journal of the australian naval institute...1983/08/03 · journal of the australian naval...

JOURNAL OFTHE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE

V O L U M E 9 A U G U S T 1983 N U M B E R 3

Registered by Australia Post Publication No. NBP 0282

AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE

1 The Australian Naval Institute has been formed and incorporated in the Australian Capital TerritoryThe main objects of the Institute are:—

a. to encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and the Maritimeprofession.

b. to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navy and theMaritime profession.

c. to publish a journal.

2 The Institute is self supporting and non-profit making. The aim is to encourage discussion, dissemina-tion of information, comment and opinion and the advancement of professional knowledge concerningnaval and maritime matters.

3. Membership of the Institute is open to —

a. Regular Members Members of the Permanent Naval Forces of Australia

b Associate Members - (1) Members of the Reserve Naval Forces of Australia(2) Members of the Australian Military Forces and the Royal Australian

Air Force both permanent and reserve.(3) Ex-members of the Australian Defence Forces, both permanent

and reserve components, provided that they have been honourablydischarged from that force.

(4) Other persons having and professing a special interest in naval andmaritime affairs.

c Honorary Members A person who has made a distinguished contribution to the Naval ormaritime profession or who has rendered distinguished service to theInstitute may be elected by the Council to Honorary Membership

4 Joining fee for Regular and Associate members is $5 Annual Subscription for both is $15.

5 Inquiries and application for membership should be directed to:—

The Secretary,Australian Naval Institute,P.O Box 18,DEAKIN, A.C.T. 2600

CONTRIBUTIONS

As the Australian Naval Institute exists for the promotion and advancement of knowledge relating tothe Naval and maritime profession, all members are strongly encouraged to submit articles for publicationOnly in this way will our aims be achieved

DISCLAIMER

In writing for the Institute it must be borne in mind that the views expressed are those of the author andnot necessarily those of the Department of Defence, the Chief of Naval Staff or the Institute.

The Editorial Committee reserves the right to amend articles for publication purposes

ISSN 0312-5807

JOURNAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE (INC.)

T ITLE C O N T E N T S P A G E

From the Editor 3Seapower 84 5Annual Subscriptions 5Correspondence 7Defence Decision Making and a Military Strategy

— by Lieutenant Commander P.L. Clark RAN 11The Exploitation of Technology by the RAN During the Next Ten Years

— by Lieutenant Commander D.J. Farrell RAN 17The Duty/Task Inventory

— by Commander H.L. Daw and Lieutenant Commander G.P. Robson 21RAN Acquisition of a Ship's Bridge Simulator

— by Lieutenant Commander F.A. Allica RAN 25The Gladiator and the Bureaucrat

— by Lieutenant K.C. Bayly-Jones 35The Proof and Experimental Establishment Port Wakefield

— by Lieutenant K.C. Mathews RANEM 39Washington Notes

- by Tom Fnedmann 45Ships and the Sea by Commander R.J. Pennock RAN

Kangaroo Island Tragedies 49More SUCCESS 50

Chapter News 52AGM Notice 53SGM Notice 53Canberra Chapter Meeting 53Book Reviews 55Journal Back Issues and Binders 57Naval Institute Insignia 59Membership and Address Form 60

Articles or condensations of articles are not to be reprinted or reproduced without the permission ofthe Institute. Extracts may be quoted for the purposes of research, review or comment provided thesource is acknowledged

The front cover: USS TEXAS —courtesy USN

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute — Page 1

— Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

FROM THE EDITOR

I am pleased that we have been able to procure another coloured front cover and I would liketo think that the habit will become well-established, but it all depends on our advertisers: if we havea coloured ad, then at very little extra cost we can run colour on the cover. May I take thisopportunity to thank all our advertisers, regardless of their colour, and our advertising sub-editors,Ian Noble and Frank Allica.

This edition contains a mixed, but interesting collection. Without running through all thecontributions, I would like to draw your attention to a couple of pieces on little known subjects. KenMathews has responded to the earlier call for articles about the smaller establishments and hasbrought HMAS PORT WAKEFIELD to our attention, whilst Frank Allica has delivered a veryilluminating article on an RAN 'first' — the bridge simulator project. The RAN Staff College ANISilver Medal was won by Lt Cdr Farrell and his essay follows along the lines of the earlier piece byFrank Allica on the way ahead (there is also some interesting correspondence on that subject).Another Staff College paper has been given a new lease of life by Peter Clark: though written afew years ago, he still felt that his views on Defence decision making were apposite today. Toround off this summary of the contributions, there are some Washington Notes that echo the viewsexpounded by Sir VAT Smith (by the way, Tom Friedmann is looking for a copy of Vol 1 of theOfficial History of the RAN in WWII — any help?); the Assistant Editor, Haydn Daw, has a furtherarticle on training which is not as esoteric as it might seem; and Kim Bayly-Jones poses thequestion of when best to introduce young officers to the intricacies of Head Office.

My predecessor, Robyn Pennock, is keeping me well supplied with Ships and the Seaarticles, with special reference to the shipping industry centred on Adelaide, but there is still plentyof scope for other budding historians. Another former editor, Dick Perryman, is to be congratulatedon his gong in the last honours list, and one of our major contributors over the years (strangelysilent at the moment!) has been awarded the Captain Guiness prize of £100 by the Naval Review- well done, James Goldrick.

Elsewhere in this edition, you will find notices about SEAPOWER 84, currently scheduled forApril 1984, and for this year's AGM on the 28th October 1983. An unpopular issue is annualsubscriptions which are now due for renewal; despite my exhortations as Secretary last year,there were far too many late payers, so please send your cheques off now.

Lastly, two more thoughts for the future. The next edition of the journal will definitely be on therelated themes of oceanography, meteorology (with an article from our correspondent at theAmerica's Cup), hydrography, law of the sea, and coastal surveillance. Intending authors, andthose in positions where they can persuade intending authors to put pen to paper, please note thatthe copy deadline will be the 24th October; the earlier the better. The Art sub-editor, JohnMortimer, and the Distribution sub-editor, Charlie Lammers, are both keen photographers andcollectors of pictures of ships. They have suggested, and I have passed to the Council forconsideration, that as there is no central repository of historical photographs in the RAN, includingthose being taken today by Service and civilian phots, the ANI might like to consider organisingsuch a service. I do not want to be deluged with negatives, prints and photo albums in the next fewweeks as the project is no more than a fascinating thought at the moment, but I would like ourreaders to think about the implications and possibilities and perhaps send ideas to us.

Geoff Cutts


OTOMAT:THE WAVE RIDER

BEYOND THE HORIZON

Page 4 — Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

SEAPOWER 84Following the outstanding success of Seapower 79 and Seapower

81, the Council of the Australian Naval Institute is planning our ThirdInternational Seminar to be held in Canberra on 27th and 28th April,1984.

Seapower 84 will explore the subject of Australia's maritimedependence. Speakers of national and international renown are beinggathered together to address this subject from the viewpoint of strategy,politics, industry and diplomacy, commerce and media. The Chief ofNaval Staff is amongst these distinguished speakers and it is hoped thatthe seminar will be opened by His Excellency the Governor-General.

The next issue of the Journal will contain further details; in themeantime, note your diary.

ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTIONSSubscriptions for the next financial year 1983-1984 are due on the 1stOctober 1983. Please pay as soon as possible and make yourcheques/money orders payable to the Australian Naval Institute for $A15.Renewals should be forwarded to:

The TreasurerAustralian Naval InstitutePO Box 18DEAKIN ACT 2600(AUSTRALIA)

No proforma is supplied or required but if your mailing address haschanged recently, you should use the usual change of address form inthe journal and enclose it with your subscription.


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Correspondence

CONSISTENT STANDARDSDear Sir,

In the haunts where Ancient Mariners lurk, theconversation all too often, especially after a couple ofgins, tends to bewailing the way it never blows like itused to, and how the modern Navy is not like of old.

How reassuring then to this AM to learn from theFebruary 93 issue of the Journal, that the Nelsonicvirtue and chivalry to the weaker sex is still present —vide John Whittaker's article. I am sure that he lookedafter the lady in distress in the same way that Nelson didEmma Hamilton.

Also it is clear from Don Fry's address that thesame standards can be expected from the Naval Storesbranch as applied 27 years ago.

So, at least in some respects, it does blow like itused to.

Yours faithfully,

R.J. Basset!

COMMEMORATIVE PLAQUES

Dear Sir,On Sunday the 24th of April, we saw on the TV

news, a report of the unveiling, with due ceremony, of aNaval plaque at the entrance to Man of War Steps,Farm Cove, Sydney. Readers may care to know thatthe inscription reads:

This landing area was erected for the RoyalNavy in '\9'\3. For 150 years, Man of War Stepsserved as the landing and embarkation point forthe men of the British and Australian Fleets inpeace and war.

From these steps, 2,215 officers and sailorsof the Royal Australian Navy left to serve theircountry in the Great War of 1914-1918, theSecond World War 1939-1945, Korea, Malayaand Vietnam never to return to enjoy the fruits oftheir labours in their native land.

"Ye who tread their footstepsRemember their glory."

Erected by the Naval Association on the 20thJanuary 1983.'

A plaque on the eastern side of the Steps reads:'In conjunction with the official opening of the

Sydney Opera House in 1973, The Store Jetty,known as Man of War Steps, was restored jointlyby the Dept of Public Works and the MaritimeServices Board, when a ramp and berthing pon-toon were added to the structure.

The Store Jetty is situated near the site of theprivate landing steps built during the administra-tion of Major General Lachlan Macquarie, Gov ofNSW (1810-1821) and for a period, formed one ofthe walls of a small boat harbour situated to thewest.

In Admiralty charts dated 1857 the Store Jettywas named "Watering Place" and no doubt wasused by vessels at anchor in Farm Cover to obtainwater supplies. The use of the jetty for themovement of personnel and stores to and fromnaval vessels moored in the (Farm Cove) Man ofWar anchorage nearby, early last century, and thefacilities continued to be used by the RoyalAustralian Navy until work on the present recon-struction.'

Another interesting plaque, unveiled by AdmiralSir Victor Smith in 1981 is in Parramatta and reads:

This memorial was erected by the Council ofthe City of Parramatta in conjunction with theNaval Historical Society of Australia to commemo-rate the service of all ships who bear the namePARRAMATTA in the Royal Australian Navy:HMAS PARRAMATTA (Torpedo Boat Destroyer)1910-1928, HMAS PARRAMATTA (Sloop) 1939-1941, HMAS PARRAMATTA (DE) 1959. Thestern of the Torpedo Boat Destroyer, first ship builtfor the Royal Australian Navy, is embodied in thismemorial. It was the last class of British warshipdesigned with an outboard rudder.'

And finally, a couple of ideas for the Council andmembers to consider. How about the ANI Councilissuing members with some form of membership cardfor use as a means of identification when visiting shipsand depots (especially useful for Associate members)?How about the Institute insignia made up as a coatbadge? And how about a special ANI birthday card tocelebrate the RAN's 75th birthday?

Yours faithfullyEric Jehan


MARITIME OPERATIONS

Dear Sir.In his letter 'Maritime Operations' in your May

1983 issue. Air Vice Marshal Candy waffles furiously inthe finest traditions of blimpdom — the impertinence ofthat young puppy Allica to dare suggest there may be acase for the Navy running its own air! Obviously theyoungster has never studied any history and is totallyignorant of the subject, a handicap he shares with theunfortunate Americans, Russians. French and otherignorant foreigners who at this very moment areexpanding naval air as fast as they can lick.

Come to think of it. however, why do we need aseparate Air Force at all? A very good case can bemade for the RAAF being declared a redundantService whose personnel and equipment would bebetter employed shared as requisite between the olderServices, with any surplus funds thus released becom-ing available for the purchase of hardware relevant todefence, rather than to the acquisition of aerial hot rodsorientated exclusively to the pathetic vision of a replayof the Battle of Britain forty years on.

Such an initiative would lead to the abandonmentof various absurd 'combined' schools which exist onlyas a result of the present aberration of the existence ofa surplus Service, and also to the elimination of theunedifymg spectacle of Admirals and Generals in anoperational situation grovelling for vital support, whichthe Air Force as presently constituted is perfectlyentitled to be 'too busy' to provide.

Yours faithfully,WOC Roberts

LCDR RAN (Ret'd)

The following two letters were printed in 'The Canberra Times'following AVM Candy's letter in the last Journal.

Sir.Air Vice-Marshal C.D. Candy's letter (The Canber-

ra Times, April 20) invites response.I have not yet read Lieutenant-Commander Alli-

ca's article, allegedly proposing that the RAN should". . . take control of the RAAF s maritime-patrol squad-rons . . ." However. I do not believe this suggestionshould be dismissed lightly, as the Air Vice-Marshallsuggests, on the basis that it has been discounted inthe past. Circumstances have changed greatly inrecent years, and we need to make the best use of ourlimited assets and resources.

I think Air Vice-Marshal Candy sums up the issuesvery well. To quote him: "They are crystal clear — letnavies continue to control operations against forces onor below the surface of the sea, whilst air forces mustcontinue the exercise of air power in all of its roles,including maritime reconnaissance and maritimestrike".

But should we — using this logic — develop afourth (and separate) arm of the Australian DefenceForce: a Royal Australian Submarine Force, if you like,"to exercise submarine power in all of its roles,including maritime reconnaissance and maritimestrike"?

Of course not! But what Air Vice-Marshal Candy,and so many others, overlook in this obviously ongoingargument is that the "issue" is not surface, orsub-surface — or air; clearly, it is maritime.

A definition may clarify the matter even further:maritime is defined in different dictionaries, variouslyas "connected with the sea"; "relating to navigation,shipping", etc; "pertaining to the sea"; "bordering thesea"; or "nautical". Air, surface and sub-surface areartificial divisions — designed, perhaps, to retain andprotect the status quo.

And despite his assertion that RAAF maritime-reconnaissance crews have ". . . through exercises,inter alia, with similar forces of many other nations,built up international recognition of, and renown fortheir expertise and performance", the true measure oftheir expertise must be their experience and know-ledge of maritime matters.

This includes the way naval officers think. (Afterall, they comprise the opposition — in fact, not just inthe mind). It includes the effect which inclementweather, for example, has on ships and men whospend long periods at sea (without returning to thecomfort of home, and without time off to recover from"fatigue" at the end of the sortie).

These may seem tenuous requirements -perhaps they are. But it proves, surely beyond doubt,that the maritime reconnaissance crews only have thatknowledge of the maritime environment which can begained from the air during each sortie. At best, thismust be described as limited.

Therefore, perhaps Lieutenant-Commander Alli-ca's suggestion is not as unsupportable as Air Vice-Marshal Candy makes out; perhaps the maritime patrolsquadrons should be put into the hands of the expertswho best know the maritime environment (and theopposition).

Might I add — noting Air Vice-Marshal Candy'sheavy reliance on British precedent — that in the late60s/early 70s the British Government (like our own in1983) decided to pay off the Royal Navy's carriers onthe assumption (like our own in 1983) that the Air Forcecould and would support the Fleet.

However, even with a larger air force whichincluded tankers, a smaller coastline to protect, andmany more airbases suitable for modern aircraft, theRoyal Air Force was unable to provide the necessarysupport. As a result, the Invincible-class earner andSTOVL aircraft, which proved essential to the successof the Falklands campaign, were developed.

The lesson for Australia is clear — as time will tell.N.C. Hyland

Sir,With all due respect to Air Vice Marshall C.D.

Candy RAAF (Retired) I wish to take issue with hisletter of 20 April. I can find no evidence which wouldsuggest that the RAN has made a serious attempt totake control of airforce's maritime squadrons and itwould appear that Navy has had no aspirations toachieve these ends, certainly in the recent past.

An analysis of most major navies of the worldshows that in almost every case operational commandof maritime forces, including maritime patrol aircraft


(MPA), is exercised by naval command. Air ViceMarshal Candy's reference to the British example is inerror as operational control of MPA in the UK DefenceForce is permanently delegated to AOC 18 Group whois operationally responsible to CINCFLEET. Of particu-lar interest is the US Navy who not only haveoperational control of their MPA but fly and maintainthem highly successfully as an integral part of the USN.It is obvious that the Australian system of operationalcontrol is out of step with the rest of the world.

The present Australian maritime command struc-ture is similar to structures overseas but is activatedonly for exercises and in time of war and/or tension.Joint Force exercises continually highlight flaws in thissystem which are difficult to correct because of the lackof continuity in command and control and the need fortri-service agreement to any change. Clearly thecommand structure in peace should be the same as inwar and this requires the continuous appointment ofone maritime commander in control of all maritimeassets, air, surface and subsurface to conduct opera-tions in all facets of maritime warfare. Only Navy hasthe maritime expertise to exercise this command.

This proposal is not inconsistent with the state-ment made in February 1983 by the Minister forDefence in outlining the present Government's policyon Defence. A commitment is implied in this statementto organize a single, multi-service maritime commandwhich would include all sections of the Defence Forcedevoted to defence of trade, Australian maritimesupply lines, protection of Australia's coast and resist-ance to an enemy force.

I agree with Air Vice Marshal Candy in hisrecognition of MPA personnel and I applaud thededication and expertise of the RAAF air and groundcrews of the maritime squadrons. I also agree in light ofa no carrier decision by the Government, that naviesshould "continue to control operations against forceson or below the surface of the sea". My proposal forNavy to take control of the MPA squadrons wouldprovide a maritime commander with control of aircraftwhich are tasked in operations against forces "on orbelow the surface of the sea".

