jp 3-07 joint doctrine for military operations other than war · joint doctrine for military...

16 June 1995

Joint Doctrine forMilitary Operations

Other Than War

Joint Pub 3-07

JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILIChairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The range of military operations,f irst established in Joint Pub 3-0,described military operations extendingfrom war to military operations other thanwar (MOOTW). While we havehistorically focused on warfighting, ourmilitary profession is increasinglychanging its focus to a complex array ofmilitary operations — other than war.

This publication describes the basictenets of MOOTW — from a generaldescription of all types of operations toplanning considerations necessary for

effective execution. It serves as the springboard into a series of publicationson tactics, techniques and procedures that provide additional detail on themore complex MOOTW.

Participation in MOOTW is critical in the changing international securityenvironment. Although the goals and endstates may not be crystal clear,you should spare no effort in planning and executing MOOTW. Your supportof national security interests in today’s challenging environment is as crucialas it is in war.

You should become familiar with the information contained herein — ourNation and its independence may depend upon your knowledge.

PREFACE

i

1. Scope

This publication explains how militaryoperations other than war (MOOTW)differ from large-scale, sustained combatoperations. It addresses purpose, principles,types of operations and planningconsiderations. A doctrinal basis isprovided for related joint tactics,techniques, and procedures (JTTP)publications which address specific typesof MOOTW.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared underthe direction of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine togovern the joint activities and performanceof the Armed Forces of the United States injoint operations as well as the doctrinal basisfor US military involvement inmultinational and interagency operations.It provides military guidance for theexercise of authority by combatantcommanders and other joint forcecommanders and prescribes doctrine forjoint operations and training. It providesmilitary guidance for use by the ArmedForces in preparing their appropriate plans.It is not the intent of this publication torestrict the authority of the joint forcecommander (JFC) from organizing the forceand executing the mission in a manner theJFC deems most appropriate to ensure unityof effort in the accomplishment of theoverall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established inthis publication apply to the commandersof combatant commands, subunifiedcommands, joint task forces, andsubordinate components of thesecommands. These principles and guidancealso may apply when significant forces ofone Service are attached to forces of anotherService or when significant forces of oneService support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication isauthoritative; as such, this doctrine (orJTTP) will be followed except when, in thejudgment of the commander, exceptionalcircumstances dictate otherwise. Ifconflicts arise between the contents of thispublication and the contents of Servicepublications, this publication will takeprecedence for the activities of joint forcesunless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, normally in coordination with theother members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,has provided more current and specificguidance. Commanders of forces operatingas part of a multinational (alliance orcoalition) military command should followmultinational doctrine and guidance ratifiedby the United States. For doctrine andprocedures not ratified by the United States,commanders should evaluate and follow themultinational command’s doctrine andprocedures, where applicable.

ii

Preface

Joint Pub 3-07

Intentionally Blank

TABLE OF CONTENTS

iii

PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................... vii

CHAPTER IINTRODUCTION

• Purpose...................................................................................................................... I-1• Military Operations Other Than War ....................................................................... I-1

War ........................................................................................................................ I-1MOOTW ............................................................................................................... I-1

• Primacy of Political Objectives ................................................................................ I-2• Strategic Aspect ........................................................................................................ I-3

Deterrence ............................................................................................................. I-3Forward Presence .................................................................................................. I-4Crisis Response ..................................................................................................... I-4

• Range of Military Operations Other Than War ........................................................ I-5MOOTW Involving the Use or Threat of Force ................................................... I-5MOOTW Not Involving the Use or Threat of Force ............................................ I-6Simultaneous Operations ...................................................................................... I-6

• Duration of Operations ............................................................................................. I-7• Conclusion ................................................................................................................ I-7

CHAPTER IIPRINCIPLES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

• General .................................................................................................................... II-1• Principles of Military Operations Other Than War ................................................ II-1

Objective ............................................................................................................ II-1Unity of Effort ..................................................................................................... II-3Security ............................................................................................................... II-3Restraint .............................................................................................................. II-4Perseverance ........................................................................................................ II-4Legitimacy........................................................................................................... II-5

• Principles in Action ................................................................................................ II-5Objective ............................................................................................................. II-5Unity of Effort ..................................................................................................... II-6Security ............................................................................................................... II-7Restraint .............................................................................................................. II-7Perseverance ........................................................................................................ II-7Legitimacy........................................................................................................... II-7

• Conclusion .............................................................................................................. II-8

iv

Table of Contents

Joint Pub 3-07

CHAPTER IIITYPES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

• General ................................................................................................................... III-1• Types of Operations ............................................................................................... III-1

Arms Control ...................................................................................................... III-1Combatting Terrorism ........................................................................................ III-2DOD Support to Counterdrug Operations ......................................................... III-3Enforcement of Sanctions/Maritime Intercept Operations ................................ III-3Enforcing Exclusion Zones ................................................................................ III-4Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight .............................................. III-4Humanitarian Assistance (HA) ......................................................................... III-4Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) ................................................ III-8Nation Assistance/Support to Counterinsurgency ............................................ III-9Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) ............................................... III-11Peace Operations (PO) .....................................................................................III-12Protection of Shipping .....................................................................................III-14Recovery Operations ........................................................................................III-14Show of Force Operations ...............................................................................III-14Strikes and Raids .............................................................................................III-15Support to Insurgency ......................................................................................III-15

• Conclusion ...........................................................................................................III-15

CHAPTER IVPLANNING FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

• General ................................................................................................................... IV-1• Planning Considerations ........................................................................................ IV-1

Unit Integrity ...................................................................................................... IV-1Intelligence and Information Gathering ............................................................ IV-2Multinational Operations ................................................................................... IV-4Command and Control (C2)............................................................................... IV-4Public Affairs ..................................................................................................... IV-6Civil Affairs (CA) .............................................................................................. IV-6Psychological Operations................................................................................... IV-6Coordination with NGOs and PVOs ................................................................. IV-7Interagency Operations ...................................................................................... IV-7Legal Requirements ........................................................................................... IV-8Logistics ............................................................................................................. IV-9Medical Operations.......................................................................................... IV-10Active/Reserve Mix ......................................................................................... IV-11Transition from Wartime Operations to MOOTW ......................................... IV-11Termination of Operations .............................................................................. IV-12

• Education and Training...................................................................................... IV-13• Conclusion ........................................................................................................... IV-14

v

Table of Contents

APPENDIX

A Administrative Instructions ............................................................................ A-1

GLOSSARY

Part I—Abbreviations and Acronyms ..................................................................GL-1Part II—Terms and Definitions ............................................................................GL-3

FIGURE

I-1 Range of Military Operations ........................................................................ I-2I-2 MOOTW Contributions to the Attainment

of National Security Objectives.................................................................. I-3II-1 Principles of Military Operations Other Than War ..................................... II-2II-2 Principles in Action ..................................................................................... II-6III-1 Types of MOOTW Operations ................................................................... III-1III-2 Combatting Terrorism ................................................................................. III-2III-3 Humanitarian Assistance ............................................................................ III-5III-4 Nation Assistance Programs ....................................................................... III-9IV-1 Multinational Operations Considerations ................................................... IV-4IV-2 Areas Requiring Legal Expertise ................................................................ IV-9IV-3 Reserve Units Needed in MOOTW .......................................................... IV-11IV-4 Post-Conflict Activities ............................................................................ IV-12IV-5 Termination of Operations Actions .......................................................... IV-13IV-6 MOOTW Education and Training ............................................................ IV-14

vi

Table of Contents

Joint Pub 3-07

Intentionally Blank

Military operations otherthan war (MOOTW)encompass the use ofmilitary capabilities acrossthe range of militaryoperations short of war.

Political objectives driveMOOTW.

Military operations other than war (MOOTW) can beapplied to complement any combination of the otherinstruments of national power. To understand MOOTW, itis useful to understand how they differ from operations inwar. Although MOOTW and war may often seem similarin action, MOOTW focus on deterring war andpromoting peace while war encompasses large-scale,sustained combat operations to achieve national objectivesor to protect national interests. MOOTW are more sensitiveto political considerations and often the military may notbe the primary player. More restrictive rules ofengagement and a hierarchy of national objectives arefollowed. MOOTW are initiated by the National CommandAuthorities and are usually, but not always, conductedoutside of the United States.

All military personnel should understand the politicalobjective and the potential impact of inappropriateactions. Commanders should remain aware of changes notonly in the operational situation, but also of changes inpolitical objectives that may warrant a change in militaryoperations. One goal of MOOTW is to deter war throughintervention to secure US interests. Overseas presenceactivities demonstrate our commitment, lend credibility toour alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisisresponse capability while promoting US influence and

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

•

•

•

•

•

vii

Compares Military Operations Other Than War(MOOTW) with War

Explains the Relationship between MOOTW and PoliticalObjectives

Discusses MOOTW Principles

Outlines Types of MOOTW Operations

Describes Planning Considerations

Political Objectives

General

viii

Executive Summary

Joint Pub 3-07

The wide range ofMOOTW provides theNational CommandAuthorities with manypossible options duringunsettled situations.

There are six principlesthat must be considered inorder to achieve thedesired objectives ofMOOTW.

access. Crisis response may include employment ofoverwhelming force in peace enforcement, a singleprecision strike, or emergency support to civil authorities.

When other instruments of national power are unable toinfluence a deteriorating or potentially hostile situation,military force or threat of its use may be required todemonstrate US resolve and capability. This is a risk thatmay result in a combat situation. Should deterrence fail,force may be required to compel compliance in the formof strikes, raids, peace enforcement, counterterrorism,enforcement of sanctions, support to insurgency andcounterinsurgency, and evacuation of noncombatants. Theuse of military forces in peacetime helps keep the day-to-day tensions between nations below the threshold ofarmed conflict or war and maintains US influence inforeign lands. These operations include humanitarianassistance, disaster relief, some nation assistance, foreigninternal defense, most support to counterdrug operations,arms control, support to US civil authorities, evacuation ofnoncombatants in a permissive environment, andpeacekeeping. Noncombat MOOTW often can be asimultaneous operation with combat MOOTW.

MOOTW principles are an extension of warfightingdoctrine. Application of these principles helps ensuresuccess and minimize losses by focusing on aspects ofMOOTW that deserve careful consideration. They are asfollows: 1. Direct every military operation towards a clearlydefined, decisive and attainable objective. 2. Unity ofeffort in every operation ensures all means are directed toa common purpose. 3. Security is always important anddepends on never permitting hostile factions to acquire amilitary, political, or informational advantage. 4. MOOTWmay require restraint in order to apply appropriate militarycapabilities prudently. 5. Perseverance allows formeasured, protracted application of military capability insupport of strategic aims. 6. Committed forces must sustainthe legitimacy of the operation and the host government,where applicable.

Range of MOOTW

Basic Principles

ix

Executive Summary

The types of operations areextensive and representMOOTW in which USforces may be involved.

Plans for MOOTW areprepared in a similarmanner as plans for war.

These operations include: arms control; combattingterrorism; Department of Defense support to counterdrugoperations; enforcement of sanctions/maritime interceptoperations; enforcing exclusion zones; ensuring freedomof navigation and overflight; humanitarian assistance;military support to civil authorities; nation assistance/support to counterinsurgency; noncombatant evacuationoperations; peace operations; protection of shipping;recovery operations; show of force operations; strikes andraids; and support to insurgency.

The mission analysis and command estimate are vital inMOOTW. Of particular importance in the planningprocess is the development of a clear definition,understanding, and appreciation for all potentialthreats. Commanders should always plan to have the rightmix of forces available to quickly transition to combatoperations or evacuate. Unit integrity allows for quickdeployment and continued operations. Intelligence andinformation gathering needs to be multi-disciplined andutilize fused intelligence from all sources within the militaryincluding spaced-based intelligence, human intelligence,counterintelligence, and mapping, charting and geodesy.Multinational operations need special attention andrequire increased liaisons and advisors. Command andcontrol are overseen by the joint force commanders (JFCs)and their subordinates and should remain flexible to meetspecific requirements of each situation and promote unityof effort. Public affairs, including media reporting,influences public opinion and may ultimately be a principlefactor in the success or failure of the operation. Civil affairsmay provide assessments of the civil infrastructure, assistin the operation of temporary shelters, and serve as liaisonbetween the military and various outside groups.Psychological operations provide a planned, systematicprocess of conveying messages to, and influencing selectedtarget groups. Coordination with nongovernmental,private voluntary organizations and interagencyoperations allows the JFC to gain greater understandingof the situation and the society involved. MOOTW maypresent unique legal issues. The logistics element mayprecede other military forces or may be the only forcesdeployed. Medical operations support MOOTW to protectUS personnel and enhance mission capability. MOOTW

Types of MOOTW

Planning Considerations

x

Executive Summary

Joint Pub 3-07

may require reserve units and individuals not found in theactive component or may require deployment of more unitsor individuals possessing a capability than are available inthe active component forces. A commander’s campaignplan should include a transition from wartime operationsto MOOTW to ensure that desired political objectivescontinue. The termination of operations includes actionsto be taken as soon as the operation is complete. Suchactions encompass transitioning to civil authority, markingand clearing minefields, closing financial obligations, pre-redeployment activities, redeploying forces and numerousother actions depending on the specific operation.

This publication provides basic concepts and principles toguide the Services and combatant commands to prepare forand conduct MOOTW. It describes those militaryoperations and provides general guidance for military forcesin the conduct of joint MOOTW.

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER IINTRODUCTION

I-1

“Consolidating (the Cold War) victory requires a continuing US role and newstrategies to strengthen democratic institutions. Military civic action can, inconcert with other elements of US strategy, be an effective means of achievingUS objectives around the globe.”

General Fred F. Woerner, Jr.US Army, Retired

1. Purpose

This publication supports Joint Pub 3-0,“Doctrine for Joint Operations,” byproviding basic concepts and principles toguide the Services and the combatantcommands to prepare for and conductmilitary operations other than war(MOOTW) . It describes these militaryoperations and provides general guidancefor military forces in the conduct of jointMOOTW. Detailed information onplanning for and employing forces inMOOTW is provided in joint tactics,techniques, and procedures (JTTP)publications within the Joint Pub 3-07series and other joint and Servicepublications.

