JOURNAL

STUDY

RELIGIONS

IDEOLOGIES

for theof&

EDITOR:Sandu FRUNZA, B.B.U.

EXECUTIVE EDITORS:Michael JONESTemple UniversityMihaela FRUNZA B.B.U.

MEMBERS:Diana COTRAU, B.B.U.Codruta CUCEU, B.B.U.Nicu GAVRILUTA, U. Al. I Cuza, IasiAna-Elena ILINCA, B.B.U.Petru MOLDOVAN, B.B.U.Adonis VIDU, Emanuel Univ.Adrian COSTACHE, B.B.U.Catalin Vasile Bobb, B.B.U.Horatiu CRISAN (PDF)

MANUSCRIPT EDITOR:Liviu POP

Advisory Board

Aurel CODOBAN, B.B.U.Aziz AL-AZMEHAmerican University of BeirutIoan BIRIS, West Univ., TimisoaraRecep BOZTEMUR, Middle-EastTechnical University of AnkaraIoan CHIRILA, B.B.U.Teodor DIMA, U. Al. I Cuza, IasiMichael FINKENTHAL, HebrewUniversity of JerusalemLinda FISHERCentral European Univ., BudapestMircea FLONTA, U. Bucharest

• No. 11 • summer 2005

Edited by S.C.I.R.I. & SACRIhttp://www.sacri.ro

ISSN: 1583-0039

Ladislau GYEMANT, B.B.U.Zev HARVEYHebrew University of JerusalemMoshe IDELHebrew University of JerusalemAdrian-Paul ILIESCU, U. BucharestMarius JUCAN, B.B.U.Ioan-Vasile LEB, B.B.U.Mircea MICLEA, B.B.U.Adrian MIROIU, SNSPA, BucharestCamil MURESANU, B.B.U.Toader NICOARA, B.B.U.Dorothy NOYESOhio State University

Dan RATIU, B.B.U.Wade Clark ROOF,University of California, Santa BarbaraTraian ROTARIU, B.B.U.SALAT Levente, B.B.U.Johannes Michael SCHNARRER,University of KarlsburgLeonard SWIDLERTemple UniversityPeter van der VEERUniv. of UtrechtLeon VOLOVICIHebrew University of JerusalemVERESS Carol, B.B.U.

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Con

tent

s RELIGIOUS AND IDEOLOGICAL AMERICAN PLURALISM

ArticlesHAJER BEN HADJ SALEM

Beyond Herberg: An Islamic Perspective On ReligiousPluralism In The Usa After 9/11 • 3

RALUCA MOLDOVAN

Anatomy of a Hoax: Holocaust Denial • 17

MIHAELA FRUNZÃ

Între religiozitate ºi marketing: analiza unui fenomenliterar • 28

ION CORDONEANU

Religie ºi Putere în America - de la Alexis de Tocqueville laadministraþia Bush jr. - • 39

RECEP BOZTEMUR

Religion and Politics in the Making of American Near EastPolicy, 1918-1922 • 45

ROXANNE D. MARCOTTE

Egyptian Islamists and the Status of MuslimWomen Question • 60

ReviewsGYEMANT MARIA

J. Derrida, J. Habermas , Le “concept” de 11 septembre,Dialogues à New York (octobre – décembre 2001) avecGiovanna • 71

CIPRIAN LUPºE

Moshe Idel, Cabaliºtii nocturni • 76

DRAIMAN SEBASTIAN

Florea Lucaci, Creatie si fiintare. Un temei înontologia umanului • 78

CÃTÃLIN VASILE BOBB

Petru Moldovan, Moshe Idel. Dinamica misticii iudaice • 81

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The history of America’s openness to immigrationfrom diverse regions has advanced the course ofreligious pluralism. Many religious groups existed inAmerica, yet only a few were publicly significant inadvancing the course of pluralism from tolerance ofdifferences to inclusion and participation. Their publicsignificance was contingent upon their ability to helpdevelop models of religious pluralism. Such modelsreflect structures that evolved as a result of attemptsto formulate responses to diversity and to assert thatthere is religious unity to America. At first, this unitywas Protestant; at some point in US history itevolved into Judeo-Christian; then it came to be“potentially” multi-religious with an Abrahamic over-tone. Since 9/11 some scholars of Islam have be-come more articulate in advancing the pluralist stateof mind toward becoming global in perspective.

On balance, it may well be that the greatest contribu-tion made by the United States to global religious life isits demonstrating that, however vast the pluralism, a vitalreligious culture can flourish. Pluralism does not under-mine common life but seems to enrich it. The seedsplanted by diverse tribal cultures and by European colo-nists centuries ago came to full growth in the twentiethcentury, for it was the century when pluralism-religiouspluralism- came of age.1

Charles Lippy’s celebration of a pluralism that cameof age in the twentieth century is a celebration of a con-textual realization of an ideal that the US has been strug-gling to affirm since its inception. The US has a culture ofpluralism because it has been the setting for a multitudeof responses to religious diversity. These responses havebeen shaped by a tension between two seemingly anti-thetical poles: a gradual, at times grudging, acceptance ofthe reality of religious diversity (manyness) and a staunchdesire for unity (oneness). Although the meanings of the

Hajer Ben Hadj Salem

Beyond Herberg: An IslamicPerspective On ReligiousPluralism In The Usa After 9/11

Hajer Ben Hadj SalemEcole Normale Superieure ofTunis

E-mail:hbenhadjsalem@yahoo.fr

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two terms “diversity” and “pluralism” overlap, the differ-ence between both is essential to understand the dilem-mas and tensions that underscore the process of trans-formation. In the Culture of Religious Pluralism, RichardE. Wentz defines “diversity” and “pluralism” as follows:

Diversity is the awareness of manyness, the dis-covery that there are “others besides us and ourown communities (…) individuals and groupsoften tend to think of themselves as isolated en-tities. Diversity represents a threat to that isola-tion (…) [T]he human condition is such thatpluralism continues to be resisted by programsof conquest and conversion. The culture of reli-gious pluralism has evolved in tension with theimpulse to conquer or convert the “other” in-stead of to contemplate the manner in which theideas, practices, and sociality of others are as-pects of our own incompleteness - indeed, ofhuman incompleteness. (Wentz :15)

This paper is an attempt to show how the history ofAmerica’s openness to immigration from diverse regions2

has advanced the course of religious pluralism. Many re-ligious groups existed in America, yet only a few werepublicly significant in advancing the course of pluralismfrom tolerance of differences to inclusion and participa-tion. Their public significance was contingent upon theirability to provide a viable and coherent interpretation ofAmerican reality of which they made part. In a tellingmanner, groups who revered different cultural and reli-gious symbols were able to project different perspectiveson shared cultural and religious symbols. In finding acommon ground, these groups were able to help de-velop models of religious pluralism. Such models reflectstructures that evolved as a result of attempts to formu-

late responses to diversity and assert that there is a reli-gious unity to America. These responses were meant togive meaning to “E Pluribus Unum.” At first, this unitywas Christian (ideally including all Christian, then Prot-estant, denominations), at some point in US history itevolved into Judeo-Christian (including Protestants,Catholics, and Jews), then it came to mean “potentially”multi-religious with an Abrahamic overtone (includingChristians, Jews, and Muslims, with Hindus and Buddhiston the periphery). Since 9/11 some scholars of Islamhave become more articulate in advancing the pluraliststate of mind toward becoming global in perspective.

The religious traditions that are covered by thesemodels are known as world religions. They immigratedto the US at relatively different stages of its history andmade varying headways on the road to pluralism. Whatunites them most is that their experiences on the path ofpluralism reflect recurring patterns and contest strate-gies.

My study of the dynamics of the culture of religiouspluralism is based on the following definition of culture:“an identifiable and regularized behavior that is attribut-able to a particular people and that is expressed throughcertain images, symbols, rituals, myths, and other kindsof stories.”(Wentz p.1) As cultures undergo endlesstransformations, the culture of religious pluralism, as itnow stands, is the outcome of interactions of symbolsand myths of the “many” and the “one”. These interac-tions have generated transformations in both. Let’s gothrough the models of religious pluralism.

The First Model: A Protestant“Establishment” that NurturedDiversity

Key words:

religious pluralism,inclusion, Islam, America,globalreligious life, PATRIOTAct

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At the time of the Revolution the people of Americawere predominantly foreign born: Europeans and theirdescendants. The religious mosaic that they spreadthroughout the American landscape reflected the spec-trum of Protestant Europe‘s sectarianism. The colonialperiod was marked by the centrality of Calvinism and Pu-ritanism in shaping the world view of the settlers, thecentrality of religion in shaping the civil order. It was alsomarked by an underlying current of tolerance of dissentthat set the groundwork for religious liberty in the newnation. When the Constitution was adopted and the“novus ordo Seclorum” was established, denomination-alism was the unique response of these diverse groups togive meaning to their diversity; and an unofficial “Protes-tant establishment” was their answer to their pluralclaims to religious truth. While levelling many of the tra-ditional notions of religion and politics that were left be-hind in Europe, and to a less extent in some of the colo-nies, religious disestablishment and the concomitant(and somewhat unique) American principle of voluntarychurches enshrined in the First Amendment3 to the con-stitution44 The American separation of church and statewas a unique and revolutionary settlement to the ques-tion of religious diversity in the Christian world. AsCatherine Albanese put it in America Religions and Reli-gion did not act as a sluice obstructing the normal flowof the Christian spirit in the infant republic. On the con-trary, as de Tocquville observed in Democracy inAmerica and as historical facts have confirmed, it fosteredconstant diversification and perpetual modificationswithin Christian denominations, and made Christianitythe indiscriminately “well-established religion of thenation.”

The pervasiveness of the institutional presence of the“informal Protestant establishment” in the early days ofthe republic was captured by Hutchinson who arguesthat

The religious establishment involved, first andmost obviously, the more powerful Protestantdenominations, especially those of the Baptists,Congregationalists, Episcopalians, Methodists,and Presbyterians. Second, it included the multi-tude of voluntary associations, both interde-nominational and nondenominational, that pro-moted missions, peace, temperance, andnumerous other kinds of moral and social re-form. Third, it derived authority from a large anddominating world of English-language cultural,literary, educational, and journalistic entitiesthat were Protestant in personnel and outlook.Finally, the establishment must be understoodas a personal network of Protestant leadershipthat extended across the churches, controlledmost of the nation’s political life, and managedvirtually all of the major secular institutions andentities in American society.5

The denominations that are referred to in the forego-ing quotation used to denounce each other’s teachingsduring the colonial period. Yet within the republic wherereligious liberty was protected by law, they came to seethemselves as part of a larger spiritual community of theChristian Church. This spirit of unity was not providedby any of these denominations. The real ground for unitywas the religion of the civil order: the civil religion6 of theAmerican Revolution. In The Broken Covenant : Civil Re-ligion in Time of Trial, Robert Bellah defines civil reli-gion as follows:

By civil religion I refer to that religious dimen-sion, found I think in the life of every people,through which it interprets its historical experi-ence in the light of transcendent reality (p. 3)

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Civil religion provided some basis for public unitythat broke down boundaries separating diverse religionsthat were on American soil at the inception of the repub-lic. It did so by initiating a whole process of myth-buildingthat revolved around the memorable deeds that Ameri-cans performed to initiate an age unknown before in thehistory of humanity. The way some of these myths wereinterpreted during the early years of the republic helpedmaintain an unofficial “Protestant Establishment” in theUS. The latter helped weaken the boundaries between“the many” and the “one.” By binding the “many” intothe “one’ in Protestant terms, the Protestant majoritygave a possible meaning to diversity that opened the wayfor further possibilities.

The Second Model - Protestant,Catholic and Jew

With the advent of the 19th century, signs of culturalcomplexity and heterogeneity were very well reflected inthe unprecedented demographic change that marked theAmerican landscape. A severe reduction in ProtestantChristianity’s numerical dominance in the Americanpopulation was occasioned by the sweeping flow ofCatholic and Jewish immigrants who started settling inAmerica in significant numbers. Along with the new “di-vergent” movements such as Adventism, Pre-millennialism, the Mormons, and the Holiness Move-ment that started gaining ground after the Civil War,Catholic and Jewish public presence became highly vis-ible in America. According to Hutchinson, between 1850and 1920 the Roman Catholic population “expanded atnearly three times the rate of overall population growth,while the number of Jews rose spectacularly - from fiftythousand to more than three million.” (Hutchinson: 114)

What this religious mosaic generated was a visiblechange in the public discourse about religious diversityand pluralism. Toleration of non-radical beliefs, and to aless extent behaviours, seemed to have given way to therhetoric of inclusion that was articulated by Jewish andCatholic leaders in an era of melting pot enthusiasm.Such headway could not have been made withoutchanges that took place within the informal “Protestantestablishment” to keep pace with the social, economic,and cultural changes that cut right across society and af-fected religion as well as politics. These included the riseof the social gospel with its leanings towards minorities,the wide appeal the liberal theological surge had amonggreat numbers of people in the US, and the convening ofthe World Parliament of Religions in September 1893 inChicago. The latter was an outright manifestation of amuch wider campaign for inclusion orchestrated by lib-eral sections within Judaism, Catholicism, and Protes-tantism. For the first time ever Jews and Catholics wereincluded by American Protestants in a conference on reli-gion. This occurrence infused Protestantism with new lifeand contributed more than their nativist counterparts tomaintaining the authority of the “establishment” withinAmerican culture.

Despite opposition to inclusive pluralism from theright wing of the Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish spec-trums, liberals within these traditions displayed in theircampaign for inclusion a plethora of themes and pro-vided a repertoire of contest strategies. It was by capitaliz-ing on the liberal belief that all religions are infused withdivinity that the liberal wings within Judaism, Protestant-ism, and Catholicism won their battles for inclusionwithin their faith groups and the large faith community.They advanced a discourse that rested upon two pillars:first, a rejection of the non-essential doctrines and prac-tices of their faith, and a preservation of its timeless es-sentials, and second, a belief in the promise of universal

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religious freedom guaranteed by the First Amendment.Their arguments reflect a subtle blend of civil and reli-gious themes even in their theological aspects.

Theologically, their discourse was premised on a re-pudiation of religious essentialism by acknowledgingthat one’s religion presents a conception of the God-Idea(which is similar to what is referred to in the Declarationof Independence). What ensued from this was an out-right rejection of rigid traditionalism as a crippling force.Americanists among Catholic and Jewish religious lead-ers expanded this rhetoric so far as to enthusiastically as-sert their claim that traditionalism was out of tune withthe times, and that the future and welfare of their reli-gions depended upon the willingness of the traditionalestablishments (Roman authorities in the Catholic caseand Orthodox Rabbis in Europe and the US in the Jewishcase) to undertake reforms based on American Catholicand Jewish experiences. Moreover, they would considerthemselves as Americans with a special mission to recon-cile their religious traditions with modernity by providinga model that derived its superiority from that of theAmerican example with its separation of Church andState.

This argument seemed like an outright attack on theRoman establishment, and also like an affront to thethen nascent Zionist spirit within the Jewish communi-ties (more than its Orthodox wing). Nowhere was it morestrikingly expressed than it was in the Americanist Jewishattempt to adopt the American myth of origin to that ofthe children of Israel as presented in the Old Testament.They portrayed America as their promised Zion. This wasbest reflected in the Central Conference of AmericanRabbis that convened in 1897. In this gathering Americanrabbis asserted that “We are unalterably opposed to po-litical Zionism. The Jews are not a nation, but a religiouscommunity...America is our Zion. Here in the home of re-

ligious liberty we have helped in founding this newZion”. (Hutchinson: 126)

The sense of separation from a group that allegedlyheld them loyal to an outside authority, which seems la-tent in the Jewish statement, was a pivotal theme in theCatholic discourse as well. From John London to John F.Kennedy, American Catholics had the most daunting taskof asserting their loyalty to America and the American po-litical system. They had to deflate a staunch anti-Catholicpropaganda. Entangled in emotional and ideologicalconsiderations, it thrived on breeding in the public an ir-rational fear that Catholics in America were conspiringwith Rome to threaten the stability of the American sys-tem.

In spite of the religious polyphony that characterizedpublic discourse on religion, and in spite of the fact thatreligious and ethnic diversity had become a daily realityby the end of the 19th and the first half of the twentiethcentury, American church history continued to emphasizethemes of Protestant unity rather than themes of diversityand unsettled pluralism. It was Will Herberg’s Protes-tant, Catholic, Jew, published in 1955, that shifted theemphasis of American religious history. The Judeo-Chris-tian model he praised was premised on his claim thatAmericans identify themselves, as Americans, as belong-ing to one of three traditions. The American way could beCatholic, Protestant, or Jewish. Even though Herberg’sbook was a consensus book, it was an attempt at broad-ening the scope of religious pluralism by assigning a newmeaning to “Christianity” wherein “Christian” came tomean “theist”: one who believes in the God of the Bibleand of Abraham. This meant in effect that “Christian” wasin some way inclusive of “Jew”.

Herberg’s model, which stresses that Americans de-fine themselves religiously as Protestants, Catholics, orJews, had great appeal in the post-war spirit of revivalthat cut right across churches and the realm of civil reli-

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gion. Herberg’s trinity came to light when the legendarystatus that the story of the four chaplains, two Protes-tants, a Catholic and a Jew, who sank in the troop shipDorchester in 1944, was still tickling the American senseof divine providence. It was also a possible answer toPresident Eisenhower’s pronouncement in 1952 that“our government makes no sense unless it is founded ina deeply felt religious faith - and I don’t care what it is.”Certainly what Eisenhower meant by deeply felt religiousfaith was something antithetical to the atheism of thethen communist enemy. It was so large in scope that itmight include the myriad of long-ignored religious tradi-tions in the US. In this respect, Herberg’s trinity fell shortof reflecting the richness of the religious landscape ofAmerica in the mid-twentieth century. It was left to MartinMarty, Edwin Gaustad, Sydney Ahlstrom, and their follow-ers to fill in the gaps.

The Third Model: A Multi-ReligiousAmerica with an Abrahamic Overtone

Since the passage of the Immigration Act of 1965, thedefinition of religious diversity has expanded well be-yond its sectarian Christian rivalries and Biblical tolera-tion, and now includes Buddhists, Muslims, Hindus,Sikhs and others from many parts of the Globe. Thesetraditions, upon observation, reflect a wide range of sec-tarian postures, adding to the plurality of the Americanlandscape. From a civil religious perspective, the Actmarked another stage in broadening the meaning of suchlong-cherished concepts as religious freedom, mutual re-spect, and voluntary “churches” or churches without gov-ernment financial support, as guaranteed by the FirstAmendment.

Among the recently published studies of post-1960sreligious pluralism is Diana Eck’s A New ReligiousAmerica. This book gives sympathetic attention to thepresence of three major world religions on Americansoil: Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam. The pluralismabout which Eck wrote, far from being the trinity pre-sented by Herberg, is associated with the democratic ideathat holds that difference must not be equated with infe-riority. It is neither inclusive nor participatory; it is morelikely to be still grappling between the stages of toler-ance and inclusion. With an assurance made by a partici-pant observer to her fellow Americans that neither the re-ligious behaviour of these groups nor their beliefs areradical, the book includes an open invitation for averageAmericans to build bridges of dialogue and mutual un-derstanding with them. Diana Eck‘s call for “positive plu-ralism” contains a latent warning about the conse-quences of isolation from and ignorance of these faithtraditions and communities.

The September 11th events proved Eck’s fears true.Before September 11 there were already more Muslimsin the United States than Episcopalians. It is only a mat-ter of time before adherents of Islam replace Jews as thelargest non-Christian religious group in the US. To coverthis new reality scholars were engaged in an effort to de-velop a model that would replace the “Judeo-Christian”one. The “Abrahamic” model emerged as the leadingcandidate. The advocates of this model attempt to traceIslam, Judaism, and Christianity back to a single origin:Abraham. The model seemed to have had official sanc-tion by the US government during the 90s. On the occa-sion of the first Eid after the Gulf War, president Bush Se-nior started the tradition of sending Eid greetings toAmerican Muslims. Under the Clinton administration, thefirst Eid celebration was conducted in the White House.

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The same year (1996), the first break-of-the-fast event washeld on Capitol Hill. In 1999 the first Muslim was ap-pointed ambassador by the Clinton administration; andin 2000 both chambers of congress passed resolutionsH.R. 174 and S. Res. 133 whereby Islam was recognizedas an Abrahamic faith along with Judaism and Christian-ity, and wherein contributions of Muslims to Americansociety were recognized. These gains were the outcomeof dialogue between the elite of the Muslim communitiesand the US government that was attempting to buildbridges with the Muslim world. Ordinary American citi-zens, whose knowledge of Islam and Muslims was at bestshaped by Hollywood and at worst by ignorance, like or-dinary Muslims and Imams, who were ignorant of thesystem of their country, did not have a place at the table.The Abrahamic model was a structure with bolsters ofclay.

In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks a surge ofhate crimes was directed at American Muslims, Sikhs, andother Americans of foreign origin who were likely to fit inthe stereotype of the terrorist as portrayed in the media.The well-established network of American Muslim orga-nizations, including the ministry of W.D. Muhammed, is-sued in an unprecedented way, jointly as well as indi-vidually, public statements condemning the terroristattacks and distancing themselves, at least in terms of re-ligious behaviour, from the perpetrators of the attacks.Their voices did not reach most of their fellow Americansbecause they lacked the adequate networks. The after-math of September 11th was marked by a public relationscrisis. Even though many Muslim voices were invited forthe first time to speak through major American medianetworks, they did not manage to dispel the revived cen-turies-old prejudices of “Islam” as a force to be fearedand of Muslims as inherently irrational and violentpeople. Nor did President Bush’s declaration that Islamis “a religion of peace” restore the image of Islam. Presi-

dent Bush, like the speakers on TV channels, mostly en-gineers, medical doctors, and physical scientists, whowere primarily self-taught and whose knowledge of Is-lamic text and history was quite superficial, were able toposition themselves as authorities on Islamic law andtheology. Their discourse was apologetic. Even thoughthey negated the association between Islam and terror-ism, they created another static, idealized portrait of Is-lam, failing to address the concrete social, economic, andpolitical causes at the root of such profound wrong do-ing.

The discriminatory aspect of the measures taken bythe government against Arab and Muslim nationals un-der the PATRIOT Act7, the double-standard that the gov-ernment did not shun during the April 2002 Palestinian-Israeli crisis, President Bush’s failure to denouncepublicly anti-Muslim comments by conservative Christianleaders, and the Iraqi war campaign with its glaring anti-Arab stereotypes awakened many Muslim activists andscholars in America to their own obligation of restoringthe image of their faith and traditions by assertivelyspeaking out against and eschewing all forms of extrem-ism, violence, and hatred in their midst. What is interest-ing is that out of their reconstitution of Islam one cantrace a budding conception of a new pluralism. Eventhough the tenets of this new pluralism can be found inmany aspects of American Muslim life, it can best be out-lined, I believe, in the discourses of the so-called “pro-gressive Muslim”8 scholars who come from highly variedethnic, geographical, linguistic, and intellectual back-grounds and who can be upheld as voices of legitimacyand authenticity. The new pluralism, “Global Pluralism,”has the following tenets:

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1. Beyond Abrahamic America:

On May 21, 2003, the Newhouse News Service inter-viewed religious leaders from the three ‘Abrahamic’ faithsabout whether Americans should stop using the phrase“Judeo-Christian”9 and use “Judeo-Christian-Islamic” or“Abrahamic” when describing the values and characterthat define the United States. National Muslim groupssupporting a change included the Council on American-Islamic Relations, the Muslim American Society, theAmerican Muslim Council, and the American-Muslim Alli-ance. These attempts at changing the language can bejustified by the fact that the term “Judeo-Christian” is nolonger inclusive. Yet it is difficult to think that the publicwill accept “Judeo-Christian-Islamic” when people whoattacked the US on 9/11 did so in the name of Islam. Toavoid falling into the trap of exclusivism, broader concep-tions of pluralism were put forward. One way of doing sowas through stressing the Americanness of the new reli-gious outsiders, including Muslims and non-Muslims.This stance is best articulated by Osama Siblani, an influ-ential voice among American Muslims and publisher ofthe Arab-American News in Dearborn, Michigan. “I be-lieve we should call this the United States of America,made up of Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, Muslims, Chris-tians, Jews and others,” said Siblani. “This stuff aboutlanguage has to stop. We are all just Americans.”10

2. Beyond tolerance:

In Progressive Muslims, Omid Safi underlines theshaky foundations of any conception of pluralism thatrests only upon toleration and does not evolve into in-clusion and participation. As he puts it

The connotations of “tolerance” are deeplyproblematic (…) the root of the term “tolerancecomes from medieval toxicology and pharmacol-ogy, marking how much poison a body could“tolerate” before it would succumb to death. Isthis the best that we can do? Is our task to figureout how many “others” (be they Muslims, Jews,blacks, Hindus, homosexuals, non-Englishspeakers, Asians…) we can tolerate before it re-ally kills us (?) In short, progressive Muslims donot wish for a “tolerant” Islam, any more thanwe long for a “tolerant” American or Europeansociety. Rather we seek to bring about a pluralis-tic society in which we honor and engage eachother through our differences and our common-alities.11

3. Building bridges of understanding:

A study of the reactions to Muslims in various com-munities in the US after 9/11 reflects a curious mix of re-sponses. They vary between tales of sympathy, coopera-tion, and compassion and others of intoleranceexpressed through hate crimes directed at individualsand institutions. Out of the welter of reasons that can ex-press this polarity emerges a fairly clear pattern amongthe many American Muslim citizen and leader of organi-zations I interviewed in geographically different parts ofthe US. It rests on the distinction between exclusivist andpluralist communities. The pattern, it seems, applies asmuch to the Muslim communities as it does to other faithcommunities. Dr. Koshampour, the director of the Is-lamic Council of Greater Chicago, argued that his com-munity mosque was not attacked because they had beenvery active in interfaith dialogue years before 9/11. He

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added that his community and other faith communitiesformed human shields to protect the mosques of the iso-lationists among Muslims. Isolationism within the Mus-lim communities is anchored in religious orientationsthat are distinctively puritan and supremacist.

4. Reconstituting Islam:

To promote a pluralism based on mutual under-standing and respect between religions, progressivescholars of Islam have recommended a reconstitution12

rather than a reformation of Islam. Their objection is dueto the fact that in the very language of “Reformation” liesthe notion of a significant break with the past and splitwithin the Muslim communities. It also implies that Is-lam adapts the historical and cultural course of actionlaid out by the Christian tradition. Unlike their Christianpredecessors who associated religious progress with arupture with the past, Europe and traditionalism, theprogressive Muslim project, argues Omid Safi, “is not somuch an epistemological rupture from what has comebefore as a fine-tuning, a polishing, a grooming, an edit-ing, a re-emphasizing of this and a correction of that. Inshort, it is a critical engagement with the heritage of Is-lamic thought, rather than a casual bypassing of its ac-complishments... It might be an easier task to start with atabula rasa, but that would not be an Islamic project. Be-ing a progressive Muslim, at least in the view of thisgroup, mandates a difficult, onerous, critical, uneasy en-gagement with the tradition.”13

Engagement with tradition concerns not only Muslimscholars of varied ethnic, geographic, linguistic, and intel-lectual backgrounds, but also non-Muslim scholars whoare involved in producing knowledge about Islam for or-dinary Muslims and non-Muslims. Such production of

knowledge, which is a process of image-building, should,according to progressive Muslims, be rebuilt on soundassets. These include the following:

1- Engaging the Islamic tradition as a dynamic and vi-able living tradition by transcending pietistic fictionsabout Islam developed by both Muslim apologists and byso-called orientalists. According to Khaled Abou El Fadl,“the apologetic orientation consisted of an effort by alarge number of commentators to defend and salvage theIslamic system of belief and tradition from the onslaughtof orientalism, Westernization, and modernity by simulta-neously emphasizing both the compatibility and also thesupremacy of Islam.” He carries this logic further and ar-gues that “A common heuristic device of apologetics wasto argue that any meritorious or worthwhile modern in-stitutions were first invented and realized by Muslims.Therefore, according to the apologists, Islam liberatedwomen, created a democracy, endorsed pluralism, pro-tected human rights, and guaranteed social security longbefore these institutions ever existed in the West” (p55).

The main effect of such apologetics was to turn Islaminto an untouchable symbol and to marginalize the com-plexity of Islamic intellectual heritage by reducing the his-tory of Muslims into immutable origins. This essentialistreading of the past is no less obscurantist than that oforientalist writers whose essentialist approach to the his-tory of Muslims is constituted essentially by a static reli-gion.

2-Appreciating differences of orientations: The at-tempt to reflect critically on the heritage of Islamicthought and to adapt it to the modern world requires anhonest intellectual study of the perspectives of variousschools of thought. Such a study is essential to legitimizea range of opinions and to acknowledge a spectrum ofinterpretations. In doing so, learned scholars would situ-ate themselves in that wider spectrum. Undertaking self-positioning would expose the exclusivism of many con-

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temporary Muslim pundits who hijack an entire tradition,claiming to be a one-man spokesperson for all Muslims.This supremacist posture excludes debate and discus-sion within the tradition and stymies the richness that ra-cial, gender, and other forms of diversity may bestowupon the tradition.

3-Commitment to social justice: Even though jus-tice lies at the heart of Islam, involvement in social justiceissues may be new to many contemporary Muslims in theUS. After September 11, many Muslims have joined Chris-tians, Jews, Buddhists, Hindus and others who have longbeen involved in social justice issues. By feeling respon-sible for the well-being and dignity of the marginalizedmembers of the society, Muslim communities have real-ized the need to make positive contributions to cultureand society so as to win the battle for inclusion. Yet sucha battle is difficult to win as long as justice is not guaran-teed to female and African American Muslims. In short,there can be no real participatory pluralism without get-ting women involved and incorporating the AfricanAmerican Muslim experience.

4-A commitment to the universality of Islam: Be-cause Muslims have the moral and legal principles ofpluralism available in their religious sources and heri-tages, and have had a long history of practicing plural-ism, they can, according to “progressive Muslims”, be aconstructive and effective contributor to contemporaryglobal pluralism. “To be committed to the universality ofIslam and to cope with our era of global pluralism,” ar-gues Fathi Osman, “Muslims have to go beyond their bit-ter memories of history, including the Crusades, coloni-zation, and exploitation, Jewish hostility, and Hindufanaticism. They have to approach members of the Baha’ifaith and Ahmadiyyas (...) Muslims cannot ignore eachother in this rapprochement, either: they should alsobridge the gaps between Sunnis, Shi’is (Zaydis, Ja’faris,Isma’ilis), Ibadis, and other sects and subdivisions (…)

Muslims ought to display the Quranic attitude towardshuman kind by extending the range of their dialogue toreach Hindus, Buddhists, Taoists, and other faiths. TheQuran (7: 172-173) teaches that every human being hashis or her spirituality, morality, and dignity, all human be-ings can develop universal relations and maintain globalpluralism. It is significant that the Quran calls the good‘what is recognized by common sense’ (ma’ruf) and evil‘what is rejected by common sense’ (munkar).”14

In spite of the glaring absence of African American Is-lam in the list, Osman’s view reflects a wider conceptionof pluralism that is based on global interfaith andintrafaith dialogues.

Conclusion:

The radicalism of religious diversity that has become afact since the passage of the Immigration Act of 1965 hasmade it evident that America’s diversity is much moreradical than any of the foregoing formulas. Living in anepitome of the global village, some scholars of Islam inthe US have advanced the pluralist state of mind furtherto become global in scope. The moral and legal prin-ciples of pluralism available in their religious sourcesand heritages, and their long history of practicing plural-ism can help Muslims be constructive and effective con-tributors to religious pluralism in America and also con-tribute to contemporary global pluralism. Whether thisproject will be implemented will depend on how Mus-lims develop practical strategies and independent institu-tions to channel their ideas.

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Bibliography

Ahlstrom Sydney E. A Religious History of the Ameri-can People. New Haven and London: Yale UniversityPress, 1972.

Albanese, Catherine L. America Religions and Reli-gion. 2nded. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1992.

Basinger, David. Religious Diversity: A philosophicalAssessment. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.,2002.

Bellah, Robert N. The Broken Covenant : AmericanCivil Religion in Time of Trial. 2nd ed. Chicago and Lon-don: University of Chicago Press, 1975.

Brimelow, Peter. Alien Nation: Common Sense aboutAmerica’s Immigration Disaster. New York: RandomHouse, 1995.

Eck, Diana. Encountering God. Boston: Beacon Press,1993.

————. A New Religious America: How a “Chris-tian Country” has Become the World’s Most ReligiouslyDiverse Nation. New York: Harper Collins, 2001.

Elias, Norbert. The Established and the Outsiders: ASociological Enquiry into Community Problems. Lon-don; Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications,1994.

Fuchs, Lawrence H. The American Kaleidoscope:Race, Ethnicity, and Civic Culture. Hanover and London:University Press of New England, 1990.

Gaustad, E. S. A Religious History of America. NewYork: Harper and Row,1966.

Glazer, Nathan. We are all Multiculturalists Now.Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997.

Gutmann, Amy, ed. Multiculturalism : Examiningthe Politics of Recognition. Princeton, New Jersey:Princeton University Press, 1999.

Herberg, Will. Protestant, Catholic, Jew: an essay inAmerican religious sociology. Garden City: Doubleday,1955)

Hutchinson, William R. Religious Pluralism inAmerica: The Contentious History of a Founding Ideal.New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003.

