina TSWA. Approval of temporary storageof SCI, not to exceed 6 months, may begranted by DIA or a Service.

•• Shipboard SCIFs. A shipboardtactical facility requires submission of theshipboard accreditation checklist to theNavy accreditation authority. Temporaryshipboard accreditation is approved bySOIC Navy for units which may deployfor emergency contingencies, not toexceed a 12-month deployment period.Permanent accreditation is approved bySOIC DIA.

•• Aircraft SCIFs. Aircraft will beaccredited through establishedaccreditation channels. Transports andcourier aircraft transporting SCI materialbetween airfields do not requireaccreditation; however, compliance withSCI material and communicationsdirectives are mandatory. Aircrafttemporarily configured for SCI missionsby installing pallets, vans, or containersaboard, will be accredited by the

E-3

Security

appropr ia te SOIC hav ing SCIcognizance. Cont ingency andemergency deployment aircraft,operating with SCI processing aboard,may be operated as a tactical SCIF inaccordance with Director, CentralIntelligence Directive (DCID) 1/21,“Physical Security Standards for SCIFs.”

b. Tactical SCIF Security. Althoughsecurity is necessary for the integrity of aSCIF, the SSO determines the degree ofsecurity to be maintained, taking theoperators’ needs and the local situation intoaccount. Security should support, rather thanrestrict, the mission. Recommendedguidelines for maintaining SCIF securityinclude the following.

• Staff the tactical SCIF with sufficientpersonnel as determined by the on-sitesecurity authority based on the localthreat conditions.

• Locate the tactical SCIF within thesupported headquarters’ defenseperimeter.

• Post armed guards to protect the entireperimeter of the SCIF compound.Maintain radio or wire communicationswith the guard and reserve force.

• Use a single entrance and access controlprocedures.

Figure E-1. Sample Tactical Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility OperationsMessage Format

SAMPLE TACTICAL SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTEDINFORMATION FACILITY OPERATIONS

MESSAGE FORMAT

FROM: (Originator's Message Address)

TO: SSO DIA//DAC-2A//

CLASSIFICATION

SUBJECT: TACTICAL SCIF OPERATION (U)

1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.

9.10.11.12.

(U)(U)(U)(U)(U)(U)(U)(U)

(U)(U)(U)(U)

DIA SCIF-ID number of parent SCIF.Name of Tactical SCIF.Deployed from location.Deployed to location.SCI level of operations.Operational period.Name of exercise or operation.Identification of facility used for SCIF operations (e.g., vans,buildings, tents).Points of contact.Description of security measures.Comments.POC FOR THE ACTION: (name, office symbol, and telephonenumber).

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• Keep emergency destruction andevacuation plans current and displayed.

• Store SCI materials in lockablecontainers when not in use.

• Incorporate the SCIF physical securityplan into the perimeter defense plan.

• Store no more intelligence than can bedestroyed in a reasonable amount of time.

c. Assignments of Foreign Representativesto a SCIF. Prior to the assignment of foreignpersonnel to a SCIF, the subordinate jointforce J-2 must consider the scope of theforeigner’s role in relation to the environment.Foreign representatives in a SCIF should bephysically located so that they may workeffectively without being inadvertentlyexposed to restricted data. If a tactical SCIFis in a multinational environment with aUS-only area, the US-only area must be keptseparate from any multinational operations.The guard(s) must be a US citizen. The J-2,in coordination with the SSO, should ensureconstant oversight of non-intelligenceelements residing in the SCIF to ensure thatthere will be no compromise of operationalmatters.

4. Sanitizing and/or ReleasingIntelligence

a. US government policy is to treatclassified military information as a nationalsecurity asset, which may be shared withforeign governments and internationalorganizations only when there is a clearlydefined advantage to the United States. USnational interests require that foreigngovernments provide US classifiedinformation with a degree of securityprotection comparable to what it wouldreceive while under US control. There are anumber of international and bilateral securityagreements in effect to ensure this. However,in exceptional cases it will be in US interests

to make information available to a foreigngovernment before concluding an agreement,even if the recipient government’s safeguardsappear inadequate. In these cases, whenauthorized by the National Disclosure PolicyCommittee (NDPC) as exceptions to policy,a balance is sought between US nationalinterests and the security of the classifiedinformation.

b. National Disclosure Policy (NDP)-1governs how the United States releasesmilitary information to foreign governmentsand international organizations andestablishes eligibility criteria to receivereleasable information. Detailed proceduresfor handling, processing, downgrading,release and sanitization of these materialsexist. Key national security policy andsecurity manuals are included in AppendixJ, “References.”

c. Intelligence information, even thoughit bears no restrictive control markings, mayonly be released in its original form to foreigngovernments or international organizationswith the permission of the originator and inaccordance with DCID 5/6, “IntelligenceDisclosure Policy” and NDP-1. Informationcontained in intelligence products or reportsof another intelligence communitycomponent, which bears no restrictive controlmarkings, may be used by recipientintelligence community components inreports provided to foreign governmentsprovided that the following is true.

• Foreign release occurs throughestablished foreign disclosure andprocedures.

• No reference is made to the originatingagency or to the source documents uponwhich the released product is based.

• The information is extracted orparaphrased to ensure that the source ormanner of acquisition of the intelligence

E-5

Security

and/or location where the intelligencewas collected (if relevant to protectsources or methods) is not revealed andcannot be deduced in any manner.

• RESTRICTED DATA and FORMERLYRESTRICTED DATA are prohibitedfrom foreign dissemination under theprovisions of Public Law 585, AtomicEnergy Act of 1954, as amended.

d. Even though it bears no restrictivecontrol markings, intelligence will not bereleased, either in its original form orotherwise, to foreign nationals or immigrantaliens (including those employed by, used by,or integrated into the US government)without the permission of the originator andin accordance with DCID 5/6, “IntelligenceDisclosure Policy” and NDP-1.

e. An SSO can provide more detailedinformation on SCI policy and procedures, andthe DISO assigned to the cognizant combatantcommand can help to seek exemptions tosecurity policy from national agencies. Thecombatant commander is responsible for therelease of intelligence and should request thatintelligence producers tailor their product so asto minimize the use of caveats.

f. As shown in Figure E-2, and apart fromthe exceptions listed in Figure E-3, militaryinformation is divided into eight functionalcategories by the NDPC. In almost all cases,intelligence under consideration for release atthe subordinate joint force J-2 level will be inCategory 8. Combatant command requests fordisclosure of NDPC-exception categories ofintelligence information will be made inaccordance with the policies and directives ofthe DOD, intelligence community members, orother office responsible for the information.

g. Classified information may only bedisclosed when the following applies.

• Disclosure is consistent with US foreignpolicy and national security objectivesconcerning the recipient foreigngovernment or international organization.

• Disclosure can be expected to result in aclearly identifiable advantage to theUnited States.

• It can be reasonably assumed that thedisclosed information would not be usedagainst US interests.

h. Release Policies and Procedures.J-2s should consider the following whendetermining whether to release classifiedinformation.

• Determine recipient country’s eligibilityto receive military intelligence. If thecountry is not eligible yet meets theconditions listed below, a request forexemption to NDP can be made throughthe combatant command’s ForeignDisclosure Officer.

• Determine recipient’s need to know. Anyrecipient, whether a member of the USmilitary or a foreign government, musthave a “need to know” before beingprovided with US intelligence. Whiledetermining need may be difficult, theJ-2 may rely on common sense andknowledge of the situation. For example,Country X has a legitimate need to knowabout Country Y-sponsored terroristactivities in the region. However, sinceCountry X faces no direct military threatfrom Country Y, it has no need to knowand is not eligible to receive informationon Country Y’s order of battle. Wherenecessary, a decision may be based onpolitical and/or military expediency.

• The gain must clearly outweigh the riskof compromising the source. This is most

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Figure E-2. National Disclosure Policy Functional Categories ofClassified Military Intelligence

12345678

NATIONAL DISCLOSURE POLICY FUNCTIONALCATEGORIES OF CLASSIFIED MILITARY

INTELLIGENCE

Organization, Training and Employment of US MilitaryForces

US Military Materiel and Munitions. Systems inservice and the training to operate and maintain

Applied Research and Development Information andMateriel

Production Information. Technical data to producemateriel of US origin. All classified disclosures requirean exception to policy

Combined Military Operations, Planning andReadiness. Applies to US and/or foreign governmentmilitary operations and joint and/or leased installations

US Order of Battle

North American Defense

Military Intelligence. Information of a military characterpertaining to foreign nations

easily ensured by sanitizing the originalreport to protect the source.

