journal of cases in educational leadership-2014-mette-3-18

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Journal of Cases in Educational Leadership

2014, Vol. 17(4) 3 –18© 2014 The University Council

for Educational Administration

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DOI: 10.1177/1555458914549665 jcel.sagepub.com

Article

Turnaround,Transformational, or

Transactional Leadership: AnEthical Dilemma in SchoolReform

Ian M. Mette1 and Jay P. Scribner 2

Abstract

This case was written for school leaders, specifically building-level principals and centraloffice administrators attempting to implement school turnaround reform efforts.Often, leaders who embark on this type of organizational change work in intenseenvironments that produce high levels of pressure to demonstrate improvement instudent achievement. Educators studying this case should examine the impact onethical leadership when implementing rapid reform efforts, particularly the pressure

on school leaders at the district and building levels to employ a transactional ratherthan transformational approach to leadership as they respond to the pressures ofturnaround school policy.

Keywords

turnaround school policy, school improvement efforts, accountability, politics, ethicalleadership, transformational leadership

Case Narrative

Walnut Lane Elementary is a public school that supports 500 students in a midwestern

state. The building is part of the K-12 Watertown School District, which has 19 elemen-

tary schools, 5 middle schools, and 2 large high schools. The public school system of

Watertown serves just over 13,000 students and supports high numbers of

1University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, USA2

Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA, USA

Corresponding Author:

Ian M. Mette, University of Arkansas, 237 Graduate Education Building, Fayetteville, AR 72701, USA.

Email: [email protected]

JELXXX10.1177/1555458914549665Journal of Casesin Educational LeadershipMetteand Scribner research-article2014

at Universiti Utara Malaysia on April 2, 2016 jel.sagepub.comDownloaded from

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4 Journal of Cases in Educational Leadership 17(4)

impoverished and minority status children. Located in what has become an increasingly

urbanized area, the school community has evolved over time, growing from a bedroom

community for the large neighboring city in the 1940s and 1950s to becoming an exten-

sion of the city’s downtown area. Over the past 70 years, Watertown’s demographics

have changed dramatically. Prior to World War II, Watertown was almost 95% White,

but with the building and rapid expansion of highways during the 1950s, the commu-

nity began to experience “White flight,” urban decay due to a lack of business invest-

ment, and the continual rise of crime within the area.

Throughout the remainder of the 20th century, White Watertown residents increas-

ingly migrated to newer, more secluded communities. Simultaneously, many Black

residents from the inner-city moved away from the ever increasing violence that

plagued many American cities, and thus saw relocation to Watertown as an opportu-

nity to provide their families with a safer, more stable lifestyle. In 1980, the school

demographics were roughly 50% Black and 50% White; however, by the mid-1990s,

almost three out of four children in Watertown School District were Black. Today, the

district serves students who self-identify as 82% Black, 12% White, 4% Hispanic, and

2% Other.

Watertown is part of a sprawling metro area that has a long history of racial and

economic segregation dating prior to the American Civil War. Many residents of the

area take pride in identifying their socioeconomic class based on from which high

school, and from what part of the city, a resident graduated. An example of continued

efforts to self-segregate was highlighted when city planners proposed to expand the

light rail system. While the elected officials of Watertown gladly passed the mass tran-

sit initiative to help their citizens have access to inexpensive and reliable transporta-

tion, Hillside, one of the more affluent communities in the metro area (in between the

center of the city and the Watertown area), prevented the mass transit expansion into

their municipality, thus blocking the light rail expansion into Watertown. As docu-

mented by the local media, Hillside, a mostly White, upper-middle class neighborhood

that went through gentrification several decades ago, openly debated how the mass

transit system expansion into their community would provide “open access” to “those

who might not have the best intentions.” This type of communication among neigh-

boring towns only served to divide communities and solidify racial stereotypes.

Interestingly, Watertown has several roads and rail lines that run through the munici-

pality and serve as literal dividing lines between more affluent adjacent towns with

distinctly different racial compositions.

A History of Conflict

In addition to the history of racial tension and conflict in the surrounding area, the

Watertown School District has a history of internal conflict as well. In the mid-1990s,

many of the Watertown teaching workforce, who at the time were predominantly

White, were unprepared to deal with the cultural differences of the students they sup-

ported within the Watertown community. Several lawsuits ensued, and both minority

staff members and parents of minority students successfully, and publicly,


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Mette and Scribner 5

won discrimination torts against the school district. Rather than capitalizing on the

opportunity to improve the culture and ethics of leadership within the district, the law-

suits of the 1990s magnified the dysfunction of the district and school leadership.