F.A. AllicaLieutenant Commander RAN

TRAINING AND EDUCATION

Dear Sir,I would like to comment on a number of points

made by Father Michael Head in his letter to the ANIJournal of November 1982. I have three major con-cerns with his letter:

• I cannot accept that education and training arean ill matched pair, at least in the RAN. I do notsee education and training as discrete entitiesand I believe there are examples in Navy whereeducation and training sit fairly happily together.

• Secondly, I reject the implication that navalofficers are trained and not educated.

• Thirdly, while the study of Latin, Greek and soon may lead a person to think systematically,there is no guarantee of this.

It is dangerous to get into a position of trying to

define training and education and there is little usefulpurpose in doing so here. The difficulty is illustrated byreference to Father Head's letter where the problem ofseparating education and training is illustrated. Forexample 'An educated mind has such a training . . .'.The popular conception of education and training willdo. That is, training is usually related to the learning ofspecific tasks for a job, and education is generallybroader in nature, a preparation for life or a wholevariety of tasks or performances. The important point isthat both involve learning and can be reflected inhuman performance. I see education and training asbeing more on a continuum rather than discrete entitiesand much instruction, even in the RAN, containselements of both. This certainly applies in the case ofofficers where the concentration is on education inearly service.

With regard to my second concern, surely noperson familiar with RAN officer development wouldwant to argue that it was not balanced on the education— training continuum. Father Head appears to besuggesting that it is not. Many Servicemen may thinkthe pendulum has moved too far towards education.Naval officers have been attending the University ofNSW and completing degrees, or completing othereducational courses at the Naval College for over adecade now. Yes, some of them are even completingarts degrees and arguing moral and political questionsin tutorials.

Of course it does not end there as it does in manyorganizations. Besides developing officers in navalskills during their careers, the educational process isalso continued. Officers attend a wide variety ofeducational institutions both Service and civilian, withinAustralia and overseas. My experience would suggestthat naval personnel are at least as interesting andstimulating in social settings as most other occupation-al groups.

My third concern relates to Father Head's claimthat 'an educated mind has such a training that asystematic way of thinking . . . is second nature to it'. Ifby 'an educated mind' Father Head is referring tosomeone who has been educated in the normal sense,then this claim is simply not true. It may be true, butthere is no certainty about it. My personal experience inthe field of training is that there is no guarantee that aneducated person, such as an arts graduate, willapproach course design in a systematic manner.

I am not sure how much contact Father Head haswith naval officers today. If he has found the olderbrigade like me lacking in education then I can assurehim it is not the same with the younger officers.

The RAN is most conscious of the need to developits members through education and training. I believethe RAN, and the other Services, places a strongemphasis on education in the officer developmentprogram. No one would want to argue that the systemis perfect, but it is designed to incorporate revisionsbased on changing needs and feedback received onthe product.

H.L. DawCommander RAN


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Page 10 — Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute

DEFENCE DECISION MAKINGAND A MILITARY STRATEGY

By Lieutenant Commander P.L. Clark RAN

(This article was written early in 1979 whilst I was a member of RANSC 1/79. Aside from some minor editorialchanges I have made, the thrust of the essay is unaltered and therefore presents itself as a statement relevant to

that time. PLC)

The Department of Defence decision makingprocess has been the subject of quite intensepolitical and public debate during recent months.The major thrust of the criticism has been fuelledby the new capital equipment requirements of themilitary. Accusations have ranged from wildinaccuracies (FFG costs) to some piercing truths.Happily, Government machinery has beenactivitated to deal with the latter.

It is quite apparent that particular emphasishas been attached to the capital equipmentdecisions made in the Department despite thefact that new capital equipment only accounts fora relatively small proportion (14 percent in 1978-79) of Defence expenditure. Accordingly, thisessay will examine the context in which capitalequipment projects have assumed such a priority,the decision making processes woven into theirdevelopment, and the consequent impact on amilitary strategy.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CAPITALEQUIPMENT

Despite the fact that capital equipmentprojects account only for a small proportion ofDefence outlays, their importance is readilyapparent when one considers the long termeffects of a decision to acquire a particularpiece of equipment. For example, HMASMELBOURNE has already been in service forover 20 years and her retirement is still some wayoff. Similarly other ships in service in the RANhave projected lives ranging from 20 to 35 years.Tanks, aircraft, in fact nearly all military fightinghardware, have predicted lives generallyexceeding 15 years. Thus, today's capitalequipment decisions have a long term effect onthe force structure and capabilities of our armedforces.

Since Australian military strategy is largelyderived from existing and predicted short-termcapabilities, today's decisions on capital equip-

ment will have a long-term influence on a militarystrategy. For example, a decision to replaceHMAS MELBOURNE in the early 1980s wouldsee the new ship contributing a capability andhence impact on strategy until about the year2030. Yet the decision on whether to replace sucha capability will be based on current strategicassessments whose validity declines expon-entially with time. Although such assessments arenotoriously deficient in their predictions of specificevents, such as Iran and the North Vietnam/China confrontation, they are reasoned andtherefore should contribute in part to the decisionmaking process.

For those who may feel that the derivation ofstrategy from capabilities has got the horse andcart out of sequence, it is worthy to examine manyof the Department's statements concerningAustralia's independent capability to cope with'low level contingencies within our region'.

This situation really describes a newAustralian definition of strategy — something Iwould call 'tactical strategy'. In response to thequestion 'How well placed is the ADF to deal withthis situation (scenario)?' the reply is based ontactical application of a particular range of

The Author

LCDR P.L. Clark, DFC joined the RAN as SLAircrew entry in 1966 and undertook flight training withthe USN at Pensacola, Florida. Having gained hiswings, initial postings in the RAN were to 725 and 723squadrons as a helicopter pilot. Following service withthe RANHFV (69-70) he then joined VC 724 squadronfor Macchi and Skyhawk conversions. Service in the jetcommunity has included tours on VF 805 and VC 724squadrons, specialisation as an Air Warfare Instructorand later as NAS Nowra s Station Air Warfare Instruc-tor. Prior to commencing the first RAN staff course,LCDR Clark was serving in the Naval Materiel Divisionat Navy Office. He was Senior Pilot of VF 805Squadron 1980-1982. and is currently CommandingOfficer of VC 724 Squadron.


capabilities. Hence Australian strategy largelyreflects a response to what is considered to be aplausible (and manageable) threat to the nation.The broader aspects concerning our regional andglobal responsibilities in both a political andmilitary sense are given scant, if any, attention.Such weakness in grasping the true elements ofstrategy is clearly demonstrated by the fact thatthe Army and RAAF pursue a 'continentaldefence' strategy, whilst the RAN pursues astrategy firmly based on regional (and global)considerations.

Whoever is right is irrelevant to the view thatcapital equipment decisions reflect the need for aparticular capability, yet the decision-makingprocess is excessively based on 'tacticalstrategic' thinking. Once acquired, a particularcapability forms another cornerstone for further'tactical strategic1 decision making processes.The consequence of this situation is that our'grand strategy' is gradually altered as a result ofcapital equipment decisions — not the reverse.

Of course, many would disagree with thisview. For those, the aircraft carrier is a classicexample. A decision not to acquire a replacementfor HMAS MELBOURNE would enforce aconsiderable reduction in terms of the RAN's bluewater or open ocean capabilities. Havingachieved consensus on this point (a relativelysimple task) greater momentum would follow forthe protagonists of a 'brown water', patrol boatand submarine navy. The consensus of such aprediction must be an irreversible trend towards adefensive continental strategy.

GOVERNMENT POLICY AND GUIDANCEThe major contributing factors in the decision

making process are Government policy and theguidance issued for the implementation of thatpolicy Although this is as it should be, there areother considerations that have an impact on thisaspect which is so critical to the efficientdevelopment of the Armed Forces.

Firstly, the division of financial resourcesamongst competing government departments isof critical importance to the political survival of theGovernment. Hence allocations to the compet-itors are generally commensurate with theirpredicted cost effectiveness in political terms.With firmly established guidelines for the divisionof resources as a percentage of GDP, govern-ment departments such as Defence tend toreceive a fixed share during peacetime. This hassignificant implications for Defence decisionmaking and these will be discussed in more detaillater.

A second and most important factor which

contributes to the formulation of GovernmentDefence policy is the attitudes of the publictowards defence issues. It is suggested that thereis a fundamental difference between the presentGovernment's desire to exert a truly independentinfluence on international affairs which is notmatched in all cases by the predominatingattitudes of the public. One of the most basicdifferences between the two exists in the defencearea.

Public attitudes towards defence havelargely been moulded by the major militaryconflicts of this century. Australian participation inthese events can be broadly described as a seriesof voluntary contributions to the call of majorallies. Australia has yet to conduct a totallyindependent military operation guided only byAustralian political and military considerations.

This transition towards our new politicalideals begs the question as to what the AustralianGovernment is willing to do in military terms tosupport these ideals, particularly those of aforeign policy nature.

Although both the Soviets and Americanscontinue to utilise their military forces effectively tosupport their foreign policy initiatives, theAustralian Government appears to be undecidedon this issue. The reason for this vacuum, andhence the absence of appropriate policy to guidethe development of the Armed Forces, is theproposition that public attitudes still reflect ourprevious style of military involvement - - acontribution to someone else s involvement. If thepublic can not keep abreast of our changingpolitical situation and therefore not understandthe new implications for the military, then theGovernment does not possess the requisiteresolve of the people to pursue its political aims.

Predictably, the Government has hedged itsbets on matters of defence policy by alluding to areal commitment to: regional stability (in militaryterms), ANZUS, and the Defence of Australia.1 2

With such a broad policy, the Government can beseen to be fulfilling both its international andnational responsibilities. However, in terms ofDefence decision making, this policy is so broadthat it is by necessity subjected to muchinterpretation because inadequate financialresources are provided to meet such a wide rangeof Defence responsibilities.

Problems With Defence Decision Making

The major problem associated with Defencedecision making rests with the framework aroundwhich Government policy is established. Thisframework generates the following competingdemands which arise from the inadequateprovision of financial resources:


• A trade-off between requirements for thedefence of Australia and those stated com-mitments to our region and to ANZUS.

• The relatively standard allocation of financialresources invariably leads to competing inter-Service requirements.

Given this imbalanced situation, it isunderstandable why some military and politicalleaders are moving towards far greater emphasison a 'Defence of Australia' policy. In February1978, the then Chief of Naval Staff, Vice AdmiralA.M. Synnot made the following statement in'thecontext of his assessment of the RAN:

There has been a fundamental transfor-mation of the strategic circumstances thatgoverned Australia's security throughoutmost of its history. In particular it should benoted that it is no longer practicable to pursuethe earlier policy often termed "ForwardDefence". The first call upon our DefenceForce must now be in respect of our ownnational security'.Similarly, the then Minister for Defence, the

Honourable D.J. Killen stated:'We must sustain a defence force whichsupports our diplomacy so that both, incombination, effectively deter interferencewith Australia's sovereignty by the militaryforces of a foreign power. We must sustain adefence force containing men with the rightskills, possessing the right weapons, thatcould train and develop an expanded forceas and when a major threat to Australiabegins to emerge'.4

Whether or not these attitudes reflect a trendtowards a fundamental change in AustralianDefence policy is irrelevant at this time since theyare not formally acknowledged. However, it isquite possible that they do influence the decisionmaking process.

DEFENCE DECISION MAKING PROCESSHaving established the framework within

which the decision making process must operateand the obvious constraints upon it, the processitself will now be examined.

Five Year Defence ProgramThe basis for Defence planning is the Five

Year Rolling Programme (FYRP) system whichenables the projection of both existing and newfinancial commitments to be managed inaccordance with the estimated Governmentallocation of funds. The Five Year Defence Plan(FYDP) is a specific five year element of the FYRPand will be the term used throughout this

discussion. The FYDP for budget purposes, isbroken down into two major components:• Process A The projection of existing

commitments, including all minor capitalequipment projects.

• Process B The projection of new unnapprovedmajor capital equipment proposals andfacilities.4

This article examines only Process B which isa reflection of the Service bids for new majorequipments. These bids have been the majorsource of debate and criticism directed at thedecision making process.

Policy and PlanningThe 1976 Defence White Paper established

Government policy for the development of theArmed Forces. Since this document is not specificand alludes to wide ranging military capabilitiesand commitments, it is understandable that theindividual Services are concerned with itstranslation into more concrete statements as toactual capabilities.

Hence, Service bids for the FYDP processreflect their interpretation of the capabilitiesrequired to fulfil allocated functions. Theimportant point to note here is that the Servicesare making the interpretation of Governmentpolicy. The validity of these bids will be criticallyexamined at routine intervals by the Defencecommittee system. However, the fact remainsthat this examination can be nothing more than arefining process based on further interpretation ofthe capabilities required.

Two projects appear as excellent exampes ofthis process: the Tactical Fighter Force (TFF), andthe Aircraft Carrier replacement. These projectshave stimulated a great deal of debate andcriticism both within the Department and in thepublic arena. Such debate has largely centredaround either the fighting characteristics of theTFF (fighter/air-to-ground) or whether Australianeeds an aircraft carrier at all. Both lines ofargument are pure interpretation.

Much to the chagrin of many, a formaltransition towards 'Defence of Australia' wouldnot clarify the situation at all. The TFF could still beargued as a pure fighter or as an aircraft withsome capabilities for maritime strike, whereasNavy could highlight our critical dependence onmaritime trade and would be concerned withexerting a deterring influence in the 'focal' areas.These 'focal' areas can be interpreted to be asdistant as the Persian Gulf, and hence neces-sitate the retention of various capabilities such asan aircraft carrier.

Thus whatever the actual working is of the


current style of Government policy, the battles willcontinue to be fought over interpretation. One ofthe fundamental problems here is the fact that theServices are basing their inerpretations on actualcapabilities for war, Yet our political ideals arealigned towards the preservation of internationalpeace and stability. Perhaps our Armed Forcesshould be more concerned with the maintenanceof peace, rather than the prosecution of war — asubtle difference.

If this is a reasonable proposition, it begsseveral questions. What is the Governmentwilling to do for the preservation of peace? Wouldpublic attitudes be in favour of any intervention inthe affairs of another nation? Finally, why is therea movement in political and military thinkingtowards a 'Defence of Australia?'.

It is neither intended to argue the case herefor this subtle change in policy, nor to promote thenotion that the Government should dictate allmilitary activities, but rather to highlight a view ofthe clouded atmosphere in which Defencedecision making operates. Moreover, there is afundamental divergence between the political andmilitary strategies. The former is biased towardsthe maintenance of peace and the latter towardsthe prosecution of war.

In fact it could be said of the military that theyare so entrenched in their study of scenarios tojustify their fighting capabilities (or thedeficiencies needed to acquire new capabilities)that they fail to perceive and comprehend theirpolitical functions which are fundamental to theirexistence. Similarly, it would be fair to say thattheir political masters have yet to understand theimplications for the Armed Forces with respect toAustralia's new political ideals.

Financial ResourcesThe major factor which dictates the range of

military capabilities which can be maintained orintroduced is the annual budget allocation toDefence. As mentioned earlier, this tends to be arelatively fixed amount in the order of 2.6% of theGDP. The management of this allocation largelyrests with the Department and there are a numberof significant problems associated with this task.

Before examining this matter further, it isimportant to note the pressures placed on theArmed Forces as a result of the increasing bids forcapital equipment. Firstly, since funds are notseparately earmarked by the Government for theintroduction of new equipment, the Departmentmust manipulate the budget allocation toaccommodate the Service bids. Any percentageincrease in capital equipment spending wouldhave to be matched by a compensating reductionin another area. The likely targets for suchactivities are the manpower and operating

allocations, which together account for more than80% of the Defence budget.

Since undermanning is already a seriousproblem, compensating financial reductions areinvariably made against the everyday operatingcosts of the Services. Whilst the effects of cutsagainst steaming time, flying hours and am-munition are obvious, they are of a far moreinsidious nature when the logistics arteries arerestrained.

As the Services enter an era where manymajor equipments require replacement, thepresent methods of manipulating the DefenceVote will place intolerable demands on the day today operations of the Armed Forces.

These palliatives have been accompanied bya tendency within the Department to deferdecisions on new capital equipment purchases.Such deferrals have heightened competitionamong the Services for the limited funds availablefor this purpose and have exacerbated thedemand for capital equipment funding in the1980s.

In order to retain only present capabilities,decisions will have to be made during this periodto replace many of the major equipments now inservice. Navy's case is particularly grave sincethe majority of its major combatants reach the endof their lives before the turn of the century. Thelong lead times associated with warshipsacquisition highlights the demand for timelydecisions during the 1980s.

The following represents a short list ofService bids for which decisions on replacementwill have to be made during this period, purely toretain existing capabilities:• Aircraft Carrier (including aircraft)• three DDGs and six River Class DEs• fleet underway replenishment ship• six Oberon class submarines• Tactical Fighter Force• artillery equipment• utility helicopters.

At current rates of funding for capitalequipment, these requirements represent at least15 years' worth of expenditure Add to this figurethe remaining large number of demands also tobe charged against capital equipment, then theproblems for future Defence decision making arestaggering.

Undoubtedly, the Department recognisesthis fact. However, nothing can be done toalleviate the situation until such time that afundamental change is made in Governmentpolicy concerning budget allocations to Defence.

