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Journal of Strategic Affairs

SSII Journal Summer 2018

Volume III, Issue No. 1

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Director General : Dr. Shireen Mazari

Members : Amina Afzal

Muhammad Shoaib

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STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE ISLAMABAD

Vol. III Summer 2018 Number 1

Page

Comment

Kashmir: A Potential Blueprint for Conflict Resolution

Dr.Shireen M Mazari 1

The 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review: Global and Regional

Security

Ambassador (Retd)Munir Akram 11

Articles

Syrian Crisis: A Proxy between Great Powers

Muhammad Shoaib 21

Changing Nature of the Communist Party of China

M. Abdul Qadeer 53

The Implications of India and Israel’s Growing Defence

Cooperation

Moiz Khan 70

Afghanistan and the New Great Game: Implications

for Pakistan

Kashif Hussain 101

Book Review

Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments

Amina Afzal 124

1

Kashmir: A Potential Blueprint for Conflict

Resolution

Dr. Shireen M Mazari

The Kashmir conflict has once again come centre stage

in the aftermath of the continuing Indian violence being

perpetrated by the Occupying security forces against

unarmed Kashmiris. This time it is a UN body that has

finally taken the initiative with the publication of the

first ever Report by the Office of the United Nations

High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)

released on 14 June 2018. Unfortunately the previous

Pakistan government (PMLN) and the present Caretaker

set up failed to move proactively on Kashmir in the

wake of this Report – reflecting a serious lapse in

responsible foreign policy. All that Pakistan did was

meekly welcome the Report even as India was

vehemently criticising it. The Report is a credible

account of the Human Rights situation that prevails on

both sides of Kashmir and is a first step, since the UNSC

resolutions, of the UN recognising its responsibility to

resolve the Kashmir issue in accordance with said

resolutions.

The Report should have formed the basis for proactive

diplomacy on the part of Pakistan in global capitals and

international forums from the UN to the OIC beginning

with an immediate invitation to the UN High

Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) to send in

his team for assessing the situation on the ground in

AJK. Pakistan should have done it when the report was

being drafted, instead of indulging in the usual “we will

if India will” approach, as it would have shown

Pakistan’s good intentions. There are times in diplomacy

when it is more advantageous to adopt a “we will do it


2

because we think its right regardless of what India does”

approach.

Anyhow, beyond the invitation to the UNHCHR and

taking advantage of the OHCHR’s Report, Pakistan

should have moved proactively on the following and

should still do so:

One: Drawn attention on all international forums,

including INGOs dealing with human rights as well as

legal forums, to the human rights violations by India in

IOK as identified in the Report which are in violation of

the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and customary

International Humanitarian Law.

Two: With the Report refreshing the memory of the

international community on Kashmir, Pakistan should

have reaffirmed at all forums the continuing legitimacy

of the Kashmiris struggle for self determination. It seems

Pakistan’s hidebound decision makers are not aware that

even after 9/11, the principle of self-determination has

been recognised as distinct from terrorism – the Almaty

Declaration of 4 June 2002 reaffirmed its commitment to

the right of self-determination for people remaining

under foreign occupation (II:15). This Declaration was

adopted by the Heads of State/Government of Member

States of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence

Building Measures in Asia (CICA). Both Pakistan and

India are parties to this Declaration. Not only does the

Declaration reaffirm the principle of self-determination,

it emphasises that this principle must be exercised “in

accordance with the UN Charter and international law”.

Non-fulfillment of this will pose a threat “to regional

and international peace”. For Pakistan, what could have

been a clearer reaffirmation of its position on the

Kashmir dispute?

Comment

3

Pakistan should also not be hesitant in reiterating the

UNSC resolutions on Kashmir and stating their linkage

to similar UNSC resolutions on East Timor (UNSC

Resolution 384 of December 1975 and UNSC

Resolution 389 of 1976), which were enforced in 1999

leading to East Timor’s independence from Indonesia

through a UN-conducted plebiscite. It was not that

Indonesia wanted this but it was pressured, especially by

the US, into conceding to the plebiscite. While the

struggle against Indonesian occupation was going on by

the East Timorese, their leaders, Jose Ramos-Horta and

Bishop Carlos Ximenes, were awarded the Nobel Peace

Prize in 1996. It is crucial to remind the world of the

parallels between Kashmir and East Timor at all

diplomatic forums including bilaterally by our diplomats

in the countries they are serving in. Unfortunately our

state and successive governments have chosen to remain

ignorant on this linkage.

In fact, the case of the Kashmiris before the UN is even

stronger because the occupying power itself took the

dispute to the UN under Chapter VI: Pacific Settlement

of Disputes. So both Pakistan and India agreed to have

UN intervention and to the plebiscite.

Three: In the wake of the Report, Pakistan should have

immediately demanded the UNSC insist on the return of

UNMOGIP and other independent observers into IOK.

Four: Most important, this was the time for the

government to present a blueprint for conflict resolution

premised upon the principle of self-determination and a

plebiscite. At the end of the day, Pakistan cannot simply

continue to pay lip service to UNSC resolutions and the

principle of self-determination. Nor can it move away

from the UNSC framework on which its legitimacy as a

party to the dispute rests. It is unfortunate that the State


4

and successive governments have failed to work on a

proper blueprint for conflict resolution on the Kashmir

dispute within the framework of these resolutions and

the self-determination principle. The Musharraf four

points (which were never discussed or worked out in

detail before being made public) were a non-starter

because they failed to remain within this legal

framework. Other “backdoor” diplomacy solutions have

primarily rested on some sort of arrangement that seeks

to legitimise the LOC as the border – not realising that

the LOC is the problem and cannot become the solution.

Yet, there exist today a variety of conflict resolution

models that have been successfully enforced in different

parts of Europe where territorial disputes linked with the

issue of self-determination prevailed. There was a short

period a decade or so ago when the Europeans were even

advocating different European models as viable for the

settlement of the Kashmir dispute.

The Aland Island case

For many years Pakistanis visiting Sweden were cited

the case of the Aland Islands, which were part of the

territory ceded to Russia by Sweden in September 1809,

and they became part of the semi-autonomous Grand

Duchy of Finland. From 1917, the primarily Swedish-

descent residents of the Islands kept up efforts to have

the Islands ceded back to Sweden. A petition for

succession from Finland was signed by 96.2 % of

Aland’s native adults. Swedish nationalism grew as anti-

Swedish sentiment grew in Finland as a result Finland’s

own struggle to retain its autonomy in the face of

Russification. Finland was not prepared to cede the

Islands but was prepared to give them an autonomous

status instead of renewing them. The dispute was

brought before the League of Nations in 1921 and the

Comment

5

decision was to allow Finland to retain sovereignty over

the province but within this framework, the Aland

Islands were made an autonomous territory. So Finland

had to ensure that the Aland residents maintained the

Swedish language as well as their own culture and

heritage. Also, the Islands were to be given a neutral and

demilitarised status. Aland has its own flag, issues its

own postage stamps, has its own police force and is a

member of the Nordic Council. Having visited Aland in

1989, one saw the whole arrangement for oneself.

Obviously it works well for Sweden and Finland, but

how relevant is this example in the context of Kashmir.

The relevancy is simply not there. To begin with,

Kashmir was not ceded to India through a treaty between

Pakistan and India in the aftermath of a war.

Geographically, also, islands can be granted autonomy

and be demilitarised more rationally than land-locked

territories contiguous to both antagonists. Also, and most

importantly, the Kashmir issue is not a territorial dispute

but an issue of the right of self-determination for the

people of Kashmir – a right given to them by the

international community through UNSC resolutions. The

Aland solution would mean continuation of Indian

sovereignty over Kashmir – something the Kashmiris

have never accepted. The only relevancy of the Aland

Islands case is that it went before the League of Nations,

which offered a solution and both parties to the dispute

accepted the solution. India took the Kashmir issue to

the UNSC under Chapter VI of the Charter, relating to

Pacific Settlement of Disputes. This signified that India

accepted Kashmir as a dispute between itself and

Pakistan and sought a peaceful resolution through UN

intervention. It did not appeal to the UN under Chapter

VII, accusing Pakistan of aggression against Indian

“sovereign” territory. So the historical context of


6

Kashmir and the prevailing dynamics make the Aland

Islands solution inapplicable in this region.

The Trieste case

In 1921 Italy had formally annexed parts of Austria-

Hungary that it had captured in World War I, including

the city of Trieste. The area’s population comprised

mainly Slovenians with some Croats and a large number

of Italians who lived mainly in the city itself. After

World War II the area was claimed by Yugoslavia,

mainly because the population outside the city of Trieste

was predominantly Slovenian. The Western powers

opposed this claim. Hence, the Free Territory of Trieste

was established after World War II in 1947, under the

protection of the UNSC, as a neutral state that comprised

the city of Trieste, a narrow strip of coastal territory

connecting it to Italy, Slovenia and Istria. However,

when the UNSC was unable to agree on a governor for

the Territory, Anglo- American forces occupied Zone A,

which comprised Italian-speaking city of Trieste and its

surrounding areas, while the Yugoslavs occupied Zone

B, which was the remainder of the Free Territory.

Tension between Italy and Yugoslavia continued till

1954 when a compromise solution was reached in the

Treaty of Osimo. The territory was formally divided

along the zone border and basically this amounted to a

partition of the Free Territory, which then ceased to

exist.

Again, this was primarily a historical territorial dispute

between two member states of the UN, so it is not

applicable to the Kashmir dispute. Also, a Trieste-type

solution basically means legitimisation of the existing

status quo and division of Kashmir – which would not

address the root cause of the problem: that of the right of

Comment

7

self-determination. Nor does the Trieste-type solution

allow for the option of a future referendum.

The Andorra case

This is a lesser-known case, but is extremely interesting

and may well have a greater relevance within the

Kashmir context. Andorra is located in the Pyrenees

Mountains on the French-Spanish border and is a

parliamentary co-principality comprising the Bishop of

Urgel (Spain) and the French President. This joint

suzerainty (but not sovereignty) of the French state and

the Spanish Bishops of Urgel has prevailed since 1278.

Andorra has closer ties to Spain with Catalan as its

official language and has, over the decades, become an

important tourist and winter sports destination as well as

a wealthy international financial centre because of its

banking facilities, low taxes and no customs duties. In

1993, a constitution was ratified and approved which

made Andorra a sovereign parliamentary democracy that

retained the “co-princes” as heads of state, but the head

of government retains executive power. It became a

member of the UN in 1993 as a sovereign state. The

“two princes” serve coequally with limited powers that

do not include veto over government acts. They are

represented in Andorra by a delegate. Defence of the

country is the responsibility of France and Spain and

Andorra has no currency of its own but uses that of its

two neighbours – which effectively now means a single

currency, the euro.

The Andorra model has a certain attraction, especially

for those who advocate the Independence option for a

united State of Jammu and Kashmir. It also offers India

a less unpalatable option than seeing the whole of the

State of Jammu and Kashmir becoming a part of

Pakistan – which would in all probability still be the


8

outcome if a general plebiscite was held in that State.

But the stumbling block is on the issue of Independence

– which both Pakistan and India have not conceded to,

as this option is not part of the UNSC resolutions.

Interestingly, some Kashmiris are also now referring to

the Andorra model. It certainly needs greater

exploration, with alternatives to full sovereignty in the

form of UN trusteeship for a limited period, and so on.

The Good Friday Agreement (Northern Ireland)

The Good Friday Agreement, which resolved the

Northern Ireland conflict. This Agreement was plugged

actively by the US, which put pressure especially on the

UK, in order to resolve the Northern Ireland conflict.

This model has a direct relevance to the case of Kashmir

because it is premised on two interrelated principles.

One, it recognises “the legitimacy of whatever choice is

freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern

Ireland with regard to its status, whether they prefer to

continue to support the Union with Great Britain or a

sovereign united Ireland” (that is going with the

Republic of Ireland). There is also a provision for a

periodic holding (every seven years) of a referendum in

case the people of Northern Ireland appear to change

their minds. Two, that deweaponisation will follow the

implementation of the settlement. Through this

Agreement, the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 was

repealed.

The Agreement is an international agreement between

the British and Irish governments with two components:

the legal agreement between the UK and the Republic of

Ireland; and a lengthier agreement signed between eight

political parties involved in the Northern Ireland conflict

and the two governments (UK and Irish). While the

Comment

9

agreement between the two governments is the actual

legal agreement, it incorporates, in its Schedules, the two

governments’ agreement with the eight political parties.

It is the principles underlying this settlement that are

extremely relevant to Kashmir and need to be the

starting point of any substantive solution relating to this

dispute. In fact, out of all the conflict resolution models,

this is the only one that is premised on the principle of

the right of self-determination and not merely territorial

control. Equally important Pakistan has to remember its

legitimacy as a party to the Kashmir dispute rests

entirely on UNSC resolutions so any solution, which

Pakistan puts forward, has to be within the UNSC

resolutions’ framework and that is premised on the

principle of self-determination.

It is unfathomable why the Pakistani State has failed to

move on this unless the assumption has been to simply

manage the conflict rather than resolve it. After all, in a

tunnel-vision approach, once Kashmir is resolved, both

the Pakistani and Indian States will have to revisit their

investments in the hostility paradigm. However many

critical issues remain fluid for Pakistan until the Kashmir

dispute is resolved – including the status of Gilgit

Baltistan (previously referred to as the Northern Areas)

and the international border between Pakistan and China.

In the 1963 Border Agreement between Pakistan and

China Article 6 clearly stated the following:

“The two parties have agreed that after the

settlement of the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan

and India, the sovereign authority concerned will

reopen negotiations with the Government of the

People's Republic of China on the boundary as

described in Article Two of the present agreement, so

as to sign a formal boundary treaty to replace the

present agreement, provided that in the event of the

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kashmir_dispute

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pakistan

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/India

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_of_the_People%27s_Republic_of_China

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_of_the_People%27s_Republic_of_China


10

sovereign authority being Pakistan, the provisions of

the present agreement and of the aforesaid protocol

shall be maintained in the formal boundary treaty to

be signed between the People’s Republic of China

and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.”

These issues need to be resolved on a permanent basis so

that the state of Pakistan has legal clarity regarding its

borders and so that the ambivalence being maintained by

the state of Pakistan towards Gilgit Baltistan, causing

increasing unrest amongst the people there, can come to

an end.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%E2%80%99s_Republic_of_China

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_Republic_of_Pakistan

11

The 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review:

Global and Regional Security

Ambassador (Retd) Munir Akram *

The US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) 2018 is an

important document. Its importance can be seen

from a comparison between this document and the

2010 review issued by the Obama Administration.

Whereas the 2010 review justified US nuclear

weapons retention and modernisation it was done in

the context of an effort or larger objective of

containing nuclear weapons, avoiding nuclear war

and promoting nonproliferation and arms control.

By contrast, the 2018 review issued by the Trump

Administration is a document which is a de-facto

justification for America’s nuclear rearmament and

the pursuit of an aggressive foreign and security

policy which justifies the endorsement the number

of weapons moderisation listed in the document. US

Defence Secretary, James Mattis has said that

competition between great powers, not terrorism, is

now the main focus of America’s national security.1

The statement is important even from the

perspective of Pakistan and our region because the

game has become global rather than local.

The document seeks to justify a number of policy

goals, and highlights the following: Firstly the

threat from Russia. It accuses Russia of having

violated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

* Adapted from the author’s talk at the Pakistan Institute of

Parliamentary Services (PIPS) Islamabad.


12

(INF) treaty; they are also accused of a doctrine that

envisages the use of low yield nuclear weapons;

they have also been accused of another doctrine

which envisages the first use of nuclear weapons

and the American posture is justified in response to

that policy.

An unstated fact is that Russia’s entire rearmament

process started because of two developments. The

first being the expansion of NATO. When the

Soviet Union collapsed there was an informal

understanding given to the Russians by the former

US Secretary of State, James Baker, that NATO

would not be expanded to the borders of new Russia

and especially that it would not include any of the

former Soviet Republics. However, NATO invited

almost everybody from Europe to join in except for

Russia and therefore it was quite clear that the

purpose of NATO and the posture of NATO is an

anti-Russia posture. This was the beginning of the

rationalisation for Russia’s rearmament. Secondly,

the US walked out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile

Treaty and this was the other significant

development which led to Russian nuclear

rearmament. It was one of the most important arms

control treaties in history because it recognised that

the threat of the Mutual Assured Destruction

(MAD) doctrine would become less credible if there

was a credible Anti-Ballistic Missile system

(ABMs) in place and although systems had been

developed by both sides it was agreed that they

would be limited to one each, one system to protect

the command and control by the US and one system

to protect the command and control by the

Comment

13

Russians. Once that treaty was abrogated by the US,

the Russians obviously needed to rethink how

deterrence would be maintained.

Deterrence would be maintained by taking the more

expensive route of developing the comprehensive

ballistic missile defence system which the US had

developed. The US has got at least three systems in

place: the battle field systems, the theatre systems

and the strategic systems. The Russians decided to

limit themselves to the mid-range systems, i.e. the

S300 and S400 which are very good systems. The

US chose the more extreme route and is still trying

to perfect ballistic missile defence against ICBMs.

However, in order to maintain deterrence the

Russians had to multiply or re-multiply the number

of warheads that they maintain but they have not yet

breached the limits of the START treaty.

Nevertheless, the plan was to cut down nuclear

weapons to a very low level in the aftermath of the

end of the Cold War but this objective had to be

revised in light of the two developments that were

initiated by the US. So, the justification against the

Russian moderisation presented in this nuclear

posture review is very partial and one-sided

statement of the case, to say the least.

Secondly, the document justifies moderisation by a

reference to China’s nuclear developments. When

the cold war ended China had, by all estimates, 300

nuclear warheads as compared to approximately

22,000 plus that were maintained by the US and the

Soviet Union. To now argue that China has

expanded its nuclear forces and provides a


14

justification for a US response is a little rich, to say

the least. Because China expanded from 300, it is

not known publicly as to how many nuclear

warheads China has and how many of these are

ICBMs or mid-range or short-range weapons but

certainly the numbers are nowhere close to 22,000

or even 4000 or so that are actively deployed by the

US and Russia today. So, I think the justification of

a US response to Chinese moderisation from 300 to

whatever… 500, 1000, 1200 is not a very credible

argument for the response that the US has

developed.

The NPR then targets two specific smaller powers.

One is North Korea and the other is Iran. I think the

nuclear posture review perhaps is a little behind the

curve as far as describing the situation of North

Korea because in subsequent to the writing to this

document the North Koreans have gone much far

ahead in testing their ICBM capabilities which now

pose a credible threat to the US. North Korea is

ahead of Pakistan as far as the capability for ICBMs

is concerned. It is a credible threat to the US

because even with ABMs the US can never be

certain that a nuclear missile fired by North Korea

would not get through, therefore, it is a much more

credible threat. But, who forced them? How did

North Korea actually come to this stage of

developing nuclear warheads and ICBMs? I think

people forget that in 1995-96 there was an

agreement by North Korea to scrap its graphite

reactor and then in 2000 at the behest of the Chinese

the 6-party talks started and they were making such

good progress that the North Koreans were ready to

Comment

15

scrap major parts of their nuclear programme.

However in 2002 the US imposed sanctions on

North Korea for completely unrelated reasons.

North Koreans abrogated the 6-party talks, walked

out of it and conducted nuclear explosions. The

reaction therefore was provoked on part of the US

imposing sanctions within a process that was

making progress.

The last country focused in the NPR is Iran. Here,

the justification provided for the Iranian threat is

even less credible than the justification against

Russia, China and North Korea because the Iranians

have agreed in the joint programme to freeze their

nuclear programme and give up the enriched

uranium, to limit the enrichment to a lower level at

least for 15 years. However, the US now feels 15

years is not enough and after 15 years the Iranians

will be free to do anything they want. The

understanding on which 15 years was agreed by the

P5+1 was that in 15 years the security issues which

may compel Iran to go down the nuclear route

would be resolved and that there would be no

further justification for Iran’s nuclear program. Of

course, that is now being questioned by Trump and

they want to re-open the whole issue and Trump has

now demanded from his European partners that they

must get from Iranians a commitment to indefinite

oprationality of the joint agreement and a freeze on

missile testing. Iranians have rejected both these

conditions.

So, these are the policy objectives for which the

NPR seeks to acquire endorsement from the

political system in Washington and from the


16

international community. It also seeks endorsement

for a number of weapon systems that are justified

by these policy goals and policy recommendations.

In summary this implies a complete modernisation

and replacement of nuclear triad i.e. the land based,

sea based and air based systems. The sea based

Ohio Class Submarines are to be replaced

eventually by the Columbia Class submarines and

with new SLBMs and SLCMs which would be a

new development. The land based ICBMs are to be

replaced by new ICBMs in re-enforced 450 silos

and the air force with present fleet of 40 B-52s and

25 B-2s will be replaced by a larger fleet of the 2-

As and new missile systems including stand-off

missile systems with the B-52s. Nothing will be

scrapped and much will be modernized. The nuclear

force will be huge. The force which is below the

strategic range is, of course, under no constraint

except for the INF treaty so there are a numbers of

short range nuclear weapons that are in the

possession of US which would continue to be

oprationalised. These are the two goals of the

document.

So, what are the implications?

In my opinion there are five implications of the

NPR. First of all, obviously there is a new missile

and nuclear arms race that this will trigger and has

already triggered. This huge arms race would be

based on new technologies, using artificial

intelligence, autonomous weapons and all kinds of

new weapon systems. Secondly and because of the

variety and complexity of the weapon systems there

Comment

17

will be greater likelihood of the use of the nuclear

weapons and the likelihood of the use of non-

nuclear weapons. Thirdly, there will be greater

threat to both nuclear capable and to non-nuclear

weapon states. This would be a major detraction

from international obligations that have been

undertaken by the US and other five recognised

nuclear power states under resolution 255 of the

Security Council which provides negative security

guarantees to states which are parties to the NPT.

So, there will be at least theoretical strategic nuclear

threat to the non-nuclear states and especially

because the document states quite explicitly that the

US reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in the

case of a strategic non-nuclear attack and this is a

clear violation of the resolution 255. Fourthly, and

this is being widely discussed that wars have

become more complex. People have been talking

about ‘hybrid wars’, the phrase was coined by a

Russian General some years ago but obviously the

two wars that are likely to take place are ‘complex

wars’, which could be fought at sub-conventional

levels with new technologies and with new

approaches so that the predictability of the outbreak

of conflicts and outcome of conflicts will both

become very uncertain thus complicating the task of

peace makers and the United Nations. There is also

the likelihood of more frequent preemptive and

preventive wars. These are now explicitly justified

in the doctrines that are coming out especially from

the US and Western Powers with regard to the need

for preventive wars, terrorism would take over

nuclear weapons or response to terrorist incidents.