Kallen, Horace M. Culture and Democracy in theUnited States: Studies in the Group Psychology of theAmerican Peoples. New York: Boni and Liveright,1924.

Lippy, Charles H. Pluralism Comes of Age: AmericanReligious Culture in the Twentieth Century. Armonk,New York: M. E. Sharp,2000.

Lubarsky, Sandra B. Tolerance and Transformation:Jewish Approaches to Religious Pluralism. Cincinnati:Hebrew Union College press, 1994.

Marty, Martin E. The One and the Many: America’sStruggle for the Common God. Chicago: University of Chi-cago Press, 1997.

Miller, John W. Interfaith Dialogue: Four Ap-proaches. Waterloo, Ontario: University of WaterlooPress, 1986.

Moore,R. Lawrence. Religious Outsiders and the Mak-ing of Americans. New York/ Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1986.

Muck, Terry C. Alien Gods on American Turf.Wheaton, Ill.: Victor Books, 1990.

Myrdal, G. An American Dilemma. New York: Harperand Brothers, 1944

Osman, M. Fethi. The Children of Adam: An IslamicPerspective on Pluralism. Washington, DC: Center forMuslim-Christian Understanding: History and Interna-tional Affairs, Georgetown University, 1996.

Richardson, E. Allen. Strangers in this Land: Plural-ism and the Response to Diversity in the United States.New York: Pilgrim Press, 1988.

Robbins, Thomas, and Anthony, Dick, eds. In GodsWe Trust: New Patterns of Religious Pluralism inAmerica . New Brunswick, N. J. Transaction Books,1981.

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Wentz, Richard, E. The Culture of Religious Plural-ism. Colorado: Westview Press, 1998.

Work on Islam in AmericaAl-Azmeh, Aziz. Reconstituting Islam. Washington,

D.C.: Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, 1996.Denffer, Ahmad Von. Dialogue between Christians

and Muslims. Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 1980.Dyrness, G. R., and Dyrness, A. E. Faith Works: Reli-

gious Communities Building Neighbourhoods. CA: Cen-ter for Religion and civic Culture, University ofSouthern California, 2002.

Findley, Paul. Silent no more: confronting America‘sfalse images of Islam. Beltsville, Maryland: Amana Publi-cations, 2001.

Hassan, Asma Gull. American Muslims : the NewGeneration. New York: Continuum, 2002.

Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck, ed. Muslims in the West:from Sojourners to Citizens. New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 2002.

———.Muslims in the West: from Sojourners to Citi-zens. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

———.The Muslims of America. Oxford, New York:Oxford University Press, 1991.

Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck, and Smith, Jane Idleman.Mision to America: Five Islamic Sectarian Communitiesin North America. Gainesville: University of Florida,1993.

Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck, and Lummis Adair T. Is-lamic Values in the United States: A Comparative Study.Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press,1987.

Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck and Esposito, John L. eds.Muslims on the Americanization Path? Atlanta, Ga. :Scholars Press, 1998.

Hathout, Maher. Jihad vs Terrorism. Los Angeles, CA:Multimedia Vera International, 2002.

Hunter, Shireen. The Future of Islam and the West :Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence? Westport,Conn. : Praeger, 1998.

Ibrahim, Anwar. The Need for Civilizational Dia-logue. Washington, D.C.: Center for Muslim-ChristianUnderstanding, Georgetown University, 1995.

Khan, M.A. Muqtedar. American Muslims: BridgingFaith and Freedom. Maryland: Amana publications,2002.

Lawrence, Bruce B. New Faiths Old Fears: Muslimsand Other Asian Immigrants in American Religious Life.New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.

Naff, Alixa. Becoming American: The Early Arab Im-migrant Experience. Carbondale: Southern Illinois Uni-versity Press, 1985.

Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. Islamic-Christian Dialogue:Problem and Obstacles to be Pondered and Overcome.Washington, D.C.: Center for Muslim-Christian Under-standing, Georgetown University, 1998.

Nimer, Mohamed. The North American Muslim Re-source Guide: Muslim Community Guide in the UnitedStates and Canada. New York: Routledge, 2002.

Smith, Jane I. Islam in America. New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1999.

Safi, Omid, ed. Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gen-der, and Pluralism. Oxford: Oneworld Publications,2004.

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Notes:

1 Charles H. Lippy, Pluralism Comes of Age, NewYork: M.E. Sharpe, 2000, p. 162

2 It was also punctuated by acts of exclusion and quo-tas at the end of the 19th and the first half of the 20thcenturies.

3 Under the terms of the First Amendment, Congresscould make no law either establishing or prohibiting thefree exercise of religion. Until the Reformation of the six-teenth century, Europe has understood itself asChristendom _ one theoretically unified kingdom ofChrist in which spiritual and worldly power were sepa-rate aspects of the whole. Even after the reformation,leading reformers such as Martin Luther and John Calvin,as well as Roman Catholics, had agreed that spiritual andworldly government went hand in hand… both main-stream Reformers and Roman Catholics persecuted theRadical Reformers, who with their sectarian principlewere viewed as dangerous to the Church-state unity ofChristendom. Official state churches, whether Protestantor Catholic, were the rule in Europe. Holland, the mostliberal nation in its tolerance for dissent in the seven-teenth and eighteenth centuries, still had a state re-formed Church until 1795. England during the same pe-riod continued to maintain a religious establishment.Hence, when Americans separated church and statethrough the new federal Constitution, even though theyunderstood themselves still as Christian and predomi-nantly Protestant, they had created a radically innovativecondition for religion. (p.403)

5 William R. Hutchinson, Religious Pluralism inAmerica: The Contentious History of a Founding Ideal.New haven and London: Yale University press, 2003, p.61.

6 Historically, the term “civil religion” was used by theFrench Enlightenment philosopher Jean- JacquesRousseau (1712 - 1778). The word came to repeated usein the US to refer to a phenomenon that coincided withthe birth of the nation. In the American context the resur-gence of the term tends to be associated with RobertBellah, who published an essay titled “Civil Religion” in1967.

7 According to The Status of Muslim Civil Rights in theUnited States 2002: Stereotypes and Civil Liberties, dur-ing the first few months following the attacks, between1,200 and 1,700 nationals of Arab and Muslim countries“were taken into custody in the initial stage of the crack-down. There have been charges that detainees have notbeen informed of the reasons of their detention. Manyhave not had prompt access to a lawyer and detaineeshave been treated as if they were guilty until proven inno-cent.” (P5)They are in violation of the 6th amendmentthat guarantees a speedy and public trial”. Most of themwere freed and none had any links to terrorism. On No-vember 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft an-nounced that the government would conduct “volun-tary” interviews with 5,000 legal Muslim Foreignnationals, 3,000 more were interviewed in 2002. Thoughthe attorney general said the government learned a greatdeal from the initial interviews, but little was known as tohow that information related to the investigation of theSeptember 11th attacks or any suspected terrorists. Theuse of secret evidence was also the basis upon whichthree Muslim charities,21 designated by the governmentas terrorist organizations, were closed.

8 Omid Safi defines “Progressive Muslims” as follows:Many people today who come from a whole host of

religious, political, and ethnic backgrounds describethemselves as “progressives.” There is, furthermore, a na-scent community of Muslim activists and intellectuals

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who readily identify with the term “progressive Muslims”and publicly embrace it. “Progressive,” in this usage, re-fers to a relentless striving towards a universal notion ofjustice in which no single community’s prosperity, righ-teousness, and dignity comes at the expense of another.Central to this notion of a progressive Muslim identityare fundamental values that we hold to be essential to avital, fresh, and urgently needed interpretation of Islamfor the twenty-first century. These themes include socialjustice, gender justice, and pluralism. Of course, the kindof Islamic interpretation one comes up with is largely de-termined by who undertakes the interpretation. ( Pro-gressive Muslims, p3)

9 From its founding to the late 1940s, the UnitedStates was commonly described as Christian, a trendepitomized by an 1892 Supreme Court ruling in whichJustice David Brewer wrote, “This is a Christian nation.”In a 2002 survey by the Pew Forum on Religion and Pub-lic Life and the Pew Research Center for People and the

Press, two-thirds of respondents said they consider theUnited States a “Christian nation” and 58 percent saidthe strength of American society is based on the religiousfaith of its people. However, only 14 percent said it is es-sential that a person believe in “basic Judeo-Christian val-ues” in order to be a good American.

10 Has the United States Become Judeo-Christian-Is-lamic?” See www.mpac.org (2003)

11 Omid Safi, ed. Progressive Muslims : On Justice,Gender, and Pluralism, Oxford :Oneworld Publications,2003 . pp 23-24.

12 The term was used by Aziz Al-Azmeh in 1996.13 Omid Safi, ed. Progressive Muslims, p11.14 Mohammed Fathi Osman, The Children of Adam:

An Islamic Perspective on Pluralism, Washington, D.C.:Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding : History andInternational Affairs, 1996 , p.65.

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“The alleged Hitlerian gas chambers and the allegedgenocide of the Jews form one and the same historicallie, which permitted a gigantic financial swindle whosechief beneficiaries have been the State of Israel and inter-national Zionism, and whose main victims have been theGerman people and the Palestinian people as a whole”1.

One might think that this kind of statement is thework of a completely twisted mind and that any man witha shred of common sense would dismiss it from the verystart. But, unfortunately and ironically enough, this isjust one example among many such statements thatform the bases of what is now commonly known as thephenomenon of Holocaust denial. The worst part of allis that this phenomenon, far from being just a fringeschool of thought, has gained significant ground, espe-cially in the last two decades, and has entered commonconscience, finding for itself quite a number of followers.

Raluca Moldovan

Anatomy of a Hoax: HolocaustDenial

Raluca MoldovanTeaching assistantFaculty of EuropeanStudies, Babes-BolyaiUniversity Cluj, Romania

The phenomenon of Holocaust denial, once consid-ered a fringe manifestation with very little impact,has, more or less, entered the mainstream of histo-riographical and academic debate in recent years. Themain danger associated with the deniers’ discourse isthat of forcing into the public conscience the aware-ness of the fact that there might be “more sides” tothe Holocaust history than previously known basedon written documents, testimonies of survivors andother types of proofs. The following paper is a reviewof the emergence, development and extent ofHolocaust denial, especially in the United States, aswell as an attempt to summarise the deniers’arguments, claims and motivations, following the lineopened by Deborah Lipstadt and other historians.

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Holocaust denial has become an accepted, if not quiterespected, historical assertion and it has generatedrealms of “well-founded historical literature”.

Holocaust denial emerged immediately after WorldWar II, especially in the United States, as an isolated phe-nomenon with little or no credibility, but it has come along way since then. Nowadays, traces of Holocaust de-nial and overt anti-Semitism can be found in the UnitedSates as well as throughout Europe and the Middle Eastand even as far away as Australia.

The explanations for the spreading and influence ofthis “growing assault on truth and memory”2 are manyand diverse. In the following paragraphs, I will try to out-line the essence of this phenomenon, to present itsperpetrators and to review some of the most importantreactions against it.

The Holocaust is one of those historical facts with avery enduring life: nowadays, almost half a century later,it has lost little of its striking impact upon the memory ofmankind. Newspapers, magazines, publishing houses,and research institutes regularly print articles, books,and studies centered upon different aspects directly re-ferring to or merely related to the Holocaust. On theother hand, there are almost just as many newspapers,magazines, publishing houses and institutes that regu-larly publish materials on Holocaust denial, which pointsout that there certainly is an audience ready to read andto accept the claims made by the authors of these materi-als, the self-proclaimed “historical revisionists”. Theground on which the seeds of this denial are plantedseems very fertile, and the more public the debate aboutit, the more people are likely to be caught up in the de-nial movement.

One of the most well-known and controversial publicdebates about Holocaust denial was generated by the re-cent suit brought by the freelance historian David Irving,probably the most prominent figure of Holocaust denial.

David Irving sued Professor Deborah Lipstadt for libel,claiming that the assertions she made in her book, Deny-ing the Holocaust, were extremely offensive to him. Thetrial gripped the attention of both the British and theAmerican media for many months, and the testimonygiven by David Irving horrified both the judges and theaudience. The mere fact that such persons are taken seri-ously by so many people worldwide is extremely alarm-ing, because it only shows us how vulnerable publicopinion is when the instruments of manipulation arecarefully orchestrated.3

Ignorance is the deniers’ first ally in their mission todistort history, and the higher the level of ignorance, themore dangerous the effects of the denials are. In this re-spect, one example is very relevant.4 In April 1993, inconjunction with the opening of the U.S. Holocaust Mu-seum, the Roper Organization conducted a survey meantto determine the extent of Americans’ knowledge of thephenomenon. The results expected by the organizationand the American Jewish Committee were not at all star-tling. However, the answer to one of the question theyinitially wanted to eliminate from the questionnaire wasmore than shocking: when asked “do you think it pos-sible or impossible that the Holocaust did not happen:22% of American adults and 20% of American high schoolstudents replied that it was possible. This answer showsthat Holocaust denial is not just an eerie phenomenonwith no more credibility to it than the assertion that theEarth is flat.

Under such circumstances, one should not beamazed at the growing force of Holocaust denial and atthe fact that its very existence is now being questioned intalk shows5 on national television.

Deborah Lipstadt’s book, Denying the Holocaust – theGrowing Assault on Truth and Memory, is the best to-date account of Holocaust denial. It presents chronologi-cally and clearly the roots of the phenomenon, the insti-

Key words:

Holocaust denial, anti-Semitism, manipula-tion, mass murder, gaschambers, genocide

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tutions and people involved in the practice of denial, andtheir main works and arguments.6 The author tries tosummarize the deniers’ most frequent claims (sheidentifies five major themes for research in the field ofdenial: the absence of a single master plan for the anni-hilation of the Jewish people; the absence of gas cham-bers used for mass murder at Auschwitz and othercamps; the fact that the testimonies of the survivors aregiven so much credibility because there is no objectivedocumentation to prove the Nazi genocide; the absenceof a total loss of Jewish lives between 1941 and 1945; the“mock trial” character of the Nuremberg trials, staged forthe benefit of the Jews). She also tries to find explana-tions for the proliferation of denial literature, especiallyin the last two decades. The main argument that shebrings is that the denial stirrings are closely connectedwith the neo-Nazi ideology and the rise of the radical rightin politics. The evolution of West European politics,especially in the last ten years, has pointed out elementsthat show a return to the anti-Semitic language andattitudes common more than half a century ago. How-ever, the anti-Semitism of the 1990s encompasses newelements and new ideas that feed the anti-Jewish feelingthat has always existed in Europe. Neo-Nazism and thenew radical right rely on Holocaust denial in order toobtain legitimacy and recognition in the political arena.Jean Marie le Pen7, Jorg Haider, and Pim Fortuyn, aresome of the western politicians who have played the cardof anti-Semitism and have enjoyed considerable success.The fact that these people come from countries otherthan Germany (where the appearance of such ideascould seem more natural) shows that European anti-Semitism is far from extinct. Actually, the issue of an anti-Semitic Europe has received extensive coverage fromprestigious magazines such as Time8: “a Boston newspa-per blared Kristallnacht Returns and declared, ‘not sincethe Third Reich has there been anything like it.” In

response to anxious enquiries, the Simon WiesenthalCenter in Los Angeles issued an advisory warning Jews“to exercise extreme caution while traveling to Franceand Belgium.”9 However, this does not mean that there isno anti-Semitism in Germany or in other parts of Europe.Actually, the region that has shown itself most prone tofall prey to deniers’ ideas in the past ten years is post-Communist East Central Europe, where the political andsocial atmosphere have been favorable to thedevelopment of such ideas that I will present later on.10

The most prominent European “canaries in the coalmine”11 are David Irving, who achieved internationalfame during and after the aforementioned trial, IngridRimland, Ernst Zündel, Fred Leuchter, Willis Carto,David Duke, Masami Uno, Richard Harwood, and RobertFaurisson, whom I have already quoted and whose argu-ments and statements would be extremely funny if thereweren’t so many people who take them seriously. Hisarea of study is rather unique: “criticism of texts anddocuments, investigation of meaning and counter-mean-ing, of the true and the false”12. The irony here is thatFaurisson regularly creates facts where there are noneand dismisses and falsifies pieces of factual informationthat disprove his scenarios. One of his assertions refers tothe “Draconian orders” given to the German army “not toparticipate in excesses against civilians, including theJews; consequently, the massive killings of the Jews couldnot have happened”13. Faurisson also asserts that thewearing of the yellow star was imposed on the Jews inorder to ensure the safety of the German soldiers.Following the same logic, one can easily reach theconclusion that six-year old children, who were alsoforced to wear the yellow star, constituted fierce threatsto the well being of the German soldiers14. One of hisbest-founded arguments, however, remains the one re-garding the gas chambers. According to him, the reasonwhy one should not believe in the existence of gas cham-

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bers is that “no death camp victim has given eye witnesstestimony of actual gassings”15. Faced with such irrefut-able arguments, any historian who tries to disprove hisfindings has no other option but to rest his case.

Nevertheless, leaving all irony aside, Holocaust de-nial is not a threat just to Jewish history, but a threat toall who believe in the ultimate power of reason. Theclever disguises used by these people in order to get theirmessage across could easily misguide one’s power ofreason. For instance, the first and foremost circle ofdeniers has been established around the Californian-based and respectably named Institute for Historical Re-view, which has already gained important status espe-cially in the United Sates, and which has alreadyorganized several so-called “revisionist conferences” be-ginning in 1974. The deniers have twisted the term “revi-sionism”16 so as to suit their purposes, claiming the rightto free speech under the protection of the First Amend-ment. Their main arguments – “the Ten Commandmentsof Holocaust denial” – include the pronouncement say-ing that the Holocaust, the organized plan to annihilatethe Jewish people during the Second World War, simplydid not happen. There never was a master plan whoseresult would be the annihilation of European Jewry. Onsaying that, the deniers deliberately ignore historical factssuch as Hitler’s own declarations published in officialdocuments of the time, such as the two statements Iwould like to quote and that show the extent to which theThird Reich was infused with anti-Semitism and hatred ofthe Jews, so much so that the organized massacre of allthese people was the next logical step. In a speechdelivered before the Reichstag in January 1939, Hitlersaid: “Today I want to be a prophet once more: if inter-national finance Jewry inside and outside of Europeshould succeed once more in plunging nations into an-other world war, the consequence will not be thebolshevisation of the earth and thereby the victory of the

Jewry, but the annihilation of the Jewish race in Eu-rope”17. Another statement, made in September 1942(eight months after the Wansee Conference in January1942, which marked the start of the implementation ofthe Final Solution) reinforces his ideas: “in my Reichstagspeech, I have spoken of two things: first, that now thatthe war has been forced upon us, no array of weaponsand no passage of time will bring us to defeat, and sec-ond, that if Jewry should plot another world war to ex-terminate the Aryan peoples in Europe, it would not bethe Aryan peoples which will be exterminated, but theJewry…At one time, the Jews in Germany laughed aboutmy prophecies. I do not know whether they are stilllaughing or whether they have already lost all desire tolaugh. But right now I can only repeat: they will stoplaughing everywhere and I shall be right also in thatprophecy”18.

By their claims, the deniers try to absolve the Nazis ofall guilt and put the victors and the vanquished of thewar on par. Moreover, that the the Nazis were not theperpetrators of murder and destruction, but rather theAllies were, who should also be held responsible, notonly for countless civilian casualties subsequent to theirbombing of German cities, but also for the death of Jew-ish prisoners who had been gathered in labour camps“for their own protection”19. Deniers acknowledge thatsome Jews were incarcerated in such places asAuschwitz, but this camp was equipped with “all theluxuries of a country club, including a swimming pool,dance hall, and recreational facilities”20. (These argu-ments were presented at the trial of the Canadian denierErnst Zündel by the “expert engineer” Fred Leuchter,whose case I shall discuss in the further on.)

The birthplace of Holocaust denial was not Germany,as many might think, but the United States, where onecan find many sources of inspiration for this phenom-enon as early as the 1920s and 1930s. As Deborah

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Lipstadt has observed, “modern Holocaust denial drawsinspiration from a variety of sources. Among them are alegitimate historical tradition that was highly critical ofgovernment policies and believed that history was beingused to justify those policies; an age-old nexus ofconspiratorial scenarios that place a neat coherence onwidely diverse developments; and hyperbolic critiques ofgovernment policies, which, despite an initial connec-tion to reality, became so extreme as to assume a qualityof fantasy. The aforementioned historical tradition wastaken over and co-opted by Holocaust deniers. In theother two cases, denial was their logical successors”21.American revisionism was born in 1920, after the FirstWorld War, when Sidney B. Fay and Harry Elmer Barnesstarted publishing articles and studies criticizingAmerican involvement in the war, which, according tothem, had been triggered by Jewish influences. Barnescan be rightfully regarded as the “father of American Ho-locaust denial”, because he started writing articles attack-ing the facts referring to the destruction of EuropeanJewry even before World War II had finished. Another fa-mous and influential American anti-Semite in the inter-war period was none other than Henry Ford, who notonly wrote but also sponsored the publication of suchovertly anti-Semitic pamphlets as the one entitled The In-ternational Jew: the World’s Foremost Problem22. Someother historians, such as Charles Bread and Freda Utley,claimed, in the immediate aftermath of World War II, that“Hitler did not want to go to war with Poland, butplanned for Germany and Poland to dominate Europetogether”.23 Another favorite theme of argument for theseearly revisionists (I am reluctant to use the term “de-niers” at this stage, because their activity does not fallinto the category of those proliferated by David Irving andhis supporters) was that of comparison between the Naziatrocities and the casualties and destruction broughtabout by the Allies or in some other historical atrocities,

even the American Civil War. One particular statement,made by the English professor Austin J. App, whom Ishall refer to later on as well, is relevant in this context:“the top U.S. media, possibly because they are dominatedby Jews, have no tradition of fairness to anyone theyhate. They have also in wartime subverted much of thepublic to a frenzy of prejudice. Even in our civil war,where Americans fought against Americans, Americansof the North were told and came to believe that ChoctawCounty stunk with dead bodies of murdered slaves andthat the Southern belles had worn necklaces strung outof Yankee eyeballs!… If Yankees could believe thatSouthern girls wore necklaces of Yankee eyeballs, wouldthey not even more readily believe that Germans madelampshades out of the skins of prisoners, or that theyboiled Jews into soap?”24. However preposterous theseclaims might be, all the revisionists of this period differfrom the Holocaust deniers in the sense that theystopped short of claiming that the atrocities neverhappened. They indeed tried to minimize the number ofdead, to downplay the cruelties inflicted upon the Jewsin the death camps, but they never actually said that theydid not happened.

However, one cannot say the same about what tran-spired in the early 1950s, when revisionist historians be-gan transforming into outright deniers, mostly influ-enced by the radical right ideology that had survived thefascist period and was trying to gain new legitimacy. Theactivity of the early proper deniers was also prompted bythe publication of the first accounts of the Holocaust.One of the first defenders of the Nazis in the post-war erawas the French fascist Maurice Bardèche. In his works(Letter to François Mauriac, Nuremberg or the PromisedLand), he contended that the evidence about theconcentration camps had been seriously falsified andthat the real culprits for the atrocities were not the Nazis,but the Jews themselves, because they had helped insti-

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gate the war25. Another Frenchman, Paul Rassiner,former prisoner in the Büchenwald camp, published in1948 a work called Le passage de la ligne, in which heclaims that the survivors’ testimonies could not be givenmuch credibility because they were thoroughly biased.However, his own words were given a lot of credibility,since in 1977 the American publishing house NoontidePress published all his major books concerning the Holo-caust in one issue entitled Debunking the GenocideMyth26. Rassiner also published a book in response to theclassic text Destruction of European Jewry by RaulHilberg, published in 1961, in which Rassiner claims thatthe figures presented by Hilberg in the book, all very welldocumented and concordant with the facts, were muchinflated. Rassiner’s ultimate argument is that “somepeople may have been killed, but those who conductedsuch exterminations were acting on their own and notin the name of a state order or a political doctrine”27.

The 1970s marked a change in the denier’s methods:they started coming up with new arguments alongsideold ones, the most important being the money element –the Jews pretended to have been Holocaust victims so asto inflict a deep sense of guilt upon the German peopleand thus to be able to blackmail them for hard cashpoured into the Israeli state bank. Consequently, all talkand evidence about the six million dead, the gas cham-bers, and the crematoria was an invention of the Zionistestablishment. The deniers’ attacks focused on suchprominent historians as Raul Hilberg and HannahArendt, whom they dismissed as “frauds”. Moreover,when confronted with such overt statements as the onesmade by Hitler himself, which I have already quoted, thedeniers dismiss them as well as “irrelevant hyperboles,typical of the kind of defiance that was hurled by theancient heroes”28.

The late 1970s and the early 1980s saw the establish-ment of a well-organized school of Holocaust denial, es-

pecially in the United Sates, which had become the placewith the most flourishing denial literature and wheremany European deniers came to publish their works. Un-til that period, Holocaust denial in the U.S. had beenprimarily the province of fringe, racist and extremistgroups who had found some support in a number ofseemingly respectable circles. The inventiveness of thedeniers found new arguments, the most quoted of thembeing the one according to which out of the 5 millionJews living in the United States, about 90% of them wereEuropean Jews who had allegedly died in the Holocaust,but who were safe and sound and living on money paidby the German and American taxpayers29. Harry ElmerBarnes, whom I have already mentioned, contributed sig-nificantly to the shaping of the new denial ideology,publishing some rather influential works such as TheStruggle Against the Historical Blackout, in which he ex-presses his strong belief that Germany was in no way re-sponsible either for the outbreak of World War II or forthe atrocities it had been accused of. Barnes also praisedPaul Rassiner for his great contribution to the emergenceof the truth concealed by the Jewish politicians: “this cou-rageous author lays the chief blame for misrepresenta-tion on those whom we must call the swindlers of thecrematoria, the Israeli politicians who derive billions ofmarks from nonexistent, mythical and imaginary ca-davers, whose numbers have been reckoned in an un-usually distorted and dishonest manner”30. Thus,Barnes paved the way for the claims of the American“guru of Holocaust denial”, Austin J. App. A professor ofEnglish at the University of Scranton and LaSalle College,App, just like Barnes, was mainly concerned to lift themoral burden of the atrocities charge from the shouldersof a defeated and divided Germany. App was known forbeing an ardent defender of Nazi Germany. App’s majorcontribution was the formulation of eight undeniable axi-oms that have become the fundaments of the denial

23J S R I • N o. 11 / Summer 2 0 0 5

theory, included in his suggestively entitled book, The SixMillion Swindle: Blackmailing the German People forHard Marks with Fabricated Corpses.(1973) App’s mainpreoccupation was that of dismissing the figure of sixmillion as a “smear terrorizing myth”, claiming that therewas not a single “order, document or blueprint thatproved that the Nazis intended to annihilate the Jews”31.He offered a strange argument to prove his point: the factthe some Jews had survived constituted proof that nonewere killed32. He also argued that Nazi Germany was soefficient that no Jew could have escaped if the Nazis hadindeed intended to destroy all Jews. Consequently, theHolocaust was a hoax perpetrated by the Jews andcommunists alike.

His famous eight axioms are worth quoting, becausethey prove just how far the deniers are willing to go justto prove their twisted arguments:

“1. Emigration, never annihilation, was the Reich’splan for solving Germany’s Jewish problem. Had Ger-many intended to annihilate all the Jews, a half millionconcentration camp inmates would not have survivedand managed to come to Israel where they collect “fancyindemnities” from West Germany.

2. Absolutely no Jews were gassed in any concentra-tion camps in Germany and evidence is piling up thatnone were gassed in Auschwitz. The Hitler gas chambersnever existed. The gas installations found in Auschwitzwere really crematoria for cremating corpses of thosewho had died from a variety of causes, including thegenocidal Anglo-American bombing raids”

3. The majority of Jews who disappeared and re-mained unaccounted for did so in territories under So-viet, not German control.

4. The majority of Jews who supposedly died while inGerman camps were in fact subversive partisans, spies,saboteurs and criminals or victims of unfortunate butinternationally legal reprisals.

5. If there existed the slightest likelihood that the Na-zis had really murdered six million Jews, “world Jewry”would demand subsidies to conduct research on thetopic and Israel would open its archives to historians.They had not done so. Instead, they have persecuted andbranded as an anti-Semite anyone who wished to publi-cize the hoax. This persecution constitutes the most con-clusive evidence that this figure is a swindle.

6. The Jews and the media who exploit this figurehave failed to offer even a shred of evidence to prove it.The Jews misquote Eichmann and other Nazis in order totry and substantiate their claims.

7. It is the accusers, not the accused, who must pro-vide the burden of proof to substantiate the six millionfigure, the Talmudists and Bolsheviks have so brow-beaten the Germans that they pay billions and do notdare to demand proof.

8. The fact that Jewish scholars themselves have “ri-diculous” discrepancies in their calculations of the num-ber of victims constitutes firm evidence that there is noscientific proof to this accusation”33.

App’s arguments were further explored by RichardHarwood in a booklet published in 1974, entitled Did SixMillion Really Die? The Truth at Last, which was sent tomajor newspapers and to the leaders of the British Jew-ish communities, being the preeminent British work onHolocaust denial for almost ten years after its publica-tion. Harwood argues that “Hitler had no reason to mur-der the Jews when he needed them for forced labour.” Hegoes on to point that the total number of Jews in Europebefore the war was six and a half million and that oneand a half million emigrated abroad. Harwood citesfigures from international organizations - all quoted – todemonstrate that there were not more than three millionJews in Nazi Germany34.

Deniers’ efforts have long been centered upon gain-ing scholarly and historical legitimacy, and one step to-

24J S R I • N o. 11 / Summer 2 0 0 5

wards this goal was made in 1976 with the publication ofThe Hoax of the Twentieth Century by Arthur Butz, pro-fessor of electrical engineering at Northwestern Univer-sity, who significantly changed the nature of Holocaustdenial. The American press extensively reported aboutthe stirrings caused by the publication of this book,whose denial arguments are very cleverly disguised, sinceat first sight Butz appears to be a serious scholar who isvery critical of Nazi Germany. Butz also tried to explainaway all the Nazi references to the destruction of theJews by misquoting statements made by Hitler andHimmler, and attempts to expose the Holocaust hoax asa product of a Jewish-dominated press. Butz was stronglysupported by the leader of the Institute of HistoricalReview, Willis Carto, who declared at the first revisionistconvention in 1974 that “if Satan himself had tried tocreate a force for the destruction of the nations, he couldhave done no better than to invent the Jews”35. TheCalifornian Institute also provided support and “exper-tise” in 1986, at the trial initiated by the Canadian govern-ment against Ernst Zündel, charged with stimulatinganti-Semitism through the publication and distribution ofmaterial he knew was false. (One such booklet wasentitled The Hitler We Loved and Why). Among thedeniers present at the trial were David Irving and RobertFaurisson, who provided “specialized consulting”. How-ever, the climax of the trial was reached with the testi-mony of the “expert engineer” Fred Leuchter, who was infact just a history graduate from an obscure Americanuniversity, but who claimed to have the necessary compe-tencies to conduct specialized tests at Auschwitz in orderto discover whether the facilities there could have beenused to conduct mass gassings. Unsurprisingly enough,the firm conclusion that Leuchter presented before thejury was that those facilities could have under nocircumstances been used to kill people – they were justinnocent shower rooms; moreover, he also arrived at the

conclusion that Zyklon B was a pesticide whose mainpurpose was that of killing lice, not people. The denierspresent in Canada considered Leuchter’s testimony as ahistoric event, marking the end of the “gas chambersmyth”.

However, the Court was not eager to acceptLeuchter’s arguments and the judge dismissed both the“scientific proofs” he produced and his qualifications asan engineer. However, The Leuchter Report is still re-garded a sort of Holy Grail by the perpetrators of Holo-caust denial.

Following the popularity gained by Holocaust de-niers after the Zündel trial, they considered that it wastime to make another move towards acquiring legitimacyin one of the most sensitive environments: the campusesof the American universities, where the early 1990s sawthe emergence of several posters and announcementscalling for “open debate” about the existence of the Ho-locaust. The person behind this carefully orchestrated as-sault was Bradley Smith, director of the self-styled Com-mittee for Open Debate on the Holocaust. He launched apropaganda campaign by placing ads in the campuses ofthe most important American universities, ads entitled“The Holocaust Story: How Much is False? The Case forOpen Debate”. These ads provoked a fierce debate in thecampuses, between those who supported the idea ofpublishing the ads in the campus newspapers in thename of free speech and those who considered that suchads were a danger not only for the academic environ-ment but also for the historical memory in general. Smithbet on the concept of political correctness to support hisclaim for open debate, and indeed some universities didpublish his ad either as an article or an op-ed piece in thecampus newspaper. However, the issue here was notpolitical correctness or free speech – it was distortion offacts and fabrication of evidence, and if some universitiesindeed decided to publish such an ad, then the deniers

25J S R I • N o. 11 / Summer 2 0 0 5

could consider that they obtained a major victory towardspenetrating segments of public opinion that might befertile ground for the spreading of their ideas36. The greatdanger about publishing such ads in universitynewspapers is that, as Deborah Lipstadt put it, “manystudents read both the ad and the editorials condemn-ing it. Some, including those who read neither but knewof the issue, may have walked away from thecontroversy convinced that there are two sides to thisdebate: the “revisionists” and “the established histori-ans”. They may not know that there is tremendous con-troversy about the former. They may not be convincedthat the two sides are of equal validity. They may evenknow that the deniers keep questionable company. Butnonetheless they assume that there is an “other side”.That is the most frightening aspect of this entire mat-ter”37.

