journal of philosophical research, 2019
TRANSCRIPT
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DEEPEPISTEMICVICES
IanJamesKidd,UniversityofNottingham
ForthcominginJournalofPhilosophicalResearch,2019
Abstract
Although the discipline of vice epistemology is only a decade old, the broader project of
studyingepistemicvicesandfailingsismucholder.Thispaperarguesthatcontemporaryvice
epistemologists ought to engagemore closelywith these earlier projects. After sketching
somegeneral arguments in sectionone, I then turn todeepepistemic vices: oneswhose
identityandintelligibilitydependsonsomeunderlyingconceptionofhumannatureorthe
natureofreality.Thefinalsectionthenoffersacasestudyfromaviceepistemictraditionthat
emergedinearlymodernEnglishnaturalphilosophy.
I.INTRODUCTION
Viceepistemologyemerged,overthelastdecade,asthestudyoftheidentityandsignificance
ofthecharactertraits,attitudes,andwaysofthinkingthat,invariousways,tendtoobstruct
inquiry—aninfluentialconceptiondubbed‘obstructivism’(Cassam2019).1Themorefamiliar
epistemic vices include arrogance, dogmatism, inflexibility, closed-mindedness, and other
featuresofagentsopposedto thecorrespondingvirtuesof themind–curiosity,humility,
open-mindednessandsoon–whicharethepurviewofvirtueepistemology(cf.Zagzebski
1996). Virtue and vice epistemology collectively constitute what wemight call character
epistemology,reflectingaconvictionthatthestudyofepistemicactivityoughttoinvoke,to
somesubstantivedegree, theepistemiccharactersof individualor collectiveagents.Such
charactersaretypicallycomplexanddynamic,consistingofboththestrongstabletraitswe
callvirtuesandvices,alongsideothersthatareweakerandlessstable.Mostepistemicagents’
characterswillbedappled,consistingofwell-developedvirtuesandvices,alongsideanarray
oflessstableandlesswell-formeddispositions.
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Although the discipline of vice epistemology is only a decade old, the broader
philosophical project of studying our epistemic vices and failings is much older. Ancient
Indian,Greek,andChinesephilosopherschallengedsophistry,prejudice,dogmatism,willed
ignorance, and other obstacles to virtue, reason, and wisdom, as do contemporary
philosophers,whether‘post-truthpolitics’,epistemologiesofignorance,andothersignsof
concernaboutourindividualandcollectiveepistemicfailings.Thepositiveexpressionofthis
concern is what Nicholas Wolterstorff (1996) called ‘regulative epistemologies’, overtly
normativeprojectsaimedatfacilitatingtheproperuseanddirectionofour individualand
collectiveepistemicconduct.Analysisandameliorationofourepistemicvicesandfailingsis
acrucialdimensionofthisregulativeenterprise.
In this paper,my claim is that contemporary vice epistemologists ought to attend
morecloselytothemethodsanddeliverancesofhistorians.Insectionone,Iofferasetof
arguments forwhat an historical vice epistemology and then, in sections two and three,
developacasestudy–asophisticatedearlymodernEnglishtraditioninvice-epistemology.
My claim is that an historical perspective indicates the existence of deep conceptions of
epistemicvice:onewhoseform,identity,andintelligibilityareonlyexplainableadequatelyin
relation to a deeper underlying conception of human nature or the nature of reality – a
Weltbild,perhaps.Iarguethatepistemichubrisisonesuchdeepepistemicvice,insofarasit
presupposes a conceptionof humanbeings’ epistemic capacities and situationwithin the
widerorderof reality,oneshaped,withinearlymodernEnglishnaturalphilosophy,byan
underlyingpostlapsariananthropology–aconceptionofhumanbeingsasfallen,corrupted
creatures.
Althoughviceepistemologyisrelativelyyoung,mostworksofarhastendednottobe
stronglyhistoricalinthesensesjustoutlined.OtherthanduereferencetoAristotelianvirtue
theory, there tends not to be intensive engagement with the historical contexts and
contingencyofthevicesofthemind.Giventhenascentstateofthediscipline,thisisnota
signofanyentrenchedahistoricality,especiallywhencomparedtoitssisterdiscipline,virtue
epistemology.Thelastfewyearshaveseenmorehistoricallysensitivework,eithersearches
forprecursorvirtueepistemologists–HumeandNietzsche,say–orapplyingvirtue-epistemic
resourcestothehistoryofphilosophyandofscience(cf.Alfano2016;Gelfert2013;Roberts
andWood 2007). I hope vice epistemology will also come to develop its own historical
sensibility,withthispaperbeingacontributiontothatend.
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Additionalgroundsforconfidenceinan‘historicalturn’ istheincreasinginterest in
epistemicvirtuesandvicesamongintellectualandculturalhistorians(cf.PaulandvanDongen
2017;Paul2016;Pauletal2016).Over the last fifteenyears,historianshaveturnedtheir
attention to questions of epistemic character – of what Steven Shapin dubs ‘scientific
personae’,normativeidealsstipulatingthesortsofqualitiesconstitutiveofgoodscientists.In
his book, The Scientific Life, Shapin explains his interest as the relationship between the
‘authorityofknowledge’and ‘thevirtuesofpeople’andthe ‘characterofknowers’ (2008:
xvi).Shapintracesthewaysnormativeconceptionsofthescientificself–‘personae’–shape
thearrayofepistemicvirtuesandvicesjudgedsalientinparticularsocial,institutional,and
historicalcontexts.Withineighteenthcenturynaturaltheology,wefindthehumbleandpious
GodlyNaturalist, a figuredistinct from theambitious, confidentVentureCapitalist of late
moderntechnoscience–variationsoccludedbyahistoricalandacontextualtalkofthevirtues
andvicesofthemind.
Aclassicstudyofthecontextualandcontingentnatureofepistemicvirtuesandvices
iscuriositas,atraitreviledasanepistemicandspiritualvicebymedievalChristians,onlyto
berehabilitated,duringtheRenaissanceandEnlightenment,asanintegralepistemicvirtue.
Inhismagisterialbook,TheLegitimacyoftheModernAge,HansBlumenberg(1983)argues
thatthatsatisfyingexplanationofcuriositas’schangingstatus,fromvicetovirtue,requires
systematic attention to theological, and cultural developments. Although Blumenberg
focusesonasinglecharactertraitinasinglehistoricalperiod,subsequenthistorians,suchas
LorraineDastonandPeterGalison(2007),offerwiderstudies.Theychartedtheemergence
and evolution of a set of broad conceptions of objectivity and the virtues stipulated as
constitutive of the objective inquirers. ‘Mechanical objectivity’, animated by an ‘ideal of
purity’,requiredstrictexclusionofintrudingidiosyncrasiesandminimizationofthesubjective
preferences of the inquirer. The virtues of mechanical objectivity therefore included
attentiveness,discipline,andself-restraint.Otherconceptionsofobjectivity,suchas‘truth-
to-nature’or‘trainedjudgement’,stipulatedtheirownsetsofvirtuesandvices.Bystudying
them,weseetablesofvirtuesandvicesdevelopinginresponsetochanging‘regulativeideals’,
practicalandepistemicagenda,andprojectsofenquiry.
Someofthehistoriansengagewithworkinvirtueepistemology,althoughcriticizing,
albeitpolitely,itsahistoricality.Epistemologistshavebeenslowertoreturntheinterest,and
soopportunitiesforcollaborationaremissed.Naturally,theclaimisnotthatallprojectsin
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viceepistemologynecessitatetheincorporationofhistoricalmethodsandresults.Adoption
ofhistoricalmethodsmustbemotivatedbyasenseoftheirrelevancetoone’squestionsor
concerns.Mymodestproposalisthatthatcertainworkinviceepistemologywouldbenefit
fromengagementwithhistoricalmethodsandscholarship(cf.Kidd2014,2017a,2018a).
II.VICECONCEPTS
Manyoftheconceptualresourcesofviceepistemologyaredrawnfromanalyticcharacter
epistemology. Additional resources become necessary, however, for theorizing epistemic
vicesandfailings,whichoftenhavedistinctiveaetiologies,structures,andmanifestationsto
ourepistemicpractices.FamiliarAristoteliananalysesdonotalwayshelp–manyvirtuesare
flankedmorethantheusualtwovices,andthevicesofdeficiencyandexcessdonothaveto
beequal innumber–andvicesarenotalways inversionsoftherelatedvirtues(cf.Crerar
2018).Moreover,therearemanymorevicesthanvirtuesofthemind,somorewaystofail
epistemicallythantoflourish.Tofindtheseadditionalresources,wecanturntohistory.
Considertwosuchexamples:epistemiccorruptionandcapitalepistemicvices.
(i)Muchcontemporaryviceepistemologyfocusesonanalysis,description,andappraisalof
thevicesofthemind,tasksthatnecessarilyinvoketheetiologicalquestionofhowindividual
andcollectiveepistemicagentscometoacquireordeveloptheirvariousvicesandfailings.
Certainly,manyviceepistemologistsevincethissortofinterest,withMirandaFricker(2007:
55, 58, 163) and José Medina (2012: 34, 42), for instance, exploring the ways certain
experiencesandsocialconditionscan leadtothe ‘erosion’or ‘deterioration’ofanagent’s
epistemiccharacter,whichistherebyunabletodevelop-‘thwarted’or‘inhibited’.