And lastly for all those who have concluded the


18

nuclear ban treaty, they are likely to be disappointed

because there is no time soon that nuclear weapons

are going away.

In the regional context obviously there is Russia,

China, North Korea and Iran all of which have been

spelled out in the document itself. The policy

towards Russia is most obvious. Regarding China

too it is clear what the US wants. China’s

containment would be at the technological level

because the number of their nuclear weapons is not

that high and recent decisions on US trade policy

are clear indications of the fact that there will be

constraints put on Chinese acquisition of US source

technology and that is the core of competition vis-à-

vis China.

On North Korea, Trump has agreed to the summit

with Kim Jong Un. The stakes are very high and

there is danger of coming back to square one if the

summit fails.

On Iran, I think the danger of miscalculation of

threats leading to a nuclear conflict is not so much

because of the nuclear dimension. The nuclear

dimension may provide a justification for what both

the US and Israel want i.e. to eliminate Iran’s

perpetuity to be an expansionist power. The

Iranians have now created a corridor between

Tehran and Lebanon which is directly threatening

the Israelis and these are facts on the ground which

are not going to be acceptable to the US for Israel

and therefore there is a great danger in the fact that

Comment

19

this particular situation could lead to the use of

force in the near future.

Fortunately for South Asia it is not mentioned

explicitly in the document, but it is covered in the

context of non-proliferation. It is also covered in

context of the American pre-occupation with what

the document refers to as the Asia Pacific region

and what is now being called the Indo Pacific

region. Change in wording is very significant for

Pakistan. We have to take into account that there is

a profoundly developed alliance between the US

and India and this alliance will have specific

implications for Pakistan. For Pakistan’s defence

posture, for India’s doctrines of limited war, threat

of limited conflict, Cold Start etc have not invited

any words of caution or criticism from the west. So,

we have to presume that these threats enjoy implicit

acceptance in Washington and some of the NATO

capitals because these have been used by the

Indians for their own regional objectives and have

been reinforced to some extent by statement issued

by the US. So, we have to be very careful in terms

of this alliance that is emerging. If seen together

with efforts which have been made to declare

Pakistan a sponsor of terrorism the threat then

transforms into a very real and dangerous scenario.

May be it is not wise to read too much into how it

will ultimately develop and where we are going

with this kind of scenario. Perhaps we are too much

into it, perhaps nobody is too foolish to take on a

nuclear weapon state such as Pakistan but of course

mistakes have been made in history and blunders

are possible. The record of behavior that we have


20

seen and which is manifested in the NPR does not

provide much comfort that a blunder of such a

magnitude would not take place.

References

1. “Mattis: US National Security Focus no Longer

Terrorism,” BBC, January 19, 2018.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-42752298

21


Muhammad Shoaib

Introduction

As the conflict in Syria becomes increasingly complex,

the country’s civil war has turned into a proxy war

battleground for major powers. The current conflict in

Syria presents a complex and unmanageable

humanitarian crisis, with severe human rights

violations.1 The Arab Uprising made its way to Syria on

January 26, 2011 and it became the starting point for the

ensuing unrest in the country. The Syrian regime

forcefully resisted the wave of public protests that were

demanding the ouster of Syrian President Bashar al-

Assad. This created a new theatre whereby rebel groups

started emerging and taking control of Syrian territory.

The weakening of the Syrian state system and the

subsequent power vacuum encouraged Daesh (ISIS) to

infiltrate and take hold of much of the Syrian territory.

As the chaos unfolds, “unconstructive” foreign

interference continues to prolong the war further. The

proxy war in Syria is reminiscent of the Cold War period

where two camps were engaged in establishing their

dominance through indirect confrontations.2 Foreign

powers are once again supporting the warring parties

within Syria to serve their own national interests. The

US, Turkey and some Gulf states including Jordan,

Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab

Emirates are allied with the US and are pushing for

Assad’s ouster. Although Turkey became part of

coalition air strikes against Daesh and other al Qaeda-

allied militants, differences over Kurds (YPG militia)3

have since taken over Turkey-US relations. Meanwhile

Russia and Iran are supporting the Assad regime.


22

Moscow maintains that it will continue its campaign

against militants and remain involved in Syria. Iran also

supports the Assad regime and remains involved in Syria

against the US-led coalition.

Even after several cessation-of-hostilities resolutions by

the United Nations Security Council, ceasefire

implementation in Syria remains fractured. It is also

unclear how efforts through the Geneva and Moscow

peace processes would manage the complexities and

help end the war. It is now believed that the conflict has

transformed into a global race for influence between the

US-NATO bloc and its Gulf allies and the Russia-led

counter-alliance camp. This great power competition in

Syria poses several questions that this study seeks to

answer. These include:

What are the interests of great powers in Syria? How are

these powers involved in Syria and what are their aims

and objectives? What are the implications of the great

powers’ involvement in the Syrian Crisis?

Although there are several actors involved in the Syrian

war, this study focuses on the interests and involvement

of US and Russia. Western perspective dominates most

of the available literature. Secondary sources of data

collection would be used, primarily from published

journals, books and newspaper articles, from both print

and online publications.

Background

On March 18, 2011, demonstrations broke out in the

southern Syrian city of Dar’a and in several other cities

and villages in the north of the country, including Hama

and Banyas.4 This outbreak indicated the arrival of the


23

‘Arab Spring’, which had already made its appearance in

Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen.5

Initially, the demonstrations in Syria were confined to

rural and peripheral areas.6 However, they soon spread

across the country. This can be attributed to the brutal

means employed by the Assad regime such as calling the

Army into action to repress the demonstrations.7 Within

a few weeks, the protests turned into a widespread

popular uprising against Bashar al-Assad’s government,

and ultimately, into an intense and indecisive civil war.

Owing to the involvement of some Sunni rebel groups,

the struggle in Syria took on an ethnic character, and

subsequently, a religious character as well. It became a

holy war for Islamic groups, some native to Syria and

others made up of Sunni volunteers who reached the

country from across the Arab and Muslim world. In their

view, they were fighting against the Alawites. Alawites

are a minority group accounting for a small percentage

of Syria’s population. The group is an offshoot of the

Shia sect of Islam and have ruled Syria for 40 years.

Alawites are allies of the Shiite camp in the Middle East,

comprising the Iranian state and the Hezbollah in

Lebanon.8

In April 2011, when the Syrian Army sent a column of

tanks to end the anti-government movement,9 the

situation escalated into a military conflict leading

ultimately to a civil war. The early insurgency phase

started in July 2011 and lasted until April 2012.10

This

period was characterised by the rise of armed opposition

militias and the beginning of an armed rebellion against

the Syrian regime. This period also saw the formation of

the Free Syrian Army (FSA), when some rebel officers

of the Armed Forces declared the establishment of an

organised opposition military force aimed at de-throning


24

President Bashar al-Assad. Between 2012 and December

2013, the civil war intensified11

following the failure of

UN supported cease fire attempts. On June 12, 2012, the

UN officially declared that Syria was in a state of civil

war.

In April 2013, Syrian rebel factions, including Ahrar al

Sham12

and the Al-Nusra Front13

declared war on the

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or Daesh

which was gaining dominance in the Syrian war. The

militant group was carrying out indiscriminate killings

against regime forces and rebels. Although Daesh was

initially created in Iraq following the 2003 US

invasion.14

The civil war in Syria and the emerging

power vacuum there led to the infiltration of Daesh into

the country. Daesh sought to capture Syrian territories

and establish an Islamic Caliphate there.

In May 2015, Daesh took advantage of the Syrian Civil

War to conquer further large swathes of Syrian territory.

Different rebel groups were already fighting Daesh

where the group had established its bases. The fighting

intensified with the rise of several other Islamist forces

who were fighting against Daesh as well as each other.

By June 2016, following five years of fighting, the

number of people killed in the fighting had reached

almost half a million.15

About ten million Syrians,

approximately half of the country’s population, lost their

homes, and about eight million became refugees.16

Although this exodus was the direct result of the war of

extermination conducted by both sides, it can also be

attributed to the Syrian regime’s deliberate policy of

cleansing areas suspected of supporting the rebels.

The Syrian conflict led to the de facto dissolution of the

Syrian state into several different political entities: the


25

state of ISIS (Daesh), located in eastern Syria and

northern Iraq; the remains of the original Syrian state,

led by the Assad dynasty and enjoying Russian and

Iranian patronage, located in western Syria; the

autonomous Kurdish enclaves, located in the eastern and

northern parts of Syrian territory; and the enclaves held

in significant portions of northern and southern Syria by

rebel groups, headed by Fatah al-Sham Front (formerly,

the Support Front for the People of Syria, the al-Nusra

Front, or Jabhat al-Nusra), affiliated until late July 2016

with al-Qaeda.17

Interestingly, a June 2006 article titled “Blood Borders”

was published in the US Armed Forces Journal.18

Written by a retired US army officer Ralph Peters, the

article carried a new map of the Middle East. Peters had

predicted a collapse of the existing territorial boundaries

and a division of Arab Muslim states based on sectarian

and ethnic lines. The Blood Borders map divided Syria

into several entities. It also predicted the creation of a

‘Free Kurdistan’ combining parts of Iranian and Syrian

Kurdish majority areas. Blood Borders referred to Syria

as a loser state in the new Middle East with much of its

territory divided on the basis of ethnicity. Interestingly,

the contemporary situation in Syria conforms to the

same map of the new Middle East whereby chaos and

divisions among regional states is evident. In order to

analyse the external involvement in Syria and the

interests of major powers there, it is pertinent to

highlight the geopolitical and geostrategic significance

of the country.

Geostrategic and Geopolitical Significance of Syria

Syria is located at the crossroads of the Middle East,

Central Asia and South to Southeast Asia and, for these

regions, provides a vital transit hub and outlet to the


26

Levant and Mediterranean waters.19

As discussed, from

an offensive-realist approach, great powers (the US and

Russia in this study) always seek opportunities to

acquire more power in order to feel more secure. Great

powers thus have an inherent tendency to maximise their

power. This theoretical analysis significantly describes

the post-9/11 behaviour of these powers, which conform

to the offensive-realist logic and exhibit their strategic

objective of attaining primacy in the post-Cold War

global order.20

Policy-makers have now started valuing

the political control of hydrocarbon export routes

beyond energy security. This means the political control

of such routes has implications for national security.

Therefore, the security of energy flows has now become

a matter of interest for states rather than being just a

corporate matter. As a result, the involvement of state

governments in the security of energy routes has

increased considerably.21

Therefore, to understand the

involvement of major powers in the Syrian conflict, a

discussion of the geopolitical importance of Syria is

necessary.

Examining the Syrian conflict at the macro-level,

especially in the realm of the impact of great powers on

security concepts, reveals that Syria has become the

victim of security and resource oriented international

competition.22

On the one hand, Syria remains critical to

the strategic stability of the region and, on the other, its

energy offerings bear substantial implications for the

finances and geopolitical advantage of external powers.23

In the first instance, Syria is relevant as a transit route

for arms shipments from Iran to Hezbollah in Lebanon, a

major component of the ‘Shiite axis’ or ‘Shia crescent’.24

This strategic corridor stretching from the Middle East to

the Eurasian landmass doubles as a reverse pathway to

sea, with its so-called ‘door to the sea’ located in the

section of sea that lies east of the Mediterranean i.e. the


27

Syrian coastline.25

Regarding this, Syria offers Iran

military resilience, enhancing its responsiveness to

foreign assaults and air strikes.26

Whoever wields control

over Syria would thus be able to manipulate the Shia

axis’ ground supply route. Therefore, control over Syria

would determine Iran’s military responsiveness at any

given time.27

On the economic front, Syria has proven gas reserves of

284 billion cubic metres (bcm); oil reserves of 2.5 billion

barrels (bb); shale gas reserves of 50 billion tonnes

(bt);28

and usual outputs of 385,000 barrels per day

(b/d).29

The conflict saw an increase in oil and gas

production levels and the withdrawal of (foreign)

investors from the country’s energy sector. The EU,

which accounts for most of Syrian hydrocarbon sales,30

was unavoidably affected when shortages to European

refiners raised prices in its physical oil market.

Following the US sanctions on Syrian energy exports in

2011, the EU also imposed a ban on Syrian energy

exports. However, the sanctions imposed by the EU

were not as widely drawn as the US sanctions, because

of increased involvement of some EU companies in

Syria’s oil industry. Out of 385,000 barrels of oil

produced per day, Syria exported about 150,000 barrels

per day, of which most was being exported to European

countries, particularly the Netherlands, Italy, France and

Spain.31

This underscores the importance of Syrian

hydrocarbons for the energy needs of Europe and, by

extension, the world.32

Although the economic viability

of energy resources in Syrian surroundings is still being

debated, it assumes strategic significance based on

findings that proven and potential reserves can improve

the wider supply to international markets. Hence, the

international rivalries for control of Eurasian energy

resources extend to the geographic choke points and

waterways of the Syrian locale which, according to


28

Jeffrey Mankoff, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow at

the CSIS, hold vast hydrocarbons crucial to the ever-

evolving global industrial economy.33

External Involvement

Owing to Syria’s geostrategic importance, the Syrian

Crisis is no longer an internal matter. It has become an

arena of regional and international struggle. In this

regard, Bashar al-Assad, as well as his rivals, were

influenced by the superpowers, primarily the US and

Russia, and regional powers including Saudi Arabia,

Qatar, Turkey, and Iran. This outside involvement only

exacerbated the crisis in Syria and led to the prolonged

conflict.

As the conflict unfolded, Daesh expanded its influence

and conquered more and more territory in the Middle

East. The group took advantage of the Syrian Civil War

to conquer Syrian territories in May 2015. Daesh wanted

to establish an Islamic caliphate in the region, thereby

exploiting the Islamic principles of governance in

justifying its territorial gains in Syria.34

These principles

envisage Jihad, a holy war, to bring the surrounding

political entity into compliance with Islam.35

This

concept led Daesh to fight for the creation of an Islamic

state or a caliphate in Syria and Iraq.

Similarly, the expansion of NATO also undermined the

sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria. For

example, when Russia suddenly raided territories held

by Syrian opposition groups, it triggered a response from

NATO. A Russian warplane was shot down by the

Turkish Army (Turkey is a NATO member) on the

Syrian border on November 24, 2015 because the plane

had invaded Turkish airspace several times within five

minutes, so they shot it down.36

NATO continued to


29

strengthen and enlarge its Response Force.37

Six new

command centres were built to plan military strategies

and facilitate military exercises. Peace activists warned

against NATO’s increasing involvement in the conflict.

Sharat G. Lin, President of the San Jose Peace and

Justice Centre said, “The main thing to understand is that

no matter what the conflict is in Syria – and there are

many factions – this is something that the Syrian people

will have to solve on their own,”38

In other words,

Intervention in Syria by NATO or Great Powers might

probably further destabilise Syria.

Expansion of the NATO, invasion of Daesh and the

intervention of Great Powers worsened the original civil

war in Syria. In February 2012, Russia and China vetoed

the Western-backed Arab Resolution at the UN Security

Council, which was a plan calling on President Bashar

al-Assad to resign. The US was angered by their vetoes

and blamed these countries for protecting Bashar al-

Assad. Russia and China actually acted in self-interest:

Russia intended to preserve its influence in the region

through its military ties with Syria.39

An original conflict between Syrian opposition groups

and the Syrian government changed to a civil war and

finally escalated into a global conflict. Western

intervention undermined the internal sovereignty of

Syria. Sovereignty, by definition, is the supreme power

or authority of a state to govern itself or another state.40

In other words, one will not have power over another

one. There are two types of sovereignty. Internal

sovereignty implies every state can act as it wishes and

independent of other powers within its own territory;

External sovereignty implies all states are legally equal

and no legitimate authority can tell a state what to do.

This fundamental principle of international relations can


30

be traced back to the Treaty of Westphalia following the

Thirty Year’s War.

Since great powers always seek opportunities to attain

more power in order to feel more secure,41

this

perspective exhibits the changing nature of the Middle

East where there is a rivalry between camps led by the

US and Russia, working to resolve regional crises. These

camps are also engaged in a competition over the result

of the settlement that would eventually be reached. The

powers involved are also struggling to get a share in the

emerging leadership and economic opportunities that

have arisen in the region. Consequently, geopolitical

realism and perceptions of security dilemmas shape

much of their actions and permit the crisis to define the

dynamics of global stability more negatively.

The intensification of external involvement whereby no

single armed group exists without an international

connection has seen scholars and analysts reconsider the

roles of intervening global powers which they believe

collide head-on. According to David Hartwell, Middle

East analyst at IHS Jane’s, the intervening powers have

simply made matters worse.42

Foreign powers in support

of the warring parties, the US and some Gulf states

pushing for Assad’s ouster, and Russia and Iran backing

his rule, continue to defend their unmentioned national

interests. The ongoing violence has seen Daesh overrun

vast territory whereby it has committed bloodshed

against local ethnic and religious minorities, moderate

Sunnis, and hostages from various Western countries.43

The capability of terrorist groups to inflict severe

damage to major powers and their forces, brought fears

about the country becoming a refuge for extremist

groupings and reinforced the basis for external military

support.44

Great powers’ involvement in the Syrian

conflict, both militarily and politically serves their


31

individual geostrategic and geopolitical interests in the

region.

US Interests and its Involvement in the Syrian

Civil War

The Middle East was largely overlooked in US foreign

policy until the mid-20th century when President

Roosevelt declared in 1941 that “the defence” of the

“Middle East” was integral for the defence of the US.45

This was mainly due to Saudi Arabia’s developing

relations with the US, specifically American oil

companies’ interest in exploiting the enormous oil

reserves of the Kingdom.46

Therefore, Roosevelt became

interested in the Middle East because of oil. As the

Second World War burned oil at a massive rate, the

President wanted to ensure American access to as much

as possible.

In the wake of World War II, the Soviet Union began to

look south and, in August 1957, in response to an

accusation by the Syrian government that the US had

sponsored an attempt to overthrow it, US Ambassador

Loy W. Henderson was sent to Syria. Upon his return,

Henderson wrote a report stating his concern that Syria

would fall victim to “international communism”.47

Soviet designs in the region continued to worry

Washington and it was President Nixon’s stance that

“the US would view any effort by the Soviet Union to

seek predominance in the Middle East as a matter of

grave concern”.48

The hostile relationship between

Washington and Damascus was historically caused by

the Syrian government’s support of the US’ opponents,

whether in the Arab-Israeli conflict, during the Cold War

or the more recent “war on terrorism”.


32

US-Syria relations in the aftermath of the Second World

War were shaped by the politics of the Arab-Israeli

conflict and the Cold War.49

After 9/11, the US intended

to ally with Syria in its war on terror. Syria’s long-

standing hostility toward Saddam Hussein, US-Syrian

cooperation against al-Qaeda and the Bush

Administration’s opposition to a congressional bill

placing sanctions on Syria at the end of 2002 reflected a

relatively stable US-Syria relationship.50

However, Hezbollah activities, from 2002 and 2003, on

the Israeli border created tension between Syria and the

US.51

Following his ascendance to power, Syrian

President Bashar al-Assad was rather interested in

reform related to economic liberalisation and

establishing contacts with groups accused of terrorism

such as Hezbollah and Hamas. The groups were

considered a deterrent against potential American or

Israeli attacks against either Iran or Syria.52

The US-led war against Iraq was the breaking point in

Syria-US relations. Syria did not join the US coalition

against Iraq and in fact became a vocal opponent of the

war. Damascus didn’t adjust to the new US policies

following September 11, 2001.53

After the Iraq war,

Washington accused Syria of multiple offences,

including hiding Iraq’s “weapons of mass destruction”,

the destruction of which was the US’ actual goal in the

war.54

The passage of the Syrian Accountability Act in

2003 allowed various sanctions to be imposed on Syria

by the US President.55

As a consequence, relations

between the two nations deteriorated further.

Bashar depended on the authoritarian structure of

power.56

For instance, he ordered the Syrian Army to use

a column of tanks to suppress anti-government protests

by killing protesters and even the civilians. President


33

Barack Obama said, “Assad must halt his campaign of

killing and crimes against his own people now. He must

step aside and allow a democratic transition to proceed

immediately,”57

International condemnation for the

Assad regime intensified further in August, 2013 in the

wake of a chemical weapons attack on a suburb in

Damascus.

A United Nations inspection team confirmed the use of

chemical weapons at the site.58

After announcing in

August 2012 that the use of chemical weapons by Assad

on his own people could potentially lead to military

intervention by the US,59

US President Obama agreed to

delay any military action to allow Russia to pursue its

proposed diplomatic solution.60

Russia remains Syria’s

most powerful international ally, supplying the Assad

regime with weapons and equipment to continue the

battle with the growing rebel groups,61

and defending the

regime from formal condemnation by the UNSC.62

Even

though the US had stated its reluctance to give weapons

to the rebels because of the groups’ extremist tendencies,

on June 14, 2013, Washington finally announced “it

would give the rebels “direct military aid” after

concluding Syrian troops had used chemical weapons”.63

This change in policy toward Syria followed reports

which stated that in 2012, US organisations were

suspected of operating in other Middle Eastern countries

to help oversee US military support of the rebel

groups.64

The US’ position against extremist groups was

widely known, but its arming of such groups raised

many questions. While Syria itself is not a threat to the

US, wider international implications of the Syrian civil

war make it resemble the Cold War period, with the US

and Russia arming their chosen sides as proxy

combatants in order to achieve their goals and secure

their interests.


34

Hence, the US offered military training and provided a

large number of military resources to some of the

opposition factions in order to recognise the legitimacy

of the opposite camp, even as Russia provided military

and financial support to the Syrian Army. For the US

and its Western allies, there are three major long-term

goals and interests in Syria which they want to secure

through their support to opposition factions in the Syrian

conflict.65

These interests include isolating Iran and

bolstering the strategic and economic alliance with Arab

allies like Qatar, which invests in Europe and offers an

alternative to Russian gas.