2. Military Operations OtherThan War

MOOTW encompass the use ofmilitary capabilities across the range ofmilitary operations short of war. Theseoperations can be applied to complementany combination of the other instrumentsof national power. To understandMOOTW, it is useful to understand howthey differ from operations in war.

a. War. When instruments of nationalpower are unable to achieve nationalobjectives or protect national interests anyother way, the US national leadership maydecide to conduct large-scale, sustainedcombat operations to achieve nationalobjectives or protect national interests,

placing the United States in a wartimestate. In such cases, the goal is to win asquickly and with as few casualties aspossible, achieving national objectives andconcluding hostilities on terms favorableto the United States and its multinationalpartners.

b. Military Operations Other ThanWar. MOOTW focus on deterring war,resolving conflict, promoting peace, andsupporting civil authorities in responseto domestic crises. As Figure I-1 indicates,MOOTW may involve elements of bothcombat and noncombat operations inpeacetime, conflict, and war situations.MOOTW involving combat, such as peaceenforcement, may have many of the samecharacteristics of war, including activecombat operations and employment of mostcombat capabi l i t ies. A l l mi l i taryoperat ions are dr iven by pol i t icalconsiderations. However, MOOTW aremore sensitive to such considerations dueto the overriding goal to prevent, preempt,or limit potential hostilities. In MOOTW,political considerations permeate alllevels and the military may not be theprimary player. As a result, theseoperations normally have more restrictiverules of engagement (ROE) than in war.As in war, the goal is to achieve nationalobjectives as quickly as possible andconclude military operations on termsfavorable to the United States and its allies.However, the purposes of conductingMOOTW may be multiple , with therelative importance or hierarchy of such

I-2

Chapter I

Joint Pub 3-07

purposes changing or unclear; for example,to deter potential aggressors, protectnational interests, support the UnitedN a t i o n s ( U N ) o r o t h e r r e g i o n a lorganizations, satisfy treaty obligations,support civil authorities, or providehumanitarian assistance (HA). Thespecific goal of MOOTW may be peacefulsettlement, assistance rendered to civilauthorities, or providing security for HA.The Department of Defense (DOD) isoften in a support role to another agency,such as the Department of State (DOS) inHA operations. However, in certain typesof operations DOD is the lead agency,such as in peace enforcement operations(PEO). These operations usually involveinteragency coordination and may alsoinvolve nongovernmental organizations(NGOs) or private voluntary organizations(PVOs). Finally, although MOOTW aregenerally conducted outside of the UnitedStates, some types may be conductedwithin the United States in support of civilauthorities consistent with established law.

Figure I-1. Range of Military Operations

3. Primacy of PoliticalObjectives

Political objectives drive MOOTW atevery level from strategic to tactical. Adistinguishing characteristic of MOOTWis the degree to which political objectivesinfluence operations and tactics. Twoimportant factors about political primacystand out. First, all military personnelshould understand the politicalobjectives and the potential impact ofinappropriate actions. Having anunderstanding of the political objectivehelps avoid actions which may haveadverse political effects. It is notuncommon in some MOOTW, for examplepeacekeeping, for junior leaders to makedecisions which have significant politicalimplications. Secondly, commandersshould remain aware of changes not onlyin the operational situation, but also tochanges in political objectives that maywarrant a change in military operations.These changes may not always be obvious.

MilitaryOperations

War

MilitaryOperations

OtherThanWar

Fight&

Win

Deter War&

ResolveConflict

PromotePeace

&SupportUS Civil

Authorities

Large Scale Combat OperationsAttack / Defend / Blockade

Peace EnforcementCounterterrorism

Show of Force/Raid/StrikePeacekeeping/NEONation AssistanceCounterinsurgency

Freedom of NavigationCounterdrug

Humanitarian AssistanceProtection of Shipping

US Civil Support

COMBAT

NONCOMBAT

GeneralUS Goals

RepresentativeExamples

RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

I-3

Introduction

However, commanders should strive,through continuing mission analysis, todetect subtle changes which, over time,may lead to disconnects between politicalobjectives and military operations. Failureto recognize changes in political objectivesearly may lead to ineffective or counter-productive military operations.

4. Strategic Aspect

MOOTW contribute to attainment ofnational security objectives by supportingdeterrence and crisis response options.These contributions are shown in FigureI-2 and discussed below.

a. Deterrence. In peacetime, the ArmedForces of the United States help to deterpotential aggressors from using violenceto achieve their aims. Deterrence stemsfrom the belief of a potential aggressor thata credible threat of retaliation exists, the

contemplated action cannot succeed, or thecosts outweigh any possible gains. Thus, apotential aggressor is reluctant to act forfear of failure, cost, or consequences.Although the threat of nuclear conflict hasdiminished, proliferation of weapons ofmass destruction (WMD) and conventionaladvanced technology weaponry iscontinuing. Threats directed against theUnited States, allies, or other friendlynations — ranging from terrorism toWMD — require the maintenance of afull array of response capabilities.Various MOOTW combat options (such aspeace enforcement or strikes and raids)support deterrence by demonstratingnational resolve to use force whennecessary. Other MOOTW (such ashumanitarian assistance and peacekeeping)support deterrence by enhancing aclimate of peaceful cooperation, thuspromoting stability.

MOOTW CONTRIBUTIONS TO THEATTAINMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY

OBJECTIVES

DETERRENCE

FORWARD PRESENCE

CRISIS RESPONSE

Potential aggressor is reluctant to act for fear of failure, cost,or consequences

Demonstrates commitment, lends credibility to alliances, andenhances regional stability

Responding rapidly with appropriate MOOTW options topotential or actual crises

Figure I-2. MOOTW Contributions to the Attainment of National Security Objectives

I-4

Chapter I

Joint Pub 3-07

b. Forward Presence. Forwardpresence activities demonstrate ourcommitment, lend credibility to ouralliances, enhance regional stability, andprovide a crisis response capability whilepromoting US influence and access. Inaddition to forces stationed overseas andafloat, forward presence activities includeperiodic and rotational deployments, accessand storage agreements, multinationalexercises, port visits, foreign militarytraining, foreign community support andmilitary-to-military contacts. Given theirlocation and knowledge of the region,forward presence forces could be the firstwhich the combatant commander commitsto MOOTW.

c. Crisis Response. US forces need tobe able to respond rapidly eitheru n i l a t e r a l l y o r a s a p a r t o f amultinational effort. Crisis response mayinclude, for example, employment ofoverwhelming force in peace enforcement,a single precision strike, or emergencysupport to civil authorities. The ability ofthe United States to respond rapidly withappropriate MOOTW options to potentialor actual crises contributes to regionalstability . Thus, MOOTW may often beplanned and executed under crisis actioncircumstances.

Presence is a military mission option on the lesser end of the application offorce spectrum and is common in military operations other than war situations.Between 1981 and 1983, a series of US maneuvers in Central America allowedthe US to further its interests without involving US troops in direct combat.This indirect application of US military power manifested itself in theestablishment of US military presence in Central America, particularly inHonduras, and thereby maintaining steady pressure on the belligerentSandinistas across the border in Nicaragua.

The United States conducted a series of military exercises to establish apresence in Central America that could not escape the notice of Nicaragua.Beginning with the relatively low-key HALCON VISTA, in Oct. 1981 and endingwith a large exercise, BIG PINE II in Aug. 1983, the United States evaluatedUS-Honduran ability to “detect and intercept hostile coastal incursions,” usinga range of techniques from the combined/joint movement of small numbersof forces in support of the Honduran Army to more extensive exercisesincluding drills in naval interdiction, aerial bombings, airlifts, amphibiouslandings and counterinsurgency techniques. The approved exercise plans didnot envisage any immediate combat role for United States forces, but calledfor making preparations so that American forces could be swiftly called intoaction if necessary. As a result, the exercises also included improving runwaysand providing for access to several key airfields in Honduras.

The threat of US military intervention played on the Sandinistas’ acute fearof the US military. This psychological pressure has been described as“perception management.” It recognizes the truth of Ambassador GeraldHelman’s observation that “it is very difficult and I think probably mistakento separate the military from the political from the psychological in low-intensity conflict.” This relationship is apparent in an American official’sdescription of BIG PINE I: “a substantial feint” designed to convince theSandinistas “that they will be finished if they do not bend to the general lineadopted by Washington.”

PRESENCE OPERATIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA

I-5

Introduction

US efforts to this end were very effective. America’s military power relative toNicaragua’s was unquestionably superior, but this alone was not enough. Tobe of value, a resource must be both mobilized in support of foreign policyobjectives and made credible. Recognizing this, the National Security Councilstated, “No threat should be made [without] willingness to follow through[with] military force.”

Daniel Ortega was in fact convinced of this willingness. At the height of BIGPINE II in November 1983, just days after the successful US invasion of Grenada,the Nicaraguan government mobilized the population to defend the country.Thousands of Nicaraguans were pulled from their jobs to participate inemergency militia training, causing production to come to a standstill. Thegovernment ordered citizens to dig air-raid shelters, and 1,000 Cuban adviserswere ordered back to Cuba “to remove any pretext for an invasion.” Ortegawas obviously worried, and these actions diverted scarce Nicaraguanresources and manpower from economic and social programs to defense.

The pressure brought on by increased US presence in the region and theinvasion of Grenada had a marked impact on Nicaraguan politics. Thegovernment announced an amnesty program for certain Miskito Indians whohad taken up arms against the Sandinistas and a “safe conduct” program forthe other members of the armed opposition. The senior Salvadoran guerrillasin the Managua area maintained a substantially lower profile, and Nicaraguacanceled plans to airdrop logistic support to guerrillas in the Olancho areaof Honduras. There was a temporary relaxation of press censorship, andBayardo Arce Castano (coordinator for the political committee of theSandinista National Liberation Front) cited US pressure as a reason for thescheduling of the 1984 Nicaraguan elections.

It should be noted that the US achieved these results in a very cost-efficientmanner. Some say that if the United States invaded Nicaragua it would havetaken months of relatively high-intensity fighting and years of US militaryoccupation to pacify the Nicaraguan country side. This almost certainly wouldhave cost thousands in American casualties and untold amounts of dollars.However, by establishing a US military presence by means of combinedexercises, coupled with the careful use of perception management, the sameobjectives were realized without firing a shot.

SOURCE: Kevin J. Dougherty, “The Indirect Application of Military Power:US Policy Toward Nicaragua,” Military Review , October 1994.

5. Range of Military OperationsOther Than War

MOOTW focus on deterring war,resolving conflict, supporting civilauthorities, and promoting peace (seeFigure I-1). These operations provide theNational Command Authorities (NCA)with a wide range of possiblere s p o n s e o p t i o n s, r a n g i n g f r o m

noncombat operations such as HA tocombat opera t ions such as peaceenforcement and strikes and raids.

a. Military Operations Other ThanWar Involving the Use or Threat of Force

• In spite of efforts to promote peace,conditions within a country or regionmay result in armed conflict. When

I-6

Chapter I

Joint Pub 3-07

other instruments of national power areunable to influence a deteriorating orpotentially hostile situation, militaryforce or threat of its use may berequired to demonstrate US resolveand capability, support the otherinstruments of national power, orterminate the situation on favorableterms. The focus of US militaryoperations during such periods is tosupport national objectives—to deterwar and return to a sustainable stateof peace. Such operations involve arisk that US forces could becomeinvolved in combat.

• Combatant commanders, at thedirection of the NCA, may employ USforces to deter an adversary’s action.The physical presence of these forces,c o u p l e d w i t h t h e i r p o t e n t i a lemployment, can serve as a deterrentand facilitate achieving strategic aims.Should this deterrence fail, force maybe required to compel compliance,for example, in the form of strikes,ra ids , and o the r con t i ngencyoperations. Other such operationsi n c l u d e p e a c e e n f o r c e m e n t ,counterterrorism, some foreigninternal defense (FID), enforcement ofsanctions, support to insurgency andcounterinsurgency, and evacuation ofnoncombatants.

• The use of force introduces the fear,physical strain, and uncertainty whichare among the hallmarks of the natureof warfare. Although there areimportant political, diplomatic, andlegal differences between war andmilitary operations other than war,there exists a singularly importantthreshold which may be crossed byuse (or threat of use) of military

force of any kind. In the range ofmilitary operations, this thresholdmarks the distinction betweennoncombat and combat operations.

b. Military Operations Other ThanWar Not Involving the Use or Threat ofForce. Use of military forces in peacetimehelps keep the day-to-day tensions betweennations below the threshold of armedconflict or war and maintains USinfluence in foreign lands. Suchoperations include HA, disaster relief, somenation assistance, FID, most support tocounterdrug operations, arms control,support to US civil authorities, evacuationof noncombatants in a permissiveenvironment, and peacekeeping. Suchoperations are inherently joint in nature.Although these operations do not normallyinvolve combat, military forces always needto be prepared to protect themselves andrespond to changing situations.

c. Simultaneous Operations.MOOTW often involve simultaneousoperations. Noncombat MOOTW maybe conducted simultaneously withcombat MOOTW , such as HA inconjunction with PEO. It is also possiblefor part of a theater to be in a wartime statewhile MOOTW is being conductedelsewhere within the same theater. Forexample, during the final stages ofOperation DESERT STORM, US CentralCommand conducted a noncombatantevacuation operation (NEO) in Somalia. Insuch situations, geographic combatantcommanders should pay particularattention to integrating, coordinating, andsynchronizing the effects and activities oftheir operations with US ambassadors,DOS, and other agencies. Furthermore,whenever a possibility of a threat to US

I-7

Introduction

forces ex is ts , even in a noncombatoperation, commanders should plan for andbe prepared to either transition to combatoperations or leave the area.

6. Duration of Operations

Many MOOTW may be conducted onshort notice and last for a relatively shortperiod of time (for example, strikes andraids). On the other hand, some types ofMOOTW may last for an extended periodof time to achieve the desired end state.For example, the United States has been apartner with ten other nations in theMultinational Force and Observers (MFO)in the Sinai since 1982. Short durationoperations are not always possible,p a r t i c u l a r l y in s i t u a t i o n s w h e r e

destabilizing conditions have existed foryears or where conditions are such that along term commitment is required toachieve objectives.

7. Conclusion

MOOTW include a wide range ofchallenging operations for which USforces need to be prepared. It is expectedthat Armed Forces of the United States willincreasingly participate in these operations.However, commanders must remember thattheir primary mission will always be toprepare for, fight and win America’swars. This is the US military’s mostrigorous task and requires nothing less thantop priority when training and equippingour forces.

Units deploying on Military Operation Other Than War must be prepared andequipped for a range of challenging operations.

I-8

Chapter I

Joint Pub 3-07

Intentionally blank

CHAPTER IIPRINCIPLES OF MILITARY

OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

II-1

“Instead of thinking about warfighting agencies like command and control,you create a political committee, a civil military operations center (CMOC) tointerface with volunteer organizations. These become the heart of youroperations, as opposed to a combat or fire-support operations center.”

LtGen A. C. Zinni, USMC, CG, I MEF

2. Principles of MilitaryOperations Other Than War

Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine For JointOperations,” delineates six MOOTWprinciples: objective, unity of effort,security, restraint, perseverance, andlegitimacy. While the first three of theseprinciples are derived from the principlesof war, the remaining three are MOOTW-specific. These principles are shown inFigure II-1 and discussed below.

a. Objective. Direct every militaryoperation toward a clearly defined,decisive, and attainable objective.

• JFCs must understand the strategicaims, set appropriate objectives, andensure that these aims and objectivescontribute to unity of effort . Inherentin the principle of objective is the needto understand what constitutes missionsuccess, and what might cause theoperation to be terminated beforesuccess is achieved. As an example,excessive US casualties incurredduring a peacekeeping operation(PKO) may cause abandonment of theoperation.

1. General

MOOTW encompass a broad range ofmilitary operations and support a varietyof purposes, including: supportingnational objectives, deterring war,returning to a state of peace, promotingpeace, keeping day-to-day tensions betweennations below the threshold of armedconflict, maintaining US influence inforeign lands, and supporting US civilauthorities consistent with applicable law.Support of these objectives is achieved byproviding military forces and resources toaccomplish a wide range of missions otherthan warfighting. The principles of war,though principally associated with largescale combat operations, generally applyto MOOTW , though sometimes indifferent ways. Strikes and raids, forexample, rely on the principles of surprise,offensive, economy of force, and mass toachieve a favorable outcome. However,pol i t ica l cons iderat ions and thenature of many MOOTW require anunderpinning of additional principlesdescribed in this chapter. MOOTW thatrequire combat operations (such as someforms of peace enforcement, or strikes andraids) require joint force commanders tofully consider principles of war andprinciples of MOOTW.