• Release intelligence only to the levelof command necessary, as determinedby the J-2.

• As noted above, except in exceptionalcircumstances, the organizationreceiving the intelligence mustreasonably be expected to afford the samedegree of protection against compromiseas would US channels.

i. Key points on release of classifiedmaterial are listed in Figure E-4.

5. ADP Security

a. The authority to permit the automatedprocessing of intelligence information isvested in the Director, DIA, who has theresponsibility to ensure that the risks posedduring processing are outweighed by the gain.Specifically, this means that adequate securityof contractor and DOD (less NSA/CSS)automated information systems and the

E-7

Security

EXCEPTIONS TONATIONAL

DISCLOSUREPOLICY COMMITTEE

- CONTROLLEDCLASSIFIED

INFORMATION

Atomic Information.RESTRICTED DATA/FORMERLY

RESTRICTED DATA

Naval nuclear propulsion information

Proprietary information.Rights owned by private firms or

individuals

Intelligence sources and methodsinformation protected by the Director of

Central Intelligence

National intelligence consisting offoreign intelligence

Communications security andintelligence, including equipment,

controlled by the NationalCommunications Security Committee

Narcotics intelligence

RELEASE OFCLASSIFIEDMATERIAL

Intelligence is not releasable inits original form to foreigngovernments without the

permission of the originator

Intelligence without restrictivecontrol markings may be usedin reports provided to foreign

governments if:

No reference is made tothe source documents

The information isextracted or paraphrasedto ensure that the sourcesand methods are notrevealed

Foreign release is madethrough foreign disclosurechannels and procedures

Figure E-3. Exceptions to NationalDisclosure Policy Committee-Controlled

Classified Information

security of systems (networks) that store,process and/or transmit sensitive foreignintelligence information, are under thecognizance of the Director, DIA. DIAmanages the DODIIS Computer SecurityProgram in accordance with the appropriateDOD and DCI directives.

b. As far in advance of joint operations aspossible, personnel responsible forestablishing security (in coordination withthose responsible for determining theinformation system and/or connectivityrequirements) should contact DIA. Theymust inform DIA of the names andaccreditation status of systems to be usedduring the operation, as well as planned inter-connectivity. DIA will work with plannersto balance security requirements withoperational requirements.

Figure E-4. Release of Classified Material

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Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX FDEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SHARED

PRODUCTION PROGRAM

F-1

1. Introduction

The DODIPP was established in responseto Congressional mandate to reduceduplication of effort within the DODIPC.Central to the DODIPP concept is the sharingof production. Production responsibilities areassigned to capitalize on the analytical andproduction resources of the entire DODIPCto focus expertise and maximize output forthe consumer. The structure is an explicit,logical division of activities, responsibilities,and accountability among national, Service,and combatant command production centersbased on traditional roles as specified in title10 of the United States Code and the national-level military intelligence requirementsforums. The SPP is based on data basesproduced by two or more intelligenceproduction centers. These producers areresponsible for all production based on thesubstantive topics in the shared data base.

2. Responsibilities

a. In the event of a crisis or war, defenseproduction support will focus on the NMJIC,which will form intelligence work groups orintelligence task forces as necessary inaccordance with designated responsibilitiesand procedures. RFIs/PRs from the crisis and/or engaged joint force will be transmitted toits combatant command VO which, if unableto satisfy the RFI/PR, will forward it to theNMJIC. All other RFIs/PRs relating to thecrisis will be forwarded through normal VOchains of command to the NMJIC, which willbe the single DOD VO for all other RFIs/PRsrelated to the crisis.

b. The Defense Intelligence ProductionFunctional Manager (DI/DIA) is responsible

for ensuring that DODIPC productionsupports the NMJIC during a crisis or conflict.The NMJIC will have the authority to assignPRs and reprioritize ongoing crisis-relatedproduction in coordination with the combatantcommands. The Defense IntelligenceProduction Functional Manager will retainoversight of non-crisis-related DODIPCproduction, adjusting production schedules asnecessary.

c. The Director, DI acts as the executiveagent for production issues for the Director,DIA. Key responsibilities (for a complete listof responsibilities, see DOD-0000-151-YR,“DOD Intelligence Production Program”)include the following:

• Evaluate DODIPP production centerproduction and capabilities inconjunction with the combatantcommands, Services, and appropriateDefense agencies through productionprogram reviews at each DODIPCproduction center.

• Assign and change DODIPP responsibilitiesas required in coordination with theappropriate combatant command,Serv i ce , and De fense agencyrepresentatives.

• Assist production centers in developingneeded capabilities; identify, coordinate,and program resource requirements tomeet DODIPP responsibilities; and serveas an advocate for SPP resource planningand application.

• Initiate management coordination whenp r o b l e m s a r i s e , a n d m e d i a t edisagreements.

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Appendix F

Joint Pub 2-01

• Manage the coordination of SPP database requirements and specifications toestablish DOD-wide standards forapplicable data elements, documentation,and communicat ions. Provideimplementation guidance and schedulesfor approved changes and monitorimplementation.

• Maintain active, continuous, andmeaningful communication withproduction centers on improving theproduction of substantive intelligence.

• Act as advocate for collectionrequirements to support the currency andvalidity of SPP production.

d. Based on DODIPP guidelines, MilitaryService intelligence chiefs are charged withthe same responsibilities as the combatantcommands for DODIPP tasks through Servicechannels (for a complete list of responsibilities

see DOD-0000-151-YR, “DOD IntelligenceProduction Program”) to include thefollowing:

• Validating requirements and producingintelligence to satisfy title 10responsibilities in support of the ServiceSecretaries’ responsibilities.

• Coordinating and accomplishingplanning, programming, and budgetaryactions to support the SPP, includinganalytical, automated intelligencesystem and telecommunicationcapability requirements identified byproduction centers and supportedcommands.

• Ensuring that adequate trainingcapabilities are available for currentand future analytical intelligencepersonnel to support productionresponsibilities.

APPENDIX GJOINT EXPLOITATION CENTERS

G-1

1. Overview

a. The exploitation of captured adversaryequipment and documents and theinterrogation and debriefing of EPW,detainees, refugees, and other capturedadversaries, provides significant collectionopportunities. The information obtainedthrough this exploitation, coupled with thatderived from other collection assets orresources, may provide the JFC (through theJ-2) a more complete picture of an unfoldingoperation and adversary capability. The in-theater exploitation of these sources isaccomplished at the three exploitation centers:the JCMEC, the JDEC, and the JIDC. (FigureG-1) Whenever possible, the three centersshould be collocated in the same operationalarea to facilitate rapid exchange of data.Short-term exploitation of captured materieland documents as well as interrogation ordebriefing of EPWs, refugees and othersources may be of immediate tactical value.Such debriefings can provide informationimportant for decisions regarding the targetingcycle and tempo of operations. Tacticalexploitation by trained intelligence personnelmust be accomplished as soon as possible andat the lowest possible tactical level.Long-term exploitation of the same materialand sources at joint force level may providevaluable operational, strategic and technicaldata. Further exploitation may be continuedout of theater where there are better facilitiesfor detailed research and analysis. TheJCMEC, JDEC, and JIDC all conductexploitation in the AOR and/or JOA, but theirfunctions are not limited solely to combatoperations. Both peacekeeping operations andrefugee relief, for example, could requireconfiscating weapons and contraband; andrefugee relief could also require screeningrefugees for critical information. In MOOTW

the names of these centers may be changed toreflect the type of operations being supported.

b. Joint Captured Materiel ExploitationCenter. The recovery of adversary equipmentis both a combatant command and nationalrequirement. Subsequent exploitation ofcaptured enemy equipment (CEE) can providecritical information on adversary strengths andweaknesses that may favorably influenceoperation planning. This exploitation isgenerally done in a JCMEC. Combatantcommands or subordinate joint forces shouldnotify the NMJIC through command channelsthat they require JCMEC support. This willensure that appropriate Service componentresources will be allocated.