Isolating Iran

One of the pillars of the US foreign policy is to isolate

Iran. This can be attributed to a number of reasons

including Iran’s nuclear programme as well as its

interference in regional affairs. The fall of a strategic

ally of Iran such as Bashar al-Assad would be a blow to

Iran in its showdown against the US and Israel. Indeed,

the strategic alliance with Damascus allows Iran to

maintain its Shia “axis of resistance” (Iraq-Syria-

Lebanon with the Hezbollah).66

Indeed, these

partnerships allow Tehran to counter the isolation

imposed by the US sanctions. They also allow Tehran to

maintain proxies that serve as a leverage utilised for

negotiations on the nuclear issue with world powers.67

These proxies also help Iran to counter the threats of

Israeli attacks. With this in mind, replacement of Bashar

al-Assad by a regime that would agree to isolate Iran

would favour the interests of the US, and also the rival

Arab countries in the Persian Gulf (mainly Saudi Arabia,

Qatar and the UAE), as well as Israel.68


35

Maintaining the Strategic and Economic Alliance

with the Persian Gulf Allies and the Geopolitics of

Gas

According to retired NATO Secretary General Wesley

Clark, a memo from the Office of the US Secretary of

Defence just a few weeks after 9/11 revealed plans to

“attack and destroy the governments in 7 countries in

five years”, starting with Iraq and moving on to “Syria,

Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and Iran.”69

In a

subsequent interview, Clark argues that this strategy is

fundamentally about control of the region’s vast oil and

gas resources.70

Much of the US strategy in Syria was described in a

2008 US Army-funded RAND report, titled, “Unfolding

the Future of the Long War”. The report noted that “the

economies of the industrialised states will continue to

rely heavily on oil, thus making it a strategically

important resource.” As most oil will be produced in the

Middle East, the US has “motive for maintaining

stability in and good relations with Middle Eastern

states”:71

“The geographic area of proven oil reserves

coincides with the power base of much of the Salafi-

jihadist network. This creates a linkage between oil

supplies and the long war that is not easily broken or

simply characterised... For the foreseeable future,

world oil production growth and total output will be

dominated by Persian Gulf resources... The region

will therefore remain a strategic priority, and this

priority will interact strongly with that of prosecuting

the long war.”

In this context, the report identified several potential

trajectories for regional policy focused on protecting

access to Gulf oil supplies. Exploring different scenarios


36

for this trajectory, the report speculated that the US may

concentrate “on shoring up the traditional Sunni regimes

in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan as a way of

containing Iranian power and influence in the Middle

East and Persian Gulf.” Noting that this could actually

empower al-Qaeda jihadists, the report concluded that

doing so could further Western interests by bogging

down jihadi activity with internal sectarian rivalry rather

than targeting the US.

The US also wants to maintain the security of its

European allies. Therefore, it also wants to maintain

alliances with some of the Persian Gulf states who are

important for maintaining energy flows to Europe.

Europe has significant gas energy needs and much of it

comes from Russia. Qatar shares the largest gas field in

the world with Iran, the South Pars or North Dome.72

Tensions exist between the two countries because Iran is

unable to extract its gas as quickly as Qatar, mainly

because of the sanctions imposed on Iran. Tehran

disapproves of the Qatari extraction which according to

it is “emptying” the common gas field. Iran, Iraq and

Syria had also signed an agreement for the construction

of a pipeline supposed to transport gas from the Persian

Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea in order to supply Europe.

However, Qatar transports its gas through the Strait of

Hormuz and it remains dependent on Iran for its exports

(with LNG tankers which then need to pass through the

Suez Canal). The Emirate had plans to build a gas

pipeline through Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria. But,

Bashar al-Assad blocked this project, preferring to sign

an agreement with Iran instead. One of the reasons was

to preserve its long-term energy deals with Russia.73

As

a result, Europe, which is largely dependent on Russia’s

Gazprom for its energy needs, has an interest in seeking

a competitor to lower its increasing expenditure on gas.74


37

It is understandable that a Sunni power could protect a

Qatar-Saudi Arabia-Jordan-Syria pipeline to diversify its

sources.

Consequently, the centrepiece is Syria and geostrategic

realities explain why Syria has become the victim of this

proxy war. The different geostrategic interests in Syria

explain the positions of the permanent members of the

UN Security Council, and the existing deadlock. It also

explains the difference in the actions and narratives from

world powers competing and advancing their own

national interest in the Syrian theatre.

Short-term Objectives

Apart from the stated long-term objectives, the US also

aims to achieve some immediate goals in the Syrian

theatre. In the short term, the primary US goal is to

defeat Daesh. It was the emergence of Daesh threat

which prompted the US to intervene directly in Syria

and defeating Daesh appears to be its top priority. Even

after the Syrian regime announced the defeat of Daesh in

2017, the terrorist group carried out significant terror

operations in the country which suggests that the group

is still active and has the ability to retake parts of the

Syrian territory. The US would also want to defeat or at

least weaken other Islamic extremist elements among the

anti-Assad rebels. The United States’ second main

interest is to end the civil war. Doing so is the only way

to stop the killing, end the flow of refugees to Europe,

and restore order. Peace in Syria would help end

extremism and pose a lesser threat to the outside world.

The third US interest is to oust President Bashar al-

Assad. The US and its European allies blame him for

turning an episode of domestic protest into a bloody civil

war. They do not believe that any peace process can

succeed in Syria with Assad in power. However, in


38

recent statements, they have softened this position to

reflect a willingness for Assad to play a “transitional”

role. The reality on ground may compel them to accept a

longer-term role for Assad if there seems to be no

prospect of displacing him. Finally, the US would want

to dominate the peace process in Syria so that the post-

war situation remains under its control and it could

reassert its diplomatic strength and status in the

international system. Notwithstanding the US’ goals,

Russia remains actively involved in order to secure its

competing goals and interests in Syria.

Russian Interests and Involvement in the Conflict

Russia has historical interests in the Middle East,

particularly in Syria. Russia’s association with the ruling

Assad family can be traced back to 1970. Syria was a

Soviet client in the days of the Soviet Union; it is the

only Soviet client in the area that Russia has managed to

maintain. In 1971, a Russia-Syria agreement under

Hafez al-Assad’s regime permitted the Soviet Union to

build a naval military base in Tartus, allowing the Soviet

Union to maintain its presence in the Middle East.75

Currently, Bashar al-Assad is Russia’s only ally in the

Mediterranean. Russia now has ports at Tartus and

Latakia and also a small airbase at Latakia. Russia needs

to keep Assad in power and hang on to those bases,

which complement their naval base in Crimea in

projecting power into the Mediterranean. Before Russia

intervened, Assad’s troops were being defeated in the

war, and fewer men were available for Syrian Armed

Forces. The Assad regime was becoming weak and

unstable.

The Western regime and its involvement threatened

Russia with the oldest and most important alliance in the

Middle East. It was the increasing suspicions of Western


39

intentions that Russia supported Bashar al-Assad’s

regime. Alexander Golts, a Russian military editor said,

“Russian leaders view Syria as our major ally in the

Middle East, with whom we have good political, military,

and economic ties. Foreign policy experiments, which

include cooperating greatly with the West, would not

probably occur under President Vladimir Putin’s

regime.”76

Due to the weapons contracts between Russia and Syria,

Russia has been resisting international pressure to

impose sanctions against the Assad regime.77

In 2015,

Russia suggested that Syrian opposition groups, pushed

for the democratic revolution with the help of the US

and its Western allies, led to the Syrian Civil War.

Russia set up T-90 tanks, howitzers, armoured personnel

carriers, marines and the prefab housing for personnel in

the airbase located in Latakia.78

Former US President

Barack Obama said those military build-ups would

threaten both world peace and stability. He then blamed

Russia for its presence and military establishment in

Syria.

Russia continued to support the Syrian regime due to its

national interests. In the contemporary scenario, Syria

remains a battlefield between the US and Russia. The

military actions of both the US and Russia continue to

fuel the Syrian Civil War. They have widened the gap

between Syrian opposition groups and the Syrian

government, causing a perpetual Syrian crisis.

Russia is an energy-exporting country that considers the

Middle East vital for dominating world markets.

Russia’s monopoly via its ex-Soviet supply

infrastructure from the East, next to its immense gas

reserves, is the backbone of its supremacy in gas

supplies to Europe.79

For instance, in the event of


40

heightened tensions in Russo-Western relations, the

option of switching off the energy supplies to Europe is

tantamount to vast political power for Russia. Russia’s

management of energy flow to Europe holds massive

political leverage for the country. For example, when the

US-proposed Nabucco80

pipeline struggled, Russia

profited immensely in gas purchases from Turkmenistan

at US$100 per 1000 cubic metres, and sales to Europe at

a minimum value of US$250,77 to include its 2009

energy agreements with Ukraine that drove the price of

gas to US$350 and above.81

It should be noted that the operation of Russian strategy

is subject to the ongoing debate, because it nests within

several broader sets of policy concerns on engaging US

influence region-wide as well as economic integration

with states of the post-Soviet era, including domestic

reconstruction and modernisation. However, since 2012,

Moscow has upheld the function of a strategic policy or

unified plan of action which according to it is based on

dialogue.82

In spite of Russia positioning itself as a

peacekeeper, supporting the constitutionally recognised

government’s battle with jihadists in Syria and military

support of Syria through the port at Tartus also remain

important goals for Russia.

Moreover, Russia is also employing state-owned energy

companies Lukoil and Gazprom, and pipeline network

operator Transneft, as the key instruments for

reinforcing links with the post-Soviet states. It is

creating alternative economic structures that can help

renew old ties and encourage new friendships.

Therefore, the expansion of its existing pipeline system

region-wide is very important for Russia.83

It can be

argued that Russia’s use of ‘soft power concepts’ in its

strategy of influencing public and policy discourse,

transnational financial interconnections and reconfiguring


41

geopolitical alliances, support its goals of having access

to the hydrocarbons of the region and also to regain a

dominant position in the post-Cold War order.

Russia views the US insistence on the Qatar‒Turkey

pipeline as a strategy to project Turkey as a regional

energy hub for the export of hydrocarbon resources of

the greater Middle East to Europe, and hence isolate

Russia strategically from Europe.84

Consequently, it has

continually developed its well-known energy leverage as

a counter-measure. Russia and its allies are considering

an oil route to the West, from Iran via southern Iraq and

Syria to the Mediterranean and to Europe, otherwise

known as the Islamic pipeline.85

Outflows through the

Islamic pipeline would undermine the US attempt to

push the Qatar‒Turkey pipeline as the main export

pipeline to Western markets, and defeat plans to bypass

Russia and hence weaken its dominance regionally and

globally. In July 2012, Syria’s conclusion of a wide

range of agreements on pipeline construction86

marked a

decisive victory for Russia over Middle Eastern export

channels, reinforcing its grip on energy resources in the

region as well as its monopoly in the supply of natural

gas to US-led international oil markets.

Russian aid to Assad will also increase Russia’s leverage

over him. As discussed, Syria is a potential path for

natural gas pipelines from Russia to the Mediterranean,

and Syria has signed gas exploration contracts with

Russia. On the downside, Assad was accused of

atrocities against his people, including attacks against

civilians with sarin, chlorine, and barrel bombs. His

refusal to negotiate with protesters, firing on them

instead, was the beginning of the civil war. Even with all

this mounting anti-Assad narrative, it is in Russia’s

interest to keep Assad in power and stabilise the country.


42

Although Russia and Iran are in the same camp in the

Syrian crisis, Russia may also be keeping a check on

Iran. Russia seems to have planned its Syria operation

with Iran, but according to reports, differences have

emerged between Russia and Iran over the preferred

outcome in Syria.87

Russia’s interest is to prevail over

Iran in influencing Syria therefore it may want to keep a

check on Iran’s role in Syria. Putin is trying to stabilise

the Middle East. This is one of Putin’s stated goals of the

Syrian intervention.88

Western intervention destabilised

Iraq and Libya, with no resolution in sight. Although

Syria’s civil war originated within the country, Putin

seems to believe that all such instability can be attributed

to Western intervention.89

Therefore, supporting Assad’s

existing government would serve to stabilise Syria and

perhaps the surrounding area.

Instability in the area is particularly dangerous for

Russia, as its population includes over 10% Muslims,

many of them in the volatile Caucasus region, not far

from Syria. Some Russians have even joined anti-Assad

forces in Syria, and they could cause disruption upon

their return to Russia.90

The downside is that Russia is

entering the conflict on the side of Shia Iran and Alawite

Assad, thereby alienating Sunni powers in the area.91

It

should be noted that forty Syrian insurgent groups have

vowed enmity against Russia due to its bombing

campaigns against them.92

Within Russia, most Muslims

are Sunni and not happy about the side Russia has taken.

So Russian intervention may further inflame the very

instability it wants to curtail.

Another Russian aim in Syria is to have a place at the

peace negotiations. That probably would not have been

the case without Russian military intervention. Russia

wants to challenge Western domination and claim a

more powerful position in the world. Putin’s tactics


43

seem to be focused on gaining more attention for

Russia’s military capabilities, like the cruise missiles

launched at Syria from the Caspian Sea,93

and on

attaining a Yalta-like conference with Western leaders to

define great-power spheres of interest. Russia remained

successful in convening Sochi peace talks which are

parallel to the UN-led Western peace initiatives.

Conclusion

In Syria, major powers are influencing the warring

parties towards a shared goal of achieving stability in the

region, and also to ensure a role in defining the future of

Syria. At the same time, the major powers continue their

involvement in the country in order to secure their own

crucial interests. The redefined competition between the

US and Russia and their rival strategies in Syria reflect

the offensive-realist arguments. Syria presents the main

connection between the contending pipeline projects and

export routes of great powers. The major powers are

vying to regulate oil and gas production from the region

and eventually dominate its global transportation and

trade.

As the warring parties in Syria continue to receive

increasing support from external actors, the conflict has

acquired the character of a proxy war in which

international, regional and subnational conflicts are

being fought out. Great powers in Syria treat the conflict

as a zero-sum game, where success for one is

automatically a defeat for the other. The conflict in Syria

provides Russia with the golden opportunity to

consolidate its strategic footing in the Middle East. The

political vacuum that had been created has allowed

Russia to initiate a game changing move through direct

military intervention in Syria and deepen its involvement

in the region. Through its reinforcement of the Syrian


44

regime, Russian has attained the status of a dominant

player in shaping the future of the Middle East. Russia’s

new role has forced the US to accept Russia’s new

dominant role in Syria in particular and in the Middle

East as a whole. This has also made Russian President

Vladimir Putin important for any political solution in the

region.

Though there are strategic differences between Russia

and the US regarding the Syrian conflict, the rise of

extremist organisations, especially the emergence of

Daesh is a matter of great concern for both global

powers. The rise of Daesh has caused deep tension in the

region and around the world by its killing of minorities,

institutionalising sex slavery, defeating state armies and

executing opponents through extreme acts of violence.

The group has also waged terror attacks in other Middle

Eastern countries and in Europe. Thousands of young

men and women from Europe joined the group. The

Cold War-like situation in Syria might be a zero-sum

game for some but, common security threats are

emerging from this conflict which need to be addressed

collectively by all the stakeholders.

References

1. World Report 2018 on Syria, Human Rights Watch,

https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-

chapters/syria. 2. “The Cold War Never Ended...Syria is a Russian-

American conflict says Bashar al-Assad,” The Telegraph,

October 14, 2016,

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/10/14/the-cold-

war-never-endedsyria-is-a-russian-american-conflict-say/. 3. YPG are considered by the US a major force in its fight

against Daesh in Syria. 4. Michael Slackman, “Syrian Troops Open Fire on

Protesters in Several Cities,” The New York Times, March


45

25, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/26/world/

middleeast/26syria.html. 5. Steven Heydemann, “Explaining the Arab Uprisings:

transformations in Comparative Perspective,”

Mediterranean Politics 21, no. 1 (October 7, 2015),

https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2015.1081450. 6. Joe Sterling, “Daraa: The Spark that Lit the Syrian

Flame,” CNN, March 1, 2012, https://edition.cnn.com/

2012/03/01/world/meast/syria-crisis-

beginnings/index.html. 7. Katherine Marsh, “Syria's Crackdown on Protesters

Becomes Dramatically More Brutal,” The Guardian,

April 25, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/world/

2011/apr/25/syria-crackdown-protesters-brutal. 8. Sam Dagher, “Syria’s Alawites: The People Behind

Assad,” The Wall Street Journal, June 25, 2015,

https://www.wsj.com/articles/syrias-alawites-the-people-

behind-assad-1435166941. 9. Adrian Blomfield, “Syria: Army Uses Tanks Against the

People in Day of Bloodshed,” The Telegraph, April 25,

2011, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/

middleeast/syria/8472570/Syria-army-uses-tanks-against-

the-people-in-day-of-bloodshed.html. 10.

Vince Tumminello, “Red Team: Regime

Counterinsurgency in Syria,” Small Wars Journal,

December 2015, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/red-

team-regime-counterinsurgency-in-syria. 11.

Ibid. 12.

Ahrar al-Sham also known as Harkat Ahrar al-Sham al-

Islamiya is a Sunni Salafist militant group operating in

Syria aiming at replacing the Assad regime with an

Islamic government. 13.

Al-Nusra or Jabhat al-Nusra, also known as jabhat fatah

al-Sham after July 2016 and also known as al-Qaeda in

Syria is a Salafist militant organisation fighting against

Syrian Forces and aiming at establishing an Islamic State

in Syria. 14.

Juan Cole, “How the United States Helped Create the

Islamic State,” The Washington Post, November 23,

2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/


46

wp/2015/11/23/how-the-united-states-helped-create-the-

islamic-state/?utm_term=.f4b67677901f. 15.

World Report 2017 on Syria, Human Rights Watch,

https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-

chapters/syria. 16.

Ibid. 17.

Eyal Zisser, “Syria – From the Six-day War to the Syrian

Civil War,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 44,

no. 4 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2017.

1360011. 18.

Ralph Peters, “Blood Borders: How a Better Middle East

Would Look,” Armed Forces Journal (June 1, 2006),

http://armedforcesjournal.com/blood-borders/. 19.

Jeffery Mankoff, “Eastern Mediterranean Energy,” Centre

for Strategic and International Studies CSIS,

Washington, DC, July 25, 2013,

http://csis.org/files/attachments/130726_medenergy_

mankoff.pdf. 20.

Vincent Ibonye, “Strategic Wisdom in the New Greater

Middle Eastern Game? A De-escalatory Rethinking of the

Syrian Conflict,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern

Studies (2017), http://10.1080/19448953.2018.1385268. 21.

Robin Mills, “Risky Routes: Energy Transits in the

Middle East,” Analysis Paper, no.17, Brookings Doha

Center (April 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/research/

risky-routes-energy-transit-in-the-middle-east/. 22.

Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: The National

Security Problem in International Relations (London:

Wheatsheaf Books, 1983), 106, http://press.ecprnet.eu/

documents/content/9780955248818.pdf. 23.

Ibonye, “Strategic Wisdom.” 24.

Mills, “Risky Routes.” 25.


Roxane Farmanfarmaian, “Redrawing the Middle East

map: Iran, Syria and the New Cold War,” Al Jazeera,

November 2012, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/

opinion/2012/11/2012111311424048459.html. 27.

Jubin M. Goodarzi, Syria and Iran: Diplomatic and

Power Politics in the Middle East (New York: I. B.

Taurus, 2009), https://archive.org/stream/


47

JubinGoodarziSyriaAndIranDiplomaticAllianceAndPowe

rPoliticsInTheMiddleEastLibrar/Jubin+Goodarzi+Syria+a

nd+Iran+Diplomatic+Alliance+and+Power+Politics+in+t

he+Middle+East+Library+of+Modern+Middle+East+Stu

dies_djvu.txt. 28.

BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2013, British

Petroleum, June 2013, http://www.bp.com/content/dam/

bp/pdf/statistical-review/statistical_review_of_world_

energy_2013. 29.

Syria, U.S. Energy Information Administration, February

18, 2014, http://www.eia.gov/countries/

analysisbriefs/Syria/syria.pdf. 30.

Mikael Eriksson and Francesco Giumelli, “Why the EU’s

Sanctions Against Assad’s Syria Will Backfire,” Foreign

Affairs, December 1, 2011, www.foreignaffairs.com/

articles/136705/mikaeleriksson-and-francesco-

giumelli/why-the-eus-sanctions-against-assads-syria-will-

backfire. 31.

Syria Sanctions: EU Follows US Ban on Oil Imports, and

Expands List of Designated Persons, HFW, September

2011, http://www.hfw.com/Syria-Sanctions-EU-Follows-

US-Ban 32.

Simon Mee, Giulia Segreti, and Anna Fifield, “Italy seeks

to Delay EU Oil Embargo on Syria,” Financial Times,

August 30, 2011,

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4248317c-d326-11e0-

9ba8-00144feab49a.html. 33.

Mankoff, Eastern Mediterranean Energy. 34.

According to Islamic principles, there is no distinction

between religion and politics. In theological terms, Islam

does not draw a line between worldly power and divine

authority, representing itself as a faith system as well as

the moral guidelines of which apply to all aspects.

However, certain Islamic conservatives argue that

sovereignty belongs to the God only, so the sovereign

claims of governments are illegitimate. According to the

Islamic view, the world is separated into two domains:

The domain of Islam (dar al-Islam) which implies those

lands under Muslim rulers’ control; the domain of war

(dar al-harb) includes territories without Muslim rule and


48

with which they are potentially in conflict. See Louise

Fawcett, Islam and International Relations in the Middle

East in International Relations of the Middle East 3rd ed.

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 168-171. 35.

Ibid. 36.

“Turkey’s Downing of Russian Warplane - What We

Know,” BBC, December1, 2015,

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34912581. 37.

Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya, “The US‒NATO March to

War and The 21st Century Great Game,” Global

Research (December 5, 2010),

http://www.globalresearch.ca/

index.php?context=va&aid=22170. 38.

Elaine Pasquini, “Activists Call for No Intervention in

Syria By U.S., NATO Or Israel,” Washington Report on

Middle East Affairs 32(7) (2013), 42,

https://www.wrmea.org/013-september/northern-

california-chronicle-activists-call-for-no-intervention-in-

syria-by-u.s.-nato-or-israel.html. 39.

“Syria Veto: No Heroes, No Villains,” The Straits Times,

February 8, 2012, http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/

newspapers/digitised/issue/straitstimes20120208-1#. 40.

Fawcett, Islam and International Relations. 41.