II-2

Chapter II

Joint Pub 3-07

Figure II-1. Principles of Military Operations Other Than War

OBJECTIVE

UNITY OF EFFORT

SECURITY

RESTRAINT

PERSEVERANCE

LEGITIMACY

Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive,and attainable objective

Seek unity of effort in every operation

Never permit hostile factions to acquire a military, political, orinformational advantage

Apply appropriate military capability prudently

Prepare for the measured, protracted application of militarycapability in support of strategic aims

Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation andof the host government, where applicable

PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY OPERATIONSOTHER THAN WAR

• Although defining mission successmay be more difficult in MOOTW, itis important to do so to keep US forcesfocused on a clear, attainable militaryobjective. Specifying measures ofsuccess helps define missionaccomplishment and phase transitions.

• The political objectives which militaryobjectives are based on may notspecifically address the desiredmilitary end state. JFCs should,therefore, translate their politicalguidance into appropriate militaryobjectives through a rigorous andcontinuous mission and threatanalysis. JFCs should carefullyexplain to political authorities the

implications of political decisions oncapabilities and risk to military forces.Care should be taken to avoidmisunderstandings stemming from alack of common terminology.

• Change to initial military objectivesmay occur because political andmilitary leaders gain a betterunderstanding of the situation, or itmay occur because the situation itselfchanges. JFCs should be aware ofshifts in the political objectives, orin the situation itself, that necessitatea change in the military objective.These changes may be very subtle, yetthey still require adjustment of themilitary objectives. If this adjustment

II-3

Principles of Military Operations Other Than War

is not made, the military objectivesmay no longer support the politicalobjectives, legitimacy may beundermined, and force security may becompromised.

b. Unity of Effort. Seek unity of effortin every operation.

• This MOOTW principle is derivedfrom the principle of war, unity ofcommand. It emphasizes the need forensuring all means are directed to acommon purpose. However, inMOOTW, achieving unity of effort isoften complicated by a variety ofinternational, foreign and domesticmilitary and non-military participants,the lack of definitive commandarrangements among them, and varyingviews of the objective. This requiresthat JFCs, or other designated directorsof the operation, rely heavily onconsensus building to achieve unity ofeffort.

• While the chain of command for USmilitary forces remains inviolate

(flowing from the NCA through thecombatant commander to thesubordinate joint force commander(JFC)), command arrangementsamong coalition partners may beless well-defined and not includefull command authority. Unders u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,commanders m u s t e s t a b l i s hp r o c e d u r e s f o r l i a i s o n a n dcoordination to achieve unity of effort.Because MOOTW will often beconducted at the small unit level, it isimportant that all levels understand theinformal and formal relationships.

c. Security. Never permit hostilefactions to acquire a military, political,or informational advantage.

• This principle enhances freedom ofaction by reducing vulnerability tohostile acts, influence, or surprise.

• The inherent right of self-defenseagainst hostile acts or hostile intentapplies in all operations. Thisprotection may be exercised against

A Cuban refugee undergoes a security check at Guantanimo Bay, Cuba beforeboarding a transport to safe haven in Panama during Operation ABLE MANNER.

II-4

Chapter II

Joint Pub 3-07

virtually any person, element, or grouphostile to the operation: for example,terrorists, or looters after a civil crisisor natural disaster. JFCs should avoidcomplacency and be ready tocounter activity that could bringharm to units or jeopardize theoperation. All personnel should stayalert even in a non-hostile operationwith little or no perceived risk.Inherent in this responsibility is theneed to plan for and posture thenecessary capability to quicklyt r a n s i t i o n t o c o m b a t s h o u l dcircumstances change.

• In addition to the right of self-defense,operations security is an importantcomponent of this principle ofMOOTW. Although there may be noclearly defined threat, the essentialelements of US military operationsshould still be safeguarded. Theuncertain nature of the situationinherent in many MOOTW, coupledwith the potential for rapid change,require that operations security be anintegral part of the operation.Operations security planners mustconsider the effect of media coverageand the possibility coverage maycompromise essential security ordisclose critical information.

• Security may also involve thep r o t e c t i o n o f c i v i l i a n s o rp a r t i c i p a t i n g a g e n c i e s a n dorganizations. The perceived neutralityof these protected elements may be afactor in their security. Protection ofan NGO or PVO by US military forcesmay create the perception that theNGO or PVO is pro-US. Therefore,an NGO or PVO may be reluctant toaccept the US military’s protection.

d. Restraint. Apply appropriatemilitary capability prudently.

• A single act could cause significantmilitary and political consequences;therefore, judicious use of force isnecessary. Restraint requires thecareful balancing of the need forsecurity, the conduct of operations, andthe political objective. Excessive forceantagonizes those parties involved,thereby damaging the legitimacy of theorganization that uses it while possiblyenhancing the legitimacy of theopposing party.

• Commanders at all levels must takeproactive steps to ensure theirpersonnel know and understand theROE and are quickly informed ofchanges. Failure to understand andcomply with established ROE canresult in fratricide, mission failure, andnational embarrassment. ROE inMOOTW are generally morerestrictive, detailed, and sensitive topolitical concerns than in war,consistent always with the right of self-defense. Restraint is best achievedwhen ROE issued at the beginning ofan operation address most anticipatedsituations that may arise. ROE shouldbe consistently reviewed and revisedas necessary. Additionally, ROEshould be carefully scrutinized toensure the lives and health of militarypersonnel involved in MOOTW arenot needlessly endangered.

e. Perseverance. Prepare for themeasured, protracted application ofmilitary capability in support of strategicaims. Some MOOTW may require yearsto achieve the desired results. Theunderlying causes of the crisis may beelusive, making it difficult to achievedecisive resolution. It is important to assesspossible responses to a crisis in terms ofeach option’s impact on the achievement ofthe long-term political objective. Thisassessment does not preclude decisive

II-5


military action, but frames that actionwithin the larger context of strategic aims.Often, the patient, resolute, andpersistent pursuit of national goals andobjectives, for as long as necessary toachieve them, is a requirement forsuccess. This will often involve political,diplomatic, economic, and informationalmeasures to supplement military efforts.

f. Legitimacy. Committed forces mustsustain the legitimacy of the operationand of the host government, whereapplicable.

• In MOOTW, legitimacy is a conditionbased on the perception by a specificaudience of the legality, morality, orrightness of a set of actions. Thisaudience may be the US public, foreignnations, the populations in the area ofresponsibility/joint operations area(AOR/JOA), or the participatingforces. If an operation is perceivedas legitimate, there is a strongimpulse to support the action. If anoperation is not perceived aslegitimate, the actions may not besupported and may be actively resisted.In MOOTW, legitimacy is frequentlya decisive element. The prudent useof psychological operations (PSYOP)and humanitarian and civic assistance(HCA) programs assists in developinga sense of legitimacy for the supportedgovernment.

• Legitimacy may depend on adherenceto objectives agreed to by theinternational community, ensuringthe action is appropriate to thesituation, and fairness in dealing withvarious factions. It may be reinforcedby restraint in the use of force, the typeof forces employed, and the disciplinedconduct of the forces involved. Theperception of legitimacy by the USpublic is strengthened if there are

obvious national or humanitarianinterests at stake, and if there isassurance that American lives are notbeing needlessly or carelessly risked.

• Another aspect of this principle is thel eg i t imacy bes towed upon agovernment through the perception ofthe populace which it governs.Because the populace perceives that thegovernment has genuine authority togovern and uses proper agencies forvalid purposes, they consider thatgovernment as legitimate.

3. Principles in Action

The following discussion applies theprinciples of MOOTW against thebackdrop of Operation PROVIDECOMFORT , the 1991 operation whichprovided humanitarian assistance to theIraqi Kurds. Subsequent to OperationDESERT STORM, the Iraqi Governmentdirected its military to brutally put downKurd insurgencies and drive the Kurdsfrom their homes into the mountains.World reaction to this indiscriminatebrutality and oppression prompted aid forthe Kurds. The UN passed SecurityCouncil Resolution 688 condemning Iraq’soppression of the Kurds and appealed forHA efforts. This appeal prompted the USto establish operation PROVIDECOMFORT. The following discussion,along with the illustration in Figure II-2,demonstrates the principles of MOOTW inaction during an actual operation.

a. Objective. The US Commander inChief, Europe established Joint Task Force(JTF) PROVIDE COMFORT in April 1991to assist Kurds suffering from hunger,disease, and exposure to harsh elements.The initial objective was to provide HAby airdropping food and other necessities,establishing relief centers, supervisingdistribution of food and water, and

II-6

Chapter II

Joint Pub 3-07

Figure II-2. Principles in Action

consensust h rough mutua l t rus t ,cooperation, and coordination of commoninterests. Unity of effort was enhancedthrough US efforts to ensure that all themultinational partners agreed to themission’s objectives. Diplomatic efforts,established political objectives, and USEuropean Command developed clearmilitary objectives to support politicalobjectives. Operation PROVIDECOMFORT exhibited unity of effort inthe joint, multinational and interagencyarenas.

improving sanitation and medical care.Later the operation expanded to returningthe Kurds from temporary shelters to theirprevious homes. This expanded the HAoperation to include providing protectionfrom Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’soppressive actions.

b. Unity of Effort. Relief supplies weredistr ibuted throughout the ravagedregion by a unified, multinational, andnongovernmental effort. US leadershipe f f e c t i v e l y o r c h e s t r a t e d t h emultinational and civilian-military

PRINCIPLES IN ACTION

PRINCIPLES PROVIDE COMFORT

OBJECTIVE

UNITY OF EFFORT

SECURITY

RESTRAINT

PERSEVERANCE

LEGITIMACY

Clearly defined Humanitarian Assistance

Seek team effort Unified Action

Never a hostile advantage Combat Units / Exclusion Zones

Apply capability prudently Rules of Engagement

Enduring military support Until Mission Completion

Perception of operation UN Backing / Popular Support

II-7


• US military forces included: Specialoperations forces (SOF), US Armyinfantry and attack helicopterbattalions, an Amphibious ReadyGroup with an embarked MarineExpeditionary Unit, combat supportunits, combat service support units, andUS Air Force (USAF) airlift units.

• Multinational cooperation wasdemonstrated when 11 countriesincreased operations. US leadershipand command efforts establishedinformal agreements with many NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)countries working toward theoperation’s common purpose.

• Interagency consensus buildingefforts were exemplified by interactionbetween DOD and the Office ofForeign Disaster Assistance (OFDA),as they jointly managed the Kurdishrelief and relocation effort. OFDA’sDisaster Assistance Response Teamdeployed and managed Cooperative forAmerican Relief to Everywhere andInternational Rescue Committee campmanagement and food distribution.Furthermore, civilian-military liaison,cooperation, and consensus buildingefforts were enhanced by establishinga civil-military operations center(CMOC). The CMOC provided amechanism for maintenance ofmilitary, governmental, NGO or PVOcoordination and consensus building toimprove unity of effort.

c. Security. As operations expanded andbecame more complex, Commander, JTF(CJTF) PROVIDE COMFORT formed twosubordinate JTFs. JTF Alpha provided theHA, while JTF Bravo provided the securityrequired for the operation. As part of JTFBravo, US and coalition ground combatand combat support units provided areasecurity. They were joined by

multinational air forces operating fromIncirlik, Turkey, that established andmaintained air deliveries and enforced anair exclusion zone. JTF Bravo capitalizedon the experience of Royal Marines,directly out of Northern Ireland, forexpertise in patrolling urban areas. Thisintroduced relevant experience into achallenging environment, and providedresources necessary for security.Additionally, the psychological effect ofthis force helped deter aggression againstPROVIDE COMFORT participants. Thepresence of a capable, disciplined force wasan effective deterrent.

d. Restraint. Restraint kept apotentially explosive situation with Iraqiarmed forces in check. US forces adheredto strict ROE which went into effect whenthe ground exclusion zone was expandedin concert with the air exclusion zone,allowing the Kurds to return home fromtemporary shelters. As the security zoneexpanded, US forces demonstratedincreased readiness, but used restraintwhen confronting the Iraqi forces. ROEwere balanced between the need for securityand restraint.

e. Perseverance. US perseverance hasbeen demonstrated by the continuedprovision of HA and security to the Kurds.JFCs developed and executed plans thatenabled US forces to continue the missionindefinitely. By forming subordinateJTFs when needed, CJTF PROVIDECOMFORT demonstrated the flexibility toadjust operations as required to achieveoverall mission success.

f. Legitimacy. Legitimacy of theoperation can be perceived from numerouspoints of view. The internationalcommunity initially deemed theoperation legitimate in the passage of UNSecurity Council Resolution 688. The USpublic believed the operation to be

II-8

Chapter II

Joint Pub 3-07

legitimate based on the perceived threatposed by Iraq’s actions. The Kurdishpopulation welcomed the assistance andsecurity provided by the operation. Theforces involved in the operation alsoperceive it as legitimate. As a furtherevidence of legitimacy, continuation ofOperation PROVIDE COMFORT isendorsed by the Turkish parliament everysix months. Perceptions by the variouselements involved are interdependent.Three factors contribute to the overallsense of legitimacy: a consistentdemonstration of restraint, risk to USpersonnel has been kept to the minimumessential for mission accomplishment, andtangible evidence of successfully aiding theKurds. Furthermore the role of the JointPsychological Operations Task Force inlegitimizing the military effort in NorthernIraq through well-planned and executed

in fo rma t i on managemen t was a ninstrumental element of national powerprojection. Aggressive informationmanagement on the international levelis absolutely necessary in influencingworld political opinion and legitimizing USefforts in MOOTW.

4. Conclusion

MOOTW principles are an extension ofwarfighting doctrine. Embodied in theseprinciples is the dominance of politicalobjectives at all levels of MOOTW.Application of these principles helpsensure success and minimize losses byfocusing on aspects of MOOTW thatdeserve careful consideration. When theseprinciples are ignored, JFCs increase therisk to their forces and the possibility offailure.

CHAPTER IIITYPES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

III-1

1. General

The following discussions on types ofMOOTW are listed in alphabetical order.Generally, these 16 types of operations (seeFigure III-1) are integrated into the seriesof JTTP supporting this publication.

2. Types of Operations

a. Arms Control. Arms control is aconcept that connotes any plan,arrangement, or process, resting uponexplicit or implicit internationalagreement. Arms control governs anyaspect of the following: the numbers,types, and performance characteristicsof weapon systems (including thecommand and control, logistic supportarrangements, and any related intelligencegathering mechanism); and the numericalstrength, organization, equipment,deployment or employment of the armedforces retained by the parties (itencompasses disarmament). Additionally,it may connote those measures taken forthe purpose of reducing instability in themilitary environment. Although it maybe viewed as a diplomatic mission, themilitary can play an important r ole. Forexample, US military personnel may beinvolved in verifying an arms controltreaty; seizing WMD (nuclear, biological,and chemical or conventional); escortingauthorized deliveries of weapons and othermaterials (such as enriched uranium) topreclude loss or unauthorized use of theseassets; or dismantling, destroying, or

“There is no doubt in my mind that the success of a peace-keeping operationdepends more than anything else on the vigilance and mental alertness ofthe most junior soldier and his non-commissioned leader, for it is on theirreaction and immediate response that the success of the operation rests.”

