Competing Paradigms or Birds of a Feather? Constructivism and Neoliberal InstitutionalismComparedAuthor(s): Jennifer Sterling-FolkerSource: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Mar., 2000), pp. 97-119Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3013971 .Accessed: 31/01/2014 11:00Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp .JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. .Wiley and The International Studies Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extendaccess to International Studies Quarterly.http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 137.99.31.134 on Fri, 31 Jan 2014 11:00:49 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsInternationalStudiesQuarterly(2000) 44, 97-119. Competing Paradigms or Birds of a Feather? Constructivismand Neoliberal InstitutionalismCompared JENNIFERSTERLING-FOLKER University of Connecticut This articlecompares constructivismand neoliberal institutionalismand argues that in their reificationas paradigms in competition, the 10 theoreticalcommunityis making far too much of what are relatively small differencesbetweenthemin the metatheoreticalscheme of things. Theseclaims aresubstantiated by comparing functionalism, neo- functionalism,neoliberal institutionalism,and constructivism.Such an examination reveals that they all depend on the same mechanism of functionalinstitutionalefficiencyin order to account forsocial change. Thus when constructivismhas been utilizedas an explanationforchange and transformation,it has tended to reach many of the same conclu- sions, and in the same manner,as other variantsof liberal IR theory.In addition, this comparison reveals that, despite its assumption of exog- enous interests,neoliberal institutionalismrelies implicitlyon an iden- titytransformationin order to account for cooperation's maintenance. Such a transformationis entirelyconsistentwithconstructivistexpecta- tions. The choice between neoliberal institutionalismand constructiv- ism is not paradigmatic andis merely achoice between explaining short-term,behavioral cooperation in the moment or its development into communal cooperation in the future.The article concludes with some general observationsregardingwhythisparallel has occurred and what its implicationsare for our understandingof 10. Sincethe endof the ColdWar the study of international organization(10)has witnessedarenewedinterest insubjectssuchasnorms,ideas,learning,and identity-formation.' Theaccumulatedstudy of these subjects has producedwhat onereviewer has called"the constructivist turn in IRtheory" in which theorists openup "the black box of interest andidentity formation," and arguethat "state interests emerge from and are endogenousto interaction with structures"(Check- el, 1998:326).2 This constructivist turn has elicited a great dealof attention, and Author'snote:For theirinisights,commenits,anid helpfulsuggestioinsoniearlier draftsof thisarticle,I would like to thanikPatrickThaddeusJackson, Yale Fergusoni,the editors of InternationalStudiesQuarterly,anid several anioni- ymous reviewers.Aniyerrorsor omissionisare myowni. I Several authors provide overviewsof prior theorizinigoni eachof these suLbjects.For learninlgseeLevy, 1994:280, fin.2; for ideas see Woods, 1995:163-66, anidJacobseni,1995; for niormssee Raymonid,1997:208-13, anid Kowertanid Legro, 1996; anid for ideintitysee Kratochwilanid Lapid, 1996. 2 KowertanidLegro also use the term"sociologicalturni"(1996:453). The wor-ksCheckel reviewsinicludeFinniiemore, 1996; Katzenisteini,1996; anidKlotz,1995. For otherexamples of conistructivismsee the worksof Adler (1997); Dessler (1989); Carlsniaes(1992); Kubalkova,Oniuf,anidKowert(1998); Kratochwiland Lapid (1996); Oinuf(1989); Ruggie(1998); anidWenidt(1987, 1992, 1994); as well as the workscited byCheckel in his footniote28 anidthose cited byHopf (1998). C 2000International Studies Association. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main Street, Malden,MA 02148, USA, and108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK. This content downloaded from 137.99.31.134 on Fri, 31 Jan 2014 11:00:49 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions98CompetingParadigmsor Birds of a Feather? its rise among the ranksof IR theorieshas been so rapid thatit is now frequently assigned the paradigmaticspace once reservedfor Marxism.3It is being touted as a new and potentiallyfruitfultheoreticalendeavor which offersa direct chal- lenge to existingIR theoriesand even a "middle ground" between them (Adler, 1997; Checkel, 1998:327).4 This articlewillargue thatneitherclaim is correct.Constructivismis not a new field of IR theoreticalinquirybecause it fails to offera paradigmaticalternative to liberal IR theoryand neoliberal institutionalismin particular.This failurecan be traced largelyto theoreticalmisapplication.When the goal is to explain social change, constructivistshave generally not followed through onthe historical indeterminacyimplied by the approach itself.As March and Olsen point out, if "identitiesand competencies are shaped by political activitiesand interactions ...arise partlyin the context of politics and become embedded in rules, prac- tices,beliefs,and institutions,"then "historyis path-dependentin the sense that the characterof currentinstitutionsdepends not only on currentconditionsbut also on the historicalpath of institutionaldevelopment" (1998:959).5 Yet many constructivistshave been unwilling to commit to this implied indeterminacy. When constructivismis utilized as an explanation for social change, there has instead been a noticeable proclivityto adopt the same functional-institutional causal logic presentin almost all variantsof liberal IR theorizing.Constructivism has tended to replicateliberal arguments,conclusions,and predictionsabout the futureof internationalrelationsas a result. This association is remarkable for anumber of reasons. Thefirstis that constructivismhas several theoreticalancestriesthat are decidedly not liberal in theirorientations.While its practitionerstrace the originsof constructivismto a varietyof sources, postmodernism(or what is commonlyreferredto as critical theory) is almost invariablyonthe list of theoretical antecedents.6 Clearly it would be incorrectto argue that the origins of constructivismmay be found in liberal theory,since liberalism'sreificationof modernityis preciselypostmod- ernism'sintendedtarget.Yet Hopf's observationthatthereis a differencebetween "conventionalconstructivism"and criticaltheoryis pertinenthere (1998; see also Ruggie, 1998:35-36). As he notes, "although constructivismshares many of the 3 Lapid argues in a special 1989 issue of InternationalStudiesQuarterlythat post-positivismshould be "the third debate in the field of initerniationialrelationis"(1989:235). Alonigsimilarlinies,Walt argues that realism,nieoliberal inistitutionialism,anid conistructivismare the field's three competinigparadigms(1998), anid Ruggie that it is because nieorealismanid nieoliberalinistitutionialismmay be lumped togetheroni the basis of their shared rationialchoice methodologythat anl alterniativeperspectivesuch as conistructivismis so niecessary(1998:4-11). For conifirmation thatthisperspectiveoniconistr-uctivismis nlow widelyshared withinithe field,onienieedlook niofurtherthall the 501' anniiiversaryissue of InternationalOrganization,which uses thejuxtapositioniof rationialismanidconistructivismas its organiizinigtheme (Katzenisteiniet al., 1998). 4 This is niotto say that conistructivismhas niotbeeni withoutits critics.See, for example, works of Checkel (1998:338-47); Copelanid (1998); Desch (1998); Haseniclever,Mayer,anidRittberger(1997:190-92);Jervis(1998:976); Lapid (1989:248-49); anid Mearsheimer-(1994-95). Or as Taylorniotes,while there is some descriptivemeritin the claim that actionianid structuLreare mutually conistitutive,"as anl approach to explaininigsocial chalngeit is useless," because it "rules(s) out fromthe startthe possibilityof explaininigchanige in termsof their initeractioniovertime"(1989:149; emphasis in originial).See also Kowertanid Legro, 1996:488-90, anid Hoffmannii'sdiscussioniof path-depenidenicyanidconistructivism(1991:15-19). 6 The termspost-structuralismanidpost-positivismare frequenitlysubstituted,anidconitainia niumberof differenit epistemologiesinicludinigDerrida'sdeconistructioni,semiotics,anidfeminiistpsychoanialytictheory.Whattheseapproaches have in commoniis a "dissatisfactioniwithwhat the conistitutioniEnilightenimenitproject has broughtabout" anldall attempt to challenige"the initellectualsuppositionisupoInwhich Westernirationialismanid positivismare based" (Gregory,quoted in Der Deriani anid Shapiro, 1989:xiiv; see also Roseniau, 1990, anid Smith, 1996. While both Dessler anid Wenidttrace the originisof conistruLctivismto work by AnthoniyGiddelnsoln "structuLrationitheory" (Dessler, 1989:442; Wenidt,1987:356),Wenidtlater cited a niumberof other social theoriesas alntecedenits,ilncludilng "cogniitivists,poststructuralists,stanidpoinitanidpostmodernifeminiists,rule theorists,anidstructurationiists"(1992:393). Ruggie tracesthe "social conistructivistproject"to a differenitset of theoristsinicludinigthe EinglishSchool, Durkheim, anidWeber,buLthe also ackniowledgesGiddenisanidpostmoderniismas anitecedenits(1998:11, 28-32); see also Adler, 1997, anid Kubalkova, Oinuf,anid Kowert,1998. This content downloaded from 137.99.31.134 on Fri, 31 Jan 2014 11:00:49 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsJENNIFER STERLING-FOLKER99 foundationalelements of critical theory, it alsoresolves someissues by adopting defensiblerules of thumb,or conventions,ratherthan followingcriticaltheory all the way up the postmodern critical path" (1998:181). Thus there is a split between criticalIR theorists,such as Ashleyand Der Derian, and constructivists, such as Wendt and Ruggie, regardingthe application of postmodernismto IR.7 Thelatter retain ashared "commitmentto the ideaof social science" while criticaltheorydoes not (Ruggie, 1998:36), which means that "to reach an intel- lectuallysatisfyingpoint of closure, constructivismadopts positivistconventions" and that "whereconstructivismis most conventionalis in the area of methodol- ogy and epistemology"(Hopf, 1998:183, 182).8 The splitbetween the two is even more fundamental,however,because one of the conventionsmanyconstructivistshave tended to relyupon in order to explain social change in world politics is functionalinstitutionalefficiency.The resultis thatwhen it has been utilized as causal explanation, "conventional"constructiv- ism has been farfromagnosticabout change in world politics.Because it adopts the same causalmechanism that neoliberal institutionalismdoesandneo- functionalismdid before it, it reaches the same sortsof conclusions about social change. Yet many constructivistshave insisted that neo-functionalismplays no role in theircausal arguments,which is the second reason whythe constructivist parallels with neo-functionalismare so remarkable.9It is because constructivist explanations relyon a "logic of appropriateness"ratherthan a "logic of conse- quences" thattheysupposedlyavoid the demand-driventrapthatneo-functionalism and neoliberal institutionalism(as well as realism) fall into.10However,despite intention(and perhaps unconsciously"),a close comparison reveals strongpar- allels with prior liberal theorizing.And what this suggests,in turn,is that the foundationalinsightsof postmodernismare being transposedinto the field of IR in order to reifythe project of modernity.'2Constructivismhas indeed become "conventional"because its argumentshave tended to be (neo-)functionalistin orientationand thus confirmliberal expectationsabout the futureof the inter- national system. It is difficult,as a result,to sustain the claim that constructivismcan provide a neutral alternativeto both neorealism and neoliberal institutionalismfor the 7 Hopf lists as critical IR theoristsCampbell, Walker,anid Weber. RuLggielabels the former"post-moderniist" conistructivism(addinigPetersonito the list),his owInwork (alonigwith Haas, Kratochwil,Oniuf,Adler, Finniiemore, Katzenstein,anid Elshtaini)as "n'eo-classical"conistr-uctivism,anid Wenidtanid Dessler "niaturalistic"colnstruLctivism (1998:35-36). 