Concernsaboutcharacterologicalharm,includingtheerosionofepistemicvirtuesand
the acquisition or exacerbation of epistemic vices, is familiar from earlier generations of
feministandcritical race theorists.African-AmericanandAfro-Caribbean theorists suchas
W.E.B.DuBois,FranzFanon,andAiméCesairedescribehowsubjectiontosystemic racial
oppression ‘leaves its stamp’ on the oppressed, ‘sensitizing’ and ‘collapsing’ a subject’s
epistemicconfidenceandcharacter–how,forDuBois(2015:153,154),racialoppressionhas
‘leftitsmarkontheNegrocharacter’,whichhasbeen,asCesaire(2000:7)explained,‘skillfully
injectedwith… inferiority complexes, trepidation [and] servility’.2 Such termsbelong toa
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characterologicalvocabulary,ofcourse,withtrepidationandservilitybeingincludeamong
whatMedinacallsthevicesoftheoppressed.
Associationsbetweenepistemicviceandsocialoppressiongoesbackfurther,atleast
intoanearlymodernEnglishtraditioninviceepistemology,initiatedbyMaryAstell.Her1694
book, A Serious Proposal to the Ladies, analyses socially patterned deficiencies in the
educational opportunities then afforded to upper class English women. Their curriculum
affordsonly‘frothandtrifles’,affordingwomennoopportunitiestocontemplate‘nobleand
sublimeTruths’,anepistemicallyasphyxiatingenvironmentexacerbatedbytheentrenched
sexistassumptionthatwomenpossessedonlya‘degradedreason’(2002:62)–aclaimAstell
rejects as incompatible with faith in God’s providential goodness. The harmful
characterologicaleffectsofthiseducationalenvironmentisexpressedinAstell’s(2002:62)
lament that it fuels the development in women of a set of ‘Feminine Vices’, such as
submissivenessandsuperficiality,bywhichtheirepistemiccharactersare‘degeneratedand
corrupted’. As a further consequence, the sexist convictions about women’s ‘degraded
reason’ are confirmed, since the vices tend to impairwomen’s epistemic agency inways;
therefore,thoseconvictionsbecomerealizedinaself-sustainingsystem.
Astellwastheearliestfigureinthisvice-epistemictradition,tomyknowledge,andits
second most distinguished member was Mary Wollstonecraft. Writing a century later in
Vindicationof theRightsofWomenof1792, thesamegenderedpatternsofepistemically
corrupting education are continued toongoing critique.Wollstonecraft ’s strategywas to
trackwaysthatthetransplantationofsexistsocialnormsintoeducationalpracticestended
todeprivewomenofopportunitiesforthecultivationandexerciseofepistemicvirtues. In
one example, if ‘women are not to be contradicted in company’, she argues, they are
effectivelylockedoutofthedialecticalpracticesthatwouldenablethemtodevelopvirtues
likeclarity,carefulness,andtenacity(1995:ch.4,passim).Instead,theytendtodevelopwhat
Wollstonecraftscathinglydubs‘negativevirtues’,suchasdocilityorpatience,incompatible
with the ‘vigorous exertion of the intellect’ required for robust epistemic agency. Such
educational experiences are therefore corrupting, stifling the ‘dispositions’ required for a
virtuousandactive‘temperofmind’(1995:ch.4,passim).
Whatthesecriticsaredescribingisthephenomenonofepistemiccorruption.Bythat
term, I refer to experiences or activities that promote the development and exercise of
epistemicvicesand/orfailtoencouragethecultivationandexerciseoftheepistemicvirtues
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(cf.Kidd2018b).Thisconceptgathersthediverserhetoricsof‘erosion’and‘deterioration’of
character cited earlier, and is useful for two related reasons. First, it captures a genuine,
deleteriousphenomenon,reflectingthefactthatournascentsetofepistemicdispositions
evolveunder the influenceofall sortsof factors,whichshapetheirdevelopment into the
stableformswecallvirtuesandvices.Corruptingconditionsfeedvicesandstarvevirtues,so
requireidentificationandnullification,tasksinformedbytheseearlierprojects.Second,the
phenomenon of epistemic corruption can challenge the agenda and methods of vice
epistemology.Battaly (2016a)andCassam (2016) characterize thebadnessof thevices in
relationtoepistemicvalues, insofarasbeingviciousmakesoneabadthinkerorobstructs
enquiry,respectively.Epistemiccorruptioniscertainlybadintheserespects,buttheydonot
gofarenoughincapturingthebadnessofthevices,sincethismustalsoincludefacilitating,
entrenching,andconcealingsocialoppression.Ifso,analysesofcertainepistemicvicesmust
beaxiologicallypluralistic,invokingepistemicandnon-epistemicvalues–aloveoftruthand
a commitment to social justice, for instance, allied to Nancy Dumas’s liberatory virtue
epistemology(2017)andRobinDillon’s(2007)feministcriticalcharactertheory.
Ithereforeproposeatypeofoppressivistviceepistemology,whichissensitivetothe
epistemicallyobstructiveandsociallyoppressiveaspectsofviciousagency(cf.Kidd2018c).
Withrootsincriticalracetheoryandfeministepistemology,contemporaryexampleswould
includeFricker,Medina,andAlessandraTanesini,whoagreethatepistemicvicesareboth
epistemicallyandsociallyobjectionable.Indeed,badthinkingandepistemicobstructioncan
interact in mutually reinforcing ways with social oppression – the epistemic is political.
Developing oppressivism is a task for the future, startingwith developing amethodology
sensitivetoMedina’s(2012:30)insightthat‘epistemiccharactertraits…haveadistinctive
sociogenesisforsubjectswhooccupyaparticularsociallocation.’Socialpositionalityaffects
thetypesorrangesofepistemicvicetowhichoneissusceptibleandthetypesofepistemic
resources,challenges,anddangersthatonefaces,andshoulddiscourageasocialtalkofThe
EpistemicAgentandacontextualtalkofTheEpistemicVices.Instead,oppressivistsshouldbe
alerttothe‘sociogenesis’ofthevices,thecontingenciesofepistemic(anti)socialization,the
suboptimalities of agents’ epistemic formation, and the roles played by epistemically
corruptingsocialconditions.Suchaetiologicalsensitivitysignificantlycomplicatesthetypical
criticalpracticeofchargingotherswithepistemicvice(cf.Kidd2016c).
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With theconceptofepistemiccorruption inplace, Inowturn toanother–capital
epistemicvices.
(ii) Sinceviceepistemologistsare identifyinganddescribingmanyvices, theywill soonbe
facedwiththetaskoftaxonomy,ofcogentlyorganizingtheepistemicvicesandfailingsbeing
identified.Taxonomyhasnotoccupiedmuchattentionsofar,thoughareresourcesavailable
inthehistoryofphilosophyandtheology, frompredecessorswhosoughttoorderhuman
vicesandfailings–ethicists,moralists,theologians,andothers.Suchtaxonomiesofsins,vices,
andfailingshadtobejustified, lesttheyevincearbitrarinessorprocrusteanartificiality,as
withJudithShklar’s(1984)listof‘ordinaryvices’,inheritedfromMontaigne,whichgaveno
criteriaforselection,andomittedsuchplausiblecandidatevicesaslaziness.
Withoutendorsinganyone,Iproposethreepotentialtaxonomicstrategies,twoare
drawnfromcontemporarywork,theotherfromtheearlyChristianvicetradition.
Consider,forastart,anactivity-basedtaxonomy.Thesegroupthevicesaccordingto
thetypesofepistemicactivitywhichtheytypicallyaffectorobstruct.Considertheactivities
ofcommunicatingclaims,ideas,possibilities,andotherepistemicgoods.Ifdonewell,these
evinceasetofwhatwemightcallvirtuesofarticulation,whichwouldincludeclarity,lucidity,
andprecision.Butthisalsosetsupacorrespondingsetofvicesofarticulation,suchasvagary,
dullness,andimprecision.Thisstrategyhastheadvantageofnotconfiningvicestoasingle
setofactivities: imprecisioncanbemanifested inquestion-askingorstandard-setting.But
thispointstoamaindisadvantageoftheactivity-basedstrategy:someviceswillmanifestso
widelyacrossourepistemiclivesthattryingtoclassifythembyactivitywillbefutile.Avice
thataffectsverymanyorallactivitiescannotbeclassifiedintermsofaspecialrelationshipto
anyspecificsetofactivities.
Asecondpossibilityarechallenge-basedtaxonomies.Itakemycueherefromoneof
thefewtaxonomiceffortsinvirtueepistemology–JasonBaehr’s(2011:21)groupingofthe
epistemicvirtuesintermsofnine‘challenge-relevantdemands’.Thesearegenericchallenge
encountered by inquirers in the course of their activities, including those of ‘initial
motivation’,‘focusing’,‘integrity’,and‘endurance’.Theepistemicvirtuesarecharactertraits
thatenableanagenttoappropriatelyrespondtothosedemandssoastoenableinquiryto
continue.Curiosity,forinstance,isavirtueenablingagentstomeetthedemandsof‘initial
motivation’, since it generates a desire to acquire epistemic goods (cf. Watson 2019).