As I have already pointed out, Deborah Lipstadtmainly refers to the phenomenon of Holocaust denial inthe United Sates, where it has been cultivated for de-cades, but that does not mean that Europe has beenspared this phenomenon. I have mentioned at the begin-ning of this paper that Europe is going through a newphase of anti-Semitism during which it is not unusual tosee in the newspapers declarations such as the oneprinted by the Italian daily La Reppublica on March 24,2000: “Six Million Jews dead? No way, they were muchfewer. Let’s stop with this fairytale exploited by Israel tocapture international solidarity”38. There are hardly anyfairies in this story, I may add – and this statement is notan isolated one. All over Europe and the Middle East, ar-ticles and studies have been published in order to sub-stantiate the claim that the Holocaust is nothing morethan a very convenient way for Israel to get money andinternational sympathy.

Post-communist Eastern Europe has also witnessedboth a rise in anti-Semitism and the emergence of a new

concept connected to the Holocaust period, that of “orga-nized forgetting”39. The attitudes towards Holocaust inthis region range from outright Holocaust negationism(for many years openly professed in Romania until re-cently, until the appearance of harsher libel laws, bysuch politicians as Corneliu Vadim Tudor and StanislavPanis, and writers such as Radu Theodoru, who claimsthat “no document on the Holocaust can be found. Noorder signed by Hitler, Himmler or other German lead-ers. The much-heralded Final Solution had two versions:that preceding the war against the USSR and consistingof the deportation of Jews to Madagascar; and thatfollowing the war outbreak, consisting in their deporta-tion to the Far East. The gas chambers were delousingand disinfecting chambers, and the much heraldedZyklon B was a pesticide, as demonstrated by Americanengineer Leuchter in the two analytical repots heproduced after visiting all camps in Germany, Austriaand Poland. The crematoria burned the corpses of thosewho died of typhus.”40) to deflective negationism andselective negationism. Also, Holocaust is now associatedwith “comparative trivialization”, namely the banalizationof the phenomenon and of its consequences. Shafirpoints out the meaning of “comparative trivialization” asbeing “the willful distortion of the record and of thesignificance of the Holocaust, either to the humanizationof its local record in comparison with atrocitiescommitted by the Nazis, or through comparing therecord of the Holocaust itself with experiences of massivesuffering endured by local populations or by mankindat large at one point or another in records of history”41.

The debate about the Holocaust is still in full swing,and there is no telling what might follow. The argumentsthat will be brought into the spotlight by the deniers can-not be predicted. All that we, the ordinary common sense

26J S R I • N o. 11 / Summer 2 0 0 5

people, can do is be on guard for these distortions andbe prepared to disprove them with facts. The belief thatHolocaust survivors will one day be able to walk downthe street without being pointed at and sneered at andthe Holocaust in itself will not be contested should bekept alive, just like Anne Frank (one of the deniers’ pre-ferred targets) maintained her belief in escape until thevery end: “I simply cannot build my hopes on a founda-tion consisting of despair, misery and death. I feel thesuffering of millions, I can hear the overapproachingthunder that will destroy us too – and yet, if I look upinto the heavens I know that this cruelty too shall endand that peace and tranquility will return again”42.

Notes:

1 Robert Faurisson quoted by The Guardian Weekly(April 7 1991)

2 See Deborah Lipstadt, Denying the Holocaust, NewYork, 1993, Penguin Books

3 So as to exemplify the kind of statements typical forIrving, I would like to quote a fragment from a speech hedelivered in 1996 in Portland and posted on the Internet:“when I get to Australia in January I know what is goingto happen. They are going to wheel out all the so-calledeyewitnesses. One in particular, Mrs. Altman, I’ve clashedwith her once or twice. She is very convincing. They canbe very convincing. Because they have to do it so oftenover the years. They’ve had a free run. We’re going tomeet because she has that tattoo. I am going to say, ‘youhave that tattoo, we all have the utmost sympathy for you.But how much money have you made on it! In the last 45years! Can I estimate! Quarter of a million! Half million!Certainly not less. That’s how much you’ve made fromthe German taxpayers and the American taxpayers.’

Ladies and gentlemen, you’re paying $3 billion a year tothe state of Israel. Compensation to people like Mrs.Altman. She’ll say, ‘why not, I suffered’ I’ll say you didn’t.You survived. By definition you didn’t suffer. Not half asmuch as those who died. They suffered. You didn’t.You’re the one making the money. Explain to me this.Why have you people made all the money, but Australiansoldiers who suffered for five years in Japanese prisoncamps haven’t got a bent nickel out of it!”

4 Cf. Lipstadt, op. cit., p. xi.5 The host of one such talk show in which Holocaust

survivors and deniers were brought face to face, MontelWilliams, urged viewers to stay tuned after the commer-cial break in order to find out whether the Holocaust was“a myth or a truth” (Lipstadt, op. cit., p. 2).

6 However, it is not the only book dealing with thesubject. Michael Shermer and Alex Grobman are the au-thors of another book focused on Holocaust denial, buttheir work is largely based on what Lipstadt says.(Michael Shermer, Alex Grobman, Denying History – WhoSays the Holocaust Never Happened and Why They SayIt, New York, 1995 Doubleday Books).

7 Le Pen even went so far as to declare that “the gaschambers were a mere detail of history” – D. Lipstadt, op.cit., p. 10.

8 Time Europe, June 17 2002, vol. 159/ no. 24.9 How bad is it?, in Time Europe, June 17 2002, vol.

159/ no. 24.10 See also Michael Shafir, Between Denial and “Com-

parative Trivialisation” – Holocaust Negationism in Post-Communist East Central Europe, Jerusalem 2002, TheVidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Anti-Semitism.

11 Lipstadt, op. cit., p. 2.12 Ibidem, p. 9.13 Ibidem.

27J S R I • N o. 11 / Summer 2 0 0 5

14 Ibidem.15 Ibidem, p. 16.16 This concept was launched by the renowned Ameri-

can historian William Appleman Williams in connectionwith the American foreign policy in the early period of theCold War.

17 Lipstadt, op. cit., p. 61.18 Lipstadt, op. cit., p. 61-62.19 Cf. Lipstadt, p. 21.20 Ibidem, p. 23.21 Ibidem, p. 31.22 The title of this pamphlet indicates the fact that

Ford strongly believed in the “world Jewish conspiracy”promoted by the Protocols of the Elders of Zion; he actu-ally financed the publication of 6000 copies of this infa-mous work.

23 Lipstadt, op. cit., p. 40.24 Quoted in Lipstadt, op. cit., p. 46.25 Cf. Lipstadt, p. 50.26 Noontide Press is closely connected with the Cali-

fornian headquarters of the Institute for Historical Re-view.

27 Lipstadt, p. 52.28 Paul Rassiner, quoted in D. Lipstadt, op. cit., p. 62.29 Cf. George Lincoln Rockwell, In the Valley of Death

Rode the Six Million. Or Did They?, Los Angeles 1979,Noontide Press.

30 Quoted in Lipstadt, op. cit., p. 74.31 Cf. Lipstadt, p. 93.32 “Every Jew who survived the German occupation is

proof of this” – see D. Lipstadt, p. 93.33 Quoted in Lipstadt, pp. 99-100.34 Lipstadt, op. cit., p. 119.35 Ibidem, p. 154.36 Among the universities that accepted this ad for

publication were University of Arizona, Cornell Univer-

sity, Duke University, University of Georgia, Howard Uni-versity, University of Illinois at Urbana-Campaign, Louisi-ana State University, University of Michigan, University ofMontana, Northwestern University, Ohio State University,Rutgers University, Vanderbilt University, and Washing-ton University. The list of those that refused to haveanything to do with the ad includes U. C. - Berkeley, Chi-cago State University, Brown University, U. C. - Santa Bar-bara, Dartmouth University, Emory University,Georgetown University, Harvard University, University ofMinnesota, University of North Carolina, University ofPennsylvania, Purdue University, Rice University, Univer-sity of South Carolina, University of Tennessee, Universityof Texas, UCLA, University of Virginia, Yale University,and University of Wisconsin.

37 Lipstadt, p. 208.38 The declaration belongs to Ikrima Said Sabri, the

Palestinian-Authority appointed imam of the Al-Aqsamosque and mufti of Jerusalem, and is quoted in GoetzNordbruch, The Socio-Historical Background of Holo-caust Denial in Arab Countries – Reactions to RogerGaraudy’s The Founding Myths of Israeli Politics, Jerusa-lem 2001, The Vidal Sassoon International Centre for theStudy of Antisemitism.

39 Shafir, op. cit., p. 4.40 Ibidem, p. 22.41 Ibidem. p. 60.42 Quoted in Lipstadt, op. cit., p. 230.

28J S R I • N o. 11 / Summer 2 0 0 5

„O blasfemie greþoasã”, „un banal roman deaventuri”, „maculaturã”, „kitch” – sînt doar cîteva dintredescrierile de care „se bucurã” romanul lui Dan Brown,Codul lui da Vinci în pagina culturalã a unuibinecunoscut cotidian românesc1. „Hranã putredã”, „sacplin de minciuni”, „comportament deplorabil pentru unautor” – sînt caracterizãrile rostite de un importantreprezentant al Vaticanului, care recomanda suplimentarcredincioºilor sã nu cumpere ºi sã nu citeascã respectivalucrare2.

Mihaela Frunzã

Între religiozitate ºi marketing:analiza unui fenomen literar

The article proposes an analysis of the recent best-seller “Da Vinci Code”, by Dan Brown. Several keys ofinterpreting the novel are sketched – fromdeconstructing the accuses of plagiarism and blas-phemy to analyzing the role of feminism and new-age religiousness in the plot making. In the end, theauthor comparatively examines the novel and the MelGibson movie “The Passion of Christ”, in an attemptto better situate the figure of Christ in recent culturalproducts.

Mihaela FrunzãLecturer, Ph.D., Faculty ofHistory and Philosophy,Babes-Bolyai University,Cluj, Romania.

Author of the book:Ideologie si feminism(2004). E-mail:mihafrunza@yahoo.com

29J S R I • N o. 11 / Summer 2 0 0 5

Citind astfel de prezentãri, fie eºti tentat sã considericã romanul cu pricina ºi autorul sãu nu fac doi bani –dar atunci te întrebi pe bunã dreptate de ce e nevoie deatîta osîrdie în condamnarea lor – fie poþi sã chestionezibuna credinþã a detractorilor ºi sã încerci sã afli ce anumederanjeazã atît de mult la una din cele mai bine vîndutecãrþi din ultimul deceniu.

Rãspunsul la aceastã întrebare pare evident dinmajoritatea articolelor defãimãtoare: autorul respectiveicãrþi susþine o serie de blasfemii la adresa religieicreºtine, cu scopul (pragmatic pentru unii, drãcescpentru alþii) de a face bani. Faptul în sine a pãrut atît descandalos unor editori bine intenþionaþi ºi profundcreºtini din Cluj, încît au tradus rapid una din cãrþile-parazit care „demonteazã” mecanismul romanului. Cuscopul binecuvîntat de „a da o replicã din interiorulcreºtinismului” – ºi cu finalitatea extrem de plãcutã de avinde într-o singurã lunã peste 6000 de exemplare dinrespectivul volum3.

Dar sã lãsãm pentru moment aspectul pecuniar (deºiacestuia i se datoreazã o parte din fascinaþia ce urmãreºtenu doar produsul ca atare al romanului, ci ºi diverselesub-produse asociate acestuia prin fenomenul „piggy-backing” – parazitism de marketing) ºi sã revenim la ceeace constituie, pare-se, circumstanþa agravantã a acestuia –ºi anume, caracterul blasfemiator la adresa religieicreºtine. Mai exact, nucleul dur al romanului, tezaacestuia, care în esenþã sunã cam aºa: întemeietorulcreºtinismului, Iisus Hristos, ar fi fost un om obiºnuit,care s-a cãsãtorit cu Maria Magdalena ºi a avut copii,urmaºii acestora supravieþuind pînã în prezent.

Rezumatã astfel, teoria „brownianã” pare într-adevãrsã ultragieze simþul comun al credinciosului obiºnuit.Dar… existã mai mulþi astfel de „dar”.

Este Codul un plagiat sofisticat?

Mai întîi, cã teza respectivã nu e nouã, ci reprezintãmai degrabã un cliºeu pentru cei familiarizaþi culiteratura de tip ezoteric. I s-au gãsit, de altfel, numeroaseversiuni4, ceea ce a dus pînã la acuze de plagiat adresateautorului. Respectivele acuze, în opinia noastrã, nu sejustificã, pentru cã, pe de o parte, autorul îºimenþioneazã sursele, unde e cazul, iar pe de altã parte,genul ficþional al romanului nu se supune rigorilorbibliografice ale literaturii ºtiinþifice. Altminteri, un altautor, cu mult mai celebru, care scrie un roman oarecumapropiat ca atmosferã ºi intrigã (este drept, la un nivel desofisticare superior) – desigur, vorbim aici de UmbertoEco ºi al sãu Pendulul lui Foucault – ºi care menþioneazãîn egalã mãsurã respectiva erezie (alãturi de multe altele)s-ar vedea pus la rîndul sãu în situaþia de a-ºi justificacele scrise.

Probabil însã cã respectiva alãturare îi va umple deoroare pe cititorii „puriºti”, adepþi ai valorii esteticenecontaminate de comercial; de altfel, într-o paralelã voitsugestivã (din pãcate, trãdînd mai degrabã un nefericitumor involuntar), se poate citi în grupajul dejamenþionat din Adevãrul cã: „Dan Brown e, faþã demodelul Umberto Eco, ceea ce este Vadim Tudor faþã deAdrian Pãunescu”5 (sic!). Însã nu ne-am propus sãrealizãm aici un clasament de bunã purtare pentruautori; dacã sîntem consecvenþi, din punct de vederestrict al conþinutului, cu ce e mai puþin anticreºtinãcartea lui Umberto Eco decît cea a lui Dan Brown?! Maiales cã, date fiind prestigiul ºi reputaþia de care se bucurãprimul, „circumstanþa agravantã” ar trebui sã atîrne maidegrabã de partea acestuia.

Key words:

Dan Brown, religiousness,Maria Magdalena,feminism, Mel Gibson,plagiarism, the Passionsof Christ

30J S R I • N o. 11 / Summer 2 0 0 5

„Prezumþia de vinovãþie” a falsitãþii

Mai apoi, se pune întrebarea în ce mãsurã o tezãromanescã poate fi evaluatã în paradigma „adevãr/ fals”ºi în ce mãsurã ea iese din aceastã paradigmã. Estelimpede cã diverºii autori de tipul lui James L. Garlow &Peter Jones nu ºi-au pus nici un moment o astfel deproblemã, cu toþii încercînd sã demonstreze „falsitatea”romanului ºi a diferitelor sale piste ºi surse. Ca o culme aparoxismului acestui gen de întreprinderi, meritãmenþionat faptul cã, în oraºul natal al lui Leonardo daVinci, romanului i s-a intentat chiar un proces de falsitate(doar cu acuzatori, fãrã apãrãtor!)6.

În acest caz, s-ar putea susþine cã funcþioneazã„prezumþia de vinovãþie”, deoarece, în locul obiºnuituluidisclaimer care apare la operele de ficþiune, de tipul:„Toate personajele ºi faptele prezente în aceastã operãsînt fictive. Orice asemãnare cu realitatea este purîntîmplãtoare”, autorul plaseazã chiar pe primele paginiun avertisment în care se susþine opusul: „Toate operelede artã, obiectivele arhitecturale, documentele ºiritualurile secrete menþionate în aceastã carte sînt reale”.

Cu alte cuvinte, ºi ca un posibil rãspuns la întrebareade mai sus, rãspunsul ar fi: da, este legitim de analizatromanul în cadrul paradigmei „adevãrat/ fals”, deoareceînsuºi autorul, prin intermediul propriilor sale spuse, îºiplaseazã cartea în centrul acestei paradigme.

ªi totuºi, lucrurile sînt mai nuanþate decît pare sãrezulte din acest raþionament. Sã luãm un alt exemplu,pentru lãmurire. Nimeni nu poate nega faptul cã auexistat regele Franþei, Ludovic al XIV-lea, cardinalulRichelieu ºi ducele Buckingam. Acestea sînt personajereale, cu acte în regulã, consemnate istoric înnenumãrate documente. Ele sînt, suplimentar, ºipersonaje de roman binecunoscute, graþie talentuluiunui autor (ce-i drept, pe vremea respectivã nu existatermenul de best-seller), ºi anume Alexandre Dumas.

Acest fapt nu le ºtirbeºte existenþa istoricã, dar nici nu olegitimeazã pe cea a lui d’Artagnan, ca sã luãm numelecelui mai cunoscut dintre muºchetari. Personaje realepot coexista în deplinã armonie cu personaje fictive; defapt, s-ar putea spune cã ele împrumutã celor din urmãun fel de „halou de realitate”, ceea ce faciliteazã„îngurgitarea” firului narativ. Cu alte cuvinte, AlexandreDumas ar fi putut sã scrie, la începutul romanelor sale,la fel de bine, cã „toate personajele istorice menþionateîn aceastã carte sînt reale”. Însã nimeni nu e aºa denebun ca sã-l acuze pe Dumas cã vrea sã rescrie istoriaFranþei ºi a Angliei datoritã faptului cã-l amestecã ped’Artagnan în niºte intrigi care nu au existat niciodatã.

La fel stau lucrurile, în opinia noastrã, ºi în cazul luiDan Brown. Desigur, existã tabolurile lui Leonardo daVinci ºi catedralele menþionate în Codul lui Da Vinci.Existã ºi organizaþiile menþionate de lucrarea sa. Nu sepoate însã susþine cã interpretãrile ºi intrigile elaboratede Dan Brown în jurul unor persoane ºi opere reale aualt caracter decît fictiv. Ceea ce le plaseazã, dintr-o datã,dincolo de paradigma obiºnuitã a adevãrului ºi falsului.

S-ar putea obiecta cã, pe tot parcursul romanului,personajele principale – ºi în special Robert Langdon,alter ego-ul autorului – se comportã ca ºi cînd ar aveaconvingerea cã tezele pe care le susþin sînt adevãrate.Dar, ca sã revenim la paralela noastrã: lasã vreunmoment impresia d’Artagnan cã ar avea îndoieli asupraadversarilor cu care dueleazã?!

Cine a fost Maria Magdalena?

Unii însã vor spune cã paralela aceasta nu rezistã dinalte motive: personajul d’Artagnan este completinofensiv ºi faptele sale nu impieteazã în nici un felasupra istoriei reale a Franþei, nici mãcar în ipoteza

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absurdã în care ar fi adevãrate. În schimb, tezeleprezentate de Dan Brown sînt extrem de periculoase ºiimpieteazã asupra istoriei bisericii creºtine, chiar dacãsînt false7.

Ce anume stã la baza acestor teze, pentru a fi atît dedetestabile în ochii celor care le condamnã, ne-o spunechiar autorul: încercarea de reabilitare, împotriva uneiistorii de douã milenii, a sacrului feminin. Dat fiind cãtentativa sa se desfãºoarã în cadrul teologiei creºtine,personajul principal asupra cãruia se concentreazãeforturile sale este Maria Magdalena, presupusã a figuraîn tabloul lui da Vinci, Cina cea de tainã. Ceea ce susþineel despre acest personaj este, nici mai mult nici maipuþin, decît cã ar reprezenta adevãratul „Sfînt Graal”,fiind purtãtoarea descendenþei lui Iisus. Dupã moarteaacestuia pe cruce, ea ar fi plecat în secret în Galia (Franþade astãzi) unde ar fi nãscut o fiicã, Sarah – ai cãreidescendenþi ar fi inclus, între alþii, o serie dintre regiiFranþei. Autorul invocã în sprijinul tezelor sale parte dinscripturile apocrife descoperite la Nag Hammadi, ºirespectiv aºa-numita „Evanghelie dupã Maria”.

Dacã toate aceste amãnunte biografice sînt maidegrabã nesigure, foarte puþini fiind cei care se încumetãsã le susþinã ca fapte istorice8, existã o controversãrecentã legatã de figura Mariei Magdalena, exact încontextul surselor documentare menþionate mai sus –respectiv Codicele de la Nag Hammadi, descoperit înEgipt sau Evanghelia dupã Maria, publicatã la Berlin în1955. Aceste controverse privesc însã mai degrabã roluljucat de Maria Magdalena în interiorul primei comunitãþicreºtine, încercînd un fel de reabilitare tardivã a acesteia.

Unii autori susþin cã acest interes recent pentru figuride tipul Mariei Magdalena din Noul Testament (sau allui Miriam, sora lui Moise, din Vechiul Testament) nuaduc nimic nou în privinþa datelor documentare, cireprezintã mai degrabã „un proiect pentru un anume tipde teorie feministã angajatã ideologic”9. Ceea ce se

urmãreºte prin acest proiect ar fi demonstrarea existenþeiunui conflict între bãrbaþi ºi femei în iudaism saucreºtinismul timpuriu, conflict care ar fi fost tranºat înfavoarea bãrbaþilor, ce ar fi fãcut tot posibilul pentruºtergerea urmelor în textele canonice (exemplu tipic dereacþie patriarhalã). În cazul lui Miriam, faptul cã ar fifost „profeteasã” de rang egal cu fratele ei; în cazulMariei Magdalena, faptul cã ar fi fost „apostolulapostolilor”, de importanþã egalã (dacã nu mai mare)decît Petru.

În opinia lui Kenneth L. Woodward, aceste teorii sîntgreu de susþinut în contextul studiilor biblice ºi ele relevãnu atît de vreun posibil adevãr istoric, cît de dorinþaautoarelor feministe de a-ºi regãsi temele favorite legatede critica patriarhatului în domeniul propriu de studiu.Mai mult, chiar, ele „ar fi sfîrºit prin a se identifica cuobiectul lor de studiu”, din prea mult ataºament faþã deacesta10.

În schimb, una dintre autoarele „învinuite”, KarenKing, profesoarã la Harvard Divinity School ºi autoare aunei cãrþi despre Maria Magdalena, considerã cã lucrurilestau oarecum diferit faþã de prezentarea fãcutã deWoodward. Ea aratã cã documentele de tipul Evanghelieidupã Maria ºi Codicele de la Nag Hammadi conduc la orevalorizare a importanþei pe care a jucat-o MariaMagdalena în societatea creºtinã timpurie. Fãrã a susþineteze de genul cãsãtoriei cu Iisus sau chiar de mamã acopiilor acestuia, care i se par dificil de demonstrat11,autoarea precizeazã cã imaginea Mariei Magdalena dinaceste noi surse diferã oarecum de cea din NoulTestament. Ele prezintã un personaj puternic, care,departe de a fi prostituatã, este discipola lui Iisus care l-aînþeles cel mai bine ºi pe care acesta a preþuit-o cel maimult (astfel explicîndu-se „favoarea” pe care i-o face,fiind prima cãreia i se aratã dupã înviere). O anumitãrivalitate trebuie sã fi existat între ea ºi Petru, însã aceastaeste departe de „rãzboiul” de care vorbeºte Woodward12.

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Probabil cã cea mai interesantã observaþie a autoareise leagã de faptul cã povestea Mariei Magdalena oferã oistorie alternativã a primelor secole creºtine, asemenidiferitelor Evanghelii care nu au fost incluse în textulcanonic al Noului Testament. Acest lucru nu le faceautomat „adevãrate”, adaugã Karen King, deoarece faptultrebuie validat de instituþia bisericeascã ºi de masacredincioºilor; însã oferã o perspectivã ineditã asupraunei pãrþi a istoriei creºtinismului, atunci cînd acesta nuîºi gãsise încã varianta „canonicã” (consfinþitã prinCrezul de la Niceea sau prin Noul Testament) ºi cînddiferitele interpretãri posibile nu deveniserã încã erezii13.

Religie, feminism, sacrul feminin

Personajul Maria Magdalena nu este la rîndul sãudecît una din ipostazele prin care s-a manifestat sacrulfeminin de-a lungul istoriei, mai vechi de douã milenii, areligiilor în general14. Cînd vorbeºte despre ea, ºi îngeneral despre sacrul feminin, autorul menþioneazãsimultan orientarea ideologicã ce ºi-a propus, în diversemoduri, sã conteste dominaþia masculinã în diverseleregistre ale societãþii – ºi anume, feminismul. Autorul nuezitã, de altfel, sã foloseascã propoziþii ce trebuie sã suneºocant pentru cineva care se situeazã în interiorul religieicreºtine, de tipul „Iisus a fost primul feminist din istoriaomenirii”15. Probabil cã acest lucru este unul dinmotivele pentru care cartea sa a fost întîmpinatã cu atîtde multã vehemenþã în mediile religioase, în special încele conservatoare.

Aceastã apropiere asumatã de feminism constituie,simultan, unul din punctele forte ale romanului, dar ºiuna din slãbiciunile sale. Punct forte: mai întîi, pentru cãautorul alege o orientare care îi oferã cadrul conceptualºi mijloacele cele mai potrivite necesare demonstrãrii

tezei sale (chiar dacã respectiva tezã este falsã, oricumfaptul în sine este secundar, aºa cum am încercat sãarãtãm prin discutarea ne-apartenenþei romanului laparadigma adevãr/ fals). Lucrul acesta apare cu evidenþã,dar nu este întotdeauna sesizat, deoarece puþini sîntfamiliarizaþi cu paradigmele teoretice feministe. Altfelspus, dacã cineva doreºte sã propunã o reinterpretare aistoriei (fie ea a religiei, sau a oricãrui alt domeniu) caresã revalorizeze valorile feminine, este obligat sã treacãprin aparatul conceptual al feminismului – fie ºi pentrusimplul motiv cã munca sa de documentare îi va ficonsiderabil uºuratã. În cazul de faþã, trimiterile la Zeiþã,revalorizarea pãgînismului, reinterpretarea personajelorfeminine din Biblie, menþionarea tradiþiilor tip Wicca,chiar ºi pasajele referitoare la androginie reprezintãlocuri comune în teologia, mai bine zis „thealogia”16

feministã, pe care cei familiari cît de cît cu domeniul levor recunoaºte imediat17.

În al doilea rînd, feminismul reprezintã un cadruconceptual foarte bun pentru o teorie de tipdeconstrucþionist în general (fie cã ea se referã sau nu lafemei). Mai bine spus, pornind de la modelul oferit defeminism, se poate elabora o criticã similarã a altorsisteme. Acest lucru face de altfel ca relaþia feminism-postmodernism sã fie simultan atît de strîns legatã, cît ºide contestatã18. În ce priveºte romanul, diversele privirideconstructive aplicate fie unor realizãri artistice (vezi depildã analiza tabloului Cina cea de tainã), fie unorsecþiuni întregi din istoria omenirii sînt extrem deexplicite pentru aceastã tendinþã. Suplimentar, se poateadãuga gustul (postmodern de astã datã) pentru ironie,anagrame ºi alte modalitãþi de deturnare ºi mascare asensului, chiar diversele mãºti pe care le poartã unelepersonaje (vezi cazul Învãþãtorului).

În al treilea rînd, anumite curente feministe sîntdestul de apropiate de teoria conspiraþionistã. Prin astanu trebuie sã se înþeleagã cã feminismul în ansamblu ar

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fi o teorie conspiraþionistã, însã anumite texte ºi anumiþiautori pot primi acest calificativ. O versiune sofisticatã amodelului conspiraþionist este oferitã chiar de lucrarealui Pierre Bourdieu, Dominaþia masculinã, unde nudoar sistemul social, dar chiar ºi sistemul posturilorcorporale (nu doar al dominanþilor, ci ºi al dominaþilor)trãdeazã „povestea conspirativã” a dominaþiei19. Înprivinþa cãrþii lui Dan Brown, se poate spune cã autorulexploateazã aceastã dispoziþie profund omeneascã de aimagina comploturi ºi scenarii neverosimile, pe careîntreaga istorie a încercat sã le camufleze.

În fine, ºi acesta ar fi un merit poate neintenþionat alcãrþii – ºi extrem-contextual, respectiv în þãrile mai puþinfamiliarizate cu ideile de tip feminist, cum este ºiRomânia – romanul reuºeºte sã popularizeze idei de tipfeminist mult mai eficient decît ar face-o o lucraredeclarat feministã. Datoritã etichetei de „best-seller”, ºidatoritã calitãþilor scriiturii extrem de accesibile aautorului, Codul lui Da Vinci „riscã” sã intre în case încare nimeni, niciodatã, nu va fi auzit de Betty Friedan20.În felul acesta, romanul lui Dan Brown capãtã un rolneintenþionat educativ, dar al cãrui potenþial nu trebuieneglijat.

Dar tot aici rezidã ºi pericolul ascuns (ºi din noucontextual, deci neintenþionat) al romanului: datã fiindmixtura de sentimente religioase care stã la bazanucleului acestuia, în cazul unei reacþii de respingere,aceasta se va rãsfrînge ºi asupra diverselor presupuseetichetãri ºi afilieri ale autorului însuºi: „american”,„liberal” ºi pe deasupra „feminist”. Mulþi neavizaþi vorrãmîne cu ideea fundamental greºitã cã a fi feministînseamnã, între altele, sã susþii cã Iisus s-a cãsãtorit cuMaria Magdalena (!). ªi pentru aceastã categorie decititori, chiar dacã vor mai auzi vreodatã de Betty Friedan,va fi prea tîrziu, pentru cã prejudecata ºi stereotipul sevor fi format deja.

Religiozitate ºi (auto) referenþialitate

În continuarea acestei analize, ne putem întoarceasupra a ceea ce, deºi ne-am propus sã lãsãm deoparte, arevenit constant, deºi insesizabil, de-a lungul întreguluidemers: ºi anume, faptul cã romanul este ceea ce secheamã un best-seller: respectiv se vinde foarte bine (25de milioane de exemplare traduse în 44 de limbi),producînd o mulþime de avantaje materiale autorului ºiîntregii industrii construite pe marginea sa21 ºi, prinaceasta, se rãspîndeºte în nenumãrate locuri, producîndefecte neaºteptate22.

Efectul este cel de bulgãre de zãpadã: cu cît romanuleste mai bine vîndut, cu atît presupusele sale consecinþe(pozitive sau nefaste) se rãsfrîng asupra unei categoriidin ce în ce mai extinse de persoane, afectîndu-le unoratemporar viaþa (se organizeazã deja pelerinaje Da Vinci laobiectivele turistice menþionate în roman, iar faniiurmãresc cu cartea în braþe traseele personajelor dincarte). În plus, diversele controverse iscate pe margineasa nu fac decît sã amplifice aceste efecte: scandalulreligios declanºat de unii clerici sporeºte curiozitateamarelui public care, din simplul motiv cã aflã cãrespectiva lucrare este rãu vãzutã în lumea bisericeascã,o cumpãrã ºi mai abitir. Iar în jurul cãrþii s-a creat deja oadevãratã plajã de sub-produse – de la site-uri peinternet, articole de ziare, artefacte, pînã la volumeîntregi – care, prin simpla asociere cu produsulcontestat, îºi mãresc circulaþia (vezi cazul cãrþilor de tipulCodul spart al lui Da Vinci, care îºi îmbogãþesc editorii),determinînd o creºtere în spiralã a popularitãþiirespectivului produs.

Aceastã referenþialitate – ºi auto-referenþialitate –promovate de întreaga reþea de produse ce se leagã într-un fel sau altul de roman este tipicã ideologieispectacolului cãrora se conformeazã produsele

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mediatice, respectiv efectului pe care, într-o lucrarerecentã, Umberto Eco îl denumeºte „Presa vorbeºtedespre presã”23. El vorbeºte despre un fenomen ce sepetrece pe plan mediatic ºi este lesne de sesizat chiar ºiîn contextul românesc (cutare personalitate face odeclaraþie într-un ziar; respectiva declaraþie e comentatãla douã posturi de televiziune; ziarele de a doua zi scriudespre comentariile de la TV, ceea ce provoacãdezminþirea la radio a respectivei personalitãþi º.a.m.d.):ºi anume perpetuarea (Eco o considerã artificialã) a unorevenimente prin simpla reflectare ºi re-reflectare înoglindã în mass media. De un astfel de efect de oglindireare parte ºi romanul lui Dan Brown, a cãrui popularitatesporeºte prin continua propagare a imaginii sale îndiverse medii. Am adãuga chiar cã diferenþele depercepþie ºi/sau perspectivã creeazã puncte de tensiunecare, sesizate de un ochi cunoscãtor, intrã la rîndul lor înspirala ascendentã a mediatizãrii, fiind potenþialexploatabile la infinit.

Care poate fi explicaþia pentru acest efect deoglindire, pînã la urmã pentru succesul acestui tip deroman? Pentru cã, dincolo de meritele incontestabile alescriiturii lui Dan Brown – alertã, mereu ironicã, cuschimbãri rapide de planuri ºi rãsturnãri de situaþii ce ofac, din start, ecranizabilã24 – este limpede cã„responsabilã” de cifra de vînzãri este în principal temaromanului ºi tot ghemul de controverse ºi complicaþii cepornesc de aici. O explicaþie francã, în stilul sãucaracteristic, o oferã Cristian Tudor-Popescu25: oameniicumpãrã Codul lui Dan Brown din acelaºi motiv pentrucare ºi-au luat bilet la Patimile lui Iisus al lui Mel Gibson:pentru cã vor sã afle ceva nou despre Iisus Hristos. Cualte cuvinte, dimensiunea religioasã a temei ar constituiprincipalul motiv al fascinaþiei pe care aceasta o creeazã.