8 Or as Checkel put this,because "conistr-uctivistsdo niotrejectscience or causal explaniationis;theirquarr-elwith mainistreamtheories is onitological,niotepistemological"(1998:327). Of course the extenitto which these coinvein- tionisare "defenisible"is highlyquLestioniablefroma postinoderniper-spective.See, for example, Der-Derianl anld Shapiro, 1989; Folker, 1996; Roseniau,1990; anidSmith,1996. Ruggie does recogniizeanidgrapple withthisissue to some extenit(1998:38-39). 9 Ruggie claims, for example, that conistructivism"has nio direct anitecedelntin ilnterniationialr-elationistheory," anid although he ackniowledgesapersonial theoretical debt to nieo-funictionialism,he also inisiststhat his ownl collectioinof conistructivistargumenitseffectivelyjettisonisits cor-eassumptionis(1998:11, 42, 46-47, 131). In a similar veini,Finniiemoreis careftulin National Interestsin InternationalSociety(1996)to differenitiateher conistructivist explaniationifor the diffusioniof norms froma funlctionialistor demanid-driveniexplaniationi.As she puts it, "in the cases I inivestigate,state officialswere niotresponidinigto aniypressingdemanidsor obvious crises. They were niot lookinigfor a solutionito a problem" (1996:12). Oni the other hanid,some conistructivistsexplicitlyconniiecttheir workto nieo-ftinctionialismand liberal theory,forexample, W\lelndt(1992:425; 1994); Dessler (1989:468-73); Zacher anid Matthew(1995:136); anid Carlsniaes(1992:263). 10 March anid Olsei,1998:948-54; Finniiem-iore,1996:28-31; anid Finniiemoreanid Sikkinik,1998:912-13. 11 Ruggie himselfraises this issue whenihe niotes:"It is truLethat nieo-funiictionialismembodied maniyof the methodological anid philosophical precepts that we now recogniizeto be social conistruLctivism,but it did so largely unconsciously"(1998:11; my emphasis). Sinice Ruggie ackniowledgeshavinigbeeni schooled in nieo-funictionialism (1998:xii,42), oniemightiniferfromhis owInstatemenitthatit conitiniuesto inifluenicehis argumenitsalbeituniconisciously. 122Asone studenitof postmoderniismin its literaryconitexthas puLtit, "I was chagriniedto discover that, to the extenitthat post-structuraltechniiqueshad made their-way initoIR theoryproper, theyhad beeni imported ...to affirmsomethiniglike the millenniiialenidproduLctof the liberal project" (Folker, 1996:12-13). This content downloaded from 137.99.31.134 on Fri, 31 Jan 2014 11:00:49 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions100CompetingP'aradigmsor Birds of a Feather? explorationof internationalpoliticalphenomena. Nor is it possible to sustainthe asserteddistinctionbetweenconstructivismand neoliberal institutionalismwhich has been takenforgrantedby practitionersand criticsalike. Constructivistshave tended to reifythis distinctionby arguing that their primarytargetis "systemic rationalism"or "neo-utilitarianism"rather than realism.'3 Yet in emphasizing their differenceswith neoliberal institutionalism,constructivistshave made far too much of what are relativelysmall distinctionsin the metatheoreticalscheme of things.Not only do constructivistsand neoliberal institutionalistsrelyon the same functional-institutionallogic to explain social change, theyactuallyshare the same ontology so that neoliberal institutionalismis "rationalist"only to a point. Ultimatelyconstructivismmakes explicitan assumed but unexplored step in situationallystrategicliberal argumentswhich accounts for the maintenanceof cooperation. Thus when the metatheoreticalcommitmentsmade by constructiv- ists and neoliberal institutionalistsare closely compared, one discoversthat the epistemologicaland ontological differencesdisappear, and theyturn out to be complementarytheorieswithinthe larger frameworkof liberal IR theory. Theseargumentswill be explored in the sections that follow. In order to establishthe theoreticallinks between constructivismand neoliberal institution- alism, the argumentproceeds on two separate although interrelatedfronts.The firstis to focus on constructivismand trace out its reliance on the same logic of functionalinstitutionalefficiencywhichservesas a mechanismto promote coop- erativechange in neo-functionalismand neoliberal institutionalismas well. The second frontis to focus on neoliberal institutionalismin order to demonstrate that its theoreticaldifferenceswith constructivismare not as definitiveas the constructivistliteraturewould lead one to believe. Presented in thismanner,the argumentsof this article could serve as a critique of neoliberal institutionalism, since theydemonstratethat it fails to hold its own methodological choices con- stant by smugglingin an identitytransformationconsistentwith constructivist expectations.The implicationsof this are left unexplored, however,since the article's goal is to serve as a correctiveto the flawed but increasinglyaccepted wisdom that constructivismandneoliberal institutionalismare paradigms in competition. Interestsand Identitiesin Functional,Neo-functional,and Neoliberal InstitutionalTheorizing As theoriesof IR, functionalismand neo-functionalismdeveloped afterWWII in association with the studyof the EU.Oneof the most influentialscholars of functionalismwas David Mitrany,who argued for the "functionalselection and organizationof internationalrelations,"which meant "the binding together[of] those interestswhich are common" (1943:32). Functionalismfurtherassumed that "followingthe selection of an area of common interestor concern comes the organizationof the internationalwill and effort"so that obtainingcommon interestsserved as the primarymotivationfor institutionalcreation and adapta- tion (Sewell, 1966:23). Thus the extent to which a set of institutionsor social practiceseffectivelyobtained interestsalso determinedthe extent to which indi- viduals and groups would find those institutionsdesirable. There was, as Sewell observed,a clear "utilitarianstrandwoven into the func- tionalistconception of obligation,"yet much of the functionalistliteratureput this utilitarianisminto the language of problem-solving(1966:50). Mitranycom- plained about a propensityduring"periods of transitionthatreformersare more ready to fightover a theorythan to pull togetheron a problem,"and captured the tone of the functionalistliteraturewhen he argued, "I do not representa 1'3Weindt (1994:386, 1992:393); Ruggie (1998:11); Katzensteii(1996). This content downloaded from 137.99.31.134 on Fri, 31 Jan 2014 11:00:49 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsJENNIFER STERLING-FOLKER101 theory.I representan anxiety"(1948:350). The anxietyto whichMitranyreferred, and the emphasis on problem-solvingratherthan interestfulfillment,was due to functionalism'santi-statistorientations.Its proponents were firmlyconvinced that the nation-statewas the problem that prevented common interestsfrom being obtained effectively,andMitranycharacterized "the principle of state equality" as "that most disruptiveand intractableof internationalprinciples" (1943:29). 14 Implicitin much of the functionalistliteraturewas the idea that the condition of interdependencewas an environmentalcircumstancethat demanded institu- tional innovation.15 The nation-state'sinabilityto obtain common interestsin interdependentconditions manifesteditselfas problems, dysfunctions,or the incomplete satisfactionof interests,thus generatinga demand for new institu- tional arrangements.'6And because common interestscould not be obtained with the existingterritorialdivisionsreified by national institutionalstructures, those institutionshad to be transcended.'7Institutionalformwould instead fol- low functionbecause "the organizationalcomponent of each functionalunit is intimatelyrelated to the need which it is to satisfy"(Mitrany,1943:35), and the new institutionswould be "functionallyefficient"because theymatched a pre- given collective interestto demands for how to best obtain them in the inter- dependent, environmentalcontext.The functionalapproach was hopeful rather than "debilitating"in this regard, because "the separation of functionalneeds into specifictasksand theirreassignmentto new structureswill itselfpresumably easethe strain wroughtby the present disparity"between "functionalassign- mentsand 'outgrownadministrativedivisionsand instruments"'(Sewell, 1966:33). According to functionalism,then, institutionsand social practices are ulti- matelyselected by the environmenton the basis of their ability to effectively obtain pre-givencollectiveinterests.Functionalismis, at its heart, a storyabout institutionalevolutionaryadaptation in which common interests,needs, or pur- poses are the motivationfor institutionalcreation,but the institutionalparticu- lars are determinedby environmentalcircumstances.Thus a functionalaccount of the historicaldevelopmentof institutionsnecessarilyinvolvesan evaluation of institutionsaccording to theirefficiencyat obtaininga given interestin the given circumstances,apoint March and Olsen's schematic of institutionalhistories underscores (1998:957). Because, as Wendt notes, collectivesocial practices "cannot change identities and interestsif the latterare taken as given"(1992:393), a functionalexplanation for social change does not involvea storyof interestformation.What functional- ism is concernedwithinstead is institutionalpreferenceformation.Interests,such 14 See, for example, Mitrany'sintroductionito his 4th editioni(1946:9). 