Cited in “Syria Becoming Wider Global, Regional Proxy

War,” Reuters, June 13, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/

article/2012/06/13/us-syria-global-proxy-

idUSBRE85C13720120613. 43.

Regional Situation Report For Syria Crisis, UNFPA, 45,

May 2016. 44.

Bruce Crumley, “On Tracking Syria’s Western Jihadis,”

News Deeply Syria Deeply, April 17, 2014,

http://www.syriadeeply.org/articles/2014/04/5168/trackin

g-syrias-western-jihadis. 45.

Ismael, 1974. 46.

Bruce Riedel, Muhammad bin Salman’s U.S. Visit Marks

75 years of U.S.-Saudi Ties, Brookings,

https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/

03/12/muhammed-bin-salmans-u-s-visit-marks-75-years-

of-u-s-saudi-ties/


49

47.

Carol Sorby, “The Struggle for Syria (The Road Towards

the United Arab Republic),” Asian and African Studies 9,

no. 2 (2000), 213-234, https://www.sav.sk/journals/

uploads/ 080610437_Sorby.pdf. 48.

Ibid, 116. 49.

Reyna Harrison, The US in Syria: A Realistic View of

International Relations, Diablo Valley College,

kropfpolisci.com/ir.sample.paper.harrison.pdf. 50.

Robert G. Rabil, Syria, the United States, and the War on

Terror in the Middle East (London: Praeger Security

International Westport, Connecticut, 2006). 51.

Armenak Tokmajyan, “Hezbollah’s Military Intervention

in Syria: Political choice or religious obligation?,”

Approaching Religion 4, no. 2 (December 2014),

https://journal.fi/ar/article/view/67554/27850. 52.

Itamar Rabinovich, “Israel’s View of the Syrian Crisis,”

Analysis Paper no. 28, The Saban Center for Middle East

Policy at Brookings, November 2012. 53.

Mark Gasiorowski ed., The Government and Politics of

the Middle East and North Africa (Boulder, Colo:

Westview Press, 2011), https://doi.org/10.1002/

pad.4230030123. 54.

Ibid, 292. 55.

Fact Sheet: Implementing the Syria Accountability and

Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003 (Fact

sheet), May 11, 2008, http://georgewbush-

whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/05/2004051

1-7.html 56.

Hillary Mann Leverett, U.S. Policies Toward Israel and

Iran: What are the Linkages?, Middle East Policy

Council, July 2010, https://www.mepc.org/us-policies-

toward-israel-and-iran-what-are-linkages-1. 57.

“Obama To Syrian Civilians: U.S. Stands with You,”

Huffington Post, April 5, 2012,

https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/04/obama-to-

syrian-citizens_n_1254348.html. 58.

David Usborne, “Syria Gas Attacks: the Clear and

Concise Evidence from UN Chemical Weapons

Inspectors,” The Independent, September 16, 2013,

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-


50

east/syria-gas-attacks-the-clear-and-concise-evidence-

from-un-chemical-weapons-inspectors-8820454.html. 59.

James S. Brady, Remarks by the President to the White

House Press Corps, The White House Office of the Press

Secretary, August 20, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/

the-press-office/2012/08/20/remarks-president-white-

house-press-corps. 60.

Mark Landler and Jonathan Weisman, “Obama Delays

Syria Strike to Focus on a Russian Plan,” The New York

Times, September 10, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/

2013/09/11/world/middleeast/syrian-

chemicalarsenal.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 61.

“Who Is Supplying Weapons To The Warring Sides In

Syria?,” BBC, June 14, 2013,

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-22906965. 62.

“Russia Will Give UN ‘Proof’ of Syria Rebel Chemical

Use,” BBC, September 18, 2013,

https://www.bbc.com/news/ world-middle-east-24140475. 63.

“US Says It Will Give Military Aid to Syria Rebels,”

BBC, June 14, 2013, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-

us-canada-22899289 64.

“Who Is Supplying Weapons.” 65.

Milad Jokar, “War in Syria: Geopolitics of the Conflict,”

Huffington Post, December 6, 2017,

https://www.huffingtonpost.com/milad-jokar/war-in-

syria-geopolitics-_b_2378683.html 66.

Jane Kinninmont, “The Syria Conflict and the Geopolitics

of the Region,” European Institute of the Mediterranean,

2014, http://www.iemed.org/publicacions/historic-de-

publicacions/anuari-de-la-mediterrania/sumaris/

avancaments-anuari-2013/The%20Syria%20Conflict_

Med2014.pdf. 67.

Jokar, War in Syria. 68.

Ibid. 69.

Nafeez Ahmed, “Syria Intervention Plan Fuelled By Oil

Interests, Not Chemical Weapon Concern,” The

Guardian, August 30, 2013,

https://www.theguardian.com/ environment/earth-

insight/2013/aug/30/syria-chemical-attack-war-

intervention-oil-gas-energy-pipelines.


51

70.

Ibid. 71.

Christopher G. Pernin et al., Unfolding the Future of the

Long War (Arroyo Center: Rand Corporation, 2008),

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs

/2008/RAND_MG738.pdf. 72.

South Pars is the Iranian name and North Dome is the

Qatari name of the gas field. 73.

Jokar, War in Syria. 74.

Ibid. 75.

Tung Yui Li, “The Role of Power Plays in the Syrian

Crisis,” Hong Kong Baptist University, 2016, http://

repository.hkbu.edu.hk/lib_ugaward/10/. 76.

Fred Weir, “Why Russia Is Willing To Sell Arms To

Syria,” The Christian Science Monitor, January 12, 2012,

http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2012/0119/Wh

y-Russia-is-willing-to-sell-arms-to-Syria 77.

Yossef Bodansky, “Russia, Syria, and the West: Finally,

at the Crossroads?,” Defence & Foreign Affairs Strategic

Policy 43, no. 9 (2015). 78.

Ibid. 79.

Nikolay Kozhanov, “Russian Policy Across the Middle

East: Motivations and Methods,” Chatham House,

February 2018, www.chathamhouse.org/sites/.../2018-02-

21-russian-policy-middle-east-kozhanov.pdf. 80.

The Nabucco pipeline is a US-proposed gas pipeline for

construction across Europe via Bulgaria, Romania and

Hungary to carry gas from Turkey across Europe to

Austria. 81.

Pavel Polityuk and Richard Balmforth, “Ukraine Signs

$10 billion Shale Gas Deal with Chevron,” Reuters,

November 5, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/

11/05/us-ukraine-chevronidUSBRE9A40ML20131105. 82.

“The President’s Address to the Federal Assembly,”

Kremlin.ru, December 12, 2013, http://www.kremlin.ru/

transcripts/19825. 83.

Philip Stephens, “How Donald Trump has Played

Vladimir Putin’s Game,” Financial Times, July 6, 2017,

https://www.ft.com/content/a27e426a-6179-11e7-8814-

0ac7eb84e5f1.


52

84.

Emre Iseri, “The US Grand Strategy and the Eurasian

Heartland in the Twenty-First Century,” Geopolitics 14,

no.1 (2009), 26-46, https://doi.org/10.1080/

14650040802578658. 85.

Ibid. 86.

Ibid. 87.

Syria and Beyond: Managing Russian Ambitions in the

Middle East, Policy Workshop Report, Woodrow Wilson

School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton

University, January 2018, http://wws.princeton.edu/

sites/default/files/content/USandRussiaPWFinalReport_0

3.07.2018.pdf. 88.

Ron ben Yishai, “In Syria, Iran Is Getting In Putin’s Way

Too,” Ynet News, May 31, 2018,

https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-

5273601,00.html. 89.

Judey Dempsey, “Should the West Work with Russia on

Syria?,” Carnegie Europe, September 16, 2015,

http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=61294. 90.

Cheryl Rofer, “Russian And American Interests in Syria,”

Nuclear Diner, October 15, 2013,

https://nucleardiner.wordpress.com/2015/10/13/russian-

and-american-interests-in-syria/. 91.

Paul Goble, “Some of Russia’s Sunni Muslim Majority

Angered by Putin’s Support of Shiite Syria and Iran,”

Window on Eurasia, October 7, 2015,

http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/10/some-of-

russias-sunni-muslim-majority.html. 92.

Bassem Mroue and Sarah El Deeb, “Syrian Insurgent

Groups Vow to Attack Russian Forces,” Al Arabiya,

October 6, 2015, https://english.alarabiya.net/en/

News/middle-east/2015/10/06/Syrian-insurgent-groups-

vow-to-attack-Russian-forces.html?utm_source=

Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=New%20

Campaign&utm_term=%2ASituation%20Report. 93.

“Russian Missiles Strike Syria from Caspian Sea,” BBC,

October 7, 2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-

middle-east-34462539/russian-missiles-strike-syria-from-

caspian-sea.

53

Changing Nature of the Communist Party

of China

Muhammad Abdul Qadeer

Introduction

In order to understand the People’s Republic of China’s

(PRC) exponential growth and its steady rise during the

last century, it is necessary to study the Communist

Party of China (CPC) which has maintained a firm

political monopoly in the country. Although advocates

of multi-party-political system have argued that only

Western-style democracy can ensure progress, the CPC

has proven otherwise. Not only has it remained

successful in carrying out a range of internal reforms, it

has also carried out reforms relating to other sectors of

the state, society, and economy in China.

The CPC has also been successful in managing the

country’s huge population because it has led the Chinese

economy to long-term rapid development through trade

liberalisation and export development. China has also

seen a rapid improvement in people’s living standards.

Between 2012 and 2017, the CPC lifted a total of 68.53

million people out of poverty and the country’s national

poverty rate dropped from 10.2 % to 3.1 %.1 This is

regarded as one of the CPC’s major accomplishments. In

the realm of defence, achieving the modernisation of

national defence and the armed forces is another

important objective of the CPC. The Party has increased

the military’s fighting ability through rapid

modernisation of its army, navy, air force and strategic

support force.2 In October 2017, China’s paramount

leader, Xi Jinping announced that the CPC would build

“world-class military” by the 2050.3


54

Meanwhile, the most prominent objective of the CPC is

its strong emphasis on the advent of a “new era” for

China in which CPC will lead the country to a new

round of economic reforms and to realise socialist

modernisation by 2035.4 In this regard, the CPC has

played a crucial role in pushing ambitious economic

policies such as the “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR)

initiative. In the foreign policy domain, China has

displaced US-led order in Asia by strengthening its

defence and economic partnerships with long time

American allies like Pakistan, the Philippines and

Indonesia.5

This study will focus on the CPC as an institution rather

than on the political system in China. It will examine the

CPC’s strengths, weaknesses and flexibility in adjusting

to new conditions. It will also explore the CPC’s

evolution and development and examine how the CPC

has survived when so many other communist parties

failed to remain afloat.

Background

China remained in a constant state of turmoil between

1839 and 1945. It was the most turbulent era in China’s

history as it suffered a series of military defeats at the

hand of foreign powers and faced almost 100 years of

wars, including the Opium War6 and the War of

Resistance against Japanese Aggression.7 In China, this

period is dubbed the “Century of National

Humiliation.”8

The military defeats weakened the Qing dynasty which

had ruled China since 1644. In 1911, a group of

revolutionaries in southern China led a successful revolt

against the Qing dynasty during the Xinhai Revolution.

The revolt led to the overthrow of the Qing dynasty in

Changing Nature of the Communist Party of the China

55

1912 ending centuries of imperial rule in the country.

The end of imperial rule led to the establishment of the

Kuomintang (KMT) nationalist government in China

headed by a Chinese revolutionary, Sun Yat-sen. Many

saw the establishment of the KMT as the beginning of a

new age of nationalism in China. The KMT governed all

or parts of mainland China from 1928 to 1949.9

However, the new government failed to unify the

country under its control. The Qing withdrawal had

created a power vacuum in certain regions, resulting in

the rise of warlords. These warlords controlled their

territories in China and claimed independence from the

KMT government. This resulted in what is known as the

‘May Fourth Movement’ in which thousands of students

rallied in Beijing against the KMT government in

1919.10

It was during this time, when Marxism started to

spread throughout the country. Furthermore, the 1917

Russian October Socialist revolution which transformed

Russia from an imperial monarchy into a Communist

state also attracted the attention of Chinese masses.11

By

1921, communism had found its way into China and the

CPC was formally established with the help of Russia’s

Communist International (Comintern).12

The CPC and KMT remained primary rivals to each

other most of the time due to their differing narratives.

The KMT focused on nationalism and relied on

intellectuals who were more worried about national

humiliation. It staunchly advocated for cancellation of

all “unequal treaties” signed between the Qing Dynasty

and Western powers. The “unequal treaty” was most

commonly referred to as the Treaty of Nanking which

was concluded between Britain and China after the end

of First Opium War in 1842. Under the treaty, China was

forced to open a series of “treaty ports” along the

Chinese coast to Britain.13

Over the next few years China


56

concluded a series of similar treaties with other powers

including the United States, Japan and France granting

certain rights to foreign-owned businesses while

compromising China’s sovereignty.14

Meanwhile, the

CPC focused on class struggle rather than national

consciousness.15

However, in 1926 the two parties supported each other

for a short period to fight against warlords.16

Also

between 1937 and 1945, both fought together against the

Japanese invasion. The Japanese forces surrendered and

were forced to retreat from China after World War II

ended in 1945. Following Japanese surrender, a power

struggle began between the KMT government led by

Chiang Kai-shek and the CPC led by Mao Zedong, a

Chinese communist revolutionary, triggering a Civil

War in the country.17

By October, 1949, the Communist

Party of China was successful in gaining control in

mainland China after Mao Zedong’s Communist Party

defeated the Kuomintang government. Chiang Kai-shek

fled to the island of Taiwan where he established a

government in exile, whereas, the CPC rose to power in

mainland China .18

Organisation of the Communist Party of China

(CPC)

Initially, the CPC began as an underground, Marxist-

Leninist party that operated on the principle of the

communist doctrine of “democratic centralism”. In

democratic centralism, the party is the only permitted

political player and its decisions are binding on party

members.19

According to basic principles of democratic

centralism in China, individual party members are

subordinate to the party organisations. Although, the

CPC allows for debate and discussion on policy matters


57

among party members, however, it requires absolute

support of policy once a decision is made.

In China’s democratic centralism there is a political

hierarchy whereby senior party officials expect

disciplined compliance from junior officials.20

Promotion within the party requires experience and

effectiveness in performing one’s job. However, the

CPC’s meritocracy often suffers when dealing with

those dubbed as “princelings”, meaning a relative of one

of the early senior CPC officials. Some CPC leaders use

their influence to secure positions of authority for their

family members, regardless of their abilities or

experience. The “princelings” remain a significant

political force in China. Xi Jinping is one example of a

“princeling” in China whose father, Xi Zhongxun served

as a Secretary General and Vice Premier of the State

Council during the 1950s.21

The Communist Party of China is headed by the party’s

Political Bureau (Politburo) and its Standing Committee.

The Politburo is headed by the party’s General

Secretary. However, of more significance than the

Politburo is its Standing Committee which is the most

powerful policy making body in China.22

Meanwhile, the National People’s Congress (NPC)

usually acts as a “rubberstamp” for decisions already

made earlier by Communist Party. It is China’s

unicameral legislative body.23

Despite the stature

accorded to the NPC in China’s constitution, the NPC

has very little political power. The Secretariat is another

political institution for the CPC which is described in

China’s constitution as an administrative body. Its role is

to supervise party matters and implement decisions

made by the Politburo and its Standing Committee.


58

The other key institution in China is the CPC-controlled

Central Military Commission (CMC) that exercises

command and control over the People’s Liberation

Army (PLA). PLA is in charge of military and defence

affairs, including the formulation of China’s military

strategy.

Evolution of the Communist Party of China

China was governed until 1954 without a constitution

and the CPC leadership comprised the same soldiers

who had freed various parts of the country. During those

years, the CPC mobilised all political and economic

forces that were not opposed to the revolution.

However, over the years, the CPC pursued a variety of

political reforms to strengthen a state governance system

as well as the administrative systems of the country.

Moreover, the CPC has undergone significant shifts in

its economic policies since 1949. The economic reform

policies were initially more gradual. For instance, after

Mao Zedong gained power in China, he began a host of

economic policies and reforms to rebuild the country.

Among the most important were his land reforms. Under

Mao, China seized land from wealthy owners and

redistributed them to landless peasants. He transformed

China from an agricultural economy to a Communist

society and abolished private ownership of land,

property and industry.24

Similarly, in 1958, Mao initiated the Great Leap

Forward, a movement which sought to rapidly

industrialise the country.25

However, the Great Leap

Forward ended in failure. By 1961, there was a

widespread famine and food shortage due to lowered

agricultural production. Many people lost their lives due


59

to the famine, and as a result, Mao lost political clout

within the CPC.

In 1966, Mao launched the Cultural Revolution in China

to reassert his authority and to preserve true communist

system in China.26

He warned the public that capitalism

was a threat to the development of the country and urged

citizens to eliminate anything related to capitalist

culture.

The Cultural Revolution lasted for at least 10 years up

until Mao’s death in 1976.27

After Mao’s death, a power

struggle ensued within China which saw the

marginalisation of Mao’s ‘Gang of Four’ supporters, a

powerful group led by Mao’s last wife, Jian Qing and

strong proponents of the cultural revolution. The

members of this influential group were arrested and put

under trial.

In 1978, Deng Xiaoping - viewed as the main architect

of China’s economic liberalisation programme - became

the de-facto leader of the CPC.28

He denounced Mao’s

actions. Under his leadership, China saw dramatic policy

shift. This period is called the “Period of Reform and

Opening Up.”29

In 1975, Deng enacted the “Four

Modernisations” programme, which sought to revive the

Chinese economy so that the country could be

transformed into an advanced industrial nation. It

focused on the modernisation of Agriculture, Industry,

Science and Technology and National Defence.30

Mao’s push for continuous socialist transformations was

reversed by Deng’s policy of “de-collectivisation”.

China also underwent major social and economic

transformations and it was during his tenure that China

experienced unprecedented economic growth. Deng

introduced drastic economic reforms and liberalised


60

China’s trade policies through opening up to the global

economy.31

Deng also introduced collegial management in the party,

replacing the cult of personality under Mao. The CPC

under Deng opened its doors for intellectuals and re-

established its mandate to carry out “socialism with

Chinese characteristics”.32

During the reform era, Deng transformed the party from

strongman rule to collective leadership among the elite

and institutionalised the transfer of power from one

leader to the next, with each president serving a

maximum of two five-year terms.33

Deng also

established a rules-based system for succession whereby

leadership succession could take place according to legal

guidelines rather than personality struggles.34

By the end of 1989, Deng retired from the Party’s top

position and Jiang Zemin rose to prominence becoming

General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee and

Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission. In

1993, Jiang Zemin became President of China.35

Jiang

was successful in establishing himself as a leader at par

with Mao and Deng Xiaoping. He put forward the

“Three Represents” Theory which was written into the

CPC’s constitution at the 16th Party Congress in 2002.

The theory embraced private entrepreneurs and focussed

on the economic freedom and political control

introduced by his predecessor Deng Xiaoping.36

In 2002, Hu Jintao succeeded Jiang Zemin as General

Secretary of the CPC. Hu presented the concept of

“Scientific Outlook on Development” which was

eventually written into the CPC Constitution at the

Party’s 17th National Congress in 2007. The scientific

outlook concept called for the harmonious development


61

of economy and society and improvement of science and

technology.37

In November 2012, Xi Jinping set forth the new political

slogan of the “China Dream” a concept for realising the

“rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”. The “Chinese

Dream” involves multiple aspects including the “dream

of a strong nation,” and the “dream of a strong army.”

However, soon after Xi took over as CPC’s chief in

2012, he began dismantling the architecture established

by Deng Xiaoping to avoid succession fights. Xi took

over the leadership of all of the top policy making

committees such as foreign affairs, national security and

management of the economy inside the party.38

In

March, 2013, the National People’s Congress elected Xi

as China’s President. In October 2016, the CPC declared

Xi Jinping as China’s “Core Leader”, suggesting the rise

of a new strongman in China. The title was previously

held by Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. In October,

2017 the 19th Party Congress enshrined Xi’s political

thinking - “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with

Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” - into the CPC’s

constitution. In February 2018, China’s Communist

Party cleared the way for President Xi Jinping to stay in

power indefinitely, by abolishing term limits on the

Presidency.39

The rules on leadership term limits were

set by Deng Xiaoping to prevent a repeat of the Cultural

Revolution which was inspired by the cult worship of

Mao Zedong.

Likewise, in the external domain, Xi broke Deng

Xiaoping’s dictum of “hide your capabilities and bide

your time” which meant that China should “keep a low

profile” in the context of China’s diplomatic policy until

the country is integrated in the global economic

system.40


62

Xi declared that China is ready to “take centre stage in

the world.” His Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is as

much an economic programme as it is a geopolitical

campaign to take China to the centre of world affairs.

Under the BRI, Xi expanded Chinese business, military

and diplomatic influence around the world.

However, the party’s ideological foundation has

remained Marxist-Leninist despite the changing

leadership over the years. Consequently, the names of

the most significant Chinese leaders and their theories

have been recognised in the party’s constitution. In the

most recent version of the party’s statute, “Mao Zedong

Thought,”41

“Deng Xiaoping Theory,”42

, Jiang Zemin

“Three Represents” and “Xi Jinping Thought”43

are all

part of the CPC’s fundamental doctrine, “Socialism with

Chinese characteristics” which adheres to Marxism but

at the same time calls for adopting pragmatic policies

not otherwise seen as particularly socialist in their

nature.44

The Challenges for the Communist Party of China

Despite Beijing remaining authoritarian at home, it has

become more cooperative abroad especially on issues

like climate change, trade and North Korea. Beijing is

the third-largest donor of the United Nations. China’s

new stance toward the world is a result of the continued

strength of the Chinese economy and the growing

political confidence of the CPC.

However, China faces a number of difficult domestic

and external challenges that, if not addressed by the

country’s leaders, could undermine its stability. Most

important among these are issues related to China’s legal

system which has drawn much attention in the press.