Media interactions were poorly handled, as those school employees who were inter-

viewed about the impact of the lawsuits often came across as gruff, unapproachable,

and unconnected to the needs of the changing population of students being served.

Moreover, administration during the 1990s typically employed a transactional style of

leadership that focused on controlling, influencing, and managing the tumultuous

work environment.

By the time a dynamic new superintendent, Dr. Rachel Taylor, came into the district

in 1999, the relationship with the press was so damaged by previous administration

that it took several years of repairing media relations for the local newspaper to share

her message of improving student achievement via instruction with cultural relevancy.

In addition, the new superintendent attempted to empower educators in the district by

utilizing a transformational style of leadership that valued the work, opinions, and

visions of teachers to address issues of social equity and justice. The teachers union

bought into the vision, and many schools saw immediate improvement in school cul-

ture and student achievement. After 3 years in the district, Dr. Taylor won the state

administrator of the year award for her work to promote cultural awareness in the

classroom. Then, in 2003, she left for a large metropolis area in Texas, the high-stakes

accountability measures of No Child Left Behind (NCLB) consequences went into

effect, and the Watertown District slowly regressed into a culture that focused on

responding to the demands of reform initiatives rather than meeting the needs of their

students. In other words, the lack of ethical leadership by district and building admin-

istrators created a culture of compliance under a transactional leadership approach that

focused on controlling the students, teachers, and overall school environment.

In 2006, a surrounding school district was stripped of its accreditation by the State

Department of Education (SDOE), and many school officials feared the Watertown

School District would soon be next. In early 2009, the SDOE announced the launch of

a new reform effort that invited the lowest performing schools in the state to take part

in a turnaround school initiative, called the State Turnaround Schools Project. With the

assistance of a turnaround consulting firm, the goal of the program was to create a tar-

geted, specific, highly prescriptive support program that provided executive leadership

training for principals. By focusing on using data to drive instruction for students and

to make personnel decisions, as well as using predictive assessments written by the

same corporation that wrote a large portion of the state assessment, the hope of partici-

pating was to improve student achievement within 2 years. The SDOE contacted the

superintendents of school districts directly to suggest participation, rather than includ-

ing principals of the building in the conversation, mainly because participation in the

turnaround program required the removal of ineffective principals. As a result, many of

the school districts who were invited, including Watertown, felt coerced by the state to

accept the State Turnaround Schools Project invitation. This was primarily because the

SDOE had already stripped the accreditation of two of the largest school districts in the

state, and many districts felt they might be next if they did not comply.


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Compounding the issue was pressure from the Watertown central office for Walnut

Lane to participate in an effort to show the SDOE that the district was doing every-

thing in its power to address low student achievement. However, behind closed doors,

many central office administrators only seemed concerned with maintaining district

accreditation. Further complicating the matter was the recent election of a new school

board president and three new board members, all of whom were White and whose

families had lived in Watertown since the late 19th century, long before the municipal-

ity was racially transformed. These newly elected members created a foursome major-

ity, of the seven total board members, which seemed determined, with the help of the

local newspaper, to remove the Watertown superintendent, Dr. James Winslow.

Winslow, a Black man in his mid-50s, was depicted in recent newspaper articles as an

ineffective leader incapable of standing up to the demands of the local teachers union.

As one new board member told the newspaper, Winslow was not capable of forcing

the strong teachers union to “get down to work and make these students learn.” As a

result of the onslaught from both the newspaper and the school board foursome,

Winslow felt further compelled to demonstrate that district leadership was doing

everything in its power to improve student achievement, even if it meant trying new

programs such as the State Turnaround Schools Project that were considered suspect

by many practitioners and researchers throughout the state. Walnut Lane would par-

ticipate, and Winslow believed he had just the right principal for the job.