Figure G-1. Joint Exploitation Centers

JOINT EXPLOITATIONCENTERS

Joint CapturedMateriel

ExploitationCenter

JointDocument

ExploitationCenter

JointInterrogation

and DebriefingCenter

Enemy Prisonerof War Sites

Subordinate joint forceJ-2X or human intelligence

operations cell

Exploitation ofCaptured Enemy

Equipment

DocumentExploitation

NAIC, ONI, NGICThe Services

NAVEODTECHDIV

G-2

Appendix G

Joint Pub 2-01

• Organization. The Foreign MaterielProgram is the focus for forming aJCMEC to conduct exploitation of CEE.A JCMEC is formed of Foreign MaterielProgram personnel from the Services’technical intelligence organizations andNaval Explosive Ordnance Disposal. Itis activated during periods of joint forcedeployments, deployed to thecombatant command, and normallyassigned to and under the combatantcommand (command authority) of theCINC. DIA supplies a TechnicalIntelligence Branch from w h i c h t h eJ - 2 e x e r c i s e s s t a f f responsibilityover all matters pertaining to CEE,i n c l u d i n g p r i o r i t i z i n grequirements for CEE, technicalintelligence reporting, and coordinatingwith the J-3 and J-4. The J-2 alsoevaluates the mission and situation anddetermines the potential for capturingadversary materiel. These factorsdetermine the size and composition of theJCMEC.

• Responsibilities. The combatantcommand approves establishment oftheater collection points recommendedby the J-2 and sets the priority for therecovery and movement of CEE to thosecollection points and CONUS. Thesubordinate joint force and subordinatecommands provide access to CEEcollection points to JCMEC personneland other supporting specialists. Thesepersonnel then evacuate CEE deemed tobe valuable for intelligence or other DODrequirements. The exploitation of CEEbelow Army division and separatebrigade, Marine Corps expeditionaryforce command element, and Navy andAir Force component levels is limited.Units below these levels are responsiblefor recovering adversary materiel andreporting its capture. Medical equipmentand materiel should be exploited in thesame manner as other CEE, except that

cooperation and collaboration with localmedical units should be established usingGeneva Convention guidelines.Normally, a Service componentcommander or the joint force landcomponent commander (if designated)establishes the JCMEC facility andprovides or coordinates all necessarylogistics, communications, siting, andtransportation support for the JCMEC.

c. Joint Document Exploitation Center.Document exploitation, like equipmentexploitation, is both a combatant commandand national requirement. Generally,documents may be moved much more easilythan CEE and will contain information on alarge range of topics. Captured documentsprovide information on adversary intentionsand planning (including deception); locations;dispositions; tactics; communications;logistics; morale; intelligence requirementsand assessments; psychological operationsefforts aimed at friendly forces, adversaryforces, and the civil populace; and equipmentuse, status, and operation. The JDEC shouldbe centralized, staffed, and equipped to be ableto dispatch JDEC teams to lucrative targets(e.g., adversary field staff or commandlocations, facilities, or vehicles, airfields, orother facilities) as soon after capture aspossible, or with maneuver units when suchtargets are anticipated. Combatant commandsor subordinate joint forces requiring a JDECshould notify the NMJIC through commandchannels, requesting JDEC operationssupport.

• Organization. The DIA focus forforming a JDEC is the DocumentExploitation Branch of the Directoratefor Information Systems and Services.As with the JCMEC, it is activated duringperiods of joint force deployments,deployed to the combatant command,and normally assigned to and underthe combatant command (commandauthority) of the CINC. The subordinate

G-3

Joint Exploitation Centers

joint force J-2 exercises staffresponsibility over all matters pertainingto document exploitation, includingprioritizing requirements, intelligencereporting, and coordinating with thesubordinate joint force J-3 and J-4. TheJ-2 also evaluates the mission andsituation and determines the potential forcapturing adversary documents. Thesefactors determine the size andcomposition of the JDEC.

• Responsibilities. The combatantcommand approves priority for therecovery and movement of documents totheater collection points and the CONUSas recommended by the J-2. Thesubordinate joint force and subordinatecommands provide access to captureddocuments to JDEC personnel and othersupporting specialists. These personnelevacuate documents deemed to bevaluable for intelligence or other DODrequirements. Document exploitationcapabilities exist at the Army corps,Army light infantry division, and in thecommand element of the Marine air-ground task force, with the organiccapabilities of the Navy and Air Forcebeing more limited. Units below theselevels are responsible for recoveringadversary documents and reporting theircapture. Normally, a Service componentcommander or the joint force landcomponent commander, if designated,establishes the JDEC facility andprovides or coordinates all necessaryJDEC personnel, logistics, communications,siting, and transportation support.

d. Joint Interrogation and DebriefingCenter. The JFC normally tasks the Armycomponent commander to establish, secure,and maintain an EPW camp system. Undersome circumstances, particularly duringMOOTW, the JFC may designate another

component commander to be responsible forthe EPW camp system. The subordinate jointforce J-2 establishes a JIDC for follow-onexploitation. The establishment (when,where, and how) of the JIDC is highlysituation dependent, with the main factorsbeing the geographic nature of the JOA, thetype and pace of military operations, the campstructure, and the number and type of thesources. The JIDC may be a central site whereappropriate EPW are segregated forinterrogation, or it may be more of aclearinghouse operation for dispatch ofinterrogators or debriefers to other locations.

• Organization. The JIDC interrogationand debriefing activities are managed bythe subordinate joint force HUMINTstaff section or HOC. The HOC willcoordinate with the TFCICA within theJ-2X for CI augmentation forexploitation of those personnel of CIinterest, such as civil and/or militaryleadership, intelligence or politicalofficers and terrorists. The staff isaugmented by deployed DHS personnel,linguists and, as required, componentpersonnel. The HUMINT appendix ofAnnex B (Intelligence) to the OPLANor CONPLAN contains JIDC planningconsiderations.

• Responsibilities. Service componentinterrogators collect tactical intelligencefrom EPWs based on joint force J-2criteria. EPWs (i.e., senior level EPWs)are screened by the components andthose of further intelligence potential areidentified and processed for follow-oninterrogation and debriefing by the JIDCto satisfy theater strategic and operationalrequirements. In addition to EPW, theJIDC may also interrogate civiliandetainees, and debrief refugees as wellas other non-prisoner sources foroperational and strategic information.

G-4

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Joint Pub 2-01

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX HINTELLIGENCE CYCLE EXECUTION RESPONSIBILITIES

H-1

The intelligence cycle execution responsibilities for the Joint Staff J-2, combatant commandJ-2, subordinate joint force J-2, subordinate joint force components and the Military Servicesare depicted below.

H-2

Appendix H

Joint Pub 2-01

PLANNING AND DIRECTION

Long-Range, Strategic Planning. Forms Intelligence Working Groups/ Intelligence Task Forces. Augments JTF with NIST, DHS.

Joint Staff J-2/DIA

Combatant Command J-2

Writes intelligence annex, develops CIAP and theater TTPs.Identifies communications / logistics requirements. Tailors JIC forcrisis support. Requests personnel augmentees and augmentsJTF JISE as required.

Subordinate Joint Force J-2Forms JISE. Identifies personnel / C4I equipment requirements.Establishes command relationships with components. ActivatesJ-2X.

Subordinate Joint Force Components

Supporting assigned forces.

Military Services

Provide trained personnel / interoperable C4I equipment perCIAP and theater TTPs. Augment other commands, as directed.

C4I

CIAPDHSDIAJ-2J-2XJICJISEJTFNISTTTP

Communications, Control, Communications, Computers andIntelligenceCommand Intelligence Architecture PlanDepartment of Human ServicesDefense Intelligence AgencyDirector of Intelligence; Joint StaffCounterintelligence/Human Intelligence Staff ElementJoint Intelligence CenterJoint Intelligence Suppor t ElementJoint Task ForceNational Intelligence Suppor t TeamTactics, Techniques, and Procedures

Figure H-1. Planning and Direction

H-3

Intelligence Cycle Execution Responsibilities

COLLECTION

Coordinates and levies nationalsystem tasking. Responds to RFI.

Joint Staff J-2/DIA

DIAJ-2JTFPIRRFI

Monitors national system tasking,conducts liaison, responds to RFI.

Primary responsibility forcollection management. Developstheater collection plan.

Coordinates theater sensors andother assets, deconflicts PIR,tasks theater sensors.


Identifies, prioritizes, validates RFI.Develops synchronized collectionplan. Tasks components.

Identifies, prioritizes, and taskscollection by components.

Subordinate Joint Force J-2

Identifies, prioritizes PIR / RFI.Manages organic capabilities.Supports JTF.

Collect intelligence as tasked.Conduct collection from targets ofopportunity.