Brigadier M. Harbottle, UN Forces, Cyprus

°

°

°

°

°

°

°

°

°

°

°

°

°

°

°

Arms Control

Combatting Terrorism

DOD Support toCounterdrug Operations

Enforcement of Sanctions /Maritime InterceptOperations

Enforcing ExclusionZones

Ensuring Freedom ofNavigation and Overflight

Humanitarian Assistance

Military Support to CivilAuthorities (MSCA)

Nation Assistance /Support toCounterinsurgency

Noncombatant EvacuationOperations (NEO)

Peace Operations (PO)

Protection of Shipping

Recovery Operations

Show of Force Operations

Strikes and Raids

TYPES OF MOOTWOPERATIONS

Figure III-1. Types of MOOTW Operations

III-2

Chapter III

Joint Pub 3-07

disposing of weapons and hazardousmaterial. All of these actions help reducethreats to regional security. Otherexamples include military support for theConventional Armed Forces in EuropeTreaty by conducting and hosting siteinspections, participating in military dataexchanges, and implementing armamentreductions. Finally, the US military’simplementation of Vienna Document 1992confidence and security building measuressuch as unit/formation inspections, exercisenotifications/observations, air and groundbase visits, and military equipmentdemonstrations are further examples ofarms control.

b. Combatting Terrorism. Combattingterrorism involves actions taken to opposeterrorism from wherever the threat. Itincludes antiterrorism (defensivemeasures taken to reduce vulnerability toterrorist acts) and counterterrorism(offensive measures taken to prevent, deter,and respond to terrorism). See Figure III-2.

• Antiterrorism programs form thefoundation for effectively combattingterrorism. The basics of suchprograms include training anddefensive measures that strike abalance among the protection desired,the mission, infrastructure, andavailable manpower and resources.The US Government may provideantiterrorism assistance to foreigncountries under the provisions ofChapter II of the Foreign AssistanceAct of 1961. Joint Pub 3-07.2, “JTTPfor Antiterrorism,” provides detailedguidance on this subject.

• Counterterrorism provides responsemeasures that include preemptive,retaliatory, and rescue operations.Normally, counterterrorism operationsrequire specially trained personnelcapable of mounting swift and effectiveaction. DOD provides speciallytrained personnel and equipment ina supporting role to governmental

Figure III-2. Combatting Terrorism

ANTITERRORISM

Defensive measures takento reduce vulnerability ofterrorist attacks

Includes training anddefense measures thatstrike a balance among thedesired protection,mission, infrastructure,and available manpowerand resources

COUNTERTERRORISM

Offensive measures takento prevent, deter, andrespond to terrorism

Provides responsemeasures that includepreemptive, retaliatory, andrescue operations

COMBATTING TERRORISM

III-3

Types of Military Operations Other Than War

lead agencies. Counterterrorism is aprincipal special operations mission(see Joint Pub 3-05, “Doctrine forJoint Special Operations.”). DOS,Department of Justice (DOJ)(specifically, the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation), or the Department ofTransportation (DOT) (specifically theFederal Aviation Administration)receive lead agency designationaccording to terrorist incident locationand type. DOS is the lead agency forincidents that take place outside theUnited States; DOJ is the lead agentfor incidents that occur within theUnited States; and DOT is the leadagent for incidents aboard aircraft “inflight” within the special jurisdictionof the United States. The Assistant tothe President for National SecurityAffairs resolves any uncertainty on thedesignation of lead agency orresponsibilities.

c. DOD Support to CounterdrugOperations. In counterdrug operations,DOD supports federal, state, and local lawenforcement agencies in their efforts todisrupt the transfer of illegal drugs intothe United States. The National DefenseAuthorization Act of 1989 assigned threemajor counterdrug responsibilities toDOD:

• Act as the single lead agency fordetecting and monitoring aerial andmaritime transit of illegal drugs intothe United States by emphasizingactivities in the cocaine sourcecountries, streamlining activities in thetransit zone, and re-focusing activitiesin the US to concentrate on the cocainethreat at critical border locations;

• Integrate the command, control,communications, computer, andintelligence assets of the United States

that are dedicated to interdicting themovement of illegal drugs into theUnited States;

• Approve and fund State governors’plans for expanded use of theNational Guard to support druginterdiction and enforcement agencies.I n a d d i t i o n , t h e 1 9 9 3 D O DAuthorization Act added the authorityfor the DOD to detect, monitor, andcommunicate the movement ofcertain surface traffic within 25miles of the US boundary inside theUnited States. Other DOD support tothe National Drug Control Strategyincludes support to law enforcementagencies (federal, state, and local) andcooperative foreign governments byproviding intelligence analysts andlogistical support personnel; supportto interdiction; internal drugprevention and treatment programs;and research and development. Ane x a m p l e o f D O D s u p p o r t t ocounterdrug operations was theestablishment of JTF 6, in 1989, toprovide counterdrug support along theSouthwest border of the United States.Joint Pub 3-07.4, “Joint CounterdrugOperations,” provides detailedguidance concerning counterdrugoperations.

d . En fo rcemen t o f Sanc t i ons /Maritime Inter cept Operations. Theseare operations which employ coercivemeasures to interdict the movement ofcertain types of designated items into orout of a nation or specified area. Theseoperations are military in nature and serveboth political and military purposes. Thepolitical objective is to compel a countryor group to conform to the objectives ofthe initiating body. The military objectiveis to establish a barrier which is selective,allowing only those goods authorized to

III-4

Chapter III

Joint Pub 3-07

enter or exit. Depending on geography,sanction enforcement normally involvessome combination of air and surfaceforces. Assigned forces should be capableof complementary mutual support andfull communications compatibility. Anexample of sanctions enforcement isOperation SUPPORT DEMOCRACYconducted off the coast of Haiti beginningin 1993.

e. Enforcing Exclusion Zones. Anexclusion zone is established by asanctioning body to prohibit specifiedactivities in a specific geographic area.Exclusion zones can be established in theair (no-fly zones), sea (maritime), or onland. The purpose may be to persuadenations or groups to modify their behaviorto meet the desires of the sanctioning bodyor face continued imposition of sanctions,or use or threat of force. The measuresare usually imposed by the UN, or otherinternational bodies of which the UnitedStates is a member. However, they mayalso be imposed unilaterally by the UnitedStates. Exclusion zones are usuallyimposed due to breaches of internationalstandards of human rights or flagrantabuse of international law regarding theconduct of states. Situations which maywarrant such action include: (1) thepersecution of the civil population by agovernment; (2) to deter an attempt bya hostile nation to acquire territory byforce. The sanctions may create economic,political, military, or other conditionswhere the intent is to change the behaviorof the offending nation. Examples ofenforcement of exclusion zones areOperation SOUTHERN WATCH in Iraq,initiated in 1992, and Operation DENYFLIGHT in Bosnia, initiated in 1993.

f. Ensuring Freedom of Navigationand Overflight. These operations areconducted to demonstrate US or

international rights to navigate sea or airroutes. Freedom of navigation is asovereign right according to internationallaw.

• International law has long recognizedthat a coastal state may exercisejurisdiction and control within itsterritorial sea in the same mannerthat it can exercise sovereignty overits own land territory. Internationallaw accords the right of “innocent”passage to ships of other nationsthrough a state’s territorial waters.Passage is “innocent” as long as it isnot prejudicial to the peace, goodorder, or security of the coastal state.The high seas are free for reasonableuse of all states.

• Freedom of navigation by aircraftthrough international airspace is awe l l -es tab l i shed pr inc ip le o finternational law. Aircraft threatenedby nations or groups through theextension of airspace control zonesoutside the established internationalnorms will result in legal measures torectify the situation. These norms aredeveloped by the International CivilAviation Organization . An exampleis the Berlin air corridors that existedfrom 1948 until 1990, allowing airaccess to West Berlin. The ATTAINDOCUMENT series of operationsagainst Libya in 1986 are examples offreedom of navigation operations, bothair and sea, in the Gulf of Sidra.

g. Humanitarian Assistance (HA).HA operations relieve or reduce theresults of natural or manmade disastersor other endemic conditions such ashuman pain, disease, hunger, or privationin countries or regions outside the UnitedStates. HA provided by US forces isgenerally limited in scope and duration;

III-5


it is intended to supplement orcomplement efforts of host-nation (HN)civil authorities or agencies with theprimary responsibility for providingassistance. DOD provides assistance whenthe relief need is gravely urgent and whenthe humanitarian emergency dwarfs theability of normal relief agencies toeffectively respond. See Figure III-3.

• The US military can respond rapidlyto emergencies or disasters andachieve order in austere locations.US forces can provide logistics;command, control, communications,and computers; and the planningrequired to initiate and sustain HAoperations.

• HA operations may be directed bythe NCA when a serious internationalsituation threatens the political ormilitary stability of a region consideredof interest to the United States, or when

the NCA deems the humanitariansituation itself sufficient andappropriate for employment of USforces. DOS or the US ambassadorin country is responsible fordeclaring a foreign disaster orsituation that requires HA. WithinDOD, the Undersecretary of Defensefor Policy has the overall responsibilityfor developing the military policy forinternational HA operations.

• HA operations may cover a broadrange of missions. An HA missioncould also include securing anenvironment to allow humanitarianrelief efforts to proceed. US militaryforces participate in three basic typesof HA operations: those coordinatedby the UN, those where the UnitedStates acts in concert with othermultinational forces, or those wherethe United States responds unilaterally.

Figure III-3. Humanitarian Assistance

TYPES OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS

þ

þ

þ

þ

To relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters orother endemic conditions

Limited in scope and duration

Supplements or complements efforts of host nation

May cover a broad range of missions

l

l

l

Coordinated by the UN

US acts in concert with other multinational forces

US responds unilaterally

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

III-6

Chapter III

Joint Pub 3-07

• E x a m p l e s o f h u m a n i t a r i a nassistance are Operations SEAANGEL I, conducted in 1991, andSEA ANGEL II, conducted in 1992,

to provide assistance in the aftermathof devastating natural disasters inBangladesh.

Bangladesh has traditionally been one of nature’s favorite targets. Tornadoes,cyclones, and monsoons occur with alarming regularity in this country, whichcontains the world’s second largest delta region at the confluence of theGanges, Brahmaputra, and Magma rivers. While this tremendously fertileregion supports over 120 million people, damage from natural disasters isoften severe, mainly due to the low terrain, the high density of the population,and a poorly developed infrastructure.

Cyclone Marian struck this delta on the southeast coast during the eveningof 29 April 1991 with winds in excess of 235 km/hr and tidal surges between15 and 20 feet. Well over 100,000 people died and millions were left homeless.Over 1 million cattle (essential for pulling plows and providing transportation)died. Crops on 74,000 acres of land were destroyed; another 300,000 acresof cropland were damaged, and fields were covered with salt water,contaminating the soil and corrupting the drinking water.

Infrastructure destruction was widespread. Bangladesh’s major port,Chittagong, was severely damaged and was nonoperational for several days.Damaged/sunken ships, many of them belonging to the Bangladeshi Navy,blocked the port. Several key bridges, including the main bridge to Chittagong,were washed out or otherwise damaged. Throughout the storm-affected area,sea walls collapsed, jetties disappeared, dirt roads were flooded, buildingswere ravaged, and transportation was virtually destroyed.

For the government of Bangladesh (GOB), the cyclone could not have comeat a worse time. After years of military rule, Bangladesh had installed itsfirst civilian government, under Prime Minister Zia, less than two monthsearlier. Therefore, the young, inexperienced government, sensitive toappearing weak or incompetent and struggling domestically to developbureaucratic cohesion, faced serious problems in reacting to the cyclone.

Strangely, one of the problems was not one of relief supplies availability.Adequate emergency supplies existed either in government storage houses,called “Go Downs,” or stored and owned by nongovernmental organizations(NGO) such as Cooperative American Relief Everywhere (CARE) and the RedCrescent. The GOB, however, was hindered by the lack of cooperation fromthe NGO, which remembered martial law and were wary of the new regime.Further, the bureaucrats that controlled the grain in the “Go Downs” weresimilarly reluctant to hand over control to other agencies.

Notwithstanding these political hurdles, the most serious problem was oneof distribution. The combination of a poorly developed infrastructure andthe havoc wreaked by the cyclone effectively cut off Chittagong for severaldays. Further, once relief supplies were brought to Chittagong, the GOB

OPERATION SEA ANGEL

III-7


virtually had no means to distribute them to isolated islands off the coastwhere needs were most acute.

On 10 May 1991, the President directed the US military to provide humanitarianassistance. A Contingency Joint Task Force (CJTF) was immediately formedunder the command of Lieutenant General Henry C. Stackpole, commanderof the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) based in Okinawa. A US NavyAmphibious Task Force (ATF) returning from the Persian Gulf war wasredirected to Bangladesh. A Bangladesh citizen, spotting the ATF approachingfrom the water, allegedly called them “Angels from the Sea.” Regardless ofwhether this incident ever occurred, news of it spread and Operation SeaAngel had begun.

The relief effort truly was an international operation. Besides the indigenousGOB forces and the international and local NGO, several countries joinedthe United States in participating. The United Kingdom sent a supply shipwith four helicopters. The Japanese government sent two helicopters. India,Pakistan, and China also provided assistance.

Two days after the President’s order, LtGen. Stackpole arrived with a smallCJTF element. A Special Operations Forces (SOF) Disaster AssistanceResponse Team (DART) arrived later that day. The next day five UH-60Blackhawk helicopters arrived from Hawaii, along with a Navy Environmentaland Preventive Medicine Unit. Other joint assets continued to flow into thearea, as required. Fifteen soldiers of B Company, 84th Engineer Battalion,already deployed to Bangladesh to construct schools, were diverted toChittagong. The bulk of US forces were from the ATF consisting of the 4,600Marines of the 5th MEB, 3,000 sailors of Amphibious Group 3, and 28helicopters. The MEB also brought four Landing Craft Air Cushioned (LCAC)vehicles, which proved invaluable in delivering aid to isolated islands.

Immediately upon his arrival in the capitol city of Dhaka, LtGen. Stackpolebegan an assessment of the situation, and identified three critical concerns:First, the intelligence needed to adequately assess the situation wasunavailable; Second, the problem of distribution quickly became apparent,and was considered the most pressing by the Joint Task Force (JTF) staff;Finally, the issue of Bangladeshi sovereignty required that the GOB be clearlyviewed by the populace as being “in charge”.

LtGen. Stackpole proceeded to develop a Campaign Plan consisting of threephases. After initial survey, liaison, and reconnaissance, Phase I (one week)entailed initial stabilization of the situation (delivery of food, water, andmedicine to reduce loss of life). Phase II (two weeks) entailed restoring thesituation to the point where the Bangladesh government could take controlof relief efforts. Phase III (two weeks) was the consolidation phase in whichthe Task Force would depart and the Bangladesh government would takecomplete control of all relief efforts.

The distribution problem clearly was the most demanding task and it’saccomplishment was most critical to the success of the operation. Therewere two aspects: first, supplies had to be moved from Dhaka to Chittagong;second, these supplies then had to be moved to the devastated islands. The

III-8

Chapter III

Joint Pub 3-07

decision was made to fly supplies by fixed-wing to Chittagong, then viahelicopter to the islands. The MC-130 aircraft that brought the specialoperations forces provided the fixed-wing capability until Air Force C-130sarrived. A JTF augmentation cell (including the five Blackhawk helicopters)was dispatched from Hawaii. The 5th MEB and its helicopters and LCACsarrived three days later.