CONCLUSIONThe Department of Defence decision-making


process which has evolved to deal with the newcapital equipment requirements of the military hasattracted a good deal of debate and criticism. Oneof the major reasons for this is the fact that thesenew capital equipment requirements form thecornerstone of military capabilities for a consid-erable period, which in some cases span morethan 30 years. Moreover, it is upon thesecapabilities that a military strategy is derived.

The major considerations that impact on thisdecision making process are the interpretationsmade by the individual Services and theDepartment concerning the translation ofGovernment policy into military capabilities. Theextent to which these new capabilities can beintroduced is then dictated by the Government'sallocation of financial resources.

Government policy and the funds allocatedfor its implementation form the backbone of theDefence decision-making process. Yet theDepartment has diverged from the Governmentover the interpretation of policy. The military is tooconcerned with its capabilities for war, whilst theGovernment pursues the preservation of peace.This subtle divergence is then clouded by atransition in military and political thinking towardsa 'Defence of Australia' policy. Such a transition isin fundamental conflict with our new independentpolitical ideals which strive for the preservation of

international peace and stability. Such a policy oninternational affairs is without substance if anation is only concerned with an introspectiveoutlook on defence issues.

Therefore, the very basis of the presentdecision-making process is at worst in directconflict with our long term political ideals and atbest, clouded by the appropriate interpretation ofGovernment policy. Even so, under existingguidelines, the present process will be inoperableduring the 1980s because the significantdemands for new capital equipments required tomaintain only existing capabilities could not befunded under these arrangements.

Hence an Australian military strategy, whichis largely derived from our military capabilities, isunlikely to be aligned with the political functionswhich are fundamental to its existence.

Notes

1. 1976 Defence White Paper.2 Hon D.J. Killen M.P Statement to the House of

Representatives 29 March 79.3 Opcitp. 5.4 Minor capital equipment is defined as that which has no

significant force structure or joint Service implications and atotal cost of less than $5.Om with no individual piece ofequipment costing more than $0.250m. An equipmentproposal which exceeds any of the above criteria is definedas major capital equipment.

.

HMS RAMILLIESA. & J. Pavia Supplied by J. Mortimer


Imagine awhere youposon.

me of Battleshipew the enemy's

It would give you a considerable advantage, to put it mildly.As defence preparedness grows more technical, the advantages of working with

experts are obvious. The Systems Engineering Division of CSA, working with highlytechnical defence systems, has built up a considerable bank of expertise.

CSA helped the RAN set up the Combat Data System Centre (CDSC)in Canberra. We developed real-time software for the Action InformationOrganisation and Tactical Trainer (AIOTT) at HMAS Watson.

We've worked with the RAAF in the Maritime area.And with the Army. We've designed Network Monitoring andControl systems. We've developed facilities for crew training,for post-operational analysis and for software updating ofa complex, integrated tactical system.

CSA's capabilities extend from initial feasibility studiesto the total management and execution of majorDefence projects.

With a staff of 500 computer professionalsand trained support personnel, the sheer brainpowerwe can muster is phenomenal.

And, while we can't guarantee you'll winall your battles, we can certainlyhelp you increase your hits.

R725

The ComputerProfessionals.


The author was awarded the ANI Silver Medal for this essay submitted during his attendance at the RAN StaffCollege

THE EXPLOITATION OFTECHNOLOGY BY THE RAN

DURING THE NEXT TEN YEARSby Lieutenant Commander D.J. Farrell, RAN

Much has been spoken and written in recenttimes about the impact of technological change onour society. Many of these words have beenemotive; few show a real understanding of thechange. Many words have been about the com-puter revolution, but this is only the most obviousaspect of the technological change. It is a symp-tom of a larger revolution not the cause. The realtechnological revolution is the result of devicesand ideas. They are the result of research anddevelopment. The discovery of two devices, thetransistor and the integrated circuit, led to thedevelopment of another device, the micro-processor, which allowed an idea to become thestepping stone for the computer revolution. Weread in our newspapers and journals that Aust-ralia has fallen behind in this technologicalrevolution. We all use its by-products. Many of usare employed as a result of it. Yet few of us earnour living from it.

For the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), thetechnological revolution is apparent. Much of itsequipment is becoming obsolescent. The cost ofreplacement equipment is high and rising morerapidly than the inflation rate. The availability ofmanpower to operate the equipment is low and itscost is high. The RAN's ability to operate, repairand replace its equipment is decreasing as aresult of economic pressures on the Defencebudget. The RAN must soon determine whatships, systems and equipments will be necessaryfor its continued operation into the twenty-firstcentury and how to obtain them. This essay doesnot attempt to define what the RAN needs. Itproposes that there is an alternative method tothose practised in recent years for the RAN to getwhat it needs. Much of our Navy's needs can bedesigned and built in Australia with ensuingbenefit to the nation.

Much of the technological advantage en-joyed by the USA is a result of defence-centredresearch and development; their space pro-

gramme can be considered as an advanced armof the Defence Department. However, the USAdoes not hold an industrial advantage com-mensurate with its technological advantage. Thereasons are complex, but one may be a result ofpoorly directed investment. There appears to be amanagement emphasis on short-term profitabilityrather than long-term dominance.

A long-term, defence-related plan for Aust-ralian industry, which is beset with similarproblems to those in the US, can provide us withat least a regional technological and industrialadvantage. Defence can provide the stimulus forsuch a plan and will directly benefit from it. TheRAN can be in the vanguard of this plan bysupporting the exploitation of technology byAustralian industry over the next 10 years. TheNavy's aim should be to sponsor a plannedresearch and development effort over 10 yearswhich would allow the production of equipments,systems and platforms in and for the future.'

EXISTING POLICIESThe Australian Defence Department and

Defence Force have a predilection for self studyand internal review. A significant number of in-vestigations have been made and reports writtenin recent years. Yet the benefits of changesarising from these studies have often seemed lostin the bureaucratic jungle. Perhaps it is time to

The Author

Lieutenant Commander Farrell is a Weapons Electricalofficer whose postings include HMAS HOBART.Directorate of Naval Weapon Design and the RANTrials and Assessing Unit. Prior to attending the RANStaff College, he served on exchange with the UnitedStates Navy. He is currently posted to the RAN Trialsand Assessing Unit.


forget the investigation and get on with the job ofdefending Australia and Australia's interests.

RAN — Past and PresentFor the past 30 years, the RAN has been a

carrier-based Navy. Equipment purchases, tac-tics, training and manpower have been selectedwith the underlying assumption of always havinga carrier. Now there is a void that may be difficultto fill. The RAN must ignore the void — it can onlybe filled by another carrier, and a replacement isnot in sight. The RAN is at a crossroads; a sig-nificant milestone has been reached, albeit(outwardly) unexpectedly. The milestone wasachieved with the assistance of years of studywhich now must be forgotten. The Navy mustadvance, not reflect nor argue. There is room for ahost of new ideas; a lot of old thinking must die.The future is now important, the past largelyirrelevant.

The RAN has been buying overseas formuch of its life. Early years saw, for traditionalreasons, a dependence on the United Kingdom;later years show a dependence on the USA;scattered through the years have been some localdevelopments and local building of overseasdesigns. The reliance by the RAN on overseasexpertise will continue in future years unless amajor change of ideas is chosen by or forced onthe Navy. Two, major RAN projects — the newsubmarine and follow-on destroyer — will be tooverseas design and most likely built in Australia.These may be the only major RAN ship acqui-sitions in the next 10 years.

There is some cause for concern if the nextdestroyer purchases are FFG 7 Class ships aspresently planned. They will represent 20-yearold technology when completed, for they weredesigned in the early 1970s. The RAN is likely, inorder to achieve commonality of equipment inservice, to install equipments which will havebeen out of production for several years in its'new' FFGs.

A Basis for the FutureDuring the next 10 years, the RAN is likely to

select, and eventually buy and build, techno-logically old ships for its surface force. With thecarrier now gone, there is time to rethink theconcept for future purchases. More modernequipments are available and can be selectedand installed, new systems can and will beproduced. There must be a break point fromexisting systems and equipments to new ones. Ifthe RAN is forced to change its concepts ofoperations as a result of the carrier loss, the timefor that break may be now. The types of ships andsystems for a new role are likely to be different.The new concepts of operations can form the

basis for a change in technology and a change ofsource.

Recent experiences in the British Falklandscampaign may have demonstrated that someconcepts of ship design should be reviewed. Themany dollars spent in making destoyers such asthe SHEFFIELD Class less vulnerable throughship design may be wasteful. Survivability is amatter of detection and destruction of the enemy,away from the naval platform. A simpler shipdesign can be contemplated if sufficient defencesare provided. Australia has the ability to designand produce ships, ship systems and equipmentWhat is lacking is the commitment to a research,development and industrial effort to do so. TheDefence Force and Department policies may bethe reason that this state exists. A policy changecan convert the ability to a reality.

A CONCEPT FOR THE FUTUREAn ideal goal for Australia would be to seek

future domestic production of Defence Forceequipment, though the basically conservativenature of Australian society may make such agoal seem to be an impossible dream. Consider-able Government investment would be neededand the present political and economic climatemay make the dream possible. A positive com-mitment is required.

A realistic goal may be to seek an increasingshare of defence procurement from domesticsources. To achieve this goal will require sacri-fices by the Defence Force, Government andpopulation. Considerable initial investment inresearch and development will be needed; firstproduction may be several years away.

To achieve domestic defence production willrequire close co-operation between the DefenceForce and Department, Defence laboratories,Australian industry, universities and other Gov-ernment departments and instrumentalities. ADefence research, development and productioncouncil comprising representatives of thesebodies could be the vehicle by which such co-operation is achieved. Its aim would be to co-ordinate the research and production aspects andto ensure optimum use of resources.

A Navy PolicyA proposed policy for the RAN is to aim for an

increasingly Australian designed and built Navalforce. The achievement of this aim may not becomplete for many years as there are aspects ofnaval ship design for which this country has noearly capacity. There are many aspects for whichthere is no capacity, but all that is lacking is acommitment and the investment. The initial corn-


mitment should be Navy's, and the investmentmust be part of the national aim.

The RAN can, almost immediately, plan forthe production over the next 10 years of a series ofdetail designs for naval platforms. Concurrently, aset of system and equipment specifications anddesigns for those platforms should be produced.A parallel review of existing and planned navalsystems and equipments suitable for the plat-forms would assist in an eventual selection of shipfits. A review of Australian research and industrialcapacity would ascertain the capability for localproduction and determine what additional cap-acity would need to be provided.

The Navy policy should be to establish a setor series of common designs. A basic systemcould be installed in a simple or small ship, andenhanced or expanded systems in more complexor larger ships. A key element of such a policy is touse a top-down design approach, similar to thatused by the US Navy in designing the FFG 7Class. This approach means specifying the size,cost and manning limits for a platform which mustthen be produced within those constraints.

Such a plan will necessitate a substantialNavy investment in an initially non-productiveresearch and development function. However,investment by Navy alone probably will be in-sufficient to achieve anything more than a minimalcapability. Therefore, the Navy must sell its planboth to Government and industry who must alsoprovide the necessary levels of investment. Navymust add a firm commitment to the end productsof this investment and therefore must providedetailed requirements to ensure that its needs aremet.

The Navy should specify a minimum set ofperformance and technical requirements whichmust be simple and attainable goals. Incentivesfor exceeding specifications, within an estab-lished set of constraints, could be provided.Above all, performance requirements must berealistic and aimed at producing innovative butnot complex technical solutions.

Early benefits could be attainable. Localmanufacture of some equipments may be pos-sible in early stages. Early production may bespecifically for test and evaluation purposes,installation on existing platforms or enhancementof existing equipments.

SOME SPECIFIC CONCEPTSThe concept behind any local design and

production of naval systems is to exploit tech-nology, to obtain at least a regional technologicaladvantage. The time lapse between conceptualdesign and final use must be as short as possible.Systems must be flexible and capable of en-

hancement and modification as easily and quicklyas possible. The concept leads to a modulardesign approach and a (small) set of standardsboth for inter- and intra-unit interfaces.

A series of concepts for naval vessels —surface combatants, amphibious vessels andsupport ships — could be established. Forexample, the surface combatants might comprisea patrol boat similar in size to the FREMANTLEClass, a larger patrol vessel of 500 tonnes, acorvette of 1 000-1 500 tonnes, a frigate of2 500-3 000 tonnes and a destroyer of 4 000-4 500 tonnes. The amphibious ships could com-prise a light, medium and heavy landing ship.Support ships might comprise supply, command,repair and training versions.

The series of ship designs could be producedin the next 10 years. Initially a set of outlinespecifications could be produced by Navy in threeto four years. These would be passed to a detaildesign bureau for production of final designs. Thedesign bureau, set up in the initial period, wouldbe a joint Government/industry body. Decisionson production could be made at the 10 year point.Earlier production of specific types could be aNavy priority and should be possible.

Perhaps the greatest factor in naval equip-ments is imposed by the need to meet militarystandards and specifications. These lead tounique design and test requirements whichgenerally result in the production of specialcomponents for which the Navy must bear thecost. The necessity for these requirements shouldbe questioned. Many who have been to sea inmodern warships may never have stopped toconsider the humble television set installed inmost living spaces. It is always a commercialproduct, often subject to the worst of abuses by itsusers, usually hard-mounted to a bulkhead,subject to the same environment as many navalsystems and is usually reliable. Many have beendesigned and built in Australia. Consideration towaiving a number of military specifications shouldbe given. A series of trials of available commercialproducts with direct naval applications should beconsidered. The equipments should be operatedfor a period long enough to properly evaluatereliability and performance in typical ship en-vironments. Failures should be examined indetail. Results may well prove that modern com-mercial products are suitable for naval use.

As for ships, a series of conceptual designsfor ship systems and equipments should bemade. All possible ship systems should beexamined for local production. Following theconceptual design process, a decision to proceedcould be made and detail design proceeded.Again some systems could proceed to productionearly. The basis of local equipment production


should be the establishment of standard cabinetand module design. There is no pressing reasonwhy naval equipments must have unique cabinetdesigns. A standard set of cabinet sizes designedto take a standard set of module sizes can help toreduce costs. Of course, this approach is aimed atelectronic systems but a similar approach tomachinery systems can be taken.

In fact, the design approach should be tosimplify and standardise whenever and whereverpossible. For electronic systems, the establish-ment and use of standard interfaces should beimplemented as early as possible. Within a ship,there is no constraint on interfaces; externalinterfaces must be compatible with those of ourallies. Optical fibre data communication should beused. This offers substantial savings in weightand interference, and reduces ship vulnerability.

IMPLEMENTATIONThe RAN should plan to sponsor the design

and production of ships and shipboard systems inAustralia. This must be a long-term plan simplybecause, with minor exceptions, none is donetoday. Yet those exceptions are often notable andcould be saleable.

Over the next 10 years, the RAN shouldsponsor the research and development effortaimed at implementing the plan. There are somestarting points - - the universities, Defencelaboratories and some industrial bodies. Theinitial aim should be to work towards an earlyconcentration o1 efforts. The creation of a Service,Department, Government and industry infra-structure for the exploitation of technologicalcapability should be the first step and becemented in the first year.

In the second to fifth years, the RAN shouldconcentrate efforts in establishing designconcepts. A 'task force' of available technical andoperational manpower should be dedicated toproducing the concepts. Regular dialogue withresearch and industrial activities can establishlocal capabilities, either available or readilygained, to which later efforts can be concentrated.

The sixth through tenth years should seedesign concepts passed to research and in-dustrial bodies for detail design. Perhaps somesimpler system can be produced by the end of thisperiod. There must be close co-operationbetween the Navy and other bodies to ensure thatconcepts are properly brought to realisation. TheNavy must dedicate manpower to this task.

Obviously, the Navy and Government mustprovide funding and facilities to enable the fruitionof the plan. Navy should be prepared to commitpart of its manpower and funds to the task. It mustconvince Government to agree to the plan and to

provide additional funds. Industry must beprepared to support the plan with more researcheffort than has been the case in recent years.

It is suggested that the Defence Departmentprovide space and facilities, say at the Defencelaboratories, to assist with the early industrialeffort. The Defence Research Centre Salisbury,has the space, facilities and manpower to providethe necessary support.

CONCLUSIONBoth the RAN and the nation can be con-

sidered to be at a crossroads — the Navy due tothe loss of its carrier, and the nation for economicreasons. We have a new Government which hasstated a commitment to technological and eco-nomic recovery. Yet Australian industry is in manyrespects dying. The road to recovery is with achange of emphasis, a change of technology.

A significant basis for the technologicaladvantage of the USA lies with its defenceindustry and associated research and develop-ment. At least regionally, Australia should be ableto emulate this advantage. The economic ad-vantage should follow as the defence-relatedindustrial capability flows on to non-defenceindustry. The exploitation of technology fordefence purposes can lead to growth of related,non-defence industrial capacity. Production ofattractive defence systems can lead to a newexport commodity.

These ideas may seem idealistic, but theyare within the capability of Australia and Aust-ralians. They represent a change of thinking forthe RAN and for Australian industry Theyrepresent the commitment of Government fundsto research and development. But in the end theyare worth more than a passing thought. Withsome effort and a little courage they could be theway of the future.

BIBLIOGRAPHY1. Gower Lieutenant Colonel S N Some Options for a Defence

Technological Strategy Defence Fellowship Scheme 1978Commonwealth of Australia. 1978.