Provide trained personnel /interoperable collection system.

Provide trained personnel andassets.

Military Services

Defense Intelligence AgencyDirector for Intelligence; Joint StaffJoint Task ForcePriority Intelligence RequirementsRequest for Information

Management Operations

Figure H-2. Collection

H-4

Appendix H

Joint Pub 2-01

PROCESSING AND EXPLOITATION

Establishes C4I standings; provides personnel augmentees.

Joint Staff J-2/DIA


Manages theater processing; ensures that JTFs have requiredcapabilities.


Operates deployable joint processing center when required.


Receives results from JTF processing center.

Military Services

Field deployable processing systems; train/equip forces.

C4I

DIAJ-2JTF

Command, Control, Communications, Computers, andIntelligenceDefense Intelligence AgencyDirector of Intelligence; Joint StaffJoint Task Force

Figure H-3. Processing and Exploitation

H-5

Intelligence Cycle E

xecution Responsibilities

Figure H-4. Production - Part One

PRODUCTION - PART ONE

Joint StaffJ-2/DIA

CombatantCommand J-2

Indications &Warning (I&W)

CurrentIntelligence

General MilitaryIntelligence

TargetIntelligence

Science &Technology (S&T)

Principal agent;worldwide; theaterbackup

Department ofDefense focal pointfor fused all-sourceanalysis andreporting

Intelligencecommunications. All-source assessments.Manages DefenseIntelligence Agencydistribution process(DPP)

Supports Commanderin Chief (CINC) / jointtask force battledamage assessmentcell. Train target(Intelligence)personnel.

Manages Departmentof Defense scientificand technical centers;coordinates scientificand technicalintelligencerequirements withCINC; provides jointcaptured materielexploitation centerpersonnelaugmentees

Theater expert;operates I&W center

Authoritative theaterestimates; maintainsdata bases

Theater assessments;maintains data bases;DPP participant

Target systemanalysis; producestarget validationmaterials; battledamage assessmentvalidation targetdevelopment; targetnominal

Validates nationaltechnical intelligencerequirements;coordinatesmovement ofcaptured materiel

H-6

Appendix H

Join

t Pu

b 2

-01

PRODUCTION - PART TWO

SubordinateJoint Force J-2

Indications &Warning (I&W)

CurrentIntelligence

General MilitaryIntelligence

TargetIntelligence

Science &Technology (S&T)

I&W consumers;monitors / reports

Mission specificintelligence;prioritizes request forintelligence

User of generalmilitary intelligence;tailors to joint taskforce focus

Collates operationalbattle damageassessment; targetanalysis; targetdevelopment; targetnominal

Executes technicalintelligence mission inthe operational area

SubordinateJoint Force

Components

I&W consumers;monitors / reports

Customers; providerequest forintelligence to jointtask force jointintelligence supportelement

IntelligenceProduction Schedule

Report mission battledamage assessment;target analysisdeconfliction; targetdeveloping; targetnominal weaponeering

Provide technicalintelligence collectionrequirements toforces

Military Services I&W consumers; trainpersonnel in defenseI&W system

Customers; augmentNational Military JointIntelligence Center

DPP participants;augment jointintelligence centerproduction

Train target personnel;provide specializedfunctional products

Manage scientific andtechnical centers;provide personnelaugmentees to jointtask force; providespecialized analysis

Figure H-4. Production - Part Two

H-7

Intelligence Cycle Execution Responsibilities

DISSEMINATION AND INTEGRATION

Worldwide hard/soft copy publishing and dissemination; archives.Manages Department of Defense Intelligence Information

System (DODIIS). "PUSH" system.

Joint Staff J-2/DIA


Theater publication; archives. Push and pull dissemination.


Disseminates to components. Pull system.


Ensure dissemination to tactical forces. Pull system.

Military Services

Ensure dissemination to non-deployable / in-garrison forces. Pullsystem.

DIAJ-2

Defense Intelligence AgencyDirector for Intelligence, Joint Staff

Figure H-5. Dissemination and Integration

H-8

Appendix H

Joint Pub 2-01

EVALUATION

Customer satisfaction/feedback.

Joint Staff J-2/DIA

Recommend improvements for "push/pull" products.Feedback to requesters.


Feedback to requesters.


Provide feedback on all products requested / pushed.


Provide feedback on all products requested / pushed.

Military Services

Defense Intelligence AgencyDirector for Intelligence, Joint Staff

DIAJ-2

Figure H-6. Evaluation

APPENDIX JREFERENCES

J-1

The development of Joint Pub 2-01 is based upon the following primary references.

1. National Security Act of 1947, as amended.

2. Title 10, United States Code Armed Forces, as amended.

3. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

4. Executive Order 12333, “United States Intelligence Activities.”

5. Executive Order 12958, “Classified National Security Information.”

6. Joint Pub 1, “Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States.”

7. Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).”

8. Joint Pub 1-0, “Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations.”

9. Joint Pub 1-01, “Joint Publications System, Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques,and Procedures Development Program.”

10. Joint Pub 1-02, “DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.”

11. Joint Pub 2-0, “Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations.”

12. Joint Pub 2-01.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Intelligence Supportto Targeting.”

13. Joint Pub 2-01.2, “Joint Doctrine, and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures forCounterintelligence Support to Operations.”

14. Joint Pub 2-02, “National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.”

15. Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations.”

16. Joint Pub 5-0, “Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.”

17. Joint Pub 5-00.2, “Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.”

18. Joint Pub 6-0, “Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer(C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations.”

19. Joint Pub 6-02, “Joint Doctrine for Employment of Operational/Tactical Command,Control, Communications, and Computer Systems.”

J-2

Appendix J

Joint Pub 2-01

20. NDP-1, “National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified MilitaryInformation to Foreign Governments and International Organizations.” (Short Title: NationalDefense Policy)

21. DOD 5200.2-R, “DOD Personnel Security Program.”

22. DOD Directive S-5210.36, “Provision of DOD Sensitive Support to DOD Componentsand Other Departments and Agencies of the US Government.”

23. DOD Directive 5205.1, “Acquisition and Reporting of Information Relating to NationalSecurity.”

24. DOD Directive 5230-11, “Disclosure of Classified Military Information to ForeignGovernments and International Organizations.”

25. DOD Directive 5240.1, “DOD Intelligence Activities.”

26. DOD-0000-151-YR, “DOD Intelligence Production Program.”

27. DOD-0000-151A-YR, “DOD Intelligence Production Program: ProductionResponsibilities” (U).

28. DOD-0000-151B-YR, “DOD Intelligence Production Program: Production Priorities”(U)

29. DOD-0000-151C-YR, “DOD Intelligence Production Program: Production Procedures”(U)

30. DOD S-5105.21-M-1, “Sensitive Compartmented Information Administrative SecurityManual.”

31. DCID 1/7, “Security Controls on the Dissemination of Intelligence Information.”

32. DCID 1/21, “Physical Security Standards for SCIFs.”

33. DCID 5/1, “Espionage and Counterintelligence Activities Abroad.”

34. DCID 5/6, “Intelligence Disclosure Policy.”

35. DCS-2600-5345-92, “DIA Guide to Foreign Disclosure.”

36. DIAM 58-5, “Imagery Processing, Exploitation, Production, Reporting andDissemination.”

37. DIAM 58-8, “Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) User’s Guide.”

38. DIAM 58-11, “DOD Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Policies and Procedures.”

J-3

References

39. DIAM 58-12, “DOD Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Management System.”

40. DIAM 58-17, “Defense Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Requirements Manual.”

41. MJCS-51-88, “Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.”

42. MCM-15-94, “Memorandum of Agreement Concerning CIA Support to US MilitaryForces.”

43. CJCSI 1301.01, “Policy and Procedures to Assign Individuals to Meet CombatantCommand Mission Related Temporary Duty Requirements.”

44. CJCSI 3210.01, “Joint Information Warfare Policy.”

45. CJCSI 5221.01, “Delegation of Authority to Commanders of Combatant Commands toDisclose Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and InternationalOrganizations.”

46. CJCSI 6110.01, “CJCJ-Control Tactical Communications Assets.”

47. CJCSM 3122.02, “Manual for Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD)Development and Deployment Execution.”

48. CJCSM 3122.03, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (PlanningFormats and Guidance).”

49. CJCSM 3122.04, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Vol II: (SupplementalPlanning and Execution Formats and Guidance).”