63

China’s judicial system has seen number of positive

steps since the 15th National Congress of the CPC,

which includes, increased transparency of court

proceedings, improved professionalism of judges,

improvement in litigation procedure, method of trial and

judicial management.45

However, despite these reforms,

the CPC still has a final say over political cases

especially in situations involving senior politicians.46

In China there is a consensus amongst ruling elite that

the country requires a different kind of legal system

from Western models which strengthen the Communist

Party’s leadership instead of weakening it.47

Corruption

is another issue for China’s Communist Party. It was

reported that hundreds of party’s members including

high-level officials were expelled or arrested for

corruption charges in China by the end of 2016.48

Notwithstanding these problems, the CPC has assisted

millions of people out of poverty during the last four

decades and rapid economic growth has boosted the

livelihoods of millions in China.49

However, after nearly

40 years of economic reform at home and opening to the

global economy during the 1980s, China is amongst the

countries with most unequal income distribution in the

world.50

Therefore, on the domestic front, it is speculated

that the next-generation of CPC leaders may bring about

another round of reforms within the CPC. However, it

still remains unclear what kind of reforms, the next

generation of CPC leaders would adopt in the coming

years.

On the foreign policy front, China’s territorial issues in

the South China Sea and East China Sea have negatively

impacted relations with its neighbours including, Japan,

Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, the Philippines

and Taiwan.51

In years to come, the CPC leadership may


64

confront increased tensions between China and its

neighbours in tackling these problematic issues. Thus,

Chinese leaders and party members would be required to

carry out effective diplomacy to peacefully resolve the

territorial matters with its neighbours.

Conclusion

Western observers look at China’s political reform in

terms of whether it is becoming more democratic or not.

However, democratisation is not the only standard of

measuring the development of a country. A strong

regulatory and governing foundation laid down during

Deng’s period has made China the world’s second

largest economy after the US. Scholars across the globe

are anticipating that China will soon become the world’s

largest economy.

While China has emerged as a major player in

international politics and a leading world economy, it

views itself as the world’s other superpower assuming

itself as an alternative to the US. In view of that, China

is attempting to reshape the global economic system

through trade and investment partnerships. Hence the

CPC leadership has vowed to support the multilateral

trading system and to promote economic globalisation.

References

1. “China Brings Nearly 13 mln People Out of Poverty in

2017,” Xinhua, February 1, 2018, www.xinhuanet.com/

english/2018-02/01/c_ 136942195.htm. 2. “China’s Communist Party Agrees on Government

Reform, But No Details,” Reuters, February 28, 2018,

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-politics/chinas-

communist-party-agrees-on-government-reform-but-no-

details-idUSKCN1GC1J7.


65

3. “CPC to Build World-Class Armed Forces by Mid-21st

Century: Xi,” Xinhua, October 18, 2017,

http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/18/c_

136688500.htm. 4. “Xi Says China to Basically Realise Socialist

Modernisation by 2035,” Xinhua, November, 18, 2017,

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcong

ress/2017-10/18/content_33404773.htm. 5. “China and Pakistan Launch Economic Corridor Plan

Worth $46 Billion,” Reuters, April 20, 2015,

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-china/china-

and-pakistan-launch-economic-corridor-plan-worth-46-

billion-idUSKBN0NA12T20150420; “China, Philippines

Agree to Boost Trade, Economic Cooperation,” Xinhua,

March, 17, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/

2017-03/17/c_136137660.htm. 6. The conflict between China and Britain from 1839 to

1842, known as the Opium War. It started after British

East India Company got involved in trafficking of opium

to China. The Chinese tried to stop the trade and this led

to the Opium War of 1839-1842. The Opium War ended

with the Treaty of Nanking. The Chinese paid the British

a multimillion dollar indemnity and ceded Hong Kong to

Britain. China remembers this war as a beginning of

century of humiliation. 7. In 1931, Japanese troops attacked three north-eastern

provinces of China known as Manchuria and later

launched a full-scale attack on China. This initiated the

Sino-Japanese War in 1937 thus leading to the Japanese

capture of large swathes of the Chinese territory including

Shanghai. China was militarily weak and could not match

the modern Japanese troops. 8. Alison Kaufman, “The Century of Humiliation and

China’s National Narratives,” (Testimony before the U.S-

China Economic and Security Review Commission

Hearing on “China’s Narratives Regarding National

Security Policy”, March 10, 2011). 9. Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation:

Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign


66

relations, (New York; Colombia University Press, 2012),

78-79. 10.

“The Evolution of China’s Communist Party, 90 Years in

the Making,” China Briefing, July 1, 2011,

http://www.china-briefing.com/news/2011/07/01/the-

evolution-of-chinas-communist-party-90-years-in-the-

making.html. 11.

Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation. 12.

Ibid. 13.

“The First Opium War, Episode 47”, BBC, February 21,

2006, https://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/history/empire/

episodes/episode_47.shtml. 14.

Catherine Ladds, “China and Treaty-Port Imperialism,”

Hong Kong Baptist University,

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/97811184

55074.wbeoe079. 15.

Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation, 82. 16.

Ibid. 79. 17.

Suzanne Pepper, Civil War in China: The Political

Struggle 1945-1949 (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,

1999). 18.

“History Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975),” BBC,

http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/chiang_kais

hek.shtml. 19.

“The Communist Party of China,” An Illustrated History

of the Communist Party of China,

http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/45981.htm 20.

Ibid. 21.

Bo Zhiyue, “Who Are China’s ‘Princelings’?,” The

Diplomat, November, 24, 2015, https://thediplomat.com/

2015/11/who-are-chinas-princelings/. 22.

“Inside China’s Ruling Party,” BBC,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/asia_pac/02/china_p

arty_congress/china_ruling_party/how_china_is_ruled/ht

ml/politburo.stm. 23.

“National People’s Congress,” The National People’s

Congress of the People’s Republic of China,

http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Organization/node_28

46.htm.


67

24.

Mo Zhang, “From Public to Private: The Newly Enacted

Chinese Property Law and the Protection of Property

Rights in China,” Berkeley Business Law Journal 5 no. 2

(2008): 320. 25.

“Evolution of China’s Revolution: from Bloody

Repression to Capitalism Red in Tooth and Claw, The

Telegraph, September 27, 2009,

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/

6235611/Evolution-of-Chinas-revolution-from-bloody-

repression-to-capitalism-red-in-tooth-and-claw.html. 26.

“History, Mao Zedong (1893-1976),” BBC,

http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/mao_zedon

g.shtml. 27.

Ibid. 28.

Alexander Pantsov and Steven Levine, Deng Xiaoping: A

Revolutionary Life (New York: Oxford University Press,

2015). 29.

David Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy

and Adaptation (Washington DC: University of California

Press, 2008). 30.

David Wen-wei Chang, China under Deng Xiaoping:

Political and Economic Reform (Macmillan, 1991). 31.

Ezra Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of

China, (Belknap Press, 2013). 32.

Ibid. 33.

Ibid. 34.

Catherine Keyser, “Three Chinese Leaders: Mao Zedong,

Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping,” Asia For Educators,

http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_leaders.

htm. 35.

“Jiang Zemin Biography,” ChinaVitae,

http://chinavitae.com/biography/Jiang_Zemin/full. 36.

“How will the world remember Jiang Zemin?,” CNN,

November 7, 2002, http://edition.cnn.com/2002/

WORLD/asiapcf/east/10/29/profile.jiang.zemin/. 37.

Scientific Outlook on Development becomes CPC’s

Theoretical Guidance, ChinaDaily, November, 11, 2008,

http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/2012-11/08/content_

15892786.htm.


68

38.

John Pomfret, “Xi Jinping’s Power Grab Could Lead to a

‘Political Catastrophe’ in China,” The Washington Post,

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-

opinions/wp/2018/02/26/xi-jinpings-power-grab-could-

lead-to-a-political-catastrophe-in-

china/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.58574d8304a4. 39.

John Ruwitch, “Timeline - The Rise of Chinese Leader Xi

Jinping,” Reuters, March 16, 2018,

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-parliament-xi-

timeline/timeline-the-rise-of-chinese-leader-xi-jinping-

idUSKCN1GS0ZA. 40.

David Pilling, “No one is immune from Beijing’s ‘gravity

machine’”, Financial Times, December 12, 2013

https://www.ft.com/content/32470bd8-619d-11e3-b7f1-

00144feabdc0 41.

In China Mao’s Thought is part of the official doctrine of

the Communist Party of China, however, since the 1978

beginning of Deng Xiaoping’s market economy-oriented

reforms, the concept of “socialism with Chinese

characteristics” has come to the forefront of Chinese

politics. Mao has advocated that peasants should be the

bulwark of the revolutionary energy, led by the working

class in China. 42.

The idea of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” was

one of the most significant creations of Deng Xiaoping.

Deng, by adopting a market economy to China’s own

condition, successfully achieved unprecedented economic

success. The theory does not claim to reject Marxism–

Leninism or Mao Zedong Thought but instead seeks to

adapt them to the existing socio-economic conditions of

China. 43.

Xi Jinping Thought promotes the supremacy of the

Communist Party. Xi’s philosophy teaches that the goal

of a powerful, unified China can be achieved only if the

Communist Party stays firmly in control of China. 44.

Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, People’s Daily,

September 30, 2007, http://en.people.cn/90002/92169/

92211/6275043.html.


69

45.

“Chinese Legal Reform,” Paul Tsai China Center, Yale

Law School, https://law.yale.edu/china-center/programs/

chinese-legal-reform. 46.

“With Legal Reforms, China wants Less Interfering in

Cases, Fewer Death Penalty Crimes,” Reuters, March 10,

2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-

parliament-legal/with-legal-reforms-china-wants-less-

interfering-in-cases-fewer-death-penalty-crimes-

idUSBREA290C320140310. 47.

China’s Top Court Says No to West’s Model of Judicial

Independence, Reuters, February 26, 2015,

https://in.reuters.com/article/china-law/chinas-top-court-

says-no-to-wests-model-of-judicial-independence-

idINKBN0LU07M20150226. 48.

Visualising China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign, China

file, January 21, 2016, http://www.chinafile.com/

infographics/visualizing-chinas-anti-corruption-campaign. 49.

“China has Lifted 600 Million People out of Poverty,”

CCTV, October, 18, 2014, http://english.cntv.cn/2014/

10/18/VIDE1413584528072923.shtml. 50.

Sidney Leng, “China’s Dirty Little Secret: Its Growing

Wealth Gap,” South China Morning Post, July, 7, 2017,

http://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/21017

75/chinas-rich-grabbing-bigger-slice-pie-ever. 51.

Amanda Macias, “China’s in the Hot Seat on 2 Major

Foreign-Policy Issues,” Business Insider, August 27,

2016, http://www.businessinsider.com/chinas-hot-seat-

korea-south-china-sea-2016-8.

70

THE IMPLICATIONS OF INDIA AND

ISRAEL’S GROWING DEFENCE

COOPERATION

Moiz Khan

Introduction

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Israel in

July 2017 and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin

Netanyahu’s reciprocal visit to India in January 2018 are

evidence of an intensification of the bilateral partnership

between India and Israel in the areas of defence,

intelligence and trade. Though the two countries are

increasing their cooperation in other fields as well,

defence remains the main pillar of bilateral relations.

India serves as a major market for Israeli arms; between

2012 and 2016, the country was the recipient of 41% of

Israeli arms exports.1 According to the Stockholm

International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), India was

the third largest arms importer in the period 2013-2017,

and the country’s imports increased by 24% between

2008–12 and 2013–17.2 Russia accounted for 62 per cent

of India’s arms imports in 2013–17 while the country’s

arms imports from the US arms imports from the USA

increased by 557% between 2008–12 and 2013–17.

Moreover, during these two periods India’s arms imports

from Israel also increased by 285%, making Israel the

third largest supplier to India.3

Collectively, Israel’s military sales to India range from

Phalcon airborne warning and control systems

(AWACS) and Searcher, Heron and Harop unmanned

aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Aerostat and Green Pine

radars, and Barak air defence systems.4 Apart from arms

procurements, India and Israel also conduct joint


Cooperation

71

military exercises to help India improve its military’s

operational capabilities.5

With reference to the aforementioned developments, this

paper is an effort to provide a comprehensive

understanding of India-Israel defence cooperation and its

implications for South Asian strategic stability. The

study will discuss Pakistan’s threat perceptions and

security challenges arising out of the military

cooperation.

The study would examine the following questions: what

sort of arms procurement deals are being signed between

India and Israel? What aims and purposes do India and

Israel seek to achieve with the help of their defence

cooperation deals? What are the implications of Israeli

arms transfers to India and how do they affect both

Pakistan’s threat perceptions and defence policies?

Historical Overview

When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited

Israel in July 2017 to mark the 25th anniversary of

diplomatic relations between the two countries,6 he

became the first Indian Prime Minister to officially visit

Israel since the establishment of bilateral ties between

the two countries in 1992. Though India-Israel relations

go back a long way,7 they had become stagnant owing to

India’s fear of upsetting its relations with Arab countries

and its support for the Palestinian demand for statehood.8

Prime Minister Modi’s visit highlights a significant

change in India’s foreign policy outlook. While

reiterating India’s support for a ‘two state-solution of the

Israeli-Palestinian conflict’ during the visit,9 Modi

clearly signalled that India’s relationship would not be

hyphenating Israel and Palestine.10

The two countries

announced a ‘strategic partnership’ and signed numerous


72

agreements in various key areas including water

management, agriculture, research and development and

space.11

In January 2018, Prime Minister Benjamin

Netanyahu visited India. His visit provided greater

impetus to the India-Israel bilateral partnership.12

The

visit was significant also because it occurred despite

India’s vote in favour of a UNGA resolution rejecting

US recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.13

India’s Israel policy has always been guided by the

notion of realpolitik. In a 1949 letter by the India Prime

Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to his Chief Ministers, he

clearly articulated the flexible approach based on realism

that would guide India’s policy towards Israel. In his

letter he said,

Any action that we may take must be guided not only

by idealistic considerations but also a realistic

appraisal of the situation. Our general policy in the

past has been favourable to the Arabs and, at the

same time, not hostile to the Jews. That policy

continues. For the present, we have said that we are

not recognising Israel. But this is not an irrevocable

decision and the matter will no doubt be considered

afresh in view of subsequent developments.14

Throughout history, India’s economic interests in the

Middle East determined the country’s policy towards

Israel. After recognising Israel in 1950, India took nearly

forty-two years to establish full diplomatic relations with

the country in 1992.15

India had already delayed the

recognition of Israel for two and half years after it came

into being on May 14, 1948.16

It finally established its

diplomatic ties with Israel in 1992 only when it was

deemed realistic and economically advantageous for the

country.17

There were various reasons behind these

delays. India’s major concern was its trade relations with

the Arab world. India served as a large market for the


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73

Arab World and their mutual trade included, tea, spices,

gems, jewellery, and engineering goods.18

It was thought

that the large volume of trade between India and the

Arab countries would be jeopardised if India were to

recognise Israel.19

India was reluctant to hurt Muslims’ sentiments attached

to the partition of Palestine both within the country and

outside.20

India, therefore, had to follow a pro-

Palestinian policy for national cohesion at home and in

order not to antagonise Muslims of Arab states. Another

major reason for not recognising Israel was India’s

position and role in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)

which prevented it from supporting Israel. Since NAM

was supportive of anti-colonial struggles around the

world, India considered efforts of establishing a Jewish

state a last adventure of British colonialism.21

Notwithstanding Gandhi’s sympathy towards European

Jews, he could also not overlook Palestinians struggle

against colonialism. Gandhi considered imposition of

Jews on Palestinians wrong and inhuman.22

Despite all

these reservations, India awarded a de-facto recognition

to Israel in 1950 after both Iran and Turkey two leading

Muslim majority countries lent a de-facto recognition to

the country.23

Though India still remained reluctant in establishing full

diplomatic relations with Israel following the

recognition, the end of the Cold War provided India an

opportunity to review its policy towards Israel.24

After

the disintegration of the Soviet Union, India’s main

diplomatic and strategic ally during the period, India had

to revisit its foreign policy to adjust it towards the

changing international order where the US had emerged

as the sole dominant power. Indian leaders realised that

normalisation of ties with Israel would be important for

India’s eventual rapprochement with the US, since the


74

American Jewish lobby had an effective influence over

the US ‘political establishment. Moreover, the initiation

of the Arab-Israeli peace process backed by the US also

served as an opportunity for reluctant states to consider

developing relations with Israel.25

The October 1991

peace conference in Madrid, a formal gathering with

Israel sponsored by the US and the Soviet Union to

revive the Israeli-Palestinian peace process involving

majority of Arab countries, forced India to evaluate

Israel’s importance in the Middle East and benefits that

could be accrued by strengthening diplomatic relations

with the country.26

Domestically, the ascendance of the

Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the Indian political

system helped remove hesitations about Israel. The BJP

with its Nationalist and Hindu outlook perceived Israel

not as a diplomatic burden but a potential ally.27

The first

formal call for full relations with Israel came forward in

the BJP convention of October 1991. This call made the

Congress Party to also adopt a realistic approach towards

Israel.28

As a result, India accorded full diplomatic

recognition to Israel on January 29, 1992, and embassies

were established in each other’s countries.29

Diamonds and Defence

The Indo-Israel relations are often described as being

made up of ‘diamonds and defence.’30

This attribution to

their relationship is based on the fact that diamonds and

defence items are the two main commodities in their

bilateral trade. Nearly half of the imports of the two

countries comprise diamonds polishing and processing

trade while approximately 40% of Israeli arms are

transferred to India.31

Since India’s relationship with

Israel has flourished across a wide range of areas

including agriculture, water management, science and

technology, tourism, agriculture and other forms of

trade, defence cooperation between the two countries


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75

continues to dominate the bilateral relations for last 25

years.

India emerged as a very vast weapons market for Israeli

defence industries to export their weapons and help the

country’s economy. For India, Israel became a preferred

source for acquiring latest military equipment. India

sought Israeli weapons basically for two reasons;

Russian failure to provide promised weapons on time

and at suitable price and; difficulties that India faced in

developing the desired weapons at home.32

However,

during the initial years, India sought Israeli military

technology companies to help upgrade its aging Soviet-

era military aircrafts and other equipment as Israel had a

sound reputation in retrofitting of old weapons.33

Today,

Israel is the third largest exporter of arms to India, after

the US and Russia. Data from SIPRI shows that defence

exports from Israel are related to aircraft, air defence

systems, armoured vehicles, artillery, missiles, naval

weapons, sensors, ships and other defence products and

technologies.34

Netanyahu’s January 2018 visit to India

also revolved around weapons deals. During

Netanyahu’s visit, he confirmed that the $500-million

Spike anti-tank guided missile deal between India and

Israel was back on the table which had been cancelled by

India prior to Netanyahu’s visit.35

Meanwhile, India’s

Defence Ministry also confirmed in January 2018 a plan

to purchase 131 surface-to-air Barak missiles from Israel

in a $70 million deal36

and approved the purchase of

assault rifles and carbines from Israel to meet the

immediate requirement of troops.37

Apart from weapons sales, both India and Israel are also

engaged in the field of co-development and co-

production of weapons. This engagement helps India to

redesign and to strengthen its firms in manufacturing

latest military technologies as part of its so called ‘Make


76

in India’ policy. It also confirms with the Indian requests

for technology transfer and emphasis on domestic

production. A long list of Israeli military items, such as

ammunition, UAV parts, and even missiles (Spike anti-

armour, the Python-4 air-to-air, Barak-8 surface-to-air)

are now being produced in India.38

This element of co-

production in both the countries’ defence trade would

also lower Indian dependence on importing weapons.39

Defence cooperation between the two countries can be

attributed to several reasons. For India, the demonstrated

capability of Israeli weapons systems remains its main

interest. Similarly, for Israel, India’s market for weapons

trade serves as huge impetus for strengthening of

bilateral defence engagements.40

It implies that India’s

quest for latest military technologies and Israel’s efforts

to further widen the market for its military products

complement each other. By enhancing defence trade

with Israel, India also sought opportunities to emulate

Israeli technology in developing its own defence

industry.41

Defence Engagements in Various Domains

Defence collaboration between India and Israel started

even before the establishment of diplomatic relations.

The two countries helped each other in their individual

conflicts even during the frosty years of their relations.

Israel provided covert military assistance to India during

its wars of 1962, 1965 and 1971 and the 1999 Kargil

Conflict.42

India helped Israel covertly with military

equipment during the ‘Six-Day War’ of 1967,43

by

providing Israel with spare parts for Mystere and

Ouragan aircraft, as well as AX-13 tanks.44

On the request of former Indian Prime Minister

Jawaharlal Nehru Israel came to help India in 1962 by


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77

supplying mortars for the Indian Army delivered by

ships flying the Israeli flag overruling Indian requests for

anonymity.45

Similarly, during India’s 196546

and 1971

war47

with Pakistan, Israel again supplied mortars and

ammunition. These mortars equipped two of India’s

Artillery Regiments and proved highly effective with

their steep trajectory and heavy calibre charge especially

in mountainous terrain.48

After Research and Analysis

Wing’s inception (RAW) in 1968, its relation with

Mossad, Israel’s intelligence agency, commenced

despite the killing of Indian soldiers serving in United

Nations Emergency Force in Gaza by Israeli air and

artillery strikes during Israel’s 1967 Six-day war.49

After the fruition of diplomatic relations in 1992,

defence cooperation between Indian and Israeli Air

Forces also commenced when the two countries signed a

pact for the purchase of Searcher and Ranger Unmanned

Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in 1992.50

In 1993, Israel also

showed a willingness to upgrade India’s old Soviet

equipment. For this purpose, two Israel-based companies

Elbit systems and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI)

entered into a contract with India to upgrade Indian Air

Force’s (IAF) ageing MiG-21 fighter aircraft.51

Another important Israeli contribution came

immediately in the aftermath of the 1999 Kargil War, in

the domain of surveillance and target acquisition. India

purchased the Long-Range Reconnaissance and

Observation System for its army.52

The Indian Army

deployed these systems along with hand-held thermal

imagers that greatly enhanced its anti-infiltration

measures and those reconnaissance and observation

systems are still being used by the army deployed along

the Line of Control and along the International Border.53

During the Kargil War India also received laser-guided

bombs for modified IAF Mirages from Israel.54


78

To overhaul its naval capabilities, India had signed a

deal for the purchase of two Super Dvora Mk-2 fast

patrol boats from the IAI worth $10 million in 1996. For

the deal, Israel was also willing to transfer the

technology of patrol boats. The IAI awarded licences for

India to manufacture these boats in its Goa Shipyard.