15 It remainisuniclearin thisliteraturewhetheriniterdepenidenicewas a nlew pheniomenionior had alwaysexisted and human beinigswere onilyjust becominigcogniizanitof it. Reiinschprovides a typicalexample in arguinig that "recogniiziniginiterdepenidenicewithother civilizedniationsof the world" meant recogniizingthat"there is a broader life; there are broader interestsanid more far-reachinigactivitiessurrounidinigniationiallife in which it must partici- pate in order to develop to the full its own niatureanid satisfycompletelyits maniynieeds"(1911:8, 4). Other early discussionisof initerdepenideniceiniclude Rappard (1927:818) anid Bailey, who argued that "the moder%nstate is brought initoconitactwith other states in almost everyaspect of its niationialexistenlce,"anid that "the stranldsof moderniiniterniationialrelationisspread to everyniookanidcranniiyof the governimenitmachinie"(1930:273). 1 would like to thanikJoeGrieco for callinigmyattenitionito the Bailey article. 16 Accordinigto Mitrainy,"fidelityto outgrowniadminiistrativedivisionisanid inistrumenits"was "hamstriinginlgthe nlew goals" which "clamors for their beiniglinikedtogetherin the most suitable practicalway" (1945:10), anid that while "we are favoredby the nieed anid habit of materialcooperationi,we are hampered by the genieralcliniginigto political segregationi"(1948:351). 17 Henice the fuLnctionialapproach could move global affairs"beyonidthe niationi-state"(Haas,1964), because sovereignity's"conitenitanidworkinig...could be modifiedby ...inlconlspicuous anidpartial tranisfersof authorityto initerniationialfuLnctionialorganis"(Mitrainy,1943:29), anid "the accumulationiof such partial tranisfersin time brilngs about a tranislationiof the true seat of authority"(Mitrainy,1946:9). This content downloaded from 137.99.31.134 on Fri, 31 Jan 2014 11:00:49 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions102CompetingParadigmsor Birds of a Feather? asthe maximizationof economic wealth or retention of political office, are differentiatedfrompreferencesas the particularpolicies and practicesan actor mightadopt in pursuitof those interests.18One mightargue that functionalism is interestedin the "social construction"of preferenceswithin agiven set of collectiveinterestsand contextualcircumstances,yetclearlyfunctionalismis not "social constructivism"as the latterhas been described by its proponents.It does not recognize "the fact that the specific identitiesof specific states shape their perceived interestsand, thereby,patternsof internationaloutcomes" (Ruggie, 1998:14), "that through interaction,states might form collective identitiesand interests"(Wendt,1994:384), or that "interestsare notjust 'out there' waitingto bediscovered; they are constructed through social interaction" (Finnemore, 1996:2).19In fact,the relationshipbetweensocial practices,identity,and interests is inverted.The functionalcreation and innovationof institutionsdepends on the extentto which a set of pre-giveninterestsare obtained, and identityis not an antecedent to interestsbut is itselfaresult of functionalinstitutionaleffi- ciency related to interestand environment.Individuals want to obtain the pre- given interestsmore than their identitiesare shaped by the social practices in which theyhave been engaged. Thus functionalismassumes that new identities will be supplied (or "sociallyconstructed")as circumstanceswarrant. Small wonder,then,thatfunctionalismassumed a relativeease in the ability"to breed a new conscience" in "non-political"tasksonce the functionalwayrevealed thatit "wouldpromisesomethingforthe purse of necessity"(Mitrany,1943:40,29). Bytheearly1960sfunctionalismhad spawneda neo-functionalistvariantwhichrec- ognized the difficultiesin definingan interestas "non-political,"as well as the ne- cessityforpersuading"politicalactorsin severaldistinctnationalsettings. .. to shift theirloyalties,expectations,and politicalactivitiestowarda new and largercenter" (Haas,1961:366-67). Yet even with its greater sensitivityto these issues, neo- functionalismcontinued to assume thatonce the cooperativeregional effortbe- gan to reap greaterbenefits,loyaltyto the regional institutionswould gradually develop (Lindberg,1963:6; see also Haas, 1958:16).20 The continued reliance on functionalassumptionsaboutinterests,institutions,and identityled neo-functionalists to overestimatethe degree to whichelite identitiesand loyaltiescould be changed bystrategicinteraction.It assumed thatthe desire to maximize theirassigned in- terestwas whatmotivatedelites,and so the transferenceof loyaltyand identifica- tionin neo-functionaltheorywas like the loyaltya consumermightgiveto the store withthe mostcompetitiverates on its charge card.2' 18 Milimerprovidesanlexample of thiscommonidistiniction:"Initerestsare the stable founidationioniwhich actors' preferenicesover policy shiftas their situationianid the policy areniavary.Preferenicesare a variable; initerestsare niot"(1997:15, fin.4). Kratochwilanid Ruggie poinitouLtthat this separationiis basic to what they refer to as "inistrumenitalism,"which presumes "thatit is alwayspossible to separate goals (presumablyexpressed in priniciples anid niorms)frommeans (presumablyexpressed in rules anid procedures),anid to order them in a superordiniate- subordiniaterelationiship"(Ruggie, 1998:99). 19 Or, as Kratochwilanid Ruggie put it, "social inistitutionis,before theydo aniythinigelse-forexample, act as in-junictionis-expressrule-likepractices ...that make routiniesocial initeractionipossible by makinlgit mutually comprehenisible"(Ruggie, 1998:91; see also Adler, 1997, Hoffmannii,1999, Kratochwil,1982, anid Kubalkova,Olluf, anid Kowert,1998). 20 As Haas put it, initegrationiwas to be "coniceivedniotas a coniditionibut as a process" which "relies oni the perceptioniof initerests. ..by the actors participatinigin the process" so that "initerestwill be redefiniedin termsof regionialratherthania purelyniationialorienitationi"(Haas,1958). Loyalty-shiftiniganid initerest-redefiniitioniwould occur firstamonigniationialelites who would finidthemselves"sucked in" to cooperative effortsanid"would tranisfer theirsupport anid loyaltiesaway from niationialauthoritiestowardsthe CommuLniityinistitutionisin returnifor the satisfactioniof vital interests"(Webb, 1983:17-18). 21 Or as Webb put it, neo-functionalismconitiniuedto assume that"the stakinigof claims aniddemanidsin return forexchanigesof politicalloyaltiesreiniforcedthe authorityof the systemas a whole," anidit "regarded this patterni of politicalactivityas directlytransferableto an internationalsetting"(1983:17). It never strayedfarfromMitrany's originalassumptionthat"each of us . . . is in effecta collectivityof functionalloyalties;so that to build up a world community... is merelyto extend and consolidate it also as between national sections and groups" (1959:647). This content downloaded from 137.99.31.134 on Fri, 31 Jan 2014 11:00:49 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsJENNIFERSTERLING-FOLKER103 Because functionalisttheorizingcontinued to engage in whatSewell noted was "soft-pedalingthehumanaspectsinvolved"withsocial change (1966:38),itwashardly surprisingthatneo-functionalismfailed to accuratelydescribe or predictthe pro- cess of cooperation in Europe.22Not onlydid it become the subject of widespread criticism,its own proponentseventuallysuggestedthatthe pursuit of other theo- reticalapproaches mightbe more fruitful(Haas, 1975, 1976). 3 And one of the best knownrevisionsof neo-functionalismwas whatlater became knownas neoliberal institutionalism,which included the studyof internationalregimesas well as the condition of interdependenceupon which regime causalitywas explicitlyprem- ised.24Althoughinterdependencehad alreadyplayed a role in earlyfunctionalist theorizing,it did not attaintheoreticalprominenceuntilafterneo-functionalism had run into troubleand its firstmanifestationswere the studyof "transnational relations"(Keohane and Nye,1971).25Keohane and Nyelateradopted theterm"com- plex interdependence" andspecifically acknowledged their "debt" to neo- functionalism(1989),26as did Keohane (1984:7-9,66-67),whohelped add hegemonic decline to the rosterof pertinentenvironmentalcircumstances. What marked neoliberal institutionalismas a theoreticalancestor to Mitrany's functionalismwas its reliance on that same functionalinstitutionallogic. Neo- liberal institutionalismassumed thatwhile the major industrialsshared a number of common interests,chief among them was the capitalistpursuitof profitand thereforethe motivationto adopt whatevermethodswould most efficientlymax- imize it (Keohane, 1984:79, 209).27Hence neoliberal institutionalismassumed, as with other functionalvariantsbefore it, that institutionalinnovationwas based on abilityto effectivelyobtain given collective interestsin given environmental circumstances,and that as circumstanceschanged, so too would institutions. Neoliberal institutionalismwas different,however,in itsattemptto hold not only interestsconstantbut identitytransformationissues as well. Constructivistshave tended to harp on the theory'sassumptionof exogenous interestsas its primary weakness.28Wendt has even asserted that the "nascent sociologyof international community"in neo-functionalthoughtwas somehow "lostin the economics of in- ternationalcooperation developed by realistsand rationalists"(1994:394). This is simplya misrepresentationof the historicaltheoreticalrecord. While it was true thatpriorfunctionaltheorizingwas not as careful(or self-conscious)about making its assumptionsexplicit(and oftenadded to the confusionby referringto the re- definitionofinterestsratherthanpreferences),exogenous interestshad clearlybeen presentin liberal functionaltheorizingall along. And while neoliberal institutionalistswere certainlymore overt in their sub- scriptionto this assumption,thiswas only because theybelieved theycould tap into a potential advantage of exogenous interestsoverlooked by prior function- alists. If interestswere held constant and identitya functionof interests,then 22 Even acursoryglance at the study of identityin psychologyuinderscoreshow "soft-pedaled"it was, and reviewsof this literaturemay be fouLndin Bloom, 1990; Druckman, 1994; and Mercer, 1995. 23Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsenprovidesa good reviewof the criticisms,revisions,and eventual abandonment of ieo-funictionalism(1991; see also HIaggard,1991:427-29, and revisionsin Carlsnaes, 1992, anid Corbey, 1995). 24 Thus I have included under the neoliberal institutionialrubricstandard regime works(Krasner,1983; Keo- hane, 1984) and interdependence workssuch as those by Keohane and Nye (1977); RosenaLl (1976);-lanrieder (1978); and Rosecrance (1986). 25 Transnationalrelationswe-ceargued to have grownsince the nineteenthcenitury,thuscreatinga new context in which "cooperativeaction is likelyto create new internationalinstitutionsto cope with increasinginterdepen- dence" (1971: 375, 395). 