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CombiningBaehr’s accountof inquiry-relevant challenges andCassam’sobstructivism,we
mightdefineepistemicvicesascharactertraits,attitudes,andwaysofthinkingthatobstruct
inquirybyimpairinganagent’scapacitytoappropriatelyrespondtothevariousdemandsof
inquiry.
In his discussion, Baehr does not apply this taxonomic strategy to the vices. This
promptsthequestionofwhetheritcanbe,and,ifso,howeffectiveitwouldbe.Ithinkcertain
vicescouldbeclassifiedinthisway–forinstance,incuriosityandinsensibilityascharacter
traitsthatimpairanagent’scapacitytomeetchallengesofinitialmotivation.Butothervices
are less easily handled, such as the vice of epistemic laziness. Usually, it has been
conceptualized inrelationtothechallengesof initialmotivationandendurance.3 (Roughly
speaking,alazyagentfailstostartortostickwithinquiries–whichmightbetwosubsetsof
asinglemotivationalchallengesthatoccursbeforeandduringinquiry.)Butthisistoonarrow:
lazinesscanaffectanagent’scapacitytorespondtoalloftheinquiry-relevantchallenges–if
andhowoneinitiatesandcontinuesinquiry,butalsoifandhowonefocusesinvestigations,
evaluatesevidence,andattempts toactwithepistemic integrityand flexibility. If so, then
epistemic laziness is auniversal vice, that impactson thewhole rangeof inquiry-relevant
challenges,suchthatitcannotbeclassifiedusefullyinrelationtoanyonetypeofchallenges
(seeKiddMS).
A third taxonomic strategy is taken from the history of the early Christian vice
tradition,asdescribedbyRebeccaDeYoung(2009)inherbook,GlitteringVices.Bythefourth
centuryAD,theologianshaddrawnuponbiblicalandphilosophicalsourcestoidentifyahuge
arrayofvices,sins,andhumanfailings.Thefirstknownlistsoftheviceswerecompiledby
Evagrius of Pontus (346-399 AD), a Desert Father concerned with the moral and other
temptations faced bymonastics. Some are familiar to us (anger, gluttony, avarice) while
othersarelessso(vainglory,acedia–aspirituallyinflectedlaziness).JohnCassian(360-430)
andPopeGregory(540-604)thensystematicallyorderedtheselistsintoasetofsevencapital
vices,subsumingsomeanddiscountingothers.Criticssoonprotestedthatthevicesincluded
intheseofficiallistswereneitherthecommonestnortheworst,anobjectioncompounded
by the fact that these vicesdidnot correspond to theprincipal virtues, suchas faith and
courage.Ananswercameintheconceptofa‘capitalvice’,thosewithaspecialgenerative
capacitytoproduceoractasthesourceofothervices.Cassianusesanorganicmetaphor,
describingthecapitalvicesasthe‘roots’fromwhichothervicesare‘offshoots’,whileothers
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preferaquaticimagery:theterm‘capitalvice’comesfromtheLatincapit,meaning‘head’,as
in ‘source’ or ‘wellspring’, such that the capital vices are, as DeYoung (2009: 29 and 33)
‘singledoutbecausetheyare“sourcevices”…thatserveasanever-bubblingwellspringof
manyothers.’
Ihavesuggestedelsewherethattheremaybecapitalepistemicvices(cf.Kidd2017b).
Thesehaveaspecialcapacitytoactastherootsorsourcesofothers,givingthemaprivileged
ontologicalstatusthat,inturn,givesthemaspecialtaxonomicstatus.Whethertheideacan
becashedout isataskforanothertime,pendinginvestigationofasetof issues,ofwhich
three stand out. First, what is the nature of the putative ‘capitality’ relationship – it is
conceptual,causal,orpsychological?Second,towhatconceptionoftheontologyofepistemic
vicewouldacceptanceofcapitalepistemicvicescommitus?TheChristianvicetheoriststook
thevices tobe trackinggenuinemoral categories,meaning that, for them, capital vices–
moral and spiritual ones, at least – are discovered rather than created or imposed. But
contemporaryviceepistemologistsdemur,withCassam(2017)arguingforan‘impositionist’
account,bywhichboundariesbetweenvicesare imposedbyus in relation toourspecific
interestsandconcerns,notdiscoveredasexistingobjects.Athirdworry–sharedwiththe
othertaxonomicstrategies–isthatanyvicecould,infact,functioncapitallyasthesourceor
rootofothers.Assessingthispossibilityrequires,attheleast,carefulinvestigationofarange
ofcandidatecapitalepistemicvices.
Inlatersectionsofthispaper,mysympathyforanimpositionistaccountwillbecome
clear.Ioffertheconceptofcapitalepistemicviceshereasacontributiontotheefforttomap
out the range of options available to vice epistemologists once they begin the task of
taxonomy.
III.LISTSOFVICES
Itisobviousthattherearemanyepistemicvicesandfailings.Ashortlistwouldeasilyexceed
thedozensketchedbyLindaZagzebski(1996:162)inherbook,VirtuesoftheMind.Wemight
divide the epistemic vices into two types. Familiar vices are those entrenched in our
vocabularies fordescribing formsofepistemiccharacterandconduct,naturallyandeasily
springing to mind, as it were – arrogance, dogmatism, laziness, inflexibility,
closedmindedness, and so on. Esoteric vices are those that do not feature in prevailing
vocabularies,despitetheirtrackinggenuineformsofepistemicviciousness.Examplesinclude
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epistemic self-indulgence and epistemicmalevolence (cf. Baehr 2010, Battaly 2010). Over
time, many vices will flux between categories, becoming more or less familiar with the
vagariesof timeandculture.Historically, thishappens to themoralvices, too,withonce-
familiarvices likecupidityandconcupiscencehavingnowbecomeesoteric–signsofwhat
DeYoung(2009:26)callsthe‘fluidityofthevicetradition.’
The plurality and variability of our epistemic vices and failings offers a further
argumentforanhistoricalviceepistemology.Byexploringhistorically,wecanidentifyand
retrievevices thatwereoncerecognizedbutsince lapsed intoobscurity.Certainvicesare
perennials,tobesure,enduringinhistoryasstablefeaturesofourepistemicvocabularies.
Buttherearealsotransientvices,onesconfinedtoparticularculturesorhistoricalperiods
andwhichdisappearedwhentheypassed.Anexampleistheviceoftestimonialinjustice–
roughly, adisposition toallownegativeprejudices todeflate the testimonial credibilityof
persons againstwhomone is prejudiced (cf. Battaly 2017–whousefully remindsus that
Frickerdoesconceiveoftestimonialinjusticeasavice).Althoughtestimonialinjusticeisan
entrenchedfeatureofhumanepistemiclife,itsdescriptionasaviceonlyoccurredinthelate
20thcentury.Itdidsoagainstacertainculturalandintellectualcontextshapedbyfeminist
and black activism, social epistemology, egalitarian political values, and so on (cf. Kidd,
Medina,andPohlhausJr.,2017,PartsIIandIII).
By searching historically, we can track how certain vices emerged, evolved or
disappearedinrelationtochangingsocialandintellectualcontexts.Notalloftheviceswe
findwillbeintelligibleorrelevanttocontemporarylife,giventhevariationsintheconvictions,
enthusiasms,andsensibilitiesofdifferentcultures.Butnorshouldweruleoutthepossibility
thatothersmaybe.Evenifnot,theystillteachusthingsabouttherangeofformsofepistemic
depravityidentifiedbyearliergenerations.
A particularly rich array of epistemic vices and failings was identified in the Late
BaroqueandearlyEnlightenmentEuropeancultures,describedbySariKivisto(2014)inThe
Vices of Learning. Its title refers to critical discourses of that period devoted to vitia sive
errores eruditorum – ‘the vices and errors of scholars’, hybrid ethico-epistemic failings to
which the new scholarly classeswere judged particularly susceptible. Tables of ‘scholarly
vices’were constructed fromexistingmoral and religious concepts, intellectual and social
norms, and satirical and polemical tropes. Using this complex inheritance, a range of
traditional sins and failings gradually, explains Kivisto, ‘acquired new meanings and
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interpretationsinascholarlycontext’,aspartofamorepositiveprojectto‘constructanideal
type of scholar’ (2014: 6, 259). Scholarly vices of the period included many of Christian
vintage,mostobviouslypride,whileotherswererootedinahistoricallynewerEnlightenment
concernforsociability.Manyhavesplendidnames–titulomania,logomachia,andmisocosmy
–butnonesurviveintomodernlistsofepistemicvices,evenifmanyoftherelevantepistemic
behaviorsarestillfamiliar.