In the final analysis, Operation Sea Angel proved to be unique in severalrespects. It was almost entirely sea-based, with no more than 500 servicemembers on shore at night. It was conducted in a benign environment; noweapons were carried by US forces, except for some sidearms carried byguards of cryptographic materials. It was also the first time that a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) was used as a joint task force nucleus. Finally, aunique effective command and control structure was used to synchronize theefforts of US, British, Bangladeshi, and Japanese non-governmentalorganizations, and other organizations such as the US Agency for InternationalDevelopment (AID) and a Chinese assistance element.

SOURCE: McCarthy, Paul A., “Operation Sea Angel, a Case Study,” RAND, 1994.

• Limitations on military forces inproviding support to civil authoritiesinclude, among others, the PosseComitatus Act, Title 18, US CodeSection 1385--Use of Army and AirForces as Posse Comitatus. This Actprohibits the use of federal militaryforces to enforce or otherwiseexecute laws unless expresslyauthorized by the Constitution orAct of Congress. Statutory exceptionsto the Posse Comitatus Act whichallow active duty military members torespond to civil disturbances areincluded under Title 10 Sections 331to 333: Request from a State (331),Enforcement of Federal Law (332),and Protection of Civil Rights (333).Additional important exceptions toPosse Comitatus are found in Title 10Sections 371-380.

• Examples of military support to civilauthorities are disaster relief providedduring Hurricanes Andrew in Floridaand Iniki in Hawaii in 1992, anddeployment of troops during a civildisturbance in California in 1992.

h. Military Support to CivilAuthorities (MSCA). These operationsprovide temporary support to domesticcivil authorities when permitted by law,and are normally taken when an emergencyovertaxes the capabilities of the civilauthorities.

• Support to civil authorities can be asdiverse as temporary augmentationof air traffic controllers and postalworkers during strikes, restoration oflaw and order in the aftermath ofriots, protection of life and federalproperty, or providing relief in theaftermath of a natural disaster.Authority for additional support to lawenforcement officials is contained inDOD Directive 5525.5, “DODCooperation with Civilian LawEnforcement Officials,” and permitssuch support as loan of equipment, useof facilities, training, and transfer ofinformation. Support is constrainedin some instances by the Economy Act(31 US Code Section 1535) which mayrequire the requesting agency toprovide reimbursement.

III-9


Under DOD Directive 3025.1,“ M i l i t a r y S u p p o r t t o C i v i lAuthorities,” the Secretary of theArmy is designated the ExecutiveAgent for MSCA.

i. Nation Assistance/Support toCounterinsurgency. Nation assistance iscivil or military assistance (other thanHA) rendered to a nation by US forceswithin that nation’s territory duringpeacetime, crises or emergencies, or war,based on agreements mutually concludedbetween the United States and that nation.Nation assistance operations support anHN by promoting sustainable developmentand growth of responsive institutions. Thegoal is to promote long-term regionalstability. Nation assistance programs ofteninclude, but are not limited to, securityassistance, FID, and HCA (see FigureIII- 4). All nation assistance actions areintegrated through the US Ambassador’sCountry Plan.

• Security Assistance. Securityassistance refers to a group ofprograms by which the United Statesprovides defense articles, militarytraining, and other defense-relatedservices to foreign nations by grant,loan, credit, or cash sales in furtheranceof national policies and objectives.

•• Some examples of US securityassistance programs are ForeignMilitary sales, Foreign MilitaryFinancing Program, InternationalMilitary Education and TrainingProgram, Economic Support Fund, andcommercial sales licensed under theArms Export Control Act.

•• Security Assistance Surges.Security assistance surges acceleraterelease of equipment, supplies, orservices when an allied or friendlynation faces an imminent militarythreat. Security assistance surges are

Figure III-4. Nation Assistance Programs

HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE

Provided in conjunction with military operations and exercises.Must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally createhumanitarian benefits to the local populace.

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

The total political, economic, informational, and military supportprovided to another nation to assist its fight against subversionand insurgency.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

A group of programs by which the United States provides defensearticles, military training, and other defense-related services.

NATION ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

III-10

Chapter III

Joint Pub 3-07

An example of nation assistance/support to counterinsurgency wasOperation PROMOTE LIBERTY, in1990, following Operation JUSTCAUSE in Panama.

“The severity of human suffering inSomalia caused commanders to try toalleviate the situation on their own.Units were deployed to the field toprovide security for the humanitarianrelief agency convoys of food. Uponseeing the appalling conditions, andrealizing they were not tasked to givefood or provide direct support to thepopulation, local commanders took itupon themselves to try to arrange foror speed up relief supplies. While well-intended, this activity diverted thecommanders’ attention from theirprimary mission.”

Center for Army Lessons LearnedNewsletter, 93-8.

• Humanitarian and civic assistanceprograms are provided under Title 10US Code Section 401. This assistanceis provided in conjunction withmilitary operations and exercises,and must fulfill unit trainingrequirements that incidentally createhumanitarian benefit to the localpopulace. In contrast to emergencyrelief conducted under HA operations,HCA programs generally encompassplanned activities in the followingcategories:

•• Medical, dental, and veterinarycare provided in rural areas of acountry;

•• Construction of rudimentarysurface transportation systems;

•• Well drilling and construction ofbasic sanitation facilities; and,

•• Rudimentary construction andrepair of public facilities.

military in nature and are focused onproviding additional combat systems(weapons and equipment) or supplies,but may include the full range ofsecurity assistance, to include financialand training support.

• Foreign Internal Defense. FIDprograms encompass the totalpolitical, economic, informational,and military support provided toanother nation to assist its fightagainst subversion and insurgency.US military support to FID shouldfocus on assisting HN personnel toanticipate, preclude, and counter thesethreats. FID supports HN internaldefense and development (IDAD)programs. US military involvementin FID has traditionally been focusedon helping another nation defeat anorganized movement attempting tooverthrow the government. US FIDprograms may address other threats toan HN’s internal stability, such as civildisorder, illicit drug trafficking, andterrorism. These threats may, in fact,predominate in the future astraditional power centers shift,suppressed cultural and ethnicrivalries surface, and the economicincentives of illegal drug traffickingcontinue. US military support to FIDmay include training, materiel,advice, or other assistance, includingdirect support and combat operationsas authorized by the NCA, to HNforces in executing an IDAD program.Joint Pub 3-07.1, “JTTP for ForeignInternal Defense,” provides furtherdetails on this subject. FID is aprincipal special operations mission.For further details on specialoperations forces (SOF) involvementin FID, see Joint Pub 3-05, “Doctrinefor Joint Special Operations,” andJoint Pub 3-05.3, “Joint SpecialOperations Operational Procedures.”

III-11


j . N o n c o m b a t a n t E v a c u a t i o nOperations (NEO). These operationsn o r m a l l y r e l o c a t e t h r e a t e n e dnoncombatants from a foreign country.Although principally conducted to evacuateUS citizens, NEOs may also include

selective evacuation of citizens from the HNas well as citizens from other countries.

• NEO methods and timing ares i g n i f i c a n t l y i n f l u e n c e d b ydiplomatic considerations. Underideal circumstances there may belitt le or no opposition; however,commanders should anticipateopposition and plan the operation likeany combat operation.

• NEOs are similar to a raid in that theoperation involves swift insertion ofa force, temporary occupation ofobjectives, and ends with a plannedwithdrawal . It differs from a raid inthat force used is normally limited tothat required to protect the evacueesand the evacuation force. Forces

penetrating foreign territory toconduct a NEO should be kept to theminimum consistent with missionaccomplishment and the security of theforce and the extraction and protectionof evacuees.

• Pursuant to Executive Order 12656, theDOS is responsible for the protectionand evacuation of American citizensabroad and for guarding their property.This order also directs the DOD toadvise and assist the DOS inpreparing and implementing plans forthe evacuation of US citizens. The USAmbassador, or Chief of theDiplomatic Mission, is responsible forthe preparation of Emergency ActionPlans that address the militaryevacuation of US citizens anddesignated foreign nationals from aforeign country. The conduct ofm i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s to a s s i s timplementation of Emergency ActionPlans is the responsibility of thegeographic combatant commander.

Selected Haitian noncombatants board a US C-130 bound for safe havencamps in Panama during Operation ABLE MANNER.

III-12

Chapter III

Joint Pub 3-07

• E v a c u a t i o n o p e r a t i o n s a r echaracterized by uncertainty.Evacuation operations may be directedwithout warning because of suddenchanges in a country’s government,reoriented political or militaryrelationship with the United States, asudden hostile threat to US citizensfrom elements within or external to aforeign country, or in response to anatural disaster. Joint Pub 3-07.5,“JTTP for Noncombatant EvacuationOperations,” provides detailedguidance.

• Examples of NEO are EASTERNEXIT, conducted in 1991, when US andforeign national personnel wereevacuated from Somalia, and QUICKLIFT, also conducted in 1991, whenpersonnel were evacuated from Zaire.

k. Peace Operations (PO)

• PO are military operations tosupport diplomatic efforts to reacha long-term political settlementand categorized as peacekeepingoperations (PKO) and peace

enforcement operations. PO areconducted in conjunction with thevarious diplomatic activities necessaryto secure a negotiated truce and resolvethe conflict. Additional types ofMOOTW (e.g., HA and NEO) maycomplement peace operations. MilitaryPO are tailored to each situation andmay be conducted in support ofdiplomatic activities before, during, orafter conflict.

•• Peacekeeping Operations. PKO aremilitary operations undertaken with

the consent of all major parties to adispute, designed to monitor andfacilitate implementation of anagreement (cease fire, truce, or othersuch agreements) and supportdiplomatic efforts to reach a long-term poli t ical sett lement. Anexample of PKO is the US commitmentto the Multinational Force Observers inthe Sinai since 1982. Joint Pub 3-07.3,“JTTP for Peace Operations,” (in draft)provides additional information onpeacekeeping.

Joint forces support Peace Enforcement Operations to compel compliance withmeasures designed to establish an environment for truce or cease fire.

III-13


•• Peace Enforcement Operations.PEO are the application of militaryforce, or threat of its use, normallypursuant to international authorization,to compel compliance with resolutionsor sanctions designed to maintain orrestore peace and order. PEOmiss ions inc lude in tervent ionoperations, as well as operations torestore order, enforce sanctions,forcibly separate belligerents, andestablish and supervise exclusion zonesfor the purpose of establishing anenvironment for truce or cease-fire.Unlike PKO, such operations do notrequire the consent of the statesinvolved or of other parties to theconflict . Examples of PEO areOperation POWER PACK conductedin the Dominican Republic in 1965 andthe secondary effort in Somalia(UNITAF), 1992-1993.

• Relationship of Peace Operations toDiplomatic Activities. US militarypeace operations support politicalobjectives and diplomatic objectives.Military support improves the chancesfor success in the peace process by

lending credibility to diplomaticactions and demonstrating resolve toachieve viable political settlements. Inaddition to PO, the military mayconduct operations in support of thefollowing diplomatic peace activities:

•• Preventive Diplomacy. Preventivediplomacy consists of diplomaticactions taken in advance of apredictable crisis to prevent or limitviolence. Military support todiplomacy may, for example, take theform of a preventive deployment. Anexample is Operation ABLE SENTRY,where US Forces deployed in 1993 toMacedonia in support of the UN effortto limit the fighting in the FormerRepublic of Yugoslavia.

•• Peacemaking. Peacemaking is theprocess of diplomacy, mediation,negotiation, or other forms of peacefulsettlements that arranges an end to adispute, and resolves issues that ledto conflict. Military activities thatsupport peacemaking include military-to-military relations and securityassistance.

Joint forces in Military Operations Other Than War are often deployed in supportof the United Nations in multinational peace operations.

III-14

Chapter III

Joint Pub 3-07

•• Peace Building. Peace buildingconsists of post-conflict actions,predominantly diplomatic andeconomic, that strengthen andrebuild governmental infrastructureand institutions in order to avoid arelapse into conflict. Military supportto peace building may include, forexample, units rebuilding roads,reestablishing or creating governmententities, or the training of defenseforces.

l. Protection of Shipping. Whennecessary, US forces provide protectionof US flag vessels, US citizens (whetherembarked in US or foreign vessels), andtheir property against unlawful violencein and over international waters. Withthe consent of the flag state this protectionmay be extended to foreign flag vesselsunder international law. Protection ofshipping includes coastal sea control,h a r b o r d e f e n s e, p o r t s e c u r i t y ,c o u n t e r m i n e o p e r a t i o n s, a n denvironmental defense, in addition tooperations on the high seas. It requiresthe coordinated employment of surface,air, space, and subsurface units, sensors,and weapons, as well as a commandstructure both ashore and afloat, and alogistics base. Protection of shipping isaccomplished by a combination ofoperations. Area operations, either land-based or sea-based, are designed to preventa hostile force from obtaining a tacticalposition from which to attack friendly orallied shipping. This includes oceansurveillance systems that provide data forthreat location and strike operations againstoffending bases or facilities. Threats notneutralized by area operations must bedeterred or addressed by escort operations.Generally, escorts are associated withconvoys, although individual ships or atemporary grouping of ships may beescorted for a specific purpose. Minecountermeasures operations are integral

to successful protection of shipping and arean essential element of escort operations.An example of protection of shippingi s Operation EARNEST WILL, thereflagging of Kuwaiti ships in 1987.Environmental defense operations providefor coordinated Coast Guard/DODresponse to major pollution incidents bothat home and overseas. These incidentshave the potential for grave damage tonatural resources, the economy, andmilitary operations.

m. Recovery Operations. Recoveryoperations are conducted to search for,locate, identify, rescue, and returnpersonnel or human remains, sensitiveequipment, or items critical to nationalsecurity. These operations are generallysophisticated activities requiring detailedplanning in order to execute them,especially when conducting them in deniedareas. They may be clandestine, covert,or overt. Other recovery operations maybe conducted in friendly areas, particularlywhen the HN does not have the means toprovide technical assistance in conductingthe recovery. An example of a recoveryo p e r a t i o n i s O p e r a t i o n F U L LACCOUNTING conducted to account forand recover the remains of US servicemembers lost during the Vietnam War.

n. Show of Force Operations. Theseoperations, designed to demonstrate USresolve, involve increased visibility of USdeployed forces in an attempt to defusea specific situation that if allowed tocontinue may be detrimental to US interestsor national objectives.

• US forces deployed abroad lendcredibility to US promises andcommitments, increase its regionalinfluence, and demonstrate itsresolve to use military force ifnecessary. In addition, the NCA ordershows of force to bolster and reassure

III-15


friends and allies. Show of forceoperations are military in nature butoften serve both political andmilitary purposes. These operationscan influence other governments orpolitico-military organizations torespect US interests as well asinternational law.

• A show of force involves theappearance of a credible militaryforce to underscore US policy interestsor commitment to an alliance orcoal i t ion. Pol i t ica l concernsdominate a show of force. Militaryforces conduct these operations withinlegal and political constraints. Theforce coordinates its operations withthe country teams affected. A show offorce can involve a wide range ofmilitary forces including joint USmilitary or multinational forces.Additionally, a show of force mayinclude or transition to joint ormultinational exercises.

