JOLLIBEEFOODSCORP(JFC):THECHAMPOFFASTFOOD

ExecutiveSummaryAs a group, we are issuing a BUY recommendation based on the analysis of financial statements,informationonquick–servicemarket,well-knownstockanalysts forecasts,andsignificantevents fortheperiod2006to2016(upto30September2016).Inparticular,thegroupmadetheabuyrecommendationforthefollowingreasons:JFC’sQualityofEarningsAsweknow,inmakingdecisionsonwhethertobuyorsellstock,itisbesttolookatthecompany’squalityof its of earnings. For JFC, it is very clear: revenues are increasing, margins are stable, but moreimportantly,JFCisawashwithcash.JFC’sCompetentManagementThe performance of JFC has been highly attributed to their Management. While there may have beenchanges, theyseemtobe insignificant, thuscontinuityofstrategies(proventobesuccessful) isexpectedfromastablecompanysuchasJFC.MarketValuationofJFCfrom2006-2015Markethasover-valuedthestock–thisisveryclearfromthefigures.Butthisdoesnotmeanthattheover-valuation iswithout basis. It simplymeans that themarket has high expectationswith respect to JFC’sperformance.CompetitionintheQuickServiceRestaurantIndustryJFCisinamarketthathassomanyplayers.Inthepast,JFC’sstrategywastobuy-outitscompetitors.Thisstrategymaystillworknowwithnewentrantstothequickservicerestaurantindustry.JFC’sStockPerformancefrom2006-2015Acriticalindicatorforstockperformanceisreturns.Ontheaverage,itisstillgrowing,butataslowerpace---anindicatorthatJFCasacompanyhasmaturedandstabilized.BusinessDescriptionJollibeeFoodsCorporation(JFC)isaPhilippines-basedcompanyengagedinthedevelopment,operationand franchising of quick-service restaurants (QSR) under the trade name Jollibee. The Company has anumber of subsidiaries, which include FRESH N' FAMOUS FOODS, INC., which develops, operates andfranchises quick-service restaurants under the trade names Chowking and Greenwich; RED RIBBONBAKESHOP, INC. (through RRB HOLDINGS, INC.), which develops, operates and franchises restaurantsunder theRedRibbon tradename;MANG INASALPHILS., INC.,whichdevelops, operates and franchisesrestaurants under the Mang Inasal trade name, and PERF RESTAURANTS INC., which franchisesrestaurants under the Burger King trademark in the Philippines. It also has subsidiaries and affiliates,

MarketDataPrice 247 Change é3.20

(1.31%)PrimaryExchange

XPHS

whichdevelopandoperateitsinternationalbrands,YongheKing,HongZhuangYuan,SanPinWang,brandsundertheSuperFoodsGroup(includingHighlandsCoffeeandPho24),12HotpotandDunkin'Donuts.

CompanyStrategiesJFCfocusesonthesestrategies:

1. GlobalExpansion&BrandAcquisition–JFCcontinuestoexpanditsbrandportfoliotocatertodifferentmarket segments and establish business presence across globe through organic growthand acquisitions to boost growth and profitability. JFC has increased by 205 stores worldwidecomparedtoayearago.

2. IncreasingNumberofStores–2015wasarecord-breakingyearforJFCwithatotalof306storesopened:249inthePhilippines,39inChina,1intheUS,17inSoutheastAsiaandtheMiddleEast.67Jollibeestoreswerealsoopenedduringtheyear,thehighestinJollibeehistory.

3. StrongDomesticBusiness–Jollibee,Chowking,Greenwich,RedRibbonandBurgerKingstoresinthe Philippines all showed strong performance and exceeded target sales and return oninvestments with some brands posting double-digit growth in system-wide sales. In particular,BurgerKingcontinuesthistrendwith12consecutivemonthsofdouble-digitsalesgrowthin2015.

KeyPerformanceIndicatorsJFChasTopFive(5)KeyPerformanceIndicators:

1. System Wide Sales – A measure of all sales to consumers both from company-owned andfranchisedstores.

2. Revenues–Totalof1)allsalesmadebytheJFCownedstores,2)commissarysalestofranchisedstores,3)rentalrevenuesfromJollibeeGroup’spropertydivision,and4)servicesrenderedbyin-houseconstructionandservicegroups.

3. Net IncomeMargin–AmeasureofJFC’sreturnforeverypesoofrevenueearnedafterdeductingcostofsales,operatingexpenses,interestsandtaxes.