Walnut Lane Elementary Dr. Rhonda Brown, principal of Walnut Lane, has served as principal in the Watertown

School District for the past 10 years and had built a reputation as being a no-nonsense

administrator who successfully implemented multiple reform efforts to improve stu-

dent achievement in response to NCLB requirements. Rhonda, a well-educated Black

woman with an EdD from a highly reputable university in the metro area, had risen

through the Watertown ranks quickly. At the age of 27, she was one of the youngest

principals in her district. Now in her late 30s, she was a seasoned administrator who

was regarded as a change agent. After the Watertown School District agreed to partici-

pate in the State Turnaround Schools Project in the spring of 2009, Dr. Winslow

removed the previous Walnut Lane principal, and Rhonda was promoted from a

smaller elementary school building. Told by Winslow that she was to help implement

the State Turnaround Schools Project initiative starting in the fall of 2009, Rhonda

knew the improvement effort would be difficult. However, she had taken on many

challenges in the past and saw this as an opportunity to continue to improve her status

in the district.

Although Rhonda was not known as having a warm personality, she was seen as an

achiever. She built solid relationships with teachers at her previous two school build-

ings through hard work, trust, and the willingness to “work in the trenches” to collabo-

rate and improve instructional practices. Moreover, she improved community

engagement at each of her two previous schools, helping parents see teachers as peo-

ple who could help their children succeed, not people who forced unnecessary lessons.




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As a result, culture improved in both of Rhonda’s previous schools. Rhonda was

driven, motivated, and passionate about helping students earn a quality education, but

she also possessed what many administrative peers described as a laser-like focus on

proving her leadership experience could be an asset to the Watertown central office.

Yet the road to improvement for Rhonda and Walnut Lane would not be easy. As

Rhonda would soon discover, Walnut Lane was not like other schools participating in

the State Turnaround School Project. One thing setting Walnut Lane apart was the fact

that the building had received a major overhaul in physical appearance 2 years ago

when the district applied for and received grant funding from the federal government

to update buildings in danger of being closed due to structural concerns. As such, the

building had new flooring, new windows, a new gymnasium and cafeteria, and a

much-needed centralized air unit. Thus, the school had already undergone a major

physical transformation, eliminating the ability to capitalize on a “quick win” to show

the community that the school was serious about improvement. If Rhonda were to

turnaround Walnut Lane, she would have to show more than just physical

improvements.

Another aspect that differentiated Walnut Lane from other turnaround schools par-

ticipating in the State Turnaround Schools Project was the strong presence of union

representation among the faculty. Further complicating the issue of Walnut Lane’s

prior physical transformation (in contrast to other schools that were just starting) was

the fact that the local union president was a fourth-grade teacher in the school build-

ing. The local union strongly opposed many of the would-be reform efforts suggested

by the State Turnaround School Project, which included a longer school day, increased

evaluation and greater scrutiny of teacher performance, Saturday school, and remov-

ing tenure. The union president also had the ear of the local newspaper editor, who

seemed to be more interested in printing stories about conflict between teachers and

administrators than celebrating the successes that existed in pockets throughout the

district. Moreover, Walnut Lane had its fair share of mediocre teachers, some of whom

Rhonda suspected would have to be put on professional improvement plans (PIPs) to

target specific improvement efforts. However, Rhonda believed in the importance of

supporting teachers through continued supervision and professional development and

that it was her job to build her staff by meeting them where they were individually in

their careers. Rhonda knew the turnaround reform effort would be difficult at Walnut

Lane, but by participating in the program, she felt she surely would be able to imple-

ment change and impact the lives of students she served on a daily basis. Of course,

there also was the potential victory of turning around the lowest performing school in

the district, which Rhonda thought would surely propel her to the central office.

An Ethical Dilemma

After participating in initial training with turnaround consultants during the summer of

2009, Rhonda came back energized with new information and felt ready to make

changes at Walnut Lane. Realizing the lack of time to properly plan for an improve-

ment effort of this size, Rhonda understood she could not undertake this mammoth




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reform effort on her own and would have to rely on the support of the turnaround

consultants to ensure success. Interestingly enough, however, was the disconnect

Rhonda noticed between what the turnaround specialists spoke about and what

Rhonda, herself, knew about educational leadership. Many of the suggestions to “turn

around” low-performing schools ignored relationship building with teachers in

exchange for achievement on assessments, demanded unnaturally rapid improvement,

and appeared to use data to remove teachers, not to build educators with individualized

professional development. When Rhonda brought her concerns to the attention of Dr.

Winslow in a 2009 September meeting, he responded by stating, “It sounds like you’re

just not up for the job. We can always find someone else who is willing to make the

change that is necessary at Walnut Lane.” Not wanting to miss a leadership opportu-

nity, Rhonda assured Winslow she could lead Walnut Lane through the turnaround

process.