Este limpede cã asistãm, la începutul acestui mileniu,la o revenire a religiozitãþii care cu greu poate fi explicatã

cu resursele disciplinelor tradiþionale – motiv cedeterminã, de altfel, constituirea unui nou domeniu,interdisciplinar, de analizã: studiile religioase. Cusiguranþã, teza secularizãrii societãþii, propusã în secolultrecut, se vede azi infirmatã, atît la modul violent, demiºcãrile integriste ºi fundamentaliste, cît ºi la modul laxºi difuz, de diversele miºcãri de reînnoire spiritualã genNew Age – ºi respectiv cu toatã gama de nuanþeintermediare între aceste douã tipuri. Un exemplu recental acestui interes determinat de religie, potenþat dedimensiunea globalizãrii, îl reprezintã manifestaþiile fãrãprecedent prilejuite de agonia ºi respectiv moartea PapeiIoan Paul al II-lea26.

Ceea ce caracterizeazã aceastã revigorare areligiozitãþii recente este aparenta sa dislocare în raportcu cea veche: cu vorbele lui Eliade, astãzi sacrul nu semai camufleazã în stîlpul din centrul cortului, ºi uneorinici în catedralele goale, ci în spectacolul telenovelelorsau în marile reprezentaþii prilejuite de meciurile de LigaCampionilor27. Pe un palier similar pot fi aºezate ºifenomenele mediatice de tip Codul lui Da Vinci sauPatimile lui Iisus.

Iisus între Codul lui Dan Brown ºiPatimile lui Mel Gibson

Însã ce anume au acestea douã în comun, dincolo detrimiterea (mai degrabã vagã în primul caz) laîntemeietorul creºtinismului – ºi respectiv de succesul decasã? În aparenþã, cele douã sînt mai degrabã opuse:dacã romanul lui Dan Brown se situeazã în extremacontemporaneitate, filmul lui Mel Gibson pretinde cãreconstruieºte, în mod istoric, ultimele 12 ore din viaþaMîntuitorului (anul 33 e.n.); primul e postmodern, ludic

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ºi parodic, celãlalt e grav pînã la grotesc, cãutîndveridicitatea pînã la numãrul de sfori din biciulromanilor.

Un prim element comun, aparent neaºteptat, esteacela cã, în ambele, personajul Iisus este denerecunoscut. Dacã acest fapt este evident în romanul luiDan Brown (unde Mîntuitorului îi este atribuitã cãsãtoriacu Maria Magdalena ºi respectiv ºirul de descendenþi ceduc pînã la regii Franþei), cum poate fi susþinut în cazulfilmului lui Mel Gibson, care pretinde cã reprezintã cumaximã exactitate personajul biblic? Cei care au vãzutînsã filmul ºi hectolitri de imitaþie de sînge folosiþi acolo,pot confirma cã imaginea personajului principalseamãnã prea puþin cu reprezentãrile cliºeizate, oarecumeterate, propagate de bisericã referitoare la acesta. Cualte cuvinte, ºocul de a-l vedea pe Iisus în posturã deSilvester Stalone, plin de sînge din vîrful firelor de pãrpînã la cãlcîie ºi încasînd pumni, bice ºi palme pe toatãdurata filmului, este cel puþin similar ºocului de adescoperi cã acesta ar fi putut avea urmaºi.

De aici rezultã un al doilea element comun: imensacontroversã pe care ambele le-au creat în cadrulbisericilor tradiþionale. Am amintit deja anatemasimbolicã azvîrlitã asupra Codului; în privinþa Patimilor,ele au provocat revolta mai puþin a bisericilor creºtine, cîta comunitãþilor evreieºti, care au sesizat prezenþa unorreplici ce justificau incriminarea întregului popor evreude moartea lui Iisus28. Cu alte cuvinte, religiozitateaprezentã în ambele este, dacã nu contestatã deschis, celpuþin suspectã din perspectiva discursului religiilortradiþionale.

Un al treilea element este reprezentat de potenþialulreligios inovator (intenþionat sau neintenþionat) pe carecele douã producþii mediatice îl creeazã. Dacã în cazulfilmului au fost discutate efectele asupra a numeroasepersoane care ºi-au relatat experienþele mistice

declanºate de acesta, în privinþa romanului se pot amintipelerinajele fãcute de fani la „locurile sacre” menþionateîn textul cãrþii: diversele obiective turistic-arhitecturale, dela Catedrala unde este înmormîntat Isaac Newton ºi pînãla muzeul Luvru29. Efectul iese, de fiecare datã, dincadrele religiozitãþii tradiþionale.

Mai departe, un alt element care face legãtura dintrereligiozitate ºi succesul de casã, este violenþa prezentã înambele: de la tonele de pumni, pietre ºi lovituri de biciîncasate de Hristosul lui Mel Gibson, pînã la cadavrelesemãnate de Silas ºi Teabing pe parcursul romanului.Violenþã care apare, în bunã tradiþie post-Oliver Stone,aproape gratuitã: dacã Iisus tot urmeazã sã fie crucificat,te întrebi de ce anume are nevoie regizorul sã-l aducã înstadiul de plagã deschisã pe tot corpul pînã la capãtulfilmului; la fel, o parte din omorurile din carte sîntconsiderate fãrã sens chiar de fãptuitorii lor, iar primasecvenþã, în care apare corpul despuiat ºi lipsit de viaþã allui Sauniere, mînjit de sînge ºi aºezat în ipostaza Omuluivitruvian, dincolo de mesajul încifrat pe care îltransmite, codificã exact genul de violenþã senzaþionalãpe care Hollywood-ul l-a fãcut atît de familiar. Motivul?Violenþa vinde foarte bine produsul mediatic – cu referirela succesul de casã al celor douã producþii. Celãlaltmotiv? În ambele cazuri, violenþa are conotaþii sacreevidente: dacã lucrurile nu au nevoie de explicaþie încazul filmului, poate nu e lipsit de interes de remarcatfaptul cã principalul fãptaº al crimelor din roman esteun membru al ordinului religios Opus Dei, care practicãsuplimentar ºi auto-violenþa (purtarea brîului cu spini ºiauto-flagelarea)30.

În strînsã legãturã cu tema violenþei se poateevidenþia o alta, conexã – rãzboiul dintre bine ºi rãu.Aceastã împãrþire clarã a personajelor din ambeleproducþii în douã tabere – pozitive ºi negative – estelimpede atît în cazul romanului (unde avem ca

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personaje „bune” pe Robert Langdom, Sophie Neveu,inspectorul Fache ºi personajele „rele”: Silas, episcopulAringarosa, Sir Teabing) cît ºi al filmului (undeportretizaþi pozitiv sînt Iisus, Maria, apostolii iarportretizaþi negativ apar evreii, romanii, Satana ºi,desigur, Iuda). Nu lipsesc rãsturnãrile de situaþie: SirTeabing, iniþial vãzut ca aparþinînd taberei „binelui” sedovedeºte în final a fi chiar capul taberei adverse;inspectorul Fache, care la început îi persecutã pe eroi, sereveleazã la final ca þinînd de tabãra cea bunã. Însã acestlucru nu schimbã cu nimic ierarhia prestabilitã, maidegrabã o întãreºte. Avantajele acestei lecturi în „alb-negru” sînt evidente: cititorii nu trebuie sã-ºi batã preatare capul cu dedesubturile personajelor; poziþia lor va ficlarã: ei „þin” instinctiv cu partea bunã ºi îi vor savuravictoria finalã. De altfel, impresionaþi de imaginile„rãzboinice” existente în filmul lui Gibson, unul dinanaliºtii sãi a comparat „rãzboiul” din film cu rãzboiulcontra teroriºtilor aflat pe ordinea de zi a societãþiiamericane dupã evenimentele din 11 Septembrie31.

În fine, fãrã a epuiza lista similaritãþilor, se poatespune cã ambele produse conþin premisele pentru oeventualã (ºi mult speratã) continuare. Mel Gibson îºipoate exersa talentul regizoral ºi efectele de make-up pefaptele apostolilor (masacrele acestora avînd unpotenþial de violenþã încã ne-explorat la adevãrata luivaloare de piaþã), iar Dan Brown a promis deja cã va„produce” o continuare, un indiciu pentru fanii amatoride enigme fiindu-le deja oferit pe coperta originalã aCodului. Trãim într-o erã a simulacrelor, anunþa dejaBaudrillard, iar semnul tipic al acestora este faptul cãsînt mereu multiple, cel puþin duble, mereu repetitive ºipredispunînd la continuãri, pastiºe ºi remake-uri32.Astfel, cele douã produse mediatice se înscriu în logicaculturalã a erei simulacrului, anticipîndu-ºi propriiledubluri.

***

Sã fie acestea cele mai potrivite chei de înþelegere aleromanului lui Dan Brown? ªi respectiv, combinaþiaplagiat-blasfemie-feminism-religiozitate new-ageistãreþeta succesului? Fãrã îndoialã, autorul ne va rãsplãti încurînd setea de curiozitate ºi de senzaþional cu un nou(previzibil) best-seller. Dar sã nu anticipãm. Dincolo deceea ce poate fi scris pe marginea ºi în rãspãrulromanului, cartea meritã cititã, mãcar pentru a înþelege,ca sã-l mai parafrazãm încã o datã pe Eco, „în ce cred ceicare nu (mai) cred”.

Notes:

37J S R I • N o. 11 / Summer 2 0 0 5

1 Citatele sînt extrase din grupajul de pe pagina 5 aAdevãrului, vineri, 13 mai 2005, grupaj initulat sugestiv:“Industria de tipizate literare a lansat un nou model desuccess: <<Codul lui Da Vinci>>”.

2 Remarcile aparþin Cardinalului de Genova TarcisioBertone, unul dintre apropiaþii Papei Ioan Paul al II-lea.În MSNBC News Services, “Cardinal’s Plea: Don’t read‘Da Vinci Code’. Theologian calls novel insulting ‘sackfull of lies’”, March 16, 2005. Online, http://www.msnbc.msn.com

3 Este vorba despre volumul “Codul spart al lui DaVinci” (autori: James L. Garlow ºi Peter Jones), recenttradus la editura Aqua Forte din Cluj. Informaþia a fostpreluatã din ziarul Clujeanul, 16-22 mai 2005, pp. 4-5.

4 În articolul apãrut în Clujeanul, “Miºcarea<<Brownianã>>”, Doru Pop enumerã cîteva dintre ele:cartea “Holy Blood, Holy Grail” (autori: Michael Baigent,Richard Leigh ºi Henry Lincoln); romanul lui NikosKazantzakis, “Ultima ispitire a lui Iisus Hristos” ºi filmulcu acelaºi nume a lui Martin Scorsese.

5 Remarca îi aparþine studentului Iancu Ion, autor alpanseului “Iisus, jucãria noastrã…”, apãrut în Adevãrul,vineri 13 mai 2005, p. 5.

6 Procesul a fost organizat de experþi în artã ºi clericiconsevatori. Cf. Camelia Ciobanu, Mona Bica, “NebuniaCodului lui Da Vinci”, în Ziua, 16 martie 2005. Online,http://www.9am.ro/revistapresei/Monden/6492/Nebunia-Codul-lui-Da-Vinci

7 Este poziþia editorului clujean al Codului spart allui Da Vinci, Voicu Bojan, care spune: “Dar nu poþi sãzici <<ªi ce-i cu asta!>>, fãrã sã vezi consecinþele petermen lung ale acceptãrii unor asemenea idei”. Peaceeaºi poziþie se situeazã ºi cardinalul Tarcisio Bertone,atunci cînd spune: „Nu putem pãstra tãcerea asupraadevãrului cînd sîntem puºi în faþa tuturor minciunilor ºiinvenþiilor din aceastã carte”. În MSNBC News Services,“Cardinal’s Plea: Don’t read ‘Da Vinci Code’. Theologian

calls novel insulting ‘sack full of lies’”, March 16, 2005.Online, http:// www.msnbc.msn.com

8 Una dintre aceºtia este Margaret Starbird, ale cãreilucrãri sînt citate în Codul lui Da Vinci.

9 Este opinia jurnalistului Kenneth L. Woodward, “AQuite Contrary Mary. Like Jesus, Mary Magdalene is nowthe subject of a cultural makeover. What agenda do femi-nist scholars have in mind?”. Online, http://www.beliefnet.com/story/131/story_13188_1.html

10 Ibidem.11 Vezi poziþia sa în cadrul unui documentar NBC, în

Stone Phillips, “Secrets behind ‘The Da VinciCode’Dateline travels throughout Europe to investigatebest-selling novel’s controversial claims”, April 20, 2005.Online, http:// www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7491383

12 Karen King, “Letting Mary Magdalene Speak. Tradi-tion is not fixed. Newly-discovered texts like the Gospelof Mary let us hear other voices in an ancient Christiandebate”. Online, http://www.beliefnet.com/story/131/story_13186_1.html

13 “Evanghelia dupã Maria ne permite sã auzim o altãvoce în dezbaterea anticã, ce a fost pierdutã pentruaproape 2000 de ani. Ne extinde înþelegerea asupradinamicii creºtinismului timpuriu, însã nu ne oferã ovoce dincolo de orice fel de criticism”. Karen King, ibi-dem.

14 Pentru o prezentare a istoriei sacrului feminin înmarile religii, vezi Catherine Clement, Julia Kristeva,Femeia ºi sacrul, Ed. Albatros, Bucureºti, 2001.

15 Dan Brown, Codul lui Da Vinci, Ed. RAO,Bucureºti, 2004, p. 265.

16 Dacã mai clasicul “theo-logie” provine dingrecescul “theos” (formã masculinã), compusul elaboratde feministe, “thea-logie”, este derivat din variantafemininã a acestui termen.

17 Pentru o trecere în revistã a relaþiei feminism-religie, vezi Mihaela Frunzã, “Feminitate ºi ocultism” , în

38J S R I • N o. 11 / Summer 2 0 0 5

Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies, nr. 5/summer 2003, pp. 127-142. Online, http://hiphi.ubbcluj.ro/JSRI

18 Deoarece postmodernismul, în viziunea unorfeministe, nu oferã motivaþii pentru a prefera un sistemnon-oprimant unuia oprimant.

19 Pierre Bourdieu, Dominaþia masculinã, Ed.Meridiane, Bucureºti, 2003.

20 Feministã de orientare liberalã, consacratã întimpul valului al doilea, cunoscutã în special pentrulucrarea sa The Feminine Mystique.

21 Cine cautã pe Google referinþe la roman va fiinundat de diverse site-uri pe teme conexe

– gen anagrame, tablourile lui Da Vinci ºi misterulcavalerilor templieri.

22 Un prieten american care lucreazã la un muzeu deartã ne-a povestit cã, prin simpla asociere cu Codul luiDa Vinci, una dintre conferinþele despre Leonardo daVinci gãzduite de respectiva instituþie s-a bucurat deprezenþa a cîteva sute de vizitatori, în locul celor cîtevazeci cu care erau obiºnuiþi.

23 Umberto Eco, “Despre presã”, în Cinci scrieri mo-rale, Ed. Humanitas, Bucureºti, 2005, p. 69.

24 Cartea va fi de altfel ecranizatã, în rolul principalfiind actorul Tom Hanks, ceea ce reprezintã deja un primindiciu cã succesul filmului va fi cel puþin comparabil cucel al romanului. O altã confirmare a efectului debulgãre de zãpadã despre care vorbeam mai sus.

25 Acesta susþine cã: “Cu cît Occidentul seîndepãrteazã în viaþa creºtinã de practica ºi teoriacreºtinã, cu atît creºte interesul pentru story-urilorchristice – vezi block buster-ul <<Patimile lui Iisus>>”.Cristian Tudor Popescu, în Adevãrul literar ºi artistic, nr.754, 8 februarie 2005.

26 Vezi pe aceastã temã articolul “Forþa religiei. Cîtevareflecþii pe marginea unui articol”, semnat de RodicaBinder în Dilema veche, nr. 69, 13-19 mai 2005, p. 24.

27 De altfel, Rodica Binder observã în articolul mai suscitat: “spiritul religios care pluteºte în aer, strãin dedogme ºi ritualuri, avînd acest incontestabil caracter par-ticular, individual, pare a se afla el însuºi în cãutareaunui adãpost, altul decît i-l pot oferi formeletradiþionale ale catolicismului, creºtinismului sauchiar, prin extrapolare, ale celorlalte confesiunimonoteiste“ (subl. n.).

28 Pentru o prezentare a dezbaterilor iscate de filmullui Mel Gibson în societatea americanã, în special încercurile evreieºti, vezi J. Shawn Landres and MichaelBerenbaum (eds.), After The Passion is Gone: AmericanReligious Consequences, AltaMira Press, Lanham MD,2004.

29 De asemenea, un politolog american, RichardWightman Fox, susþine cã romanul lui Dan Brown„speculeazã valul de repulsie împotriva corupþiei BisericiiCatolice”, încercînd sã exploateze dorinþa americanilorde a-l regãsi pe adevãratul Iisus, aºa cum a fost el”. Cf.Romulus Cãplescu, „Un fenomen numit Codul lui DaVinci (II)” în Adevãrul literar ºi artistic, 15 martie 2005,p. 14.

30 Despre legãtura sacru-violenþã, vezi Rene Girard,Violenþa ºi sacrul, Ed. Nemira, Bucureºti, 1995.

31 Este opinia lui Mark Juergensmeyer, autor întrealtele al unui volum despre evenimentele din 11Septembrie 2001. În acest caz, ne referim la articolul“The Passion of War”, în J. Shawn Landres and MichaelBerenbaum (eds.), After The Passion is Gone: AmericanReligious Consequences, AltaMira Press, Lanham MD,2004.

32 Vezi Jean Baudrillard, Simulacres et simulation,Minuit, Paris, 1987.

39J S R I • N o. 11 / Summer 2 0 0 5

În „Despre democraþie în America” Tocqueville esteun adevãrat susþinãtor al educaþiei instinctului politicindividual. Valoarea educativã a democraþieireprezentative constã în aceea cã ea introduce indivizii înviaþa politicã, provocând dezbateri ºi co-interesându-i înparticiparea la viaþa publicã. Remediul propus deTocqueville împotriva tendinþei de apatie politicã esteacela al separãrii puterilor, dar a unor puteri orientatespre susþinerea voinþei de libertate.

În jurul ideii de libertate se concretizeazã concepþiaprivitoare la relaþia dintre ordinea religioasã ºi ordineapoliticã. Pornind de la afirmaþia cã „orice om care acceptão opinie numai pe baza afirmaþiilor fãcute de cineva îºiînrobeºte spiritul”1, Tocqueville crede cã tipul deautoritate moralã ºi intelectualã este salutar pentrufaptul cã acordã individului puterea ºi rãgazul de a se

Ion Cordoneanu

Religie ºi Putere în America- de la Alexis de Tocqueville laadministraþia Bush jr. -

This text is meant to bring to the fore the connectionbetween politics and religion, as it was reflected intheory that Alexis de Tocqueville dealt to in his bookentitled „De la démocratie en Amérique”. In the sametime, it takes into consideration the well-knownmeeting between J. Habermas and J. Ratzinger(2004, January), which was carried out at theCatholic Academy in München. Here, a debateregarding the pre-political moral foundations of thestate took place.The interest in such a topic has streamed from whatsome people consider to be the „dogmatic-religiouspolicy” concerning social philosophy, which the BushAdministration put into practice.

Ion CordoneanuLecturer, Ph. D.Faculy of History andPhilosophy, „Dunãrea deJos” University, Galati,Romania

40J S R I • N o. 11 / Summer 2 0 0 5

sluji de libertate. Este conturatã încã de la început ideeaseparãrii celor douã arii pe care le guverneazã spiritulreligios ºi spiritul libertãþii: „Dând spiritului soluþia clarãºi precisã pentru un mare numãr de probleme metafiziceºi morale, importante ºi greu de rezolvat, religia îi dãputerea ºi rãgazul de a acþiona în liniºte ºi energic în totspaþiul pe care i-l lasã în seamã; spiritul uman a înfãptuitlucruri deosebit de importante în secolele de credinþã nuatât datoritã religiei cât libertãþii ºi calmului pe careaceasta i le-a dat”2.

Specificul religiozitãþii americane constã în aceea cãreligia nu mai este receptatã atât ca doctrinã revelatã,cât mai ales ca opinie comunã pe care majoritatea oasumã, scutind individul de obligaþia de a-ºi face pãreriproprii. Omnipotenþa politicã a majoritãþii nu sedatoreazã instituþiilor politice ci egalitãþii generate dedemocraþie, în condiþiile cãreia „domnia intelectualã acelor mulþi” este absolutã3.

Pentru funcþionarul Restauraþiei, problema nu estede a accepta existenþa autoritãþii intelectuale ci care îisunt limitele ºi cum funcþioneazã relaþia dintre religie ºiputere. El recunoaºte cã toate acþiunile umane suntdeterminate de idei generale despre Dumnezeu, neamulomenesc ºi îndatoririle cãtre semeni, idei care sunt sursacomunã absolut necesarã care îndepãrteazã îndoiala,neputinþa ºi hazardul din toate acþiunile umane. Ca ºi înpoliticã, oamenii sunt dezorientaþi, în lipsa uneiautoritãþi religioase, de independenþa nelimitatã ºilibertatea fãrã margini care li se deschide în faþaspiritului. De aici, convingerea cã „dintre toate credinþeledogmatice, cele mai de dorit mi s-au pãrut a fi credinþeledogmatice în materie de religie”4, aceasta chiar încondiþiile în care interesul nostru se îndreaptã exclusivcãtre aceastã lume.

În America, ordinea religioasã, diferitã de ordineapoliticã, nu a fost zdruncinatã iar legile au putut fischimbate cu uºurinþã. În plus, religiozitatea împreunã

cu obiceiurile naþionale concurã la alimentareasentimentului patriotic – de aici forþa ei. Dar, deºiputernicã în ordine spiritualã, religiozitatea americanã îºicunoaºte ºi impune singurã limitele; de aici puterea ei,alta decât cea politicã: „creºtinismul ºi-a pãstrat deci omare autoritate asupra spiritului americanilor ºi, ceea cevreau sã subliniez cu deosebire, el nu domneºte numaica o filozofie adoptatã dupã ce a fost examinatã ci ca oreligie în care crezi fãrã a o discuta”5. Examinatã dinperspectivã strict umanã, chestiunea relaþiei dintre religieºi putere ridicã întrebarea asupra modului cum sepãstreazã autoritatea religioasã în condiþiile funcþionãriidemocraþiei. Tocqueville observã, în acest sens, cã religiatrebuie sã activeze în limitele proprii, prin depãºireacãrora ºi-ar pierde credibilitatea6. Separarea foarte clarã asferei religiei de zona publicã mai presupune, dupãTocqueville grija ca, prin activitatea ei specificã, religia sãnu „ofenseze fãrã rost ideile general admise ºi intereselepermanente ale masei”7.

Condusã ºi respectând ideea cã majoritatea dominã,religia în America nu are amestec în politicã, dar acceptãopiniile generale ale timpului, fiind, la rândul ei,susþinutã de opinia publicã, prin forþa cãreia, laolaltã cucea a majoritãþii, se impune credinþa.

***

Spuneam, la început, cã ideea libertãþii este cea înjurul cãreia se concretizeazã concepþia privitoare larelaþia dintre ordinea religioasã ºi ordinea politicã.Trebuie sã remarc faptul cã atunci când scrie referitor laaceastã problemã, Tocqueville se referã, în special lacreºtinism, ºi cu precãdere la creºtinismul catolic.Afirmând cã „pe lângã fiecare religie existã o opinie

Key words:

Power, Habermas,Ratzinger, Alexis deTocqueville, religiouspluralism, democracy,religious minorities

41J S R I • N o. 11 / Summer 2 0 0 5

politicã care i se alãturã prin afinitate”8, Tocquevillecrede în capacitatea spiritului uman de a reuºi sãuniformizeze cele douã ordini, politicã ºi divinã, „sãarmonizeze cerul cu pãmântul”. Speranþa aceasta,aparþinând deopotrivã unei mentalitãþii restauratorii ºicredinþei milenarist – apocatastazice, este metamorfozatãde gânditorul politic în convingerea cã, în Lumea Nouã9

„de la început, principiul politic ºi religia au fost în acordºi de atunci n-au încetat sã fie”. De aceea Tocquevilleconsiderã creºtinismul american eliberat de autoritateapapalã, „democratic ºi republican”10.

Este evident cã faptul cã Tocqueville privilegiazã,între toate religiile, creºtinismul care „este cel maifavorabil libertãþii” ºi „egalitãþii”. Dar el admirã cuprecãdere catolicismul care, departe de a fi un inamic aldemocraþiei, este considerat cel mai favorabil egalizãriicondiþiilor (spre deosebire de protestantism, pentru carevaloare mai are independenþa decât egalitatea). Cum seîntâmplã ca cei mai fideli ºi zeloºi în credinþã sã fie ºi ceimai republicani ºi democratici? Explicaþia stã în modul încare este organizatã comunitatea religioasã catolicã(singur preotul este deasupra celorlalþi oameni) ºi înatitudinea faþã de dogmã ºi cult (nu se face diferenþa pecriterii profesionale, de avere sau de autoritate). Apoi,compatibilitatea dintre catolicism ºi democraþie sefundamenteazã ºi pe argumentele istorice care iau înconsiderare condiþia socialã precarã a credincioºilorcatolici, pe de o parte, ºi situaþia demograficã minoritarãîn care se aflã ei. În aceste condiþii, pentru ca ei sã ajungãla putere, trebuie ca toþi cetãþenii sã ajungã la putere; ºipentru ca sã-ºi poatã exercita drepturile, e nevoie sã fierespectate toate drepturile. În aceastã logicã apare ideeapluralismului religios care uzeazã de argumentul privinddrepturile unei minoritãþi religioase.

Dar pentru Tocqueville este mai importantcatolicismul în direcþia argumentãrii distincþiei ºiseparãrii sferei religioase de sfera puterii. Astfel, teoria

dublului adevãr care funcþiona în dogmatica romano-catolicã este transferatã în aria organizãrii democratice acetãþii, cu deosebirea cã raþiunea ºi autoritatea ei au fostaplicate dimensiunii politice a existenþei umane: „Preoþiicatolici din America au împãrþit sfera intelectualã în douãjumãtãþi: întruna au rãmas dogmele revelate cãrora li sesupun fãrã discuþie; în cealaltã u plasat adevãrul –politic, considerând cã acesta a fost abandonat deDumnezeu cãutãrilor libere ale omului”. Acest argumenteste hotãrâtor pentru ca Tocqueville sã conchidã cã ceide credinþã catolicã sunt, pe de o parte, supuºi dogmeireligioase ºi, pe de altã parte, cei mai independenþicetãþeni din lume11.

Separarea dintre religie ºi putere duce la conturarea,din perspectivã politicã, a noþiunii de religie civilã, înlegãturã cu care nu se pune problema adevãrului.Problema adevãrului este una individualã, în schimbpentru societate este important ca cetãþenii sã profesezeo religie, indiferent de adevãrul ei. Separatã de putere,religia nu exercitã vreo influenþã asupra legilor sau apoliticii în general, ci contribuie la odinea în stat prindirijarea moravurilor, orânduirea familiei ºi putereaasupra inteligenþelor. Orice aspect al vieþii private eradominat de convingerea religioasã. Dacã în viaþa publicãtotul este pus în discuþie ºi „pare abandonat dezbaterilorºi încercãrilor omeneºti”12, în lumea moralã totul estesigur pentru cã se fundamenteazã pe preceptelereligioase.

De pe aceste poziþii, Tocqueville criticã lipsa decredinþã a unor europeni (referindu-se, probabil lafrancezi) considerând-o îndobitocire ºi ignoranþã. Dacã înFranþa spiritul religios ºi spiritul libertãþii sunt contrare,în America ele, deºi (sau poate tocmai pentru cã)distincte, sunt intim legate. De aceea, legãtura dintrereligios ºi politic, pe de o patre, ºi separarea dintreBisericã ºi Stat, pe de altã parte, sunt considerate de

42J S R I • N o. 11 / Summer 2 0 0 5

Tocqueville cauzele esenþiale ale „stãpânirii calmeexercitate de religie”13.

ªi totuºi, mirarea gânditorului politic rãmâne: „cumde s-a putut întâmpla ca, diminuând forþa aparentã areligiei, sã i se sporeascã puterea realã”. Pãrãsindu-ºivocaþia universalã ºi aliindu-se cu puterea politicã, religiava avea, inevitabil, putere doar asupra unei pãrþi acomunitãþii, pierzându-ºi speranþa de a domni pesteîntregul corp eclezial. Acceptând sã se manifeste înlimitele puterii politice, religia pãrãseºte esenþa ei veºnicãºi rolul de a rãspunde unui interes veºnic ºi acceptã sã secontamineze de caracterul trecãtor al puterii pãmânteºti.Lecþia istoriei trebuie învãþatã foarte bine, cu atât maimult cu cât este o lecþie simplã: orice guvernarefundamentatã pe stãpânire ºi constrângere estetrecãtoare ºi „nu s-a vãzut niciodatã o guvernare care sãse sprijine pe o predispoziþie invariabilã a sufletuluiomenesc sau sã se întemeieze pe un interes veºnic”14.

***

„Religia […] trebuie sã fie consideratã prima dintreinstituþiile politice”15. Dupã 164 de ani de la scriereavolumului 2 al Democraþiei în America, avea loc laAcademia Catolicã din München întâlnirea cu tema„Fundamentele morale pre-politice ale statului de drept”dintre Ratzinger ºi Habermas16. Dupã mai bine de unsecol ºi jumãtate (de când Tocqueville scria cã religia,chiar dacã nu dã ea gustul libertãþii, mãcar uºureazãfolosirea ei), umanitatea parcã s-a oprit sã meditezeasupra destinului ei, ºi asta într-un timp de mari tensiunispirituale ºi politice care au în spate proiectecontinentale sau mondiale. La aceastã întâlnire, esenþialãpentru istoria mileniului al treilea, nu s-a susþinut (nici

nu era cu putinþã) cã „religia este necesarã pentrumenþinerea instituþiilor republicane” (Tocqueville), darpunctul de vedere comun emis acolo a privit religia cadiscurs, respectiv ca fenomen social extrem deimportante ale cãror drept de existenþã ºi manifestaresunt esenþiale pentru societatea democraticã.Condamnarea celor care vor sã impunã tãcerediscursului religios ºi afirmarea neutralitãþiiconstituþionale ºi a toleranþei (Habermas) se întâlneºte,din direcþia opusã, cu semnalul referitor la necesitatearecorelãrii religiosului cu raþionalul ºi la reclamarea (îndiscursul de investiturã ca Papã) a „tiranieirelativismului”17.

Cert este cã se impune în mediile intelectuale areEuropei ºi Americii rediscutarea rolului dimensiuniireligioase a existenþei umane într-o societate democraticãîn care valorile toleranþei ºi a respectului pentrualteritate trebuie sã fie nu doar „flautus vocis”. Plecândde la îngrijorarea exprimatã de cardinalul Ratzingerreferitoare la pericolele izvorâte dintr-o înþelegere laicã avieþii, trebuie formulatã întrebarea dacã o anumeînþelegere ºi practicare a libertãþii (în plan ºtiinþific,moral, politic) nu costã prea mult destinul umanitãþii. ªicât de naivã ni se pare acum remarca lui Tocquevilleconform cãreia „pânã în prezent n-am întâlnit pe nimeniîn Statele Unite care sã îndrãzneascã sã afirme maxima cãtotul e permis în numele societãþii”18. În atari condiþii, nuºtiu cum s-ar putea interpreta mãsura AdministraþieiBush jr. de a restricþiona accesul la fonduri a unorproiecte propuse de ONG-uri care promoveazã odatã cucombaterea HIV, legalizarea prostituþiei19. Faptul cãAdministraþia de la Washington promoveazã abstinenþa ºifidelitatea ar fi privit de Tocqueville drept o curiozitate:nu ar înþelege de ce valori ca acestea trebuie sã intre însfera preocupãrilor politice. Evident cã statul ar trebui sãfie neutru în materia religioasã, dar s-ar putea replica: nudespre o chestiune religioasã este vorba, ci despre

43J S R I • N o. 11 / Summer 2 0 0 5

îngrijorarea autoritãþii politice referitoare la fenomenecare duc la disoluþia societãþii. Nu ºtiu cât de practice ar fialte soluþii precum dezincriminarea prostituþiei20 ºi nicinu cred cã este vorba despre o politicã dogmatic-religioasã în chestiuni de filozofie socialã. Cred doar,împreunã cu Tocqueville, cã libertatea nu poate figânditã independent ºi împotriva unei evaluãri dinperspectivã religioasã. Altfel ar fi nevoit sã vadã cã zelulreligios nu se mai poate încãlzi la flacãra patriotismului21

ºi sã constate cã existã contradicþii între legea carepermite poporului american sã facã orice ºi religia care îlîmpiedicã sã conceapã totul ºi îi interzice sã îndrãzneascãorice22.