50. “Joint-Service Tactical Exploitation of National Systems (J-TENS) Manual.”

51. “Handbook of the National SIGINT Requirements System.”

52. IPSG/INCA-133, “Communications Handbook for Intelligence Planners.”

53. USIS Directive 2-0, “Imagery Processing, Exploitation, and Delivery Policy.”

54. Public Law 585, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

J-4

Appendix J

Joint Pub 2-01

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX KADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

K-1

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to theJoint Warfighting Center, Attn: Doctrine Division, Fenwick Road, Bldg 96, Fort Monroe,VA 23651-5000. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness,consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent and the Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director forIntelligence (J-2).

3. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J2-J2P/J7-JDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans andInteroperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20318-7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in thispublication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as anenclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requestedto notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected inthis publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTEDNUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

K-2

Appendix K

Joint Pub 2-01

4. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publicationcenters.

b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands,Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreigngovernments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (DefenseAttache Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, Room 1A674, Pentagon,Washington, D.C. 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assignedadministrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988,“Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.”

By Military Services:

Army: US Army AG Publication Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2898

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: CO, Naval Inventory Control Point700 Robbins AvenueBldg 1, Customer ServicePhiladelphia, PA 19111-5099

Marine Corps: Marine Corps Logistics BaseAlbany, GA 31704-5000

Coast Guard: Coast Guard Headquarters, COMDT (G-OPD)2100 2nd Street, SWWashington, D.C. 20593-0001

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications isunrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified jointpublications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R.

GLOSSARYPART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

AAA anti-aircraft artilleryADP automated data processingAIG addressee indicator groupAOR area of responsibilityAUTODIN Automatic Digital Network

BDA battle damage assessment

C2 command and controlC2W command and control warfareC4 command, control, communications, and computersC4I command, control, communications, computers, and intelligenceCA combat assessmentCAP crisis action planningCCD camouflage, concealment, and deceptionCD-ROM compact disk - read only memoryCEE captured enemy equipmentCI counterintelligenceCIA Central Intelligence AgencyCIAP Command Intelligence Architecture/Planning ProgramCINC commander of a combatant command; commander in chiefCIO Central Imagery OfficeCISO Counterintelligence Support OfficerCJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffCOA course of actionCOLISEUM Community On-Line Intelligence System for End-Users

and ManagersCOM collection operations managementCOMINT communications intelligenceCOMSEC communications securityCONPLAN operation plan in concept formatCONUS continental United StatesCRM collection requirements managementCSAR combat search and rescueCSE client server environmentCSG cryptologic support groupCSS Central Security Service

DCI Director, Central IntelligenceDCID Director, Central Intelligence DirectiveDHS Defense HUMINT ServiceDI DIA Directorate for Intelligence ProductionDIA Defense Intelligence AgencyDIDS Defense Intelligence Dissemination System

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DIN defense intelligence networkDISA Defense Intelligence AgencyDISN Defense Information Systems NetworkDISO Defense Intelligence Support OfficeDMA Defense Mapping AgencyDO DIA Directorate of OperationsDOD Department of DefenseDODIIS Department of Defense Intelligence Information SystemDODIPC Department of Defense Intelligence Production CommunityDODIPP Department of Defense Intelligence Production ProgramDPM Dissemination Program Manager

ELINT electronic intelligenceEPW enemy prisoner of warEW electronic warfare

GBS Global Broadcast ServiceGCCS Global Command and Control SystemGCI ground control interceptGI&S geospatial information and servicesGMI general military intelligence

HOC HUMINT Operations CellHSE HUMINT support elementHUMINT human intelligence

I&W indications and warningIAW in accordance withIDB Integrate Data BaseIMA individual mobilization augmenteeIMINT imagery intelligenceIRR individual ready reserveIW information warfare

J-1 Joint Manpower and Personnel StaffJ-2 Joint Intelligence StaffJ-2X joint force J-2 CI/HUMINT staff elementJ-3 Joint Operations StaffJ-4 Joint Logistics StaffJ-5 Joint Strategic Plans StaffJ-6 Joint Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4)

Systems StaffJC2WC Joint Command and Control Warfare CenterJCMEC Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation CenterJCMT Joint Collection Management ToolsJCS Joint Chiefs of StaffJCSE Joint Communications Support ElementJDEC Joint Document Exploitation Center

GL-3

Glossary

JDISS Joint Deployable Intelligence Support SystemJFC joint force commanderJIC Joint Intelligence CenterJIDC Joint Interrogation and Debriefing CenterJIPB joint intelligence preparation of the battlespaceJISE Joint Intelligence Support ElementJMICS JWICS Mobile Integrated Communications SystemJOA joint operations areaJOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution SystemJSST Joint Space Support TeamJTF joint task forceJTMD joint table of mobilization and distributionJWICS Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System

LAN local area networkLOCE Linked Operational Intelligence Centers EuropeLOCs lines of communications

MASINT measurement and signature intelligenceMDITDS Migration Defense Intelligence Threat Data SystemMETOC meteorological and oceanographicMIIDS Military Intelligence Integrated Data SystemMOOTW military operations other than war

NATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNBC nuclear, biological, and chemicalNCA National Command AuthoritiesNCR National Cryptologic RepresentativeNCSE NIST Communications Support ElementNDP National Disclosure PolicyNDPC National Disclosure Policy CommitteeNIST National Intelligence Support TeamNMJIC National Military Joint Intelligence CenterNRO National Reconnaissance OfficeNSA National Security AgencyNSC National Security Council

OB order of battleOPLAN operation planOPORD operation orderOSD Office of the Secretary of DefenseOSINT open-source intelligenceOSIS Open Source Information System

PGM precision-guided munitionsPIR priority intelligence requirementsPOC point of contactPOL petroleum, oil, and lubricants

PR production requirementPSYOP psychological operations

RFI request for informationRMS Requirements Management System

S&TI scientific and technical intelligenceSAM surface-to-air missileSATCOM satellite communicationsSCI sensitive compartmented informationSCIF SCI facilitySIGINT signals intelligenceSII statement of intelligence interestSIO senior intelligence officerSIPRNET SECRET Internet Protocol Router NetworkSIR specific information requirementSOF special operations forcesSOIC senior official of the Intelligence CommunitySPP Shared Production ProgramSSM surface-to-surface missileSSO Special Security Office(r)STEP standard tactical entry point

TBM theater ballistic missileTENCAP Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities ProgramTFCICA Task Force Counterintelligence Coordinating AuthorityTIP target intelligence packageTPFDD time-phased force and deployment dataTPFDL time-phased force and deployment listTSWA temporary secure working areasTTP tactics, techniques, and procedures

UAV unmanned aerial vehicleUN United NationsUS United StatesUSSPACECOM US Space CommandUSTRANSCOM US Transportation CommandUW unconventional warfare

VO Validation Office

WAN wide-area networkWMD weapons of mass destruction

GL-4

Glossary

Joint Pub 2-01

all-source intelligence. 1. Intelligenceproducts and/or organizations and activitiesthat incorporate all sources of information,including, most frequently, humanresources intelligence, imagery intelligence,measurement and signature intelligence,signals intelligence, and open source data,in the production of finished intelligence.2. In intelligence collection, a phrase thatindicates that in the satisfaction ofintelligence requirements, all collection,processing, exploitation, and reportingsystems and resources are identified forpossible use and those most capable aretasked. (Joint Pub 1-02)

battlespace. The commander’s conceptualview of the environment and factors whichmust be understood to successfully applycombat power, protect the force, andcomplete the mission. Battlespaceencompasses the surface, subsurface,endoatmosphereic, and extoatmosphericspheres of a particular geographic area. Italso includes the electromagnetic spectrum,cyperspace, and human psychologicalaspects of military operations. Thedimensions of a command’s battlespace aredictated by its mission, its capabilities, andthe capabilities of any potential adversaries.A command’s battlespace embodies itsoperational area and area of interest. (Thisterm and its definition are applicable onlyin the context of this pub and cannot bereferenced outside this publication.)

collection asset. A collection system,platform, or capability that is supporting,assigned or attached to a particularcommander. (Approved for inclusion in thenext edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

collection management. The process ofconverting intelligence requirements intocollection requirements, establishing

priorities, and tasking or coordinating withappropriate collection sources or agencies,monitoring results and retasking, asrequired. (This term and its definitionmodifies the existing term and its definitionand is approved for inclusion in the nextedition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

collection management authority.Constitutes the authority to establish,prioritize and validate theater collectionrequirements, establish sensor taskingguidance and develop theater collectionplans. Also called CMA. (Approved forinclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub1-02.)