ThescholarlyvicesdescribedbyKivistoareonesetofoptionsfromasingleperiodof
Europeanculturalandintellectualhistory.Otherperiodsofferusmanyothers,beyondthose
ofearlyChristianandearlymodernEuropeanculture.Insteadofpilingupexamples,Isimply
affirmthathistoricalresearchescangiveusasetofnewepistemicvicesandfailings.Naturally,
someofthesetransientvicesfadedforgoodreasons,mostobviouslywiththedissolutionof
theirsurrounding‘formsoflife’.TheearlyChristianviceofacediawasembeddedinaformof
monastic life, indexed to its particular values, imperatives, and temptations (cf. DeYoung
2009:ch.4).Itceasedtoexistwhenthatformoflifedissolved,evenasotherviceswithwhich
itwaslisted,likegluttonyandpride,didpersistinnew,alternativeforms.
Othertransientvicesmaybequitedifferent.ThescholarlyvicesdescribedbyKivisto
were indexed to what were then newly emerging scholarly structures, where pursuit of
authorityandesteemcouldfueldesiresforfameandfutilequarrelling.It’snotcynicismto
suggestthatsuchcorruptingsocialandprofessionalstructuresarestillinplace,ofteninmore
complex and entrenched forms. If so, there is value in our scrutinizing vitia sive errores
eruditorumtoseewhich,ifany,applytocontemporaryacademicculture.
Underlyingthesepointsisadeeperoneaboutthecontingencyoftherangeofvices
thathavebecomeentrenchedinourepistemicimagination.Itisclearthatourinheritedtable
ofthevicesisincompleteandpartial,whichisunsurprising,giventhatitwasnottheresultof
carefuldesignanddeliberation.Manydevelopmentsinfluencethekindsofvicesandfailings
thatwerecognize: theologicaldebates,moralcultures, socialmovements,andmuchelse.
Suchcontingencies influencenot justthespecificviceswerecognize,butalsothebroader
rangesthosewerecognizefallinto(apointmadebyhistorically-mindedandfeministvirtue
ethicists).
ThatworkcallsattentiontoatendencywithinWesternmoralphilosophyofthelast
few centuries to privilege a certain range of moral values: confidence, autonomy,
independence–andsoon–whilemarginalizingothers,includinglove,care,anddependence.
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Such contingences have many sources, including demographic biases, deep-rooted
masculinist prejudices, ongoing marginalization of those with caregiving roles, andmany
others.Whateverthecauses,acleareffectistheprivilegingofasetofprometheanmoral
virtues such as confidence, creativity, and self-sufficiency—as feminist theorists, care
ethicists,andothershavedocumented.Asaresult,therangeofvirtuesandconceptionsof
flourishingcomestobecontingentlydelimitedinwaysthatoughttoberesisted.
An interesting question is whether the range of epistemic vices (and virtues) we
currently privilege evinces a similar degree of contingent constriction. Certainly, a
contemporary focus on the epistemic vices surrounding humility is partly a legacy of the
enduringinfluenceoftheChristiantradition,evenifthefidelityofsubsequentconceptionsof
Christianhumilitytothattraditionaremorecomplexthanisrealized(cf.Pardue2013).Other
writers discuss deeper forms of influence – ones shaping a more heterogeneous set of
epistemic character traits.Neil C.Manson (2012)argues that ‘the standard conceptionof
epistemicvirtue’operative incontemporaryepistemology tends tocharacterizevirtuesas
‘traitsanddispositionsrelevanttoacquiringknowledge’.Butthis‘acquisitionist’conception
is,heargues,‘partialandunbalanced’,insofarasit‘downplaysorignoresthefactthatthere
arevirtues innotseekingknowledge’ (2012:240).Mansondubstheseoccludedtraitsand
dispositions‘virtuesofepistemicrestraint’,whichareignoredbymostvirtueepistemologists,
whopreferacquisitionistvirtues,suchascuriosity, inquisitiveness,and loveofknowledge.
Similar claims are made by Richard Smith (2006, 2016), who advocates for ‘virtues of
diffidence’,suchasreserve,reticence,anddiscretion.
MansonandSmitharguethattherangeofepistemicvirtuescurrentlyrecognizedand
esteemedwithinvirtueepistemologyisundulynarrow.Thesetofoccludedvirtuesincludes
thoseofrestraintanddiffidence,characterizedbyaquietistratherthanactiviststanceon
epistemicagency.Withtwocaveats,Isharetheirworries.First,manyepistemicvirtuescan
surelytakeacquisitionistor ‘restrained’or ‘diffident’forms:epistemiccouragecaninvolve
bold,muscularactions,butalsoarefusalorreluctancetoinitiateorperformepistemicacts.
Second,thereareatleasttwowaysaconceptionofepistemicvirtuecanbe‘unbalanced’or
‘partial’–calltheseinclusion-partialityandaspect-partiality.Aconceptioncanfailtoinclude
asetofvirtuesoritcanincludeonlycertainoftheiraspects,orboth(socouragemightbe
included,butonlyinitsactivistforms).Similarpointssurelyalsoapplytoepistemicvices.Our
conceptionsofvicemaycontingentlyfailtoincludecertainvicesortheymayfailtorecognize
13
certainaspectsofthosevicesthatwedo.Comparethepluralityofvicesofhumilitythatwe
recognizewiththedearthoftermsforthevicesopposedtocuriosityorcourage–ataskmade
easier when we turn to other philosophical and cultural traditions with quite different
conceptionsofepistemicvirtueandvicearequitedifferent.Moregenerally,ifcertainranges
ofvirtuesarebeingoccluded,so tooarecertainrangesofvices.Byadoptinganhistorical
stance,wemaybeabletoidentifycertainpatternsandpartialities inourconceptionsand
tablesofepistemicvirtueandvice.
Theexistenceoftransientepistemicvicesandimbalancesinourconceptionsofvice
pointstoamoregeneralvalueofadoptinganhistoricalperspective.Thisisthedisclosureof
thecontingencyofourepistemicimaginations–ofthewaysthatourwaysofthinkingabout
formsofepistemiccharacterareshapedbysocialandhistoricaldevelopmentsthatmaynot
haveobtained.Itshouldbeclearthatourinheritedepistemicimaginationisnotaproductof
carefulsustainedprocessesofdeliberationanddecision.Itwasaresultofacomplexarrayof
eventsanddevelopments–theological,cultural, intellectual–andthevariousconvictions,
prejudices,andenthusiasmsthattheyreflectedandsustained.Thismeansthattherangeof
epistemicvicesandfailingsthatwecanperceiveisacontingentproduct,highlydevelopedin
certainrespectsbutobscureandundevelopedinothers.Somevice-clustersareexploredin
detail,whileotherslanguishwhiletheyawaitsystematicinvestigation.Thesepointsmatter
tosomeofthedeepaimsofviceepistemology:todeepenourawarenessof,andsensitivity
to,therangeofourepistemicvicesandfailingsmanifestinindividualandcollectivecharacters
andconduct,toenableustobetterarticulateourdiscontentsandappraisecriticallyourways
ofsocializingepistemicagents,andtochartourmorefullythepluralityofformsofepistemic
excellenceanddepravityofwhichhumanbeingsaresoevidentlycapable.Suchenrichment
ofourepistemicsensibilitiesisliabletobechallengedbythepersistenceofundetectedand
uncorrectedimbalancesandpartialitiesinourwaysofthinkingaboutthevicesofthemind.
InthissectionIhavesketchedasetofgeneralargumentsinsupportofagreaterattentionto
historicalmethodsandresultsbyviceepistemologists.Doingsocanoffernewvice-concepts
andnewvicesandvariousformsofunderstandingandinsight,forinstanceintothehistorical
contingencyofourconceptionsofepistemicvice.Inthenextsection,Iconsiderafurtherset
ofargumentsforanhistoricalviceepistemology.
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IV.DEEPCONCEPTIONSOFEPISTEMICVICE
Animportantinsightofhistoricalviceepistemologyisthatourepistemicvicesandfailingsdo
notfloatfreeofpractices,projects,andcontexts.Ourepistemicvicesareexpressedthrough
our epistemic practices, manifested within our projects of inquiry, and shaped by wider
culturalandintellectualcontexts.Thechanginghistoryofcuriositasoffersaclearcasewhere
changingconceptionsoftheformandnormativestatusofacharactertraitwas intimately
relatedtochangingtheologicalandnatural-philosophicalpracticesandprojectsthatwerein
turnanimatedbythechangingculturalshiftsfromlatemedievaltoRenaissancehumanistto
earlyEnlightenmentculture.Ifso,theidentityandintelligibilityoftheviceofcuriositascannot
beunderstoodadequatelyinisolationfromthesedeeperstructures.Inthissection,Iwantto
generalizethisclaimbyarguingfortheexistenceofwhatIshallcalldeepepistemicvices.
A deep conception of epistemic vice is one whose identity and intelligibility is
determined by the set of practices, projects, or contexts within which it is embedded.
Explanationoftheseviceswillrequireonetoappealtothosedeeperfeatures.Whatwemight
call‘shallowexplanations’wouldexplaintheidentityandstatusofavicebylocatingitwithin
thearrayofpracticesinwhichtheytypicallymanifestortheparticularprojectsofinquirythey
obstruct.Bycontrast, ‘deepexplanations’willappeal tosomethingmore fundamental–a
worldview,Weltbild,ormetaphysicalvision.(‘Depth’,here,isadescriptive,notevaluative,
term.) Idonotclaimthatallepistemicvicesareormustbeconceptualizeddeeply in this
sense,northatallworkinviceepistemologyoughttobuildinshallowanddeepexplanations
oftheirpracticesorprojectsofinquiryordeepermetaphysicalvisions.Onlycertainvicesand
certainkindsofvice-epistemicworkwouldneedto‘godeep’.