With the help of local turnaround consultants provided by the State Turnaround

Schools Project and confirmation from Dr. Winslow that Walnut Lane was to proceed

as directed, Rhonda’s newly formed leadership team examined individual student data

to identify the school’s strengths and weaknesses in student achievement. In addition,

the leadership team was also able to assess the instructional deficiencies of teachers.

In particular, the turnaround consultants trained the leadership team and led teachers

on instructional assessment practices such as classroom data analysis and developing

student lessons that were highly aligned to state objectives. The turnaround consul-

tants even suggested purchasing and using predictive assessments written by the same

corporation that wrote a large portion of the state assessment. Thus, by working closely

with the turnaround consultants and accepting their role as advisors in the improve-

ment effort, Rhonda could individualize goals for both students and teachers, increase

achievement on assessments, and establish procedures for overall turnaround school

improvement. Data, as Rhonda was learning, must be at the center of a turnaround

effort.

In addition to working closely with the turnaround consultants, Rhonda also bene-

fited from the network of other turnaround principals and consultants who helped

focus on specific areas of evaluation improvement. During one session that she

attended during October of 2009 with her Assistant Superintendent for Human

Resources (HR), the turnaround consultants brought in several HR specialists who had

successfully removed tenured teachers from other school districts who were unwilling

to partake in the turnaround process. Thus, the State Turnaround School Project sup-

ported the notion that if teachers refused to take part in their individualized areas of

improvement, principals and HR directors should follow this recently provided train-

ing and initiate the necessary documentation to remove teachers who refused to take

part in the improvement effort process.

Overwhelmed by the perceived pressure to promote rapid and dramatic improve-

ment, between October and December of 2009, and with the help of the turnaround

consultants, Rhonda put 7 teachers on PIPs, one of whom shortly resigned. Drawing

the ire and attention of the local teachers union, a public maelstrom soon ensued on the

front pages of the local newspaper. By the end of the first year in the State Turnaround




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Schools Project, Rhonda successfully dismissed 11 ineffective teachers out of 32 total

from her building by providing consistent documentation of poor teacher performance.

Of those 11 who were to be removed from Walnut Lane, 6 of them had tenure status.

The teachers union continually weighed in on Rhonda’s leadership, as well as their

dissatisfaction with the participation of Walnut Lane in the State Turnaround Schools

Project. However, the superintendent viewed it as a short-term loss in exchange for

long-term success. Even though culture at Walnut Lane was suffering, Dr. Winslow

thought it was positive in the long-term if it meant removing ineffective teachers.

Moreover, the school board seemed appeased by the efforts of the superintendent to

finally put pressure on resistant teachers to change. After all, Walnut Lane was identi-

fied by the SDOE as one of the lowest performing schools in the state, and Watertown

had to prove it was doing everything it could to keep its accreditation.

With the difficult first year behind her, Rhonda felt good going into August of 2010,

as she believed she was well on her way to making change in her building. Yet she

began to reflect and wonder at what cost. After a year of taking part in the State

Turnaround Schools Project and a flurry of very public activity as the teachers union

responded to Rhonda’s removal of ineffective teachers, Walnut Lane saw a slight

bump in state standardized test scores. While Dr. Winslow openly claimed this as the

beginning of a successful turnaround, Rhonda was more conflicted than she had ever

been about what it would take to truly turnaround Walnut Lane. While she had fol-

lowed the advice of the turnaround consultants and superintendent to remove ineffec-

tive teachers, much irreparable damage had been done to Walnut Lane’s school culture.

In addition, Rhonda was concerned with the managerial-based, transactional style of

leadership she was using to promote change, as this went against most of her training

and experience in school leadership. While the district continued to strongly encour-

age Walnut Lane’s continued participation in the State Turnaround Schools Project,

leaders in the central office were met with staunch opposition by the local teachers

union to implement any further changes within the school building. Thus, in a board

meeting in November of 2010, more radical changes such as extended school days,

Saturday school, or any other reform effort that would draw the close scrutiny of the

teachers union were determined to be off-limits.