26 Keohane and Nye expressed their belief that "manyof the insightsfromintegrationtheorycould be trans- ferredto the growingand broader dimensionsof initernationaleconomic interdependence"(1989:247-48), and in this endeavor theywere encouraged by HIaas himself,who suLggCsted that neo-functionalismbe "both included in and subordinated to the studyof changing patternsof interdependence"(1975:86). 27 See,for example, Keohane, 1984:24, 27; Keohanie and Nye, 1977:40; and Rosecrance, 1986. 28 Wendt (1992:393; 1994:384); Ruggic (1998:ch. 1); Hlasenclever,Mayer,and Rittberger(1997:ch. 5). This content downloaded from 137.99.31.134 on Fri, 31 Jan 2014 11:00:49 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions104CompetingParadigmsor Birds of a Feather? logicallyone could treatidentityas constantas well.29This avoided the "nascent sociology"ascribed to by neo-functionalistswho, despite theirgreaterattention to identitytransformationissues, had never really considered the complexities involved.The adoption of exogenous interestswas thus believed to be areal improvementat the timesince, as Keohane noted, it avoided the impressionthat the theorist"must'smugglein' idealisticassumptionsabout motivations"(1984:67). By holding identityconstant, neoliberal institutionalismcould also reject neo- functionalteleologywhichhad envisioneda particularinstitutionalend-pointfor the functionalprocess.30When, in the mid-1960s, the European nation-state reasserteditselfagain in the formof Charles de Gaulle, it was that teleological tendencythat proved so visiblydamaging to neo-functionaltheorizing. Neoliberal institutionalismattemptedto salvage the logic of functionalinsti- tutionalefficiencyfromthe teleological orientationsof its immediateancestorby positingthatenvironmentalcircumstanceswere constantlyevolving.This meant that more diffuseinstitutionalpatternsand collective social practices could be explained withthe same functionallogic. And the beautyof it was thatit allowed liberal scholars to work withinthe nation-stateparadigm ratherthan opposed to it, thusside-steppingthe issue of the nation-state'scontinued viabilitywhich had posed such a problem for neo-functionalism.In this neoliberal institutionalism was rejecting the original "functionalistconception of 'state' as astatic and uncreativeentity"(Sewell, 1966:34), and arguinginstead thatstateelites could be partnersin aprocess that would not, at least in the short term, displace the nation-statebut ratherassist it in meeting its own interests.31 Thus the nation-statewas still the primarybarrier to effectivelyobtaining collectiveinterestsin new environmentalconditions,but neoliberal institution- alism now posited thatits inhibitingeffectswere feltonly at the level of strategic perceptions.Elites failed to recognize the ineffectivenessof the strategiesthey employed, because their strategicjudgment was clouded by an unquestioned reliance on unilateralismheld over from the days when the nation-statecould obtain its interestsautonomously.32The offendingperceptions were treated as by-productsof behavior, rather than of identityor interest.And as with func- tionalism, neoliberal institutionalismderived ahopeful prescriptionfrom its analysis of these dysfunctionsbased onthe nature of interdependence itself, which it argued would promote a process of simple learning among state elites about the greaterefficacyof multilateralisminstead. This was an interestingtwist on functionallogic, but ultimatelya theoreticallyuntenable one since neoliberal institutionalismretained functionalism'santi-statistorientations (apoint also observedby Little[1996:82]). Thus it continued to assume thatthe desire on the part of state elites to obtain a given collective interestcould be causally privi- leged over the domestic social practices and institutionsin which elites were already involved,which give their activityits meaning in the firstplace, and which,as Ruggie puts it, "specifywhatcountsas that activity"(1998:22). 29 This was also implied by the distinctionbetween "simple" and "complex" learning which ineoliberalsfre- quentlyutilized. See, for example, Nye, 1987:380; Keohane and Nye, 1989:34-36, 232-34, 240-41; and Keohane, 1984:97-101; see also Hlasenclever,Mayer,and Rittberger,1997:146;Jonsson, 1993:218; and Levy,1994. 30 Keohane and Nye, 1989:248; Keohane, 1983:149, fn. 22; and Tranholm-Mikkelsen,1991:8-9. 31 In this it may actually have been closer to Mitrany'soriginal formulationthan neo-functionalism.Each functionalsectorwas to be organized "according to its nature,to the conditionsunder which it has to operate, and to the needs of the moment" (Mitrany,1943:34), anid as aresult the institutionswere supposed to be "flexible emanations of the need in question, integrallyand uniquely related to the statusof that nieed over time" (Sewell, 1966:10; see also p. 68). Thus Mitranyentertainedthe idea that some interestsmightindeed be best obtained via local and national functionalorganizations,while others could prove to demand regional, intra-regional,anld global organization. 32 See Keohane and Nye, 1971:371, 375, 1989:161; and Rosecrance, 1986:22-24. As Keohane and Nye put it, the "illusion"of "totalconitrol"reproduced "well-entrenchedpatternsof governmentalbehavior"whichwould "have to be discarded" (1989:232; see also Keohane, 1984:115, 258-59; and Rosecrance, 1986:190). This content downloaded from 137.99.31.134 on Fri, 31 Jan 2014 11:00:49 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsJENNIFER STERLING-FOLKER105 FunctionalInstitutional Efficiency in Constructivist Arguments Given that constructivismcould not appear to be more differenttheoretically, how is it possible to assert that the same functionallogic that binds neoliberal institutionalismto prior functionaltheorizingis present in constructivisttheo- rizingas well? Most constructivistsrecognize that the two are inherentlyincom- patible and are thereforecarefulto distance theiraccounts fromfunctionalism. Ruggie argues,forexample, thatin an effortto examine more diffusepatternsof "institutionalization,"ratherthan the expectationallylimitingoutcome of "inte- gration,"he 'jettisoned the neofunctionalistexpectation that political commu- nity among states necessarilyimplied organization above states, as well as the assumption that functionalcontexts possess inherent logics which affectthat outcome" (1998:42). Similarly,Finnemore and Sikkinkargue that constructivists can avoid being labeled functionalistswhen they reject "argumentsabout the intrinsiccharacteristicsof the issue" and emphasize institutionalcontradictions "as a barrierto any sort of teleological argumentabout theireffects"(1998:908). Yet these caveats reflect abasic misunderstandingover what constitutesa neo-functionalargumentand what makes an argumentnecessarilyfunctionalin the firstplace. As neoliberal institutionalismdemonstrates,it is quite possible to separate a functional-institutionallogic fromteleologyif one assumes that envi- ronmental circumstancesare evolvingas well.33It is the coupling of pre-given collectiveinterestswithexternal circumstancesthat distinguishesa functionalist account of institutionalinnovationand change, because the combination leads almost inevitablyto an argument that the function of institutionsand social practicesis to efficientlyachieve particulargoals fora collectivewithinthe larger context. Any argument that adopts this basic formula,even if careful to avoid pre-specifiedinstitutionalend-points,is going to produce a storyabout institu- tional selection based on "functionalinstitutionalefficiency."It is going to end uppositing, as March andOlsenobserve, that the "rules, norms, identities, organizationalforms,and institutionsthat exist are the inexorable products of an efficienthistory,"and that "survivinginstitutionsare seen as uniquely fit to the environment,thus predictable from that environment"(1998:958). And in this regard March and Olsen are certainlycorrect to use the label "functional institutionalism"to characterizeconstructivistarguments(1998:958).34 This is because in each of the constructivistaccounts thatwillbe reviewedhere some sortof collectiveinterestis assumed as pre-givenand hence exogenous to so- cial interaction.Alternativetermsare utilized to describe the pre-givencollective interest,and theyalso take a varietyof forms.According to Wendt,forexample, "corporateneeds" or "appetites"include traditionalconcernswith"physicalsecu- rity"and "aspirationsfora betterlife,"as well as with"stablesocial identities,"and "recognitionas an actor by others"(1994:389, 385). In some of Ruggie's workthe interest is describedas a "socialpurpose"or "task" andit involves "international production"or "freetrade"(1998:64,48, 66). But elsewhereitis a "problem"or need to "deal withthose dimensionsof collectiveexistence that [are] irreduciblytran- sterritorialin character"such as "genericformsof international'collectiveaction problems"'(1998:118-19,189,190-91,266).Alternatively,Finnemorerefersto "duty" or "obligation,"and her pre-givencollectiveinterestinvolvesthe need simrply"to be appropriate"to the social practicesin which othersare engaged (1996:29; see also Finnemore and Sikkink,1998:901-3). 33 As Scruton notes, "functionialexplanation has sometimesbeen thoughtto be a kind of teleological explana- tion, but this seems wrong,"because a teleological explanation is "any explanation of some event or process in terms of its endrather-than its origins" while "a function is not acondition which necessarilypostdates the occurrence of what it explains" (1982:459; see also Nagel, 1961). 