Theideaofdeepconceptionsofepistemicvicesislargelyneglectedwithincharacter
epistemology, but less so among historians. Among character epistemologists, only Bob
RobertsandW.JayWoodhaveexplicitlyarguedthatcertainepistemicvirtuesandvicesare
‘indexedto’and‘presuppose’suchdeepobjectsorgroundsas‘conceptionsofhumannature
and the nature of the universe’ or ‘metaphysical commitments and world-views’. Our
conceptionsofepistemicvirtueandvice,theyargue,are‘madethemoredeterminatethe
morewelocateourselveswithinatraditionthatincludesaparticularunderstandingofhuman
natureandthenatureoftheuniverse’(2007:23,82,155,189).Buttheyleavetheoperative
term‘indexing’undefined.Onwhatwemight(non-derogatively)callashallowreading,their
claimmaybethatvirtuesandvicesarehistoricallycontingent,comingandgoingasthese
15
conceptionsandworldviewschange.Butonadeepreading,theclaimmightbethatthevery
existenceandintelligibilityofcertainvirtuesandvicesdependsuponthoseconceptionsand
worldviews.
ItisthelatterreadingthatIwanttodefendhere.Iwanttoargue(a)therethatwas
anactivevice-epistemologicaltraditioninearlymodernEnglishnaturalphilosophyand(b)it
hadasetofepistemicviceswhoseidentityandintelligibilitywasultimatelydeterminedbya
deepconceptionofhumannature–ofourbeing‘fallen’creatureswithdefectiveepistemic
abilities and that (c) this background conception substantially shaped the range of vices
conceptuallyavailabletotheearlymodernEnglishnaturalphilosophers.Myhopeisthatthis
casestudyisabletoprovide‘proofofconcept’fordeepepistemicvices.
Theterm‘naturalphilosophy’isusedtorefertotheearlierstagesofwhatwewould
nowadaysdubnaturalscience,whichwascertainlytakingformbythelatefifteenthcentury.
Englandwasacentralsiteofnaturalphilosophicalinquiry,bothinpracticalresearches–or
whatscholarsdub‘experimentalnaturalphilosophy’–andmoretheoreticalreflectiononits
methods.Thepracticalandtheoreticaldimensionswerenotsharplydistinct,ofcourse,since
amaintaskfornaturalphilosopherswastodesignandtojustifymethodsofinquiry.Mostof
theactiveexperimentalistsofthedaywerealsoengagedindebateaboutwhatwetodaycall
epistemologyandphilosophyofscience.
Anintegralfeatureofthesephilosophicaldebateswasanacutesenseofthenatural
deficienciesandinadequaciesofhumanepistemiccapacities.Initsearlierstages,thissense
wasarticulatedusingpathologicaldiscourses–of‘diseasesandinfirmitiesofthemind’and
themany‘defectsandimperfections’evidentfromsoberscrutinyoftheunderstanding.Much
of this pathological language reflected interests in medicine and physiology common to
learnedmenoftheperiod.ButIsuspectitalsomarkedsomethingdeeper:thefactofthere
beingdifferencesbetweenthevariousdiscoursesofepistemicdeficiencies.Earlierinhistory
the hamartiological discourses dominated owing to the cultural and intellectual
entrenchmentofChristianityinEurope.Butdiscoursesfocusedonsintendedtodownplay
theameliorativerolesofhumanoverdivineagency.Sinfulcreatures,stainedbyoriginalsin,
lack the spiritual and moral capacities required for self-amelioration. Pascal (1980, §45)
lamented that our ‘wretchedness’ – ourbeing ‘full of natural error’ – is so extensive and
profound that it ‘cannot be eradicated except through grace’. SinceonlyGod’s grace can
repair our moral, spiritual and epistemic deficiencies there was very little grounds for
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confidenceintherestorativepotentialofhumanagency.Suchpessimismbecamemuchless
compellingonceattentionshiftedtodiscoursesofpathology–diseaseentailscure,weakness
entailsstrength,anddefectsentailrepair.
Theconceptualizationofhumanepistemicdeficienciesinthecategoriesofpathology
startedtoencourageanewandmoreconfidentsensethattheymightbecorrectedthrough
formsofhumanagency. SoranaCorneanu (2011)documents theemergence,withinearly
modern English natural philosophy, of a new medicalized rhetoric of ‘cure’, ‘regimens’,
‘disciplines’, and ‘cultures’–all aimedat ‘the cureandperfectingof thehumanmind’by
offeringways to ‘diagnose the stateof one’s cognitive and affective faculties’ and, if and
where possible, ‘to cure their infirmities and cultivate their strengths.’ Underlying the
epistemologicalandmethodologicalviewsofBoyle,Locke,andtheircontemporarieswasa
therapeuticprojecttodevelop‘ananatomyofcapacities,limits,anddistempers,aswellasa
view about the possibility and need of a cure and cultivation thatmay shape a virtuous
inquirer’ (2011: 2, 220). Corneanu demonstrates that the dominant discourse was
pathological, but I want to argue that it slowly evolved into a characterological one that
conceivedofourepistemicdeficienciesintermsofvices.
V.FROMIDOLSTOVICES
Theearliestfigure inthisstory isFrancisBacon(1561-1626). InNewOrganon,of1620,he
describedasetof‘IdolsoftheMind’,which‘doviolencetotheunderstandingandconfuse
everything’(2000:§44).Thesefallintoroughlytwotypes.TheIdolsoftheTribeandtheCave
areinnatedeficiencies:theformeraregeneralfeaturesofhumannature,likeourtendency
toperceivemoreorderinthingsthanexists.Thelatterrefertoidiosyncrasiesofindividual
persons. By contrast, the Idols of theMarketplace and the Theatre are socially acquired
deficiencies,arisingfrominadequaciesinourlanguageorphilosophicalsystemsandfromour
interactionswithotheragents(acquiredbiases,say).AnobviousfeatureoftheIdolsisthat
theyincorporatearangeofepistemicvicesandfailings.ItseemsobviousthattheIdolsare
notthemselvescharacterologicalvices,butratherwaysoftheorizingcertaintypesofnatural
oracquiredepistemicdeficiencies.
Intothemid-1660s,however,thepathologicaldiscoursegraduallybegantoshiftinto
amoreovertlycharacterologicaldiscourseofvice. JosephWright, JosephGlanvill,Thomas
SpratandotherluminariesofEnglishnaturalphilosophyallbegintospeakintermsofvices.
17
Wrightcriticizesavicehecalls‘distraction’,amarkofinquirerswhoare‘desirousofvarietie
andalteration’andthereforeincapableofproperconcentrationandperseverance.Glanvill–
aprescientchampionofnaturalscience–castigatescredulityandobstinacy,apairofvices
arisingfromourtendencytomake‘precipitatejudgments’,toreceive‘allthings’inaspiritof
‘promiscuousadmission’.Insteadofbeingcarefulanddiscerning,thecredulouswillaccept
anythingwhiletheobstinatewillabandonorrevisenothing.Sprat–afounderandthefirst
historianoftheRoyalSociety–stateshistargetviceinhis1661bookVanityofDogmatizing.
Heactuallytargetsapairofvices–dogmatismandscepticism–whicharisefrom‘anover-
hasty,andprecipitantconcluding’beforeinquiryiscompleteand‘aversionfromassigning’of
anycausetoaneffect.Eachvicereflectsadysregulationinthemind’spowersofassent.
Suchremarksoftenmingleavocabularyofvicewithoneofdiseaseanddistemper.I
suspectamainreasonforthegradualshiftfromcategoriesofdiseasetovicewasthatthe
latterofferedmorefine-grainedresourcesforarticulatingourepistemicfailings.Generictalk
of‘distempers’ofthemindisonething,butthereisavarietyandcomplexitytoalanguage
ofvices–ofcredulity,distraction,obstinacy,dogmatism,scepticism.Bythelate1660s,we
findthefulleststatementofthenaturalphilosophicalvice-epistemictraditionintheworkof
JohnLocke.InspiredbyBaconandothernaturalphilosophers,muchofLocke’sepistemology
wasconcernedwithappraisalofthelimitsofhumanunderstanding.Itsbroadconvictionwas
that our epistemic capacities in their natural, untutored state aredeficient in oneof two
respects.First,ourpowersofreasonandunderstandingarelimited,althoughalsopotentially
capableofenhancement.ThroughoutBoyle’s1681DiscourseonThingsaboveReason,there
islongdiscussionsofthe‘dependencyandlimitednessofourNatures’andthe‘limitednature
oftheIntellect’.Butthetonewasnotquietist.Boylearguedthatthe‘mostnobleandgenuine’
functionofReasonistoturnitspowersinwardbyengaginginthe‘perfectiveaction’ofself-
appraisalofitscapacitiesanddeficiencies:themind‘notonlysee[s]otherthingsbutitself
too,andcandiscern…whateverinfirmitiesislaboursunder’(quotedinCorneanu2011:117).