4. BasicEarningsperShare–AnindicatorofJFC’sprofitabilitywhichallocatesthecompany’sprofittoeachoutstandingshareofcommonstock.

5. Return on Equity – A measure of return for every peso of invested equity. JFC uses ROE tocompareprofitabilityofotherfirmsinthesameindustry.

ShareholderStructureThreemajorshareholdergroupsownJFC.AsofDecember2015,HyperDynamicCorporationowns25.54%whileHoneyseaCorporationowns11.94%,andWinallHoldingCorporationwith5.06%.Itisimportanttonotethat28.58%isownedbyPCDNomineeCorp.(Non-Filipino)andPCDNomineeCorp.(Filipino)with9.34%. Total issued and outstanding shares as of December 2015 are 1,069,669,555 shares. Tony TanCaktiongholds0.79%whileWilliamTanUntiongandandErnestoTanmantionghold0.72%and0.49%,respectively.CorporateManagementInJuly2014,theboardofJFCapprovedtheappointmentofChiefOperatingOfficerErnestoTanmantiongasthe company’s next Chief ExecutiveOfficer andPresident replacing his brotherTonyTanCaktiong,whofoundedJollibeein1978andsteereditintooneofAsia’slargestfoodservicecompanies.ThiswaspartofJFC’s Succession Planning. "We have been preparing Ernesto for assuming greater responsibilities. Hisperformance has clearly demonstrated that he is ready to lead the Jollibee Group as its new CEO,” Tan

Caktiongsaid,describingthemoveas itbuildsastrongerandlargerbusinessinthefuture.TanCaktiongremained as the Chairman of the JFC Board and continues to play a significant role in pursuing newventuresandpartnershipsaswellasproductresearchanddevelopmentfortheJollibeeGroup.IndustryOverviewandCompetitivePositioningFastfoodIndustryinthePhilippinesIndustryValueDuetoagrowingeconomy,thefastfoodindustryinthePhilippinesiscurrentlyvaluedatPhp170Bin2015(salesinfastfoodcategory:foodservicevalue)withatotalnumberof7,629storesacrossthecountry.This12%growth fromthepreviousyear isamarginalslowdown fromthe13%valuegrowth in2014due tostiffeningcompetitionandmaturityoftheindustry.However,fastfoodispoisedtorecordavalueCAGRof6% from 2016-2020, forecasting to hit Php 231B in 2020. Also, the number of stores is expected toincreasebyaCAGRof6%to10,622storesin2020.AccordingtoEuromonitor,fastfoodremainsthefastestgrowingconsumerfoodservicechannelinthecountryin2015.

CompetitiveLandscapeIn 2015, JFC maintains its dominance in the fast food segment with acompanymarketshareof55.9%.Thisischaracterizedbyitswiderangeofbrandportfolio consistingof popular local brands such as Jollibee,MangInasal,Greenwich,Chowking,RedRibbonandBurgerKing.Thesebrandsare also the leaders in their respective fast food categories. Its nearestcompetitor,McDonald’sCorp.,holdsa20.3%marketshare,whileinthirdplace is Yum! Brands Inc., which operates KFC. In the fast food brandcategory, Jollibee leads the way with 37.5% market share followed byMcDonald’s with 20.8%. Chowking andMang Inasal, both brands underJollibeeFoodsCorp., trailwith8.8%and5.2%marketsharerespectively.KFChas5.0%shareoftheindustry.RobustPhilippineEconomicPerformanceNolongerthesickmanofSoutheastAsia,thePhilippineshasbeenshowingastellareconomicperformancesince 2012with a GDP growth of 6.8% driven by the influx of foreign remittances fromOFWs and therobust growth of the BPO industry resulting to an increase in household consumption. The midterm

electionsof2013andPresidentialelectionsin2016havecontributedgreatly to theGDPgrowthabove7%.In2016,forthefirsttimeever,thePhilippinessurpassed China’s growth of 6.7%. The continuedstrong economic performance, surpassing theASEAN region, earned the country an investmentgraderatingdueitsstrongeconomicfundamentals.In addition to its GDP growth, the GDP per capitaalso has been increasing, which translates to an

increase in household consumption expenditure. Thismeans that the purchasing power of Filipinos hasincreased to includemore than thebasicnecessities.Filipinoshavemoredisposable incomeandthe fastfood industrywouldbenefitgreatly sinceFilipinoscandinemoreandshopmore.TheGDPpercapita in2015reachedUSD2,529orPhp123,000.GrowingPhilippinePopulation

ThepopulationofthePhilippinesreached100Min2014andthetrend is expected to continue as it hit 102M in 2015. Theincreasing population is beneficial to the fast food industry asmore people translate to more customers and sales. Growingcommunities in provincial areas are quickly turningmunicipalities into cities and the foray of JFC into expanding tothese previously underserved areas will result to untappedgrowthopportunitiesforthecompany.