Vizitând America (1830-1832), Tocqueville observa cãcei care (mai) cred (dintre francezi) „au vãzut cã în patrialor, omul ºi-a folosit în primul rând independenþapentru a ataca religia, se tem de contemporanii lor ºi seîndepãrteazã înspãimântaþi de libertatea pe care aceºtiaºi-o doresc”. Este expresia unui impas, sesizat cu multînaintea noastrã, dar pe care noi îl trãim, uneori îlexperimentãm, fiind nevoiþi sã renegãm din când încând, în numele unor valori incerte, propria umanitatepe care, într-un viitor nu prea îndepãrtat, s-ar putea sãnu mai fim în stare s-o recunoaºtem.

Note

1. Alexis de Tocqueville, Despre democraþie înAmerica, Humanitas, 1995, vol. 1, p. 15. de acum, în textDA, 1.

2. DA, 1, p. 15.3. Tocqueville prevede chiar cã „opinia generalã va

deveni o religie al cãrei profet va fi majoritatea” (DA, 1, p.17). De altfel, în legãturã cu receptarea religiei ca opinie

comunã, este interesant de ºtiut cã formula „In God wetrust” ar putea fi cititã ca o formulã strict religioasã, darea se asociazã cu dimensiunea fundamentãrii pactuluisocial aºa cum a fost el definit de John Locke. Termenul„trust” (încredere), utilizat în context politic,caracterizeazã legãtura dintre cei care guverneazã ºi ceiguvernaþi (http://eduscol.education.fr/index.php?./D0126/fait_religieux_monnanteuil.htm). Totuºi, Tocquevilleexplicã religiozitatea americanã ºi din perspectivãistoricã, arãtând cã pe continentul american nu a avutloc o revoluþie democraticã, aºa cum s-a întâmplat înEuropa (cazul Franþei este cel mai evident) unde vecheautoritate ºi credinþe religioase s-au tulburat.

4. DA, 1, p. 26.5. DA, 1, p. 12.6. Fãrã a ignora cã, de-a lungul istoriei lui,

creºtinismul a fost ºi el instrumentalizat politic, sunt deacord cu remarca autorului conform cãreia, spredeosebire de Islam, unde maximele politice, legile civile,penale sau teoriile ºtiinþifice îºi gãsesc locul alãturi deprincipiile religioase, Evanghelia, în principiile eiesenþiale, se preocupã doar de „raporturile generale aleoamenilor cu Dumnezeu ºi cu ei înºiºi” (DA, 1, p. 29). Dela aceastã observaþie, Tocqueville aratã incompatibilitateaIslamului cu democraþia ºi prevede perpetuareacreºtinismului în societãþile democratice.

7. DA, 1, p. 33.8. DA, 2, p. 367.9. Lumea Noului început, în termenii lui Mircea

Eliade, trebuia sã se fundamenteze pe o nouã religie, cucaracter pronunþat civil, de orientare catolicã, al cãreiviitor, în Lumea Veche a Europei fusese retezat. S-arputea argumenta, dar nu e locul, ideea cã gândireapoliticã a lui Tocqueville are un pronunþat caracterprofetic, un profetism politic ale cãrui rãdãcini sunt, înfapt, religioase.

44J S R I • N o. 11 / Summer 2 0 0 5

10. Cu Tocqueville, în prima jumãtate a secolului alXIX-lea ºi dupã Conciliul II Vatican, este rezolvatã, dinperspectivã teoreticã problema compatibilitãþii dintredemocraþia liberalã ºi catolicism, iar cu Max Weber estedemonstratã legãtura dintre etica protestantã ºi capital-ism. Problema teoreticienilor de azi ai politicului estedacã o valoare ºi o „invenþie” occidentalã (drepturileomului ºi democraþia) sunt compatibile cu religiile dinafara spaþiului euro-atlantic (creºtinism ortodox, islam,budism, confucianism).

11. DA, 2, p. 369.12. DA, 2, p. 372.13. DA, 2, p. 376. Cu tristeþe, între altele fie spus,

poate cã aceasta este lecþia pe care ar trebui sã odescopere ierarhia BOR: „I-am vãzut desprinzându-se cugrijã de toate partidele ºi evitând orice contact cu patimainteresului personal” (DA, 2, p. 377).

14. DA, 2, p. 379.15. DA, 2, p. 373.

16. Textele celor douã intervenþii în „Zur Debatte”,no. 1, 2004, München, 2004.

17. vezi ºi comentariul lui Virgil Nemoianu, Religios ºilaic în registru filosofic, în „Adevãrul literar ºi artistic”,nr. 769, 24 mai 2005.

18. DA, 2, p. 373.19. vezi Gabriel Andreescu, Tema prostituþiei în

România ºi Administraþia Bush, în „Ziua”, 5 mai, 2005.20. Susþinãtorii acestor practici prezintã argumente

de genul „dreptul de a uza de propriul corp”.21. DA, 2, p. 374.22. DA, 2, p. 373.

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Introduction

Following the American religious revivalism in theSecond Great Awakening period between the 1790s andthe 1830s in New England, New Hampshire and ruralConnecticut, not only many conservative Yale Seminarygraduates started to become ministers to expandreligious fundamentalism to the easternmost regions ofthe U.S., but also a bunch of regional missionary,benevolent and moral and religious reform associationswere established to spread various walks ofProtestantism towards the West. Methodist, Baptist andPresbyterian missionaries organized countless missionsfor American Indians in the Western half of the UnitedStates during the period; the Baptists increased the totalChurch membership from approximately 65.000 in 1796to 814.000 in 1844.1

Recep Boztemur

Religion and Politics in theMaking of American Near EastPolicy, 1918-1922

Recep BoztemurAssist. Prof. Dr., MiddleEast Technical University,Department of History, andMiddle East Studies,Ankara, Turkey. Co-authorof the book: Yüzyýl(Century), 1899-1999(2000). E-mail:boztemur@metu.edu.tr

This study deals basically with the combination of religion

and politics in American foreign policy in the Near East in

the immediate aftermath of the First World War. The

diplomatic activities regarding the protection of American

religious, educational, philanthropic institutions, the safety

of American interests and missionary activities and the

safeguarding of a future for the Ottoman Armenians are

examined in two parts: the first dealing with the spread of

Protestant missionary activities in the Ottoman Empire,

and the second, coping with the US political struggle for

protecting American political, religious and commercial

interests during the Paris Peace Conference through an

analysis of diplomatic correspondence in the US archives.

46J S R I • N o. 11 / Summer 2 0 0 5

In the beginning of the Awakening, the missionaryactivity in the U.S. looked like a civilizing mission of themiddle class people of New England for the people who,the evangelical Christians thought, were culturally,socially and economically different from themselves.However, the missionary activity soon turned to anevangelical zeal, the aim of which was to providereligious services and spread Christianity to the otherpeoples of the world. The American religious revivalismdeveloped with the help of the religious ideology that theUS were the chosen as the territory for the Protestants tobe settled and to spread their denominations to the non-Christian peoples around the world. The LondonMissionary Society established with the ideology ofAmerican Puritanism in 1795 to evangelize India wasfollowed by societies, associations and institutions inNew York in 1796, Connecticut in 1798 and inMassachusetts in 1799 for the expansion of revivalistChristianity by evangelical churches and schools. Themerge between societies produced in 1826 the AmericanHome Mission Society in New York; and American BaptistHome Mission Society in 1832 in Oregon and New York.In 1809 the London Society for Promoting Christianityamong the Jews had a primary goal of expandingProtestantism among the Jews in the Holy Land.2 Themissionary activity was strengthened by theestablishment in 1810 of a Congregationalist-Presbyterian society, the American Board ofCommissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM). TheBoard funded by the US governments “civilization fund”worked not only to evangelize Native Americans but alsoorganized missions to India, China, Ceylon and theMiddle East to expand Protestantism as well as Americancommercial activities.

The US policy of expanding the American sphere ofinfluence was basically founded on utilizing the civic,religious and philanthropic institutions in accordance

with the American interests throughout the world.American political, economic and/or commercial interestswere to be represented, furthermore developedworldwide by the missionary organizations, which in turnwere to be protected by the US diplomatic activities andpolitical protection. Another dimension of providingdiplomatic security to American interests throughout theworld was to offer protection to the communities thatwere available for carrying out the necessary functions ofUS policies abroad. Therefore, the minority communitieshere and there were attracted to the US interests by theProtestant missionary activities, which became one of thekey instruments of American diplomacy.

This study deals basically with the combination ofreligion and politics in American foreign policy in theNear East in the immediate aftermath of the First WorldWar. The diplomatic activities regarding the protection ofAmerican religious, educational, philanthropicinstitutions, the safety of American interests andmissionary activities and the safeguarding of a future forthe Ottoman Armenians are examined in two parts: thefirst dealing with the spread of Protestant missionarypursuits in the Ottoman Empire, and the second, copingwith the US political struggle for protecting Americaninterests through an analysis of diplomaticcorrespondence in the US archives.

I. Religion: The Expansion ofAmerican Evangelism in the 19th andthe Early 20th Centuries in theOttoman Empire

The arrival of the US Protestant missionaries to theMiddle East in 1820 added yet another component to the

Key words:

religion, politics,American foreign policy,the Near East, diplomaticcorrespondence,Ottoman Americans, FirstWorld War

47J S R I • N o. 11 / Summer 2 0 0 5

religious mixture of the Ottoman Empire. The socialorganization of the Ottoman Empire was based on therecognition of each religious community within its placevis-à-vis the state, and Christian communities, whetherCatholic or Orthodox, had their autonomy in theirinternal affairs as the Muslim and Jewish communities.The Catholic missionaries, the Jesuits and Franciscans,were active starting from the 16th century especially in theLevant until 1773 when the Jesuit order was dissolved.While the influence of Catholic missions continued toremain limited due to the conflict between Catholic andGregorian sects, the Protestant missionary activity aimedto expand not only individual Protestant piety, but alsoto increase the Anglo-Saxon influence over the religionand culture of societies abroad. Therefore, Catholicchurches and the Orthodox Patriarchate in the OttomanEmpire reacted against the work of Congregationalistmissionaries and produced traditional churches’ andCatholics’ pressure over the state to limit (and if theycould do so, to prevent) Protestant impact over theirrespective communities. However, the Protestantmissionaries had more that religious aims; they had thegreatest impact over Ottoman Christian populations.

The Americans presented Protestantism in asimplified manner excluding the rites, rituals and the useof charms and relics. In lieu of unintelligible language ofthe traditional churches, the American interpretation ofChristianity was based on the use of the Bible in thevernacular language of the Middle Eastern communities.The missionaries excluded the use of traditionalmaterials in the worship as well as de-emphasized theclerical hierarchy by ruling out the monopoly oftraditional clergy in their churches. They started toevangelize the Nesturians, Greek Orthodox, Assyrians,and especially Gregorian and Orthodox Armeniancommunities. The priests, bishops, archbishops andpatriarchs of the Ottoman communities considered the

American Protestantism as a threat to their own powerand authority over their own church members.3 Despitethe failure of American missionaries in convertingOrthodox Christians to Congregational Protestantismdue to the conflict between the clergies of eachdenomination, the Protestant Church was accepted asanother “millet” (community) by the Ottoman authoritiesin 1850.4 The ABCFM’s evangelical activity in theOttoman Empire produced, in 1906, 520 Protestants inJerusalem, 956 in Damascus, 2128 in Beirut, 13.144 inAleppo, a significant number of which comprised theconverted Armenian population.5

The re-institution of Catholic missionary in theOttoman Empire through opening up of the schools likeUniversité Saint Joseph led the Protestant missionaries toconcentrate their efforts on the emancipation of Catholic,Orthodox and Gregorian Christians of the OttomanEmpire from their own churches’ pressures and on theliberation and “enlightenment” of these communities.Also these efforts coincided well with the Ottomanattempts at educational modernization mostly in Frenchmanner and in French medium, and the AmericanProtestants started to focus on the field of education tochallenge the Catholic missionaries’ activities over theOttoman Christians. The initial settlements of theAmerican Protestant missionaries, Izmir, Istanbul andBeirut became educational centers for newly-establishedProtestant communities. The basic administrative andfinancial support for the American schooling andphilanthropic activities in the Ottoman territories camefrom the American Evangelical societies. The ABCFM, theAmerican Baptist Missionary Church, Bible Society,Presbyterian Board of Commissioners for ForeignMissions, American Tract Society, YMCA and theEpiscopal Missionary Church were among the many toestablish and rule American educational, benevolent andphilanthropic societies in Turkey. The advantage of the

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Protestant missionaries over other missionary activitiesstemmed from the fact that the American missionariesacted not only in the expansion of Protestantism but alsothe expansion of an American life-style through manyinstitutions including hospitals and medical centers,orphanages, educational institutions for the adults,Sunday schools in their churches and many socialactivities like informal meetings and sermons.6 Themissionary activities were organized in three basic areas,education, publication and health services, each of whichwas carefully coordinated. The Protestant missionariescreated a special system of education for the OttomanChristian missionaries by opening up the first Protestantschool in 1824 in Izmir. The number of the missionaryschools was soon to reach 71 in 1860, 331 in 1900 and450 in 1913. The number of students in Protestanteducational institutions rose from 2742 in 1860 to25.922 in 1913.7 The Protestant education was extendedto the Ottoman Christians, basically to the OttomanArmenians, for several reasons: the missionary educationat the primary and secondary levels required teachers forhigher missionary education and local clerics forProtestant churches. But, more important than that, themissionary education was to spread Protestantism and aspiritual way of life among the local communities as wellas to respond their demands for upbringing educatedand qualified youngsters who would have the word in thenational development of their communities. The firsthigher education institution, the Robert College, thoughnot directly belonged, but strongly related to the ABCFM,was established in Istanbul in 1863, followed by theSyrian Protestant College in Beirut in 1866.8 Theseschools were managed by a Board of Directors,composed by the businessmen, US and British consuls,and Protestant missionaries and the members of localArmenian churches; ruled by the local ArmenianProtestants as in the case of the Central Turkey College

and the Armenia (then Euphrates) College, and servedmostly to the Armenian community in the OttomanEmpire.9 The American Protestant missionaries weredefinitely successful in spreading literacy among theOttoman Christians. Almost half of the immigrants (46.7%) from Syria to the US between 1899 and 1910 had theireducation in Protestant missionary schools. In 1912,there were 133.100 students in Armenian schools ruledby the Armenian Patriarchate with the help of theAmerican missionary schools.10

The missionary activities and the American concernfor the protection of the Ottoman Armenian communitybecame basic obstacles in naturalizing the relationsbetween the US and modern Turkey after the First WorldWar. Added to the already available difficulties were theworks of the Armenian groups established in the US forfurthering the Armenian cause in the Ottoman territories.The American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Reliefwas established in 1915 for raising funds for the refugeesin the Anatolian countryside. The Committee adopteditself to the missionary activities and carried out apropaganda campaign favoring the Armenians,disfavoring the Turks, and protecting Americancommercial and philanthropic interests in the Near East.Supported by the former US ambassador to Istanbul,Henry Morgenthau Sr., the Committee became the NearEast Relief to serve the Armenians and to advanceAmerican and Armenian causes in Turkey.11 In the sameperiod, some US-based organizations such as ArmeniaAmerica Society and American Committee for theIndependence of Armenia were working to secure anAmerican mandate over the Ottoman Armenians, and ifpossible Turkey, while the diplomatic activities werecarried out to protect the economic and commercialrights and privileges of American individuals andcompanies in Turkey. The American policies were madein the post-War period in such a mixture of concerns.

49J S R I • N o. 11 / Summer 2 0 0 5

II. Politics: Armenian Question and theU.S. Near Eastern Policy

Diplomatic relations between the United States andthe Ottoman Empire, which started with a comprehensivetrade agreement in 1830, were interrupted on April 20,1917 with the U.S.’ declaration of war on Germany, theOttoman partner in the World War I. However, the U.S.did not proclaim war against the Ottoman Empirebecause of a vigorous concern of protecting the interestsof American commercial enterprises, and missionary,educational and philanthropic investments in theEmpire. Even after the declaration of war againstGermany, the U.S. policy-makers were in favor ofmaintaining good relations with the Ottoman Empire.The former ambassador to Istanbul, Morgenthau metwith Lansing, the Secretary of State, and convinced himthat Turkey might reach a separate agreement with theAllies because of bitter disagreement between Turkeyand her German masters. President Wilson, approvingthe idea of maintaining the relations, decided to sendMorgenthau to Palestine to investigate the situation ofthe Ottoman Jews. Since Morgenthau’s mission requiredthe participation of Jewish leaders, the BritishGovernment was asked for the participation of Dr. ChaimWeizmann in the mission. However, Lord Balfour, theBritish Foreign Secretary did not want to solve thePalestinian problem without complete defeat of theOttoman Empire and gave Weizmann the duty ofconvincing Morgenthau to abandon his investigationproject.12 The British, depending on their secretagreements with France, Italy and Russia over thepartition of the Ottoman Empire during the war,naturally were not in favor of the U.S. intervention in theNear Eastern question.13

After the Axis lost the War, it was decided by theMudros Armistice on October 30, 1918 that all Ottomanpossessions in Arabia, Syria, Iraq and Africa were to beplaced under Allied military control, the Straits were tobe open and all fortifications to be occupied by the Allies,who also had the right to occupy any strategic pointagainst any threat to Allied security.14 In fact, in the twoweeks after the Armistice, Istanbul was under the defacto occupation of the Allied fleet of sixty vesselsconducted by Admiral Calthrope, representative of theAllies in Mudros.

On November 30, 1918, in the immediate aftermathof the Armistice, the U.S. Secretary of State RobertLansing instructed Lewis Heck, Secretary of AmericanEmbassy in Switzerland to return to Istanbul as acommissioner in order to gather information for the StateDepartment, but without any official relations with theOttoman government.15 On August 28, 1919, RearAdmiral Mark Lambert Bristol was appointed as AmericanHigh Commissioner to conduct the consular -but not thediplomatic- relations of the States from the AmericanEmbassy in Istanbul. Therefore, the Swedish Embassy hasdiscontinued to manage American affairs with theOttoman officialdom16, since the new American HighCommissioner was to conduct the official business underthe protection of the Allied military and naval forcesoccupying the Ottoman capital.

At the end of the War, the Allies were to implementtheir plan of the partition of the Ottoman Empire, so-called the sick man of Europe. President Wilson was oneof the head figures of this plan with his famous addresson January 8, 1918, the twelfth point of which wasdealing directly with granting sovereignty to the Turks aswell as autonomous development and self-determination to the Ottoman non-Muslim subjects. His

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ideas were based on his vision of getting the Turks out ofEurope including the capital city of the Empire. He wassuggested by a report of the American Delegation at theParis Peace Conference on Jan 21, 1919, stating that aninternational state should be established inConstantinople under the governance of the GreatPowers, an Armenian state in the Eastern Anatolia underthe U.S. mandate and a Turkish state in central Anatoliaunder the mandatory principles and without any powerof governance.17 In fact, for the American government,not the Turkish question, but the establishment of anindependent Armenian state had the greatest importancein making the peace. In his message to the AmericanCommission to Negotiate Peace at Paris, Secretary ofState Robert Lansing stated on August 16, 1919 thatshould the Turkish authorities not take the necessarymeasures to prevent any massacres and atrocities byTurks, Kurds and other Muslims against Armenians,there would be a complete alteration of the condition ofpeace and the absolute dissolution of the Empire.18 Infact, Professors Albert H. Lybyer and Colin Day, of theAmerican Peace Commission, as well as Colonel T.E.Lawrence, were in favor of an American mandate over theStraits and the future Constantinopolitan state, with thehope of having an Armenian mandate.

The British opinion in the Peace Conference was incomplete agreement with President Wilson’s ideas. TheBritish defended the implementation of the FourteenPoints of the US President, suggesting that it was requiredto recognize Armenia under one of the Great Power’smandate, Thrace and Smyrna under Greek control, andthe separation of Cilicia, Lebanon, Syria, Palestine andMesopotamia from the Empire. Each state’s rights of self-determination were to be recognized and each were to beindependent under certain limitations of Great Powersupervision in the name of Conference and, ultimately,of the League of Nations. Additionally, Zionist Jews and

Armenians were to have special consideration because oftheir unique situation and numerical strength in theMiddle East countries. Since the Armenian mandate wasto promote justice between the nationalists, toreconstruct the country and to establish politicalinstitutions for the independence, the Peace Conferenceitself should have intervened in the Armenian nationalstate.19

At the Paris Peace Conference, on January 29, 1920,the British delegation circulated a draft resolution statingthat Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine and Arabiamust be completely detached from the Turkish Empirebecause the Ottoman authorities misruled andmistreated the subject peoples and the Armenians.20

Despite the British declaration for the Armenian cause toattract the U.S. government’s attention, for the British, allthe questions of the Near East, in fact, were to be takeninto account as a whole. Not only the Armenian case, butthe problems of Arab territories of the Empire and thedelicate situation of Palestine were well outlined in theBritish statement:

“The problems of Palestine are parallel in severalrespects to problems already discussed in relation toother Middle Eastern countries: (a) in Palestine, as inThrace, the Straits, the Smyrna district and Armenia, thepopulation is mixed and has not a common will; (b)though the great majority of the population is Arab, theJewish agricultural colonist in Palestine like Armeniansand Greeks in the areas above mentioned, are a minoritywhich, on account of the historic past, its superior vigorand ability, the barbarous methods by which its numbershave recently been reduced, and its reservoirs ofpotential immigrants, from which its losses can be madegood, is certain of a future which entitles it toconsideration out of proportion to its present numbers;(c) the Christian, Jewish and Moslem Holy places inPalestine, like the waterway in the zone of the Straits,

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constitute a world interest of such importance that itshould take precedence, in case of conflict, over politicalaspirations of the local inhabitants.21

Lloyd George, the head of the British delegation,strongly supported that the Conference could best dealwith the difficulties of Near Eastern problems throughmandates conferred on single powers. However,President Wilson had indicated in the first draft of theCovenant of the League of Nations, on January 10, 1919,that territories formerly belonging to the OttomanEmpire should be placed under some kind of trust underthe projected League of Nations and not being thesubject of annexation by any power.22 The U.S. Presidentdid not share entirely the views of the British delegationand felt that it was not the appropriate time to discussthe partition of the Empire. Although there were rumorsof an American mandate, President Wilson was not surewhether he would be able to convince the Americanpeople to accept one. It was suggested that Americantroops should even occupy Constantinople orMesopotamia, but it was evident that they could not doso, since the U.S. was not at war with Turkey. Therefore,it would be unwise for the U.S. to accept any form ofmandate until they knew how it was intended to work.23

At the Conference, the Armenian delegation was ledby Mr. Aharonian, representing the Armenian Republic,and Boghos Nubar Pasha representing the group calledNational Delegation of all Armenians, who presentedtheir case of independent Armenian state on February26, in front of the Council of Ten. The Armeniansdemanded Cilicia including the Marash and AdanaSanjaks with the port of Alexandretta on theMediterranean, the port of Trabzon on the Black Sea, inaddition to six eastern vilayets of Erzurum, Bitlis, Van,Diyarbakir, Harput and Sivas. Also included in theArmenian plan was the territory of the Republic ofArmenia in the Caucasus, Erivan, southern Tiflis,

southwestern Elisabetpol (Gümrü) and Kars, with theexception of northern Ardahan. They also demanded thatit was necessary to place Armenia under the jointprotection of the Powers with a twenty year mandateonce it was liberated from the Ottoman Empire.24

However, for the Council, the problems of Armenia werecomplicated by the fact that for generations theArmenians had been scattered, mostly by theircommercial pursuits, to the far-flung corners of theOttoman Empire and even the world, and there washardly any region in which they constituted a clear-cutmajority of the population.25

The Ottoman Delegation was also granted a hearingby the Supreme Council at the Paris Peace Conferenceon June 23, 1919. Instead of an Armenianindependence, the establishment of theConstantinopolitan state and the partition of the Empireby the Allies, the Ottoman demands were focused on thepreservation of the territorial integrity of the Empire andthe sovereignty of the Sultan. The protection of the rightsof minorities would be under the constitutional form ofgovernment in accordance with the Wilsonian principles.Also demanded were the appointments of Americansupervisors to governmental offices and ministries in thecapital and an American Inspector-in-Chief in everyprovince in the Empire. As for the Armenian Republic atErivan, if this state was to be recognized by the Entente,the Ottoman delegation was going to discuss adreferendum the frontier line to separate the newRepublic from the Empire. In addition, Damad FeridPasha stated in the memorandum that the Imperialgovernment was ready to grant all facilities in its powerto the Armenians who wished to expatriate themselves toestablish the Republic. However, as regards to those whomight have wished to stay in Turkey, they were to enjoy,like the other minorities, free cultural, economic andmoral developments. The Ottoman government,

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nevertheless, could not have accepted anydismemberment of the Empire, or any mandate of theGreat Powers, neither in the Arab territories, nor in partsof so-called Armenia in Asia Minor.26

It was obvious that President Wilson wished to obtaina mandate for Armenia and an American highcommissioner had been appointed. He asked for part ofCilicia and eliminated the option of accepting anothermandate for Istanbul since this was one of the greatestproblems of European powers.27 By this date, inaddition, the Supreme Council of the League of Nationsmet under the French Premier Clemencau at Paris onJanuary 19, 1920 agreed that the government ofArmenian state had been recognized as the de factogovernment. However, the acting Secretary of State, Polknotified Mr. Wallace, the U.S. ambassador in France, thatthe U.S. government had reached no definite conclusionsas to the recognition of the Republic of Armenia, sincethe relations of the United States toward the Armenianstate to be created under the Turkish peace treaty havebeen under consideration.28 This decision to notrecognize the Armenian state by the U.S. was sent by Mr.Wallace to Colonel William N. Haskell, Allied HighCommissioner appointed to represent the United States,Great Britain, France and Italy in Armenia. However,since it was believed by the U.S. government that such arecognition would not be perceived by the Moscowgovernment as the beginning of an attempt todismember Russia, the new Secretary of State BainbridgeColby sent a dispatch to the Representative of theArmenian Republic on April 23, 1920, stating that by thedirection of the President, the government of the UnitedStates recognized, as of that date, the de factogovernment of the Armenian Republic in Erivan.29 Thisaction was taken, however, with the non-recognition ofterritorial frontiers which were subjects for laterdelimitations. This future arrangement of the frontiers

was addressed on April 27, 1920, to President Wilson bythe Supreme Council of the League of Nations as anappeal to accept the mandate for Armenia, including thequestion of the boundaries of the new state. For theSupreme Council, since the President was alreadyfamiliar with the cause of “larger Armenia” , thereremained on the shoulders of Mr. Wilson the solution ofthe question of what portions of the vilayets of Erzurum,Van, Bitlis and Trabzon, still in the possession of Turkishauthorities, could have properly and safely been added tothe existing Armenian state of Erivan, and, what means ofaccess to the sea should have been provided in order toensure to the new Armenia a self sufficing nationalexistence.30 In other words, it remained to be settled howthe exact boundaries on the west and south should havebeen inserted in the peace treaty with Turkey. Theboundaries of Armenia on the northwest, north andnortheast were expected to be solved by mutualagreements with the adjoining states of Georgia andAzerbeijan which were also recently recognized by theLeague of Nations in the same date with the recognitionof Armenia.

Irrespective of the mandate and the boundaries, therewere additional considerations which the SupremeCouncil wished to call to the attention of the U.S.government. Central to these additional issues was thepromise and assurance of external aid in order toprovide security and existence of the new Armenian state.Therefore, the United States was asked to participate inthe aid program to Armenia as well as to undertakemilitary responsibilities for its security. Although theAmerican Relief Administration under the chairmanshipof Colonel Haskell had already delivered ninety twothousand tons of flour and one hundred and eightthousand tons of food and supplies to Armenia andopened forty hospitals and seventeen orphanages,according to the Council, its immediate needs were “the

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provision for the military forces required to defend itagainst external attack and provision for the financialmeans that will enable it to constitute an orderlyadministration and to develop its own economicresources”.31 By this date, arms and ammunition havealready been provided by the Allied Powers to the existingforces possessed by Armenian Republic of Erivan,however, this was not enough to occupy and administerterritories belonging to Turkey and to enforce the treatyof San Remo in making Turkish territories moreaccessible to Armenian arms. Therefore, the SupremeCouncil asked from the United States government thepossibilities to raise volunteer troops in America as wellas to provide aid, credits and loans. Although PresidentWilson expressed his willingness to undertake to act asmediator for the Armenian boundaries32, the Secretary ofWar, Newton D. Baker rejected sending American troopsto Armenia. In his memorandum on June 2, 1920,depending on the report of General Harbord, Chief ofthe American Military Mission to Armenia, it was statedthat it was impracticable to maintain in ArmeniaAmerican forces of occupation estimated to beapproximately 27.000, as to insure the protection of thatstate against invasions by force.33 In fact, it was the righttime for the U.S. to expect the risk of attack from theBolshevik forces. By this time, a Soviet army ofapproximately 70.000 had been advancing southwardthrough the Caucasus, had recently occupied Baku, andhad entered Russian Armenia.

The Sèvres Treaty between Turkey and the Allies wassigned by the Ottoman representatives on August 10,1920. As was stated earlier, the main reason of this delayfor Turkish peace was due to disputes over Ottomanlands relinquished to Russia and the future of theArmenian state. In order to break the deadlock over theboundaries of Armenia, the British ambassador Geddessent a dispatch on August 6, 1920 to the Secretary of

State, Bainbridge Colby, asking whether the President’sdecision as to the boundaries of Armenia might beexpected in the near future since this question hasbecome a matter of urgency owing to the imminentsignature to the peace treaty with Turkey.34 AlthoughPresident Wilson did not draw the borderline betweenTurkey and Armenia before the signature of the Treaty,the long awaited Sèvres Treaty provided the Allies withtheir shares and spheres in the Ottoman territories, aswell as giving the Armenians and the other subjectpeoples of the former Ottoman Empire everything theydemanded in terms of independent statehood. While PartIII, Section 6, Article 88 of the Treaty remarked thatArmenia was recognized as an independent and freestate by the Sultan’s government, Article 89 stated that

“Turkey and Armenia as well as the other HighContracting Parties agree to submit to the arbitration ofthe President of the United States of America the questionof the frontier to be fixed between Turkey and Armenia inthe vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis, and toaccept his decision thereupon, as well as any stipulationshe may prescribe as to access for Armenia to the sea, andas to the demilitarization of any portion of Turkishterritory adjacent to the said frontier”35.

The Treaty did not mention anything about anAmerican mandate over Armenia since the Congress hadnot accepted it because the reports of both King-CraneCommission and General Harbord’s Commissionregarding a greater U.S. mandate for Anatolia, Rumelia(Thrace), Constantinople and Transcaucasia were tobring the biggest share of the postwar burdens to theUnited States. In fact, the Harbord Report providedfactual background for an American decision on theArmenian mandate proposal. This report, dated October16, 1919, after examining the history and current statusof Armenia favored the mandate with thirteen points ofreservation. The Report emphasized the importance of

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mandate for humanitarian reasons, however, it stressedthat the estimated cost of $ 756.014.000 for a five yearperiod was a strong factor against the mandate.Harbord’s recommendations came to the White Housejust at the time when President Wilson was having hisfight with the Senate over the entrance of the UnitedStates to the League of Nations and the ratification of theVersailles Treaty. Therefore, he could not have muchinfluence on the U.S. decision on accepting themandate.36 In his letter on December 1, 1920 to PaulHyman, President of the Council of the League ofNations at Geneva, President Wilson wrote that theinvitation to accept a mandate for Armenia had beenrejected by the Senate and although the fate of theRepublic of Armenia had always been a great interest tothe American people, he was unable to authorize anymaterial contribution or to employ military forces for therelief of Armenia without the approval of the Senate,whose actions could not have been forecasted by theExecutive.37 The assumption of mandate over Istanbuland Armenia was, therefore, not favored by the Congress,a point, which was clearly explained later by CharlesEvans Hughes, Secretary of State in the Harding andCoolidge administrations between 1921-1925. For him,this “would directly and immediately involve this [theU.S.] government in one of the most vexing political andterritorial problems of the world -the storm center ofhistoric rivalries and bitter contests”.38 In fact, it is notwrong to say that the Wilson administration was right notto accept the mandate on the troublesome Turkishterritories since the nationalist movement organized inAnatolia against the Allied occupation of Turkey wasresisting any similar aggression of the Armenians in theeastern provinces as well. Like the attitudes of theTurkish nationalists against the British, French, Italianand Greek forces in the central, southern and westernAnatolia, the feeling against Armenia gaining any territory

in the eastern provinces was most bitter and strongerthan ever before. No one in the High Commissions inConstantinople believed that the Turks would evacuateany territory ceded to Armenia and would have to beforced to make such evacuation.39

The Turkish nationalists under the leadership ofMustafa Kemal started to organize military resistance andwage war against the Allied occupation in order tosucceed in reversing the defeat of the World War andavoid partition. But Ankara carried out a successfuldiplomatic campaign along with the military fighting. Themilitary victories in the years 1919 to 1920 could neverhave been gained without an astute foreign policy, whichparalleled military campaigns, aided them and woninternational recognition for the results of the militaryadvances. The bases of foreign policy were determinedby the creation of independent and sovereign Turkishstate, a commitment to the maintenance of territorialunity and complete abolition of all such extraterritorialrights in matters of justice, taxation and economicexploitation, as foreigners had enjoyed, and remarkablyabused, under the Ottoman Empire. Already from thedays of the Sivas Congress in September 1919, whichestablished the Representative Committee of the newnationalist administration and the Association for theDefence of Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia as the basesnot only for the national struggle against imperialism butfor the future independent Turkish state, it wasproclaimed that all Turkish territory inside the MudrosArmistice frontiers was regarded as an indivisible wholewithin which no foreign intervention should be allowed,nor any independent Greek or Armenian state. TheMuslim majority, ‘a veritable fraternity’, would grant nospecial status to non-Muslim minorities such as theformer Ottoman system had permitted. No mandate orprotectorate over Turkey would be considered. Foreignscientific or economic assistance would be accepted only

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if it were untainted with imperialism. The national willmust control the Sultan’s government, which shouldhave convoked a National Assembly.40 Though the SivasDeclaration still considered the Istanbul government ofSultan Mehmet VI to be the lawful one, it rejectedIstanbul’s policy of acquiescence and submission to theAllied demands. Mustafa Kemal later explained in hisfamous Speech in 1927 that his aim had already from thebeginning extended to the creation of a new andindependent Turkish state, since continued allegiance tothe Sultan’s government was unacceptable to him.41

Therefore, Mustafa Kemal tried to force his foreign policyupon the new Istanbul Cabinet of Ali Riza Pasha, whichwas much more sympathetic to the nationalists than theformer cabinet of Damad Ferid, who had been accused ofsubservience to the Allied, especially British, leadership.