2. Independent External Review of the Defence Science andTechnology Organisation Report. Australian GovernmentPublishing Service. 1980.

3. Internal Review into Objectives and Procedures of theDefence Science and Technology Organisation AustralianGovernment Publishing Sen/ice October 1980.

4. O'Connor Desmond The Future of Defence and Technologyin Australia: General Considerations Working Paper No 44The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre. CanberraDecember 1981

5. Technological Change in Australia. Report of the Committeeof Enquiry into Technological Change in Australia AustralianGovernment Publishing Service 1980


THE DUTY/TASK INVENTORYby Commander H.L. Daw RAN and Lieutenant Commander G.P. Robson RAN

Professional trainers in the RAN hold theview that for most people the concept of theDuty/Task Inventory (DTI) is a murky one. Manypeople confronted with a DTI are not sure what itis, how it was developed or what they areexpected to do with it. As the DTI is the basedocument for the design of training, it is offundamental importance. In addition, manymembers of the RAN, outside those directlyinvolved with training, may be called upon toassist in the construction of a DTI or to evaluatea draft. The aim of this short article is to developthe concept of the DTI, to clarify the developmentof the document and to state its method ofapproval. Additionally, the authors hope thatthose reading this article will gain an additionalunderstanding of the first step in the applicationof the RAN Training System.

The Training System subscribed to by theRAN can be summarized by the following model:

A N A L Y S E

J

DESIGN

\ .

CONDUCT

E V A L U A T E

—<— V A L I D A T E

The RAN Training System starts and endsat the job. The phase ANALYSE, commenceswith an analysis of the job. In the final phase,VALIDATE, the performance of the trained manis measured on the job. It is this starting andfinishing with the job that gives the training itsvalidity. In this article, we will only examine thefirst section of the Analysis phase.

In the RAN, the person involved in conduct-ing the analysis of the job is called a trainingdeveloper. He will sometimes be part of theSchool staff but this is not always the case. For

example, in HMAS NIRIMBA, the training de-velopment staff are in a separate, central cellworking directly for the Training Commander.

A job consists of a series of duties and taskswhich are completed by the incumbent. In theRAN, the job can often be equated to category orspecialization, for example, Cook and ClearanceDiver. Officers with the specialization 'P' havethe job of Pilot but a Supply Officer could haveany one of a number of jobs, such as Secretary,Pay Officer or Naval Stores Officer. 'SupplyOfficer' can be thought of more as an occupationwhich will be punctuated by employment in anumber of areas.

A duty is one of the major work areasperformed by an individual. A job consists of oneor more duties. A duty can be further expressedas a number of closely related tasks. Dutiesoften determine the qualifications to perform inthe job. For example, one duty for a Petty OfficerSeaman is 'Boatwork' and for an EngineerOfficer 'Refits and Maintenance Co-ordination'.Both are broad work areas which would involvethe performance of a number of tasks.

The task is the lowest level of behaviour in ajob that describes the performance of ameaningful function. It is the examination of thejob at this level and below that enables a relevanttraining package to be developed. Tasks andtask statements have certain important charac-teristics:

The Authors

Both officers joined the RAN in the sixties and arein the Instructor Branch. At the time of writing,Commander Daw was Officer-in-Charge RAN Schoolof Training Technology and Lieutenant CommanderRobson a member of staff employed as a trainingconsultant. Commander Daw holds the degrees ofBachelor of Arts and Master of Science (InstructionalSystems). Lieutenant Commander Robson, an Artsgraduate, is currently studying for his Master ofScience at Florida State University and on completionwill occupy the billet of Training Development Officer inHMAS NIRIMBA

Journal of the Austral/an Naval Institute — Page 21

A task statement describes a highlyspecific action. It has a verb and an objectand is precise. For example, 'operatesMulloka Recording Replay TrainingEquipment (MURRTE)1, looks promisingbut it is not a good task statement. It is notspecific. It means different things to diffe-rent people. MURRTE is operated for areason and it is this reason that shouldform the basis of the task statement.'Raise and lower hull outfit', however, is aspecific action.

Tasks are performed in a relatively shortperiod of time: seconds, minutes or hoursbut rarely days, weeks, months or years.To 'prepare a well trained Navy' is a goalrather than a task.

Tasks are observable. The performanceof the job holder or the results of hisefforts, can be seen. 'Understand theRule of the Road' is not a task statementbecause neither the process nor resultscan be observed. However, certain ac-tions which require an understanding ofRule of the Road can be observed.Tasks are measurable. That is, there is inthe performance of the task, or theproduct produced by it, a method of

judging that the task has been properlyperformed.

• Each task is independent of other actions.A task is performed for its own sake, forthe job being considered.

The training developer employs a tool,called a 'scalar diagram' in organizing the manytasks which make up a job. He does this to allowa pictorial representation to be made whichclearly shows the relationship between tasks andduties. An example of a scalar diagram is atFigure 1.

To gain a clear definition of a job, all theduties and tasks which make up the job need tobe accurately determined. Initially the trainingdeveloper will generate a draft list of duties andtasks. This process involves collecting informa-tion from one or more of the following sources:

from current and former job holderscurrent and former job supervisorsbooks of referencemanufacturers' handbooksobserving people doing the job anddefect returns etc.

In collecting information from job holdersthrough personal interview, the training develop-er could step the incumbent through the tasksperformed in a typical day's work and then add tothat list any unusual or less frequently performed

JOB

DUTY

TASK

SUB-TASK

SUPPLY OFFICER — ACCOUNTS

PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION

EVALUATE SUBORDINATE'S PERFORMANCE 0

MONITOR COUNSEL REPORTPERFORMANCE SUBORDINATE PERFORMANCE

TASKELEMENTS

ASSESSPERFORMANCE

GRADEPERFORMANCE

1OBSERVEPERFORMANCE

(0 indicates analysis not displayed for simplicity.)

Figure 1 — Part Scalar Diagram for Job Supply Officer — Accounts

(Here only one task of one duty area has been partly analysed. In practice, this is a substantial job which can occupy a largedisplay area. The scalar is normally developed on a large roll of graph paper and displayed on a bulkhead.)


tasks. In this interview, he would aim to obtain aprecise statement describing the action involvingin the task and, in addition, record informationabout task conditions and standards. From thisinformation comes the draft list of tasks whichmust be authenticated before being accepted asa job description. There are two methods advo-cated for authenticating this draft list. The first iscalled the Questionnaire technique, which in-volves compiling a questionnaire which includesthe draft list of tasks. This can then be adminis-tered to the total population (or a sample) ofpeople performing, or who have recently per-formed, the job. The aim of this survey is to gaina large body of information about task perform-ance, primarily to determine whether the taskslisted are actually representative of the job.

Collation of the responses can be doneeither manually, or by having the questionnaireinitially constructed in such a way as to have theresponses analysed and collated by a computer.The latter approach would normally be carriedout by the Occupational Analysis Cell in NavyOffice.

The second method, called the 'expertpanel' approach, involves the selection of a smallsample (say 6-12) of 'experts' in the job con-cerned. The draft list of tasks is examined by thepanel independently, for agreement or disagree-ment on whether the tasks are representative ofthe job. The comments from these experts canthen be analysed with any disagreementsamong the panel clarified or settled by thetraining developer.

Whichever method is used, there will nowbe evidence which will enable a representativelist of job tasks to be constructed. It is veryimportant at this stage that the scalar diagram,exemplified in Figure 1. now be developed downto task element level for all tasks. This processwill inevitably result in amendment to the repre-sentative task list.

Once the scalar is complete, the list of taskscan then be transcribed on the DTI form. Beforedispatching the DTI to Navy Office for approval,an explanatory statement should be attachedwhich includes information on the contact officer,assumptions made, procedure followed, futureintentions with target dates and so on.

Extracts of an example of a DTI for the job of'Bridge Watchkeeper' are shown at Figure 2.Duties are shown in upper case and tasks inlower case.

The DTI is then forwarded to the Director ofNaval Training (DNT) for approval. On receipt,DNT will circulate the DTI to the relevant 'UserDirectorate' for comment. (For example anavigation DTI would go to Director of Tactics,Action Information and Navigation (DTAN)). It is

the user directorate's responsibility to vet the DTIfor accuracy and completeness and to inject theeffects of future projects if not already included.The User Directorate is endorsing the DTI as acorrect description of the job that has to beperformed. The DTI then becomes the contrac-tual agreement between the user and DNT. Thatis, the user directorate agrees that the DTIrepresents the job and DNT 'contracts' to de-velop training for that job. The DTI is thenreturned to the training developer with anyamendments noted. If any of the amendmentsproposed are in conflict with the data collectedduring the job analysis, the training developershould inform DNT so that the matter can beresolved.

While the training developer is awaitingformal approval of the DTI, he should progressother steps in the Analysis Phase. The DTI willbe the basis for performing the following actions:

• Task Analysis. Here the knowledge, atti-tudes mental and physical skills whichmust be learned for task performance areidentified and listed.

• Training Analysis. The trainees are consi-dered and steps taken to collect evidenceon what they already have learned. In-structor capacity is also determined. Inaddition, facilities which exist in the RANto conduct the training are listed.

• Feasibility Analysis. This activity results ina decision concerning the best method ofclosing the learning gap between whatthe trainee already knows and what thejob requires. It need not be a decisionwhich involves training. If it is training,then it need not necessarily be at a navalschool.

• Training Objectives and Tests. These areconstructed if the Navy is to design itsown course and they become the basis oftraining design which will occur in the nextphase.

The compilation of the DTI is the critical firststep in what may be a long process leading up tothe running of the first training course. The DTI isalso the 'contract' between the trainer and theuser Directorate on which course design isbased. Like any other sequence of dependentevents, if the first is incorrectly or inadequatelyperformed, the final result is guaranteed to beless than perfect, no matter how careful thetraining developer might be from then on. Forthese reasons it is most important that the DTIshould be properly constructed and staffed by allwho are consulted during the development pro-cess. The authors hope this article will assistthose readers who are involved to make a moreinformed and valuable input.


FOR JOB

DUTY/TASK INVENTORYBRIDGE WATCHKEEPER

BRANCH ...SEAMAN

UNITNO. DUTY/TASK DESCRIPTION

1 NAVIGATION

1.1 Plan and execute an ocean passage

1.2 Plan and execute a visual pilotage plan incorporating an anchorage

1.3 Plan and execute a blind pilotage plan incorporating an anchorage

1.4 Check compass accuracy by using a heavenly body

1.5 Check compass accuracy by transit

1.6 Check compass accuracy by Douglas Protractor/Station Pointer

1.7 Assess and report local weather conditions

1.8 Fix the ship by all means including:

a. using radio navigation aids

b. using gyro compass bearings

c. using magnetic compass bearings

d. using radar

e. by observations of the sun

f. by observations of the planets, stars and moon

g. with SATNAV

h. by horizontal sextant angles

using OMEGA

j. Douglas Protractor/Station Pointer

k. Sounding contours

Relative Bearings

or combination of a-1 above

1.9 Pilot the ship using Sonar

Duties 2 and 3 omitted4 COMMUNICATIONS

4.1 Send/receive messages by:

a. flashing lights.

b. signal flags, etc.

Figure 2 — Extracts from Bridge Watchkeeper DTI


RAN ACQUISITION OF A SHIP'SBRIDGE SIMULATOR

by Lieutenant Commander F.A. Allica RAN

'It is of immense importance that the soldier, high or low, whatever rank he has,should not have to encounter in war those things which, when seen for the firsttime, set him in astonishment and perplexity: if he has only met with them onesingle time before, even by that he is half acquainted with them.'

— Carl Von C/ausewitz

With the acquisition ot a ship's bridgesimulator early in 1985, the RAN is entering anexciting new era in its methodology of training.For several years, it has been recognised that itis neither practical, nor cost effective to conductlive training in many training fields. Certainly, theaircraft industry recognised from its inceptionthat simulator training was the most cost effec-tive means to train aircrew and to put a pilotthrough the most extenuating of emergencyprocedures at minimal cost and at no risk topersonnel.

Tactics and operations room procedureshave for many years been exercised and prac-tised in simulated operations rooms which areoften a more cost effective and definitive meansof training than practical training at sea. Ofcourse, simulation cannot achieve all trainingob|ectives and there will always be a need forpractical sea training. With the significant andrapid advances in technology in recent years,spiralling costs in weapons systems, associatedarmament and the sophisticated targets requiredto simulate today's threat, it is now more practic-al and certainly less costly to conduct mostmissile and gunfire engagements by simulatedmeans. Consequently, there are now a widerange of simulator systems available in a com-oetitive market to prospective users.

A different area of simulation which isbreaking into this market is the ship's bridgesimulator. Traditionally, the training of personnelin ship handling, navigation, officer of the watchprocedures and ship safety, including rule of theroad, has been by practical experience at sea.This system has many short comings, not in theleast that the student is not permitted to makeany mistakes (the most effective means in thelearning process). Any Commanding Officer whoaspires to greater things will exercise vigorouscontrol over a trainee in a new and or dangerous

environment and often takes over when heconsiders the situation so merits or is beyond theexpertise of the trainee. This of course, is not anunreasonable reaction, but it doesn't allow for anoptimum system of training.

This lack of first hand exposure of a juniorofficer to ship handling incidents often militatesagainst his gaining any significant experience inmanoeuvring a ship in 'at risk1 situations until heis in command of his own ship. In these days offew sea going commands and appointments, thisoccurrence is not uncommon and will lead, andperhaps has already led, to an overall lowering ofstandards. The acquisition of a bridge simulatorwill obviate intervention by the CommandingOfficer and allow trainees to be responsible fortheir own actions without the risk of collision/grounding or the subsequent board of inquiryand/or courts martial.

The RAN is, to a degree, pioneering newground in its acquisition of a simulator in that weare the first naval (non merchant service) toacquire a simulator of this nature, and someconsiderable international interest is followingthe RAM's development and utilisation of this

The Author

Lieutenant Commander F.A. Allica joined the RAN in1965 and served in HMAS HOBART during her tour olduty in V'etnam in 1970. He qualified DestroyerGunnery Officer in 1971. Principal Warfare Officer in1975 and Advanced Warfare Officer (Above WaterWeapons) in 1978. In 1972 he was CommandingOfficer of HMAS SAMARAI in PNG waters, he hasserved as gunnery officer of HMAS STUART and HMSLONDON during which time he saw service in theStanding Nato Atlantic Squadron and under FOFIOther appointments include Command Gunnery Offic-er WA and SO(G) Directorate of Naval User Require-ments. In 1980-81 he was Executive Officer of HMASVAMPIRE prior to taking up his current appointment asBridge Simulator Project Director.


training resource. Several merchant marineacademies have recently acquired or are in theprocess of acquiring marine simulators (includ-ing the Australian Maritime College at Launces-ton). There have been unsophisticated attemptsto develop bridge procedural trainers in the past;however, it is only now. with the advent ofmodern computer-based technology, that it hasbeen possible to design and produce simulatorswhich realistically reproduce the 'at sea' environ-ment.

A major impediment which had to be over-come in the development of a bridge simulatorwas in the area of visual simulation. The cuestaken by a mariner in handling a ship are about90 percent visual. He requires a good, near to allround vision and the ability to correlate the visualscene with his navigational instruments, radarand chart. These exciting visual requirements donot exist to the same degree in other forms ofsimulation, where more reliance may be madeon instrumentation, and the visual scene needonly be displayed on one or two channelsthrough a periscope or onto a screen immediate-ly in front of an aircraft's cockpit as appropriate.As visual presentation is not so important inthese simulators, it has been possible to dupli-cate the required land or seascape on a modelboard which is photographed by a mobile videocamera and projected onto the video screen.Naturally, the production of a model board isexpensive and extremely limiting in providing avariety of gaming areas.

Whilst attempts have been made to conductbridge simulation utilising model boards andvideo screen presentation, the changing anddynamic nature of the sea environment and thevessels which sail on it cannot be adequatelysimulated in this form. It was not until thedevelopment of the computer-generated imag-ery that it was possible to build a simulator whichcould simulate this changing environment on awide wrap-around screen presentation.

The RAN s requirement is different to themerchant marine. Ship handling simulators arebeing acquired by maritime colleges for a multi-plicity of reasons, but most of them stem from adesire to train pilots and captains in manoeuvringlarge tankers, container vessels and similarvessels in confined waters and also to be usedas an evaluation and investigative tool in thestudy of environmental, ergonomic, ship dyna-mic and other effects on large hulled vessels invarious conditions and situations. The RAN mainrequirement, however, is to train officers inmanoeuvring ships at sea in company with othervessels.

The RAN requirement for a bridge simulatorarose in 1978 when it became evident that withthe trend towards the acquisition of new fleetunits with limited accommodation, the paying offof older vessels such as MELBOURNE and theDARINGS, that there would be fewer trainingbillets at sea to accommodate stage 4 seamenofficers training for the award of a Full BridgeWatch Keeping Certificate (FBWC). At the sametime, an unprecedented number of junior officerswere forecast to be in the stream in the early tomid 1980s who would require billets at sea, andan exponential queue of officers awaiting seabillets would develop. A number of measureswere taken to keep this queue to a minimum andto date it has failed to materialize to anysignificant degree. Notwithstanding, the ac-quisition of a simulator will ease the trainingburden and ensure that young officers proceed-ing to sea for the award of their FBWC will beconsiderably more experienced than their pre-sent day counterparts. This should lead to theearlier award of the FBWC and an easing of thefleet training task.