• As an example of a show of force,Operation JTF-Philippines wasconducted by US forces in 1989 insupport of President Aquino during acoup attempt against the Philippinegovernment. During this operation, alarge special operations force wasformed, USAF f ighter aircraf tpatrolled above rebel air bases, and twoaircraft carriers were positioned off thePhilippines.

o. Strikes and Raids. Strikes areoffensive operations conducted to inflictdamage on, seize, or destroy an objectivefor political purposes. Strikes may be usedfor punishing offending nations or groups,upholding international law, or preventingthose nations or groups from launching their

own offensive actions. A raid is usually asmall-scale operation involving swiftpenetration of hostile territory to secureinformation, confuse the enemy, or destroyinstallations. It ends with a plannedwithdrawal upon completion of the assignedmission. An example of a strike isOperation URGENT FURY, conducted onthe island of Grenada in 1983. An exampleof a raid is Operation EL DORADOCANYON conducted against Libya in1986, in response to the terrorist bombingof US Service members in Berlin. Joint Pub3-02, “Joint Doctrine for AmphibiousOperations,” provides specific guidance onamphibious raids.

p. Support to Insurgency. Aninsurgency is an organized movementaimed at the overthrow of a constitutedgovernment through the use of subversionand armed conflict. The US Governmentmay support an insurgency against aregime threatening US interests. US forcesmay provide logistic and training supportto an insurgency, but normally do notthemselves conduct combat operations. Anexample of support to insurgency was USsupport to the Mujahadin resistance inAfghanistan during the Soviet invasion.

3. Conclusion

The operations discussed in this chapterare representative of the wide range ofMOOTW. Although each type of operationhas unique aspects that influence planning,there are some considerations that areapplicable to most MOOTW. Theseplanning considerations, along witheducation and training requirements forMOOTW, are addressed in Chapter IV,"Planning for Military Operations OtherThan War."

III-16

Chapter III

Joint Pub 3-07

Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IVPLANNING FOR MILITARY

OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

IV-1

1. General

Key planning factors are addressed inthis chapter, along with education andtraining implications of MOOTW.

2. Planning Considerations

Plans for MOOTW are prepared in asimilar manner as plans for war. Themission analysis and command estimateprocesses are as critical in planning forMOOTW as they are in planning for war.Of particular importance in the planningprocess for MOOTW is the developmentof a clear definition, understanding, andappreciation of all potential threats.Oftentimes the threats may be unique anddisproportional or have the appearance ofbeing asymmetrical to the US operationsbeing conducted. For this reason, effortsshould be made to include an intelligenceelement in the first deployment package.Although the possibility of combat may beremote in many types of MOOTW,commanders should always plan to havethe right mix of forces available toquickly transition to combat operationsor evacuate. Additionally, when conductingnoncombat operations, commanders mustconsider the feasibility and means ofredeployment, possibly to another theater,to conduct other operations.

a. Unit Integrity. Planners shouldattempt to maintain unit integrity. USforces train as units, and are best able to

accomplish a mission when deployedintact. By deploying as an existing unit,forces are able to continue to operate underestablished procedures, adapting these tothe mission and situation, as required.When personnel and elements are drawnfrom various commands, effectiveness isdecreased. By deploying withoutestablished operating procedures, an ad hocforce is less effective and takes more timeto adjust to requirements of the mission.This not only complicates missionaccomplishment, but may also have animpact on force protection. Even ifpolitical restraints on an operation dictatethat a large force cannot be deployed intact,commanders should select smallerelements for deployment that haveestablished internal structures and havetrained and operated together.Additionally, when deploying into asituation which may involve combatoperations, commanders should deploywith appropriate joint force combatcapability , including elements that havehad the opportunity to train together anddevelop common operating procedures. Inorder to provide JFCs with neededversatility, it may not be possible topreserve unit integrity. In such cases,units must be prepared to send elementswhich are able to operate independently ofparent units. Attachment to a related unitis the usual mode. Units not accustomedto having attachments may be required toprovide administrative and logistic supportto normally unrelated units.

“British troops getting ready for duties in Northern Ireland and Nordic soldierspreparing for deployment to Macedonia are specifically retrained to useminimum force rather than maximum force to deal with threats they face.”

Special Warfare , April 1994

IV-2

Chapter IV

Joint Pub 3-07

b. Intelligence and InformationGathering

• MOOTW requires multi-disciplined,all-source, fused intelligence. Asingle source approach cannot supportall requirements.

• Manned and unmanned aerialintelligence sensors, to includespace-based, can provide valuableinformation where other intelligenceinfrastructure is not in place. Remotesensing systems can provideinformation on terrain, weather andother environmental factors essentialto MOOTW. Data from spacesystems can be used to updateantiquated maps and provide up-to-date locations of facilities andobstacles. Sensors on space andaerial platforms can also monitorterrestrial force movement and assistin treaty verification. In addition,communications systems usingspace-based resources can providesecure, reliable dissemination ofintelligence and other informationwhere there is little or no existingcommunications infrastructure.

• In MOOTW conducted outside theUnited States, human intelligence(HUMINT) may provide the mostuseful source of information.However, a HUMINT infrastructuremay not be in place when US forcesarrive; therefore, it needs to beestablished as quickly as possible.HUMINT can supplement otheri n t e l l i g e n c e s o u r c e s w i t hpsychological information notavailable through technical means.For example, while overhead imagerymay graphically depict the number ofpeople gathered in the town square,i t cannot gauge motivations or

e n t h u s i a s m o f t h e c r o w d s .Additionally, in underdeveloped areasbelligerent forces may not rely heavilyon radio communication, denying USforces intelligence derived throughsignal intercept. HUMINT isrequired to supplement signalsintelligence and overhead imagerywhich we typically rely upon toproduce the most accurate products.

• Specific essential elements ofinformation which drive collectionmanagement process in MOOTW maydiffer in focus from those targeted inwar. In war, intelligence collectionincludes an entire range of factors witha major emphasis on the enemy’smilitary capability. Intelligencecollection in MOOTW , however,m i g h t r e q u i r e a f o c u s o nunderstanding the political, cultural,and economic factors that affect thesituation. Information collection andanalysis in MOOTW must oftenaddress unique and subtle problemsnot always encountered in war. It willrequire a depth of expertise in (and amental and psychological integrationwith) all aspects of the operationalenvironment’s peoples and theircultures, politics, religion, economics,and related factors; and any varianceswithin affected groups of people. It isonly through an understanding of thevalues by which people definethemselves, that an intervenor canestablish for himself a perception oflegitimacy and assure that actionsintended to be coercive, do in fact havethe intended effect. In addition,intelligence collection must focusq u i c k l y o n t r a n s p o r t a t i o ninfrastructure in the AOR/JOA , toinclude capabilities and limitations ofmajor seaports, airfields, and surfacelines of communications.

IV-3

Planning for Military Operations Other Than War

• In MOOTW involving in-depthcoordination or interaction with NGOsand PVOs and most UN operations,the term “information gathering”should be used rather than the term“ i n t e l l i g e n c e . ” T h e t e r m“information gathering” is alsoappropriate in peacekeepingoperations because peacekeepers mustbe overt, neutral, and impartial. Non-military organizations may resentbeing considered a source ofintelligence. These organizations mayperceive that US forces are seeking torecruit members of their organizationsfor collection efforts, or turn theorganizations into unknowingaccomplices in some covert collectioneffort. NGOs and PVOs, by the verynature of what they do, becomefamiliar with the culture, language,and sensitivities of a populace. Thisinformation is very valuable tomilitary commanders as they seek toaccomplish missions which focus noton destroying an enemy, but onproviding aid and assistance to thepopulace of a foreign country. Byusing the term “informationgathering,” military forces may beable to foster better communicationswith other agencies, and therebybenefit from their valuable knowledge.

• Counterintelligence (CI) operationsare as important in MOOTW as theyare in war. Even though there maynot be a well-defined threat,protection of the force requires thatessential elements of friendlyinformation be safeguarded. InMOOTW, this is particularly pertinentin countering belligerent HUMINTefforts. Members of NGOs andPVOs working closely with US forcesmay pass information (knowingly orunknowingly) to belligerent elementsthat enables them to interfere with the

mission. Members of the localpopulace often gain access to USmilitary personnel and their bases byproviding services such as laundry andcooking. The local populace mayprovide information gleaned frominteraction with US forces to seekfavor with a belligerent element, orthey may actually be belligerents.JFCs must consider these andsimilar possibilities for compromiseof operational information, and takeactions to counter this compromise. CIpersonnel can develop an estimate ofthe threat, and recommend appropriateactions. Equally important is theircritical role during multinationalMOOTW in establishing proceduresand safeguards regarding theprotection, handling, and release ofclassified or sensitive information tocoalition partners, allies, andsupported elements. Because of thepossibly tenuous relationships betweenthe US and coalition partners duringa particular MOOTW, JFCs must bealert to the possibility that covertintelligence operations may beconducted against them by acoalition partner. CI planning andoperations must deal with thiscontingency, but in a uniquelysensitive way.

• Additionally, the importance ofmapping, charting, and geodesyshould not be overlooked. This isparticularly true in multinationaloperations, where it is essential thatmaps, charts and support data (toinclude datum and coordinate systemto be used) are coordinated in advance.The accuracy, scale, and currency offoreign maps and charts may varyw i d e l y f r o m U S p r o d u c t s .Additionally, release of US mappingmaterials may require foreigndisclosure approval.

IV-4

Chapter IV

Joint Pub 3-07

c. Multinational Operations

Multinational operations planningshould take into account the considerationsshown in Figure IV-1.

• When planning for operationsinvolving multinational partners,JFCs should assign missions basedon each multinational partner ’scapabilities. Each nation’s politicalconsiderations will influence its degreeof involvement in a specific MOOTW.Some multinational partners may notbe traditional allies of the US. Othersmay harbor long-standing animositiestowards other participating nations.T h e s e f a c t o r s c r e a t e u n i q u einteroperability, foreign disclosure andcounterintelligence issues. Earlydetermination and resolution ofthese issues with partner nationsduring the planning process iscritical for retaining the cooperationof multinational partners and ensuringthey have the resources necessary toaccomplish their assigned missions.

• JFCs should plan for increased liaisonand advisory requirements whenconducting multinational operations.Language barriers, varied culturalbackgrounds, and different militarycapabil i t ies and training maydetract from effective coordinationw i t h m u l t i n a t i o n a l p a r t n e r s .Interoperability of equipment andcoordination of different logisticsupport systems must be consideredin assigning missions and areas ofoperations. Liaison and advisoryteams must be adequately organized,staffed, trained and equipped toovercome these detractors. Althoughcommanders may not normallyprovide a liaison team to a particularunit, in multinational operationsdeployment of a team may be criticalto effective coordination and missionaccompl ishment SOF-uniquecapabilities in language and cross-cultural training, their regionalorientation and forward deployment,and focus on independent small unitactions make them one of theprincipal forces of choice toc o m p l e m e n t a n d s u p p o r tmultinational operations objectives.Chapter VI of Joint Pub 3-0, “DoctrineFor Joint Operations,” and Joint Pub3-16, “Joint Doctrine for MultinationalOperations” (under development),provide guidance for multinationaloperations. Effective options forcommand and control of multinationalforces are covered below.

d. Command and Control (C2). Nosingle C2 option works best for allMOOTW. JFCs and their subordinatesshould be flexible in modifying standarda r r a n g e m e n t s t o m e e t s p e c i f i crequirements of each situation and promoteunity of effort. Communications plannersmust be prepared for rapid changes inmission that alter the types and priority of

MULTINATIONALOPERATIONS

CONSIDERATIONS

l

l

l

l

l

l

Political Considerations

Language Barriers

Cultural Backgrounds

Military Capabilities andTraining

Equipment Interoperability

Logistic Support SystemCoordination

Figure IV-1. Multinational OperationsConsiderations

IV-5


support provided. Interoperability ofcommunications systems is critical to thesuccess of the operation.

• In US unilateral operations, C2arrangements may vary based onnecessary coordination with US civilauthorities, or federal, state, and localagencies involved in domestic andforeign operations. For example, C2arrangements during support to UScivil authorities must be plannedwith unity of effort in mind , andprovide communications links toappropriate US agencies. In a disastersituation, routine communicationsmay be disrupted. Civil authoritiesmight have to rely on backupcommunications systems, or if civilianbackup systems are disrupted, themilitary may have the onlycommunications equipment available.Military leaders should be preparedto establish communication linkageswith these authorities. Outside theUnited States, even when US forceso p e r a t e u n i l a t e r a l l y,s o m ecommunications links will berequired with local civil authoritiesor international agencies, dependingon the situation. Additionally,communications planning mustconsider the termination of USinvolvement in MOOTW and thetransfer of responsibility to anotheragency such as the UN or an NGO.Systems may have to be left behind tosupport the ongoing effort. This mustbe addressed early in the planningeffort.

• There are several options that maybe employed for the C2 ofmultinational forces; however,planners must be prepared to extend acommunications umbrella over themultinational force. Effective options

for C2 of multinational forcesinclude:

•• In the lead nation option, a nationagrees to take the lead in theaccomplishment of an internationalmandate. The lead nation generallyprovides the preponderance of forcesand the commander and basic staff tocontrol operations. Other nationsplace forces under the operationalcontrol of the lead nation’s militarycommander and augment the staff ofthe controlling headquarters. Thissimplifies unity of command, andallows the lead nation to set militaryobjectives in cooperation with otherm i l i t a r y f o r c e s , a p p r o v e t h ecomposition of the force, and assuremutual understanding of the mandateby all partners.

•• The parallel option allowsmultinational partners to retain greateroperational control of their forces. Themandating organization (e.g., UN)selects a commander for the force. Astaff, proportionally representing allcontributing nations, is assembled onan ad hoc basis. The force commanderhas operational control of forces of themultinational partners, but generallyto a lesser degree than that exercisedin the lead nation option.

•• The regional alliance optiondepends on the ability of regionalnations to lead a coalition effort.Regional alliance C2 approaches mayalso hinge on the influence exerted bya nation in a regional leadershipposition. Existing alliances may serveas a basis for C2 of forces involved inMOOTW. For example, the C2structure of NATO was designed forwar, but may also be effective inMOOTW.

IV-6

Chapter IV

Joint Pub 3-07

e. Public Affairs

• The worldwide media coverageprovided by satellite communicationsmakes planning for public affairsmore important than in the past.This is especially critical in MOOTW,where there can be significant politicalimpact. Media reporting influencespublic opinion, which may affect theperceived legitimacy of an operationand ultimately influence the successor failure of the operation. The speedwith which the media can collect andconvey information to the publicmakes it possible for the worldpopulace to become aware of anincident as quickly as, or evenbefore, JFCs and US Governmentdecisionmakers. JFCs should developa well-defined and concise publicaffairs plan to minimize adverse effectupon the operation and include theirpublic affairs officer early in theplanning process.