Second,Lockeinheritedanacutesensitivitytothenaturalandacquiredcorruptionsofthe
mind,althoughhethereisnomentionofIdolsoftheMind.MuchoftheEssayConcerning
HumanUnderstandingusestheinheritedpathologicalvocabulary,aswhenLockeexplainshis
projectasbeingto‘study…ourownabilitiesanddefects’,‘peculiarendowmentsandnatural
fitnesses,aswellasdefectsandweaknesses’(Locke1968:421).Butinhisverylatewritings,
18
what emerges is a fully-developed discourse of vice, the best example being the
posthumouslypublished1706essay,‘OntheConductoftheUnderstanding’.
OriginallyintendedasthefifthbookofarevisededitionoftheEssay,the‘Conduct’is
usuallycoupledwithSomeThoughtsConcerningEducationasaconcisestatementofLocke’s
viewsoneducationaltheoryandpractice.Certainly,bothworksdiscussthe importanceof
educationtothecultivationoftheunderstanding–ofchildrenandadults–andthewider
politicalimportanceofepistemicallywell-conductedcitizens(cf.TarcovandGrant’seditor’s
introduction to Locke 1996; Yolton 1998). But there is also a further dimension of the
‘Conduct’, one neglected in the existing scholarship: its status as an exercise in vice
epistemology.Muchoftheessayisconcernedwithsketchingoutarangeofepistemicfailings
–of‘Vices[that]opposeormenaceourEndeavours’,asLockesaysinstrikinglyobstructivist
terms (Locke Essay, §3.5.18). I count at least thirteen – such as ‘haste’, ‘anticipation’,
‘resignation’,and‘despondency’-whichtendtoclusteraroundfailuresofepistemicdiscipline
andself-control.LikeGlanvillandotherEnglishphilosophersoftheperiod,arunningconcern
iswithfailurestoproperlyregulateourepistemicagency–theviceofhaste,for instance,
marks an inquirer whose rushes through the proper procedures of inquiry in ways that
jeopardiestheintegrityoftheirconclusions(cf.Locke,SomeThoughts,§25).
Isuggestthatthereisanexplicitexerciseinviceepistemologyunderlying‘Conduct’.
Itrepresentsamaturecharacterologicaldiscourseofepistemicdeficiencyinvirtueofhaving
fourfeatures.First,anexplicitvocabularyofvices,somefamiliarandsomeesoteric.Second
isanexplicitconcernforepistemiccharacter–itsvariousvirtuesbutalsoitsmanyvices.As
Corneanu(2011:163)explains,bythetimeof‘Conduct’,Lockehas‘movedfirmlytowarda
conceptionofthecharacteroftherightfulknower,andofhispersonalepistemicexcellence.’
Although the concern with virtues and excellences is important to a characterological
discourse, so, too, is concern with vices and corruptions. The third component of a
characterologicaldiscourseisananalysisoftheeffectsofvicesonpracticesandprojectsof
inquiry. Lockedoes this inhisdescriptionsofhowhaste,anticipationandothervicesand
failings ‘oppose’or ‘menace’ourvariousepistemic ‘Endeavours’.Thedespondent inquirer
abandons inquiries once they becomedifficult and so confine themselves to low-hanging
epistemicfruit,therebyfailingtoacquireepistemicgoodsbutalsotoeffectivelymeasurethe
scopeoftheircapacities.
19
Afurtherpairoffeaturesofacharacterologicaldiscourseisanactiveconcerntogive
anaccountoftheaetiologyofourepistemicvicesandfailingsand–closelyrelated–asetof
effectiveameliorativepractices.Lockeandhiscontemporarieswerenotconcernedsimplyto
describeourepistemicdeficiencies,vices,andfailings,butrathertocorrectornullifythemin
whateverwaystheycould.BaconarguedthatthehistoricalpersistenceofIdolsoftheMind
hadsystematicallyimpairedearlierprojectsofinquiry,hencehisconfidenceintheprojects
of natural philosophy that were Idol-proofed by his ‘Great Instauration’. Despite their
pragmaticapplications,theseprojectshadadeepertherapeuticpurpose,namelytonullify
the‘Idolsofthemind’atboththeagentialandcollectivelevelsthroughthecentralizationand
methodologicaldisciplineofinquiry.Suchtherapeuticidealsrequired,inpractice,anaccount
oftheaetiology–theoriginsandsources–ofourepistemicdeficiencies,which,inturn,could
indicateeffectiveameliorativestrategies.
Therewereatleasttwovice-epistemictraditionsinearlymodernEnglishphilosophy.
The educative tradition focused on the epistemically corrupting tendencies of prevailing
educationalsystems,theirtendencytopromote,atleastinwomen,variousofthevicesof
themind.Within thenatural philosophical vice-epistemic tradition, thedevelopmentof a
characterologicaldiscoursecamelater.Overthecourseofthesixteenthcentury,weseea
steadyshifttowardsdiscoursesthatfocusedonvice,eveniftheothercategories,ofsinand
disease,continuedtorumbleawayinthebackground.
Myoutstandingtask is toarguethatat leastsomeofthevicesofthisperiodwere
deeplyconceptualized,insofarastheywereindexedtoaconceptionofhumannatureorthe
natureofreality.Idothisbyofferinga‘deep’explanationofanotherwisepuzzlingfeatureof
thelistsofvicesoftheperiod—afailuretoarticulateaviceof‘epistemichubris’.Theabsence
ofthisviceinvitesexplanation,sinceitreflectsanexaggeratedorinflatedestimationofthe
scopeandstrengthofhumanepistemiccapacities–ofreasonandunderstanding–whichwas
preciselytheconcernofearlymodernEnglishnaturalphilosophy.
Toexplaintheunusualabsenceofhubris,Iarguetheirviceepistemologywasindexed
toaconceptionofhumannatureasintrinsicallycorruptedbothepistemicallyandspiritually
bytheoriginalsininheritedfromtheFallofMan.Thisconceptiondidnotprovidewhatthe
viceofhubrisrequires:anestimationofthefullarrayofhumanepistemiccapacities.
VI.HUMILITYANDITSVICES
20
TheearlymodernEnglishnaturalphilosophersesteemedarangeofepistemicvirtues,none
morethanthosereflectiveofwhatSoranaCorneanucalls ‘epistemicmodesty’.Arangeof
dispositions, habits, and attitudes fall under that label, such as preferences for a
‘nondogmaticstyleofdiscussionandpresentation’,and‘prudentinquiryratherthanpositive
assertion,fortheprobableratherthanfortheinfalliblycertain’(Corneanu2011:99f).This
cultureofepistemicmodestyhadmanysources:therevivalofskepticism,culturalrepertoires
ofgentlemanly truth-telling, the irenicminimalismof theAnglicanReformation,and–my
focus in this section – a postlapsarian theological anthropology, one that emphasizes the
‘fallen’statusofhumanbeings,theirintrinsicallycorruption,asinheritorsoforiginalsin(cf.
Popkin2003,Shapin1994,Shapiro1983).
Withoutdenyingtheimportanceoftheothercontextualsources,Iproposethatthe
earlymodernEnglishviceepistemologywasdeeplyindexedtowhatCorneanu(2012:99)calls
an‘anthropologicalconceptionofhumanfrailtiesandcapacities’.Initsgeneralform,human
beings were conceived as initially possessing an exalted array of epistemic capacities,
expressed in Christian mythology as ‘Adamic wisdom’, consisting of knowledge and
understandingofaremarkablescope,depth,andcertitude.Unfortunately,ourpriorstateof
epistemicandmoralexcellencewasspoiled,profoundlyandirrevocably,bytheFall.During
themedievalperiod,theologiansdifferedintheirjudgementsabouttheextentandseverity
ofourepistemicandspiritualcorruptionsufferedbypostlapsarianhumanbeings.
Theoptimists,suchasThomasAquinas,maintainedthatthe‘lightofnaturalreason’,
since it ‘pertains to the species of the rational soul’, can never be ‘forfeit’, even by so
profoundlydestructiveaneventas theFall (cf.SummaTheologiae1a.95,1).Without such
optimisticestimationsofournaturalanduntarnishedepistemiccapacities,theentireproject
ofrationaltheologywouldappearfutile.Butthepessimists,pre-eminentlySaintAugustine,
demurred:ourepistemicandmoralnatures,although‘atfirstfaultlessandwithoutanysin’,
havebeenprofoundlycorrupted,sincetheFall‘darkensandweakens’ourcapacities,which
continuetooperateonlythankstodivineillumination(OnNatureandGrace3.iii).4
The long story of the gradual entrenchment of the more pessimistic Augustinian
anthropologiesisnotmyconcernhere.Whatmatters,formypurposes,isthat,bythelate
1500s,ithadcometopermeateEnglishnaturalphilosophy.Itwasaccepted,interalia,that
oursensoryfacultiesaredulled,ourpassionsunbalanced,andourepistemiccapacitiesunable
topenetratetothe‘essences’ofthings,offeringonlythemodestprospectofaslow,collective
21
accumulation of, at best, probable knowledge (cf. Harrison 2007: 6f). The general
epistemological significance of these anthropological convictions to earlymodern English
philosophy should be clear – its modest empiricism, for instance, and emphasis on
collectivizedinquiry.