collection manager. An individual withresponsibility for the timely and efficienttasking of organic collection resources andthe development of requirements for theaterand national assets that could satisfyspecific information needs in support of themission. Also called CM. (Approved forinclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub1-02.)

collection operations management. Theauthoritative direction, scheduling, andcontrol of specific collection operations andassociated processing, exploitation, andreporting resources. Also called COM.(Joint Pub 1-02)

collection requirements management. Theauthoritative development and control ofcollection, processing, exploitation, and/orreporting requirements that normally resultin either the direct tasking of assets overwhich the collection manager has authority,or the generation of tasking requests tocollection management authorities at ahigher, lower, or lateral echelon toaccomplish the collection mission. Alsocalled CRM. (This term and its definition

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

GL-5

GL-6

Glossary

Joint Pub 2-01

modifies the existing term and its definitionand is approved for inclusion in the nextedition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

collection resource. A collection system,platform, or capability that is not assignedor attached to a specific unit or echelonwhich must be requested and coordinatedthrough the chain of command. (Approvedfor inclusion in the next edition of JointPub 1-02.)

combat intelligence. That knowledge of theenemy, weather, and geographical featuresrequired by a commander in the planningand conduct of combat operations. (JointPub 1-02)

command and control warfare. Theintegrated use of operations security,military deception, psychologicaloperations, electronic warfare, and physicaldestruction, mutually supported byintelligence, to deny information to,influence, degrade, or destroy adversarycommand and control capabilities, whileprotecting friendly command and controlcapabilities against such actions. Commandand control warfare is an application ofinformation warfare in military operationsand is a subset of information warfare.Command and control warfare appliesacross the range of military operations andall levels of conflict. Also called C2W.C2W is both offensive and defensive: a.C2-attack. Prevent effective C2 ofadversary forces by denying information to,influencing, degrading, or destroying theadversary C2 system. b. C2-protect.Maintain effective command and controlof own forces by turning to friendlyadvantage or negating adversary efforts todeny information to, influence, degrade ordestroy the friendly C2 system. (Joint Pub1-02)

communications intelligence. Technicaland intelligence information derived from

foreign communications by other than theintended recipients. Also called COMINT.(Joint Pub 1-02)

counterintelligence. Information gatheredand activities conducted to protect againstespionage, other intelligence activities,sabotage, or assassinations conducted by oron behalf of foreign governments orelements thereof, foreign organizations, orforeign persons, or international terroristactivities. Also called CI. (Joint Pub 1-02)

data base. Information that is normallystructured and indexed for user access andreview. Data bases may exist in the formof physical files (folders, documents, etc.)or formatted automated data processingsystem data files. (Joint Pub 1-02)

deception. Those measures designed tomislead the enemy by manipulation,distortion, or falsification of evidence toinduce him to react in a manner prejudicialto his interests. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Defense Information Systems Network.Integrated network, centrally managed andconfigured to provide long-haulinformation transfer services for all DODactivities. It is an information transfer utilitydesigned to provide dedicated point-to-point, switched voice and data, imagery, andvideo teleconferencing services. Alsocalled DISN. (Approved for inclusion inthe next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

Department of Defense IntelligenceInformation System. The aggregationof DOD personnel, procedures,equipment, computer programs, andsupporting communications that supportthe timely and c o m p r e h e n s i v ep r e p a r a t i o n a n d presentation ofintelligence and intelligence informationto military commanders andnational-level decisionmakers. Alsocalled DODIIS. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Glossary

GL-7

Glossary

electronic intelligence. Technical andgeolocation intelligence derived fromf o r e i g n n o n - c o m m u n i c a t i o n selectromagnetic radiations emanating fromother than nuclear detonations orradioactive sources. Also called ELINT.(This term and its definition modifies theexisting term “electronics intelligence” andits definition and is approved for inclusionin the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

estimate. 1. An analysis of a foreignsituation, development, or trend thatidentifies its major elements, interprets thesignificance, and appraises the futurepossibilities and the prospective results ofthe various actions that might be taken. 2.An appraisal of the capabilities,vulnerabilities, and potential courses ofaction of a foreign nation or combinationof nations in consequence of a specificnational plan, policy, decision, orcontemplated course of action. 3. Ananalysis of an actual or contemplatedclandestine operation in relation to thesituation in which it is or would beconducted in order to identify and appraisesuch factors as available and needed assetsand potential obstacles, accomplishments,and consequences. See also intelligenceestimate. 4. In air intercept, a code meaning,“Provide a quick estimate of the height/depth/range/size of designated contact,” or“I estimate height/depth/range/sizeo f d e s i g n a t e d c o n t a c t i s___________________.” (Joint Pub 1-02)

force protection. Security program designedto protect soldiers, civilian employees,family members, facilities, and equipment,in all locations and situations, accomplishedthrough planned and integrated applicationof combatting terrorism, physical security,operations security, personal protectiveservices, and supported by intelligence,counterintelligence, and other securityprograms. (Joint Pub 1-02)

foreign instrumentation signals intelligence.Technical and intelligence informationderived from the intercept of foreignelectromagnetic emissions associated withthe testing and operational deployment ofnon-US aerospace, surface, and subsurfacesystems. Foreign instrumentation signalsintelligence is a subcategory of signalsintelligence. Foreign instrumentationsignals include, but are not limited to,telemetry, beaconry, electronic interrogators,and video data links. Also called FISINT.(This term and its definition modifies theexisting term and its definition and isapproved for inclusion in the next editionof Joint Pub 1-02.)

general military intelligence. Intelligenceconcerning the (1) military capabilities offoreign countries or organizations or (2)topics affecting potential US or alliedmilitary operations, relating to thefollowing subjects: armed forcescapabilities, including order of battle,organization, training, tactics, doctrine,strategy, and other factors bearing onmilitary strength and effectiveness; areaand terrain intelligence, including urbanareas, coasts and landing beaches, andmeteorological, oceanographic, andgeological intelligence; transportation inall modes; military materiel productionand support industries; military andcivilian C4 systems; military economics,including foreign military assistance;insurgency and terrorism; military-political-sociological intelligence;location, identification, and descriptionof military-related installations;government control; escape and evasion;and threats and forecasts. (Excludesscientific and technical intelligence).Also called GMI. (This term and itsdefinition modifies the existing term andits definition and is approved forinclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub1-02.)

GL-8

Glossary

Joint Pub 2-01

Global Command and Control System.Highly mobile, deployable command andcontrol system supporting forces for jointand multinational operations across therange of military operations, any time andanywhere in the world with compatible,interoperable, and integrated command,control, communications, computers, andintelligence systems. Also called GCCS.(Approved for inclusion in the next editionof Joint Pub 1-02.)

geospatial information and services. Thecollection, information extraction, storage,dissemination, and exploitation of geodetic,geomagnetic, imagery (both commercialand national source), gravimetric,aeronautical, topographic, hydrographic,littoral, cultural, and toponymic dataaccurately referenced to a precise locationon the earth’s surface. These data are usedfor military planning, training, andoperations including navigation, missionplanning, rehearsal, modeling, simulation,and precise targeting. Geospatialinformation provides the basic frameworkfor battlespace visualization. It isinformation produced by multiple sourcesto common interoperable data standards. Itmay be presented in the form of printedmaps, charts, and publications; in digitalsimulation and modeling data bases; inphotographic form; or in the form ofdigitized maps and charts or attributedcenterline data. Geospatial services includetools that enable users to access andmanipulate data, and also includesinstruction, training, laboratorysupport, and guidance for the use ofgeospatial data. Also called GI&S. (Thisterm and its definition are provided forinformation and are proposed for inclusionin the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02 by JointPub 2-03)

human intelligence. A category ofintelligence derived from information

collected and provided by human sources.Also called HUMINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

imagery intelligence. Intelligence derivedfrom the exploitation of collection by visualphotography, infrared sensors, lasers,electro-optics, and radar sensors such assynthetic aperture radar wherein imagesof objects are reproduced optically orelectronically on film, electronic displaydevices, or other media. Also calledIMINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

indications and warning. Those intelligenceactivities intended to detect and reporttime-sensitive intelligence information onforeign developments that could involve athreat to the United States or allied military,political, or economic interests or to UScitizens abroad. It includes forewarning ofenemy actions or intentions; the imminenceof hostilities; insurgency; nuclear/non-nuclear attack on the United States, itsoverseas forces, or allied nations; hostilereactions to United States reconnaissanceactivities; terrorists’ attacks; and othersimilar events. (Joint Pub 1-02)

information warfare. Actions taken toachieve information superiority by affectingadversary information, information-basedprocesses, information systems, andcomputer-based networks while leveragingand defending one’s own information,information-based processes, informationsystems, and computer-based networks.(Joint Pub 1-02)

intelligence. 1. The product resulting fromthe collection, processing, integration,analysis, evaluation, and interpretation ofavailable information concerning foreigncountries or areas. 2. Information andknowledge about an adversary obtainedthrough observation, investigation,analysis, or understanding. (Joint Pub1-02)