While two of these boats were purchased from the IAI,

an additional six were manufactured in India in

subsequent years.55

The Dvora MK-2 boats are

significant for offshore operations, naval intelligence,

and command and control at sea.56

As these vessels are

equipped with day and night surveillance and weapon

locating systems, they are important for detecting and

destroy enemy fast boats.57

In addition to Dvora MK-2

boats, the IAI also supplied India the fast attack craft

INFACT T-82 in 2003. With an operating speed of 40

knots in a 550-mile area, these vessels are the fastest

ones so far in the Indian Navy. These vessels have also

enhanced the Indian Navy’s offensive and defensive

operational capabilities.58

Further in the domain of surveillance, India also

purchased Heron Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (and

Searchers) manufactured by Israel Aerospace Industries

(IAI) in 2003. Heron UAVs are the main systems

deployed with the Indian Army aerial surveillance

operations.59

In order to upgrade its main battle tanks (MBTs), India

had approached Israeli defence firms to refurbish its

ageing T-72 tank with thermal imaging and better fire

control. India’s Alpha Design Technologies (ADT)

entered collaborated with Israeli firm Elop-Elbit

company in this regard in 2014. In 2016, India received

170 upgraded thermal kits for its T-72 Tanks and

upgradations for 1000 T-72 tanks with thermal imaging


Cooperation

79

or night vision capabilities.60

The upgradation of the T-

72 MBTs provide the Indian army with the capabilities

required to fight without any time barrier at night. The

Elop-Elbit is also in contract with India to upgrade the

Infantry Command Vehicles in the IA.61

The company

has already transferred over 300 thermal imager

standalone kits (TISK) which would add night vision

capabilities for main gun firing and missiles.

Approximately, some 969 such command vehicles had

been upgraded by the end of 2015.62

In 2015, the IAF also acquired the EHUD air combat

manoeuvring instrumentation (ACMI) system from

Israel.63

The IAF is among the leading air forces in the

world having incorporated this system in its training

modules.64

Apart from providing real-time high

dependability weapons simulation and hit/miss

assessments for live training, the system would also it

would help the Indian military to improve its overall

coordination and synchronisation among its three arms

(Air Force, Army and Navy) in any future conflict. 65

Moreover, in order to enhance its land forces’

capabilities of anti-tank war, India has signed a deal with

Israel for Spike Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM). On

January 17, 2018, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin

Netanyahu said that the $500-million Spike anti-tank

guided missile deal between India and Israel was back

on the table. Earlier, India had formally scrapped the

deal for Spike missiles for unknown reasons with

Israel’s state-owned defence contractor Rafael Advanced

Defence Systems a week before Netanyahu’s visit to the

country. On January 3, 2018, Rafael had confirmed the

cancellation of the deal. However, India is now reviving

the deal because the country considers the Spike missiles

battle-proven. The missile has a longer range and is

lighter than the Indian Nag missile.66


80

Other specialised equipment, that India purchased from

Israel, including the Tavor lightweight assault rifles and

Galil sniper rifles, have also been inducted a few years

earlier with all three services of the Indian military.67

Moreover, Punj Lloyd from India and Israel Weapon

Industries (IWI) are also considering a deal to set up a

factory in central India to manufacture these weapons.68

In order to further enhance the fire-power of the Indian

Army, the Indian Government approved the purchase of

another set of assault rifles and carbines from Israel to

meet the immediate requirement of troops in January

2018. India’s Defence Acquisition Council (DAC),

headed by Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman,

cleared the procurement of 72,000 assault rifles and

93,895 carbines worth $553 million. According to media

reports, the procurement would be made available to the

forces in two tranches – one fourth by the state-owned

Ordnance Factory Board and the remaining by local

private industry.69

India-Israel Space Cooperation

As a part of growing ties, India and Israel also maintain

a high-level cooperation in the field of space technology.

This cooperation was officially initiated when Shimon

Peres, then Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister,

visited Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) in

January 2002. Following the visit, an agreement on

space cooperation was signed between the former head

of Israel’s Space Research Programme Col. Aby Har-

Even and former ISRO Chairman Dr K. Kasturiarangan

in November 2002. Consequently, India launched two

Israeli satellites including Synthetic Aperture Radar

(SAR) surveillance satellite in 2008,70

and SAR imaging

satellite RISAT-2 on board a domestically built Polar


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81

Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) from the Sriharikota

Space Centre in 2009.71

Given the interests and capabilities available in the

domain of space in both India and Israel, cooperation in

space is likely to be strengthened in future. The main

element in space collaboration is that Israel remains

interested in Indian space launching capabilities, while

its small satellites have attracted Indian attention. Since

Israel considers Indian space launchers reliable, India

signed various MoUs with Israel in the domain of space

during Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Israel in July

2017.72

The Indian space programme has been thriving since its

inception. With its successful space launches and various

space programmes, the Indian space mission is emerging

as a new space power. For example, in June 2016, the

ISRO launched 20 satellites in a single payload.73

Similarly, in February 2017, it successfully launched

104 satellites on a single rocket and set a world record.74

This prowess of the Indian space programme has

attracted the attention of other countries including Israel

for mutual collaboration. However, India’s bilateral

cooperation with Israel has raised concerns in Pakistan.

Though India claims that its satellites are mainly for

weather, communication and navigation purposes, they

could ultimately be used for military purposes due to

their multipurpose nature.75

Currently, the Indian

military is using 13 satellites Cartosat-1 and 2 series and

Risat-1 and Risat-2, GSAT-7 or INSAT-4F.76

As

discussed earlier, Risat-2 is an Israeli satellite which can

be used for multipurpose while the Cartosat-1 and 2

satellites are also fitted with Israeli technology for high

resolution imagery.77

This dual-use satellite network

gives India a technological advantage which can be used

for tactical and strategic goals against Pakistan. These


82

satellites not only remove India’s dependence over

foreign satellites for intelligence and surveillance but

also provide the country with the capability to monitor

activities around its borders through high-resolution

imagery, intelligence gathering, and navigation. Not

only do such capabilities help prevent possible attacks,

they also enable a prompt response to incoming attacks

against India.78

India-Israel Engagement in Air and Missile

Defence Systems

The strategic collaboration between India and Israel

encompasses engagement in the purchase and co-

development of interceptor missile systems, radars and

other related technologies. In this regard, India signed a

contract with the IAI and Rafael for the supply of nine

Barak-I Anti-Missile Defence (AMD) systems in 2001.

With this contract, India not only acquired missile

defence system for its naval vessels but also opened

more avenues for cooperation and collaboration in future

years. 79

In March 2018, the Indian Ministry of Defence

contracted IAI and Rafael to deliver the Indian Navy 131

additional Barak-1 missiles. The contract is valued at

$70 million. Barak-1 is a supersonic missile with an

operational range of 10 kilometres.80

Similarly, in 2009, India signed a deal with Israel for the

supply of quick reaction surface-to-air missiles (QR-

SAM).81

Initially, the Indian Government approved

proposals to augment air defence capabilities for eight

regiments with QR-SAM worth $2.2 billion in 2012.82

The SPYDER QR-SAM has the potential to engage

targets at 360° and the missiles can be launched within

five seconds of its readiness mode. It has the capability

of intercepting cruise missiles, short-range ballistic

missiles (SRBMs), aircrafts or drones at 15km range.83


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83

In May 2017, India conducted successful tests of its first

newly acquired Spyder systems.84

A trial of system’s

Python and Derby missiles was conducted to validate

various parameters and checking its operational

readiness.85

To further upgrade the strategic cooperation, India and

Israel signed a major deal in March 2010 to jointly

develop the Long-Range Surface to Air Missile

(LRSAM) system for the Indian Navy (IN), involving

the Defence Research and Development Organisation

(DRDO) of India and the IAI. The deal worth $1.4

billion provided Indian with an opportunity to acquire

design and manufacturing technology of the system.86

A

similar contract has also been signed between the two

countries for the development of same systems for the

Indian Army and IAF. These systems for the Army and

the IAF were called Medium Range Surface to Air

Missiles (MRSAM) systems. These two systems,

LRSAM and MRSAM are also called the ‘Barak 8’ or

‘Barak NG’ missile systems. Though the initial

collaboration between the two countries on Barak 8 co-

development began in 2006 and was approved in 2009,

the Indian Government finally approved the deal worth

$2.5 billion for the purchase of MRSAM in February

2017.87

The Indian Army will deploy the system by

2023. Similarly, India contracted IAI for the delivery of

LRSAM for its navy in May 2017, and the delivery was

made in September 2017.88

The aforementioned air defence systems will help India

to maintain a multi-layered defence shield. Though these

systems may prove effective against cruise and short-

range ballistic missile, they are ineffective against long-

range ballistic missiles. In order to fill the gap, India is

indigenously developing a two-layered ballistic missile

defence (BMD) system involving exo-atmospheric and


84

endo-atmospheric interceptor missiles. For an efficient

system, India entered into negotiations with Israel to buy

its Arrow-2 anti-missile system’s Green Pine radar.

However, Israel could not transfer the radar system to

India without US’ approval as the system had been

jointly developed. The former Bush Administrator

approved the Israeli Green Pine radar system for sale to

India. After the approval, India purchased 3 Green Pine

radars in 2001.89

The US influence was not limited to the sale of Green

Pine radars. The US also allowed Israel to sell the IAI-

developed Phalcon Airborne Early Warning and Control

(AEW&C). Israel’s dependence on the US, in terms of

economic packages, access to dual-use items, and

influence in multilateral forums, had a huge impact on

its weapons trade. The US can easily block or pressurise

Israel to suspend any weapons deal. In 2000, for

example the US pressurised Israel to drop the sale of

Phalcon Airborne Warning and Control Systems

(AWACS) sale to China. However, the sale of same

strategic AWACS to India had been approved by the US.

A trilateral deal involving Russia, Israel and India was

signed in 2004 for the sale of AWACS on three similar

IL-76 modified platforms.90

India received these

AWACS during 2009-2011.91

The US influence over India-Israel relations has

remained constant. The country’s role in the

development of defence cooperation between India and

Israel has been impressive, even if not favourable at all

the times. For example, the Administration of former US

President Bill Clinton opposed Israeli military sales to

India owing to technology transfer regimes, Israel-US

co-production provisions, and arms embargos over

India’s nuclear tests of 1998.92

Israel did not join the US

weapons embargo on India. Instead, Israel finalised a


Cooperation

85

deal to sell India advanced electronic equipment for its

warplanes. Though the equipment had no American

technology and it was indigenously developed by Israel,

the US opposed the deal and called it contrary to arms

control agreements. Despite the US opposition, Israel

moved forward with the deal.93

However, this situation became favourable for India

during George W. Bush’s tenure who openly supported

the India-Israel partnership. The US’s approval for the

purchase of Phalcon AWACS marked the evolution of

the US position on its policy regarding transfer of

technology to India. The success behind Phalcon

AWACS was the result of BJP’s political lobbying in the

US. In order to mobilise the US support, the BJP

government in 2000s actively engaged Jewish

organisations in the US and gave an effective push for

India-US rapprochement for allowing Israel’s sensitive

defence sales to India.94

With the help of Jewish

organisations, India not only achieved US’ support for

its defence cooperation with Israel but also had Israel an

direct source for acquiring US defence technology

including the Green Pine Radar.95

These developments

imply that the US has, direct or indirect, leverage over

India-Israel defence engagements. Since the post 9/11

time period has witnessed a convergence of interests

between India and US, the US has tacitly been approving

Israel’s military sales and transfer of technology to

India.

However, the growing defence cooperation between

India and Israel also started creating problems for US

defence industries in gaining contracts from India. For

example, India had originally considered purchasing the

US-made ‘Javelin’ ATGMs and negotiations were

‘nearly completed’ for the two countries to jointly

develop the ATGM by late 2016.96

Reluctance from the


86

US on technology sharing stalled the negotiations.

Alternatively, India reached Israel and successfully

negotiated deal for Spike ATGMs.97

It implies that

Israeli defence industries are appealing partners for India

and their mutual cooperation in joint ventures,

production and research and development in high-

technology military equipment would remain intact in

the future as well. It is because Israel has shown greater

flexibility in its policy of transfer of technology.

Moreover, Israel imposes minimal conditions over its

arms contracts. This flexibility has helped Israel gain a

stable position for its defence industry in the Indian

weapons markets.98

The Future of India-Israel Defence Cooperation

Though the official acknowledgement of exact financial

volume trade is not known, a large section of Israeli

arms exports is made to India.99

The defence trade

between the two countries ranges from sale of bullets to

radars, air deterrent systems including AWACS, and

UAVs, and co-development of missile defence systems.

The bilateral defence cooperation is not merely restricted

to sale of weapons but it has extended to joint ventures

and joint manufacturing, including transfer of

technology as well as joint research and development in

defence and security fields,100

suggesting a strategic

partnership between the two countries.

Although the ever-thriving Indo-Israeli defence

cooperation has mutual benefits for both the country’s

individual markets, there are also obstacles and

disadvantages, especially for Israel. Israeli arms and

military technology are popular in the world for their

technological sophistication and integrity. Israel’s

willingness to transfer technology to India under various

trade deals would not only provide India the technology


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87

but also help the country in acquiring the expertise in the

development of arms and equipment. This possibility

could allow India to use Israel’s technology for its own

weapons and its sale for its own use in the future.101

The

waning Indian dependence on Israeli weapons would

also result in lowering of defence trade between the two

countries, since at numerous times, India has tried to

remain restricted to local weapons. For example India

once cancelled a deal with Israel for Barak 8 interceptor

missiles in favour of its Akash and Trishul interceptors. 102

In January 2018, India’s DRDO also cancelled Spike

anti-tank missile deal with Israel for unknown reasons

but it was revived back during Netanyahu’s visit to

India.103

These examples imply that Israeli companies

could possibly face challenges due to India’s policy of

strengthening local manufacturing through its ‘Make in

India’ programme.104

Consequently, India’s self-reliance

and indigenisation in the defence sector could negatively

impact Israeli defence trade and market in the long run.

Notwithstanding these problems, India-Israel relations

will continue to expand, with increased cooperation in

the domains of defence and space.

Security Implications for Pakistan

Given that the defence aspect of the India-Israel

relationship is the main pillar of their bilateral ties,

Israeli defence cooperation is also increasing Pakistan’s

security concerns and threat perceptions. India is

engaged in a rapid modernisation of both its

conventional and strategic military assets for deterrence

and dissuasion. India’s huge military infrastructure

continues to expand with the help of indigenous weapon

development and foreign defence trade. Weapons trade

with Israel is not only enhancing India’s military

strength quantitatively but also qualitatively. Indian

military modernisation is increasing Pakistan’s


88

vulnerability vis-à-vis India at both conventional and

strategic levels.

Conventionally, the Indian military is already stronger

than that of Pakistan. With a 2:1 disparity ratio in

army,105

the IAF and the Indian Navy also has an

advantage of 1.9:1 ratio over Pakistan.106

This

quantitative disparity further increases with Indian

imports of sophisticated weapons in the region. The

mixed array of indigenous and foreign weapons adds

into Indian confidence of launching a limited war with

Pakistan under the country’s nuclear threshold. On the

other hand, Pakistan is adopting measures against the

increasing threat of India’s Cold Start doctrine that calls

for rapid limited conventional attack against Pakistan.107

However, Israeli weapons including armed and

surveillance and reconnaissance UAVs and AWACS

efficiently enhances Indian intelligence surveillance

capabilities against Pakistan. With these capabilities,

India poses a potential threat to Pakistan’s Command

and Control assets. During war time, these assets along

with Israeli satellites may also be used to locate

Pakistan’s military assets, their mobility, missile launch

sites and radars. Even during peace time, India can

maintain a constant watch over Pakistan’s military

movement, giving the country an opportunity to develop

counter-measures.

At the strategic level also, Israel’s help in developing

India’s indigenous strategic BMD system and transfer of

other air and missile defence systems are also increasing

Pakistan’s threat perceptions.108

The growing number of

anti-missile systems in India is also very destabilising

the deterrence between India and Pakistan in the

region.109

As effective deterrence rests on the condition

of mutual vulnerabilities, the presence of an effective

BMD systems with an actor in a given region


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89

undermines the ‘fear of mutual assured destruction

(MAD)’ between the states.110

Consequently, such a

situation not only creates a security dilemma by inducing

a false sense of security with BMD possessor, but also

influences an arms race in the region.111

The deployment of multi-layered anti-missile systems

both at land and sea would reduce Indian vulnerability

against Pakistan’s ballistic and cruise missiles by

affecting the possible penetration of these missiles into

the Indian territory.112

India’s sense of invulnerability

may induce a false sense of security to the country and

would ultimately act as an incentive for conducting pre-

emptive strike against Pakistan. Moreover, the growing

BMD capabilities of India would also affect Pakistan’s

strategic calculation.113

It has pushed Pakistan to

consider enhancing its nuclear arsenal both

quantitatively and qualitatively. In order to overwhelm

Indian BMD systems, Pakistan is considering an

increase in its offensive capabilities by adding more

lethal nuclear warheads. Therefore, Indian import or

development of missile defence systems would engage

both the countries in an unending strategic arms race.

Pakistan has always expressed concerns about India’s

military modernisation, development of the BMD

systems and nuclearisation of the Indian Ocean region.

These developments led Pakistan to adopt ‘Full

Spectrum Deterrence’ nuclear posture in face of growing

challenges from India. Pakistan maintains that the

country “would not remain oblivious to the evolving

security dynamics in South Asia and would maintain a

full spectrum deterrence capability to deter all forms of

aggression without entering into an arms race with any

other country.”114

However, the FSD policy is not a shift

from its decade old nuclear policy of Credible Minimum

Deterrence.115

Moreover, Pakistan has always shown


90

restraint and responsibility while adopting measures

aimed at preserving deterrence stability in the region. In

April 2011. Pakistan conducted the first launch of its

surface-to-surface short-range ballistic missile Nasr to

deter the evolving threats at all the levels of the threat

spectrum.116

Pakistan’s Nasr tactical nuclear weapon

(TNW) was developed to fill the gap at the tactical level

of conflict and as direct response to India’s Cold Start

doctrine (CSD).117

The CSD basically calls for up to 8

independent armoured brigades to penetrate up to 50

kilometres into Pakistan to capture territory in an event

of a limited conflict under the country’s nuclear

threshold. Israel’s continued transfer of sophisticated

weapons and air defence systems enhances India’s

offensive capabilities which could allow the country to

easily operationalise it’s CSD strategy against Pakistan.

Therefore, to further augment its defence, Pakistan tested

two other important weapons in January 2017, including

Babur-3 submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM)118

and medium-range surface-to-surface ballistic missile

Ababeel (MRBM), which is capable of carrying multiple

independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs).119

The successful development of Babur-3 provides

Pakistan with a credible second-strike capability,

enabling the country to launch nuclear weapons from

deep sea.120

In order to further augment the regional

strategic stability, Pakistan developed Ababeel MRBM

to ensure survival ability of its offensive missiles against

India’s anti-missile systems. 121

Conclusion

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between

India and Israel in 1992, their bilateral relationship has

now grown to a full strategic partnership. India-Israel

relations have flourished across a wide range of areas

including agriculture, commerce, science and


Cooperation

91

technology, space and trade. However, defence

cooperation between the two countries is a dominating

factor in the overall relationship. Indo-Israeli defence

engagement comprises not only weapons sale but also

involves elements of co-development and transfer of

technology. Israel has proven to be an appealing supplier

of state-of-the-art weapons and technology to India over

the last two decades. Furthermore, India-Israel defence

cooperation would continue in the coming years. Since

US-India interests are now converging, the US would

also likely not object to the transfer of weapons and

technology from Israel to India. More significantly,

India would also have an indirect access to US weapons

components through Israel. Though India is still

dependent on Israeli weapons and would remain so for at

least a foreseeable future, the country may potentially

become self-sufficient in the development of

sophisticated weapons technology owing to the transfer

of Israeli technology to the country under its trade deals.

Israeli arms procurement by India including weapons for

surveillance and reconnaissance and anti-missile systems

directly influence Pakistan’s sense of security. Israeli

weapons in the region not only affect deterrence stability

but also intensify the arms race in South Asia.

References

1. Josef Mills, “Israel and India: The Ties that Bind,” RUSI,

January 23, 2018, https://rusi.org/commentary/israel-and-

india-ties-bind. 2. Pieter D. Wezeman et al., “Trends in International Arms

Transfers 2017,” SIPRI Fact Sheet, Stockholm

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trends-international-arms-transfers-2017. 3. Ibid.


92

4. “Indian Commandos in Israel for 2-Week Long Blue Flag

Military Drills,” Hindustan Times, November 9, 2017,

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commandos-in-israel-for-2-week-long-blue-flag-military-

drills/story-sNXH78lHnk3c2Qav7I3xPN.html. 5. Ibid.

6. “Modi in Israel: All that Happened during PM’s Historic

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modi-in-israel-benjamin-netanyahu-reuven-rivlin-all-that-

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snapshot/articleshow/62281261.cms. 8. Chinmaya R. Gharekhan, “India–Israel: Retrospective and

Prospective,” Strategic Analysis 41, no.4 (2017): 316-317. 9. “Modi in Israel: All that Happened during PM’s Historic

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The policy of ‘de-hyphenation’ of Israel-Palestine

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hyphenating-israel-palestine-why-india-must-handle-

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Cooperation

93

nation/israel-pm-benjamin-netanyahu-leaves-for-historic-

visit-to-india/articleshow/62495268.cms. 13.

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vote-why-india-voted-against-the-us/story-

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http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pag

es/declaration%20of%20establishment%20of%20state%2

0of%20israel.aspx. 17.

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Dr. R. Sreekantan Nair, Dynamics of a Diplomacy

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Ibid., 52. 20.

P.R. Kumaraswamy, “Reframing India’s Palestine

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Efraim Inbar, “Israel and India: Looking Back and

Ahead,” Strategic Analysis 41, no. 4 (2017): 370. 22.

Sudha Rao, The Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Indian View

(New Delhi: Orient Longman Ltd., 1972), 38. 23.

Inbar, “Israel and India,” 371. 24.

Efraim Inbar, ‘The Indian-Israeli Entente’, Orbis 48,

(2004): 92-95. 25.

Moshe Yegar, The Long Journey to Asia. A Chapter in the

Diplomatic History of Israel (Haifa: Haifa University

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P. R. Kumaraswamy, “India-Israel: Emerging

Partnership,” Journal of Strategic Studies 25, no.4


94

(2002): 198. 27.

Ibid, 199. 28.

Ibid. 199. 29.