FinancialAnalysis

RATIOS 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006PROFITABILITY

GrossProfitMargin 17.41% 18.33% 18.36% 17.44% 17.49% 18.62% 19.42% 18.12% 20.40% 20.00%OperatingProfitMargin 6.80% 7.76% 8.11% 7.20% 7.43% 8.21% 8.08% 7.56% 8.25% 8.87%NetProfitMargin 4.89% 5.91% 5.82% 5.25% 5.17% 5.99% 5.56% 5.28% 6.17% 6.36%ReturnonAssets 8.75% 11.12% 11.09% 9.85% 9.88% 11.01% 10.22% 10.09% 12.29% 12.51%ReturnonEquity 17.05% 21.56% 21.46% 18.33% 17.62% 19.13% 17.50% 17.30% 20.21% 20.91%

LIQUIDITYCurrentRatio 1.29 1.26 1.18 0.94 1.10 0.99 1.45 1.45 1.38 1.29QuickRatio 0.85 0.80 0.83 0.70 0.75 0.79 1.18 0.98 1.00 0.94

ACTIVITYReceivableTurnover 15.44 16.94 27.53 27.66 24.70 21.10 22.18 22.61 21.68 20.97InventoryTurnover 13.94 14.87 20.18 20.39 17.26 21.46 16.41 15.70 20.18 19.31PayablesTurnover 16.12 18.14 18.78 19.03 11.82 11.32 10.11 11.87 12.65 11.50TotalAssetTurnover 1.59 1.70 1.77 1.73 1.65 1.67 1.66 1.66 1.83 1.84

LEVERAGELong-termdebttoEquity 28.71 16.29 18.02 4.04 20.18 0.30 14.96 17.55 0.81 0.43DebttoEquity 32.66 25.78 22.92 25.65 28.77 24.71 17.16 20.70 2.38 2.08

SHAREHOLDERRATIOSEarningsperShare 4.62 5.07 4.45 3.58 3.14 3.12 2.61 2.27 2.36 2.16DividendPayoutRatio 56.96% 32.32% 15.95% 35.49% 34.10% 32.07% - 37.04% 33.84% 31.47%GrowthofJollibeefrom2006to2015

GrowthinSalesIntermsofsales,Jollibeehasgrownpositivelyfrom2006to2015.Ithasanaverageannualgrowthrateof13.27%forthepast10years.NetsalesincreasedfromalmostPhP34billionin 2006 to PhP 100 billion at the end of 2015. Sales weredriven by local and global expansion through the years asstatedpreviously. JFChaspresence isSoutheastAsia,China,Middle East and United States. Additionally, Jollibee hascontinuedtoacquireseveralquickservicerestaurantsinthePhilippinesandabroad.

JFC’smergerandacquisitionsfrom2006-2015areshownbelow:

Issuer Action EffectiveDateBKTitansInc Acquisition September30,2011MangInasalPhilippinesInc Acquisition November22,2010BeijingHongzhuangyuanCateringTradeManagementCoLtd Merger October1,2008BelmontEnterprisesVenturesLtd Acquisition June18,2007BakerFreshFoodsPhilippinesInc Acquisition September29,2006GreenwichPizzaCorp Acquisition January17,2006

GrowthinNetIncomeNetincomefigureshaveshownarelativelyincreasingtrendsince2006.Averageannualgrowthrateisat11.99%whileaveragenetincomemarginis5.64%.