DescriptionThe building, which will be at HMAS WAT-

SON on the former site of the Mortar MK 10. willhouse all the facilities necessary to support thesystem such as classrooms, student's prepara-tion room, workshops and office accommoda-tion.

The simulator wil consist of a bridge mock-up, around which will be placed at approximately7 metres radius a circular screen of 250 degrees(125 either side of centre) onto which computer-generated images of sea scenes will be proje-jcted. The ship's bridge will be mounted on amotion platform. Its rear wall is equipped with alarge window, which will give the instructor aview of the bridge interior and of the sea scenariofrom his position in the instructor's station whichis directly adjacent to the bridge. To ensure anatmosphere of privacy for the trainees, the viewbetween the bridge and the control room can beclosed by means of a blind if an advancedexercise so permits.

At the rear of the control room, there will bean auditorium, separated by a soundproof con-certina door which will allow instruction to takeplace prior to the door being opened to view alive exercise if desired. This concept will beuseful both in the familiarisation of trainees andto accommodate the large number of visitorswho are expected to want to view this uniqueequipment, especially during the first years of itsoperation.

The control of the simulator is at the


instructor's control station. Here, the instructorhas complete control of its operation. The centralprocessor (Gould 3227) is at the centre of anetwork of ten other processors which controlthe functions of synthetic generation of thecolour video, radar generation, bridge and othership control and instruction functions. The entirescene is computed and displayed just as anobserver would see it from the bridge of anactual moving ship. The synthetic scene isprojected by 11 video projectors onto the sur-rounding screen.

The radar simulation provides up to 20simulated targets and coastline as selected bythe instructor, and the radar agrees with thevisual scene. Various other controls for com-munications and audio are also interfaced withthe system and form an integral part of thesystem, which may be recorded and played backin slow or quick time for debriefing or illustrativepurposes.

The bridge is a generic bridge which will berepresentative of the FFG'DDG and SWANTORRENS Class of DE. Representative meansthat it will not resemble any one class; however,by altering the position of key navigation equip-ment such as the strip repeats or use of bridge orengine room controls it is possible to represent

any of these three classes of ship. The bridge willbe large enough to accommodate the OOW. atactical operator, quartermaster and navigator orcaptain if so desired. The bridge equipment isbased on that in actual use in RAN destroyerswith all displays, instruments and intercoms. Thebridge is mounted on a simple motion basewhich is capable of pitch and roll to •* 5 degreesand representative vibration.

Four formation ships can be controlled fromthe formation ship consoles. Each console con-sists of a graphic display which, centered on oneformation ship, shows the geometrical situationof the other ships in company. These ships canbe manned by students for manoeuvring andvoice communication practice and appear in thevisual scene, providing a realistic interaction in'game play. Alternatively, if these stations are notmanned, the instructor and his assistant cancontrol the 'other ship' models to gain similartraining value.

Own ship model and formation ship modelsbehave and handle realistically with ship dyna-mics computed in the central processor with theaid of an extensive mathematical model basedupon RAN ship trials data and practical shiphandling information The own and formationship models handle realistically and include such

Bridge simulator flowchartCourtesy Krupp Atlas Elektronik


Hamburg Bridge Simulator — instructor consoleCourtesy Krupp Atlas Elektronik

dynamics as shallow water effect, windage, shipinteraction effects during RAS and many others.In addition, the instructor can apply a variety ofmachinery breakdowns in order to fully test thestudent OOW.

The instructor assistant console consists oftwo indentical consoles each equipped with acolour graphics display, a keyboard and rollball. Aslave radar is provided between the two posi-tions to monitor the bridge radar. The workload issplit between the two positions so that it ispossible for one person control for low levelexercises, or two man control when in-companyships are introduced into the exercise. Thegraphic display shows the current exercise situa-tion with important ship data. Communicationwith the processor takes place largely by re-sponding to prepared questions — the 'menutechnique as it is called.

The instructor will monitor the exercise as ittakes place. He uses the graphics display for thispurpose which displays all navigational informa-tion including the coastline and navigationmarks. Own ship, 4 formation ships and the 16other ships move within this tactical display. Pasttracks are shown and, in addition, all relevant

data is displayed in alpha numeric characters.The instructor can also assess precisely the usethat is made of the bridge radar unit by monitor-ing his radar display.

The simulator is able to simulate all forms ofNaval activity including operations at sea, incoastal and pilotage waters. Computer-generated scenes of our harbours will be pro-duced in time, and upon these may be superim-posed the effects of wind, tidal steam current,fog, rain and all the other external factors whichaffect a ship at sea.

Each manoeuvre region is stored in its ownset of magnetic disks. In this way, any desirednumber of manoeuvre regions can be created.The instructor may superimpose the desiredenvironmental conditions, shipping and otherfactors.

At the end of an exercise, a record is printedout automatically showing the most importantexercise data and corresponding times. This isuseful for debriefing purposes. The exercise isrecorded and reproduced in all detail which is anexcellent aid in the criticism of ship manoeuvres.1

Visual, radar and audio run simultaneously andcan be frozen or played in slow and quick


motion. This comprehensive recording facility isimportant and provides an excellent instructionalaid in that the student is often unaware of anincorrect decision being made in the hecticsituations which develop on the bridge. It ispossible to pick up an exercise from when anincorrect decision was made and demonstratethe successful outcome when the right decisionis injected.

In addition to recording for debriefing pur-poses, all exercises may be stored on magneticdisks and used again as a pre-set exercise whichreproduces all the exact parameters and shiptracks which occurred in that exercise. Thispre-set exercise capability is useful in the de-velopment of a library of exercises which high-light a particular training point or navigationalincident. 'Other ship1 tracks in this mode, remainon their pre-set heading unless altered by theinstructor.

A feature of the simulator is the onsiteprogramming facility which permits the modifica-tion and generation of ship models and harbourscenes by utilization of digitizer equipment. Adrawing of whatever is required to be modelled,eg, ship or coastline, is placed on this drawingboard and is electronically etched by this instru-

ment and the results show up on a VDU. Themodel is etched from several aspects and whenthe results are satisfactory, colour is added andthe model is then available for use in cassetteform. A certain number of models will be pro-vided at system acceptance; however, a largeproduction task will be required in the initialstages to produce Australia scenarios. It is asimple task which can be undertaken by unskil-led manpower but it is time consuming and takesone man 2 weeks to model a ship such as anFFG. It is possible that the RAN may be able toobtain several scenarios from the HamburgMaritime College who have a similar simulatorwhich will have been in operation for two yearswhen the RAN system is accepted.

Simulator Training

Training priorities for use of the simulatorhave been agreed and it has been determinedthat the primary user of the simulator will bejunior seaman officers, prior to joining their shipsfor practical sea training to gain their FBWC. Thistraining is best co-ordinated and managed dur-ing their Stage III courses.

Second priority is given to commandingofficers and executive officers designate so that

Hamburg Bridge SimulatorCourtesy Krupp Atlas Electronik


**

./->.•"̂ ,̂_ .̂.-w »

DIVISION ACTIVITE^

CHEMIN DES TRAVAILS B.P. 53 06801 CAGIMES-SUR-MER!

UNDERSEA•:- r^

^ WARFARE ",» . . -» - • .*'•"

SYSTEMS:•»»*•. ' ' • • - «~

SOUS-MARINES

EDEX FRANCE - TEL. (93) 20.01.40 TELEX : TCSF 204 780 Fi

True-to-Life SimulationSimulation- and Trainingsystems for all applications

e. g. ATLAS Submarine Team TrainerATLAS ASW and Sonar TrainerATLAS Weapons Firing Simulator

ATLAS Ship Handling Simulator

K R U P P G M B H

AS-ELEKTRONIK BREMEN

they may practise handling their ships in themore advanced manoeuvres of replenishmentapproaches, harbour entry and alongsideapproach. It will also dust off a few cobwebsaccumulated during sometimes long periodsashore at head office. Other users will be bridgeteams from ships alongside in Sydney; Long andShort navigating officers courses; and navalreserve officers. It is apparent that there will belittle free time.Research and Development

Not stated as a requirement, but existing asa capability is the simulator's ability to be used asan investigative tool. The RAM's simulator will becapable of answering many questions about themaritime environment which until now have notbeen able to be researched in any depth. Thesimulator will allow experiments to gather dataand to provide repeatability of trials to includeadditional data. It will be useful for analysis of thebridge instrumentation, information presentation,the ergonomics of bridge design, and evaluationof the man himself and his capacity to absorb theinformation as presented. It will be possible to gobeyond the bridge to the ship itself and evaluateship handling techniques, the advantages ofdifferent screw and rudder, external factors, aidsto navigation, buoys, lights, beacons: are theyreally assisting the mariner or are they dreamedup by bureaucrats sitting at desks with a niceorderly plot on a plan? Certainly it is not afoolproof path to the answers we are seeking,but it is a far better option than we have had inthe past.

Project ManagementIn comparison with many Defence projects,

the Bridge Simulator has led somewhat of acharmed life. The project received considerableimpetus in 1980 following the Afghanistan incur-sion and was brought forward for a year 0

decision. It has been developed in 2 Phases:Phase 1, the Project Definition to investigate theviability of the project, and Phase 2, Acquisitionand Installation. Sperry Systems Management ofUSA and Krupp Atlas Electronik of BremenGermany undertook Phase 1 and, as a result ofevaluation of their responses, Krupp wereawarded the Phase 2 contract at a firm price of$10.309m. Total project costs are $13.379m (atAugust 1982 prices) which include the facilityand spares. A tender for construction of thebuilding was accepted in January 1983. Workcommenced in February and is expected to becompleted by May 1984. Krupp will install andset the system to work on site late in 1984 priorto final system acceptance trials programmed forMarch 1985. It is planned that Krupp (Australia)will be awarded the first maintenance supportcontract for a period of three years from accept-ance. Two Australian firms, FP Sanney Pty Ltdand Computer Sciences of Australia, have beenawarded sub-contracts for the design and manu-facture of components of the simulator systemwhich will have Australian Industrial Participation(AIP) in excess of 30 percent.

Conclusion

Visitors to the Hamburg Facility have beenthoroughly enthralled by the total realism of thesystem and convinced that the bridge simulatorwill be a very valuable training aid. This opinionis confirmed by the increasing number of mari-time colleges who are acquiring simulators fortraining purposes. By mid 1985, all RAN naviga-tion courses will employ the simulator as a majortraining aid. Its introduction into service is ex-pected to contribute significantly to the reductionin overall training time in the award of a FBWC.and will ultimately result in the production of amore polished, confident and safe bridge watch-keeping officer.

CHANGED YOUR ADDRESS?

Did your last Journal turn up late, or come via another ship or establishment''' If it did. thenperhaps you have moved and forgotten to tell us Similarly, if the rank was wrong then perhaps youmay have forgotten to amend that too.

If you have changed your address, or rank, or intend to do one or the other, or both, before thenext edition please let us know Just drop a note to the Membership Secretary and advise him of

your name;membership number (top of the address label);new address (or new title)


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THE GLADIATOR ANDTHE BUREAUCRAT

by Lieutenant K.C. Bayly-Jones RAN

At a lecture to the Joint Services StaffCollege recently, the subject of junior officers'training and postings was raised as part of anaddress on the RAN. The Chief of NavalPersonnel, Rear Admiral Martin, had this to say:

'We share with the Army and the Air Forcethe problem of producing an officer who isbrave, aggressive and decisive in combat,used to being a man of action, and a leader ofmen. We then drop him at an office desk inCanberra, miles from the sea, expet him tounderstand and be successful in theintricacies of the bureaucratic jungle wherethe qualities for which he was selected andwith which the Service has armed him are notof the same use to him. If he is posted toCanberra too early to sit at a desk, there is thedanger that he will become too good at beinga bureaucrat and that his sword will beblunted as a result.'

This article will discuss the 'Gladiator and theBureaucrat' issue as put forward by AdmiralMartin but based on the following assumptions:

• that the officers referred to are of the executivebranch, and

• that they are at the junior lieutenant level whenposted ashore.

I have no doubt that Admiral Martin's remarksapply to all branches, though perhaps to a lesserdegree.

SL75To illustrate the present situation with regard

to junior seaman lieutenants, Table 1 outlines theposting history of the class of seamansupplementary list officers who joined the RAN inMarch 1975. SL officers are used because inbroad terms they are expected to spend moretime at sea during their short service than their GLcounterparts. That, at least was the impressiongiven to us upon entry!

SL 75 seaman training was completed withthe award of Bridge Watchkeeping Certificates in1978, when general career progression, and insome cases, specialisation started At the

moment, eight from an initial entry of fourteenremain; four have transferred to the General List,two have sub-specialised (submarines andMCD), and five have received APWO training.

The ConceptThe Gladiator and the Bureaucrat concept,

as it applies to junior seaman lieutenants will belooked at briefly as an ideal, and free from theconstraints of short term realities Two questionsimmediately arising from Admiral Martin'sremarks might be:

• How late can we leave learning theBureaucrat's art if we are to practise it for thebenefit of the Navy?

• Does the sword in fact become blunted as aresult of learning the Bureaucrat's art?

I leave these questions deliberately open as foodfor futher thought.

Navy Office, Malfunction Junction, PortFumble or whatever description one likes toapply, is a fact of life, as is bureaucracy and theassociated red tape. The Navy, as an instrumentof Government and having to compete for publicmoney will never be rid of the Navy Office systemin one form or another. We have to learn to use the'system' to our advantage, and I believe that if weare to be successful, the learning process muststart at a relatively early age. The theoreticalproblem seems to be one of maintaining anadequate balance. We need officers well versedin both arts and with the ability to develop rapidlythe skills learnt in each area should the situationdemand it.

The Author

Lieutenant Kim Bayly Jones joined the RN in 1974 as aSupplementary List Midshipman He transferred to theRAN in 1976 after completing initial training at BRNCDartmouth and onboard HM Ships FEARLESS andDEVONSHIRE. After Stage IV BWC training, he pinedHMAS BOMBARD in 1978, completed an APWOCourse (1979) and then served in HMAS TORRENSand DERWENT as APWO ASW through to 1981 Heloined Navy Office in 1981 on the staff of DTXC-N andis currently Flag Lieutenant to CNS


command of FREMANTLES indicate that seabillet shortages will be maintained at presentlevels. The effects of the demise of the APWOcourse have yet to be felt.

RealitiesThe present situation is well known. Put

simply there are too few sea billets to go round.Contributing factors are the scrapping of HMASMELBOURNE, the changeover from Attack toFremant/e Class patrol boats, and the ongoing DEmodernisation. The situation is poor and it isunlikely to be relieved in the foreseeable future.Present trends in the minimum manning concept(FFG and FOD) and the postings of seniorlieutenants/junior lieutenant commanders to

While we seek to find suitable slots for theExecutive lieutenant in our ships, it would be fairto say that there are a number of vacant desksashore waiting to be filled. Whether these desksare appropriate or not is the subject of somedebate. The range of shore jobs availableappears to be endless, and they cover the wholespectrum of naval tasks. For instance, juniorAPWO trained Seamen lieutenants have in recentyears been posted ashore to the following areas:

• Recruit School — CERBERUS• Parade Training Off\cer-ALBATROSS• Barrackmaster — KUTTABUL• Directorate of Naval User Requirements —

Navy Office• Directorate of Trade and Exercise Co-

ordination — Navy Office• Directorate of Surface and Air Weapons —

Navy Office• Fleet Operations Centre — FHQ.

TABLE 1

SL 75 OUTLINE POSTING PATTERN

YEAR 1978 1979 1980 1981

RANK SBLT SBLT SBLT/ LEUTLEUT

A MWV MWV MWV

Those examples are indicative only, but theydo give some idea of how we are using our assets.Some postings are generated for reasons knownonly to the poster and the individual concerned,besides which it is not the object of this article toquestion Individual posting policy. In light of theabove example, the pattern of shore postingsappears to retain, insofar as possible, the edge ofthe young Gladiator's sword when posted to NavyOffice: the three directorates above are all closeto the Navy Office 'coal face' for a warfarestreamed seaman.

'Six of One, and Half a Dozen of the Other'There are many pros and cons associated

with what is essentially a discussion on seaversus Navy Office postings for junior Seamanlieutenants. I would categorise them as follows:

ProsNavy Office provides a broader under-standing of the Service, and an insight intothe way Government, and the bureaucracywork. I suggest that anyone exposed to theCanberra environment comes away with amore balanced view of the factors thatgovern the Navy. A subsidiary benefit wouldhopefully be in the attitude of the youngofficer coming from the Fleet, and knowingthat he will soon be returning. It is in his owninterest to provide fresh input to thebureaucratic machine with an aim toimproving its efficiency.A job in Navy Office introduces younglieutenants to the awesome amount of paperwork required to keep the Navy afloat. Theability to express oneself in Service writing is

7982

LEUT

7983

LEUT

APWO" APWO NO

B

C

DE

F

GH

MWV

MWV

SMMWV

OOW

oowOOW

MWV APWO APWO- NO

APWO ESTAB MWV MWV

SM SM SM NO'

ESTAB ESTAB NO

MWV

MCD

APWO APWO

MCD MCD

OOW APWO APWO

NO

DE(N)

SM

NO MWV

ESTAB DE

OOW

APWO

MCDFHQ

LEGEND

MWV — Minor War Vessel NO/XO

APWO — Assistant Principal WarfareOfficer

NO — Navy Office Job

ESTAB — Establishment Job

DE(N) — Destroyer Navigator

SM — Submariner

OOW — Major Unit Watchkeeper

MCD — Mine Clearance Diving Officer

FHQ — Fleet Headquarters Job

' Transferred to GL

The table shows that of the eight, seven had either had, or are presently in desk jobs, and of those seven, fourhave been in Canberra at Navy Office.


a skill that all officers have to develop for jobsashore and at sea. Staff Colleges teachthese skills, but for those posted ashoreprematurely, the Navy Office job will providean opportunity to develop them ahead oftime. Another factor in the early developmentof communication skills is inherent in thework environment, where a lieutenant findshimself working directly for, or in some caseswith, lieutenant commanders, commandersand captains. The necessary hierarchy andfunctions of a ship restrict the opportunity fora junior lieutenant to converse (in the truesense of the word) with his Captain. NavyOffice requires a junior officer to consultdaily, and often argue his point of view, withofficers considerably senior to himself. I amnot implying that discipline is weak at NavyOffice, just that the different nature of thework requires the junior officer to com-municate with his seniors in a way that mightpreviously have been unthinkable to him.