Highly influential on the Turkish foreign policy,Mustafa Kemal also gained a clear nationalist majority inthe elections for the new parliament held in December1919. Mustafa Kemal was elected as the deputy fromErzurum, however, he hesitated to go to Istanbul toattend parliamentary meetings because of the danger tohim both from the Sultanate and the Allies. Despite this,the new Istanbul Parliament led by Rauf [Orbay], a closefriend of Kemal and a member of the RepresentativeCommittee since the beginning, voted and confirmed thenationalist demands accepted in the Sivas Congress asthe National Pact. The Allies were thus notified of theTurkish demands which, in Kemal’s view, had to serve asthe basis for peace negotiations.42 The Pact emphasizedcomplete -territorial, political, judicial and economic-independence; nothing like the capitulations would beaccepted. There has been no mention now of foreignassistance as there had been at Sivas. The territorialclaims extended from Armistice frontiers to includeKurdish areas as well, while plebiscites were demandedfor Kars, Ardahan, Batum and Thrace. Only regions with

an Arab majority were specifically excluded. Minorities inTurkey would have no special privileges beyond therights commonly recognized in the minority treaties ofthe peace settlement. If Istanbul, seat of the Sultanateand the Caliphate, were secure, regulations on trafficthrough the Bosphorus and Dardanelles could be madejointly by Turkey and other interested parties. Theseprinciples were declared by the National Pact as theminimum conditions for a just and lasting peace.43

In fact, the British occupation of Istanbul on March16, 1920, the recognition of Armenian state in theTurkish territories, and the partition of the Empire by theAllied statesmen at San Remo, were the main reasons forthe creation by the Turkish nationalists of theGovernment of the Grand National Assembly (GNA) inAnkara on April 23, 1920. The Assembly, in the next dayof its opening, elected Mustafa Kemal as the President ofthe GNA and also as the head of the Council of Ministerselected by the GNA. The Government did not declare theSultan deposed, but called him an Allied prisoner whoseacts were, therefore, invalid. Moreover, the decisions thatsovereignty unconditionally belongs to the nation andthe Grand National Assembly is the sole representative ofnation were taken. Thus, the GNA implied by thesedeclarations that it never recognized any agreementpreviously made by the Sultan’s government with theAllies. From this time on, the GNA assumed theresponsibility to act on behalf of the nation, to declarewar and to sign peace, to conclude treaties and to receivediplomats, despite the Allied recognition of Istanbulgovernments. Allied Powers were again officially notifiedthat the GNA alone represented the people of Turkeyand that it would preside over the present and futuredestiny of Turkey so long as the unjustified occupation ofIstanbul continued.44 In addition, the Nationalgovernment in Ankara that represented the vast majorityof the Turks never recognized the Sèvres Treaty signed by

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the Sultan’s Istanbul government, and was fightingagainst the Allies in the West and the Armenians in theEast. The Armenian government declared war on Turkeyon October 10, 1920 with the assistance of Georgia,however, during the fall and winter of 1920 Turkishtroops with the help and cooperation of its only ally,Moscow, excluded all Western Powers and Armeniansfrom the settlement in the area, despite the rivalrybetween Ankara government and the Soviet Union overthe control of Eastern Anatolia. Azerbaijan was by thenSoviet-dominated, and the last British troops hadevacuated Batum in July. Upon the rejection of Ankara’sultimatum by Armenia regarding the withdrawal ofArmenian troops from the region, General KazýmKarabekir, an outstanding Turkish military leader,delivered an attack from Erzurum in late September thatswept through Kars, Ardahan and Alexandropol in sixweeks. These had been centers of the American Near EastRelief Organization working for aid, funds, independenceand statehood for the Armenians. Moscow thenengineered a coup to capture the Armenian government,which was wholeheartedly accepted by the Armenians toforestall any further Turkish advance. General Karabekirsigned Ankara’s first international treaty at Alexandropolon December 2, 1920, which returned Kars to Turkishcontrol and again made possible direct land connectionwith the Soviet Union.

Meanwhile President Wilson completed his task ofdrawing the frontier between Turkey and Armenia withthe creation of the greater Armenia, which includedTrabzon as the major sea port, and Erzurum, despite itsoverwhelming Turkish majority.45 However, before theopening of negotiations between the Armeniangovernment at Erivan and the nationalist government atAnkara, and even before the appointment by Wilson of amediator between the Armenians and the Kemalists, itwas officially declared on December 2, 1920 that the

Armenian Republic at Erivan joined the Union of SovietSocialist Republics. The Armenian Cabinet formed aweek before was overthrown and a new Armeniangovernment was formed with a joint committee ofBolshevik commissaries and the members of theArmenian nationalist Dashnak Party and wasimmediately recognized by Moscow. During the peaceconference between Turkey and Armenia at Kars, thelocal government at Alexandropol was made Bolshevikand the Armenian frontier towns of Foulkspril andDelijan were also occupied by the Russian troops.46 Thecooperation between the Turkish nationalists and theRussian Bolsheviks, therefore, had led to the abrogationof the Western plans for the creation of an independentArmenian state under the U.S. mandate to act as a bufferzone between Russia and the Middle and Near East onthe one hand, and between Turkey and the central AsianTurkic states on the other, in spite of the existence ofSoviet republics themselves, being such a buffer for thelatter. As a result of the correspondence between theacting Secretary of State, Davis, the U.S. ambassador inFrance, Wallace and the President of the Council of theLeague, Hymans, it was decided not to send theArmenian boundary decision of President Wilson to thepress for publication.47

During 1921 and 1922, the war of Turkishnationalists continued in Asia Minor against foreignoccupation and especially against the Greek advancemoving through Central Anatolia, coming as close as 70kilometers to Ankara. The friendly relations betweenAnkara and the Russian Socialist Federated SocialistRepublic were concluded on March 16, 1921 with thesignature of Treaty of Friendship which confirmedTurkey’s northeastern border arrangements.48 Throughthis treaty, the Kemalist government of Ankara wasstrengthened against the Allies diplomatically, and withthe Soviet logistic and financial assistance, militarily. At

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this juncture, interesting strategic developments startedto divide the Allies into separate camps. Franceconcluded a separate Agreement for the Promotion ofPeace with Ankara49, providing the withdrawal of Frenchforces from occupied Cilicia behind the Syrian borders,and a special administrative regime for the district ofAlexandretta. This allowed Ankara to pull the Turkishtroops from the Cilicia region and to transfer them to amore heated war zone in Western Anatolia. In August1922, the reinforced Turkish army defeated the Greeksand expelled them from Turkish territory within less thana month. Kemalist Turkey thus won the war whichhelped lead not to the restoration of the former sick manof Europe, but to the establishment of the Republic andthe survival of the Turkish people as an independentnation.

While the Turkish national liberation war wasprogressing in Anatolia, the Armenian question played aprominent role in the United States’ 1920 presidentialcampaign and became an important part of the foreignpolicy of the Harding presidency until his death in August192350. The Republicans were against accepting amandate and the Democrats were in favor of everypossible and proper aid for Armenian autonomy and

independence. As was the case for Wilson, churchgroups, missionaries and philanthropic associations,along with the active Armenian lobby formed by theAmerican Armenian societies, loaded the Hardingadministration with petitions on behalf of theemancipation and liberation of Armenia, a pressurewhich embarrassed particularly Charles E. Hughes, sincehe was once the head of the American Committee for theIndependence of Armenia. However, the Americanconcern for the Armenian state and people at thepolitical level was replaced by the worries for theprotection of American interests, the US missionaryactivities and particularly by the possibility of futureaccess to Mesopotamian oil. The latter concerns, namelysecuring oil concessions in Mesopotamia added more tothe intermingling of U.S. religious and political interestsin the beginning of the 1920s, which forced the newadministration to concentrate its attention more on theMiddle East, in order to gain a possible access toMesopotamia by defending the rights and status ofAmerican religious, educational, philanthropic andmissionary activities.

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Notes:

1 Bret E. Carroll, The Routledge Historical Atlas of Religion inAmerica, N.Y. and London: Routledge, 2000, pp. 62-65.2 Bruce A. Masters, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World:the Roots of Sectarianism, Port Chester, NY, USA: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2001, pp. 147-148.3 Robert L. Daniel, “American Influences in the Near East before1861”, American Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Spring 1964), p. 77.4 The social organization of the Ottoman Empire based on thedenominational representation of Muslim, Jewish, Orthodox andRoman Catholic communities provided a vacuum for the GreatPowers of Europe to intervene in internal affairs of the Empire.Russian Empire declared itself as the protector of Orthodoxcommunity while the French played its card for the Catholic,mostly Maronite population in Greater Syria. The acceptance of theProtestant “millet” by the Ottoman Empire gave a big chance to theBritish to enjoy the role of the big brother of the Protestantcommunity, since the US hesitated to interfere in the social andpolitical affairs in another country in such a remote distance.Another reason for the British supremacy over Armenian Gregorianand Protestant populations of the Ottoman Empire was theAmerican ideology of religious liberty and the defense of Americanmissionaries the separation of the state and church. For a detailedanalysis of the relations between the state and Ottoman millets, andGreat Power intervention in the Ottoman affairs, see: Enver Z.Karal, Osmanli Tarihi, Vol. V: Nizam-i Cedit ve Tanzimat Devirleri,1789-1856, Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1947; Matthew S.Anderson, The Eastern Question, 1774-1923: A Study inInternational Relations, N.Y.: St. Martin’s, 1966; Benjamin Braudeand Bernard Lewis (eds), Christians and Jews in the OttomanEmpire: the Functioning of a Plural Society, N.Y.: Holmes andMeier Publishers, 1982.5 Masters, Ibid., p. 151.6 Seçil Karal Akgün, “Mormon Missionaries in the OttomanEmpire”, Turcica: Revue d’Etudes Turques, Vol. 28 (1996), p. 347.7 Uygur Kocabasoglu, “Osmanli Imparatorlugunda 19. YuzyildaAmerikan Yuksek Okullari”, Bahri Savci’ya Armagan, Ankara:Mulkiyeliler Birligi Vakfi Yayinlari, 1988, pp. 305-306.8 Ibid. p.306.9 The details of the missionaries’ educational activities and theirschool system are out of the limit of this study. For moreinformation see: Uygur Kocabasoglu, Kendi BelgeleriyleAnadolu’daki Amerika: 19. Yüzyilda Osmanli Imparatorlugu’ndaki

Amerikan Misyoner Okullari, Istanbul: Arba Yayinlari, 1989; SecilKaral Akgun, Amerikali Misyonerlerin Ermeni Meselesinde Rolu,Ataturk Yolu, Vol. 1, No. 1 (May 1988), pp. 1-12; Omer Turan,“Missionary Activities in Turkey From the Ottoman to theRepublican Period” in The Great Ottoman-Turkish Civilization,Vol.I, Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayinlari, 1999, pp. 513-519.10 Masters, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World, Ibid,p.151. Comparing the number of students in the other Ottomanschools may give a better opinion about the functions of Americanmissionary activities: In the Empire in British Protestant schoolshad 12,800 students in 1912. The government schools had 81.226while the schools under the Orthodox Patriarch of Constantinoplehad 184,568 students, the French schools had 59.414, and Russianeducational institutions had about 10.000 pupils. Ibid, p.151.11 Robert L. Daniel, “The Armenian Question and American-TurkishRelations, 1914-1927”, The Mississippi Valley Historical Review,Vol. 46, No.2 (Sep. 1959), pp. 254-255.12 Frank Jewett, “Why We Did Not Declare War on Turkey”, CurrentHistory, V.14 (April-September 1921), pp. 989-990.13Kamuran Gürün, The Armenian File: The Myth of InnocenceExposed. N.Y.: St. Martin’s Press, 1985, pp. 240-241; for the texts ofthe secret agreements between the Allies, see also, J. C. Hurewitz,Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record,1914-1956, V. II, Princeton, N.J.: van Nostrand, 1956, pp. 11-12, 18-22, 23-25.14Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: ADocumentary Record, Ibid, pp. 36-37.15 Metin Tamkoç, “The Question of the Recognition of theRepublic of Turkey by the United States”, The Turkish Yearbook ofInternational Relations, 1960, I, Ankara: SBF Yayinlari, 1961, pp. 94.16The Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relationsof the United States, 1920, V. I (Washington, 1936), pp. 210-218;the Correspondence between the Department of State and theSwedish Embassy at Istanbul. The Papers will be mentioned, fromnow on, with the abbreviation of FRUS, year and volume.17 Harry N. Howard, The King-Crane Commission: An AmericanInquiry in the Middle East, Beirut: Khayat, 1963, pp. 10-11, and forthe text of the recommendations of the American Delegation,Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East.., pp. 40-45.18Tamkoç, “The Question of the Recognition of the Republic ofTurkey...”, pp.96-97.19Howard, The King-Crane Commission: n American Inquiry in theMiddle East..., pp.10-15.

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20 FRUS, Paris Peace Conference (PPC), V. III, pp. 785-786; 795-796; V.XI, pp. 1; 5.21 Howard, An American Inquiry in the Middle East, p. 18.22 Harry Howard, The Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic History,1913-1923, Norman, Oklahoma: the Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1931,pp.218-219.23FRUS, PPC, V. III, p. 788.24Howard, An American Inquiry in the Middle East..., pp. 26-27,and FRUS, PPC, V.IV, pp. 147-157.25Howard, An American Inquiry in the Middle East..., p. 27.26Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East..., pp. 60-61;Howard, An American Inquiry in the Middle East...,pp. 28-29.27FRUS, PPC, V. VII, pp. 14, 193-194, 198, 200-201.28FRUS, 1920, V. 3, pp. 775-777.29Ibid., p. 778.30Ibid., p. 780.31Ibid., pp. 781-786. The monetary value of American aid toArmenia totaled $ 21.012.000 of which only $ 560.000 came fromthe British government. Ibid., p. 786.32Ibid., p. 783.33Ibid., p. 785.34Ibid., p. 787.35Ibid., p. 796.36For the text of the General Harbord’s Report, see: FRUS, 1919, V.2, pp. 841-889 and The U.S Congressional Record, 66. Congress,2nd Session, V. 59, Part 8, (May 25 - June 5, 1920), pp. 7877-7886and for the texr of the King-Crane Report, see: FRUS, PPC, 1919,V.XII, pp. 745-863.37League of Nations, V. 4 (1921), Boston; World Peace FoundationPamphlets, 1921, pp. 193-194. In fact, President Wilson alreadyknew what attitude the Senate would take in relation to theassumption of the mandate. The Senate’s reservation to Article 10of the Covenant of the League of Nations, relating to the territorialsovereignty and political independence reads as follows:“TheUnited States assumes no obligation to preserve the territorialintegrity or political independence of any other country by theemployment of its military or naval forces, its resources, or anyform of economic discrimination, or to interfere in any way incontroversies between nations, including all controversies relatingto the territorial integrity or political independence, whethermembers of the League or not...” Dexter Perkins, “TheDepartment of State and American Public Opinion”, TheDiplomats, 1919-1939, ed. by Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert,Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1953, p. 285.

38Charles Evans Hughes, “Recent Questions and Negotiations: AnAddress Before the Council on Foreign Relations, New York,January 23, 1924”, Foreign Affairs-Special Supplement, V.2, N.2(December 1923), p. 350xiii.39Letter of Admiral Bristol, the U.S. High Commissioner in Istanbulto the Secretary of State on September 18, 1920, FRUS, 1920, V. 3,p. 788.40Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, A Speech Delivered by Ghazi MustafaKemal, President of the Turkish Republic, October 1927, Leipzig:K.F. Koehler, 1929, pp. 131-132.41Ibid., p. 27.42Ibid., pp. 306-310.43Hurewitz, Ibid., pp. 74-75.44Roderic H. Davison, “Turkish Diplomacy from Mudros toLausanne”, The Diplomats, 1919-1939, pp. 181-18245FRUS, 1920, V.3, pp. 789-804, letter from Bainbridge Colby on theWilson’s decision to Ambassador Wallace in Paris, on November 24,1920.46Telegram of Moser, American Council at Tiflis to the actingSecretary of State, Davis at Washington, on December 4, 1920,Ibid., p. 806.47Ibid., pp. 807-809.48Hurewitz, Ibid., pp. 95-97.49Ibid., pp. 97-100.50Congressional Record, 66. Congress, 2nd Session, V. 59 (1919-1920), Part.3 p. 2934, Part 4 pp. 3907, 4108, Part 6 p. 5660, Part 8pp. 7549-7553, 7876, 8071; 67. Congress, 1st Session, V. 61 (1921),Part 4 p. 4202; 67. Congress, 2nd Session, V. 62 (1921-1922), Part 1p. 475, 690, Part 5 p. 4500, Part 6 p. 5760, Part 9 pp. 8773-8779,Part 11 p. 11267.

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In the last century, a variety of ideologies flourishedin the Muslim world that was still grappling with the longlasting effects of its encounter with the West. A numberof discourses on gender, all purporting to betterwomen’s lives, were popular, at one time or another: thediscourses of secularism, modernism, reformism, tradi-tionalism, state feminism and even Islamism. In the early20th century, Modernist voices were championingwomen’s cause, at a time when Islamists began to makesimilar claims. Islamists have now become the new tradi-tional, and often the most vocal, forces of contemporaryMuslim societies, resistant to some, but not all changes.The religio-political activism of Muslims holding collegeand university degrees, many of whom are professionalsand who belong to the new urban middle-classes, fo-cuses on the rejection of any type of dichotomy betweenthe religious and the secular realms. Islam must shapeand mold all aspects of Muslim society and Muslimsmust strive, in any way they can, to achieve this goal. Con-temporary Islamism, however, is far from being merereligious traditionalism. In what follows, it will be argued

Roxanne D. Marcotte

Egyptian Islamists and theStatus of Muslim WomenQuestion

This paper will explore the gender discourse ofcontemporary Egyptian Islamists and argue that theirgender discourse is not merely a religious andtraditional discourse, but that this politico-religiousIslamic ideology articulates a quite modern constructof gender equality. The gender discourse of anumber of important Egyptian Islamists, al-Banna’,Qutb, al-Ghazali, al-Qaradawi and Ezzat will provideillustrations of these modern developments. Modernelements incorporated in today’s Islamist revivalistapproaches create new understandings, neitherpurely traditional, nor purely modern, that are‘modern constructs’ that attempt to remaintraditional, while integrating specifically moderncomponents. The presence of these two seeminglyopposing and contradictory elements may account forthe present popularity that Islamist discourses enjoyin many Muslims countries.

Roxanne D. MarcotteLecturer in Arabic andIslamic StudiesThe School of History,Philosophy, Religion andclassicsThe University ofQueenslandBrisbane, AUSTRALIAEmail:r.marcotte@uq.edu.au

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that contemporary Egyptian Islamist discourses are quitemodern constructs. This can best be illustrated bypresenting diachronically the gender discourses of anumber of important Egyptian Islamists.

The founder of the foremost contemporary Islamistmovement, the Egyptian Muslim brotherhood (foundedin 1928), Hassan al-Banna (d. 1949) envisioned an Is-lamist project that would restore the past glories of theMuslim world.1 This utopian ideology would becomereality only by way of a return to the ‘true’ Islam and anelimination of any kind of foreign dominations over theMuslim world.2 With such a utopian goal, the Islamist ‘re-storative’ project was to develop into a highly politicalideology. In an ever-changing world, Islamist activismcontinues to ‘reaffirm’ Muslim values and thus providesthe movement with its deep moral underpinning that isnot without any consequence for the status of Muslimwomen. Al-Banna wrote that the movement muststruggle in order “that a free Islamic state may arise inthis free fatherland, acting according to the precepts ofIslam, applying its social regulations…,” a politicalproject that led the movement to be outlawed in Egypt in1954.3 The movement is still unable to officially partici-pate in Egyptian political life.

The discourse of the Muslim Brotherhood movementemerged as a ‘product of crisis’ and the result of the‘cross-cultural interplay’ between Europe and the Mus-lim world. This encounter led the Islamic world to es-pouse a ‘revivalist mentality.’4 The earlier formulations ofthe Islamist discourse of the Muslim Brotherhood move-ment remains quite typical of a number of contemporaryIslamist discourses that are, for the most part, indebtedto the earlier Islamist ideology of the Muslim Brother-hood movement. The cross-cultural interplay betweenthe West and the Islamic world has helped shape the na-ture of the Islamists’ traditional, yet simultaneously mod-ern discourses on women.

Qatar-based Egyptian Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who re-cently turned down the leadership of the Muslim Broth-erhood,5 and Egyptian Heba Raouf Ezzat, two contempo-rary Islamist figures, propose ‘Islamically progressive’views on Muslim women’s role, status, and rights in Mus-lim societies. A number of these views have gained inpopularity among many segments of the Muslim popula-tion, but one may ask to what extent, and in what sensecan their views on Muslim women, claimed to be‘progressive,’ be truly modern? Claims made by contem-porary Islamists al-Qaradawi and Ezzat can be shown tohave their roots in the writings of earlier Islamists, suchas al-Banna and his most important successor, SayyidQutb (d. 1966), who wrote during the second quarter ofthe 20th century, and whose ideas found an expression inthe social and political struggle of Zaynab al-Ghazali. Theclaimed ‘progressive’ views of earlier Islamists onwomen’s issues have never really ceased to be part of therevivalist discourse of Islamists on Muslim women, as at-tested by the recent views of al-Qaradawi and Ezzat.

New discourses on women’s role, status, and rightsemerged out of the Muslim world’s encounter with theWest and its modernity (understood in a broad sense).This encounter triggered the emergence of novel cross-cultural developments, even in the religious realm. Vari-ous Muslim groups advocated a number of rights forwomen, albeit often within the traditional religiousframework. For instance, the Egyptian Society for theProgress of Women (founded in 1908) tried to showMuslim women how Islam had historically provided themwith more rights than their Western sisters.6

Appeal to the traditional discourse of the Islamic reli-gious tradition to argue for more rights for women re-mains paradoxical, but not without its own justification.Kandiyoti has tried to explain women’s adherence to tra-ditional discourses, their relationship with women’srights and traditional Muslim societies by appealing to a

Key words:

gender , Egyptian Islam-ists, Muslim society,Muslim Women Question,political activism,Feminism

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notion of ‘patriarchal bargain,’ whereby change is en-dorsed through the accommodation of traditional reli-gious values.7 Accommodation allows women to negoti-ate greater freedom from within the strictures ofpatriarchal society and with the values and principles itupholds. The same phenomenon occurs today in Iran.Khosrokhavar identifies this strategy as the actions of ‘lat-eral actors’ who possess, nonetheless, real agency: “for-mally respecting the social norms and rules and contest-ing them in a responsible manner … embedding it withinIranian tradition, religion, and culture … in such a wayas to undermine it [that is, male domination] fromunderneath.”8 The strategy has remained a viable alterna-tive all over the Muslim world throughout the last cen-tury. Paradoxically, this strategy appears to have in-creased in popularity in the last two or three decades,especially within the ranks of urban, middle-class womenIslamists.

The increased demands for greater rights for womenare indicative of on-going changes that have befallen theMuslim world.9 Muslim women’s lives have undergonetremendous changes during the last hundred years.Women were provided with education, became literateand entered the labor market in increasingly greaternumbers. These changes have gradually altered Muslimattitudes towards women’s role in society. These changeshave fashioned a new awareness and played a role in theemergence of new gender discourses, a new ‘episteme’with which to think about Muslim women.10 At the outsetof the 20th century, women of all political and ideologicalpersuasions campaigned for women’s cause. Egyptianwomen formed associations, started journals, wrote inthe nationalist press, and associated themselves topolitical parties.11 Islamist women joined in these newsocial and political activities during the latter part of the1800s and the 1900s.

The project of the Islamists to ‘re-Islamize’ Egyptiansociety, through Islamic education and the services pro-vided by their charitable organizations, had but one goal:the establishment of a ‘truly’ Islamic society ruled by anIslamic government.12 Capitalizing on human resources,the Islamist movement of the Muslim Brotherhood en-couraged Muslim women to struggle, side by side withmen, for the Islamic ‘Call’ (da‘wa). Social activism wasnot prohibited. Women were permitted, even encouragedto be engaged in the social realm and, to a lesser extent,in the political realm, as long as their social and politicalactivities for the Islamic cause were not undertaken at theexpense of their domestic responsibilities. Al-Bannabelieved that “destroying the integrity of the family andthreatening the happiness of the home” was one of thesocial causes of the dissolution of the Islamic state.13 Thisnew call for the social and political activism of womenwas, however, quite new and modern. The Islamistmovement developed its own distinctive gender dis-courses, a mixture of traditional religious conservativeideas, along side modern ones, producing a new hybrid,neo-traditional gender discourse compatible with its ‘re-storative’ ideological project.

In the early 1950s, Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966) became thenew leader of the Muslim Brotherhood. In his Social Jus-tice in Islam, he identified human equality as one of thefoundations of social justice in Islam.14 Although he didnot discard a number of traditional gender-biased con-ceptions, Qutb was, nonetheless, calling for greater gen-der equality, in line with new emerging discourses ofequality between women and men. He provided explana-tions and justifications for some of the inequalities foundin the Scriptures and the religious (legal) tradition. Forinstance, he explained the different shares inherited bymen and women by appealing to men and women’sdifferent ‘responsibilities.’ He asserted that women have

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a ‘natural capacity and skills’ for managing thehousehold, making it possible for him to appeal towomen’s ‘greater right to care’ and man’s ‘right of man-agement.’ Qutb’s ‘distributive’ notion of equality remainsa staple of Islamist discourses. The notion of equality isoften opposed to, or even replaced with a notion of‘complementarity,’ that is, women and men are equal,yet different, thus providing some grounds for ajustification of some of the religious inequalities. Qutb in-sisted upon equality, not only in religious and spiritualmatters, but also in economic and financial matters,which he traced back to the Scriptures, where it is statedthat both men and women share a common origin(Qur’an, 7:189), making each one of them an “equal halfof the one ‘soul’.”15 Islamist interpreters of the religioustradition and of the Qur’an will argue for some kind of Is-lamic women’s rights. Their works have become modelsfor hundreds of similar works on women in Islam whosesophistication and success remains to be analyzed.

In spite of the traditional roles of mothers and wivesthat it promoted, the Islamist discourse of the MuslimBrotherhood appealed to a growing number of Muslims.Their discourse provided Islamic ‘empowerment’ to Mus-lim women in the social and political spheres, as long asthey were working for the Islamic ‘Call.’ Zaynab al-Ghazali, for example, joined the first Egyptian women’sorganization, the Egyptian Feminist Union, but was soondiscontented as women’s liberation movement is a‘deviant innovation,’ the result of Muslim’s backward-ness. Al-Ghazali believes that the departure from the trueteachings of Islam was the cause of women’s suffering.The only solution to this suffering is the return to trueIslamic teachings. Al-Ghazali’s solution was to found herown Muslim Women’s Association. Eventually, she joinedthe Muslim brotherhood (in 1949) as an active member,

was arrested in 1965, tortured for belonging to a bannedorganization, and eventually released.16

Like the projects of al-Banna and Qutb, Zaynab al-Ghazali’s project was the re-Islamization of society. Islam-ists were being discredited by the secular and moderniz-ing forces for their backwardness, but they held steadfastto the belief that the real backwardness of Muslim societywas the result of Muslims’ estrangement from Islam. Arenewed social activism was required to promote areturn to Islamic values. The Islamists’ call for women’ssocial and political activism is, nonetheless, a product ofmodern times and has never been a historicallysignificant element of the Islamic tradition. The newimpetus provided by these ideas is illustrated with al-Ghazali’s own life story. She included in her first mar-riage contract a stipulation that allowed her to obtain adivorce if her husband disagreed with her Islamic activ-ism. Her second husband provided her with a writtenagreement that stipulated that he would help her in theIslamic ‘Call.’ After the death of her second husband, al-Ghazali could argue that she had fulfilled her religiousduty in marriage, refused to remarry and dedicated therest of her life to the Islamic ‘Call.’17 Women have used anumber of ‘Islamic’ stipulations into their marriage con-tracts to better their conditions, but stipulations likethose included by al-Ghazali are almost unheard. Islamistwomen are thus willing to use the resources of Islamiclegal prescriptions to their own advantage, opening newIslamically defined opportunities that enables them toventure into traditionally inaccessible male publicspheres.

The social and political activism of women such as al-Ghazali, in the name of the Islamic ‘Call,’ although amodern novelty, remains in line with al-Banna’s andQutb’s vision of women’s social activism for the Islamiccause. For al-Ghazali, women constitute a “fundamental

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part of the Islamic call.” She argued that women can bemore active than men, because, in accordance with theIslamist vision of gender relations, men are the providersof the household. In addition, women’s social and politi-cal roles constitute undeniably a highly ethical endeavor.Muslim women “build the kind of men that we need tofill the ranks of the Islamic call.” Women are the pillarsof a virtuous Islamic society. To fulfill their role in the re-building of the Islamic nation, women need to be edu-cated, cultured, and knowledgeable about the preceptsof the Qur’an, the Islamic tradition, of world politics, etc.Once they have fulfilled their god-given roles, the “first,holy, and most important mission is to be a mother andwife,” something they cannot “ignore,” they can thenembark on their utopian mission.18 It should come to nosurprise that the roles of Muslim women as mothers andwives become religiously ‘essentialized’ roles.Domesticity becomes the envisioned horizon of women’snatural and primordial activities.

Islamists are calling for greater gender equality in anumber of specific social spheres. Women Islamists ad-vocate gender equality, especially in the realm of educa-tion. The right to education no longer remains restrictedto men alone. Al-Ghazali did send a memorandum to theGrand Mufti of Saudi Arabia to have girls educated.19 In asense, Islamists have internalized the modernizing aimsof the modern Muslim states, embodied in their insis-tence on the nation-building values of education. Similar‘transformative values’ can now serve the Islamist ‘restor-ative’ project which they often envision as resting morespecifically on religious education. Al-Ghazali’s own per-sonal social endeavors for the Islamic ‘Call’ includedteaching classes on the Qur’an.

Traditional religious Islamic views on women wereundergoing a parallel process of change that was to ac-commodate notions of greater equality between the gen-

ders. During the 1960s and the 1970s, attitudes amongthe religious class continued to change. Mahmud Shaltut,rector of the Egyptian Sunni al-Azhar University from1958 to 1963, and ‘Abd al-Halim Mahmud, rector from1973 to 1978, upheld what Stowasser labels a ‘moreegalitarian gender paradigm.’ Their novel, albeit discreetdiscourses on women originated from within the wall ofthe thousand year old Sunni religious institution ofhigher education.20 During the same period, theideologue of the Islamic regime in Khartoum (Sudan)proposed similar Islamist views on gender equality in hisWomen in Islam and Muslim Society.21 Other leading reli-gious figures and intellectuals, like Muhammad al-Ghazali, a much read Islamist author throughout the lastquarter of the 20th century, and Yusuf al-Qaradawi, bothal-Azhar University graduates, although not part of theEgyptian religious ‘establishment,’ proposed novel Islam-ist gender discourses articulated in terms of women’sand men’s ‘humanity and personhood.’ In fact, it wasonly during the last twenty years “that the affirmation ofwomen’s political rights emerged in the clerical and Is-lamist discourse” which Stowasser wonderfully illus-trated.22

Two contemporary proponents of a renewed Islamistdiscourse on gender equality, Yusuf al-Qaradawi andHeba Raouf Ezzat, co-founded the popular Qatar basedweb site on Islam.23 Al-Qaradawi has become one of theArab world’s foremost media religious leaders (ulama)with his popular weekly TV program on Islam thatreaches over 20 million Arabs, the Islamic version ofAmerican televangelists. Al-Qaradawi’s status of clericand the legitimacy provided by his Al-Azhar Sunni Univer-sity training allows him to propose novel interpretationsof Islam to a receptive audience. In the same manner, hecan criticize traditional interpretations and the causes oftheir prevalence. He can propose interpretations that

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attempt to bridge the gap between tradition andmodernity. In his 1994 Collections of Fatwas (2 vols.), al-Qaradawi rejected a number of traditional interpretationson women and politics that signaled a significantdevelopment within traditionalist circles.24 Zaman hasshown the relevance of ulamas, or religious leaders, as‘custodians’ of change in the contemporary Muslimworld,25 while Hooker has shown how contemporaryfatwas, or religious legal opinions, can reflect socialchanges.26 The fact that a religious scholar of Islamist al-legiance is voicing these new views indicates a growingconsensus on these matters. An increasing number of re-ligious leaders appear to have become more receptive tothe reassessment of the place and role of women in Mus-lim society. One reason may be the efforts of a growingnumber of religious leaders to align themselves with newrealities and understandings of women’s contemporarypolitical and social roles.