• Public affairs plans should provideopen and independent reporting,respond to media queries whichprovide the maximum disclosure withminimum delay, and create anenvironment between commander andreporters that encourages balancedcoverage of operations. An effectiveplan provides ways to communicateinformation about an operation andfulfills the US military’s obligation tokeep the American public informed.Additionally, a public affairs planenhances force protection throughsecurity at the source and operationalsecurity awareness, to include thepossibility of media attempts to acquireand publicly disseminate classifiedinformation. Public affairs plansmust also anticipate and pre-planresponse to possibly inaccuratemedia analysis and promulgation of

disinformation and misinformation byUS, coalition, and other media sources.Joint Pub 1-07, “Doctrine for PublicAffairs in Joint Operations” (underdevelopment), provides furtherguidance.

f. Civil Affairs (CA). CA units containa variety of specialty skills that supportMOOTW. CA capabilities are normallyt a i l o r e d t o s u p p o rt p a r t i c u l a roperational requirements. CA units mayprov ide assessments of the c i v i linfrastructure, assist in the operation oftemporary shelters, and serve as liaisonbetween the military and various NGOs andPVOs. Establishing and maintainingmilitary to civil relations may includeinteraction among US, allied or coalition,host-nation forces, as well as NGOs andPVOs. CA forces can also provideexpertise on factors which directly affectmilitary operations to include: culture,social structure, economic systems,language, and host-nation supportcapabilities. CA may also include forcesconducting activities which are normallythe responsibility of local or indigenousgovernments. Selection of CA forcesshould be based upon a clear concept ofCA mission requirements for the typeoperation being planned. Joint Pub 3-05,“Doctrine for Joint Special Operations,”provides specific guidance on the principalspecial operations missions, and Joint Pub3-57, “Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs,”provides specific guidance for employmentof CA forces.

g. Psychological Operations. PSYOPforces can provide significant support inMOOTW. Military PSYOP constitute aplanned, systematic process of conveyingmessages to and influencing selectedtarget groups. The messages conveyed bymilitary PSYOP are intended to promoteparticular themes that can result in desiredattitudes and behaviors. This information

IV-7


may include safety, health, public service,and messages designed to favorablyinfluence foreign perceptions of US forcesand operations. Although Joint Pub 3-53,“Doctrine for Joint PsychologicalOperations,” provides specific informationregarding employment of PSYOP forces,JFCs should be aware that successfulMOOTW may hinge on direct control ofor direct influence over the operationalarea mediums of mass communication(radio and television).

h. Coordination With NGOs andPVOs. In MOOTW, JFCs should beprepared to coordinate civilian andmilitary actions. One method to buildunity of effort and conduct this liaison isto establish CMOC. There is noestablished structure for a CMOC; its sizeand composition depend on the situation.A doctrinal layout of a CMOC organizationcan be found in the Handbook for CMOCOperations, published by the US Army JFKSpecial Warfare Center and School.Members of a CMOC may includerepresentatives of US military forces andUS Government agencies, other countries’forces involved in the operation, HNorganizations (if outside the United States),

and NGOs and PVOs. US Army civilaffairs personnel are ideally suited andtrained for CMOC duties. Civil affairsteams should be considered by the JFC toestablish the core of the CMOC. Througha structure such as a CMOC, the JFC cangain a greater understanding of the rolesof NGOs and PVOs and how theyinfluence mission accomplishment.Although formal agreements are not alwaysnecessary, such agreements betweenmilitary and civilian organizations mayimprove coordination and effectiveness.Such agreements can take the form ofmemorandums of agreement orunderstanding as well as terms of reference.

i. Interagency Operations. MOOTWwill often involve other departments andagencies.

• Within the United States, the FederalEmergency Management Agencynormally leads the response to a naturaldisaster, while the DOJ or DOT couldbe expected to lead in a counterterroristoperation. Effective liaison with thelead agency enables the JFC toeffectively support the politicalobjectives of the operation.

One hundred and sixteen persons lost their lives in the 27 March 1964,earthquake in south central Alaska, and property damage was over $300million. The affected communities included Anchorage, Seward, Valdez,Kodiak and Whittier, with Anchorage being the largest of these.

The Alaska earthquake resulted in one of the most extensive involvementsof the military in a civilian disaster in the history of the United States. Themilitary operation which was labeled “Operation Helping Hand,” involvedprincipally the Army and Air Force of the Alaskan Command, and the AlaskaNational Guard. Headquarters for the Alaskan Command is located justoutside of Anchorage at Elmendorf Air Force Base. This large air base isalso the headquarters for the Alaskan Air Command. Headquarters for theUnited States Army, Alaska is at Fort Richardson, adjacent to Elmendorf AirForce Base. At the time of the disaster, some 25,000 military personnel resided

EARTHQUAKE IN ALASKA

IV-8

Chapter IV

Joint Pub 3-07

in the Anchorage area. Described here is the involvement of the military inthe Anchorage area, its participation in disaster operations in the othercommunities notwithstanding.

Since Elmendorf AFB and Ft. Richardson are in such close proximity, themilitary is well integrated into the community of Anchorage. The military inAnchorage, for example, played an important role in the economic life of thecity and was interwoven with civilian organizations and groups in many ways.The wives of military personnel stationed in the Anchorage area taught in theAnchorage schools, and their children attended school in the city. The militaryand civilian organizations cooperated with one another in numerous ways;for example, Anchorage area fire departments had mutual aid agreementswith military fire departments. Also, upon retirement from active militarylife, former military personnel sometimes assumed positions in Anchorageorganizations. Thus, there was a spirit of cooperation and interdependencebetween the military and civilian communities of Anchorage prior to the 1964catastrophe. It was not surprising then that the military provided considerableassistance to the community in its hour of need.

The earthquake occurred around 5:30 p.m., and about 6:30 p.m. the first contactwas made between the military and civilian officials. At this time, the ArmyProvost Marshall from Ft. Richardson—who had been sent into the city tosee if military assistance would be needed—made initial contact with civilianauthorities at the downtown Public Safety Building, which became theemergency operation center for the city. Throughout the period, the provostmarshall acted as the Army liaison officer between the Army headquarters,the city police department and the Anchorage Civil Defense with the functionof coordinating requests for assistance. At 8:00 p.m., the police requestedArmy troops to assist in securing Anchorage against possible looting and tocontrol the movement of people in the affected areas. Because of themagnitude of the earthquake, officers at the base had anticipated the needfor assisting the civilian community; thus they were well mobilized when theofficial request was received. At approximately 8:30 p.m., the first contingentof troops departed from Ft. Richardson for Anchorage. From this initial pointof involvement, the assistance from the military in the disaster-struckcommunity of Anchorage expanded considerably.

SOURCE: William Anderson, “Military-Civilian Relations in DisasterOperations,” USA Office of Civil Defense, 1968.

• For MOOTW outside the UnitedStates, the lead agency will normallybe the DOS and the US Ambassadorwill coordinate US activities throughan established Country Team withr e p r e s e n t a t i o nf r o m a l l U Sdepartments and agencies in thatcountry, including DOD. In countrieswhich lack US embassies, a specialPresidential Envoy may be designatedto direct the operation.

• That a non-DOD agency may have thelead on a given operation does not alterthe military chain of commandestablished in the appropriate orderissued by the NCA.

j. Legal Requirements. MOOTW maypresent unique legal issues. In addition totraditional skills necessary in militaryjustice, legal personnel may requireexpertise in areas such as those shown in

IV-9


Figure IV-2. Commanders should ensurethat their supporting Staff JudgeAdvocate, or civilian legal counsel, hasthe resources available to respond to thevariety of complex international andoperational legal and regulatory issues thatmay arise during MOOTW. HN legalpersonnel should be integrated into thecommand legal staff as soon as practical toprovide guidance on unique HN domesticlegal practices and customs.

AREAS REQUIRINGLEGAL EXPERTISE

l

l

l

l

l

l

l

l

l

l

l

Refugees

Displaced and detainedcivilians

Fiscal law

Rules of engagement

Psychological operations

Civil affairs

Medical support

Local culture, customs,and government

International law andagreements (such as Status-of-Forces Agreements andenvironmental initiatives)

Military and political liaison

Claims

Figure IV-2. Areas Requiring LegalExpertise

k. Logistics

• In MOOTW, logistics elementsmay be employed in quantitiesdisproportionate to their normalmilitary roles , and in nonstandardtasks; planners must be aware thatoverextending such forces mayjeopardize their ability to supportcombat opera t ions .Log is t i cselements may precede other militaryforces or may be the only forcesdeployed. Logistics personnel may bedeployed to a foreign nation to supporteither US or multinational forces.Logistics forces may also havecontinuing responsibility after thedeparture of combat forces, in supportof multinational forces or PVOs andNGOs. In such cases, they must befamiliar with and adhere to anyapplicable status-of-forces agreementto which the US is a party. Logisticspersonnel must also be familiar withand adhere to any legal, regulatory, orpolitical restraints governing USinvolvement in the MOOTW. Thecommander must be alert for potentiallegal problems arising from the unique,difficult circumstances and the highlypolitical nature of MOOTW such asdisaster relief and humanitarianassistance operations. Logisticsplanners should analyze the capabilityof the HN economy to accommodatethe logistic support required by the USor multinational forces and exercisecare to limit adverse effects on the HNeconomy. Logistics units, like allother units, must be capable of self-defense, particularly if they deployalone or in advance of other militaryforces.

• Early mission analysis must alsoc o n s i d e r t r a n s p o r t a t i o nrequirements. Airfields and portsmust be assessed, particularly those in

IV-10

Chapter IV

Joint Pub 3-07

underdeveloped countries where statuswill be in question. Delay incompleting the assessment directlyimpacts the flow of strategic lift assetsinto the region. Additional supportforces may be required to buildsupporting infrastructure. Thisimpacts follow-on force closure as wellas delivery of humanitarian cargo.Also procedures must be establishedt o c o o r d i n a t e m o v e m e n trequirements and airfield slot timeswith other participants in theoperation. Availability of fuel andother key support items may impingeon transportation support.

• Fundamental logistics principles applyacross the range of military operations.Refer to Joint Pub 4-0, “Doctrine forLogistic Support of Joint Operations,”for additional specific guidanceregarding logistics.

l. Medical Operations

• There is usually a requirement toprovide medical support to US forces

engaged in MOOTW. Medicaloperations teams brought by US forcesare intended to support those forces.The US military has unique, rapidlyd e p l o y a b l e , m o b i l e m e d i c a lpersonnel and units which arefrequently called upon to provide alarge portion of the medical support.Rapid and early integration ofpreventive medicine units andpractices is perhaps the mostimportant medical operation thatmust be planned. Medical supportoperations protect US personnel andenhance mission capability byreducing the threat of uncontrolleddisease problems. Planning to providemedical services for US forces anddesignated individuals should includehospitalization, preventive andveterinary medicine, medical logistics,blood, medical regulating, andaeromedical evacuation planning. Fora complete discussion of medicalplanning, refer to Joint Pub 4-02, “JointDoctrine for Health Service Support inJoint Operations.”

A deployed US medical specialist examines an X-ray in support of efforts toreduce the spread of tuberculosis and identify preventative medicine requirements.

IV-11


• When planning for MOOTW, thepotential to treat the HN indigentpopulation or allied militarypersonnel must be considered. Therespective capabilities of allied,civilian relief, or other supportingmedical forces should be consideredprior to finalizing the medical supportconcept.

• Medical examination of indigenousand coalition personnel and theirenvironments will frequently provideunique operational insights to the JFCduring MOOTW. Presence and use ofdrugs, threat development of WMD,and other critical evidence are oftenfirst identified or verified through thisvaluable intelligence source.Continuous coordination is necessarybetween the medical and intelligenceelements.

m. Active/Reserve Mix. MOOTWmay require units and individuals notfound in the active component or mayrequire deployment of more units orindividuals possessing a capability than areavailable in the active component.Examples of these types of units are shownin Figure IV-3. Mobilization of any reservecomponent units may be difficult if war isnot imminent or declared. Consequently,most reserve component participationwill be through volunteer support. Totake advantage of volunteers, plannersshould select roles and tasks for reserveforces that can be supported by a rotationalforce -- tour requirements in excess of threeweeks will discourage and limit volunteers.If time permits, planners shoulddetermine what reserve componentcapabilities are required, and how longit will take for the units to be trained andready for deployment. Planners should alsoreview personnel and equipmentauthorizations for reserve component

units to ensure compatibility with activeforces. For example, a reserve unitequipped with commercial cargo vehicleswould not be able to operate as well inrough terrain as an active unit equippedwith tactical vehicles. On the other hand,use of active forces, especially in functionalareas heavily reliant on the reservecomponent, may impact on those forces’ability to respond to their wartime taskingsin the near term because of the time neededto redeploy and repair or replaceequipment.

n. Transition from Wartime Operationsto MOOTW. A commander’s campaignplan should include a transition fromwartime operation to MOOTW.Commanders plan for this transition at thevery outset of hostilities. This ensuresdesired political objectives continue to bepursued after the cessation of wartimeoperations. Figure IV-4 shows post-conflict activities.

RESERVE UNITSNEEDED IN MOOTW

l

l

l

l

l

l

l

Civil affairs

Psychological operations

Airlift

Linguist units and FOAs

Medical

Port security

Engineers

Figure IV-3. Reserve Units Needed inMOOTW

IV-12

Chapter IV

Joint Pub 3-07

• JFCs may need to realign forces oradjust force structure to begin post-conflict operations. The JFC’splanning and continuous developmentof the estimate of the situation willreveal the nature and scope of theseactivities and the forces required.These forces may be available withinthe joint force or may be required fromanother theater or from reservecomponents.

• As post-conflict operations progress,military forces may largely be ins u p p o r t o f o t h e r U S a n dinternational agency efforts. Post-conflict activities typically begin withsignificant military involvement, thenmove increasingly toward civiliandominance as the threat wanes andcivil infrastructures are reestablished.

• Typical post-conflict activitiesinclude transition to civil authorities,support to truce negotiations, CAsupport to reestablish a civilgovernment, PSYOP to fostercontinued peaceful relations, and

continuing logistic support fromengineering and transportation units.

o. Termination of Operations

• As in war, MOOTW operationalplanning includes actions to be takenas soon as the operation is complete.These actions depend on the specificoperation and may include the itemslisted in Figure IV-5. The manner inwhich US forces terminate theirinvolvement may influence theperception of the legitimacy of theentire operation, and application ofthis principle of MOOTW requirescareful planning for this phase.Additionally, proper accountability offunds and equipment facilitatesd i s b u r s e m e n t o f f u n d s a n dr e i m b u r s e m e n t s a g a i n s t a n youtstanding claims.

• P l a n n e r s s h o u l d s c h e d u l eredeployment of specific units assoon as possible after their part in theoperation has been completed. This iscritical for maintaining readiness for

Figure IV-4. Post-Conflict Activities

Activities include:

Transition to civil authorities

Support to truce negotiations

Civil affairs support to reestablish acivil government

Psychological operations to fostercontinued peaceful relations

Continuing logistic support from

l

l

l

l

l

SIGNIFICANTMILITARY

INVOLVEMENT

CIVILIANDOMINANCE

POST-CONFLICT ACTIVITIES

IV-13


humanitarian assistance and peacekeepingoperations) warfighting skills are notalways appropriate. Therefore, to beeffective in these types of MOOTW, a mindset other than warfighting is required.

a. Readying forces to successfullyconduct MOOTW requires a two-prongedapproach (see Figure IV-6). The first prongis the professional military education ofall officers and noncommissioned officers(NCOs). Their formal MOOTW educationbegins with basic leadership training andculminates at the senior service or academylevel. The focus of MOOTW education ist o e n s u re l e a d e r s a t a l l l e v e l sunderstand the objectives, principlesand characteristics of MOOTW, and canplan and conduct these operations. Asleaders progress, they will learn aboutMOOTW at a level applicable to theircurrent and next grade. Leader educationwill include discussions, lessons learned,and situational exercises, and shouldculminate with senior leaders performingin a command or staff position during aMOOTW exercise.

b. The second prong is the training ofindividuals, units, and staffs. The focusof this training is to ensure thatindividuals and units have the necessaryskills for a given MOOTW, and that thestaffs can plan, control, and support theoperation. Depending on the anticipatedoperation, predeployment training couldinclude individual skill training, situationaltraining exercises, field training exercises,combined arms live fire exercises, mobilityexercises, command post exercises, andsimulation exercises to train commanders,staffs, and components. If there is sufficienttime prior to actual deployment for anoperation, units should culminate theirpredeployment training in a joint trainingexercise based on the anticipatedoperation. The unit tasked for the operationshould participate in the exercise with the

future operations in either theprimary role of fighting the nation’swars or deploying for subsequentMOOTW. Forces that have beenperforming noncombat types ofMOOTW, such as PKO, may bedegraded in combat proficiency. If theMOOTW tasks are significantlydifferent from their combat tasks,forces may require proficiency trainingprior to being deployed as warfighters.