“Israel and India: 26 Years of Friendship, Innovation, and

Prosperity,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January

14, 2018, http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2018/Pages/

Israel-India-26-years-of-friendship-innovation-prosperity-

14-Jan-2018.aspx. 30.

S. Samuel C. Rajiv, “India and Israel: Strategic Partners

on the Move,” The Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic

Studies, Perspectives Paper No. 728, January 30, 2017,

https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/india-israel-

strategic-partners/. 31.

Ibid. 32.

Inbar, ‘The Indian-Israeli Entente’, 97. 33.

Bidanda M Chengappa, “India-Israel Relations: Politico-

Military Dimensions,” CLAWS Journal (2010), 251. 34.

“Asia and the Middle East lead rising trend in arms

imports, US exports grow significantly,” Stockholm

international Peace Research Institute, March 12, 2018,

https://www.sipri.org/news/press-release/2018/asia-and-

middle-east-lead-rising-trend-arms-imports-us-exports-

grow-significantly-says-sipri. 35.

Vijay Prashad, Netanyahu in India: What was Swept

under the Carpet,” Al-Jazeera, January 20, 2018,

https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/netanyahu-

india-swept-carpet-180120161503967.html. 36.

Judah Ari Gross, “India Shoots Down $500m Missile

Deal with Israel ahead of Netanyahu Visit,” The Times of

Israel, January 2, 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/

india-shoots-down-500m-missile-deal-with-israel-ahead-

of-netanyahu-visit/. 37.

Vishnu Som, “In Rs. 3,547 Crore Deal, Assault Rifles,

Carbines Purchase Fast-Tracked,” NDTV, January 16,

2018, https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/government-fast-

tracks-purchase-of-assault-rifles-carbines-for-rs-3547-

crore-after-11-year-wait-1800806. 38.

Inbar, “Israel and India: Looking Back and Ahead.” 375. 39.

Ibid.


Cooperation

95

40.

Prakash Gopal, “India–Israel Defence Engagement: A

Naval Perspective,” Strategic Analysis 41, no. 4 (2017):

343. 41.

Ibid. 42.

Joshua Falk, “India's Israel Policy: The Merits of a

Pragmatic Approach,” Stanford Journal of International

Relations (2009): 2-3. 43.

Prithvi Ram Mudiam, ‘Indian Power Projection in Greater

Middle East’, in Global Politics, ed, M. Parvizi Amineh,

(Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2007), 420. 44.

Ibid. 45.

Ibid. 46.

Nicolas Blarel, The Evolution of India’s Israel Policy

(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2015), 158. 47.

Ibid. 48.

Ibid, 159. 49.

Ibid. 186. 50.

Ibid, 281. 51.

Gopal, “India–Israel Defence Engagement.” 343. 52.

K.P. Nayar, ‘Why India Chose Rafale’, The Telegraph,

February 6, 2012, https://www.telegraphindia.com/

1120206/jsp/frontpage/story_15098135.jsp. 53.

Suhasini Haider, “Paradigm shift after Israel’s aid during

Kargil,” The Hindu, July 21, 2014,

http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/paradigm-shift-

after-israels-aid-during-kargil/article6234801.ece. 54.

Nayar, “Why India Chose Rafale.” 55.

Efraim Inbar and Alvite Singh Ningthoujam, “Indo-Israeli

Defense Cooperation in the Twenty-First Century,” Middle

East Security and Policy Studies no. 93 (2012): 4. 56.

“Super Dvora II,” Bharat Rakshak, http://www.bharat-

rakshak.com/NAVY/Ships/Active/170-Super-Dvora.html. 57.

Ibid. 58.

Inbar and Ningthoujam, “Indo-Israeli Defense

Cooperation.” 6. 59.

Robert O. Freedman, Contemporary Israel (Philadelphia:

West View, 2010), 442. 60.

“The Secret of T-72 Main Battle Tanks Improved Night

Vision,” The Hindu, February 19, 2015,

http://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/bangalore/the-


96

secret-of-t72-main-battle-tanks-improved-night-

vision/article6911932.ece. 61.

Ibid. 62.

Ibid. 63.

Joseph Weiss, “IAI Presents an Impressive Array of

Technologies,” Indian Defence Review, February 18,

2015, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/iai-

presents-an-impressive-array-of-technologies/. 64.

“IAI will Supply Elbit Systems Components Worth $13

million for the Ehud, Air Combat Maneuvering

Instrumentation (ACMI) Systems,” Israeli Aircraft

Industries, April 5, 2011,

http://www.iai.co.il/Shared/UserControls/Print/PopUp.asp

x?lang=en&docid=42456. 65.

Ibid. 66.

“Scrapped Spike missile deal back on table, says

Netanyahu,” The Hindu, January 18, 2018,

http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/scrapped-spike-

missile-deal-back-on-table-says-

netanyahu/article22463823.ece. 67.

Nayanima Basu, ‘Punj Lloyd ties up with Israeli co to

manufacture assault rifles in India’, The Hindu, May 4,

2017, https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/

companies/punj-lloyd-ties-up-with-israeli-co-to-

manufacture-assault-rifles-in-india/article9680111.ece. 68.

Ibid. 69.

“Defence Acquisition Council nod to procurement of

assault rifles, carbines worth Rs 3,547 crore,” The Times

of India, January 16, 2018,

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/dac-nod-to-

procurement-of-assault-rifles-carbines-worth-rs-3547-

crore/articleshow/62525551.cms. 70.

Neeta Lal, “India’s Eye in the Sky Takes Aim,” World

Security Network, April 21, 2009,

http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/India-Israel-

Palestine/Lal-Neeta/Indias-eye-in-the-sky-takes-aim. 71.

Indrani Bagchi, “Military surveillance gets a boost with

RISAT-2,” The Times of India, April 21, 2009,

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Military-


Cooperation

97

surveillance-gets-a-boost-with-RISAT-2/articleshow/

4426913.cms. 72.

“India-Israel Sign Seven MoUs on Space, Water

Conservation, Agriculture; Plan to set up $40 million

R&D Fund,” First Post, June 26, 2018,

https://www.firstpost.com/india/india-israel-sign-seven-

mous-on-space-water-conservation-agriculture-plan-to-

set-up-40-million-rd-fund-3779445.html. 73.

“PSLV-C34 Successfully Launches 20 Satellites in a

Single Flight,” Government of India, Department of

Space, Indian Space Research Organisation, June 22,

2016, https://www.isro.gov.in/update/22-jun-2016/pslv-

c34-successfully-launches-20-satellites-single-flight. 74.

“PSLV-C37 Successfully Launches 104 Satellites in a

Single Flight,” Government of India, Department of

Space, Indian Space Research Organisation, February 15,

2017, https://www.isro.gov.in/pslv-c37-successfully-

launches-104-satellites-single-flight. 75.

Raja Mansoor, “Pakistan Is Losing the Space Race,” The

Diplomat, February 1, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/

2018/02/pakistan-is-losing-the-space-race/. 76.

Ibid. 77.

Ibid. 78.

Ibid. 79.

Nicolas Blarel, The Evolution of India’s Israel Policy:

Continuity, Change, and Compromise since 1922 (New

Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2015), 300. 80.

Rahul Udoshi, “India Orders Additional Barak-1 Short-

Range SAMs,” Jane's 360, March 26, 2018,

http://www.janes.com/article/78846/india-orders-

additional-barak-1-short-range-sams. 81.

“Govt Nod for Rs 4k cr Israeli Surface-to-Air Missile

System,” Times of India, August 19, 2009,

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Govt-nod-for-

Rs-4k-cr-Israeli-surface-toair-missile%20system/

articleshow/4908764.cms?referral=PM. 82.

Masood ur Rehm Khattak, “Strategic Significance of

Indo-Israel Defence Collaboration: Implications for

Pakistan’s Security,” IPRI 16, no. 2 (2016): 52. 83.

Ibid.


98

84.

“Israeli Spyder Missile Test a Hit,” The New Indian

Express, May 12, 2017, www.newindianexpress.com/

states/odisha/2017/may/12/israeli-spyder-missile-test-a-

hit-1603851--1.html. 85.

Ibid. 86.

Efraim Inbar and Alvite Singh Ningthoujam, Indo-Israeli

Defense Cooperation in The Twenty-First Century, Rubin

Centre in Research for International Affairs, December

22, 2011, http://www.rubincenter.org/2011/12/indo-

israeli-defense-cooperation-in-the-twenty-first-century/. 87.

“India Approves $2.5 billion Missile Deal with Israel,”

The Express Tribune, February 24, 2017,

https://tribune.com.pk/story/1337386/india-approves-2-5-

billion-missile-deal-israel/. 88.

Lopamudra Roy, “IAI Delivers First Domestically Built

LRSAM to Indian Navy, “Naval Technology, September

5, 2017, https://www.naval-technology.com/news/

newsiai-delivers-first-domestically-built-lrsam-to-indian-

navy-5917555/. 89.

R. N. Ganesh, “Nuclear Missile-Related Risks in South

Asia.” In The Next Arms Race, ed, Henry D. Sokolski,

(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), 305-355. 90.

Yiftah S. Shapir, “Israel’s Arms Sales to India,” Strategic

Assessment 2, no. 3 (2009): 30-34. 91.

Khattak, “Strategic Significance of Indo-Israel Defence

Collaboration.” 92.

Nicolas Blarel, “Assessing US Influence over India–Israel

Relations: A Difficult Equation to Balance? Strategic

Analysis 41, no. 4 (2017): 394. 93.

Ibid. 94.

Jason A. Kirk, ‘Indian-Americans and the US–India

Nuclear Agreement: Consolidation of an Ethnic Lobby?’,

Foreign Policy Analysis 4 no. 3 (2008), 275–300. 95.

Blarel, “Assessing US Influence over India–Israel

Relations,” 395. 96.

Vivek Raghuvanshi, “US, India Said to be Nearing

Javelin Co-Production Agreement,” Defence September

21, 2016, https://www.defensenews.com/land/

2016/09/21/us-india-said-to-be-nearing-javelin-co-

production-agreement/.


Cooperation

99

97.

Rahul Singh, ‘India, Israel seal $2 billion missile deals:

What it means for New Delhi?’, Hindustan Times, April

7, 2017, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-

news/india-israel-seal-2-billion-missile-deals-what-it-

means-for-new-delhi/story-

xgm5OC7iYHNtuX1YDCV10J.html. 98.

Blarel, “Assessing US Influence over India–Israel

Relations,” 395. 99.

“Asia and the Middle East Lead Rising Trend in Arms

Imports.” 100.

Herb Keinon, “Netanyahu: Modi Is Revolutionizing

Israel-India Ties,” The Jerusalem Post, January 16, 2018,

https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/India-Israel/WATCH-

Netanyahu-and-Modi-pledge-strong-ties-in-joint-

statement-536783. 101.

Shapir, “Israel’s Arms Sales to India,” 35. 102.

Ibid, 36. 103.

Scrapped Spike missile deal back on table, says

Netanyahu.” 104.

Shapir, “Israel’s Arms Sales to India,” 36. 105.

“The Military Balance”, International Institute for

Strategic Studies (2015): 251, 278. 106.

Ibid. 107.

C. Raja Mohan, “Fernandes Unveils Limited War

Doctrine”, The Hindu, January 25, 2000,

http://www.thehindu.com/2000/01/25/stories/01250001.ht

m. 108.

Ganesh, “Nuclear Missile-Related Risks in South Asia.” 109.

Frank P. Harvey, “The Future of Strategic Stability and

Nuclear Deterrence,” International Journal 58, no. 2

(Spring, 2003): 321-22. 110.

Robert Powell, “Crisis Stability in the Nuclear Age,” The

American Political Science Review 83, no. 1 (March

1989): 61; 67. 111.

Feroz Hassan Khan, “Prospects for Indian and Pakistani

Arms Control,” in The Next Arms Race, ed. Henry D.

Sokolski (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, July

2012), 358. 112.

Ibid. 113.

Ibid.


100

114.

Press Release, No PR-133/2013-ISPR, Inter Services

Public Relations, September 5, 2013,

https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release-

detail.php?id=2361. 115.

Press Release, No. PR 133/2013 ISPR, Inter Services

Public Relations, September 5, 2013,

https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-

press_release&date=2013/9/5. 116.

“Press Release, No. PR94/2011-ISPR, Inter Services

Public Relations, April 19, 2011.

http://www.press.uchicago.edu/books/turabian/turabian_c

itationguide.html. 117.

Press release, No PR-344/2017-ISPR, Inter Services

Public Relations, July 5, 2017, https://www.ispr.gov.pk/

press-release-detail.php?id=4097. 118.


Public Relations, January 9, 2017,

https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release-

detail.php?id=3672. 119.


Public Relations, January 24, 2017, www.ispr.gov.pk/

press-release-detail.php?id=3705. 120.

Press Release, No PR-10/2017-ISPR. 121.

Press Release, No PR-34/2017-ISPR.

101

Afghanistan and the New Great Game:

Implications for Pakistan

Kashif Hussain

Introduction

For much of the late 19th and early 20

th centuries the

former British and Russian empires remained locked in

what is known as the ‘Great Game’. With Central Asia

forming part of the Russian empire and South Asia being

colonised by the British, Afghanistan served as the

buffer zone between their respective spheres of

influence. With the end of the Second World War the

Great Game also came to an end. However, the post 9/11

geostrategic maneuvers around Afghanistan gave rise to

the so called ‘New Great Game’. In this new game,

various regional and extra-regional powers are trying to

increase their influence in Afghanistan in order to gain

regional hegemony.

Ostensibly, the US intervened in Afghanistan to fight

terrorism. However, the long term US’ presence in the

country indicates that it is carefully, selectively and very

deliberately deploying its resources on the Eurasian

continent.1The vast landmass of Asia and Europe

combined constitutes the Eurasian continent.2 Within

Eurasia Afghanistan holds a significant geostrategic

position for connecting Southern, Southeastern, Western

and Central Asia. The reasons for the US to deploy its

military in Afghanistan are also clear. Doing so has

enabled the US to keep a check on China and Russia,

both of which could eventually emerge as dominant and

antagonistic Asian powers.3

In order to enhance its presence in the region, the US has

also maneuvered the complex South Asian power

Afghanistan and the New Great Game: Implications for Pakistan

102

relations to its advantage.4 It has struck a strategic

partnership with India, which already had tense relations

with China. The growing Indo-US partnership in turn

has strengthened the China-Pakistan strategic nexus.

China has launched its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

and selected the Pakistani corridor to access the Middle

East, Central Asia and beyond, through the CPEC.5 The

refusal of both the US and India to recognise CPEC not

only adds complexity to the situation but is a

manifestation of the rivalry between the two camps.6

Interestingly, Russia is also favouring China and

Pakistan in matters relating to Afghanistan. Against the

Indo-US wish to find a military solution to the Afghan

conflict, Russia supports Sino-Pakistan efforts for a

political breakthrough.7

Pakistan’s role is also pivotal for its geostrategic

leverage8 vis-à-vis Afghanistan and for connecting West,

Central and Southeast Asia. Pakistan also remains

important in terms of its history of political influence

over the Afghan Taliban.9 For the United States (US),

Pakistan is also vital for ensuring a smooth supply of

logistics to its mission in Afghanistan.10

The country’s

significance for China is evident in its mega investment

in the shape of the CPEC. Meanwhile, Russia is also

enhancing its bilateral relations with Pakistan, keeping in

view its central role in the changing geostrategic

environment.

In view of the emerging geostrategic trends this paper

discusses the following:

What are the key strategic objectives of various

players involved in the New Great Game in

Afghanistan?


103

How does Pakistan’s geostrategic location

influence the US, Chinese and Russian policies in

pursuance of their interests in the region?

What implications and policy options exist for

Pakistan in light of the emerging New Great

Game?

The US Geostrategy in the Region

The interplay of strategy and geography in world affairs

led to the creation of the term ‘geostrategy’. Coined by

Frederic L. Shuman in 1942, geostrategy was the

translation of the German term ‘Wehrgeopolitik’ used by

the German geostrategist Karl Haushofer.11

Zbigniew

Brzezinski is one of the most prominent contemporary

advocates of geostrategy. His famous book The Grand

Chessboard is an instrumental guide available in order to

comprehend the US’ underlying geostrategic maneuvers

in the Eurasian continent. He defines the subject as, “the

strategic management of geopolitical objectives”.12

In

explaining the required elements for the US to be able to

exercise its geostrategic power and employ its

geostrategic skill, Brzezinski emphasised ‘the careful,

selective and very deliberate deployment of American

resources on Eurasian chessboard’.13

According to the

writer, the global primacy of the US will depend on how

America deals with the complex Eurasian power

relations and its ability to prevent the emergence of a

dominant and antagonistic Asian power.14

In pursuit of Brzezinski’s geostrategic

recommendations15

to wield greater geopolitical

advantage over the Eurasian continent, the US has

adopted attributes of ‘offensive realism’.16

John J.

Mearsheimer’s theory of ‘offensive realism’ is built on

five core assumptions. The first assumption is that there

is anarchy in the international system, which means that


104

there is no hierarchically superior, coercive power that

can guarantee limits on the behaviour of states.17

Second,

all great powers possess offensive military capabilities,

which they are capable of using against other states.18

Third, states can never be certain that other states will

refrain from using those offensive military

capabilities.19

Fourth, states seek to maintain their

survival above all other goals.20

Fifth, states are rational

actors, which means that they consider the immediate

and long-term consequences of their actions, and think

strategically about how to survive.21

Mearsheimer further

argues that the best way for great powers to ensure their

survival is to maximise power and pursue hegemony.22

The prospects for a state becoming global hegemon23

are

meagre due to vastness of the world territory hence the

need for great powers to pursue regional

hegemony.24

China’s bid for regional hegemony has thus

prompted the US and most of China’s neighbours to try

and contain China.25

Afghanistan serves as a focal area for the US to keep a

check on China’s growing interests in South and Central

Asia which could ultimately become a threat to US’

hegemony in the overall Asia Pacific region.26

To this

end, the US has chosen to partner with China’s

unfriendly neighbour, India.27

Interestingly, the US is not only encouraging India’s

involvement in Afghanistan but also favours a greater

position for New-Delhi in the greater Asia Pacific

region.28

India plays an important role within US’ counter

China policy in South Asia and the wider Asia Pacific

region.29

The 2018 US National Defence Strategy (NDS)

clearly singled out China as a strategic competitor

possessing revisionist objectives to attain regional

hegemony in the Asia pacific region.30

One of the

objectives outlined in the NDS document is clearly


105

bolstering partners against coercion.31

In December

2016, the US Embassy and Consulates in India outlined

a fact sheet endorsing the defence relations of both

countries; and finalised India’s designation as a “Major

Defence Partner”.32

The Indo-US nuclear deal and the

defence partnership between the two countries can also

be explained in the light of the US’ efforts to contain

China. The US struck a civil nuclear deal with India in

2008. It was followed by close cooperation in building

India’s anti-ballistic missile systems.33

Over the years,

the US has become one of India’s largest arms

exporters.34

Both countries signed the Logistic Support

Agreement (LSA) in August 2016. The agreement

governs the use of each other’s land, air and naval bases

for repair and resupply. Moreover, the US is enhancing

India’s military capabilities in order to bring New-Delhi

at par with China.35

The fact that the US remains wary of China’s Belt and

Road Initiative (BRI) is evident from the fact that Alice

G. Wells, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

for South and Central Asia voiced concern about China’s

fast-moving Belt and Road Initiative during the US-

India forum held in April 2018.36

Wells emphasised that

through this initiative Beijing pumps cash into

infrastructure projects to buy access to resources around

the region.37

The CPEC, which is a flagship project of

the BRI, envisages taking China’s peaceful rise to new

heights by overhauling Pakistan’s infrastructure;

moreover it also acts as a counter-balance to the growing

Indo-US partnership.38

At the same time, Russia’s role is changing in the region

owing to the Afghan situation. Traditionally, Moscow

has been a close ally of India in the region.39

Although,

both India and Russia still maintain cordial relations,

their interests seem to be diverging in Afghanistan.40


106

Even as India and the US remain focused on fighting the

Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, Moscow wants a

political reconciliation and streamlining of the Taliban in

order to focus attention on the rising Daesh threat.41

In

fact, the danger of Daesh for both Pakistan and Russia

has brought the two countries closer.42

In 2014, Russia

lifted its arms embargo on Pakistan.43

Since then,

Russia-Pakistan strategic relations have been growing.

In addition to that, Moscow’s endorsement of the BRI

and its plans to connect it with Eurasian Economic

Union (EEU) has meant Russia siding on the Sino-Pak

camp.44

The New Great Game

US’ Interests

The Bilateral Security Agreement signed between the

former Obama Admiration and Government of

Afghanistan in 2014 clearly reflects the US’ strategic

objective to ensure its long term presence in

Afghanistan. The agreement permits the stay of the US

and NATO troops in Afghanistan until the end of 2024

and beyond.45

The US Military will have access to nine

major land and airbases, including Bagram, Jalalabad,

Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, Herat, Helmand, Gardez and

Shindand.46

For the US, Afghanistan serves as a vital

geostrategic point not only to keep a check on Russian

influence in Central Asia but also to deny any prospect

of China becoming a regional hegemon.47

Additionally, the US has shown its willingness to

connect the Central Asian energy resources through

pipelines with South Asia. In 2011, former US Secretary

of State, Hillary Clinton, shared her vision with her

German and Afghan counterparts on the sidelines of

66th United Nations General Assembly’s conference. It


107

asserted the revival of the old concept of Silk Road.

Clinton expressed her willingness to build rail tracks,

highways and energy resource pipelines.48

The revival of the New Silk Road would promote

economic growth throughout Central Asia by integrating

the region into the global economy through introduction

of advanced infrastructure and effective cross-border

trade.49

Yet another important objective of the new Silk

Road initiative is to provide an economic boost to

Afghanistan.50

Various initiatives have been taken as a

result. Projects like Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-

India (TAPI) pipeline and CASA-1000 which aim to

provide energy from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to

Afghanistan, Pakistan and India are integral parts of the

US’ new Silk Road Strategy.51

On February 23, 2018

Afghanistan’s section of TAPI pipeline project was

launched in Herat.52

The 1,814-kilometer pipeline would

pass through the territories of Herat, Farah, Nimroz,

Helmand and Kandahar provinces of Afghanistan, then

via Quetta and Multan in Pakistan the final destination

of the pipeline would be the Indian town of Fazilka. The

envisaged $22.5 billion project is expected to be

completed by 2019.