Rhonda felt confused, frustrated, and even betrayed. She knew that there were more

ethical considerations to take into account than just removing ineffective and resistant

teachers, such as building relationships, focusing on effective and engaging instruc-

tional practices, and improving teachers based on individualized professional develop-

ment needs. Her shift from a transformational style of leadership where she had

inspired teachers to perform at high levels, to a transactional approach where she con-

trolled behavior and actions with sanctions and rewards, also was a professional con-

cern for herself as she reflected on her participation in the State Turnaround Schools

Project. In addition, she felt real, constant pressure from Dr. Winslow, who was simi-

larly pressured by the school board, to make immediate changes at Walnut Lane.

While Rhonda was doing all of the technical things necessary to promote change,

the building culture had rapidly deteriorated to the point of clear dysfunction. By

attempting to rapidly improve student achievement through the prescribed turnaround




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efforts, teachers were scared that if they did not follow Rhonda’s lead, then they, too,

would be removed from Walnut Lane. Instead of focusing on improving their instruc-

tion based on walk-through data, teachers began isolating themselves, locking their

doors and covering their door windows with paper. Perhaps most importantly, there

had been a noticeable drop in shared leadership and shared accountability. Teachers

blamed each other for not providing proper instruction in earlier grades as a reason

why students were struggling to improve academically; as a result, little collaboration

occurred between teachers and enrichment efforts faltered.

By the end of the second year of participation, in May of 2011, Walnut Lane saw

another slight increase in scores on the state exam. However, teachers privately shared

among each other that students were complaining about taking too many tests and that

learning was no longer fun. Dr. Winslow claimed victory in the turnaround program

but, feeling continued pressure from the school board, left Watertown in July 2011 to

work as a turnaround consultant expert. Rhonda, a reflective administrator, knew the

culture of her school was greatly damaged. Before the start of the 2011-2012 school

year, she was moved back to another small elementary school by the replacement

superintendent. She had such high aspirations for school turnaround—what had gone

wrong?

Teaching Notes: The History of Turnaround School

Policy, the Impact on Ethical Leadership, and the

Transformation Into Transactional Leadership

In 2001, the U.S. Department of Education published the School Improvement Report:

Executive Orders on Actions for Turning Around Low-Performing Schools. Written as

a result of executive orders from President Bill Clinton in 2000, the report focused on

the need to support traditionally failing schools to develop challenging academic stan-

dards, construct high-quality assessments to track and monitor progress, hire well-

trained educators, and employ strong leadership to guide the vision and mission of the

school community (U.S. Department of Education [U.S. DOE], 2001). Ultimately, the

School Improvement Report (U.S. DOE, 2001) held that improving low-performingschools is hampered by a lack of ability at the building, district, and state levels to

provide interventions that build capacity to improve student achievement. As seen in

the Watertown case, both district and building leadership provided too much emphasis

on the technical improvements of turnaround policy while seemingly ignoring cultural

aspects, lacking ethical leadership to meet the needs of the individual school building,

and relying heavily on a form of transactional leadership by targeting areas of weak-

ness and rewarding compliance to produce increased test scores.

As interest in school turnaround policy increased, the Center on Innovation and

Improvement (funded by the U.S. DOE) published School Turnarounds: A Review ofthe Cross-Sector Evidence on Dramatic Organizational Improvement (Rhim, Kowal,

Hassel, & Hassel, 2007). The authors posit two findings, (a) environmental context

and (b) leadership; allow turnaround leaders to implement a clear timetable, target




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specific measures of improvement using data; not be constricted by pre-existing regu-

lations; align systems of support; increase community engagement; and motivate all

staff to change and/or replace those who are not willing to change (Rhim et al., 2007).

Again, as seen in the Walnut Lane turnaround efforts, the principal is able to use data

to inform practice and remove teachers who are not willing to change, but she is not

able to motivate her teachers. Rather, they are coerced into participation as the princi-

pal attempts to manage their behaviors. Moreover, she is not able to influence the

environmental context of turnaround, namely, the need to increase community engage-

ment and to communicate clear expectations of what turnaround efforts entail.

Borrowed from the organizational sciences and business management world of the

1980s, turnaround school policy is heavily influenced by the organizational turnaround

successes and failures of the private, for-profit business sector (Murphy, 2008).