GL-9

Glossary

intelligence cycle. The process by whichinformation is converted into intelligenceand made available to users. There are sixphases in the cycle: a. planning anddirection — Determination of intelligencerequirements, development of appropriateintelligence architecture, preparation of acollection plan, and issuance of orders andrequests to information collection agenciesb. collection — Acquisition of informationand the provision of this information toprocessing elements. c. processing andexploitation — Conversion of collectedinformation into forms suitable to theproduction of intelligence. d. production— Conversion of processed informationinto intelligence through the integration,analysis, evaluation, and interpretation ofall source data and the preparation ofintelligence products in support of knownor anticipated user requirements. e.dissemination and integration — Deliveryof intelligence to users in a suitable formand the application of the intelligence toappropriate missions, tasks, and functions.f. evaluation — Continuous assessment ofintelligence operations during each phaseof the intelligence cycle to ensure that thecommander’s intelligence requirements arebeing met. (This term and its definition areprovided for information and are proposedfor inclusion in the next edition of JointPub 1-02 by Joint Pub 2-0.)

intelligence discipline. A well defined areaof intelligence collection, processing,exploitation, and reporting using a specificcategory of technical or human resources.There are five major disciplines: humanintelligence, imagery intelligence,measurement and signature intelligence,signals intelligence (communicationsintelligence, electronics intelligence, andforeign instrumentation signalsintelligence), and open source intelligence.(Approved for inclusion in the next editionof Joint Pub 1-02.)

intelligence estimate. The appraisal,expressed in writing or orally, of availableintelligence relating to a specific situationor condition with a view to determining thecourses of action open to the enemy orpotential enemy and the order of probabilityof their adoption. (Joint Pub 1-02)

intelligence operations. The variety ofintelligence tasks that are carried out byvarious intelligence organizations andactivities. Predominantly, it refers to eitherintelligence collection or intelligenceproduction activities. When used in thecontext of intelligence collection activities,intelligence operations refer to collection,processing, exploitation, and reporting ofinformation. When used in the context ofintelligence production activities, it refersto collation, integration, interpretation, andanalysis, leading to the dissemination of afinished product. (Joint Pub 1-02)

intelligence requirement. Any subject,general or specific, upon which there is aneed for the collection of information, orthe production of intelligence. (Joint Pub1-02)

intelligence system. Any formal or informalsystem to manage data gathering, to obtainand process the data, to interpret the data,and to provide reasoned judgments todecisionmakers as a basis for action. Theterm is not limited to intelligenceorganizations or services but includes anysystem, in all its parts, that accomplishesthe listed tasks. (Joint Pub 1-02)

interoperability. 1. The ability of systems,units, or forces to provide services to andaccept services from other systems, units,or forces and to use the services soexchanged to enable them to operateeffectively together. 2. The conditionachieved among communications-electronics systems or items of

GL-10

Glossary

Joint Pub 2-01

communications-electronics equipmentwhen information or services can beexchanged directly and satisfactorilybetween them and/or their users. Thedegree of interoperability should be definedwhen referring to specific cases. (Joint Pub1-02)

J-2X. Umbrella organization consisting ofthe HUMINT Operations Cell and the TaskForce Counterintelligence CoordinatingAuthority. The J-2X is responsible forcoordination and deconfliction of all humansource related activity. (Approved forinclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub1-02.)

joint captured materiel exploitation center.Physical location for deriving intelligenceinformation from captured enemy materiel.It is normally subordinate to the joint force/J-2. Also called JCMEC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint deployable intelligence supportsystem. A transportable workstation andcommunications suite that electronicallyextends a joint intelligence center to a jointtask force or other tactical user. Also calledJDISS. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint doctrine. Fundamental principles thatguide the employment of forces of two ormore Services in coordinated action towarda common objective. It will be promulgatedby the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,in coordination with the combatantcommands, Services, and Joint Staff. (JointPub 1-02)

joint document exploitation center.Physical location for deriving intelligenceinformation from captured enemydocuments. It is normally subordinate to thejoint force/J-2. Also called JDEC.(Approved for inclusion in the next editionof Joint Pub 1-02.)

joint force. A general term applied to a forcecomposed of significant elements, assignedor attached, of two or more MilitaryDepartments, operating under a single jointforce commander. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint intelligence architecture. A dynamic,flexible structure that consists of theNational Military Joint Intelligence Center,the theater joint intelligence centers, andsubordinate joint force joint intelligencesupport elements. This architectureencompasses automated data processingequipment capabilities, communicationsand information requirements, andresponsibilities to provide national, theaterand tactical commanders with the full rangeof intelligence required for planning andconducting operations. (This term and itsdefinition modifies the existing term andits definition and is approved for inclusionin the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

joint intelligence center. The intelligencecenter of the joint force headquarters. Thejoint intelligence center is responsible forproviding and producing the intelligencerequired to support the joint forcecommander and staff, components, taskforces and elements, and the nationalintelligence community. Also called JIC.(Joint Pub 1-02)

joint intelligence preparation of thebattlespace. The analytical process usedby joint intelligence organizations toproduce intelligence assessments, estimatesand other intelligence products in supportof the joint force commander’s decisionmaking process. It is a continuous processthat includes defining the total battlespaceenvironment; describing battlespacecharacteristics; evaluating the adversary;and determining and describing adversarycourses of actions. The process is used toanalyze the surface, sub-surface,

GL-11

Glossary

endoatmospheric, exoatmospheric,electromagnetic, cyberspace, and humandimensions of the environment and todetermine an opponent’s capabilities tooperate in each. Joint intelligencepreparation of the battlespace products areused by other staff elements in preparingtheir estimates and are also applied duringthe analysis and selection of friendlycourses of action. Also called JIPB. (Thisterm and its definition are provided forinformation and are proposed for inclusionin the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02 by JointPub 2-0.)

joint intelligence doctrine. Fundamentalprinciples that guide the preparation ofintelligence and the subsequent provisionof intelligence to support military forces oftwo or more Services employed incoordinated action. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint intelligence support element. Asubordinate joint force forms a jointintelligence support element as the focusfor intelligence support for joint operations,providing the joint force commander, jointstaff, and components with the complete air,space, ground, and maritime adversarysituation. Also called JISE. (Approved forinclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub1-02.)

joint interrogation and debriefing center.Physical location for the exploitation ofintelligence information from enemyprisoners of war and other non-prisonersources. It is normally subordinate to thejoint force/J-2. Also called JIDC.(Approved for inclusion in the next editionof Joint Pub 1-02.)