Al-Qaradawi advocates greater social and politicalroles for Muslim women who are engaged in the ‘Call.’He condemns the increased shunning of women in Is-lamist gatherings and the views that advocate greater con-trol and restriction on women’s social and politicalparticipation. He criticizes the “misogyny [that] aboundsin the pronouncements of many Islamic ‘scholars’ and‘imams’ “ that he believes are responsible for the fact thatentire societies “have mistreated their female membersdespite the fact that Islam has honored and empoweredthe women in all spheres of life. The woman in IslamicLaw is equal to her male counterpart.”27 Al-Qaradawiattempts to empower women within the Muslimcommunity, especially in the public sphere, wherewomen have historically been excluded. His position isreminiscent of the ones upheld by earlier Islamists, likeal-Banna and Qutb who both envisioned a more activerole for Muslim women who were working for the ‘Call.’

Al-Qaradawi still needs to argue for this equality be-tween women and men. He argues with theological andjurisprudential arguments that were put forward earlierby Shaltut (d. 1963) (for example, equality regarding‘blood-money,’ the money that must be paid to the familyof the victim to compensate a death, equal liability forone’s actions, and equality of testimony, since women’s“testimony is demanded and valid in court”).28 Al-Qaradawi rejects the idea of inequality, first, by means ofan exegesis of scriptural passages (Qur’an, 33:33-34)that allows him to ‘contextualize’ revelation and tohighlight historical counter-examples to seclusion. Hethen proceeds to present early interpretations thatcontradict later misogynic interpretations. He alsoprovides an argument, from an Islamic legal (shari‘a)point of view, that confinement is not the normal state ofaffair, but that it rather constitutes only a Qur’anic legalpunishment for adultery (Qur’an, 4:1-5). The extensionof exclusion is thus narrowed (but not eliminated) to itsspecific legal context. Finally, al-Qaradawi introduces theconcept of modesty to replace the one of seclusion(Qur’an, 33: 33).29 Although the Qur’an remains at theforefront of any Islamist interpretation of equality, at-tempts are made to overcome traditional unequal under-standing of the place of Muslim women in Islam that findtheir origins in the Scriptures.

For Islamists, the blueprint for a truly Islamic societyand the Islamic ideals of gender equality remains theScriptures. The interpretative strategies with which theyattempt to make sense of scriptural discrepancies in theface of their claims to gender equality reflect the measureof their willingness to engage with modernity. Al-Qaradawi does not discard unequal Qur’anic prescrip-tions, such as the testimony of two women equating thatof one man or discarding women’s testimony ‘altogether’for major crimes and those requiring ‘retaliation’ (that is,the blood-money to pay to the family of the victim), but

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instead provides what may be labeled ‘naturalistic’reasons for these Qur’anic injunctions. By appealing towomen’s intrinsic ‘nature,’ he, cannot fail, in the end, tojustify and legitimize these unequal prescriptions. He canonly state that the explicit inequality of treatmentbetween women and men found in some Qur’anicpassages does not take anything away from women’s‘humanity and integrity.’ Attempting to salvage tradition,al-Qaradawi reasserts a certain type of gender inequality,although he attempts, at times, to argue that someaspects of Islamic Law ‘do’ recognize gender equality. Anumber of al-Qaradawi’s arguments for equality rest onthose that were developed by Shaltut. Al-Qaradawi doesnot, however, use Shaltut’s refutation (for example, thata woman’s testimony cannot be equated with that of aman) to draw the ‘necessary’ conclusion for a ‘real’equality between women and men. This is indeed aprudent traditionalist reflex in view of his moretraditional audience.

A tension inevitably subsists between new discourseson Islamic equality and those of traditional interpreta-tions. A similar tension arises regarding al-Qaradawi’sideas on women’s authority and gender differentiation.Al-Qaradawi’s negotiations with modern and traditionalunderstandings clearly illustrate possibilities of thinkingoutside the boundaries of the tradition, although he re-fuses to openly take more perilous stands. The mainconcerns of Islamists remain to ensure that women areprovided with the social and political opportunities thatwill enable them to become productive contributors ofsociety, first and foremost, as mothers and wives of stead-fast Muslims, but also as active members of Muslimassociations, working for the ‘transformative’ project thatrests at the heart of the Islamic ‘Call.’ Islamists like al-Qaradawi may, in fact, be viewing women’s social andpolitical activism in a rather ‘instrumentalist’ fashion, in amanner not so different than al-Banna’s own earlier po-

sition. Gender equality takes a second place to the re-quirements of the Islamic ‘Call’ which requires an in-creasingly greater number of socially and politically ac-tive Muslim women.

More recently, however, women Islamists have advo-cated their own brand of social activism and, as a conse-quence, have become Islam’s new interpreters. Unhappywith the term feminism, they often deconstruct it in anattempt to take into account their own experiences andto ‘re-appropriate’ their own Muslim identity. In so doing,these women challenge western understandings of theterm. The gender discourses of these women Islamistsput forward familiar ideas. For instance, Heba RaoufEzzat promotes a number of al-Qaradawi’s ideas. It maywell be legitimate to ask what might the relation betweenal-Qaradawi’s views and those of women Islamists ongender equality be. Al-Qaradawi’s new ‘womanist’ dis-course may, in fact, signal recognition by religious lead-ers of the inescapable challenges that the increasedvoices of Muslim women in general and Islamist womenin particular create for Islam, al-Ghazali and Ezzat beingtwo cases in point.

A political theorist lecturing at Cairo University and atease with western scholarship, Ezzat belongs to the newgeneration of university-educated Islamist women whowrite about women in Islam. She analyzes genderequality in light of the Scriptures and those Qur’anicverses that promote an Islamic notion of ‘gendercomplementarity,’ a notion that pays full respect to‘housewifery’ and motherhood. Ezzat’s motto is to “liber-ate women, and still keep the family,” the latter consist-ing of the primary and fundamental social structure ofMuslim society.30 The objective might be laudable in it-self, but it determines, from the outset, the conclusionsshe will draw in her political analyses of women role insociety. Although women ‘can,’ do ‘have’ the choice tohold a public office, their primary domestic responsibili-

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ties prevent the majority of them to succeed in the politi-cal arena, as “only few women can practically manageboth the responsibilities of family and jurisdiction [thatis, holding a public office].”31 Domesticity appears to belurking not far away from her ‘exception’ rule.

Political opportunities, available to both women andmen, at least for the few ‘exceptional’ women, need to bematched with similar social opportunities. A call forunlimited access to both education and employmentnow defines this new social equality between the gen-ders. In this perspective, the veil becomes a means of‘empowerment’ for women who can now “use the veilpragmatically to get room to maneuver, enlarge theirscope of action and increase their independent mobility… in the social world outside domestic boundaries, astrategy that is legitimized by religious authoritative dis-course.”32 Such statements exemplify Ezzat’s use of the‘patriarchal bargain’ to advocate change through a pro-cess of accommodation of traditional religious valuesand to negotiate greater freedom from within the stric-tures of the patriarchal society. The promotion of botheducation and women’s social involvement (not merelyemployment) remains a main feature of today’s Islamistgender discourse, but, as mentioned earlier, the empha-sis on and legitimization of women’s social activities goesback at least to the first quarter of the 20th century. Herrenewed demands for the social betterment of women’ssituation, through education and employment, do notappear to be something significantly novel in the writingsof Ezzat who belongs to the third generation of EgyptianIslamist. Such demands, nonetheless, point to thesustained relevance of a number of modern ideaspresent in Islamist discourses.

Ezzat’s fight for woman’s rights, albeit within the con-fines of the Islamic tradition, can be labeled a feministstruggle, as her aim remains the betterment of women’ssituation. Ezzat, however, understands feminism in

Islamist terms. Feminism is the product of the seculariza-tion of western society, one of the stages of itsdevelopment that is fundamentally incompatible with Is-lam.33 For Ezzat, fighting for women’s rights undoubtedlydoes not transform one into a feminist: “I am not anIslamic feminist”34 and “I don’t search [for ideas] outsideIslam, and there’s no such thing as Islamic feminism.”35

In a fashion akin to the criticisms made by critics of cul-tural relativism, Ezzat criticizes the universal claims thatfeminism makes, as mere historical and contingent prod-ucts, based on her Islamist assumption that Islam’s ownversion of women’s rights is the only universal version ofwomen’s rights. This is where some of the limitations ofher feminist understanding may rest.

Ezzat also attacks feminism for having been co-optedby the State. The State is responsible for the ‘erosion’ ofIslamic Family Law and the State’s curtailment of the ac-tivities of Islamic groups, such as the Muslim Brother-hood and has used feminism to achieve its goal. Histori-cally, legal approaches have been privileged in the Araband Muslim world in order to introduce legal changes inthe States’ efforts to promote more gender equality. Ezzatcriticizes these legal approaches primarily because theydid not address the real causes of inequality which haveeconomical, political and social causes. Her major qualmrests with the erosion of traditional Islamic Family Law,the underlying assumption of her criticism of the Stateand feminism being that such legal changes would beunnecessary if Muslim states provided justice and equal-ity (social, political, economic, etc.). A true Islamic statewould and should uphold precisely the type of justiceand equality which the Muslim Brotherhood movement isadvocating. More fundamentally, however, her concernsrests with her belief that the existence of Islamism itselfthat is threatened: “the feminist movement has becomeone of the allies of the regimes against the‘fundamentalist’ threat.”36 In addition to being an exter-

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nal western threat, feminism becomes an internal threat,as an instrument of the State in its efforts to eliminate theIslamists.

The meeting of the discourses of tradition and moder-nity once again creates a tension. Like al-Qaradawi, Ezzatadopts, on the one hand, traditional values, those ofmotherhood, housewifery and the primacy of IslamicFamily Law (without any discussion of its consequencesfor women) and, on the other hand, modern values,those of active social, economical and political roles forwomen. The latter modern values have certainly beenhistorically absent from traditional interpretations ofwomen’s role, rights and status in Islam. The work ofLois Lamya al-Faruqi on Islamic identity and the ‘alien’ in-fluences that have been imposed on Muslims exhibitssimilar tensions. Al-Faruqi identifies feminism as one ofthe “certain alien ideological intrusions on our societies,ignorance, and distortion of the true Islam, or exploita-tion by individuals within the society.”37 Her ‘nativism’38

pushes her to focus on, and appeal to genuine indig-enous values and culture (associated with Islam), allow-ing her to state that “if feminism is to succeed in an Is-lamic environment, it must be an indigenous form offeminism” which most Muslim women would believe isIslam’s true egalitarian principles of justice. For today’sIslamists, Muslim women’s salvation is in Islam: “pre-scriptions that are found in the Qur’an and in the ex-ample of the Prophet Muhammad […] are regarded asthe ideal to which contemporary women wish to re-turn.”39 The tension between traditional and modern val-ues is only one of the manifestations of a ‘struggle foridentity’ for contemporary Muslims in the face of increas-ing western encroachment and an even more rapidlyincreasing globalization. This tension is also reflected inthe gender discourses of Islamists.

The few examples provided illustrate how even con-temporary religious Islamist discourses, although intrin-sically traditional in nature, attempt to align themselveswith contemporary values, such as gender equality andwomen’s rights discourses. These examples providesome credence to Hymowitz’s claim that “Islamic femi-nism can affirm the dignity of Islam, while at the sametime bringing it more in line with modernity.”40 The man-ner in which Islamists achieve this goal still remains to befully examined, but the preceding contextualization ofsome present day Islamist discourse, in the light ofearlier Islamist discourses on women yields, however,unexpected results and illustrates how the contemporaryviews of al-Qaradawi, Ezzat, or al-Faruqi on Muslimwomen, their role, status, and rights find their roots inthe earlier Islamist discourses of al-Banna’, Qutb, andeven al-Ghazali.

The modern elements incorporated in today’s Islam-ist discourses on gender equality and women’s rights,none of which are merely traditional discourses, areequally important to understand the Islamist discourse.Their revivalist approaches create new modern under-standings, neither purely traditional nor purely mod-ern.41 Today’s Islamist discourses constitute ‘modernconstructs’ that attempt to remain traditional, whileadopting specifically modern components.42 Contempo-rary values such as education and the possibility forwomen to engage in social and political activities, espe-cially for the Islamic cause, have become intrinsic parts oftheir new contemporary claims.43 The presence of thesetwo seemingly opposing and contradictory elements mayaccount for the present popularity that Islamistdiscourses enjoys in many Muslims countries.

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Notes:

1 Al-Banna, Hassan, Five Tracts of Hasan Al-Banna’(1906-1949): A Selection from the Majmu‘at Rasa’il al-Imam al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna’, translated from the Ara-bic and annotated by Charles Wendell. Berkeley and LosAngeles: University of California Press, 1978, 6-7.

2 Al-Banna, Five Tracts of Hasan Al-Banna’, 31.3 Al-Banna, Five Tracts of Hasan Al-Banna’, 31.4 Al-Banna, Five Tracts of Hasan Al-Banna’, 7.5 Al-Jazeera, “A-Qaradawi Turns down Top Brother-

hood Post,” Monday 12 January, 2004; <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/F7E30839-EFA2-4F86-9E05-887DEECEB3D1.htm> (1 July 2005).

6 Beth Baron, The Women’s Awakening in Egypt: Cul-ture, Society, and the Press, New Haven, Yale UniversityPress, 1994, 176-8.

7 Deniz Kandiyoti, “Bargaining with Patriarchy,” Gen-der and Society, 2.3 (1988): 274-290.

8 Farhad Khosrokhavar, “Toward and Anthropology ofDemocratization in Iran,” Critique, 16 (2000): 3-29, esp.24-5.

9 Valentine M. Moghadam, “Engendering Citizenship,Feminizing Civil Society: The Case of Middle East andNorth Africa,” Women and Politics, 25.1/2 (2003): 63-87.

10 Roxanne D. Marcotte, “Identity, Power, and the Is-lamist Discourse on Women: An Exploration of Islamismand Gender Issues in Egypt,” in Islam in World Politics,eds. Nelly Lahoud, Anthony H. Johns and Allan Patience,London, Routledge Curzon, 2005, 67-92, esp. 75-7.

11 Baron, The Women’s Awakening in Egypt, 115.12 Janine A. Clark, Islam, Charity, and Activism:

Middle-Class Networks and Social Welfare in Egypt, Jor-dan, and Yemen, Bloomington, IN, Indiana UniversityPress, 2004.

13 Al-Banna, Five Tracts of Hasan Al-Banna’, 26-27.

14 William E. Shepard, Sayyid Qutb and Islamic Activ-ism: A Translation and Critical Analysis of Social Justicein Islam, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1996, ix-x, and chap. 3; cf.Sayyid Qutb, Social Justice in Islam, rev. ed., translatedfrom the Arabic by John B. Hardie, translation revised andintroduction by Hamid Algar, Oneonta, NY, IslamicPublications International, 2000.

15 Shepard, Sayyid Qutb and Islamic Activism, 62-4.16 Valerie J. Hoffman, “An Islamic Activist: Zaynab al-

Ghazali: Translated from the Arabic by Valerie J.Hoffman,” in Women and the Family in the Middle East.New Voices of Change, ed. Elizabeth W. Fernea, Austin,University of Texas Press, 1985, 233-254, esp. 235;Margo Badran, Feminists, Islam, and Nation, Gender andthe Making of Modern Egypt, Princeton, Princeton Univer-sity Press, 1995, 163.

17 Hoffman, “An Islamic Activist,” 237.18 Hoffman, “An Islamic Activist,” 236-7.19 Hoffman, “An Islamic Activist,” 244.20 Barbara Stowasser, “Old Shaykhs, Young Women,

and the Internet: The Rewriting of Women’s PoliticalRights in Islam,” The Muslim World, 91.1/2 (2001): 99-119, esp. 101.

21 Hasan Abdalla Al-Turabi, Women in Islam andMuslim Society, 1973, <http://www.jannah.org/sisters/turabi.html> (1 July 2005).

22 Stowasser, “Old Shaykhs, Young Women, and theInternet,” 101-2.

23 IslamOnline.net, cf. <http://www.islamonline.net>(1 July 2005).

24 Stowasser, “Old Shaykhs, Young Women, and theInternet.”

25 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contem-porary Islam: Custodians of Change (Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 2002).

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26 Michael B. Hooker, Indonesian Islam: SocialChange through Contemporary Fatawa, Crowns Nest,NSW, Asian Studies Association of Australia with Allen &Unwin, 2003.

27 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, The Voice of Woman in Islam[written after 1995]; <http://www.jannah.org/sisters/qaradawi.html> (1 July 2005).

28 Al-Qaradawi, The Voice of Woman in Islam.29 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, The Islamic Movement and

Women’s Activity; <http://www.jannah.org/sisters/qaradawimov.html>, (1 July 2005).

30 Heba Raouf Ezzat, “RethinkingSecularism…Rethinking Feminism,” 1 June 2002;<http://www.islamonline.net/English/contemporary/2002/07/Article01.shtml> (1 July 2005).

31 Heba Raouf Ezzat, “Women and the Interpretationof Islamic Sources,” Women Issues, October 1999.<http://www.islam21.net/pages/keyissues/key2-6.htm>(1 July 2005).

32 Heba Raouf Ezzat, “Ask About Islam, Question andAnswer Details: The Voice of Muslim Women,”IslamOnline.net, 19 May 2003; <http://www.islamonline.net/askaboutislam/display.asp?hquestionID=4059> (1 July 2005).

33 Ezzat, “Rethinking Secularism,” and Idem, “Womenand the Interpretation of Islamic Sources,”

34 K. el-Gawhary, “An Interview with Heba Ra’ufEzzat,” Middle East Report, No. 191, Nov-Dec.: 26-27.

35 Ezzat, “Rethinking Secularism”; cf. Sanna Negus, “AChosen Identity. Columnist and Social Critic Heba RaoufEspouses Social Equality without Feminism and IslamicValues without Islamism,” Cairo Times, vol. 3, issue 25(22-6 January); <http://www.cairotimes.com/content/archiv03/raouf.html> (18 July 2003).

36 Ezzat, “Rethinking Secularism.”

37 Lois Lamya al-Faruqi, “Islamic Traditions and theFeminist Movement—Confrontation or Cooperation?”;<http://www.jannah.org/sisters/feminism.html> (1 July2005).

38 For a use of the term in an Iranian context, cf.Mehdi Boroujerdi, Iranian Intellectuals and the West. TheTormented Triumph of Nativism, Syracuse: SyracuseUniversity Press, 1996, 14-9.

39 Al-Faruqi, “Islamic Traditions and the FeministMovement.”

40 Kay S. Hymowitz, “Why Feminism is AWOL on Is-lam,” City Journal, winter, vol. 13, no. 1 (2003): 36-51;<http://www.city-journal.org/html/13_1_why_feminism.html> (1 July 2005).

41 Bruce B. Lawrence, Defenders of God: The Funda-mentalist Revolt against the Modern Age. 2nd ed., Co-lumbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995.

42 Roxanne D. Marcotte, “How Far Have ReformsGone in Islam?” Women’s Studies International Forum,26.2 (2003): 153-66, esp. 162-3.

43 Helen Hardacre, “The Impact of Fundamentalismson Women, the Family, and Interpersonal Relations,” inFundamentalisms and Society: Reclaiming the Sciences,the Family, and Education. Vol. 2 of The Fundamental-ism Project, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993,129-50; cf. Hoffman, “An Islamic Activist.”

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În data de 11 septembrie 2001 am stat cu toþii în faþatelevizoarelor nevenindu-ne sã credem ceea ce vedem. Îndecorul american cu care eram cu toþii obiºnuiþi datoritãmulþimii de filme pe care le-am consumat avea loc uneveniment atroce pe care, într-o primã fazã, ne simþeamincapabili sã-l deosebim de ultimul film SF urmãrit.Pentru prima datã a schimba canalele nu mai însemnanimic: toate televiziunile din lume difuzau aceeaºiimagine pe care o reluau la nesfârºit. Iar noi priveam cugurile cãscate cum al doilea avion, alb-negru ca într-unfilm de epocã, lovea unul dintre turnurile gemene aleWorld Trade Center-ului, cum un avion venit parcã dinaltã lume lovea în ordinea mondialã, în economiamondialã ºi în orgoliul statului care constituia centrulacestei lumi. Dar în acele momente toate acestesimboluri erau estompate de ºocul pe care orice om dinaceastã lume l-a avut când a realizat cã ceea ce vede nueste un film, o ficþiune, ci cã omul care sãrea de la etajulal 90-lea care era în flãcãri, ºi care apãrea pe ecranelenoastre ca un punct gri, era un om real, viu ºi care încâteva secunde va fi mort. Dupã primele câteva vizionãriale imaginilor primele bãnuieli apocaliptice au început

Gyemant Maria

J. Derrida, J. Habermas,Le “concept” de 11 septembre,Dialogues à New York (octobre– décembre 2001) avecGiovannaBorradori, Paris: Galilée, 2004

sã se înfiripe în minþile noastre. Sã fie vorba de un nourãzboi mondial? De un sfârºit al lumii sub zeci deciuperci nucleare? Pentru prima datã Statele Unitepãreau cu adevãrat aproape de noi, atât de aproape pecât de probabil era ca furia lor nuclearã sã bulversezepacea mondialã cu care am avut timp sã ne obiºnuim ºis-o considerãm garantatã în ultimii 50 de ani în carerãzboaiele n-au încetat sã se desfãºoare dar o fãceau înmod discret, în zone pe care nu întotdeauna ºtiam sã learãtãm pe hartã. În acele momente 11 septembrie era orealitate fãrã nume, un eveniment ce se impunea cuforþa cu care se impune piciorul patului în momentul încare te loveºti cu degetul mic de el. Dar, într-o lume încare istoria se produce instantaneu, n-a fost nevoie demult timp pentru ca evenimentul sã capete un numeconvenþional, “11 septembrie”, nume care sã serveascãdemersului de conceptualizare, respectiv de asumare,apropriere, disecare ºi clasare, metodã proprie culturiioccidentale, prin care aceasta face sã disparã prinasimilare tot ce nu corespunde cadrelor ei de înþelegere.

Astfel, la douã luni de la eveniment, GiovannaBorradori reuºea sã obþinã câte un interviu cu privire laevenimentul din 11 septembrie de la cele douã vocimajore ale filosofiei zilelor noastre: Jürgen Habermas ºiJacques Derrida. Aceste interviuri au constituit nucleulcãrþii Le “concept” de 11 septembre1. Putem, deci,examina în aceastã carte primele impresii pe careevenimentul ce va rãmâne înregistrat în istorie subnumele de “11 septembrie” le-a lãsat asupra culturiimondiale. Este vorba despre o primã încercare deconceptualizare, uºor forþatã, având în vedere lipsa dedistanþã istoricã ce caracterizeazã opiniile celor doi marifilosofi. Cu toate acestea, ea nu este lipsitã de valoare,dimpotrivã, este o mãrturie autenticã a opiniei publice aacelei perioade, o mãrturie venitã nu din partea oricui, cichiar a creatorilor de opinie. Putem identifica ideile luiHabermas ºi Derrida în politica pe care statele cãrora ei

Gyemant MariaFaculty of History andPhilosophyBabes-Bolyai UniversityCluj, Romania

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le aparþin au dus-o în legãturã cu acest subiect ºi, deasemenea, putem identifica germenii ideilor care aucirculat în Europa ºi America acelei perioade. Aceastãcarte oferã deci o surprinzãtoare imagine exhaustivã arelaþiilor internaþionale datate “11 septembrie”. Cei doimari filosofi ai lumii occidentale, amândoi europeni,venind din cele douã þãri cu cea mai grea pondere înEuropa, anume Germania ºi Franþa, ºi reprezentândfiecare opinia publicã a þãrii respective în cea mai înaltãformã a ei, îºi dau cu pãrerea asupra unui eveniment ce amarcat izbucnirea conflictului între Statele Unite, cea maimare putere mondialã ºi reprezentantã a lumii creºtine ºiIslam, luat ca termen general pentru a defini toatã acealume obscurã, marginalizatã, pe care ne-am dori s-oputem ignora, ce se aflã mai la est de anumite limitealeatorii. Evident, Statele Unite nu luptã în numelecreºtinismului, de aceea s-a renunþat la nefericitaexprimare cu privire la “cruciada antiteroristã”. Deasemenea, adversarul nu este Islamul în totalitatea lui,ca lume musulmanã definitã prin credinþa ei, citerorismul fundamentalist, imposibil de delimitat ºi deidentificat. Dacã ne-am obiºnuit sã-i privim pe Habermasºi pe Derrida ca pe susþinãtori ai unor puncte de vedereîn general opuse, în cazul evenimentului din 11septembrie ei cad de acord asupra unei unice chestiuni:reacþia Statelor Unite a fost exageratã. Vom încerca sãprezentãm pe rând punctul de vedere al fiecãruia dintrecei doi filosofi. Vom arãta într-o primã parte cã poziþiapro-democraticã a lui Habermas, speranþa lui neclintitãîn posibilitatea dialogului este, pe cât de generoasã, peatât de imposibil de realizat. În a doua parte a textuluivom prezenta viziunea lui Derrida cu privire lafenomenele de auto-imunizare ce caracterizeazã lumeade dupã sfârºitul rãzboiului rece expunând dezvoltãrile,recunoscut utopice, pe care el le aduce în interviul din22 octombrie 2001, cu privire la conceptul deospitalitate. În final, vom încerca sã privim cãderea World

Trade Center-ului din perspectiva zilelor noastre, prinprisma consecinþelor pe care le-a implicat. Ne vomîntreba asupra posibilitãþii unei soluþii a acestei aporiicare a ajuns la termenul ei, anume aporia globalizantã astatului democratic unic ºi asupra perspectivei unei noiordini mondiale ºi a elaborãrii a noi strategii, fie ele deluptã sau de pace.

Jürgen Habermas, cunoscut drept filosof aldialogului, a crescut în Germania de dupã al doilearãzboi mondial, unde democraþia era aplicatã cuconvingere. Astfel, în toatã filosofia lui Habermasstrãbate acea încredere fãrã rezerve cã democraþia, caîncununare a spiritului iluminist ºi ca izbândã a raþiuniiºi a consensului asupra pasiunii cu care sunt susþinutepãrerile cu pretenþie la universalitate, este singura ºi ceamai bunã soluþie politicã ºi cã dialogul este unicul modde a regla conflictele. Întrebat cu privire la 11septembrie, Habermas descrie evenimentul în cuvinte vii,fãcând apel la imaginea unor avioane pline de pasageriºi încãrcate cu combustibil care devin proiectile vii. Darºocul acestui eveniment constã, dupã pãrerea lui, înspecial în noutatea ºi în surpriza pe care o provoacã:teroriºtii sinucigaºi nu pot fi traºi la rãspundere,obiectivul distrus are o deosebitã putere simbolicã ºiîntreaga lume este martorul direct acestei atrocitãþi prinintermediul media. Pentru Statele Unite este vorba de opalmã uriaºã ºi neaºteptatã, iar faptul cã sursa ei nupoate fi identificatã ºi cã în cazul unei identificãri, aceastanu vizeazã un stat cãruia sã i se poatã declara rãzboi a datnaºtere unor reacþii exagerate atât în rândul cetãþeniloral cãror naþionalism virulent se pronunþã în varii moduri,cât ºi la nivelul statului care declarã rãzboi terorismuluiîn general fãrã a putea prin aceasta identifica vreunduºman precis. Încet-încet, acest concept vag de terorismcapãtã contur datoritã intervenþiei media ºi a declaraþiilorpolitice. Dar, odatã cu aceastã conceptualizare apar ºi oserie de confuzii grave. Se pune întrebarea dacã existã

Key words:

11 September, terror,fundamentalism, violence,Jürgen Habermas, JacquesDerrida, GiovannaBorradori, Europe, America

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vreo diferenþã între terorismul naþional, de exempluluptele de guerilã sau terorismul palestinian, care au cusiguranþã un scop politic, ºi terorismul internaþional, alcãrui exemplu îl constituie 11 septembrie. Terorismulnaþional ar fi o luptã cu obiectiv politic la finalul cãreiateroriºtii devin membrii onorabili ai noii societãþi pentrulibertatea cãreia au luptat. Dar Habermas crede cu tãrieca 11 septembrie nu relevã de nici un fel de determinarepoliticã, iar ceea ce poate fi condamnat pentru aceastãatrocitate este fundamentalismul unor oameni ca BenLaden. Fundamentalismul, acea “dispoziþie a spirituluiprin care cineva se obstineazã sã impunã propriileconvingeri ºi motivaþii când acestea nu sunt în nici un cazacceptabile de cãtre toþi ceilalþi”2 este reacþia secundarã afenomenului globalizãrii, care presupune uniformizareaunui sistem social de sorginte occidentalã, mai mult,iudeo-creºtinã, în care anumite culturi se vãdmarginalizate, umilite, excluse. Fundamentalismul, vãzutdin aceastã perspectivã, este “o reacþie de apãrareîmpotriva angoaselor produse prin eradicarea violentã aunor forme de viaþã tradiþionale”3.

Aceasta fiind situaþia actualã, Habermas identificãdrept cauzã a violenþei faptul cã nu existã dialog întrecele douã pãrþi ale conflictului. “Spirala violenþei începeprintr-o spiralã a comunicãrii perturbate care, via ospiralã a neîncrederii reciproce incontrolate, conduce lao rupturã în comunicare”4. Dacã în interiorul uneisocietãþi unitare apar astfel de conflicte, aplanarea lorrevine terapeutului sau justiþiei, tematizarea verbalã aconflictului fiind primul pas spre rezolvarea lui. Încontextul conflictelor dintre state apare însã o problemã.Deºi existã, dreptul internaþional actual este încãlcatadeseori. El nu reprezintã decât o soluþie secundarã prearar luatã în considerare atât la nivelul statelor europene,care au luptat câteva secole pentru recunoaºtereaidentitãþii naþionale ºi nu sunt dispuse sã renunþe lasuveranitatea lor în favoarea binelui mondial, cât ºi la

nivelul Statelor Unite care, de pe poziþia lor de super-putere, preferã sã regleze conflictele ce le privesc întribunale militare proprii. Ceea ce pune în ºah dreptulinternaþional este, practic o unicã problemã:incapacitatea de a depãºi punctul de vedere al identitãþiinaþionale ºi al intereselor naþionale spre o ordine ce sãvizeze binele general. Habermas prevede însã, în luminaevenimentelor ce au bulversat lumea, o trecere de ladreptul internaþional clasic la o ordine cosmopoliticã ceare pãrþi bune ºi pãrþi rele. Este bine ca drepturileomului sã fie puse mai presus de suveranitateanaþionalã, astfel încât sã se poatã interveni în caz deurgenþã, dar, pe de altã parte, aceastã intervenþie estezãdãrnicitã de faptul cã organismele ce garanteazãdreptul internaþional ºi legitimeazã fiecare stat înacþiunile lui nu deþin o forþã proprie care sã-i dublezeautoritatea juridicã, astfel neavând mijloacele sã obligestatele naþionale sã le respecte deciziile.

Soluþia pe care o oferã Habermas, consistentã cuîntreaga sa filosofie, este aceea a unui dialog de pe poziþiiegale, care sã se bazeze pe o toleranþã realã. Politica nurezidã, afirmã Habermas reluându-l pe Carl Schmitt, “încapacitatea unei identitãþi colective de a se afirmaîmpotriva altor identitãþi colective altfel constituite”5. Estenevoie de o democraþie realã, constituþionalã, care sã sehrãneascã chiar din opiniile adverse ei, pe care letolereazã, fãcând astfel din minoritãþi pãrþi integrante. Odemocraþie în care bazele dialogului sunt comune, iarrespectul este reciproc este o democraþie deschisã, gatasã-ºi modifice propria perspectivã, failibilã aºa cum efailibilã orice construcþie umanã, îmbogãþind-o prindialog ºi prin acceptarea perspectivei celuilalt. Trebuieastfel eliminatã acea violenþã latentã prezentã încomunicare, ce dã seamã ºi de caracterul paternalist altoleranþei care este adeseori unilateralã, în sensul uneiconcesii condescendente. În alte cuvinte, soluþia luiHabermas este renunþarea la discursurile universaliste,

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ideologice ºi la impunerea valorilor proprii ºi adoptareaunei poziþii de respect reciproc bazat pe acceptareaaceloraºi norme morale.