However,thereisaninconsistencybetweenactualnetincomefiguresandthenetincomemargins.Asshowninthegraph,actualnetincomemayshowanincreaseas compared to the previous year but net incomemargin may show otherwise as compared to thepreviousperformance.Growth in actual net income can be attributed to thegeneral reduction in Cost of Goods Sold, and Selling,General and Administrative Expenses values. Cost ofGoods Sold values moved in the same increasingmanner as revenues, with an annual average of

77.53% of sales since 2006. On the other hand, Selling, General and Administrative Expenses trendedinverselywithsalesatanannualaverageof10.81%.Nonetheless,astoNetProfitMargin,thetrendshowsthatitisdownwards.GrowthinStockPriceandMarketCapitalization

JFC’s stock price trended positively through the years. From the period 2006 to 2015, JFC recorded thelowest quarterly closing price of PhP 31.00 on June 2006, while the highest price of Php232.00was inJanuary2015. With this trend, JFC’smarket capitalization sky-rocketed to an annual average growthof22.06%. Table presents market capitalization, its yearly growth rate and volume. Graphically, market

capitalizationisshownbelow.Withhighmarketcapitalization,JFCmayexperienceslowgrowth,whichisconsistentwiththenetprofitmarginbutassumeslowrisk.

Note: Market capitalization and volume figures are expressed in millions.

PerformanceforCurrentYear2016SecondQuarterNetIncomeisupby17.5%vs.lastyear

Second quarter 2016 earnings of JFC showsdouble-digit growth compared to the sameperiod in 2015, with an increase of 17.5%.Thisisattributedtoastrongcorebusinessofthe company propelled by new productofferingsintroducedthis2016.

SignificantEventsthataffectedJFCReviewing the financial information of JFC, it may be remiss not to look as well at certain importantinternal and external events thatmay have affected Jollibee. As there aremany significant internal andevents thatmayhaveaffected Jollibee, this reportwill focusononeexternalandone internalevent thatoccurredwithintheperiodofstudy,particularlyfrom2006to2015.Thestudywillfocusparticularlyon:(i)the2007-2008WorldFinancialCrisis;and(ii)theretirementofTonyTanCaktiongasCEOandPresidentin2014.2007-2008GlobalSlump:HowJollibeeManagementReacted

Theglobal financialcrisis (GFC)orglobaleconomiccrisis iscommonlybelievedtohavebegun in July2007 with the credit crunch, when a loss of confidence by US investors in the value of sub-primemortgages caused a liquidity crisis. This, in turn, resulted in the US Federal Bank injecting a largeamount of capital into financial markets.By September 2008, the crisis had worsened as stockmarkets around the globe crashed and became highly volatile. Consumer confidence hit rockbottomaseveryonetightenedtheirbeltsinfearofwhatcouldlieahead.1

Year MarketCapitalization Volume MarketCap

GrowthRate2006 42,060.86 1,001.45 4.45%2007 52,907.25 1,017.45 25.79%2008 42,477.66 1,023.56 -19.71%2009 56,925.59 1,035.01 34.01%2010 92,188.54 1,036.99 61.95%2011 93,932.86 1,038.37 1.89%2012 106,688.90 1,046.68 13.58%2013 182,002.67 1,051.43 70.59%2014 228,730.42 1,063.86 25.67%2015 234,104.76 1,068.97 2.35%

Thedescriptionof theGlobalFinancialCrisisabove is very accurate as it affected stockmarkets globally. The effects of the GFC,however,werenotasharshinthePhilippinesas the consumer-driven economy of thePhilippines proved to bemore resilient thanmanyintheworld,includingsomeofitsAsianneighbors.AsforJFCstockprices,whileitstartedtodeclineandreachedanegativegrowthforthefirsttimeinthe10-yearperiodofstudysometimeAprilof2008,itsuddenlysurgedandcontinuedtogrow.Infact,itupendedAyala Land, Inc. during the global crisis, proving that “[i]n the Philippines, consumer-related companiesruletheroostingoodtimesandbad.”1In fact, theGFCmight have been an opportunity for JFC, asconsumers where driven to find cheaper alternatives fortheirfoodchoices.Inonearticle,JamesHookwaynotedthat:

Ordinary consumers say the same thing. "I used to go toStarbucksforcoffeeandmaybeapastryforbreakfast,"saysRaymond Gomez, a clerical worker in Manila's financialdistrict."Butnowmostdays,IpopintoJollibeewhereIcaneatbreakfastforhalfthepriceorless."1

In fact, this isnotnew for JFC, in1983,with thePhilippines inpolitical turmoil, JFC tookadvantageandprovidedwhattheFilipinoswanted–acheapalternativetointernationalfastfoodrestaurantswhichwerecoming into the Philippine Market at around this time. JFC was confident with their product and thissentimentreflectedonJFC’sstockprices. AsnapshotofJFCstockpricescomparedtothePSEiwastakenfromthewebsiteoftheWallStreetJournalandispresentedinthegraph.Source:TheWallStreetJournalwebsite