34 Along similarlines, Zacher and Matthew'sreviewof the strandsof liberal IR theoryincludes constructivism as an example of "institutionalliberalism,"along with Mitranyand lIaas(Zacher and Matthew,1995:133-37). This content downloaded from 137.99.31.134 on Fri, 31 Jan 2014 11:00:49 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions106CompetingParadigmsor Birds of a Feather? Yet despite the differencein terminology,and at least in some cases the untra- ditionalcontentof thesecollectiveinterests,in each account theylie outside or be- yond social interactionto change. They are then coupled withan examinationof shiftingenvironmentalcircumstancesand withinthe analysisserveas the means by whichactorscan recognize absent interests(and dysfunctions)thatare not being effectivelyobtainedwithexistingsocial practicesand institutions.It is because these collectiveinterestsare exogenous thatactorswillinglyaccept innovationin their social practicesand institutions.And in each case the typeof storyproduced about thoseinnovationsinvolveshowinstitutionalpreferences,butnotinterests,havebeen sociallyconstructed.In other words,each of the constructivistexamples scruti- nized here adopts the same explanatoryformulathatcan be found in functional- ism,neo-functionalism,and neoliberal institutionalism. Wendt's "pre-theory"of collective identityformationandthe international state is acase in point (1994). His corporate appetites "provide motivational energyforengagingin action at all and, to thatextent,are priorto interaction,but theydo not entail self-interestin rnmsense, which is an inherentlysocial phe- nomenon" (1994:385; myemphasis).3 When he does later referto "self-interest," what he reallymeans are institutionalpreferences(and the identitiesassociated with them) for "how a state satisfiesits corporate interests,"which, he argues, "depends on how it defines the self in relation to the other,which is a function of social identities"(1994:385; my emphasis). When Wendt then turnsto the possible formationof collectiveidentities,the desire to obtain pre-givencorporate interestsis the reason why actors accept change in theirexistingidentities,while environmentalcircumstancesdetermine the extent to which and in what way identityinnovationwill evolve. Given his frankenthusiasmfor prior integrationtheory,it should come as littlesurprise that "risinginterdependence"is the firstof two systemicprocesses with "direct causal impacts":36 As theabilitytomeetcorporateneedsunilaterallydeclines, so does theincentiveto hang ontotheegoisticidentitiesthatgenerate such politics,and as the degree of common fate increases,so does the incentiveto identifywithothers.As interdependence rises, in other words, so will the potential for endogenous transformationsof identity.(1994:389; my emphasis) Similarlythe "transnationalconvergence of domestic values," by which Wendt means capitalismand democracy,increases the likelihood that collectiveidenti- ties and institutionsmightbe formed,because, "as heterogeneitydecreases, so does therationale for identitiesthatassume that theyare fundamentallydifferent from us" (1994:390; my emphasis). In both instances Wendt adopts the same assumptions aboutinstitutions andidentities that functionalism andneo- functionalismhad relied upon as well. Identityis a functionof whicheverinsti- tutionand set of social practicesbest obtains a set of exogenous interestsin the givensystemiccircumstances.37 Given the structureof thisargument,it is impos- 31-is own distinctionin another context, that "social life is 'ideas all the waydown' (until you get to biology and natural resources),"suggeststhat corporate interestsmightbe biological ratherthan social (Wendt, 1995:74). 36 As forother causes, structuralcontexts"merelyinhibitor facilitate,"and it is onlyafterthe necessarysystemic processes have had their effectsoni corporate needs that strategicinteractionthen acts as a"sufficientcaulse" (Wendt, 1994:389-90). 37 Wendt's treatmentof the initernationialstate is just asfascinatingsince hereplicates (almiiostverbatim) Mitrany'soriginal formulationof functionalism.Because, as Mitranyhad put it earlier, "we cannot have a world governmentbeforewe build a world community"(1948:84), Wendt argues that "collectiveidenitityformationiis an essentialaspect of ...a process"involvingthe "structuraltransformationof the Westphalianstatessystem"(1994:392). Creationiof an internationalstate requires an "identificationwith respect to some state function"so that "state actorswould regard it as normal or routinethatcertainproblemswill be handled onian internationalbasis,"which would "relocate individual state actors' de facto sovereigntyto transnationalauthorities"(1994:392-93). This content downloaded from 137.99.31.134 on Fri, 31 Jan 2014 11:00:49 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsJENNIFERSTERLING-FOLKER107 sible to avoid the conclusion that in attemptingto "build abridge" between integrationtheoryand constructivism(1994:385), Wendt has simplyrediscovered functionalismand abandoned constructivismin the process. In severalinstancesRuggie also adopts pre-giveninterestsforthe sake of analy- sis and, because he thenmatchesthemto shiftingenvironmentalcircumstancesin orderto explainsocial change,his conclusionsultimatelydepend on thesame func- tional institutionallogic. His claims regarding"embedded liberalism,"for exam- ple, are premisedon the decidedlynon-constructivistassumptionthat"as long as purpose is held constant,there is no reason to suppose that the normativestruc- tureof regimesmustchange as well" (1998:65). The "legitimatesocial purpose" to whichhe refersis "freetrade"(1998:65-66), whichimpliesthe maximizationof cap- italistprofitas an ongoing collectiveinterest.From thisRuggie produces a story about howprofithas been pursued, thatis, he documents how institutionalpref- erences evolvedgiventhe pre-givencollectiveinterestand shiftingenvironmental circumstances.Ruggie's conclusions that "in most cases the new instrumentsare not inimicalto the normsof the regimesbut representadaptationsto new circum- stances"are hardlyunexpected in thisregard (1998:83).38 ElsewhereRuggie speaks in termsof "problems"ratherthan "social purposes," which is, of course, highlyreminiscentof Mitrany'sown language derived from functionalism'sinherentlyanti-statistorientations."Territorialityat Millennium's End" tracesout the originsof "territorialrule" as the "chiefcharacteristicof the modern system"(1998:180). When turningto the subject of its transformation, Ruggie connects the subject to the issue of problem-solving:"havingestablished territoriallyfixed stateformations... what means were leftto the new territorial rulers for dealing with problems of that society that could not be reduced to territorialsolution?"(1998:189). He refersto these problems later as "the 'social defects' that inhere in the modern constructof territoriality,"and defines them "as generic formsof international'collectiveaction problems"' (1998:195, 266). A number of examples are provided and discussed more extensivelyin "Multilat- eralism at Century'sEnd" (1998:114), and must representexogenous collective interestsbecause Ruggie's premise is that nation-statesproved unable to effec- tivelyobtain them as circumstanceschanged and so more appropriate institu- tions were supplied. On thissame basis Ruggie goes on to argue that the "explorationof contem- poraryinternationaltransformation"and "the place wherein any rearticulation of internationalpolitical space would be occurringtoday"is in the "negation of the exclusive territorialform"and in "the terrainof unbundled territoriality" (1998:195). He has in mind a particularset of institutionsthatreflectthisunbun- dling,including"regimes,common markets,political communitiesand the like," whichwere developed to resolvecollectiveproblemsand hence obtain collective intereststhe nation-statecould not: In sum, nonterritorialfunctionalspace is the place in which territorialrulers situateand deal withthose dimensionsof collectiveexistencethattheyrecognize to be irreduciblytransterritorialin character.It is here that internationalsociety is anchored, and in which its patternsof evolution may be traced. (1998:191) 38 The functionallogic is most obvious in Ruggie's discussion of the "collective response" to the demise of BrettonWoods which,he argues, "reflectsan even greateraffinitywiththe expectationsof original regime design than did the arrangementsthat held in the interval"(1998:84). In other words,nation-statesdeveloped a floating exchange rate systembecause it was actuallymore efficientin post-hegemoniccircumstancesthan was the original BrettonWoods system(1998:81). 39 The examples include use of common spaces such as oceans and waterways,the maintenance of communi- cation lines, and the maximizationof profit.He argues, for example, that "withthe intensificationof trade," the original territoriallydefined communicationlinksled to "costs in profitslost, opportunitiesforegone,and admin- istrativeresources expended," and produced a situationin which "the incentivesare high for states to organize theirrelationson the basis of generalized principlesof conduct" (1998:114-15). This content downloaded from 137.99.31.134 on Fri, 31 Jan 2014 11:00:49 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions108CompetingParadigmsor Birds of a Feather? In other words,the nation-state'sinabilityto meet a set of nonterritorialcollec- tiveinterestsin shiftingcircumstancescontinues to manifestitselfas dysfunctions which then generate a demand for new institutionalarrangements.In this way the nation-statemight be "unbundled" (or as [neo-] functionalistswould have phrased it, "transcended")because it remains inherentlyincapable of obtaining these interests.This may be a legitimateconclusion to reach if one is using a functional logic, but it is certainlynot constructivismas Ruggie himself has described it. A functionallogic can also be found in Finnemore who posits that actors internalizenew social practices "not out of conscious choice, but because they understandthese behaviorsto be appropriate"(1996:29). It is "a new understand- ing of necessaryand appropriatestatebehavior" thatis "the drivingforcebehind adoption of ... innovation" (1996:65). Ultimatelynation-stateswant to be like other nation-states,a point Finnemore and Sikkinkunderscorewhen theyutilize the term "peer pressure" as a covering explanation for the acceptance of new norms (1998:903). Because the nation-state'sidentityis shaped "by the cultural- institutionalcontext withinwhich states act," they argue that all nation-states share a collectivedesire to be appropriateto thatcontext(1998:902). And because the pre-givencollective interestis the need to institutionallyconform to what other nation-statesbelieve to be important,the shiftingcircumstanceswhichwill demand institutionalinnovation to obtain this interestnecessarilyinvolve the extentto which"enough criticalstatesendorse the new norm"(1998:902).Whether or not the nation-statewill actuallyinternalizethe new norm also depends upon ongoing interactionacross nation-stateswhich encourages "iterated behavior and habit" (1998:905). Such an argument clearly depends upon alogic of functional institutional efficiency.The pre-givencollective interestin "being appropriate"ensures that institutionalinnovation across nation-stateswill be virtuallyautomatic asthe definitionof what constitutes"being appropriate" changes. That is, the new social practices will be adopted becausethose practices are more efficientat obtainingthisexogenous collectiveinterestin the new circumstances.The entire argumentrestsupon basic functionalassumptionsthat "man's behavior is best understood as the overtmanifestationof a configurationof internalizednorms," that "man's obedience to [the state] restsupon a foundationof habit," and that the "transplantationof man's obedience (w)as a matterof planned re-habituation" to new norms (Sewell, 1966:48-49). In producing functionalistarguments,the most basic tenetsof constructivism are violated. Despite repeated assertionsthatconstructivismis about identityand interestformation,noneof the constructivistexamples scrutinized here are actuallyabout interestformation.In each case an exogenous interestis posited and whatfollowsis a storyabout the social constructionof institutionalpreferences derived froma functional-institutionallogic. This necessarilyleads constructivist accounts onto the same post hoc explanatoryand predictivetrackas function- alism.40Institutionsand social practices exist because they fulfillaparticular collective need, ergo those that exist must fulfillthe need or will be changed accordingly.For such aformula to work, the institutionsandpractices that already exist andthat donot fulfillatransnationalcollective needmust be treatedas if theyhad less causal weight.Institutionalinnovationoccurs because actorswant to obtain the pre-givencollectiveinterestsmore than theiridentities, interests,or preferencesare shaped and constrainedby the nonsystemiccollec- tive social practicesin which theyhave been engaged. 