3. Education and Training

“A well-trained and disciplined militaryunit is the best foundation upon whichto build a peacekeeping force.”

LTG T. Montgomery, USASR MILREP to NATO

Readying forces for MOOTW requiresbuilding on the primary purpose of theArmed Forces -- to fight and win thenation’s wars. For most types ofMOOTW, military personnel adapt theirwarfighting skills to the situation.However, for some MOOTW (for example,

May include but are notlimited to:

TERMINATION OFOPERATIONS ACTIONS

l

l

l

l

l

Transition to civil authority

Marking and clearingminefields

Closing financial obligations

Pre-redeployment activities

Redeploying forces

Figure IV-5. Termination of OperationsActions

IV-14

Chapter IV

Joint Pub 3-07

supporting units with which it normallydeploys, and if possible, with the nexthigher headquarters for the actualoperation. Once deployed, and if thesituation allows, military skills trainingat individual and unit level may occur.Training following redeployment shouldagain focus on the unit’s wartime missions.

c. There will most likely beinsufficient time to train for a specificoperation, which is why a two-prongedapproach to preparing for MOOTW iscritical. A well-trained force can adaptto MOOTW under the leadership ofofficers and NCOs educated in theprinciples and types of MOOTW. Thelack of opportunity to train for a specific

Figure IV-6. MOOTW Education and Training

operation is in large part overcome bymilitary leaders who have a solidfoundation of MOOTW provided throughthe military education system.

4. Conclusion

In MOOTW, commanders should rely ontheir knowledge of warfighting and trainingdoctrine, but must understand thedemands of MOOTW and be preparedto tailor warfighting skills to meet theMOOTW situation. Forces engaged innoncombat MOOTW should alwaysprepare for transition to combat. Finally,success during MOOTW is founded inprofessional, skilled, trained, educated, anddisciplined Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen,Marines, and Coast Guardsmen.

MOOTW EDUCATION AND TRAINING

GOALS

Ensure all leadersunderstand theobjectives,principles, andcharacteristics ofMOOTW

Ensure individualsand units have thenecessary skills for agiven MOOTW andthat the staffs canplan, control, andsupport theoperation

OFFICERSAND NCOS

INDIVIDUALS,UNITS, AND

STAFFS

METHODS

DiscussionsLessons learnedSituational exercises

Individual skilltrainingSituational exercisesField exercisesCombined arms livefire exercisesMobility exercisesSimulation exercises

Ö

Ö

Ö

Ö

Ö

Ö

Ö

Ö

Ö

IV-15


An 11 year-old Haitian girl comforts heryounger sister during operation UPHOLDDEMOCRACY. US forces must be pre-pared to deal with a spectrum of situationswhen engaged in Military Operations OtherThan War.

IV-16

Chapter IV

Joint Pub 3-07

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX AADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

A-1

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to theJoint Warfighting Center, Attn: Doctrine Division, Fenwick Road, Bldg 96, Fort Monroe,VA 23651-5000. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness,consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the US Army. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsorfor this publication is the Director, J-5, Strategic Plans and Policy.

3. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: CSA WASHINGTON DC//DAMO-FDQ//FROM: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5/J7-JDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans andInteroperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20318-7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in thispublication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as anenclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requestedto notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected inthis publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTEDNUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

A-2

Appendix A

Joint Pub 3-07

4. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publicationcenters.

b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands,Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any joint publication to foreign governments orforeign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attache Office)to DIA Foreign Liaison Branch, C-AS1, Room 1A674, Pentagon, Washington D.C.20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assignedadministrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988,“Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.”

By Military Services:

Army: US Army AG Publication Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2898

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: CO, Navy Aviation Supply OfficeDistribution Division (Code 03443)5801 Tabor AvenuePhiladelphia, PA 19120-5000

Marine Corps: Marine Corps Logistics BaseAlbany, GA 31704-5000

Coast Guard: Coast Guard Headquarters, COMDT (G-REP)2100 2nd Street, SWWashington, D.C. 20593-0001

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications isunrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified jointpublications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R.

GLOSSARYPART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

AOR area of responsibility

C2 command and controlCA civil affairsCI counterintelligenceCJTF commander, joint task forceCMOC civil-military operations center

DOD Department of DefenseDOJ Department of JusticeDOS Department of StateDOT Department of Transportation

FID foreign internal defense

HA humanitarian assistanceHCA humanitarian and civic assistanceHN host nationHUMINT human intelligence

IDAD internal defense and development

JFC joint force commanderJOA joint operations areaJTF joint task forceJTTP joint tactics, techniques, and procedures

MFO Multinational Force and ObserversMOOTW Military Operations Other Than WarMSCA military support to civil authorities

NATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNCA National Command AuthoritiesNCO noncommissioned officerNEO noncombatant evacuation operationNGO nongovernmental organization

OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

PEO peace enforcement operationsPKO peacekeeping operationsPO Peace OperationsPSYOP psychological operationsPVO private voluntary organization

GL-2

Glossary

Joint Pub 3-07

ROE rules of engagement

SOF Special Operations Forces

UN United NationsUSAF United States Air Force

WMD weapons of mass destruction

GL-3

GlossaryPART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

arms control. A concept that connotes: a.any plan, arrangement, or process, restingupon explicit or implicit internationalagreement, governing any aspect of thefollowing: the numbers, types, andperformance characteristics of weaponsystems (including the command andcontrol, logistics support arrangements,and any related intelligence-gatheringmechanism); and the numerical strength,organization, equipment, deployment, oremployment of the Armed Forcesretained by the parties (it encompassesdisarmament); and, b. on someoccasions, those measures taken for thepurpose of reducing instability in themilitary environment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combatting terrorism. Actions, includingantiterrorism (defensive measures takento reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts)and counterterrorism (offensive measurestaken to prevent, deter, and respond toterrorism), taken to oppose terrorismthroughout the entire threat spectrum.(Joint Pub 1-02)

DOD support to counterdrug operations.Support provided by the Department ofDefense to law enforcement agencies todetect, monitor, and counter theproduction, trafficking, and use of illegaldrugs. (Approved for inclusion in thenext edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

end state. What the National CommandAuthorities want the situation to be whenoperations conclude — both militaryoperations, as well as those where themilitary is in support of other instrumentsof national power. (Approved forinclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub1-02)

ensuring freedom of navigation.Operations conducted to demonstrate USor international rights to navigate air orsea routes. (Approved for inclusion in thenext edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

exclusion zone. A zone established by asanctioning body to prohibit specificactivities in a specific geographic area.The purpose may be to persuade nationsor groups to modify their behavior tomeet the desires of the sanctioning bodyor face continued imposition ofsanctions, or use or threat of force.(Approved for inclusion in the nextedition of Joint Pub 1-02)

humanitarian assistance. Programsconducted to relieve or reduce the resultsof natural or manmade disasters or otherendemic conditions such as human pain,disease, hunger, or privation that mightpresent a serious threat to life or that canresult in great damage to or loss ofproperty. Humanitarian assistanceprovided by US forces is limited in scopeand duration. The assistance providedis designed to supplement or complementthe efforts of the host nation civilauthorities or agencies that may have theprimary responsibility for providinghumanitarian assistance. (Joint Pub 1-02)

military operations other than war.Encompasses the use of militarycapabilities across the range of militaryoperations short of war. These militaryactions can be applied to complementany combination of the other instrumentsof national power and occur before,during, and after war. Also calledMOOTW. (Approved for inclusion in thenext edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

GL-4

Glossary

Joint Pub 3-07

military support to civil authorities.Those activities and measures taken bythe DOD Components to foster mutualassistance and support between theDepartment of Defense and any civilgovernment agency in planning orpreparedness for, or in the application ofresources for response to, theconsequences of civil emergencies orattacks, including national securityemergencies. Also called MSCA.(Approved for inclusion in the nextedition of Joint Pub 1-02)

nation assistance. Civil and/or militaryassistance rendered to a nation by foreignforces within that nation’s territoryduring peacetime, crises or emergencies,or war based on agreements mutuallyconcluded between nations. Nationassistance programs include, but are notlimited to, security assistance, foreigninternal defense, other US Code Title 10(DOD) programs, and activitiesperformed on a reimbursable basis byFederal agencies or internationalorganizations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

noncombatant evacuation operations.Operations conducted to relocatethreatened noncombatants fromlocations in a foreign country. Theseoperations normally involve US citizenswhose lives are in danger, and may alsoinclude selected foreign nationals. Alsocalled NEO. (Approved for inclusion inthe next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

nongovernmental organizations. Refersto transnational organizations of privatecitizens that maintain a consultativestatus with the Economic and Socialcouncil of the United Nations.Nongovernmental organizations may beprofessional associations, foundation,multinational businesses or simplygroups with a common interest inhumanitarian assistance activities

( d e v e l o p m e n t a n d r e l i e f ) .“Nongovernmental organizations” is aterm normally used by non-USorganizations. Also called NGO.(Approved for inclusion in the nextedition of Joint Pub 1-02)

peace building. Post-conflict actions,predominately diplomatic and economic,that strengthen and rebuild governmentalinfrastructure and institutions in order toavoid a relapse into conflict. (Approvedfor inclusion in the next edition of JointPub 1-02)

peace enforcement. Application ofmilitary force, or the threat of its use,normally pursuant to internationalauthorization, to compel compliancewith resolutions or sanctions designedto maintain or restore peace and order.(Approved for inclusion in the nextedition of Joint Pub 1-02)

peacekeeping. Military operationsundertaken with the consent of all majorparties to a dispute, designed to monitorand facilitate implementation of anagreement (cease fire, truce, or other suchagreement) and support diplomaticefforts to reach a long-term politicalsettlement. (Approved for inclusion in thenext edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

peacemaking. The process of diplomacy,mediation, negotiation, or other formsof peaceful settlements that arranges anend to a dispute, and resolves issues thatled to conflict. (Approved for inclusionin the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

peace opera t ions . Encompassespeacekeeping operations and peaceenforcement operations conducted insupport of diplomatic efforts to establishand maintain peace. (Approved forinclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub1-02)

GL-5

Glossary

preventive deployment. The deploymentof military forces to deter violence at theinterface or zone of potential conflictwhere tension is rising among parties.Forces may be employed in such a waythat they are indistinguishable from apeacekeeping force in terms ofequipment, force posture, and activities.(Approved for inclusion in the nextedition of Joint Pub 1-02)

preventive diplomacy. Diplomatic actionstaken in advance of a predictable crisisto prevent or limit violence. (Approvedfor inclusion in the next edition of JointPub 1-02)

private voluntary organizations. Private,nonprofit humanitarian assistanceorganizations involved in developmentand relief activities. Private voluntaryorganizations are normally US-based.“Private voluntary organization” is oftenused synonymously with the term“nongovernmental organization.” Alsocalled PVO. (Approved for inclusion inthe next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

protection of shipping. The use ofproportionate force by US warships,military aircraft, and other forces, whennecessary for the protection of US flagvessels and aircraft, US citizens (whetherembarked in US or foreign vessels), andtheir property against unlawful violence.This protection may be extended toforeign flag vessels, aircraft, and personsconsistent with international law.(Approved for inclusion in the nextedition of Joint Pub 1-02)

raid. An operation, usually small scale,involving a swift penetration of hostileterritory to secure information, confusethe enemy, or to destroy installations. Itends with a planned withdrawal upon

completion of the assigned mission.(Joint Pub 1-02)

recovery operations. Operationsconducted to search for, locate, identify,rescue, and return personnel or humanremains, sensitive equipment, or itemscritical to national security. (Approvedfor inclusion in the next edition of JointPub 1-02)

sanction enforcement/maritime interceptoperations. Operations which employcoercive measures to interdict themovement of certain types of designateditems into or out of a nation or specifiedarea. (Approved for inclusion in the nextedition of Joint Pub 1-02)

show of force. An operation, designed todemonstrate US resolve, which involvesincreased visibility of US deployed forcesin an attempt to defuse a specificsituation, that if allowed to continue, maybe detrimental to US interests or nationalobjectives. (Approved for inclusion inthe next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

strike. An attack which is intended toinflict damage on, seize, or destroy anobjective. (Joint Pub 1-02)

support to counterinsurgency. Supportprovided to a government in the military,paramilitary, political, economic,psychological, and civic actions itundertakes to defeat insurgency.(Approved for inclusion in the nextedition of Joint Pub 1-02)

support to insurgency. Support providedto an organized movement aimed at theoverthrow of a constituted governmentthrough use of subversion and armedconflict. (Approved for inclusion in thenext edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

GL-6

Glossary

Joint Pub 3-07

Intentionally Blank

Assess-ments/

Revision

CJCSApproval

TwoDrafts

ProgramDirective

ProjectProposal

J-7 formally staffs withServices and CINCS

Includes scope of project,references, milestones,and who will developdrafts

J-7 releases ProgramDirective to Lead Agent.Lead Agent can beService, CINC, or JointStaff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2Program Directive

l

l

l

The CINCS receive the pub andbegin to assess it during use

18 to 24 months followingpublication, the Director J-7, willsolicit a written report from thecombatant commands andServices on the utility and qualityof each pub and the need for anyurgent changes or earlier-than-scheduled revisions

No later than 5 years afterdevelopment, each pub is revised

STEP #5Assessments/Revision

l

l

l

Submitted by Services, CINCS, or Joint Staffto fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services andCINCs

J-7 initiates Program Directive

l

l

l

STEP #1Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchyas shown in the chart above. is in the series of joint doctrine publications.The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint Pub 3-07 Operations

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JOINT PUB 1-0

PERSONNELand

ADMINISTRATION

JOINT PUB 4-0 JOINT PUB 5-0 JOINT PUB 6-0

LOGISTICS C4 SYSTEMSPLANS

JOINT PUB 0-2

JOINT PUB 1

UNAAF

JOINTWARFARE

JOINTDOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makesrequired changes and prepares pub forcoordination with Services and CINCS

Joint Staff conducts formalstaffing for approval as a Joint Publication

STEP #4CJCS Approval

l

l

l

Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority(PRA) to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with CINCS, Services,and Joint Staff

l

l

l

STEP #3Two Drafts

ENHANCEDJOINT

WARFIGHTINGCAPABILITY

INTELLIGENCE

JOINT PUB 2-0

OPERATIONS

JOINT PUB 3-0

jp 3-07 joint doctrine for military operations other than war · joint doctrine for military...

Documents