TheChangeinLeadershipEffectiveJuly1,2014,ErnestoTanmantiongtookovertheChiefExecutiveOfficerpositionatJFC,replacingTonyTanCaktiong, theerstwhile founderof JFC.Mr.TanCaktiongwasat thehelmof JFC for almost40yearsandwashailed tohave “transformedJollibeefromanicecreamparlorintooneofAsia’slargestfoodservice companies”1, a JFC whose growth is unsurpassed in its industry. While there were manyunconfirmedreportsastothereasonbehindthereplacement,onethingisclear,JFCasacorporationwasunmoved.BasedofthereportonthewebsiteoftheWallStreetJournal,stockpricesofJFCremainonasteadyriseasstock traders were unmoved by these news. Despite the resignation of their founding CEO, the soundfinancialfundamentalsofJFC,asseenabove,allowedJFCtohurdlethisnegativenews.Asmaybeseenfromthegraph, threemonthsbefore theannouncemen, JFC’sstockpricescontinue toperformbetter than themarket., and continued even after Mr. Tanmantiong takeover in June 2014, or almost a year after theannouncement.

Source:TheWallStreetJournalwebsite

JFCandPorter’sFiveForcesAnalysisToanalyzeJFCfurther,Porter’sFiveForcesAnalysiswasutilized, inparticular, lookingatthecriticalfivethreatstoJFC:1. Competitiverivalryorcompetition(weak)2. Bargainingpowerofbuyersorcustomers(moderate)3. Bargainingpowerofsuppliers(strong)4. Threatofsubstitutesorsubstitution(moderate)5. Threatofnewentrantsornewentry(weak)

Basedonthegroup’sanalysis,itisclearthattheremaybeanewtrendforJFCinthefuture.ThreatfromCompetitorsAsmayhavebeenseenfromthepreviousdiscussion, JFChas55%ofthemarketshareofthe localquickservicerestaurantmarket,severelyovershadowingJFC’sclosestrival,McDonald’s,withamarketshareof20%.Theother25%isdistributedamongstmorethan30otherquick-servicechains.JFChasfarreachesfromAparri to Jolo,withalmost2500 stores. JFChas increasedmarket sharenotonlybyexpanding itsJollibee Stores, but buying out existing fast food chains such as: (i) Greenwich, (ii) Chowking, (iii) RedRibbon,(iv)MangInasal,(v)BurgerKing,(vi)YongheKing,(vii)HongZhuanYuan,(viii)SanPingWang,(xi)SuperFoods,(x)12Hotpot,(xi)Jinja–andsoonSmashburger.ThreatfromsubstituteproductsThereisanewtrendcomingworldwide,atrendtoHealthandWellness.InthePhilippines,alone,thereisanemergenceofanewhealthylifestyleoutlook.ThisisaseriousthreattoJFC’sgrowthascustomersnowarelookingforhealthyalternativesandconsiderfastfood,JFCincluded,asjunkfood. InthePhilippines,therearenowfastfoodrestaurantslikeJujuEatsandSaladtoGoprovidinghealthyfastfoodalternatives.Presently,however,theserestaurantsarelimitedtotheMetroareasofthePhilippines(e.g.MetroCebu,MetroDavaoandMetroManila).Thishealthytrendismore obvious internationally as GovernmentHealth Institutions are now showing concerns on the illeffectsoffastfoodrestaurants.Considering themarket strategy of JFC, itmay choose not to include healthy alternatives in theirmenu.However, itmaynotbefarfetchedtoconceiveJFCacquiringahealth-orientedquickservicerestaurantinthenearfuture.ThreatfromNewEntrantsLocally,theremaybenewentrantsthatcouldprovetobeathreattoJFC,buttheirimpactmaynotbefeltinthenearfuture. Thelatestsignificantentranttothefast-foodmarketwasChic-Boyin2011. ThereweretalksthatJFCwasattemptingtobuyChic-Boybutthetalksfizzled,alongwithChic-Boy. ThisiswhatJFCdoestoentrants---buythemorstompthemout.