China’s Interests

China’s unprecedented economic growth during the last

couple of decades has helped the country reduce poverty

and unemployment at home and increase its national

wealth. Though, the south and centre remain wealthier

and more prosperous, the largest western autonomous

region of Sinkiang is comparatively underdeveloped.53

One of the reasons for the underdevelopment of

Sinkiang is its location far from the sea-lanes of South

China. An even the bigger challenge exists in the shape

of the rise of extremism in Sinkiang.54

In order to ensure


108

the spillover effects of economic prosperity to the

northwest of the country, China needs complete stability

in conflict ridden Afghanistan (adjacent to Sinkiang) to

stop the spread of extremism to the chinese mainland.55

Achieving this strategic goal would also help the country

to successfully implement President Xi’s geo-economic

vision (BRI) to replace the Northwest’s costly

communication dependence from South China Sea to the

sea-lanes of Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf.56

In order to ensure cheap access to energy resources

China has enhanced its relations with Pakistan through

its mega investment in the shape of the CPEC. China is

also making efforts to enhance Pakistan’s military

capabilities, so that the country would serve as a

counter-balance to India.57

Pakistan is significant for

China to keep a check on India at such a time when the

former has become a key part of the US’ counter China

policy.58

Interestingly, military assistance from China is

also vital for Pakistan, especially because the US has

cut-off almost its entire military related support to the

country.59

China has become the largest arms exporter to

Pakistan surpassing the US.60

In August 2017, the

former inked a deal with Pakistan to provide it with eight

new stealth attack submarines to form the sea-based arm

of Islamabad’s growing nuclear second-strike triad.61

One of China’s key interests in the region remains

stabilising Afghanistan in order to curb the spread of

extremism to Sinkiang. To that end, China is making

serious efforts for Afghanistan’s economic

reconstruction and political reconciliation. The country

is an active member of the ‘Heart of Asia - Istanbul

Process’ (the process sought to bring cooperation

between Afghanistan and its neighbors). The resolve for

a political reconciliation between the National Unity

Government of Afghanistan (NUG) and the Taliban is


109

also reflective in China’s efforts to activate the

Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG).62

Though the

QCG has not been able to yield any viable results,

Afghanistan continues to look towards China for

asserting influence over Pakistan to bring the Taliban to

the negotiating table.63

In this regard, China continues its

efforts to ensure a smooth relationship between Kabul

and Islamabad. On June 24, 2017, Chinese Foreign

Minister Wang Yi after consulting both the foreign

offices in Islamabad and Kabul established a crisis

management mechanism.64

Most recently, Beijing hosted

the first China-Pakistan-Afghanistan tri-lateral dialogue

mechanism to maintain a smooth and workable

environment for Afghan political reconciliation.65

The

political reconciliation would lead to a stable

Afghanistan which is essential for China to curb the

spread of extremism to its mainland.

As far as Afghanistan’s economic reconstruction is

concerned, China remains one of the largest sources of

foreign direct investment.66

The country is also investing

in Afghanistan’s housing sector.67

Additionally, efforts

are being to uplift the quality of higher education in

Afghanistan.68

Most importantly, under BRI China is

working on at least three infrastructural projects in

Afghanistan which would not only uplift the economic

conditions of the conflict ridden country but also assist

to connect entire Eurasian continent.69

Russian Interests

Afghanistan has always remained geostrategically

important for Moscow. Even during the late 19th and

early 20th century the former Russian Empire did not

allow the British to take control of the Afghan territory.

Afghanistan served as a buffer zone keeping the British

influence away from Central Asia. The Soviet invasion


110

of Afghanistan during the 1980s also reflects the

country’s importance for Moscow. The former Soviet

Union invaded Afghanistan in order to support the

communist government of the People’s Democratic

Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) against a growing

insurgency.70

However, experts have also pointed

towards the Soviet Union’s larger objective to access the

warm waters of the Arabian Sea and markets of the

Middle East through Pakistan.71

Another reason which

prompted the Soviets to invade Afghanistan was the

threat of the US influence’ spreading to Afghanistan and

Central Asia from Pakistan and Iran.72

This can be

attributed to the fact that during 1970s, Pakistan and Iran

were part of the US led Central Treaty Organisation

(CENTO).73

However, the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan failed and the USSR collapsed as a result in

1992. Almost a decade later, the US embarked on the

second Afghan invasion in reaction to the 9/11 terror

attacks. Russia initially supported the US invasion.74

However, Washington’s inability to bring stability to the

Afghanistan during the last 17-years and the consequent

rise of the Daesh in the war torn country has changed

Moscow’s perceptions. Russia deems it necessary to

politically reconcile with the Taliban in order to

collectively fight the Daesh threat.

Moscow deems it necessary to curb the Daesh threat

before it spreads to mainland Russia through Central

Asia. Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov has

stated his concern that the Daesh’s presence in

Afghanistan “increases the risk of terrorists entering

Central Asia, from where it’s not difficult for them to get

to Russia, and further.”75

For that purpose, Russia wants

political mainstreaming of the Taliban in order to

collectively fight the Daesh threat. However, the United

States and National Unity Government of Afghanistan

seem more concentrated on fighting the Taliban than


111

confronting the Daesh.76

This may be because Daesh has

been a rival to the Taliban in Afghanistan, with both

groups clashing as a consequence of rising strategic

competition.77

In fact, observers have accused the United

States and the NUG of collaborating with the Daesh

against the Taliban. While the United States has denied

this claim, it may be true that the United States and the

NUG are underestimating the threat of Daesh because it

perceives the group’s struggles with their primary

adversary (the Taliban) as a strategic asset to their

ongoing conflict in Afghanistan.

Owing to the situation, Moscow has not only transferred

significant military technology to Islamabad after lifting

its arm embargo in 2014 and increasing military to

military collaboration by holding joint exercises but also

by establishing an anti-terror commission to counter the

rising threat of Daesh from Afghanistan.78

As far as Central and South Asian integration is

concerned, Russia has endorsed China’s BRI and plans

to connect it with its vision of Eurasian Economic

Union.79

That in turn would serve to fulfil Russia’s

access to the warm waters of Arabian Sea via Pakistan,

Afghanistan and Central.80

A considerable Russia

presence in the Arabian Sea would help to strengthen

Sino-Pak nexus to counter the US.

Pakistan and the New Great Game

Notwithstanding the 16-year long Pak-US collaboration

in Afghanistan, the situation in the country is far from

stable. The Pakistan-US collaboration in the immediate

aftermath of the 2002 US-led invasion of Afghanistan

was fruitful. Consequently, in 2004 the US extended its

‘major non-NATO ally’ status to Pakistan recognising

the country’s efforts in the war against terror. The real


112

shift in Pakistan’s attitude towards the US followed the

invasion of Iraq.81

It was at that time when Pakistan

became skeptical about the US’ willingness to remain in

Afghanistan once the war was over.82

The Pakistani

leadership recognised the fact that once the military

operation was over, Afghanistan would require a new

government and reconstruction efforts for which the

Taliban leadership would be useful.83

Pakistan thus

urged the United States to distinguish between the

Taliban that wanted to strike a peace deal and those who

wanted to continue fighting.84

However the US wanted

Pakistan to not distinguish between different Taliban

factions.85

Since then it continues to criticise Pakistan’s

policy vis-a-vis the Taliban. The US alleges that

Pakistan assists various factions of the Afghan Taliban

in their activities against the US mission in

Afghanistan.86

This suspicion in turn has encouraged a

greater Indian role in Afghanistan, which has resulted in

a worsening of Pak-US relations.87

On its part, Islamabad contends that the greater Indian

involvement in Afghanistan allows New-Delhi to help

fuel anti-Pakistan segments in Kabul. Those anti-

Pakistan entities, in turn, carry out various illegal

activities, including terrorist attacks from across the

porous Durand Line.88

Not only does the US encourage India’s greater

involvement in Afghanistan, despite Pakistan’s

annoyance, it has also reduced its defence collaboration

with Islamabad. Even as Pakistan is being criticised for

its alleged differentiation between good and bad Taliban,

military aid to Islamabad is declining. There was a 73%

drop in US security aid to Pakistan from 2011 to 2015.89

In 2016 the US also cancelled the subsidised sale of

eight F-16 fighter jets.90

Pakistan received $225 million

in US foreign military financing in 2016 and in 2017 a


113

reduction of $125 million has been proposed for the first

US budget under President Trump.91

Recently, the US

suspended its entire security aid to Pakistan.92

However, for the US’ strategic objective of long term

survival in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s cooperation is

essential as the country provides the shortest sea route to

Kabul. The US has been utilising Pakistani territory to

maintain logistics to its mission in Afghanistan. In

addition to that, without Pakistan’s assistance, it would

be difficult for the US to convince the Taliban for

political settlement of the Afghan conflict, due to the

history of the Pakistan’s influence over the insurgent

group.93

Moreover, Pakistan also holds a central role in the US’

New Silk Road concept. The implementations of TAPI

and CASA-1000 projects would not be possible without

Pakistan’s collaboration. However, the US seems to be

undermining Pakistan’s significance for the achievement

of its own objectives in the region.

As far as China is concerned, Pakistan is not only the

largest market for Chinese armaments but Islamabad

also secures Beijing’s larger interest in the Indian Ocean

with respect to its energy security. China’s aims to

achieve superiority over India in South Asia cannot be

fulfilled without Pakistan’s assistance. Pakistan’s crucial

location and the establishment of one the world deepest

sea ports of Gawadar are vital in this regard. Moreover,

the CPEC and its centrality to the overall BRI increases

Pakistan’s significance for China. The 3000 km road

link under CPEC connects the Gawadar port with

China’s Sinkiang province and provides Beijing with a

shorter route for the markets of Europe, Central Asia and

the Middle East.94

The corridor would also serve to

reduce its dependence on the Strait of Malacca in the


114

Indian Ocean, through which more than three quarters of

its oil imports are currently being shipped.95

China

deems its dependence on Malacca Strait a strategic

vulnerability due to the US’ predominance over these

maritime expanses.96

For Russia too Islamabad remains important to achieve

its changing strategic interests in the region. Russia

acknowledges the Taliban’s position in Afghanistan as

the US remains unable to defeat the insurgent group.

Russia also acknowledges that Pakistan holds

considerable influence over the Taliban. In addition to

that, the rising threat of Daesh in Afghanistan is a

common danger for Russia, Pakistan and the Taliban.

Keeping this convergence of interest in view, Russia has

extended its strategic relations with Pakistan during the

last couple of years. Secondly, the successful

implementation of CPEC and Russia’s Plans to connect

the EEU with the BRI provide Moscow with the

opportunity to access the warms waters of the Arabian

Sea.

Conclusion

‘Containing China’ is one of main reasons for the

prolonged US presence in Afghanistan and its growing

strategic partnership with India. Their offensive policies

in the region have strengthened the already strong Sino-

Pak relation. Moreover, the CPEC offers immense

opportunities for countries to uplift the socio-economic

condition of the entire region.

With China surpassing the US in fulfilling Pakistan’s

military and civil nuclear needs, Washington has much

to lose as result of weak relations with Islamabad. The

US cannot maintain the logistics to its mission in

Afghanistan without Pakistan’s help. Pakistan is also


115

vital for bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table,

without which the end to the US problems in

Afghanistan seem improbable.

As far as Russia is concerned, Islamabad must capitalise

on its growing relations with Moscow by further

exploring its defence industry and making way for its

energy market. The increased Russo-Pak cooperation

should be viewed in the context of increasingly complex

challenges being faced by Moscow in the evolving

Afghan scenario. Russia considers Pakistan an important

player for the stabilisation of Afghanistan. Keeping in

view Russia’s longstanding relations with India and its

growing relations with Pakistan, Moscow could

ultimately be in a position to mediate to help resolve the

outstanding issues between the two countries.

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117

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Mearsheimer, John J. “The Gathering Storm: China’s

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There is 4000 km long disputed Line of Actual Control

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The US’ South Asia strategy announced in August 2017

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118

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https://www.dawn.com/news/1145759


119

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120

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Michael Clarke, “China’s Afghanistan Dilemma,”

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2f31af407cc8 61.

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to-supply-pakistan-with-8-new-stealth-attack-submarines-

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Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) is a four-nation

group working for reconciliation in Afghanistan which

includes Afghanistan, China, Pakistan and the US. The

group aims to initiate reconciliation process between

civilian government in Afghanistan and the Taliban to

preserve Afghanistan’s unity, sovereignty and territorial

integrity and achieve lasting peace and stability in

Afghanistan and the region. 63.

Arushi Kumar, “Why China’s One Belt One Road

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2017. https://southasianvoices.org/why-china-one-belt-

one-road-matters-afghanistan/ 64.

Baqir Sajjad, “China Brokers Pak-Afghan Crisis

Mechanism,” Dawn, June 26, 2017.


121

https://www.dawn.com/news/1341752/china-brokers-pak-

afghan-crisis-mechanism 65.

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12/26/c_136853473.htm 66.

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Relations,” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in

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http://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-china-

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http://china.aiddata.org/projects/37861 69.

China intends to extend CPEC into Afghanistan through a

set of six proposed projects including the Turkmenistan-

Afghanistan-Pakistan energy transmission line; a

motorway or rail connection from Peshawar in Pakistan to

Kunduz and extending into Central Asia; a motorway

project between Peshawar and Kabul; a road link between

Torkham and Kabul to join an existing road with

Pakistan; railway lines linking Pakistan’s Landi-Kotal

with Jalalabad and Pakistan’s Chaman to SpeenBoldak.

Additionally, the Five Nations Railway Corridor (FNRC)

is another project under BRI which runs through China,

Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, and Iran, connecting

China with the Iranian ports of Chabahar and Bandar

Abbas. 70.

“Afghan War,” Encyclopedia Britannica.

http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/turabian/turabian-

notes-and-bibliography-citation-quick-guide.html 71.

David C. George, “Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan:

Causes and Future Options,” Air War College (1986): 1,

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a178357.pdf 72.

“Russia and Afghanistan,” Institute for the study of war,

February 5, 2018.

http://www.understandingwar.org/russia-and-afghanistan


122

73.

“Central Treaty Organisation,” Encyclopedia Iranica.

http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/central-treaty-

organization-cento-a-mutual-defense-and-economic-

cooperation-pact-among-persia-turkey-and-pakistan-wi 74.

Russia and Afghanistan, Institute for the study of war,

February 5, 2018. 75.

“Pakistan Shares Russian Concern over Daesh Presence

in Afghanistan,” Pakistan Today, February 20, 2018.

https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2018/02/20/pakistan-

shares-russias-concern-over-daesh-presence-in-

afghanistan-says-asif/ 76.

“163 Rebels Dead in Weeks of Helmand Operation,”

Pajhwok Afghan News, November 5, 2017.

http://archive.pajhwok.com/en/2017/11/05/163-rebels-

dead-weeks-helmand-operation 77.

“Islamic State-Taliban Clash in Afghanistan Dozens

Killed,” Business Insider, April 26, 2017.

http://www.businessinsider.com/ap-islamic-state-taliban-

clash-in-afghanistan-dozens-killed-2017-4 78.

Kashif Hussain, “Russia-Pakistan Strategic Convergence:

Countering Daesh in Afghanistan,” South Asian Voices,

April 11, 2018. https://southasianvoices.org/russia-

pakistan-strategic-convergence-daesh/ 79.

Reid Standish, “China and Russia.” 80.

Raza Khan, “Russia’s CPEC Dream is Pakistan’s

Dilemma,” Express Tribune, September 6, 2017.

https://tribune.com.pk/story/1498597/russias-cpec-dream-

pakistans-dilemma/ 81.

Hussain Nadim, “Neither Friend nor Foe: Pakistan, the

United States and the war in Afghanistan,” Lowy Institute

(2017).

https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/neither-friend-

nor-foe-pakistan-united-states-and-war-afghanistan 82.

Ibid. 83.

Ibid. 84.

Ibid. 85.

Ibid. 86.

Mushahid Hussian, “Trump’s Afghanistan Policy: the

View from Islamabad,” CNN, August 23, 2017.


123

https://edition.cnn.com/2017/08/22/opinions/pakistan-

view-on-trump-afghan-hussain-opinion/index.html 87.

Ibid. 88.

Ibid. 89.

“US Security Assistance to Pakistan Declines to 73%,

Dawn,” August 23, 2016.

https://www.dawn.com/news/1279382 90.

Ankit Panda, “US won’t Subsidies Pakistan’s Purchase

of F-16 Fighter Jets,” The Diplomat, May 4, 2016.

https://thediplomat.com/2016/05/us-wont-subsidize-

pakistans-purchase-of-f-16-fighter-jets/ 91.

“US military Aid to Pakistan to have $125m Cut,” The

News, May 26, 2017.

https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/206723-US-military-

aid-to-Pakistan-to-have-125m-cut 92.

Iqbal, “America.” 93.

Alex Vatanka, Iran and Pakistan. 94.

Hussain, “The China Pakistan,” 20. 95.

Ibid. 96.

Ibid.


124

BOOK REVIEW

Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments:

US Crisis Management in South Asia

Moeed Yusuf

Stanford University Press, 2018

PP 320

Following the end of bi-polarity, nuclear weapons have

become an important part of the foreign and security

policies of not only South Asia but also the Middle East

and East Asia. In the second nuclear age, a strategic

environment characterised by a multipolar nuclear order,

the prevention of nuclear war no longer depends on the

security calculations of the two super powers. The

emergence of the second nuclear age implies that the

only way to handle regional nuclear crises would require

a new strategic framework and also the political means

to deal with regional rivalries. Moeed Yusuf’s theory of

brokered bargaining offers both an innovative

framework and within a analysis of the important role

played by a third party mediator with enough political

influence to avert nuclear war in South Asia.

In “Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments,” Moeed

Yusuf, Associate Vice President of the Asia Centre at

the US Institute of Peace critically examines the South

Asian nuclear rivalry in the context of a unipolar world.

According to Yusuf, third party mediation, led

principally by the United States, has played an important

role in managing three South Asian crises after May

1998. Yusuf’s book is an effort to explain how the

three-way interaction between India Pakistan and the

United States unfolded during the Kargil Crisis, the

2001-2002 Military Standoff and the Mumbai Crisis

between India and Pakistan. Yusuf contends that the

dynamic of brokered bargaining by the United States

Book Review

125

was as much a consequence of the United States’

“sensitivities” to escalation risks as it was to India and

Pakistan’s sensitivities to “third party preferences given

its power to tilt the crisis decisively against them.” In

doing so he also highlights that this three way dynamic

involved signalling to multiple audiences and hence

introduced elements of misperception and inadvertence.

According to Yusuf, traditional deterrence frameworks

evolved during the Cold War are inadequate to

understand regional nuclear rivalries whether in South

Asia or elsewhere.The emergence of the second nuclear

age has indeed resulted in a strategic environment, which

cannot be understood using the traditional deterrence

models. In South Asia for example the US has played a

decisive role in diffusing several crisis situations, hence

the need to understand “crisis behaviour centered on

third party mediation.” Although third party roles

remained important during the Cold War also, Yusuf

argues that the role played by third parties was “ in the

context of formal alliance politics” and “did not take

away from the overbearing reality of the superpower

rivalry defining the bipolar global order.” Highlighting

the role of third party mediators in the regional context,

Yusuf outlines the reasons that shape a third party’s

outlook on regional crises. He argues that the choices

that the third party makes rest on the condition of

“regional nuclearisation” on the one hand and global

uni-polarity on the other.

Yusuf then goes on to examine the outcome of three

Indo-Pakistan crises using the brokered bargaining

model to draw out both differences and similarities

between the three situations. Using the trilateral model

Yusuf highlights how Delhi, Islamabad and Washington

DC, each used signaling in order to influence the other

two players and their respective policies. Yusuf


126

concludes that the US played an essential role in

diffusing the Kargil conflict by throwing its weight

behind India vis-à-vis Pakistan even as it sought “India’s

assurance that it would not expand the conflict outside

the Kargil theater.”

According to Yusuf, the so called Twin Peaks Crisis of

2001-2002 once again saw the importance of third party

mediation in helping avert conflict in South Asia.

Despite the US’ heavy commitments in Afghanistan,

decision makers in Washington DC supported US

involvement in South Asia to end the crisis. On their

part, both India and Pakistan ultimately “wanted the

United States to act as a separator” leading to a situation

where “India was urged to show restraint and Pakistan

was pushed to deliver” on the pledges that it had

previously made. The US also played an important role

as “a conduit for information sharing” between India and

Pakistan as leadership in both countries failed to

communicate directly.

Yusuf argues that the Mumbai Crisis was different than

its predecessors in that India decided to “collate all the

information, piece together the picture and then act”

rather than taking swift action against Pakistan. It chose

instead to use “aggressive and threatening rhetoric “ to

convince Pakistan to make concessions. In this situation

to the United States played a crucial role in the context

of information sharing between the two countries and

helped prevent a crisis that otherwise had the potential to

spiral out of control.

Despite the strong arguments made in favour of third

party mediation and the successful role it has played in

managing conflict in South Asia, Yusuf’s assertion that

the brokered bargaining model can offer lessons for

crises between potential rivals in the Middle East, on the

Book Review

127

Korean Peninsula or between China and India is perhaps

too simplistic. The role of the third party mediator

depends on several factors, which are unique to every

crisis and Yusuf himself identifies these differences in

comparing the three conflicts in South Asia. These

factors include but are not limited to the roles and

attitudes of the individual leaders, the regional and

global environment and also the time frames within

which a crisis matures. All these factors together create a

unique dynamic every time a crisis occurs and a

mediator may or may not be able to deal effectively with

crises in different settings.

However this does not mean that Yusuf’s theory of

brokered bargaining isn’t without merit. Third party

mediation has assumed an important role in managing

regional nuclear conflict and will remain relevant in the

future also. The requirements for deterrence in the

regional context have become more complex not only

because deterrence relationships have multiplied but

more so because they are more interdependent and

interlinked. As such, the decision-making and policies in

one relationship will invariably impact other

relationships. Yusuf’s book provides sufficient food for

thought for policy makers to envision how future

conflicts in South Asia or other regions may unfold. It

also cautions the reader however that brokered

bargaining remains fraught with risk. In a real crisis

regional rivals and third party mediators could easily

create greater confusion and instability in the absence of

a clear understanding of crisis behavior or proper tools

to ensure peaceful outcomes.

Amina Afzal