Family life for the married man is a crucialfactor in the efforts to keep personnel happy.Of the earlier example citing the SL 75course, seven are now married, four withchildren. While a move to Canberra mayinitially be upsetting to some wives (as anymove can be) most find the area pleasantand many settle here. The lower cost ofhousing compared to Sydney, and improvedroads between the two cities are furtherbenefits to be taken into account.

ConsThe timing of the posting ashore, comingwhen the junior lieutenant is perhaps justbeginning to play an effective part in theoperation of his ship is critical. These officersare, for the most part, competent watch-keepers and effective Divisional Officers; thenext time they go to sea will, in a lot of cases,be on completion of PWO course which willhave followed the shore posting. It istherefore possible to spend up to 4 yearsaway from 'the front line' and the time takento get up to speed again in both theoperational and administrative aspects ofship routine is considerable.

No job in Navy Office provides a realDivisional challenge. The loss of contact withsailors, and the responsibilities involved intheir day to day personal management is aprime factor mitigating against the posting toCanberra. It might be suggested that theofficer returning to sea on completion of his

Navy Office job would be better equipped tomanage his sailors as a result, although thatagain is a debatable point.

The view in the 'Pro' section on the benefits ofa shore posting for the married man hide thereverse side of the coin for the single man.The prospect of a 9 to 5 job in Canberrashould be, and generally is, anathema to thebachelor. To one used to the atmosphere of aship, and a seagoing wardroom, that firstview of Russell Hill must be a frighteningexperience.

ConclusionTo sum up, let me first emphasise that a

secondary aim of this article is to seek views onthe problems as presented. The efficientmanagement of Naval manpower is an area thataffects us all.

The concept of the Gladiator and theBureaucrat has been looked at very briefly withand without the realities -- those being ourcurrent force structure and the availability ofbillets. The pros and cons including family/singleman considerations, communication skills,Divisional responsibilities and experience levelswere also discussed. An example of a group ofseaman lieutenants was used to illustrate thepoints made and I believe that exampleaccurately reflects the situation as it is across theboard.

I close with the final thought that in order toprovide the Gladiator with his sword, we must firstwin the battle for funds — and that can arguablybe done best by those who understand the rolesof both the Gladiator and the Bureaucrat.


ALSTHOM-ATLANTIQUE DIESELDEPARTMENT WINS MAJOR CONTRACT

WITH U.S. NAVY

The U.S. Navy has selected the S.E.M.T.-Pielstick PC 4 enginemanufactured by Alsthom-Atlantique's Diesel Department to equip aseries of supply ships. This is further evidence of the success of the PC 4engine, which enjoys a solid reputation for its power-to-weight ratio, lowfuel consumption, heavy fuel capability and reliability.

The propulsion system adopted for the U.S. Navy supply ships includes acontrollable-pitch propeller double screw assembly driven by two type 10PC 4 diesel engines with reduction gears and power outlets for theassociated generators. Each engine is required to provide a minimumoutput of 16,500 hp and burn 3500° sec. Redwood heavy fuel.

The entire fleet of supply ships is scheduled to include 18 to 20 vessels.As requested by the U.S. Navy, the engines for the first four vessels willbe manufactured in France and the others will be built in the productionfacilities of Colt Industry in the United States under S.E.M.T.-Pielsticklicense.

For any information on Pielstick engines, contact the Australian office ofAlsthom-Atlantique, 50 Margaret Street, Sydney, telephone: 295 121.

Advertisement


THE PROOF AND EXPERIMENTALESTABLISHMENTPORT WAKEFIELD

by Lieutenant K.C. Mathews, RANEM

At the beginning of 1982, the RAN created anew billet for an RAN officer to be stationed at theArmy's Proof and Experimental Establishment,Port Wakefield, South Australia. Although theNavy has had a close asseciation with the Rangesince its inception, this was the first time a navalofficer was to serve as an Assistant Proof Officer.The Army argued, not unreasonably, that asalmost 50% of firings and trials conducted on theRange are carried out on behalf of Navy, apermanent naval presence is justified.

The P&EE (PW) had its origin in 1926 when acommittee of two, Lieutenant Colonel H.B.G.Gibbs, of the Munitions Supply Board, andCaptain W. Spooner, RAN, selected 240 hectaresof land near the head of St Vincent Gulf for thepurpose of conducting proof firings of QF 18 pdr.ammunition for the munitions factory atMaribyrnong, Victoria. In selecting PortWakefield, the committee was influenced by thelarge stretch of sand which is exposed at lowwater, thereby facilitating the recovery of firedprojectiles.

The first rounds were fired at P&EE (PW) on5 December 1929. For the first 10 years, firingswere conducted at three monthly intervals, but thetempo naturally increased from 1939 onwardsand Port Wakefield became the principal rangefor the proof of munitions manufactured inAustralia.

An interesting development occurred in1943, when it was decided to proof several 8 inchnaval guns which had been re-lined at theBendigo Ordnance Factory As proof at sea wasout of the question, it was decided to use a 28 cmGerman railway gun as the mounting for thesebarrels. The gun, known as the 'Amiens Gun1, ormore familiarly as 'Bruno', had been captured bythe AIF in France in August 1918 and was ondisplay at Canberra railway station. On 12February 1944, the first 8 inch barrel wassuccessfully proofed. Subsequent firings for proofof propellant continued until 1947 when the 8 inchprogramme was completed.

Unfortunately, despite the historic value ofthe mounting and accessories, it was disposed ofas scrap in 1963, although the barrel used for thepropellant proof remains on display at the Range.This barrel is believed to have come from X Turret\nHMASAUSTRALIA.

Today, the Range covers an area ofCommonwealth-owned land of about 2000hectares. In addition, the Range controls a seaarea of 19,200 hectares. The land area is flat andclear of timber, consisting mainly of salt marsh.The only exception is a small area of high groundat the northern end of the Range whereadministrative, technical and domestic buildingsare concentrated.

Role and TasksThe role of P&EE (PW) is threefold:

• proof of ammunition, propellants, fuzes, gunbarrels, weapons and components as directedby HQ, Log Comd

• conduct of trials for the Services, Departmentof Defence and other departments associatedwith research and development, defectinvestigation and production of ballistic data

• development of techniques and instrument-ation to provide performance data for users andothers.

The Author

Joined the RN in March 1949 and was commissionedin February 1962 He served in the RAN on exchangebetween 1965-1966 and eventually joined the RAN in1971. Whilst in the RN, he served in battleships,cruisers, frigates, aircraft carriers and minesweepers;in the RAN. he has served in HMAS DUCHESS,HMAS PARRAMATTA and HMAS SYDNEY. In addi-tion, he has been Weapons Systems Officer at WestHead, HMAS CERBERUS: Quality Control Officer atthe Gunnery School (introducing the RAN TrainingSystem to the School); Staff Officer DSAW. andcurrently Naval Tradition and Reputation Upholder atPW


TasksP&EE (PW) is tasked to carry out various

types of proof and trials. Proof is almostexclusively dynamic proof, on ammunition of40mm calibre and above. Firings may be carriedout:• into shallow water for recovery at low tide,• into deep water,• on to sand, or• against various types of targets.

Trials are usually more complex and may bebroadly categorized as:• trials in aid of research and development,• ballistic trials,• pattern acceptance trials, and• provision of technical support for trials by other

agencies requiring facilities unique to P&EE(PW).

Additional tasks may include:

• internal technique and instrumentation devel-opment,

• assistance to agencies in departments otherthan Defence, and

• support for Service courses and training.

ManningThe unit authorized establishment provides

71 staff: 6 officers, 37 OR and 28 civilians. One ofthe six officers is an RAN Lieutenant. Eightdifferent corps are represented on the range;RAA, RAE, RASvy, RAAMC, RAAOC, RAEME,RACT and AACC.

WHAT IS PROOF?Equipment Proof

The need for trials for the development ofequipment is clear. What is not so clear is theneed for proof Proof is the final acceptanceinspection of ammunition or a piece of equipment.The proof of guns, mountings and barrels isstraight forward and is carried out using specificproof charges which subject the equipment topressures up to 20% in excess of those producedby normal Service charges.Ammunition Proof

The proof of ammunition is rather moreinvolved and has two important aspects: safetyand performance.

To begin with, the Fleet must obviously haveabsolute confidence that its ammunition will notexplode prematurely onboard ship and that fuzeswill not operate or shells detonate until after theyhave left the barrel. Proof is designed to preventsuch accidents occurring. Of course, proof firingsare carried out under strict precautions to ensurethat no harm comes to those involved.

The second proof requirement is to provethat the ammunition will produce the desiredterminal effects. An item of ammunition, say around for a 5 inch gun, has a high material costand an incalculable potential value. The purposeof the gun is to deliver a projectile onto a target inwar. The cost of the projectile which is fired at anenemy is enormous, since, indirectly, it includesthe cost of the DDG, its deployment to the battlearea, the training of the crew, and a host of otherthings. That projectile, when it is fired, mightdestroy a ship or aircraft worth many millions ofdollars. It must therefore perform perfectly, or all iswasted.

The quality of an individual round can only bejudged by the performance of a similar roundtaken from the same batch and fired. Foreconomic reasons the number of similar roundstaken from a batch must be small. In order that theresults obtained from firing a relatively very smallquantity can be applied to the whole batch with thenecessary degree of confidence, variousmeasures have to be taken. Firstly, the wholeprocess must be governed by the most strictstatistical sampling methods and the sample mustbe truly random. Secondly, the sample must befired under strictly consistent, uniform andunvarying conditions; in fact, under laboratoryconditions. These principles apply to all forms ofproof and all types of projectiles and ammunition.

Over Water RecoveryIt is often necessary for rounds to be

examined after they have been fired to determinewhether any undue distortion of the projectile hasoccurred or to ensure that driving bands remainintact. Port Wakefield is an ideal venue, perhapsthe best in the world, for Over Water RecoveryFirings. The projectiles are fired so as to ricochetor skip across the Range at high water, thusminimising terminal effects. Later the tide recedesfor a distance of up to 4 kilometres, leaving therounds high and dry on the sand from where theycan easily be recovered.

A variety of vehicles are used for recoveryincluding landrovers, a motor tri-cycle withballoon tyres and a Skima 6 Hovercraft The tri-cycle can be fun! On one occasion it was leftunattended on the beach for a short time as thetide came in. The tide at Port Wakefield runs at asmart walking pace, and when the rider nextlooked round, the tri-cycle was seen floatingupright on its balloon tyres, heading merrily outinto the Gulf.

Although the hovercraft is used to assist withrecovery, its primary purpose is for use as a patrolcraft removing fishing boats when they encroachonto the Range. I cannot recommend this partic-ular hovercraft for naval service as it becomes


--

Beach Recovery VT Towers

Ammunition Proof


unmanageable in wind speeds over 20 knots orwhen wave heights exceed one foot.

TECHNICAL FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT

Batteries

There are four batteries currently in use at theRange:

• Forward Battery. Forward Battery is suitablefor most proof firings, including HE. The batteryhas facilities for propellant charge adjustmentand instrumentation of all types.

• Victor Battery. Victor Battery is used for proofand trials of VT fuzes. The major projects beingconducted on the Range in 1983/84 are thetrials of the AN2 Mod 2 and AN3 fuzes for theNavy. More than 900 rounds of 4.5 inch and 5

inch ammunition are to be fired in support ofthese trials. VT fuzed rounds are fired to passover an 11 foot diameter radar reflectivealuminium mesh ball slung between two 90metre high towers.

• Cannister Battery. Cannister Battery is used forfirings from field carriages. It is not used for HEfirings.

• Plate Battery. Plate Battery was originallyconstructed as an armour plate range but thisfacility has now been dismantled. The battery isprimarily used nowadays for firings of RAN5in/54 ordnance.

The range has ample area for the establishmentof ad hoc batteries to carry out specific tasks.

Serial

(a)

Observation/Data required

(b)Projectile Velocityand Muzzle Velocity

Table 1 — Instrumentation

Instrumentation/ OperationEquipment

(c) (d)

Photocell chronometer Skyscreens are positioned under the trajectory at a(PCC) measured distance apart and connected through

amplifiers to counters. Projectile interruption of thefield of view provides a start/stop signal to thecounters giving an elapsed time over the measureddistance.

VT Fuze Frequency

Projectile Spin

Fuze delay

Projectile Yaw

Ferranti Type 900C

Panoramic receiverTape recorderMulti-channel antennaMagnetiser

Aluminium foilBatteryInfrared (IR) detectorCathode ray oscillo-scope (CRO)

Cards frame

Projectile Retardation PCC

A doppler radar system including a transmitter/receiver unit, data flow accessories and a dataprocessor.

Receiver detects frequency transmission of fuze.Doppler effect is recorded on tape

A magnetised projectile is fired closely parallel to along straight wire which is part of a closed electriccircuit. Resulting signals are photographed againsta time scale.Aluminium sheets are placed against the face ofa target and connected to a battery to form an opencircuit. Projectile striking foil 'shorts the circuit andstarts a counter This counter is stopped by IRdetection of detonation of shell on target.

Projectile is fired through a card or set of cards atpre-determined distances. Subsequent measure-ment of the perforation shapes will define theinclination of the projectile relative to its longitudinalaxis.

Four successive observed velocities are measuredat 100ft intervals.

Maximum pressure Copper crusher gauges Calibration copper gauges are crushed by pressureMicrometer

Pressure/Time History Strain transducersPiezo transducers

of the propellant gases Measurement of the deform-ation gives maximum chamber pressure.

The transducers are inserted into the chamber bythe most technical feasible means and the outputsignals passed to a suitable recorder.

Detonation/Frag-mentation/Tra-jectones/FuzeFunction

High speed camerasStill camerasPolaroid cameras


The Skima Six

The Ball

Mobile 4. Sin


Weapons

Between 40% and 50% of the tasks given tothe Proof Range are undertaken on behalf of theRAN Because of the peculiar nature of navalguns (from the Army's point of view) we have hadto devise some interesting hybrids, apart from themarriage between 'Bruno' and the 8 inch navalgun referred to earlier. Some of the hybrid andunusual equipments currently in use are:

• an OQF 4.Sin Mk2 mounted on an Army155mm M1A1 carriage

• a 5in/54 Naval gun mounted on a specificallydesigned 'Britstand' trailer which is affection-ately named HMAS PORT WAKEFIELD

• an OQF 40mm Mkt mounted on a 25 pdr guncarriage

Eventually, it is expected that the range willacquire a 76mm OTO Melara which will need tobe modified to suit proof requirements and thetrials which will be associated with Australianproduction of 76mm ammunition.

Observation, Meteorology andInstrumentation

Thirty one accurately surveyed observationposts are sited along the coast. These permitaccurate fall of shot, height of burst and fuzefunction observations to be made.

P&EE (PW) is equipped with the resources toproduce detailed meteorological data

Different proofs and trials have differentobservation requirements. Some of the observ-ations and instrumentation used to gather the

required information at P&EE (PW) are describedat Table 1. A brief description of each procedure isincluded. There are many others not described.Most of the more complex computations aremade simpler with the aid of a Techtronixcomputer.

Range Safety

Range safety is monitored by a Plesseysurveillance radar, the aerial for which is mountedon top of an 80 metre high steel tower.

In summary, the Proof and ExperimentalEstablishment, Port Wakefield, is a highlyprofessional unit. It is a self-sufficientorganisation, capable of undertaking a widerange of technically demanding tasks. It has avital role in minimising the risk of defectiveweapons or ammunition endangering the lives ofsoldiers, sailors and airmen when they are sentinto battle.

Propellants must be proved consistent,barrels and breeches must be able to withstandhuge pressures and fuzes must be safe andreliable. The entire round or missile must performin the manner intended, whether it wasmanufactured last year or 20 years ago.

In this short article, much has had to be leftunsaid. Ships visiting Adelaide are encouraged tosend officers and senior sailors to tour the Rangeto see for themselves the many exciting newdevelopments taking place, and the efforts madeto ensure that we follow St. Paul's injunction —

Prove all things. Hold fast that which is good.