Joint Worldwide Intelligence CommunicationsSystem. The sensitive compartmentedinformation portion of the DefenseInformation System Network. Itincorporates advanced networkingtechnologies that permit point-to-point or

multipoint information exchangeinvolving voice, text, graphics, data, andvideo teleconferencing. Also calledJWICS. (Joint Pub 1-02)

measurement and signature intelligence.Scientific and technical intelligenceobtained by quantitative and qualitativeanalysis of data (metric, angle, spatial,wavelength, time dependence, modulation,plasma, and hydromagnetic) derived fromspecific technical sensors for the purposeof identifying any distinctive featuresassociated with the target. The detectedfeature may be either reflected or emitted.Also called MASINT. (This term and itsdefinition modifies the existing term andits definition and is approved for inclusionin the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

medical intelligence. That category ofintelligence resulting from collection,evaluation, analysis, and interpretation offoreign medical, bio-scientific, andenvironmental information which is ofinterest to strategic planning and to militarymedical planning and operations for theconservation of the fighting strength offriendly forces and the formation ofassessments of foreign medical capabilitiesin both military and civilian sectors. (JointPub 1-02)

Military Intelligence Integrated DataSystem/Integrated Data Base. Anarchitecture for improving the manner inwhich military intelligence is analyzed,stored, and disseminated. The IntegratedData Base (IDB) forms the core automateddata base for the Military IntelligenceIntegrated Data System (MIIDS) programand integrates the data in the installation,order of battle, equipment, and selectedelectronic warfare and command, control,and communications files. The IDB is thenational-level repository for the generalmilitary intelligence information availableto the entire Department of Defense

GL-12

Glossary

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Intelligence Information Systemcommunity and maintained by DIA andthe commands. The IDB is keptsynchronized by system transactions todisseminate updates. Also called MIIDS/IDB. (Approved for inclusion in the nextedition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

open-source intelligence. Information ofpotential intelligence value that is availableto the general public. Also called OSINT.(Joint Pub 1-02)

operational intelligence. Intelligence that isrequired for planning and conductingcampaigns and major operations toaccomplish strategic objectives withintheaters or areas of operations. (Joint Pub1-02)

operation order. A directive issued by acommander to subordinate commanders forthe purpose of effecting the coordinatedexecution of an operation. Also calledOPORD. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operation plan. Any plan, except for theSingle Integrated Operation Plan, for theconduct of military operations. Plans areprepared by combatant commanders inresponse to requirements established by theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff andby commanders of subordinate commandsin response to requirements tasked by theestablishing unified commander. Operationplans are prepared either in a completeformat (OPLAN), or as a concept plan(CONPLAN). The CONPLAN can bepublished with or without a time-phasedforce and deployment data (TPFDD) file.a. OPLAN—An operation plan for theconduct of joint operations that can be usedas a basis for development of an operationorder (OPORD). An OPLAN identifies theforces and supplies required to execute theCINC’s Strategic Concept and a movementschedule of these resources to the theaterof operations. The forces and supplies are

identified in TPFDD files. OPLANs willinclude all phases of the tasked operation.The plan is prepared with the appropriateannexes, appendixes, and TPFDD files asdescribed in the Joint Operation Planningand Execution System manuals containingplanning policies, procedures, and formats.Also called OPLAN. b. CONPLAN—Anoperation plan in an abbreviated formatthat would require considerable expansionor alteration to convert it into an OPLANor OPORD. A CONPLAN contains theCINC’s Strategic Concept and thoseannexes and appendixes deemednecessary by the combatant commanderto complete planning. Generally, detailedsupport requirements are not calculatedand TPFDD files are not prepared. Alsocalled CONPLAN. c. CONPLAN withTPFDD—A CONPLAN with TPFDD isthe same as a CONPLAN except that itrequires more detailed planning for phaseddeployment of forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

priority intelligence requirements. Thoseintelligence requirements for which acommander has an anticipated and statedpriority in his task of planning anddecisionmaking. (Joint Pub 1-02)

reconnaissance. A mission undertaken toobtain, by visual observation or otherdetection methods, information about theactivities and resources of an enemy orpotential enemy, or to secure dataconcern ing the meteoro log ical,hydrographic, or geographic characteristicsof a particular area. (Joint Pub 1-02)

request for information. 1. Any specifictime-sensitive ad hoc requirement forintelligence information or products tosupport an ongoing crisis or operation notnecessarily related to standing requirementsor scheduled intelligence production. Arequest for information can be initiated torespond to operational requirements andwill be validated in accordance with the

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Glossary

theater command’s procedures. 2. TheNational Security Agency/Central SecurityService uses this term to state ad hoc signalsintelligence requirements. Also called RFI.(Approved for inclusion in the next editionof Joint Pub 1-02.)

Requirements Management System. Asystem for the management of theater andnational imagery collection requirements.Provides automated tools for users insupport of submission, review, andvalidation of imagery nominations asrequirements to be tasked on national orDOD imagery collection, production, andexploitation resources. Also called RMS.(Approved for inclusion in the next editionof Joint Pub 1-02.)

scientific and technical intelligence. Theproduct resulting from the collection,evaluation, analysis, and interpretation offoreign scientific and technical informationwhich covers: a. foreign developments inbasic and applied research and in appliedengineering techniques; and b. scientificand technical characteristics, capabilities,and limitations of all foreign militarysystems, weapons, weapon systems, andmateriel, the research and developmentrelated thereto, and the production methodsemployed for their manufacture. (Joint Pub1-02)

SECRET Internet Protocol RouterNetwork. Worldwide SECRET levelpacket switch network that uses high-speedinternet protocol routers and high-capacityDefense Information Systems Networkcircuitry. Also called SIPRNET.(Approved for inclusion in the next editionof Joint Pub 1-02.)

sensitive compartmented informationfacility. An accredited area, room, groupof rooms, or installation where sensitivecompartmented information may be stored,used, discussed, and/or electronically

processed. SCIF procedural and physicalmeasures prevent the free access of personsunless they have been formallyindoctrinated for the particular SCIauthorized for use or storage within theSCIF. Also called SCIF. (Approved forinclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub1-02.)

signals intelligence. 1. A category ofintelligence comprising either individuallyor in combination all communicationsintelligence, electronics intelligence, andforeign instrumentation signals intelligence,however transmitted. 2. Intelligencederived from communications, electronics,and foreign instrumentation signals. Alsocalled SIGINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

situation assessment. Assessment producedby combining military geography, weather,and threat data to provide a comprehensiveprojection of the situation for thedecisionmaker. (Joint Pub 1-02)

strategic intelligence. Intelligence that isrequired for the formulation of militarystrategy, policy, and plans and operationsat national and theater levels. (This termand its definition modifies the existing termand its definition and is approved forinclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub1-02.)

surveillance. The systematic observation ofaerospace, surface or subsurface areas,places, persons, or things, by visual, aural,electronic, photographic, or other means.(Joint Pub 1-02)

tactical intelligence. Intelligence that isrequired for planning and conductingtactical operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

targeting. 1. The process of selecting targetsand matching the appropriate response tothem, taking account of operationalrequirements and capabilities. 2. The

GL-14

Glossary

Joint Pub 2-01

analysis of enemy situations relative to thecommander’s mission, objectives, andcapabilities at the commander’s disposal,to identify and nominate specificvulnerabilities that, if exploited, willaccomplish the commander’s purposethrough delaying, disrupting, disabling ordestroying enemy forces or resourcescritical to the enemy. (Joint Pub 1-02)

validation. 1. A process normally associatedwith the collection of intelligence thatprovides official status to an identifiedrequirement and confirms that therequirement is appropriate for a givencollector and has not been previouslysatisfied. 2. In computer modeling andsimulation, the process of determining thedegree to which a model or simulation isan accurate representation of the real worldfrom the perspective of the intended uses

Assess-ments/

Revision

CJCSApproval

TwoDrafts

ProgramDirective

ProjectProposal

J-7 formally staffs withServices and CINCS

Includes scope of project,references, milestones,and who will developdrafts

J-7 releases ProgramDirective to Lead Agent.Lead Agent can beService, CINC, or JointStaff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2Program Directive

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The CINCS receive the pub andbegin to assess it during use

18 to 24 months followingpublication, the Director J-7, willsolicit a written report from thecombatant commands andServices on the utility and qualityof each pub and the need for anyurgent changes or earlier-than-scheduled revisions

No later than 5 years afterdevelopment, each pub is revised

STEP #5Assessments/Revision

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Submitted by Services, CINCS, or Joint Staffto fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services andCINCs

J-7 initiates Program Directive

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STEP #1Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchyas shown in the chart above. is in the series of joint doctrine publications.The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint Pub 2-01 Intelligence

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JOINT PUB 1-0

PERSONNELand

ADMINISTRATION

JOINT PUB 4-0 JOINT PUB 5-0 JOINT PUB 6-0

LOGISTICS C4 SYSTEMSPLANS

JOINT PUB 0-2

JOINT PUB 1

UNAAF

JOINTWARFARE

JOINTDOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makesrequired changes and prepares pub forcoordination with Services and CINCS

Joint Staff conducts formalstaffing for approval as a Joint Publication

STEP #4CJCS Approval

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Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority(PRA) to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with CINCS, Services,and Joint Staff

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STEP #3Two Drafts

ENHANCEDJOINT

WARFIGHTINGCAPABILITY

INTELLIGENCE

JOINT PUB 2-0

OPERATIONS

JOINT PUB 3-0

joint intelligence support to military operations

Documents