40 That is, a functionalexplanation"enfoldseverythingin a vaguLeformula:need, ftunctionalresponse,modified need, functionallymodifiedresponse.We see an agencyand assume, in posthocfashion,a prioror concurrentneed; we sense a need and presume an agency or a structuralextension will be along shortly"(Sewell, 1966:249-50). This content downloaded from 137.99.31.134 on Fri, 31 Jan 2014 11:00:49 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsJENNIFER STERLING-FOLKER109 The result is that domestic social practices and institutionsare either brack- eted in constructivistarguments,or theyare pertinentonly in the initialstage of institutionalpreference innovation.41This bracketingis, as Checkel observes, "odd, since it is the constructivists,with their attention to practice and inter- action, who should bekeying uponprocess andmechanisms" (1998:332). It becomes less odd, however,in lightof the functionalrather than constructivist logic upon which these constructivistargumentsrely.It is because the nation- state and its associated institutionsremain the antithesisof the collective that domestic institutionsmust betreated as less causal if the pre-givencollective interestsare to be obtained, the appropriateinstitutionsprevail,and social trans- formationoccur. It is no accident that theories of functionalinstitutionaleffi- ciencyhave routinelybeen advised to pay greaterattentionto domesticvariables,42 and that afterexamining several constructivistarguments,Checkel has to offer constructivismsimilaradvice (1998). Yet the problem of inclusion is an intracta- ble one.Any theory that begins with aninherent bias against the potential causalityof domesticpoliticalinstitutionsand social practicescannot then include theircausalityin any neutral fashion thereafter. There is in addition the violation of constructivisttenetsabout identityitself in each of the constructivistaccounts of social change examined here. Far from being created and instantiatedthrougha process of social interaction,identity followsfrom the combination of exogenous interestand circumstancesand so remains acomponent of the social constructionof institutionalpreferences. Thus the same (neo-)functionalperspectiveon identitytransformationis repli- cated. While identitymay indeed serve as an initialbarrierto the recognitionof more efficaciousinstitutions,the causal prioritizationof interestsmeans thatthe transferenceof identitiesand loyaltiesto those alternativeinstitutionsis (despite protestationsto the contraryin the literature)theoreticallyoverdetermined. Because functionalism,neo-functionalism,neoliberal institutionalism,and now constructivism all adopt the same liberal functional-institutionallogic, each pro- duces a similarstoryabout how institutionalpreferencesevolve over time. They also reach relativelysimilarconclusions about which institutionswill be created. All of them argue that in currentsystemicconditions, multilateralismis func- tionally more efficientin obtaining collective intereststhan is unilateralism. While functionalismhad been relativelymore sanguine about this process, the other three recognize that the primarystumblingblock to internationalcoop- eration lies in the realm of cognition and perception. Thus each posits that the reason cooperation has not been automatic, despite its obvious efficienciesto the practitionersof each of these theories,is because the pertinentstate actors have failed to perceive the new systemicconditions in which theyoperate and cooperation's greaterefficiencyin its context. As a result,all three theoriesposit that changing perceptionsand beliefswill make cooperation more likelyand thatinteractionis partof the formulathatwill do so. For neo-functionalismthe cognitiveproblem is existingelite loyaltiesto national institutionswhich can be overcome or shiftedif regional cooperation begins to reap benefits.For neoliberal institutionalism,the problem is that the strategicjudgment of elites is clouded by an unquestioned reliance on unilater- alism, but greater contact and informationalexchanges have the capacity to 41 Bracketing occnLrs in Wendt, 1994:388, and Fininemore,1996:3, 65-66, while initial stage nLseoccnLrs in Ruggie, 1998:72, 126-27, and Finnemore and Sikkiink,1998:896-99. Fiinnemoreand Sikkinkeven go so far as to argnLethat"a government'sdomesticbasis forlegitimationand consent and thnLsits abilityto stayin power" derives froma domesticdesire to be internationallylegitimate,thus implyingthatdomestic governancestructureshave nlo independent cauLsalweightof theirown, absent their relation to collectivesystemicinterests(1998:903). 42 Sometimes even by their own practitioners,for example, Keohane and Nye (1989:260; see also HIoffmann, 1995:239; HIaggardand Simmons, 1987:513-14; GouLrevitch,1996:371-72; and cites by HIopf[1998:194, fn. 78]). This content downloaded from 137.99.31.134 on Fri, 31 Jan 2014 11:00:49 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions110CompetingParadigmsor Birds of a Feather? reveal multilateralism'sgreater efficiency.43For constructivismthe problem is existingnational identities,and the solution is not only the greater efficacyof collective identitiesbut also successive acts of cooperation and engagement in discursiverhetoricwhich equate national-selfand collective-selfas synonymous (Wendt, 1994:390-91). Because neoliberal institutionalismparts methodological company with the other two in its attempts to hold identityconstant, its claims appearto be relativelymodest in comparison. It is concerned only withwhat Wendt refersto as "behavioralcooperation" (1994:384) and not the developmentof international communityor collective identities.Yet their reliance on the same functional- institutionallogic makes constructivismandneoliberal institutionalismmore similarthan not. While theymay differin theirambitions,theydo not differin how theyaccount forchange in the internationalsystem,or in the notion thatit is stillpossible to sneak up on and transcendthe nation-statewiththe "function- al approach." IdentityTransformationin Neoliberal Institutionalism Their common process-based ontology is another way in which constructivism and neoliberal institutionalismare similar.Here the focus is not on constructiv- ism per se but on how neoliberal institutionalismexplains internationalcooper- ation.Ruggieand Kratochwilhave observedthatin regimeanalysisits"epistemology contradictsontology" (Ruggie, 1998:95). Constructiviststake this as apoint of departure to argue for the re-introductionof interactionand identitytransfor- mation into the theoreticalmix. Yet contraryto both constructivistand neolib- eral assertions,a closer examinationof neoliberal institutionalismreveals that it doesnot actually exclude the possibilityof collective identitytransformation from its analysis. In fact, it concurs with constructivismthat identitycan be transformedthroughinteractionand that collectiveidentitieswill formaround the norm of cooperation itself.Thus Ruggie and Kratochwilare correctonly to a point because, at some unspecified link in the neoliberal causal chain, the contradictionbetweenepistemologyand ontologyis resolvedin favorof ontology. What is meant by a process-based ontology is the meta-theoreticalcommit- ment to human interactionas the sole component to social reality.44All liberal IR theory,whetherit is (neo-)functionalism,constructivism,or neoliberal insti- tutionalism,makes this commitment.Theterms "institution,""structure,"and "process"are frequentlyused interchangeablyin the liberal literatureto denote the "particularhuman-constructedarrangement(s)"that "involvepersistentand connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity,and shape expectations" (Keohane, 1989:162-63, 1990:175). Processes are the collectivepractices,both formal-materialand ideational, that human beings create and practice in order to interactwith one another and achieve particulargoals (Keohane, 1989:10, 1990:175). A process-basedontologyallows for the possibilitythat changes in the nature of interactioncan also change identity,interests,and hence behavior. It directs the scholar's "attentionto the institutionsand patternsof interactioncreated by human beings that help to shape perceptions and expectation, and therefore alter the patternsof behavior thattake place withina given structure"(Keohane, 1990:175). It is on this point that constructivistshave taken neoliberals to task, since exogenous interestsexclude not simplythe necessityof identitytransforma- 43 Keohane and Nyc, 1977:34-36, 232-34, 240-41; and Keohane, 1984:97-101. 44 This may be compared to the environmentallybased ontologyof realismwhich treatsanarchyas a physical realityseparate fromyetaffectingsocial reality(Mearsheimer,1994-95:41; Sterling-Folker,1997; Frankel,1996:xiii). This content downloaded from 137.99.31.134 on Fri, 31 Jan 2014 11:00:49 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsJENNIFERSTERIANG-FOLKER111 tion in order for cooperation to occur, but also itspossibility,at least in the short term.As Wendt puts it: Interests areformed outside the interaction context, andthen the latter is treatedas though it onlyaffectedbehavior.This can be merelya methodological presumption,but given its pervasivenessin the currentdebate it may also be seen as an implicithypothesisabout world politics:systemicinteractiondoes not transformstate interests.