Lessobvious,asitstands,ishowthisvisionofhumannatureasepistemicallydamaged
goodscangroundasetofepistemicvices.PutinthetermsIintroducedearlier,thequestion
is how a set of epistemic vices can be inflected by being indexed to a postlapsarian
anthropological conception.An important clue is thecultureofepistemicmodesty,which
indicatestherangeofviceslikelytobeofspecialconcerntotheEnglishnaturalphilosophers.
Mostobvious,at least to themodern imagination,arearroganceanddogmatism,but the
former has a rather minimal presence during this period. Bacon, for one, argues that
‘arroganceandpride’aremarksoftheIdolsoftheTribe,whichmanifests, for instance, in
preferencestobelievewhatisconvenientratherthanwhatistrue(quotedinCorneanu2011:
22). Others offer more indirect criticisms of arrogance, as in Sprat’s (1667: 33-34)
condemnationofthosewhoarenot‘willingtobetaught.’
Themore obvious vice of humility thatmost animated the earlymodernswas, of
course,dogmatism,the‘greatdisturberofourselvesandoftheworld’,saysGlanvill(1661:
225),‘maintain’duponthedepravedobstinacyofanungovern’dspirit.’Similar,iflessvivid
protests echo through the earlymodernwritings, as a ‘disease’ or vice of themind, that
contrastswiththe‘docile’inquirercelebratedbyBoyle(1999-2000:xii.304-5),fullypossessed
ofthe‘modest,humble’dispositionsofwhatSprat(1667:46)dubsthe‘CharacterofaTrue
Philosopher’.Withintheseandcountlesssimilarremarks,dogmatismemergesasaprimary
epistemicvice,astatusjustifiedinrelationtotheunderlyinganthropology.
Although no definitive conception of dogmatism prevailed during the period, its
general features werewell-established. The dogmatic person refuses to engagewith the
viewsandcriticismsofothers,theyassertbeyondwhattheycanestablish,andtheyarenot
abletoproperlydetectdeficienciesintheirknowledgeandunderstanding.Thishasvarious
badeffectsoninquiry—forinstance,dogmaticinquirersfailtoreconsidertheirviewswhen
goodreasonsaregivenfordoingso,hencetheimportanceplacedonbothempiricismand
collectiveinquiry.Butdogmatismalsoreflectsabadpsychology,sinceitentailsignoranceof
one’s capacities, what Corneanu (2011: 98) calls a stubborn ‘misevaluation of ourselves’.
Manyearlymodernnaturalphilosophicalpracticeswere intendedtonullifyorcorrectour
22
innatesusceptibilitytodogmatism,suchasthecomplexarrayof‘rulesofassent’togovern
ourrelationstoepistemicclaims.Thissusceptibilitytotheviceofdogmatismwas,ofcourse,
explained and rendered intelligible by reference to an underlying conception of human
nature.Sincedogmatismwasunderstoodasavicerootedinimbalancedpassionsandother
distempers,itsultimaterootswereour‘fallennatures’.
I think early modern conceptions of the vice of dogmatism were indexed to this
postlapsariananthropology,aswereothervices,suchascredulityandobstinacy.Butthere
areotherviceswhichwemightexpecttofindincludedintheearlymodernlistsofthevices
of themind that are notable by their absence. These include a vice thatmarks a radical
deficiencyofhumility–namelyhubris,whichrarelyfeaturesinthehistoricalorcontemporary
tables of the vices of themind. A hubristic agent assumes or asserts their possession of
epistemic capacities of a type, scope, or strength unavailable to them. But earlymodern
Englishnaturalphilosophylackedaconceptionofourepistemiccapacities,meaningthatthey
couldnotsustainaconceptofepistemichubris.
Theonlysustainedstudyofhubris,conceivedasbothanepistemicandexistentialvice,
isofferedbyDavidE.Cooperinhis2002book,TheMeasureofThings.Ifollowthemaindetails
ofhisaccount:theviceofhubrisreflectsanagentwithanexaggeratedestimationofthetype,
scope,andstrengthofhumanepistemiccapacities.Inearlierhistoricalperiods,hubriswas
oftenarticulatedintermsofpretensionstothestatusandpowersofGod,atendencythat
onlybegantorecedeintheseventeenthcentury–adevelopmentchartedbyEdwardCraig
(1987)inhisbookTheMindofGodandtheWorksofMan.Whatmarksouttheepistemically
hubristicagent isasetofvicioustendencies,onesmostobviouslymanifest inthesortsof
epistemicambitionstowhichanagentaspires—perhapsto‘acquireinsightintotheorderof
realityasGodhasdisposedit’,tociteoneofCraig’sexamplesofaguidingmedievalepistemic
ambition(cf.Craig1987:224).Althoughthepossibilityofsuchinsightwasaffirmedbymost
medievalChristiantheologians,itsrealizationwasonlypossiblewithactivedivineassistance
– a form of humility embedded in the doctrine of divine illumination. The pretension to
dispense with that assistance by asserting or assuming our possession of such epistemic
capacitiesishubristic.
Since the vice of hubris concerns assumption or assertion of an inflated set of
epistemic capacities, there are important differences between it and closely related vices
such as arrogance and dogmatism. A person can be arrogant or dogmatic without their
23
necessarilysupposingtheydoorcouldpossessanexaggeratedsetofepistemicpowers.On
thecharacterizationofarrogancedevelopedbyRobertsandWood,itconsistsofadisposition
to draw illicit inferences to some entitlement, such as the entitlement to pronounce
authoritativelyonatopicwithoutdueexpertise.Butthearrogantpersondrawsinferences
fromtheir social status,whereas thehubristicperson infersspecialentitlements fromthe
exaltedcapacitieswhosepossessionandmasterytheypresuppose.(Obviously,arroganceand
hubriscanfeedoneanother:apersonmightsupposetheyenjoyanelevatedstatusdueto
theirpresumedexaltedcapacities).Indeed,ononerecentinfluentialaccount,whatI’mcalling
hubrisemergesasasub-viceofarrogance.DennisWhitcomb,HeatherBattaly,JasonBaehr,
and Daniel Howard-Snyder (2017) characterise arrogance in terms of ‘over-owning one’s
strengths’,whichincludes‘thedispositionstoover-estimateone’sstrengths’,whichwould
makeepistemichubris–aradicaloverestimationofone’sepistemicstrengths–asub-viceof
arrogance.
Inthecaseofdogmatism,RobertsandWoodidentifythisasadispositiontorespond
irrationally to attempts by others to engage them in epistemic activity – derogating or
otherwiseresistingothers’effortstoinformorcriticizethem,say.Butthisformoftheviceof
dogmatismentailsmisuseratherthanmisestimationofone’scapacities:thedogmatistmight
beperfectlycognizantofthescopeandstrengthoftheirepistemicabilities—theyjustfailto
exercisethem,whereasthehubristicpersonactsastheydobecausetheytakethemselvesto
besofantasticallyepistemicallyequippedthattheyhavenoneedoftheinstructionorcritical
engagementofothers.Althoughoneneednotbehubristictobedogmatic,thesetwovices
canbemutuallyamplifying.
I propose that there is a conceptual space for a distinct vice of epistemic hubris,
understoodasaradicaldeficiencyofhumility(cf.Kidd2015,2016b).Itisoftenmostclearly
visibleinthesortsofepistemicambitionsaninquireradoptsorregardsasavailabletothem.
I may be hubristic if my guiding ambitions are ones beyond the capacities currently or
prospectivelyavailabletome.Astrongerformofhubriswouldbeanindividualmakingclaims
thatcouldonlybemadewithconfidenceifonecouldperformepistemictasksbeyondthe
abilitiesofevenalargecommunity,suchas,suchasreconstructingandassessingalternative
waysthathistoryandculturecouldhavegone(cf.Kidd2016c).
Isuspectthathubrisisoftenmislabeled,contributingtoitsabsencefromourlistsof
thevices.WhenKantcriticizes‘dogmatists’,suchasLeibniz,theobjectionwasnotthatthey
24
refusedtoengagewithanimportantsetofobjections.Itwas,rather,thattheirmetaphysical
ambitionspresupposedacapacitytodescribethewaytheworldis‘initself’,independentof
humansensibilityandconception. In sodoing,explainsCooper (2002:159),philosophers,
suchasLeibniz,‘creditedhumanbeings,impossibly,withthecapacitytotranscendthelimits
ofunderstanding, togainaccess to things-in-themselves.’ Since this is, at leastwithin the
termsofKant’stranscendentalidealism,anepistemiccapacitywelack,theirfaultisactually
hubris.
Interestingly,theviceofepistemichubrisdoesnotappearwithinthewritingsofthe
earlymodernEnglishnaturalphilosophers.Thisispuzzlingforthreereasons.First,concerns
with hubris are obviously pertinent to the guiding concern to determine what epistemic
powershumanbeingsdoorcould,intothefuture,possess.Second,acultureofepistemic
modesty inevitablybuilds inanespecialconcernwithfailurestoachieveandexercisethat
virtue.Ifhubrismarksthemostradicaldeficiencyofhumility,thenitoughttobecentralto
their concerns. Third, the practical ability to properly prosecute the emerging projects of
natural science presupposedhaving a sense ofwhatwould count as attainable epistemic
ambitions. Given these reasons to expect a concern with hubris to emerge within early
modern English natural philosophical vice epistemology, its absence stands in need of
explanation.