Derrida, pe de altã parte, adoptã o poziþie mai puþinechidistantã, poziþie încã prezentã în opinia publicãfrancezã. Este vorba despre ideea cã Statele Unite suntcele care au creat cadrul în care un eveniment precum11 septembrie se înscrie, dând dovadã prin aceasta de oparadoxalã predispoziþie cãtre o auto-imunitatesinucigaºã. Eveniment major, atât prin gravitatea lui cât ºiprin panica pe care a produs-o, inserând în conºtiinþacetãþenilor americani convingerea cã ce e mai rãuurmeazã abia sã vinã, 11 septembrie a încetat sã mai fie osimplã datã, devenind numele celei mai îngrozitoarespaime a oricui, spaima de un necunoscut agresiv carepoate lovi oricând ºi nu poate fi prevenit. Aceastã spaimãpoate fi înscrisã sub numele de teroare, o tensiunepermanentã vizând viitorul incert ºi este efectul dorit aloricãrui act terorist, desfãºurat împotriva unei forþe înfaþa cãreia nu are nici o ºansã ºi pe care o destabilizeazãinserând teroarea în inima populaþiei civile. În acestcontext, Derrida observã ceea ce va numi fenomen deauto-imunitate, dupã modelul biologic al organismuluicare dezvoltã un sistem de respingere a propriilorsisteme de apãrare, producând prin aceasta propriamoarte. Acest fenomen poate fi constatat la trei nivele înce priveºte Statele Unite ºi relaþia lor cu teroriºtii. Estevorba, în primul rând, de o agresiune ce vine dininteriorul Statelor Unite, sub forma unui avion propriuce a pornit de pe un aeroport propriu pentru a lovi pepropriul teritoriu într-unul dintre simbolurile principaleale Statelor unite. Dar caracterul sinucigaº, de agresiuneauto-indusã, poate fi constatat ca pregãtindu-se de maimultã vreme. În timpul rãzboiului rece, Statele Unite aufost cele care au înarmat diverse populaþii din OrientulMijlociu, le-au antrenat ºi le-au pregãtit pentru diverseatacuri. Odatã cu sfârºitul rãzboiului rece, aceste

populaþii, “consecinþã rezidualã atât a rãzboiului rece câtºi a sfârºitului acestuia”6, rãmase fãrã rost se autodistrugtrãgând dupã ele ºi entitatea care le-a creat. Simbol alcomerþului american, World Trade Center cade, victimã afoºtilor cumpãrãtori, a foºtilor clienþi ai Statelor Unite. Însfârºit, atentatul din 11 septembrie ºi consecinþele luiscot în evidenþã cercul vicios al violenþei, paradoxulagresiunii care justificã reacþiile agresive ale victimeifãcând ca violenþa sã se perpetueze la infinit. De undeprovine însã aceastã simpatie pentru cel mai slab,proprie opiniei publice franceze? Pãrerea noastrã este cãea este alimentatã de substratul istoric ce hrãneºte ºideterminã aceastã opinie publicã: este vorba deRevoluþia francezã, izbucnirea poporului împotrivaasupritorilor cu mult mai puternici, cãci afirmaþia luiDerrida cã “recursul la cea mai rea violenþã este adeseaprezentat ca singurul “rãspuns” ce poate fi dat unei“urechi surde””7 ne duce cu gândul la rãsturnareamonarhiei absolutiste în Franþa anului 1789. Deasemenea, avem exemplul rezistenþei franceze dintimpul ocupaþiei germane, exemplul prin excelenþã, celpuþin în mediul european, de terorism de guerilã, vizândeliberarea naþionalã. Chiar dacã este evident cã 11septembrie nu are a face cu o astfel de luptã, care arputea fi eventual legitimatã, în opinia publicã francezã aexistat întotdeauna o identificare mai degrabã cu aceºtiluptãtori obscuri decât cu supra-puterea americanã carele este în general antipaticã pentru simplul fapt cã esteprima putere în lume. Astfel, Derrida pune în discuþieconceptul însuºi de “terorism”, deconstruindu-l prindemonstraþia cã ceea ce denumeºte el se modificã înfuncþie de cel care îl foloseºte. Fãcând aceasta, Derridaextrapoleazã sensul de “terorism” pânã la a afirma cãacesta nu þine doar de cazurile în care existã violenþã ºimorþi, ci cã putem numi terorism chiar ºi faptul de “alãsa sã moarã” ºi “a nu vrea sã ºtim cã lãsãm sã moarã”oameni din Africa de exemplu, ce mor de foame ºi de

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SIDA. Derrida se întreabã dacã nu putem vedea înaceastã atitudine “o strategie teroristã “mai mult sau maipuþin” conºtientã ºi deliberatã”8. Acest punct de vederepare, pe cât de exagerat, pe atât de rãuvoitor, mai alesavând în vedere soluþia pe care Derrida o oferã. Aceastaconstã în regruparea statelor Europei în jurul uneiautoritãþi care sã garanteze un drept internaþional ºi caresã aibã forþa de al impune. Pânã aici, opinia derrideanãcoincide cu cea a lui Habermas. Însã Derrida considerã cãaceastã forþã trebuie sã fie laicã, orice conotaþie teologicãîncã prezentã în ideea de stat suveran, deci de autoritatedivinã trebuind sã fie evitatã. Evitând orice conotaþiireligioase este evitatã ºi posibilitatea unor conflicte deordin religios, idee generoasã în sine, dacã n-am puteaciti printre rânduri cã autoritatea în jurul cãreia ar trebuisã se grupeze þãrile europene este Franþa, singurul stateuropean unde laicitatea a mers atât de departe încât asurclasat drepturile omului9, or mare parte dintre stateleEuropei sunt state declarat catolice care ar avea uncuvânt de spus în ce priveºte acest proiect. În sfârºit, încompletarea acestei democraþii dotate cu forþa de a-ºiimpune punctele de vedere dar nerelevând deautoritatea vreunui stat, fie el chiar ºi un stat mondial,Derrida dezvoltã ideea unei ospitalitãþi necondiþionatecare ar trebui sã ia locul toleranþei creºtine, caritabile,proprie întotdeauna unui discurs al puterii. Aceastãospitalitate presupune acceptul incursiunii unui strãin,unui altul, în spaþiul tãu ºi acceptarea lui ca atare, ca ºialtul, fãrã nici o încercare de asimilare. Aceasta ar fisoluþia unei democraþii “à venir”, care se aflã pentrutotdeauna în aceastã situaþie de promisiune irealizabilã,un fel de soluþie tip Habermas dusã la extrem.

Acesta a fost felul în care 11 septembrie a fosttematizat, conceptualizat, analizat înainte ca anul 2001sã ia sfârºit.

Existã oare între naivitatea viziunii lui Habermas, caredoreºte o democraþie bazatã pe dialog în contextul

absenþei unei limbi comune ºi a unei dorinþe decomunicare, ºi scepticismul lui Derrida, care considerãorice formã de dialog un atentat la integritatea culturalãa celuilalt, o cale de mijloc? Conºtientizarea nevoii uneinoi filosofii a politicului, a eticului ºi a socialului estemarea consecinþã de lungã duratã a evenimentului din11 septembrie, iar noi vom avea ocazia sã participãm,probabil, la acest demers în anii care urmeazã.

Note:

1 Cartea a apãrut sub titlul original Philosophy in atime of terror în 2003 la The University of Chicago Press.

2 Ibid., p. 61.3 Ibid., p. 634 Ibid., p.685 Ibid., p. 72.6 Ibid., p.150.7 Ibid., p. 181.8 Ibid., p.162-163.9 Avem în vedere ceea ce astãzi e cunoscut sub

numele de “problema voalului” ºi care, chiar dacã înformularea juridicã nu atenteazã direct la drepturilemusulmanilor, a fost perceputã de opinia pubicã drept omãsurã de a interveni în cultura musulmanã pentru aelibera femeile de autoritatea exclusiv masculinã.

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Cabalã, cabalist. Termeni care „profanilor” le-arsugera cel mult proximitatea misterului, iar exegeþilor leindicã spaþiul unei vaste polisemii ce îndeamnã latravaliu hermeneutic, sunt analizaþi de Moshe Idel caspecii proprii registrului nocturn al spiritualitãþii ebraice.

Cabaliºtii nocturni aduce în faþa celor interesaþiprobleme de bazã ale ceea ce generic s-a numit ºtiinþacabalei. Un accent deosebit se pune, titlul fiind aicidefinitoriu, pe statulul oniric al tehnicilor de inducere arevelaþiei sacrului ºi, respectiv, pânã acolo, pe tehnicilede declanºare a viselor revelatorii. Un prim pas în acestdemers îl face Moshe Idel indicând diferenþa netã întretehnicile iudaice – cabaliste ºi necabaliste – ºi cele„clasice” (ale antichitãþii greceºti ºi, ulterior, eleniste)marcate de obligativitatea existenþei unui centru eminentde sacralitate, cum ar fi sanctuarul ºi templul. Dacãforma clasicã a onirismului revelator presupuneaprezenþa unui genius loci, a unei zeitãþi tutelare asociatãspaþiului arhitectonic sacru, cea iudaicã îºi regãseºteagenþii în persoana mesagerilor angelici, reprezentanþiiunei puteri divine mobile.

Cabaliºtii secolului 13 considerau starea de vis ca oformã specificã a conºtiinþei, stare a cãrei articulaþieliminarã cu cea de veghe este susceptibilã sã producãrevelarea divinului. Conform lui Moshe Idel este dereþinut faptul cã în cabala extaticã aspectele de ordinteoretic, de doctrinã, mai precis studiul lor, þin de deregistrul diurn, iar cele practice, în esenþã tehnicilemistice se supun recomandãrii de a fi efectuate noaptea.Astfel îºi fac apariþia în cabalã douã poziþii distincte,complementare dealtfel, nemarcate de vreo formãoarecare de radicalism, care privilegiazã, fiecare în parte,onirismul sau starea de veghe, ºi care se constituieconcomitent drept cadre de referinþã axiologice ºiontologice în definirea experienþelor mistice trãite desubiecþii ce recurgeau la una din tehnicile extatice. Aºa seface cã, între tehnicile de acces la divinitate, o importantãparte a literaturii cabalistice concede pozitiv cu privire lastatutul înalt al visului. Totul în ideea cã, oficial,adevãratul autor al acestei literaturi este Dumnezeu ºi,uneori, anumiþi arhangheli.

Problema tehnicilor onirice este tratatã de Moshe Idelîn cadrul delimitat de scrierile cabaliste apãrute în Spaniacelei de-a doua jumãtaþi de secol 15, preluate ulterior dealþi autori ºi îmbogãþite prin noi interpretãri. Pe bazaacestui corpus de lucrãri sunt prezentate cititoruluiprobleme de nuanþã care marcheazã diacronic pseudo-istoria curentului cabalist. Întâlnim aici un mod specificde ierarhizare axiologicã a revelaþiilor – contaminat deidealizarea unui trecut utopic – în întrupate, cu rostire(din trecut) ºi onirice, personale (din prezent). Mediereaîntre divinitate ºi recipientul mesajului este rezolvatã îndiverse modalitãþi: fie prin apelul la concepþiaveºmântului (similarã teoriilor neoplatoniciene ºignostice ale spiritului care descende în lume, asumându-ºi progresiv o corporalitate materialã), o entitate angelicãtranscendentã care îl ia în stãpânire pe cabalist, fierecurgând la mediatori cu un grad ridicat de

Ciprian Lupºe

Moshe Idel, Cabaliºtii nocturniEditura Provopress, Cluj-Napoca, 2005, 81 pp.

Ciprian LupseFaculty of History andPhilosophyBabes-Bolyai UniversityCluj, Romania

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„personalizare”, cum ar fi Ilie sau chiar diverse forþemalefice, invocate pentru atingerea unor scopuripractice. De aici decurge modul specific conform cãruiacabaliºtii percep paralelismul dintre „felul în care îngeriiºi demonii apar în aceastã lume”.

Statulul înalt al onirismului nocturn este accentuatde cabalã prin apelul la dihotomia metodologicã întreraþionalitatea prezentului, vãzutã ca decadentã, ºi visare,consideratã de cabaliºti drept compromisul cu istoriacare permite recuperarea parþialã a stãrii originare degraþie. Activitatea literarã în stare de veghe, raþionalitatea(în esenþã filosofia greacã), au contaminat culturaiudaicã de o aºa manierã încât registrul diurn alspiritualitãþii a devenit indezirabil. Modalitãþile specificede manifestare ale acestui registru, finalizate în uitareaTorei, sunt vãzute ca fiind direct responsabile de exil. Înacest context cabala, tehnicã de elecþie a registruluinocturn, este singura care mai poate apropria iniþiatuluio oarecare autenticitate. Onirismul cabalistic este sumade reguli ce trebuie respectate, este organonul carepermite aplicarea corectã a tehnicilor de acces ladivinitate în vis. Stãrile onirice sunt tehnici mistico-magicede obþinere de la entitãþile transcendente a unorrãspunsuri la întrebãrile cabalistului. Cel mai adeseaîntrebãrile vizeazã dezvãluirea unor aspecte ascunse aleistoriei fixate de Dumnezeu. În pofida determinismuluistrict, rolul cabalistului nu este unul pasiv; interesul sãupentru atari probleme reprezintã în cultura iudaicã oformã specificã de religiozitate. În plus, ca o accentuare ºio adeverire a acestui mod de a privi lucrurile, se observãcã subiecþii mai bine pregãtiþi, mai bine dezvoltaþispiritual, pot avea contacte cu „tãrâmurile îngereºti ºidivine” chiar în stare de veghe. Pregãtirea misticului esteaici hotãrâtoare. Sub aspect general Moshe Idelmenþioneazã existenþa a douã poziþii în cabalã: uniicabaliºti considerã realitatea acestei lumi, ºi implicittrãirile extatice în stare de veghe, ca fiind inferioare, în

timp ce pentru alþii realitatea în stare de veghe are unascendent asupra extazelor onirice. Abþinându-se sãdezavueze radical ºi explicit visul, ultimii continuã sã îlconsidere „o modalitate licitã de abordare anecunoscutului”.

Din punct de vedere tehnic Moshe Idel ne prezintãdiverse practici ale unor personaje renumite ºi ale unormiºcãri din interiorul cabalei. Aºa este un Sabbatai Tzevicu modul sãu specific de atingere a extazului prinsuccesiunea: izolare de societate-disocierea sufletului decorp-concentrarea mentalã. Totul sub imperiulregistrului nocturn. Tot aici sunt menþionate tehnicileshe’elat halom la hasizii aºkenazi, care induc un anumittip de vise ce intermediazã legãtura dintre divinitate ºilume. La hasizii aºkenazi visul presupune o dimensiuneinterpretativã; visul e text de descifrat în vedereacunoaºterii ordinii introduse de cãtre divinitate în lume ºipentru identificarea, regãsirea, divinului din „aceastãordine”. Prin restrângere la anumite cazuri personaledecurge de aici cã nu toate visele constituie experienþemistice ci numai acelea care aduc informaþii desprestatutul cuiva „în lumea care va veni”. Reciproc,manifestarea viselor mistice, revelatorii, reprezintã probareligiozitãþii, a venerabilitãþii, în lumea materialã a celuicare le trãieºte.

Prin modalitatea concisã de expunere a surselor,faptelor ºi argumentelor Moshe Idel atinge în lucrarea defaþã un dublu deziderat: specialiºtii ºi, dupã caz, iniþiaþiiregãsesc aici o întemeiere suplimentarã a informaþiilordeþinute, sistematizându-ºi-le din nou (pentru a câta oarã?), în timp ce lectorilor mai puþin avizaþi le înfãþiºeazãpanorama unor puncte de reper în abordarea unuisubiect a cãrui aprofundare academicã, ºi nu numai, lepoate aduce satisfacþii pe mãsura pasiunii potenþiale decare sunt chemaþi sã dea dovadã prin înseºi paginileacestei cãrþi.

Key words:

kabbalah, technics,Jewish misticism, MosheIdel

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Conceptul de creaþie a fãcut sã curgã multã cernealãpe colile cãrþilor de filosofie ºi nu numai.

Florea Lucaci încearcã în lucrarea de faþã sãrelegitimeze posibilitatea unei ontologii a umanului încontemporaneitate. În acest discurs de legitimare aduceargumentele multor filosofi începând din antichitate ºiterminând cu gânditorii contemporani. Prin acest tur deforþã prin istoria filosofiei, Florea Lucaci redã creaþiei ºifiinþãrii locul pe care îl ocupau altã datã în analizelefilosofice.

Studiul de faþã este structurat pe cinci capitole carevin în urma unei introduceri, bine formulatã. Încã dinintroducere autorul ne informeazã cã reconsiderareaontologicã a existenþei umane a devenit proiect explicitnumai în secolul al XX-lea. Problema care se poateîntrezãri pentru început poate fi, folosind cuvintelecercetãtorului, faptul cã ontologia umanului riscã sãrãmânã o simplã schiþã, un proiect neîmplinit într-uncapitol viitor din istoria filosofiei.

Întrebarea „cine este omul?”, derivatã din întrebareaprimã „ce este fiinþa?”, rãmâne deschisã spre logic ºistructural. Acesta este tipul de discurs care va fi dezvoltatde cãtre autor pe parcursul demersului sãu. Un prim pasîn acest demers este o perspectivã, chiar una antiteticã, ceare urmãtoarea tezã: „Omul este fiinþa privilegiatã princare cunoaºtem ºi reconstruim existenþa.”

În acest fel, spune autorul, noi putem construiontologia, pornind de la o existenþã privilegiatã ca ºi încazul lui Heidegger, în analitica Dasein-ului. Dar ideeaconºtiinþei ce dã unitate experienþei, dezvãluind-o calume transcendentalã, este dezvoltatã ºi de I. Kant. Eaapare încã la Aristotel, care aratã cã sufletul este într-unfel fiinþarea ce se constituie ºi este cognoscibilã în aceastãmodalitate de a fi.

„Antiteza: Omul a murit, iar raþiunea a pierdutcalitatea de principiu existenþial ºi de cunoaºtere afiinþei.” „Moartea omului” a survenit precum ºtim dupã„moartea lui Dumnezeu” proclamatã de Nietzsche. Celedouã expresii, implicându-se una pe cealaltã casuccesiune, figureazã în fapt criza raþiunii ca principiufundamental al umanismului modern. Concluziaantitezei, ne aratã Florea Lucaci, relevã moarteametafizicã a omului ºi deci imposibilitatea uneiconstituiri a ontologiei umanului.

Al doilea paragraf al introducerii vrea sã recuperezeatât omul cât ºi reconstrucþia ontologiei. Dar cum putemnoi sã recuperãm omul ºi cum sã construim sau cum sãreconstruim o ontologie a umanului? La aceste întrebãri,autorul studiului de faþã, încearcã sã rãspundã apelîndla istoria filosofiei. Ajuns în antichitatea greacã, FloreaLucaci crede cã Socrate este gânditorul prin care omul ºi-a întemeiat o lume a sa, asemãnãtoare cu lumea divinã.Socrate este „cel ce porunceºte: „nosce te ipsum” adicã„cunoaºte-te pe tine însuþi”, pentru a descoperi zeul ºicugetarea.

Draiman Sebastian

Florea Lucaci, Creatie si fiintare.Un temei în ontologia umanuluiEditura Dacia, Cluj Napoca, 2002

Draiman SebastianFaculty of History andPhilosophyBabes-Bolyai UniversityCluj, Romania

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În vederea clarificãrii conceptuale, autorul nepropune sã acceptãm cã creaþia ca temei ontologic ºiconceptul de creaþie implicã existenþa lumii umane.Lucaci mai precizeazã cã umanul, ca mod de fiinþare, îºiîntemeiazã existenþa ºi devenirea pe acelaºi patern, maiconcret pe creativitate.

Omul pentru a cunoaºte trebuie sã punã cât maimulte întrebãri, afirmã autorul, dar odatã cu interogaþia,omul deschide ochii raþiunii sale de a fi. Lucaci se sprijinãpe afirmaþia lui Heidegger, care afirmã cã întrebarea esteo întâietate ontologicã, iar actul de a întreba este „modde-a fi al unei fiinþãri” particulare.

Cu acest ultim argument, cercetãtorul nostruporneºte mai departe, spre a dezvolta cercetarea sa de-alungul urmãtoarelor capitole.

Capitolul Ontologia umanului sau centrarea pesubiect este structurat pe prezentarea conceptelor a treimari gânditori. Un prim gânditor la care se opreºte esteKant. Aceastã reîntoarcere la Kant trebuie înþeleasã,specificã autorul, ca o redescoperire ºi ca o resemnificaredin perspectiva prezentului, a subiectivismului uman caprincipiu de creaþie al „producþiei” de cunoºtinþe deculturã, respectiv a unei lumi în vederea omului.

Al doilea gânditor la care se referã în acest capitoleste Heidegger. Lucaci considerã cã analitica Dasein-uluieste un punct de plecare generos, din perspectivaproiectului de construcþie, conceptului de creaþie, caprincipiu al fiinþãri ºi devenirii.

Pentru aceastã reconstrucþie, autorul îl invocã ºi pefilosoful român Constantin Noica. Acesta a demonstratcã limba poartã cu sine, sau cã ea conþine, universalul.Aºadar ºi limba românã poartã sau este purtãtoare aadevãrului ºi în aceastã limbã fiinþa se rosteºte iar creaþiaca ipostazã a devenirii îºi gãseºte rostul.

Aceastã reconstrucþie a ontologiei bazatã pe creaþie,pe acea reconstrucþie auto-generativã, afirmã Lucaci,

avutã în vedere de Whitehead, este sortitã unei deschideriperpetue.

În capitolul Creaþia . Referinþe spaþio-temporale,spaþiul ºi timpul apar ca referinþe ontologice ale omului.Astfel Florea Lucaci distinge între:

a) ceea ce este dat aici ºi acum, care sã constituie capunct arhimedic în reconstrucþia raþional-simbolicã anaturii ca lume a omului;

b) lumea umanizatã, care este în expansiunespaþial-simbolicã ºi supravieþuieºte în secvenþetemporal paralele cu succesiunea interpretãrilorsimbolice, adicã lumea îºi adaugã o imagineparadigmaticã.

Lucaci îºi continuã analizele cu o serie de observaþiiasupra spaþiului sau mai bine zis asupra geometriei luiEuclid. Însã, spaþiul ºi timpul în viziunea cercetãtoruluisunt forme intuitiv - simbolice, sensibile ºi logicetotodatã. Autorul nu are în vedere spaþiul ºi timpul dat înpercepþii ºi reprezentãri psihice. El are în vederemodelele de reconstrucþie imaginativã ºi ideaticã a lumii,a acelor referinþe proprii actului de creaþie. În acest noucontext creat simbolic al celor douã concepte, se extind ºisupravieþuiesc tipurile ideale de fiinþare umanã.

În capitolul Creaþia. Delimitãri ºi interferenþeconceptuale, autorul abordeazã problema creaþiei dinperspectiva întrebãrii „cine este cel care creeazã?”

Pentru început, Lucaci supune noþiunea de creaþiecenzurii interogaþiei. În acest fel se observã cã noþiuneade creaþie nu mai poate fi indusã în clasa noþiunilor vagi.Dar investigaþia analiticã în perspectiva istoriei relevã cãînsuºi nucleul acesteia este schimbãtor. Iniþial termenulde creaþie îl cuprindea exclusiv pe Dumnezeu. Aceastãcuprindere era definitã prin Crezul de la Niceea ca unicCreator al lumii.

Autorul lucrãrii observã cã de-a lungul istorieinoþiunea de creaþie a fost atribuitã în secolul XVII ºi

Key words:

ontology, history ofphilosophy, humanbeing, creation, FloreaLucaci

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poeþilor, mai precis s-a vehiculat ideea cã ºi poeþiicreeazã. În perioada romanticilor, aceºtia au impus calegitimã perechea categorialã : artã- creaþie. În ultimeledecenii ale secolului XX în sfera noþiunii de creaþie se potidentifica activitãþi ºi obiecte ale preocupãrilor ºtiinþifice,economice, politice etc. În acest fel, vechiul nucleu misticpare sã fie ascuns cu totul.

Observaþiile cercetãtorului merg mai departesusþinând cã deºi s-a „democratizat” noþiunea de creaþie,aceasta are totuºi o limitã. Mai precis, deºi s-a acceptat cãproprietatea de a fi creator, desemneazã un atributesenþial, acesta nu este distribuit tuturor oamenilor.

În acest capitol autorul descrie creaþia într-un plan alidealitãþii asumate la nivelul prozaic al individului ºi alsocietãþii ºi al interpretãrii ei în raport cu noþiunea decunoaºtere.

În capitolul Structurã ºi sens în devenirea umanului,Florea Lucaci ne îndrumã sã privim asupra „poveºtii”devenirii umane aºa cum ne este propusã de ConstantinNoica. Ducînd mai departe gândul lui C. Noica, autorulface un experiment hermeneutic. La acesta, participareaimplicã douã atitudini care se presupun reciproc, unafiind firul povestirii iar cea de a doua ar fi justificareacriticã a necesitãþii creaþiei.

Experienþa ontogenezei ºi a istoriei, afirmã FloreaLucaci, fac dovada aproximativã cã omul estenedesãvârºit. Omul reprezintã, aºadar, o parte a deveniriicãreia se strãduieºte sã-i dea o împlinire sub chipuladevãrului neschimbãtor ºi etern. De aici se pot extragecâteva concluzii :

1. Umanul nu este ºi nici nu poate fi gândit ca oesenþã imanentã datã sau care apare în mod necesar datde o cauzã misterioasã.

2. Umanul gândit ca operã a omului care se sustrageefermitãþii ºi nimicniciei materiei vii poartã cu sine, înesenþa sa, ºi sensul existenþei finite, adicã aspiraþiaomului de a se înþelege pe sine ca fiinþã dedublatã.

3. Reconstrucþia umanului îºi are un punct arhimedicîn geneza ºi natura limbii ºi a limbajelor în general.

4. Creaþia culturalã a indivizilor sau a unei epoci cereo validare, ceea ce implicã o analitica conceptelor ºi anormelor cu caracter constitutiv ºi regulativ, care dauseamã de modul de a fi a omului.

În capitolul final, întitulat Valorile de întemeiere ºicreaþia axiocentricã, Florea Lucaci încearcã sã neconvingã de faptul cã între orientãrile obiective ºisubiective s-a conturat un realism naiv care readucevalorile la proprietãþile diferitelor lucruri. Iar atunci cândanaliza este particularizatã la un anumit domeniu secontureazã ºi alte orientãri privind natura valorilor.Astfel, diseminãrile ce apar din punct de vedereepistemologic impun o abordare privilegiatã a valorilordin perspectiva creaþiei ca principiu în ontologiaumanului.

În lucrarea sa de o certã valoare pentru specialiºti, ºinu numai, Florea Lucaci lasã deschis discursul asupraontologiei umanului, indicând chiar o serie de cãi pentruabordãri viitoare. În mod foarte convingãtor ºi plin desubstanþã, filosoful Florea Lucaci reabiliteazã prinstudiul sãu creaþia ºi fiinþarea ca un pas decisiv înreconstrucþia continuã a ontologiei umanului.

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Primul lucru pe care îl sesizeazã cititorul cãrþii luiPetru Moldovan este dificultatea temei abordate, dublatãde scriitura complicatã ºi uneori chiar cripticã a tânãruluiautor. Cu toate acestea, Petru Moldovan pare a fisingurul autor din România care reuºeºte sã trateze într-o manierã exhaustivã o problemã atât de complexã cumeste cea a misticismului iudaic, aºa cum este el teoretizatîn opera lui Moshe Idel. Rigoarea ºi meticulozitateaexasperante, care uneori îþi lasã impresia cã cel ce serevendicã a fi ucenicul lui Moshe Idel vrea sã spunã maimult decât magistrul sãu, îl recomandã pe tânãrulcercetãtor clujean ca un nume ce nu mai poate fi ocolitatunci când vrei sã vorbeºti despre Moshe Idel. În acelaºitimp, mã bucurã în aceastã carte tentaþia specializãrii, acunoaºterii cât mai vaste a unui anumit subiect singular.

Încã din începutul cãrþii, Petru Moldovanmãrturiseºte ce anume îºi propune sã prezinte înlucrarea sa: ”cabala teozoficã, alãturi de curentulcontemporan ei, cel extatic; rolul lor în cultura

europeanã, aspectul mesianic al acestor curente,hasidismul, hermeneutica cabalisticã, ºi, nu în ultimulrând, modalitãþile de percepere a Torei ºi motivulGolemului”.

Cultura occidentalã recunoaºte, fãrã ocoliºuri, apurta înãuntrul sãu amprenta palimpsest aiudaismului. Creºtinismul canonic nu-ºi refuzã dreptulde a apela la cartea sfântã, Tora, fãrã a face din acestrecurs o posibilã tipologie axiologicã. Influenþele facparte din firul firesc al istoriei. E îndeobºte cunoscutãrecuperarea, mai mult sau mai puþin afirmatã, a luiPlaton în patristicã, a lui Aristotel puþin mai târziu, înscolasticã etc, ca sã numesc aici exemplele cele maicelebre. Adicã, în orice operã vom putea regãsiîmprumuturi, idei similare, într-un cuvânt sincretismeculturale absolut naturale. Însã, ceea ce m-a frapat încazul cãrþii de faþã este cã Petru Moldovan, urmãrindmodul de gîndire al magistrului sãu, susþine ideeaimaculãrii aproape totale (probabil cã forþez uºorlucrurile, însã ideea rãmâne) a misticismului iudaic.Anume, dacã înãuntrul iudaismului putem regãsi odinamicã, în sensul unei miºcãri pe axa istoriei, aceastaeste neutrã oricãrei influenþe exterioare; adicã estesingularã, în sensul pãstrãrii identitãþii proprii ºi unicã,în sensul regãsirii în întreaga culturã a unui singurcurent mistic, cel al misticii iudaice.

Urmãrind firul gândirii lui Moshe Idel, PetruMoldovan prezintã Cabala teozoficã (o modalitateritualicã de a intra în contact cu divinitatea) analizîndproblema celor 10 Sefirot ca pluralitate a antrophos-uluidivin. Pe de o parte, dacã desluºim între copierea(mimesis-ul) Sefirot care creeazã omul, atunci putemregãsi o variantã cunoscutã a panteismului, iar pe de altãparte, în contra-partidã putem discuta, ne spune PetruMoldovan, ºi despre o altã tendinþã cabalisticã, aceea de a

Cãtãlin Vasile Bobb

Petru Moldovan, Moshe Idel.Dinamica misticii iudaiceProvopress, Cluj, 2005.

Cãtãlin Vasile BobbTeaching assistant,Department of SystematicPhilosophyFaculty of History andPhilosophyBabes-Bolyai UniversityCluj, Romania

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vedea cei zece Sefirot ca fãcând parte din om, nefiindaltceva decât o reflectare a decadei divine.

Cabala extatic-profeticã este discutatã în special înlegãturã cu Abraham Abulafia - care propune o serie detehnici mistice pentru a putea intra în contact cuDivinitatea. Printre acestea putem aminti: recitareanumelor divine, numerologia, etc. În acest context,problema hermeneuticii devine una de o realãimportanþã. Petru Moldovan analizeazã cu claritate celeºapte modele interpretative ale sensului Torei propusede Abulafia. Dintre acestea þin sã menþionez douãmodele de interpretare a sensului. Mai întîi, restauraþioliterarum, metoda prin care „literele sunt întoarse înstarea lor de materie primordialã ”. Se poate observa,astfel, cu uºurinþã, importanþã literelor care refac traseuliniþial al creaþiei ceea ce revine la a spune cã existã ometodã umana de cunoaºtere ontologicã. În al doilearînd, cea de a ºaptea metodã analizatã de autor, SfântaSfintelor, al cãrei scop este acela de „a aducecontemplatorul Torei la stadiul profeþiei printransformarea versetelor Torei în alte propoziþii, adicã înNume Divine”. Fundamentalã aici este tentaþiacunoaºterii creaþiei, unde contemplatorul poate intra încontact direct cu Divinitatea.

Petru Moldovan reconstruieºte gândirea lui MosheIdel într-o manierã, cum îi place sã afirme, aparentcronologicã punând în evidenþã metodologiile dispersatepe care magistrul sãu le foloseºte. Fiind vorba de workin progress, maniera interpretativã pe care PetruMoldovan i-o atribuie lui Moshe Idel pare a fi cea a toolbox-ului adicã, cea a diferitelor metode utilizate pentrusubiecte care nu sînt foarte diferite. Dacã spre exemplufilologia, recursul la textele disponibile pe acest subiect,nu dã roade în analiza Golemului, atunci se poateanaliza istorico-psihologic impactul fiinþei umano-divineasupra perioadei în care acesta ar putea fi regãsit.

Registrul analizei lui Petru Moldovan poate fi cu greusistematizat. Autorul nu resimte nici o dificultate în a-ºiapropia, spre exemplu, metoda istoricã în analizafenomenului studiat. Apoi, pare-se, pregãtirea filosoficãde care dispune îi permite ºi o abordare fenomenologicã.Desigur, nu în sensul husserlian al cuvântului, ci într-unul care îi permite regãsirea anumitor tipologiifenomenale în contexte diferite. Însã, ceea ce i sar puteareproºa tânãrului autor este faptul cã nu-ºi acordãdestulã libertate hermeneuticã, rãmâne apropiat ºi preafidel textului magistrului sãu. Se pare cã paricidul, atâtde natural în culturã, va surveni în acest caz mult maitârziu.

Key words:

Mystics, kabbalah,Moshe Idel, Jewishmisticism, PetruMoldovan