(1994:384; see also Adler, 1997; Ruggie, 1998) Oneof constructivism'scontributionsto IRtheoretical debates has beento highlightthe inherenttensionbetweena process-basedontologyand the assump- tion of exogenous interestswhich lie beyond the scope of social interactionto effect. Yet despite itsepistemologicalcommitments,neoliberalinstitutionalismascribes to the same process-basedontologyas well. The self-interestedactor's freedomof choice is always initiallyembedded in aset of larger social practices, which typicallyinclude capitalist-marketeconomics and the shared norms and institu- tions thatare associated withit. Keohane and Nye's argument,forexample, "that aset of networks,norms, andinstitutions,onceestablished, will bedifficult either to eradicate or drasticallyto rearrange"is premised on the assumption that existingsocial structuresdo have an impact on individualchoice (1989:55). This impactis also impliedby the definitionof regimesmostcommonlyemployed in the neoliberal institutionalliterature.Actor expectationsin a given issue-area convergearound principles,norms,rules,and decision-makingprocedureswhich have relevance becausethey are the social practices in which elites are already engaged when the regime analysis begins (Krasner, 1983).45Thus neoliberal institutionalismalreadyrecognizeswhatWendtlabels the "fundamentalprinciple of constructivistsocial theory...thatpeople act towardobjects, includingother actors,on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them"and that "it is collectivemeanings thatconstitutethe structureswhich organize our actions" (1992:396-97). The agency-structurebalance does appear to be askew in neoliberal institu- tionalism,since it initiallyholds embedded practices and their transformative capacities constantin itsargumentwhile privilegingagencyin the moment.46Yet ultimatelythe theoryallows social interactionto have transformativeeffectson interestsand identity,because successive acts of cooperation actually have the potential to affectintersubjectivemeanings. Thetheory only holds interests constantin order to explain whycooperation is initiallychosen. It assumes that state elites are motivated to cooperate in conditions of interdependence and declining hegemonybecause doing so allows them to maximize capitalistprofit more efficientlythan unilateralstrategies.Thus states are motivatedby the dis- coverynot only that"independent self-interestedbehavior can resultin undesir- able or suboptimaloutcomes,"but also thatjoint decision-makingdoes produce "the optimal nonequilibriumoutcome" (Stein, 1983:120, 139). States are willing to develop regimesand adjust theirbehavior accordinglybecause theycome to recognize that regimes "can correct institutionaldefects in world politics" and 45 Seealso Keohane, 1984:56, 1993:289. 46 As Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittbergerputt it, "while it appears to be accepted that states are ultimately constitutedby the fundamentalnorms and rtilesof an internationalsociety ...socialization sets states free to engage in rational behavior when it comes to solving collective action problems. As lonigas the deep normative structutresof aninternationalsociety remain unchanged they will not have any furtherimpact onparticular choices" (1997:161). In yetanother theoreticalparallel,criticshave noted that thissame sequential causal ordering can be observed in constructivistargutmentsas well (Kowertand Legro, 1996:457, fn. 11, 469; Checkel, 1998:332, 335). This content downloaded from 137.99.31.134 on Fri, 31 Jan 2014 11:00:49 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions112CompetingParadigmsor Birds of a Feather? "maybecome efficientdevices for the achievementof state purposes" (Keohane, 1983: 154).4 However,in order to explain whycooperation is maintained,which has been the primarysubject of interestto most regime theorists,it actuallystops holding interestsconstantand allows cooperative interactionto affectidentity.Because regimesare themselvessocial institutions,Keohane and Nye argue that "in the long run, onemay even seechanges in how governmentsdefine their own self-interestin directionsthatconformto the rules of the regimes"(1989:259; see also pp. 54-56). More specifically,"the principlesand norms of regimesmay be internalizedby importantgroups and thus become part of the belief systems which filterinformation"as well as "alters the way key participantsin the state see cause-and effectrelationships"(1989:266). Along similarlines,Keohane asserts it is a"fact that peopleadapt their strategiesto reality,"andthat "adaptive strategiesof institution-buildingcan also change reality,therebyfosteringmutu- ally beneficial cooperation" (1984:30). In other words,once cooperation is asso- ciated withefficientinterestmaximization,the incentiveto continue cooperating is reinforced,and iterated cooperative acts produce a progressivelyexpanding commitmentto the cooperative effort.This means that long-termparticipation in regimes has the potential to induce more than simple learning involving perceptual changes about strategicbehavior. Iterated acts of cooperation can lead to an internalizedcommitmentto the social practice of cooperation itself. Indeed, this is preciselyKeohane's argument in AfterHegemony(1984). The value of existingregimes lies not in their efficiencybut in the difficultiesof having obtained some level of multilateralismto begin with.Thus "international regimesembody sunk costs,and we can understandwhytheypersisteven when all memberswould prefersomewhatdifferentmixturesof principles,rules, and institutions"(1984:102; see also pp. 210, 215, and 254).48 As a result,regimescan "make adifferenceto actors' beliefs by helping to 'lock in'andto further develop the learning that had prompted their creation" (Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger,1997:147-48). Successive acts of cooperation create what both Krasner (1983:361-62) and Jervis(1991-92:51) have called a reinforcing"feed- back" loop which is inexplicable if the specified exogenous interestswere actu- ally being held constant. Inarguing that elites commit to the practice of cooperation in this way, neoliberal institutionalismstraysfromits own attemptto hold identityconstant. Elites were assumed to commit to cooperation onthe basis of its ability to efficientlymaximize their utilityfunctionwithin agiven systemiccontext. At some point in time, however,it appears that continued interaction has the capacityto induce a commitmentto multilateralismin whateverformit has taken and regardlessof its efficiency.Economic elites continue to commit to the multi- lateral practices not because theybelieve theyare the most efficientmeans for maximizingeconomic interests,but because the practicesare themselvesaffect- ing how elites define efficiency.An identityand interesttransformationis being implicitlyassumed here, andit is occurring as adirect result of interaction among state elites. Thus neoliberal institutionalismactivelyimplies a possibilitythat,according to Wendt, is consistentwitha constructivistexplanation for cooperation: Even if not intended as such ...the process by which egoistslearn to cooperate is at the same time a process of reconstructingtheirinterestsin termsof shared 47 Seealso Keohane, 1984:10-11, 49-50; and Bergstenand Henning, 1996:144. 48 Stein also argtiesthat"regimesactuallychange actor preferences,"because actors develop vested interestsin themand so "theirveryexistencechanges actors' incentivesand opportunities."As a result,actors "who previously agreed to bind themselvesout of self-interestmay come to accept joint interestsas an imperative"(1983:138-39). This content downloaded from 137.99.31.134 on Fri, 31 Jan 2014 11:00:49 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsJENNIFERSTERIANG-FOLKER113 commitmentsto social norms. Over time, this will tend to transforma positive interdependence of outcomes into apositive interdependence of utilitiesor collectiveinterestorganized around the norms in question. (1992:417; see also Hopf, 1998:191) As a social practice in its own right,cooperation begins to re-shape intersubjec- tivemeaningsand hence re-constituteselite identitiesand interestsaccording to cooperative norms. There is no practical differencebetween neoliberal institu- tionalismand constructivismas a result,because in order to explain whycoop- erationis maintained,neoliberalinstitutionalismsimplydropsitsinitialcommitment to exogenous interestsand identityin favorof its ontology. While onecould quarrel with the way in which neoliberal institutionalism chronologicallyarranges the agent-structurerelationship,the theorycannot be faultedforignoringthe preconditioningrelevanceof social institutionsto agents. It is for this reason that the constructivistcritique of neoliberal institutionalism, as well as its insistence that it offersa fundamentallydifferentperspectiveon internationalaffairs,misses the mark. Because theyshare a process-basedontol- ogy,neoliberal institutionalismultimatelyconcurs withconstructivismthatsocial practice has the capacityto transformidentitiesand interests.The theorycan, of course, be faulted for having muddied its own methodological watersand for claiming thatit holds self-interestsconstantwhen clearlyit does not. But choos- ing between neoliberal institutionalismand constructivismamounts to explain- ing short-term,behavioral cooperation in the moment or its development into communal cooperation and systemictransformationin the future.The choice depends not on paradigmaticdifferences,but upon the theorist'sown ambitions in delineating the time-frameof the cooperative phenomenon under scrutiny. WhyHave Birds of a Feather Flocked Together and WhyDoesIt Matter? If constructivismand neoliberal institutionalismdo not offercompeting para- digmatic choices, why has constructivismbecomethe "third debate" onthe research agenda of American 10 theorists?Althoughsuch a question should be subject to more systematicscrutiny,here Ican only offeradhoc, subjective observationsinformedbyworkon prior "greatdebates" in the field.49One of the obvious patternsin these prior debates is the extent to which the rise and fall of theoreticalalternativesis events-driven.As Kahler observes,"some theorieshave been buried and othersprivileged,not by carefultestsinternalto the discipline but by apparent anomalies thrownup by recent history"(1997:42; see also Wae- ver, 1998:691). This patterntends to give the field what Kahler calls "a peculiar volatile quality" (1997:42) or what Rochester observes is a "faddish"appearance in its "lurch fromone research agenda to another in response to the ebb and flow of currentevents"(1986:803). And in thiscontext,the end of the Cold War, as Waever puts it succinctly,"reads time to leave neorealism" (1998:691-92). Yet while empirical eventsmay have provided a necessaryor permissiveopen- ing for the development of alternativetheories, it does not explain why it is constructivismthat has been the post-Cold War's chief beneficiaryof the IR theoreticaltendencyto lurch with internationalaffairs.Why not an alternative informedby biopolitics,as Somit and Peterson have called for (1999), or a world systemhistoryapproach as described by Denemark (1999)? Whywas it construc- tivism,which at least as its practitionershave tended to use it amounts to yet another variantof liberal functionalIR theory,that filled the theoreticalvoid? One possibilityis