HMAS PORT WAKEFIELD- photos courtesy author


WASHINGTONNOTES

by Tom Friedmann

Just over a year ago the world witnessedwhat might be the last dispatch of a British battlefleet to liberate part of Britain's once vast empire.It had been many years since a fleet of any nationhad been sent to sea for such a purpose and therewere high expectations about how many newlessons would be gleaned from the first use ofhigh technology by an entire fleet. The use of theHarrier, nuclear submarines, and the massive useof guided weapons were, indeed, 'firsts'. Butthese technologies represented evolutions inconcept and design more than totally novel ideas.The greatest lessons were not really 'new' butmerely relearned and, as always, the re-education was paid for in blood and vastexpenditures of national treasure.

Since the Second World War, the UnitedKingdom has been steadily reducing the size of itsarmed forces. However, the cuts went beyondrational reduction based on the shrinking size ofthe Empire. The two decades prior to April, 1982,became a precipitous retreat by Britain from herposition as a world power. The strength of theBritish Armed Services were cut so deeply thatthe gashes went into their bone and marrow.

No Service suffered as greatly as the RoyalNavy, the island nation's first line of defence. Thenew aircraft carrier INVINCIBLE was scheduledfor transfer to Australia and the FEARLESS andINTREPID were scheduled for the breakers,thereby removing Great Britain's last amphibiousassault capability. Many frigates were to be eithersold or scrapped and replacements were never toreach even the old dangerously low levels again.Britain's politicians not only ignored the lessons ofseapower taught during the two World Wars thiscentury (including the first Battle of the Falklandsin 1914), but they also ignored their entire nationalhistory as they stripped away Britain's navalpower.

The Argentine dictatorship, a corruptmurderer of its own people, misread Britain'sactions toward unilateral disarmament. Notwithout reason did Argentine generals (as hadother dictators before them) come to believe thatany nation that would not spend enough on itsarmed forces to keep the peace, would not thenspend many more times any peacetimeexpenditure for weapons, as well as the lives of itsyoung men, to fight for such abstract principles asthe protection of its national territory and thefreedom and independence of its own people.The actual attack took most people by surprise.Obviously, it was the desperate act of a failingregime, despite the deep feeling Argentines havethat the Falklands are rightfully theirs.

At the time of the invasion, the United Stateswas involved in negotiations with Argentina toprovide troops in support of counter-insurgencyactions taking place in Central America In otherwords, Americans were dishonoring themselvesby negotiating with an abhorrent regime tobecome their surrogates — their Cubans — inCentral America. These negotiations in turncaused another tragic misreading by theArgentine generals that led them to theconclusion that the United States would supportArgentina in an invasion of the Falklands to gainArgentine support in Central America.

But if the Argentine government had anyquestions about the sympathy of the Americanpublic in their cause, they were undoubtedlydispelled soon after the attack. Although mostAmericans supported their government'sattempts to mediate between Argentine and theUnited Kingdom, American public opinionovercame what would otherwise have been a pro-Pan-American sympathy and was unquestion-ably pro-British. It was a matter of Britaindefending basic principles in which Americans


believe, against Argentina that trampled uponthose same principles.

And Britain was supported in a more thanspiritual fashion. Munitions and other suppliescame from US factories and stockpiles, andAmerican air bases — on British islands — wereused to support the fleet. Most importantly, Britainwas supplied with intelligence so far superior toArgentina's that many feel it tipped the scales inBritain's favour. Much of the intelligence camefrom joint Anglo-American operations. However,many Americans were surprised to see howclosely the United States was linked with theUnited Kingdom and how the actions of such aclose ally could affect American security interestsin circumstances over which the United Stateshad no direct control.

There has been much comment about thesuperior training and leadership of the Britishforces. But what forces are we speaking of? TheRoyal Marines, the Special Air Service, theSpecial Boat Squadron, the Gurkhas, the WelshGuards, and the Scots Guards to name several.These are some of the leading military units of theworld. Would anyone question the training andprofessionalism of the Royal Air Force and theRoyal Navy? Frankly, the only real surprise wouldhave been if these superb forces had lost.

Secretary of the Navy John Lehman'semphasis on the fact thaa the British forces weresuperior to Argentine forces because 'like theirUS counterparts, they are entirely volunteer' issomewhat questionable. Who, after all, wouldquestion the combat capability of the Israeliarmed forces, for one example, which are basedon universal conscription. Secretary Lehman, byhis comments, denies credit to the conscriptarmies that fought so valiantly for the UnitedStates in every war this nation has fought duringthis century.

The skill, stamina and resolution of themembers of the British forces were probably asgood if not better than any force Britain had eversent into battle. The campaign took place in anextremely harsh climate and once againemphasized the crucial importance of bothphysical and mental toughness for the protectionof the individual Serviceman and the success ofany military campaign.

But no matter how competent they were, theBritish were still lucky. British commanderslanded without achieving air superiority. Largeluxury liners lay offshore and sent troops intobattle in lifeboats. Such actions could have easilydeveloped into another Gallipoli, as General PaulX. Kelly, Assistant Commander of the UnitedStates Marine Corps, testified before Congress.There were errors such as the loss of thirty-two

members of the Welsh Guards on the RFA SIRGALAHAD, as they watched a film while their shipwas at action stations. But no war was ever wonwithout a large element of luck, as well as tragicmistakes.

The success of the Exocet missile used byArgentina to sink several British ships should nothave come as a surprise because of thesuccessful use of guided missiles against surfaceships in the 1967 Israeli-Arab War and the 1971Indo-Pakistan War. The potential use of guidedweapons goes back to World War II when theGermans sank the Italian battleship ROMA anddamaged several Allied warships with radiocontrolled bombs. The kamikaze, it can beargued, was the ultimate 'guided missile' and thenavies that fought that menace should havevolumes of records to study about the steps takento protect their ships. Indeed, it was not thesuccess of missiles that was the story of theFalklands but the fact that the Royal Navy sentships lacking effective close-in air defenseweapons and airborne early warning aircraft intoan environment where guided weapons would beused. This technology has been available toBritain for years and her civilian leadership shouldbe called to account for not having properlyprepared the Royal Navy's remaining vessels.

However, the Royal Navy is not alone infacing armament problems. The United Statesnavy is only now making progress in providingstate-of-the-art weapons for its ships. Frankly, theUnited States was lucky that it did not have to fighta missile war during the last two decades as it hasbeen consistently behind the Soviet Navy in thedeployment of surface-to-surface missiles andclose-in air defense weapons.

The loss of British warships has been greatlyoverplayed. It is a simple maxim that whenwarships seek the enemies of their country, theyrun the risk of being sunk, whether by gunfire,torpedo or missile. The small size of the ships losthas become an important issue in the defensedebate in America. Secretary Lehman, a largeship advocate, has stated:

The Exocet missile that sank SHEFFIELD,for instance, would have quite literallybounced off the seventeen-inch armor of the(US battleship) NEW JERSEY. . . Not one ofthe attacks sustained by British ships wouldhave been able to penetrate any vital spaceon any US aircraft carrier. The smallercarriers deployed by the UK, by contrast, arefar more vulnerable to complete loss fromtorpedo, missile, or bomb attacks becausethey lack multiple hulls, armor plate, andredundant damage control and protectivelaunching systems of large US carriers.'


USS NEW

The comparison is questionable for manyreasons. First, the Secretary of the Navy cannotbe absolutely certain that an American carrierwould not be put out of action by a surface-to-surface missile. Second, the INVINCIBLEwas notdamaged by a missile so we are not sure howsuch damage would have affected her perform-ance. Third, the Secretary underplays thedifference in missions between British aircraftcarriers and American aircraft carriers becamehe refuses to acknowledge there could be a placefor a smaller aircraft carrier in the US Navy.Fourth, the statement passes over the fact thatonly the US Defence budget is capable of conandmaintaining NIMITZ-c\ass carriers and their

JERSEYCourtesy USN

deployment is beginning to strain even thatbudget. Fifth, not all US ships carry 17-inch armorlike the NEW JEftSEVbutthe Secretary neglectedto comment on how American destroyers andfrigates would stand up to a missile attack. Finally,even if all four /OW/4-class battleships wererecommissioned (and to date. Congress hasrefused to fund the conversions of the MISSOURIand WISCONSIN) there are only four such heavilyarmored ships in the entire American inventory Isthe Secretary proposing the United States buildnew ships as heavily armored, perhaps to matchthe new Soviet 'battlecruisers'? If so, no suchplans have been released.

The Battle of the Falklands was a classic


battle of logistics. Argentina made great strides insending adequate supplies to Port Stanley towithstand a considerable siege. However, oncethe supplies arrived, Argentina's commanderslacked the ability to have them properlydistributed (shades of the Russian Front in WorldWar I). But a key point is that Argentina keptsupplies coming until the very eve of thesurrender because interdiction raids against PortStanley's airfield were ineffective. The RAF wasnever able to secure the same superiority in theair that the Royal Navy did at sea. Had otherfactors been different, this failure could havemeant the defeat of the British forces.

The United Kingdom exhibited a dazzlingdisplay of logistics preparation. Britain mobilized45 ships of her Merchant Navy in record time. TheDefense Ministry's Directorate General of Shipsdid a superb job in organizing and preparing thevessels in many ports in the United Kingdom andabroad, including Charleston, South Carolina. Butthe rapid mobilization was aided by the slump inworld shipping which made more ships readilyavailable. Much of the work was done in navyyards scheduled for closing, most notably theUGANDA'S conversion to a hospital ship atGibraltar. But even with the large number of shipscalled into national service, there were problems.For example, the Royal Yacht BRITANNIA isscheduled for conversion to a hospital ship inwartime. However, the Royal Navy was unable tomake use of the ship because it had beenunwilling to risk the political flack it would havereceived in order to convert the ship from black oilto diesel oil fuel. The only other ship in the fleetthat burned black oil was the aircraft carrierHERMES and she was to be supplied by only onetanker. Two black oil ships would have greatlycomplicated the fuel situation which could easilyhave become a catastrophy had this one tankerbeen sunk. Luxury liners and passenger ferrieswere forced to become assault ships. The fleetrequired the acquisition of five offshore oil rigsupport vessels because its only repair ship, HMSTRIUMPH had been towed to Spain three monthspreviously for scrapping.

Despite Britain's massive effort, supplieswere stretched to the limit by the end of thecampaign. In particular, munitions were used at amuch faster rate than expected. The rapid use ofmunitions in modern war should not have come asa surprise to the United States as they found itnecessary to strip American forces in both Europeand at home to resupply Israel in 1973 after itsmassive expenditures during the Israeli-ArabWar Only now, in fact, has the United Statesreally begun to fully makeup deficiencies causedby that emergency. Nonetheless, the Secretary ofthe Navy has admitted sending American ships to

sea without full magazines while still pushing forthe construction of multi-billion dollar ships. Onecan only question the priorities of any admin-istration that would build new warships whileexisting warships lack the ability to fight.

In the event of a crisis, the United States canrely on only 29 ships in its Ready Reserve Forcedespite Secretary Lehman's projections that anyAmerican task force would be far greater thananything the Royal Navy mobilized for theFalklands. The Reagan administration has askedfor an increase in size for the Ready ReserveForce to 77 merchant ships. Because of thenarrow margin of safety in Britain's supplysituation, 77 ships might not be enough. Onefactor in particular that did not figure into theFalklands fighting was the apparent lack of anyconcerted effort by Argentine submarines to sinksupply vessels, a luxury no navy should rely onwhen planning a campaign.

In the Arapaho Project, the United StatesNavy leads the world in planning to use merchantships as small aircraft carriers by placing a 'pre-packaged' flight deck and necessary supportequipment on board these ships. The concept hasnow been proven both on land and at sea but theNavy refuses to proceed any faster than at asnail's pace developing the concept, despite thegreat interest shown by several American allies,including Australia. Many are convinced theprimary reason the Arapaho has such a lowpriority, as does the rebuilding of decrepit mineforces, the merchant marine, amphibious andsupport ships, and numerous other areas, is thatthey are not 'glamorous' enough for the Navy to'push' when it seeks fuding from Congress. Thisglamour factor appears to be crucial in determ-ining the shape of America's armed services. It isnot 'glamorous' to seek money to purchase aweapon to place in reserve for use on merchantships in case of an emergency. It is not'glamorous' to request money to increasearmaments and fill magazines of ships alreadybuilt. It is not 'glamorous' to ask for money formore training and exercises to assure equipmentworks and men survive in the event they arecalled upon to do battle. Unfortunately, it is'glamour' projects that attract members ofCongress when they appropriate peacetimebudgets.

The Falklands fighting gave the West yetanother opportunity to relearn basic facts aboutwarfare. The importance of adequate training,proper equipment and sufficient supplies reignwith renewed lustre in military science courses allover the world. Hopefully, the military and politicalleaders of the democracies will heed theselessons The price Britain paid was too high to beignored.


SHIPS ANDTHE SEA

KANGAROO ISLAND TRAGEDIESThe Loch Line, a well known line of sailing

vessels on the England/Australia run, lost two ofits vessels within 16 miles of each other on thewest coast of Kangaroo Island, albeit six yearsapart,

Messrs William Aitken and James Lilburn ofGlasgow founded their line in 1867 by charteringthree sailing vessels LOCH AWE, LOCHRANNOCK (ex CLAN RONALD) and BEN NEVIS.Business was so good that in 1869 they had six1200 ton ships built especially for the trade. Thesewere LOCH LEVEN, EARN, NESS, LOMOND,KATRINE and TAY. Other vessels followed in theyears 1869-1885. The most famous of all theirvessels was LOCH ARD, but much has beenwritten on that particular vessel. According toJack Loney in Tall Ships and Sailormen, the proofof the popularity of the Loch line was that in 1901the residents of Melbourne witnessed the unusualspectacle of 7 Loch line vessels together in Port.For the record, these were LOCH TORRIDON,LOCH TAY, LOCH CARRON, LOCH ETNE,LOCH BROOM, LOCH KATRINE and LOCHGARRY.

The first vessel lost on Kangaroo Island wasLOCH SLOY. Built by D&W Henderson ofGlasgow in 1877 she was an iron barque of 1280tons gross (length 225 ft, beam 35 ft 6 in, draft 21ft). After loading a general cargo for Adelaide andMelbourne, she sailed from Glasgow on 5January 1889. Under the command of CaptainNicol. LOCH SLOY had an easy passage towardsAdelaide and 124 days out, passengers and crewwere expecting to raise Cape Borda light on thewestern end of Kangaroo Island.

Landfall was made at about 5 a.m. on 24 April1889, but it was land, not the lighthouse. Being soclose inshore, all attempts to gain sea-room wereof no avail. LOCH SLOY struck a reef some 200yards offshore in Maurpentius Bay and becamefast amongst the breakers of the Southern Ocean.Destruction was complete and of the 31 crew and6 passengers onboard the barque when shestruck, only 3 crewmen and 1 passengersurvived.

The second Loch line vessel to be wreckedon Kangaroo Island was the 3 masted, full riggedship LOCH VENNACHER. Built of iron by J&G

Thompson of Glasgow she was launched inAugust 1875 (1485 tons, length 250 ft, beam 38 ft,draft 22 ft 6 in). A fairly fast vessel she was wellknown and well liked on the run, averaging 86days London to Melbourne over 12 passages.

In her career, LOCH VENNACHER had hershare of problems. In 1893 she was dismasted ina Southern Indian Ocean cyclone and was forcedto make for Port Louis, Mauritius for repairs andre-rigging. The master. Captain Bennett, wasawarded the Lloyd's Medal for saving his ship,crew and passengers. Later, in November 1901,LOCH VENNACHER whilst at anchor at Thames-haven, was rammed by the steamer CATO andsank in 40 ft of water. One month later she wasraised and set sail for Australia.

All remained well until early 1905 when theLoch-liner left London for Adelaide and Mel-bourne with general cargo. Under the commandof Captain W.S. Hawkins there were 26 crewonboard. Details of this last voyage are not clear,of course, but one may assume that all went wellalthough the voyage took longer than normalNearing the end of the voyage to Adelaide, LOCHVENNACHER was sighted by, and spoke to thesteamer YONGALA on 6 September 1905 whenonly 160 miles to the west of the Neptune Islands.Her course was ENE, that is, on course forAdelaide.

At this stage, she was considered overdueand the superintendent of the LifesavingDepartment (Captain C.J. Clare) conferred withthe ship's Agents (GR Wills & Co). The resultwas that at 5 p.m. on Monday 18 September1905, the Marine Board steamer GOVERNORMUSGRAVE departed Port Adelaide to searchthe Neptune Island group and the south coast ofKangaroo Island. The search over the followingweek proved fruitless.

However, evidence of the wreck of LOCHVENNACHER came to Port Adelaide on Friday 29September when the master of the Ketch ANNIEWATT (Captain F. Peters) reported havingrecovered printing paper in St. Vincent's Gulf. Thepaper — according to shipping marks — hadbeen carried by LOCH VENNACHER. Morereports of wreckage came in from various parts ofKangaroo Island and although it was all from theLoch line vessel, the main problem was to locate

Journal ol the Australian Naval Institute — Page 49

the actual wreck. All evidence now pointed to thefact that LOCH VENNACHER struck YoungRocks on the western end of Kangaroo Island.

In 1976, three divers from the Society forUnderwater Historical Research located thewreck of LOCH VENNACHER approximately halfa kilometre north of West Bay on KangarooIsland. Relatively untouched by salvage oper-ations, the remains include anchors and cables,frames, plating, scuttles and the brick and pig ironballast. The remains of the bow section is tightlywedged against rocks at the base of the cliffs. Theshipwreck is classified under the (Common-wealth) Historic Shipwrecks Act of 1976. Oneanchor has been recovered and after preserv-ation was set up as a memorial to the vessel in1982 Other items are being recovered andpreserved by members of the UnderwaterHistorical Research Society.