AnynewentranttothePhilippineMarket,whetherlocalorinternationalfranchise,willhaveadifficulttimeasJFC,themarketleader,analmostinsurmountableadvantageoverthem.Newentrants,therefore,shouldstayclearfromJFC’sniche.BargainingPowerofSuppliersJFC’s control over its suppliers is waning. In the ten-year study period, JFC’s Net Trade Cycle or CashConversionCyclehadincreasedfrom5daysin2006to27daysin2015.ThisisaseriousthreattoJFCasthiswillhavebigimpactonitsfuturemarginsandrevenues.

BargainingPowerofCustomersForJFC,customersareno.1.Itsoperationsadapttocustomerswants.Asshownearlier,JFCmaintainsasmall to reasonableNetProfitMargin, ensuring thatpricesare cheapwithout compromisingquality. JFChasalsoshownthatitsflavorsadapttowhatthecustomersdemand.JFCcreatesnewitemsthatwouldsuitthecustomers’taste.Thus,itisnotuncommontoseetheJFCmenudifferfromoneregiontoanother.ConclusionThedecisiontobuyJollibeewassupposedtobeano-brainerdecision.However,asmayhavebeenseenfromthefinancialanalysisabove,thedecisionhasbecomemoredifficultasresultofthefollowingfactors:MarketAnalysis

MarketisContinuingtoOvervalueJFCJFC’s price to book ratio has steadily increased from3.84 in 2006 to 7.64 in 2015. This steady increase isattributedtothecontinuedincreaseinsharepricesbutslowdeclineinitsEPSRatio.Obviously,themarketisovervaluing JFC share prices based simply on JFC’scontinuedprojectedgrowth.

Infact,CapitalCube’s(theWallStreetJournalwebsitedataprovider)analysts’positionisthatthemedianimplied price of JFC is 187.14while the range is between 171.81 to 202.46. Simply put, themarket isoverpricingJFCbyalmost25%.JFCandtheQuickServiceRestaurantIndustryJFC is heavily invested in the quick service restaurant industry, a very profitable business – in grossrevenue. However, because quick service restaurants cater to the low-income to the middle-incomebracketofthepopulation,pricingstrategiesarecritical. Infact,becauseofthesepricingstrategies,quickservicerestaurantsareexpectedtohaveverysmallmarginsandmedianreturnsonly.Considering,JFChasnotdiversifiedandcontinuedtoinvestmostlyonrelatedindustries,netprofitmarginscontinuetobelowevenwhileitsrevenuesrapidlyincrease.JFCsStockPerformanceA critical indicator for stock performance is returns. Based on data discussed above, JFC returns havestartedtodeclinein2014.JFC:aMatureCompanyOntheotherhand,whilegrowthofJFCisprobablyinthedecline,itsfundamentalsarestable.QualityofEarningsJFC’sfundamentalsareintact.First,revenuescontinuetoriseforJFC.From2006to2015,JFC’srevenueroseby197%.Ascanbeseeninfiguresabove,JFC’sgrowthis,ontheaverage,around12%.Second,JFC’sOperatingCashflowfor2015isatPhp13.3B,anincreaseofmorethan4timesitsCashFlowin2014. JFC is certainlyawashwithcash. In fact, JFC’sCashandCashEquivalents in2015amounted tomorethanPhp11.5B,anincreaseof51%from2014,whichwasatP7.5B.Obviously, JFC can finance its operations and investments without the need for borrowing funds. JFC,however,continuestoborrow,long-term,asmaybeseenfromabovedata,whereLong-TermDebttoTotalStockholder’sEquitycontinuestoincrease.Notsurprisingly,JFC’sCashandCashEquivalentsismorethanitsTotalLongTermDebtfrom2006-2015.Third,JFC’scoreincomecontinuestoincreasefrom2006to2015.ManagementJFC’smanagementhasproventheirmettleintimesofcrisis.Infact,aspresentedearlier,twomajoreventshavetestedJFCanditsperformance.Asdiscussed,JFCanditsManagementsurvivedthe2007-2008GlobalFinancial Crisis and the Change in Leadership in 2013 with flying colors, as JFC continued its revenuegrowthandmarketleadership.

ABuyRecommendationInfine,whileJFCstockscontinuetobeover-valuedbytheMarket,thisovervaluationisnotwithoutbases.Themarket is continues tobe confident of JFC’sperformance in the futurewith its very sound financialfundamentals.Thus,thegroup,whilehavingsomereservations,recommendsaBUYofJFCshares,butwithacaveatthatsmalltomoderatereturnsshouldonlybeexpected.