Although conceptually broad, most of the literature on organizational turnaround

details common themes of declining performance, implementing a response plan to

improve output, and creating new organizational processes that increase efficiency

(Murphy & Meyers, 2008). Interestingly enough, there is a substantial amount of orga-

nizational science research indicating that turnaround efforts more often end in failure

than in success (Pearce & Robbins, 1993; Shuchman & White, 1995; Slatter, Lovett,

& Barlow, 2006). This suggests that the implementation of selective research and

ignoring evidence that turnaround policy might not be as successful as advertised may

not be wise (Mathis & Welner, 2010). Thus, although programs such as the School

Improvement Grant (SIG) initiative and the Race to the Top (RTTT) have funded more

than US$4.35 billion in school improvement efforts to date (U.S. DOE, 2010, 2011),

there is a body of research that highlights the notion that the flexible funding mecha-

nisms, supported by neoliberal ideology, treat improvement efforts as a commodity

that can be bought and sold in a transactional manner (Mette, 2013). Moreover, these

efforts contain an over-reliance on standardized assessments, as well as methodologi-

cal errors, to prove these school reform efforts are actually effective (Trujillo & Renée,

2012).

Ethical LeadershipAlmost a decade of turnaround policy literature supports the notion that there are two

main components to school turnaround: (a) technical improvements and (b) cultural

improvements. In this case study, the over-reliance on technical improvements was

influenced by a culture of leadership that lacked an ethical component when attempt-

ing to address school improvement efforts for both teachers and students, and thus

potential for increased student achievement was negatively impacted. Ethical leader-

ship acknowledges that the concept of accountability is more than simply raising stan-

dardized test scores; equally important is taking into account professional standards,

encouraging engagement from the local community, and valuing the opinions of stake-

holders throughout the community (Stone-Johnson, 2014; Strike, 2007). Thus,

accountability can be a positive or negative force in school improvement efforts, par-

ticularly in the area of teacher buy-in to help drive increased student achievement.




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A central tenet to ethical educational leadership is to empower and value educators

as individuals within the school organization to allow them to meet their professional

responsibilities (Rebore, 2014). When reflecting on ethical leadership, pedagogical

considerations should be taken into account, specifically through instruction that ques-

tions and critiques issues of justice and human rights (Shapiro & Stefkovich, 2011).

Thus, there are major implications for educational leadership programs regarding their

preparation for aspiring leaders (Furman, 2012), not just in providing a solid theoreti-

cal coursework that addresses issues of educational ethics, but also in how educational

leaders might apply these concepts in problems of practice. Theoretically, ethical

school leadership requires administrators to apply a democratic decision-making pro-

cess that considers issues of social justice (Gerstl-Pepin & Aiken, 2009; Stone-

Johnson, 2014). However, in practice, educational leaders often are required to make

decisions that balance notions of transformational leadership with practical opera-

tional choices in light of accountability requirements (Maxcy, 2002). As noted by

Stefkovich and Begley (2007), ethical leadership is often influenced by the notion of

what is considered “best interests of students”; however, they astutely point out that

this very notion can be influenced by policy-driven expectations for student achieve-

ment as a result of accountability standards. Consequently, leaders may make deci-

sions that are not in the best interests of students. Rather, they may make decisions that

are in the best interest of school leaders, district leaders, or the school organization as

a whole, as seen in the actions of the leaders in Watertown.

Transformation Into Transactional Leadership

One way to examine the relationship between ideology and implementation regarding

turnaround schools is to employ the transformation of intentions framework. The

transformation of intentions framework provides valuable critical insights to the cre-

ation of policy. As Hall and McGinty (1997) posit, “policies are vehicles for the real-

ization of intentions” (p. 441), whereby policy makers enact policy to solve problems.

Thus, intentions are inherent in the visions, goals, and interests that influence policy

makers’ political agendas that then transform into specific actions. However, as policy

is implemented, often the original intent of the policy becomes transformed to ensure

the goals are met. As a result, the actions of those implementing the policy may or may

not align with the original intent.

Placier (1996) discusses the cycle of labels in education, stating the creation of

policy is a four-stage cycle that includes creation of a new label, diffusion to a wide

audience, semantic variance in the meaning of the label, and critique of the label (see

Figure 1). When President Obama proposed reauthorization of the Elementary and

Secondary Education Act (2010) and introduced the label “turnaround school” in

Blueprint for Reform, the American public witnessed the latest attempt of the federal

government to enact policy with the purpose of reforming our country’s public educa-

tion system to better compete with other countries. With regard to “turnaround schools”

as a label, it seems the neoliberal policy was created to recapture the public’s attention

about America’s low-performing schools and to change the political context regarding




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governmental intervention. Specifically, the creation of the label “turnaround school”

attempts to reduce a stigma that is highly politicized, mainly that schools with high

levels of minority and low-socioeconomic status (SES) students correlate with pro-

ducing academically low-achieving students. As depicted in the Watertown case, the

intent to improve student achievement and ensure reform efforts are met became trans-

formed by the political agendas of school leaders and the economic interests of turn-

around consultants.