thatit was a matterof chance and thatthe tendencyto relyon 4For example, those of Kahler (1997); Hoffmann(1995); Jervis(1998); Schmidt (1998); Alker and Biersteker- (1995); Rochester (1986); Strange (1983); and Waever (1998). This content downloaded from 137.99.31.134 on Fri, 31 Jan 2014 11:00:49 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions114CompetingParadigmsor Birds of a Feather? functionallogic in order to operationalize constructivismis accidental. It seems almost inevitablethat postmoderninsightsdeveloped earlier in the humanities would eventuallyfind their way into IR theorizingproper, and the end of the Cold War served as the triggeringevent in that regard. But applyingpostmodernismis trickybusiness,since it demands thata daunt- ing theoreticalbalance be struckbetween agent and structurethat recognizes their "codeterminedirreducibility"(Wendt and Duvall, 1989:59).50This creates what Hoffmannhas referredto as "an apparent analyticalnightmare,"since it means that "neither agents nor structureshave ontological priority"(1999:5). Constructivistshave remained optimisticthat this nightmarecan be addressed withoutabandoning the social-scientificproject altogether and so have relied upon conventionssuch as pre-giveninterestsand functional-institutionallogic.51 But the optimismis purchased at too high a price since these conventionsare ultimatelyantitheticalto the entire enterprise. This may beunderscored by notingjust how farafield frompostmodernismthe adoption of such conventions takes constructivism. Because postmodernismeschews the prioritizationof one discourse over an- other,Bierstekervoices a common concern that its application of relativismto IR will "not offerus any clear criteriafor choosing among the multiple and competing explanations it produces" (1989:265). Constructivismdoes not have this problem, as it turns out, because it does adopt a criterionthat is derived from existing liberal IR theories. What is produced out of this bizarre amal- gamation is the argumentthat there is "in the post-structuralcritique of essen- tialistidentitya valuable opportunity,an unproblematicemptyspace in which a peace-lovinghumanitycan be erected" (Folker, 1996:13).52The systemicspace beyond existingnational identitiescan apparentlybe filled with a more ratio- nal discourse based on collectiveproblems as theyexist "out there" ratherthan as theyexist "in here" where our identitiesactuallyoriginate.Thus constructiv- ists have taken postmodernismto mean that there is a space empty of realist self-helpthinkingin which a liberal world polity may finallytriumphover the nation-state.That postmodernistswould recoil fromsuch an argumentis obvious. This suggests,in turn, that analternativepossibilityfor the rapid rise of constructivismand its relation to liberal functionalismis thatit was not acciden- tal at all, but instead an inevitable outcome of the nature of post-Cold War eventsand the dominance of liberal theorizingin the field of AmericanIR. Prior decades provided a mixed empirical record in which neither realism nor liber- alism could declare complete victory.53The post-Cold War period differsin that no empirical event has occurred yet to contradictJervis'sclaim regarding the 50 Dessler providesan insightfuldiscussion of the difficultiesin developing theorythatsuccessfullymeets both demands (1989:443). KratochwilandRuggie also discuss anumber of epistemological options andultimately recommendthatone adopt interpretiveepistemologicalmethods,such as privilegingconsensual knowledgeor the shiftingintersubjectiveframeworksof human discourse andpractice (Ruggie, 1998:96). Yet these methods are drawn fromcriticaltheoryin the humanities,and much could be said about the potential pitfallsof utilizingits methodsin the field of IR. See, for example, worksby Rosenau (1990); Hasenclever,Mayer,and Rittberger(1997); Lapid (1989); and Biersteker(1989). One of the mostglaringdifficulties,given thatcriticaltheoryderivesfromthe studyof texts,is determiningwhatconstitutesa "text"in the contextof IR (other than the workof fellowtheorists). For essaycollectionsthatattemptto apply discourse analysisto IR, see Der Derianiand Shapiro, 1989, and Beer and Hariman, 1996. See also Onuf's discussion in Kubalkova,Onuf, and Kowert,1998. 51 For an approach to the agent-structureproblem that does not rely on ftinctionalismand thus holds out greater promise,see Jacksonand Nexon's "p/r"approach (1999). 52Schlesinger has observed this tendencyas well, noting that "in the recent vogue for 'postmodernity'... proponentshave been apt to thinkthatthe old collectivitiesmayno longer conferidentitiesthatcommand special attention,"thus "opening up potential new spaces of tolerance of the 'stranger"'(1994:316-17). 53 See worksby Keohane and Nye (1989:xi); Krasner(1983:vii-ix); Keohane (1984:9); and Grieco (1990:9, 27); as wvellas Northedge(1976) andJones anidWilletts'sdiscussionof the Americanattachmentto interdependencefi-om a Britishperspective(1984). This content downloaded from 137.99.31.134 on Fri, 31 Jan 2014 11:00:49 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsJENNIFERSTERIANG-FOLKER115 major industrials:"with no disputes meritingthe use of force and with such instrumentsbeing inappropriate to the issues at hand, we are in unmapped territory"(1991-92:55). Much of the American IR theoretical communityhas interpretedthisunmapped territoryas the finalvindicationof liberal IR theory.54 The extent to which American theorizingabout 10is and always has been liberal theorizinggoes a long wayin explaininghow constructivismcould become so quickly popular in this post-Cold War empirical context.55Constructivism would be attractiveto a theoreticalcommunityalready predisposed to a liberal perspectivewhich assumes that because the major industrialsshare a particular set of constitutivenormsin capitalismand democracy,relationsamong them are motivatedmore by absolute rather than relativegains. The widespread accep- tance of these assumptionswould then pave the way for an approach such as constructivismwhich Haggard notes "is likelyto carrymore explanatoryweight in those more limitedareas where some common normativestructuresexist than in those in which theyare absent or extremelybroad" (1991:415). Thus the growingenthusiasmforconstructivismmaybe accounted for,at least to some extent, byjervis's observationthat"the kinds of theorieswe find attrac- tive are influenced not only by events but also by our general political orienta- tions"and "normativeconsiderations"(1998:973).An underlying"normativeagenda" that is liberal in orientationwould also explain why,as Jervishas noted, "con- structivistspay littleattentionto normsand ideas thatare both revolutionaryand evil" (1998:974). Liberal IR theorizinghas also had anhistorical tendency to co-opt new approaches, with constructivismbeing perhaps the latest example. Integration,transnationalrelations, interdependence, and regimes were each touted in turn as new ideas and approaches. As this reviewhas demonstrated, however,each contained the same functionallogic thathad simplybeen dressed up in new, albeit sometimesremarkablyfascinating,feathers. The result has been a homogenized field of JO inquiryin which theoretical choice remainslimitedto eithermore modest or more ambitiousliberal research programs.This homogenizationpresentsfewproblemsifliberalfunctionalexpla- nations for the internationalsystemand its transformationsare accurate. But normativeagendas have a way of skewingexplanation for global political phe- nomena. This charge has frequentlybeen leveled at realism, but liberal func- tionalismhas neverbeen objectivein the causal factorsit chooses to privilegeor denigrate either.This is most obvious in its biased treatmentof domestic polit- ical variables,which leads it to account for institutionalcreation and innovation as if it were "problem-solvingwithoutpolitics as a conditioningfactor"(Sewell, 1966:38). This antipathytowarddomestic political institutionshas informedall variants of liberal IR theory,leading criticsto repeatedlycharge thatliberalismcontains no theoryof politics.56And the extent to which liberal theorydominates the studyof JO suggeststhat the field will continue to move steadilyawayfromthe studyof foreignpolicyand actual decision-making(Haggard, 1991:405, 416-22). Liberal theoristscannot be entirelyblamed for this,since it was neorealism that popularized systemictheorizing,but such an emphasis is actuallyconducive to liberal theoriesof social change. Because liberal theoryhas alwaysbeen less an explanation for what policymakersactuallydo and more a prescriptionof what 54For example, Goldgeier and McFaul (1992);Jervis(1991-92); Kegley(1991); Lebow (1994); and Zacher (1992). Hoffmannargues that theorizingabout IR has been affectedby America's "ideology of progress"all along (1995:219). Winnerstigbacks up these claims witlha content analysisof IRjournalarticlesand finds that it is not pro-realisttheorizingthat dominiatesthe field but pro-liberaltheorizing(1999). Even realisttheorizinghas been affectedby the liberal, optimisticbeliefs that dominate the American social milieu (Shimko, 1992:299; Waever, 1998:721-22). 56 See Sewell, 1966:43, 44; Gilpin, 1984:299; anid Little, 1996:69. This content downloaded from 137.99.31.134 on Fri, 31 Jan 2014 11:00:49 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions116CompetingParadigmsor Birds of a Feather? theyshoulddo, theorizingat the systemiclevel allows it to avoid having to explain ongoing, empiricalanomalies. That is, it avoids having to explain whythe iden- tities,interests,and behaviorsof policymakerscontinue to be informedmore by the parochial and myopicpulling and hauling of domestic politicsand electoral cyclesthan by the far-sightedpracticesrequired of internationalcollectiveinter- ests and practices. This is where constructivismcould have made a contributionand perhaps still can if it sheds its functionalistfeathers.As long as it relies on a logic of func- tional institutionalefficiency,however,constructivismwill continue to provide explanations in which political institutionsdo not serve as conditioningfactors but instead remain instrumentsfor collectiveproblem-solving.Thus it deserves the same cogent criticismthat Sewell leveled at functionalismin 1966, and for that reason I give him the last word: The perversityof realityturnsus again to the functionalistargument. By what process doesit anticipate an elevation from the level of converging adhoc interestsof independent political units to one characterizedby a foundationof obligation?We must conclude that it hardlyconfrontsthe question. (1966:327) References ADLER,E. (1997) Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivismin World Politics. EuropeanJournalof InternationalRelations3:319-363. ALKER,H., ANDT. 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