VII.HUMANNATUREANDEPISTEMICHUBRIS
Iproposethattheabsenceofhubriscanbeexplainedinthedeepsensebyconsidering in
closerdetailacrucialfeatureoftheprevailingpostlapsariananthropology.Theviceofhubris
alwayspresupposesacertainconceptionofwhatourepistemiccapacitiesare–oftherange
ofourcapacities,theirstrengthandscope,andthepossibilities(ifany)oftheirbeingaltered,
whether of degradation or enhancement. Conceptions of the vice of hubris are always
coupledorindexedtoaconceptionofourepistemicsituationinthewiderorderofthings.
Thehubristicagentisonewho–absurdly,futilely–presupposestheir‘beingabletoescape
theconstraintswhichtheircreaturelyconditionmightbethoughttoimpose’(Cooper2002:
169).Butitshouldbeclearthattheformandfixityoftheseconstraints,thesortsofepistemic
limitsthey‘impose’,andtheextent(ifany)towhichtheymightbetranscended,canonlybe
articulatedviaasophisticatedaccountofour‘creaturelycondition’–Kant’stranscendental
idealism,say.Ifso,thenitseemspossiblethatsomeconceptionsofourepistemicsituation
25
maybeabletosustainastableconceptionoftheviceofhubris–theymaybeincomplete,for
instance.
.Butwhatwasnotknown,duringthisperiod,waswhatthescopeandstrengthofour
epistemiccapacitieswouldbeonce theyhadbeendisciplined,cured,orcultivated. Itwas
cleartotheearlymodernnaturalphilosophersthatourcapacitiesastheystandwereinan
inauspicious condition – ‘defective’, ‘weak’, vicious, corrupted. But there was no such
confidenceaboutthe‘upperlimits’ofourepistemiccapacitiesintheirfullydevelopedstate,
for the simple reason that, for the entirely of our postlapsarian existence, they were
corruptedbyourinheritedoriginalsinandthenbyfailuresofself-disciplineandthefailings
inheritedfromoursocialsystems.
This uncertainty about the scope and strength of our epistemic capacities had an
important consequence for earlymodernEnglish vice epistemology. This visionof human
naturecouldlendidentityandintelligibilitytoacertainrangeofvices,namelythosewhich
presupposeourpervasiveepistemic infirmities.Certainly, this is themain featureofearly
modernEnglishvicessuchascredulity,dogmatism,andobstinacy–allfailuresofepistemic
conductarisingfrominsufficientresponsivenesstoour‘weak’and‘defective’capacities.But
thatsameconceptioncouldnotsustainavicesuchashubris,forintheabsenceofashared
understandingoftheactualscopeandlimitsofourepistemiccapacities,itwasimpossibleto
makemeaningfulchargesofhubris.Conceptionsoftheviceofhubrisarealwaysindexedtoa
certainanthropologicalormetaphysicalconception–anaccountofourepistemiccapacities
andsituationthatenablesjudgementsaboutwhatwouldcountashubristicconduct.Inthe
absenceof a complete anthropological conception that specified the ‘upper limits’ ofour
powers,theconceptualspaceforaviceofhubriscouldnotbefilled.
We clearly see this pervasiveuncertainty about the status andupper limitsof our
epistemiccapacities inLocke’swritings,mostvisiblyandexplicitly in theEssayConcerning
Human Understanding. In the opening ‘Epistle to the Reader’, he explains the original
inspirationforhisepistemologicalprojectasbeingaconversationwithfriends,earlyin1671,
aboutmatters ofmorality and revealed religion. Unfortunately, little to no progress was
made,withcriticismsoneveryside,whichsuddenlyinspiredinLockeacrucialinsight:
Afterwehadawhilepuzzledourselves,withoutcominganyneareraResolutionof
thoseDoubtswhichperplexedus,itcarneintomyThoughts,thatwetookawrong
26
course; and that, before we set our selves upon Enquiries of that Nature, it was
necessarytoexamineourownAbilities,andsee,whatObjectsourUnderstandings
were,orwerenotfittedtodealwith(2008:4)
The insight was that the inquiry had begun without any a clear understanding of the
sufficiency of their epistemic capacities for the task at hand. The group had implicitly
presumed that their ‘Abilities’ were ‘fitted’ to deal effectively with thematters in hand.
Locke’srealizationwasthatthesufficiencyofhumanepistemiccapacitiesmustitselfbemade
anobjectofsustainedinquiry,apointreiteratedthroughouttheEssay:
IfwecanfindoutthoseMeasures,wherebyarationalCreatureputinthatState,which
Manisin,inthisWorld,may,andoughttogovernhisOpinionsandActionsdepending
thereon,we need not be troubled, that someother things escape our Knowledge
(Essay§1.1.6)
Weseeherethreerelatedpoints.First,anuncertaintyaboutthepotentialupper limitsor
‘Measures’ofourepistemiccapacities.Second,asenseofepistemicmodestyintheexplicit
affirmationthatsomethingsdo–andmightperhapsforever–‘escapeourKnowledge’.Third,
a reference toananthropologicalconception,whichLockerefers toasanaccountof ‘the
State,whichMan is in’. Since that conceptionwaspremisedonournatural andacquired
epistemicinfirmities,itmakesperfectsensethatLocke’sconcerniswiththevicesofhumility
andofdiscipline–dogmatismandlaziness,themainthemesoftheEssayand‘OftheConduct
of the Understanding’. Those are the vices that can be most effectively indexed to an
anthropologicalconceptioninclusiveofaprofoundsenseofourinfirmities.Itwaseasierto
give identity and intelligibility to vices of infirmity in a cultural and intellectual climate
dominated by a vision of human beings as epistemically corrupt, infirm,weak, defective,
vicious.Inthisclimate,focusandconcernnaturallyshiftedtowardsvicesthatarticulatedour
infirmities.
Letmesumup:earlymodernEnglishnaturalphilosophywasanimatedbyanabiding
senseofthepervasivenessofinnateandacquiredhumanepistemicfailingsanddeficiencies,
atraditionwhosefullestexpressionisLocke’sessay‘OftheConductoftheUnderstanding’.
Although shaped by a whole constellation of cultural, religious, and intellectual
27
developments,whatseemscentralwasapostlapsarianconceptionofhumanbeingsas‘fallen’
creatures,whoseepistemiccapacitiesweredamaged,severelyifnotirreparably,bytheFall.
But the underlying anthropological conception was incomplete, since it emphasized the
currentlyimperfectscopeandstrengthofourcapacitiesintheircurrentuncultivatedform–
but not their potential future status, once properly cultivated and restored. Since that
conceptionwasincomplete,itcouldnotprovideabasisforarticulationofaviceofhubris,
eventhoughitreflectedepistemologicalconcernswiththelimitsofknowledgeandproper
conduct of the understanding central to the concerns of the period. This confirms the
predictionthatconceptionsoftheviceofhubrisalwayspresupposesomedeeperconception
ofourepistemiccapacitiesandsituation.Whennosuchdeepconceptionisavailable,itwill
notbepossibletoarticulateaconceptionoftheviceofhubris.
VII.CONCLUSIONS
Thispaperarguedforanhistoricalviceepistemology,informedbythemethodsandresults
ofhistoricalscholarship,whichaffordnovelandvaluableconcepts,examples,andinsights,
notleastaccesstoprecursorexplorationsofepistemicvicesandfailingsandtheirrelationsto
political theory,natural science,andotherareasof intellectualandculturalactivity.More
importantly,historicalcasestudiesprovideexamplesofdeepconceptionsofepistemicvice,
withonecandidatebeingepistemichubris,itselfgroundedinanunderlyinganthropological
andmetaphysicalvisionofhumans’epistemicsituationwithintheorderofthings.
Acknowledgements
IamgratefulforthecommentsandencouragementofJasonBaehr,QuassimCassam,Charlie
Crerar,DavidE.Cooper,SoranaCorneanu,HermanPaul,BobRoberts,AlessandraTanesini;
ananonymousreferee;andaudiencesinCardiff,Leiden,Nottingham,OxfordBrookes,and
the2017PacificAmericanPacificAssociationmeetinginSeattle.Initialstagesofthisresearch
werefundedbyanAddisonWheelerFellowship.IofferspecialthankstoHeatherBattalyfor
herinvitationtocontributetothisissue,forherpatiencewhilewaitingforit,aswellasfor
hercomments.
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Endnotes
1TheTheearliestpaperdevotedspecificallytoepistemicvicethatIknowofisSwank(2000).2IamgratefultoAlessandraTanesiniforthesereferences.3See,forinstance,Zagzebski,VirtuesoftheMind,152,andMedina,TheEpistemologyofResistance,68.IgiveafulleraccountoftheseclaimsinKidd(MS).4Aquinas,Augustine,andthewiderChristiantheologicalcontextaredetailedatlengthinHarrison(2007),abooktowhichIammuchindebtedinthissection.