Robin PennockMORE SUCCESS

There have been a number of vessels namedSUCCESS associated with the maritime history ofAustralia. Four of the name are well worth amention in this section of the Journal.SUCCESS— 1820

In company with the RN vessels SATELLITE,RAINBOW and CHALLENGER she was presenton the Australia station in the 1820s. SUCCESS,a sixth rate vessel of 28 guns, was under thecommand of Captain James Stirling when shearrived at the Swan River on 6 March 1827.Although the rest of the Fremantle/Perth story ishistory, it could be construed that this settlementcame about by accident. Captain Stirling, andSUCCESS had in fact been sent westabout toform a colony to the eastward of the ill-fated PortEssington. (Port Essington in the NorthernTerritory was originally settled by HMSTAMAR) Adverse prevailing weather forcedStirling to obtain approval to explore the westcoast of the continent instead of carrying on to thenorthSUCCESS — 1840

621 tons, teak hull, a fully rigged ship built atMoulmein (Burma). She first visited Australia inMarch 1843 (at Fremantle) in 1847 (at Adelaide)and 1850 (at Sydney). In 1852, she arrived inHobsons Bay with 200 immigrants but oncesecured, the crew departed to join the gold rush.

Bought by the Victorian Government for useas a prison hulk whilst Pentridge Gaol was beingbuilt, SUCCESS was only one of 5 such hulks, theothers being PRESIDENT, SACRAMENTO,LYSANDER and DEBORAH. Fitted withaccommodation for 130 prisoners, SUCCESSwas to become the most infamous. Normal cellswere 7 ft. square, with the solitary confinement

cells only 3ft. wide. In 1853, the complement was3 servants, 3 cooks, 1 watchman, 1 labourer, 3warders and 83 prisoners. The Superintendent ofConvicts, a Mr. John Price, was not a popular maneven in those days. He took up his duty in January1854 but only survived until March that year when,on 26 March he was battered to death by irateconvicts working on the Williamstown break-water.

Later in 1854, SUCCESS ceased her dutiesas a prison ship and was moved into the RiverYarra to become a stores ship. In 1890, the hulkwas purchased by Mr. Alexander Phillips,refurbished and fitted out to resemble a convictship of the early Australian days. After beingexhibited in Melbourne, she was towed to Sydneyin 1891 but almost ended her career whenscuttled in Kerosene Bay. Refloated and with newowners, SUCCESS visited Brisbane, Hobart andAdelaide as a convict exhibition ship.

A voyage to England in 1894 brought furtherexhibitions as a convict ship and the exhibitionscontinued until 1912 when she was again sold,before voyaging to the United States of America.Proving to be very popular in the States, theexhibitions continued until SUCCESS wasrequisitioned for use as a cargo carrier in 1917.

After the cessation of hostilities it was back tothe now familiar role as a convict exhibition shipand in 1923 she was part of the Chicago WorldFair. At the ripe old age of 106, SUCCESS wasdestroyed by fire at a Lake Erie wharf on 4 July1946.SUCCESS— 1920

Built by Doxfords for the RN, this SUCCESSwas laid down in 1917, completed in April 1919and commissioned into the RAN on 27 January1920. A sister ship to the destroyers STALWART,SWORDSMAN, TASMANIA and TATTOO, shewas transferred to the RAN in June 1919. Arrivingin Australia in company with her sisters in April1920 she remained operational until paid off intoreserve on 21 May 1930. Once again in companywith her 4 sisters, SUCCESS was sold to theBalmain (NSW) firm of Penguins Ltd. for £2,277and broken-up in 1937.

SUCCESS— 198?Perhaps the least successful of the ships

bearing the name is the RAN's new underwayreplenishment ship HMAS SUCCESS. Presentlyunder construction at Vickers Codock, she wasoriginally planned to be in service by 1980, butwas not laid down until September of that year. ADURANCE class AOR, this vessel has beenplagued by many and varied problems and thedelivery date, although still not firm, will probablynot be until sometime in 1987.

Robin Pennock


\

HMAS SUCCESS 1920AWM Neg H17527

Taken 14 May 83HM4S SUCCESS —?

Courtesy J. Mortimer


CHAPTER NEWS

There has been no news from the Chapters for the last few journals, but here is a brief updateon what seems to be happening — the Editor would be delighted to receive regular updates fromconvenors and secretaries.

Canberra Chapter

A meeting is planned for 28 September 1983 at Legacy House when Mr Paul Eccles willspeak on 'Coastal Surveillance'. The speaker after the AGM on 28 October 1983 will be the FleetCommander, Rear Admiral Hudson.

The long term plan for the chapter is to hold meetings in March, May, September, October(concurrent with the AGM) and November. The March 1984 meeting will not take place because ofthe impending Seapower Seminar in April 1984

Commodore A. Cummins has taken over as convenor from Captain L. Fox and the secretaryis Lieutenant Commander R. Jemesen.

WA Chapter

Indications are that the WA Chapter is flourishing and that four meetings have been held inthe last year. Sub-Lieutenant Williams has taken over as secretary and a more detailed report willhopefully appear in the next journal.

Other Chapters

The NSW Chapter currently plans to hold two meetings a year at HMAS PENGUIN tocoincide with RAN Staff College programmed events

The Council has been informed that there is an interest in forming a chapter in theNowra Jen/is Bay area, and that the Victorian chapter may soon be revitalised.

All convenors and secretaries, or those interested in forming chapters, are urged to contactthe Council, via the Secretary, to let the Council know what is happening and or to ask forassistance. Transcripts of meetings where a speaker is used should be forwarded to the Editor forinclusion in the journal.


NOTICE OFANNUAL GENERAL MEETING

The Annual General Meeting will be held at 2015 on Friday 28 October 1983 at LegacyHouse, Allara Street, Canberra, ACT.AGENDA

1. Confirmation of Minutes of the Annual General Meeting held on 22 October 19822. Business arising from the Minutes.3. President's Report.4. Auditor's Report.5. Election of the officers of the Institute and the Ordinary Councillors.6. Appoint an Auditor and fix his remuneration.7. Other Business.ELECTIONS

Office BearersThe Officer Bearers of the Institute are:a. President d. Treasurerb. Senior Vice President e. Secretaryc. Junior Vice President f. Journal EditorCouncil

The Council of the Institute consists of:a. The Office Bearersb. Ten regular members known as Ordinary CouncillorsQualifications

Only regular members may hold office.

Nominations

Nominations of candidates for election are to be signed by two members (regular or associate) ofthe Institute and forwarded to reach the Secretary no later than 14 October. Nomination forms areavailable from the Secretary.Voting

Only regular members may vote and voting must be in person at the Annual General Meeting.

NOTICE OFSPECIAL GENERAL MEETING

1. A Special General Meeting will be held at 2000 on Friday 28 October 1983 at Legacy House,Allara St., Canberra, ACT, to consider the following change to the Constitution.

2. Article 8(2) currently states:The Treasurer of the Institute shall faithfully keep all general records, accounting books andrecords of receipts and expenditure connected with the operations and business of the Institutein such a form and manner as the committee may direct.'

3. Proposal. The proposal is made that 'committee' be amended to read 'Council'.

4. Reason. There is no committee as such. The Council is empowered under Article 22(2) of theconstitution to control and manage the business and affairs of the Institute'. The use of theword committee was an original drafting error.

Honorary Secretary

CANBERRA CHAPTER MEETING

Following the AGM, there will be a meeting of the Canberra chapter and an address by theFleet-Commander, Rear Admiral M. Hudson RAN.


Royal Swedish Navy has taken delivery of Hugin-class patrol boatno. 14 in a series of 16.Length: 36.4m. Displacement: 150 tons. Speed: 30+ knots.Complement: 18.

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PHILIPS


BOOKREVIEWS

BATTLESHIPS OF THE GRAND FLEET. By R.A. Burtand W.P. Trotter, M.C., Arms & Armour Press. 96 pp,ill, $23.95.

This book is a pictorial history of the Royal Navy atits peak during World War One — it is 96 pages of purenostalgia.

Battleships of the Grand Fleet covers the era fromthe first Dreadnought, HMS DREADNOUGHT in 1906to the mightly HM Ships RESOLUTION, REVENGE,ROYAL OAK, RAMILLIES and VALIANT of 1917.Although pre-Dreadnoughts are not covered, there are32 battleships and 15 battlecruisers included.

Each class is well covered with illustrations andcomprehensive data sheets. Wartime modifications arecovered in a step by step photographic record. Somechanges in appearance from commissioning to finalappearance are quite startling.

The book is packed with 169 black and whitephotographs, including eight double page spreads andalso one double page line drawing of HMSBELLEROPHON in detail.

Many of the superlative photos from glassnegatives have never been seen before and include theGrand Fleet at sea in 1916, launchings, dry docking,and broadsides from HMS BARHAM and HMSHERCULES.

r

. - ,

Many sets of photos are worthy of close scrutiny —eg, HMS CENTURION entering Valetta Harbour, Malta,in the early 1920s and then after her conversion to atarget ship in 1930, and further alteration in 1936.Another is the famous HMS WARSPITE aground on therocks at Prussia Cove, Cornwall, after parting tow on theway to the breakers in 1948 and her reduction to scrap insitu by June. 1950

Australia's only battlecruiser, HMS AUSTRALIA, iswell represented with three photographs: passing HMSVICTORY as it leaves Portsmouth Harbour in 1913, asuperb double page shot of the old 'Aussie' in July, 1913and finally an aerial pic of her listing to port after beingscuttled with honours off Sydney in 1924.

The concluding pages of the book are devoted toshots of the last of these Dreadnoughts — HM ShipsRAMILLIES, VALIANT. REVENGE and RESOLUTIONbeing demolished in Scotland between 1947 and 1950.

Battleships of the Grand Fleet is a book one tendsto pick-up and browse through from time to time and oneach occasion find some new point of interestReasonably priced at $23.95, this limp covered book isavailable from Thomas C. Lothian of 4-12 Tattersall'sLane. Melbourne, Victoria. Highly recommended

Vic Jeffery

HMS BARHAMA & J. Pavia Supplied by J. Mortimer


US DESTROYERS. By Norman Friedman. US NavalInstitute Press, 1982. 467 pp, ill, diagrams andtables, SUS46 95

Development of the Torpedo Boat Destroyer hasbeen a continuing exercise for almost a century and inUS Destroyers Norman F'iedman presents the resultsof detailed research It is without doubt the only fullstory of these craft as it applies to the US Navy. The firstseven chapters trace destroyer development between1886 and 1945, the next seven deal with the period1945 to the 'nukes', and the remainder look to the futureand ultimate developments.

Throughout the book, the author describes theNaval versus Civilian factors that determined the designand operation of destroyers. In his future predictions,the nuclear ships make their presence felt, especially inthe arguments of nuclear/conventional power plants.

In presenting the history of the design anddevelopment of destroyers. Friedman has undertaken amammoth task. With the assistance of A.D. Baker, whoprovided the line and profile drawings, the result hasbeen well worth the effort. Each class and type of shippresented is accompanied by at least one profiledrawing and many photographs. Even more interestingare the additional photographs which highlight any'alterations and additions' that have appeared aftermajor refits or rebuilds.

Development of the Destroyer ASW, or four-piper,and its derivatives shows what can be done when needs

be. Funnels and boilers were deleted, guns and ASweapons added and, in at least three cases, the wholeconcept of the DDASW altered. They becametransports, seaplane tenders and minesweepers.Others were modified to become escort ships and thusforerunners of the modern DE.

Between the two World Wars, the destroyersleaders kept a silhouette somewhat similar to theirRoyal Navy counterparts. This reviewer tried to find thepoint at which the two designs moved apart, but thechanges were subtle. The flush deck became more tothe USN way of thinking and, like the Chinese ideas ofold, the funnels taller. Possibly the ultimate rift camewith the change of name of various parts of the vessels.Calling a funnel a 'stack' is not too bad, but to dream upthe term 'mack' (combined mast and stack) must be theultimate degradation of the English language.

In the section on nuclear destroyers and frigates,Friedman deviates into the cruisers. I would questionthe need for this, but with the vast escalation in the sizeof the destroyer over the years — USS Bainbridge(DD1)452tonstoL/SSKnox(DE1052)4120tons —theactual class/type names are purely academic.

US Destroyers concludes with three data tablesand a very comprehensive index. All that is lacking is atable to allow the non-naval, and non-USN, reader tofollow the conglomeration of initials used in describingthe basic type of ship and its derivative.

Robin Pennock

rt

HMS RESOLUTIONA. & J. Pavia


Supplied by J. Mortimer

JOURNAL BACK ISSUES

Stocks of the following back issues of the Journal are available

Vol 1 No 1 August, 1975Vol 1 No 2 September, 1975Vol 2 No 1 February. 1976Nol2 No 2 May. 1976Vol 2 No 3 August, 1976Vol 3 No 2 May. 1977Vol 3 No 3 August. 1977Vol 3 No 4 November. 1977Vol 4 No 1 February, 1978Vol 4 No 2 May, 1978Vol 4 No 3 August, 1978Vol 5 No 1 February. 1979Vol 5 No 2 May. 1979Vol 5 No 3 August, 1979

Vol 5 No 4 November, 1979Vol 6 No 1 February 1980Vol 6 No 2 May. 1980Vol 6 No 3 August. 1980Vol 6 No 4 November, 1980Vol 7 No 1 February. 1981Vol 7 No 2 May. 1981Vol 7 No 3 August. 1981Vol 7 No 4 November, 1981Vol 8 No 1 February, 1982Vol 8 No 2 May. 1982Vol 8 No 3 August 1982Vol 8 No 4 November 1982Vol 9 No 1 February 1983Vol 9 No 2 May 1982Seapower 79Seapower 81

Back copies may be purchased from the Institute at $2 50 each ($7.00 for Vol 1 No 1). which price includespostage. Write to the Treasurer, Australian Naval Institute. PO Box 18. Deakin, ACT. 2600

JOURNAL BINDERS

Journal binders are available (as illustrated) from the Treasurer, price $6 00 each includingpostage. Coloured blue, with gold lettering and AMI crest, each binder will hold 12 copies of thejournal (3 years' supply) by means of a metal rod which is inserted simply through the middle page ofthe journal and held firmly at top and bottom of the binder Plastic envelopes on the bottom of thespine enable volume numbers or years to be inserted


Ferranti has the leading edgein Naval combat systems.

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It provides compact AIO/CIC for all classesl i t warship.

Page 58FKRRANTIComputer Systems

NAVAL INSTITUTE INSIGNIA

The Council of The Australian Naval Institute advises that cuff-links and mounted crestsfeaturing the badge of the Institute are now available for purchase by Members

The cuff-links are robustly made and are attractively finished in gold and black.They are epoxy-coated to ensure long life and are packaged in presentationboxes. The price is $7.00 a pair, which includes postage

The crests are meticulously hand-painted in full colour and are handsomelymounted on polished New Zealand timber. They measure 175mm x 130mm(5" x 7"). The price is $13.00 each, which includes postage.

Both items are obtainable from the Treasurer by completing the coupon below.Should you not wish to spoil your journal, please give the details on a separatesheet of paper.

The TreasurerAustralian Naval InstitutePO Box 18.DEAKIN A C T 2600

Please forward

pairs of cuff-links (o> $7 00 $

mounted crests (ffi $ 13 00 $

Total $

My cheque, payable to the Australian Naval Institute is attached

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3 I enclose my cheque for $20 (being $5 joining fee and $15 annual subscription) payable to theAustralian Naval Institute

I4 If accepted for membership. I agree to abide by the Constitution and By-laws of the Institute |

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THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE

PATRON

His Excellency the Right Honourable Sir Ninian StephenAK, GCMG, GCVO, KBE, KSt.JGovernor-General of Australia

COUNCIL

OFFICE BEARERS

PresidentCommodore I.B. James AM

Senior Vice PresidentCommodore J.S Dickson MBE

Junior Vice PresidentCaptain DR. Cooper

SecretaryCommander G.L. Purcell

TreasurerCommander D T. Bennet

Journal EditorCommander G Cutts

COUNCILLORS

Lieutenant K. Bayly-JonesCommander D A CatonLieutenant S.D. Coulson WRANSCommander P.K. CoulsonCommodore A.R. Cummins AMCaptain P.G.V. DechameuxLieutenant Commander R M JemesenLieutenant Commander I.R. GulliverCommander I.A. NobleCommander M.B. Taylor

PAST PRESIDENTS

1975-77 Commodore V A Parker1977-78 Commodore J A. Robertson

1978-83 Rear Admiral R.C. Swan AO CBE

HONORARY LIFE MEMBERS

Admiral Sir Victor Smith AC KBE CB DSCVice Admiral Sir David Stevenson AC KBE

Commodore V.A. ParkerAdmiral Sir Anthony Synnot KBE AO

Commodore J.A. RobertsonRt Hon Sir Zelman Cowen AK, GCMG. GCVO, KStJ, OC

Rear Admiral R.C. Swan AO CBE

Public Officer: Commander D R Patterson RANEM

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The Mk 2 version of the well-proven 57 mm gun system isfully automatic and housed in alow radar-signature cupola.Incorporating an improvedservo system, which ensuressuperior accuracy in roughseas, this gun is speciallydesigned for use with allmodern fire controls.

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a. -*

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