Different from the concept of transformation of intentions, transformational leader-

ship is a popular theoretical style of leadership that first became popular in the 1980s

and continues to influence practitioners and scholars in both theory and application.

Transformational leadership focuses on leading by motivating teachers to invest in the

improvement process by grounding efforts in values, goals, and beliefs (Leithwood &

Sun, 2012) to improve student achievement. In contrast, transactional leadership

implements a managerial approach that monitors the environment for weaknesses and

offers rewards for compliance (Barnett & McCormick, 2004). As displayed in the

Watertown case, school leadership shifted from inspiring followers to reach higher

levels of performance to focusing on creating incentives to follow directives and man-

aging through expressing expectations (Bass, 1985), as well as finding weaknesses of

teachers that require intervention (Bogler, 2001). As posited by Hsiao, Lee, and Tu

(2012), transactional leadership is an attempt to manage a school building via an

exchange process between leaders and teachers that creates a subordination culture. It

is an attempt to control a situation and manage outcomes in exchange for resources,

which is exactly what occurred between the State Turnaround Schools Project, the

hired turnaround consultants, the superintendent, the principal, and the teachers of

Watertown. What this type of leadership and reform effort does not address, however,

is the need to speak to the deep-rooted issues of race, SES, and segregation. This is of

Diffusion to

a wide

audience

Semanc

variance in

the meaning

of the label

Crique of

the label

Creaon of a

new label

Figure 1. Cycles of labels in education.Source. Adapted from Placier (1996).




12/16


particular importance in Watertown and similar communities faced with implementing

turnaround policy. As Burns (1978) emphasizes, transformational leadership drives

real change in the sense that it must address cultural components of leadership that

question democracy, social justice, and equity promoted by our public education sys-

tem. Thus, as a result of the focus on the technical aspects of turnaround school leader-

ship in Watertown and the inability to impart change regarding cultural components,

lasting school reform is unlikely to occur by implementing turnaround efforts.

Discussion Questions and Teaching Activities

Using this case study and associated theoretical frameworks as a platform for learning,

the following discussion questions and teaching activities are intended to engage stu-

dents of educational leadership and policy in critical conversations about leading

school reform in politically charged policy environments. Aspiring school leaders and

current teachers, principals, central office administrators, and community members

can use this case to take an in-depth look at the political, racial, and economic factors

that often lead to imposed sanctions and improvement efforts on traditionally failing

schools. Suggested readings are provided as well to further detail turnaround school

policy and provide a broader theoretical framework to deconstruct the intent of these

reform efforts.

Discussion Questions1. How might the use of transactional styles of leadership in the Watertown case

overemphasize the technical aspects of school turnaround and prove ineffec-

tive in promoting school improvement in the Watertown community as well as

Walnut Lane? Is there a time that transactional leadership could help a turn-

around school leader address necessary cultural aspects of school turnaround

improvement efforts?

2. Analyze the leadership provided by the Watertown superintendent and think

about how he might better support the turnaround effort for the Watertown

community. What real political pressures does Dr. Winslow face from his

Board of Education as well as from the SDOE, and how does this impact his

district leadership? What aspects of ethical leadership is he currently ignoring,

and whose interests are being served?

3. Analyze the leadership provided by the Walnut Lane principal and think about

how she might better support the turnaround effort in her school building. What

real political pressures does Dr. Brown face from the superintendent and the

school board? What aspects of ethical leadership is she currently ignoring regard-

ing leadership and instructional practices, and what leadership strategies might

she have used to work more closely with her teachers to promote change? How

might she determine when to employ a transformational style of leadership as

opposed to strictly using a transactional approach? What attributes should “turn-

around principals” possess? Overall, what has gone wrong for Rhonda?




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4. How might Watertown school and district leaders promote buy-in among the

community to highlight the importance of school improvement efforts? What

type of activities might leaders implement to address issues of social justice,

democracy for all, and equity among all community members? What racial,

social, and economic considerations should school leaders take into account

when attempting to implement school turnaround policy?

Teaching Activities

The role of a turnaround principal. In groups of three to four students, instructors should

ask students to discuss how Dr. Rhonda Brown approached the implementation of

turnaround policy at Walnut Lane Elementary. The instructor should provide students

with the Teaching Notes from this article, but also provide electronic copies of School

Improvement Report: Executive Orders on Actions for Turning Around Low-Perform-

ing Schools (U.S. DOE, 2001), School Turnarounds: A Review of the Cross-Sector

Evidence on Dramatic Organizational Improvement (Rhim et al., 2007), and Turning

Around Failing Schools: Policy Insights From the Corporate, Government, and Non-

profit Sectors (Murphy, 2008). Using these documents, students should create a Pow-

erPoint or Prezi that highlights the strengths and weaknesses of Dr. Brown’s turnaround

leadership, taking into account technical and cultural improvement efforts. Groups

should present their information to other groups in the class, and the instructor should

then conduct a class-wide discussion focusing on suggestions to improve the turn-

around leadership in the Walnut Lane scenario. Specifically, the conversation should

include the importance of providing transformational leadership rather than transac-

tional leadership, as well as how to involve various members of the community in the

turnaround process, including parents, civic services, faith-based centers, business

members, and other community groups.

Exploring the notion of ethical turnaround leadership. Students should explore the ethics

of turnaround leadership by conducting a debate in class regarding the research sup-

porting turnaround school policy and how turnaround policy might be supported with

ethical leadership at the district and building level. Instructors should ask the class to

split into two groups, with one side debating in favor of turnaround school implemen-

tation methods and the other side arguing against the policy. Within the debate, stu-

dents should consider whether improving achievement in a rapid manner by

implementing turnaround policy is a sustainable leadership practice. Specifically, the

instructor should not only provide students with the Teaching Notes from this article

but also give students an electronic copy of Keys to Sustaining Successful School

Turnarounds (Duke, 2008) that describes a turnaround school as having improved low

student achievement on standardized tests for at least 2 consecutive years. In addition,

students should be given Democratic School Turnarounds: Pursuing Equity and

Learning From Evidence (Trujillo & Renée, 2012) to help reflect on how well turn-

around school policy addresses the deeper societal issues of low student achievement,

such as socioeconomic factors, poverty, and race (Trujillo & Renée, 2012), and




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whether turnaround school policy focuses too much on improving standardized test

scores. For a more critical conversation about policy analysis, instructors could also

have students debate the validity of a variety of opinion literature from private consult-

ing firms, such as The Turnaround Challenge (Calkins, Guenther, Belfiore, & Lash,

2007), School Turnaround of the Rensselaerville Institute (Rensselaerville Institute,

2011), and The Turnaround Challenge and Reaching New Heights: Turning Around

Low-Performing Schools (Mazzeo & Berman, 2003).

Technical and cultural improvement: Conducting interviews with those in the trenches. In

either groups or done individually, students should conduct several interviews with

principals within their school district by asking questions regarding the implementa-

tion of school improvement efforts to improve achievement. Students should ask ques-

tions about the implications of school improvement efforts, the pressures that can be

created to improve student achievement through transactional approaches to leader-

ship, the work that is being done to improve the culture of the interviewees’ buildings

through transformational approaches to leadership, and how communities respond

and/or are involved in school improvement efforts. Students should then analyze their

findings from the interview activity, discuss any themes of ethical leadership that

emerge from the brief study, and share out their data in a brief presentation the follow-

ing class. Instructors should lead the discussion by reflecting on the lessons learned

from turnaround school improvement efforts detailed in the case study, as well as from

the interviews conducted by students. Specifically, instructors should focus on facili-

tating discussion among students by addressing the balance between technical and

cultural improvement.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship,

and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication ofthis article.

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Author Biographies

Ian M. Mette is a visiting assistant professor of Educational Leadership at the University of

Arkansas. His research interests include school reform policy, teacher supervision and evalua-

tion, and bridging the gap between research and practice to inform and support school improve-

ment efforts. Specifically, his work targets how educators, researchers, and policy makers can

better inform one other to drive school improvement and reform policy.

Jay P. Scribner is the Department Chair and Professor of Educational Foundations at Old

Dominion University. His research interests include professional learning in schools, teacher

quality, and strategic management.

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