judiciary cases for printing

7/30/2019 Judiciary Cases for Printing

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TITLE: EDENCIA VS. DAVID

CITATION: 93 Phil 696. August 31, 1953

FACTS:

Saturnino David was the Internal Revenue Collector who ordered Judges Endencio

and Jugos salaries. A case was filed. However, upon construing Article VIII Section

9 of the constitution, it shows that judicial officers are exempt from paying tax from

their salaries and thus considered that the deduction of salaries from the said

judges as a violation from the compensation received by judicial officers. Due to

this, the judgment given by Court of First Instance has declared the section 13 ofRepublic Act 590 unconstitutional. Case was appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.

RULING:

No, the Section 13 of R.A. 590 is unconstitutional. The collection of income

taxes in judicial officers is considered as against the provisions given by the Article

VIII Sec 9 of the Philippine constitution:

Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower courts shall

be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by

the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no

confirmation.

For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days

from the submission of the list.

According to the constitution, the compensation shall not be diminished

during their continuance of their service. Section 13 of RA 590 stated that no salary

received by any public officer of the republic shall be exempted from paying its

taxes. This specific part of RA 590 is in contrary with what is Article VIII Sec 9 has

provided.

The Legislative body cannot lawfully declare that no judicial officer can be

exempted from paying tax. The legislative may create laws, however, the judicial


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department of the government has the responsibility of interpreting laws and has

dutifully interpreted the said part of the constitution. The tax exemption was not

created to benefit the judicial officers but to attract good and competent men.


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TITLE: NITAFAN VS. CIR

CITATION: 152 SCRA 284

FACTS:

1. Petitioners David Nitafan, Wenceslao Polo and Maximo Savellano Jr., were duly

appointed and qualified Judges of the RTC National Capital Judicial Region.

2. Petitioners seeks to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, (CIR and the

Financial Officer of the Supreme Court) from making any deduction of withholding

taxes from their salaries.

3. Petitioners submit that any tax withheld from their emoluments or

compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decreased or diminution of their

salaries, contrary to Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the deduction of withholding tax a diminuition of the salaries of

Judges/Justices?

RULING:

The Supreme Court hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the ruling in

PERFECTO VS. MEER (88 Phil 552) and ENDENCIA VS. DAVID (93 Phil 696), that

declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary exempt from payment of the

income tax and considered such payment as a diminution of their salaries during

their continuance in office. The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of Justices

and Judges are property subject to general income tax applicable to all income

earners and that the payment of such income tax by Justices and Judges does not

fall within the constitution protection against decrease of their salaries during their

continuance in office.

The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional

provision in question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that

the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make

the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is

but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the

intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be

given effect.


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The ruling that the imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a

diminution thereof, and so violates the Constitution in Perfecto vs. Meer, as

affirmed in Endencia vs. David must be deemed discarded.


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TITLE: DE LA LLANA VS. ALBA


FACTS:

In 1981, BP 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds

therefor and for Other Purposes, was passed. De la Llana was assailing its validity

because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that would be removed because

of the reorganization and second, he said such law would contravene the

constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure of judges of the

courts, He averred that only the SC can remove judges NOT Congress.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such

statute (BP 129).

RULING:

The SC ruled the following way:Moreover, this Court is empoweredto discipline

judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their

dismissal. Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the

Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of

course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office.

There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law

no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would

thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law,

the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless,

for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to

its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office.

Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary.

In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in

accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as

incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its

view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there

is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render

advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case,

certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the

two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case


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where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who

shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That

remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no

departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is

sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to

the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior

courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is

ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any

unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed

to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with

the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save

and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.


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TITLE: SANTIAGO VS. BAUTISTA


FACTS:

Santiago was considered an alien as evidenced by his alien certificate of

registration. He averred that this is erroneous. He was born of a Filipino mother and

a Chinese father here in the Philippines. He was sent to China when he was 4 years

old by his dad. He returned in 1925 and in his Landing Certificate he was already

labeled as a Filipino. Hence, he would like to cancel the alien certificate that was

issued by the Bureau of Immigrations. In his original petition however in the lower

court he was praying for a declaratory relief for him to be declared as a Filipino. He

was favored by the court. The fiscal appealed averring that a declaratory relief is

not the proper remedy. The lower court amended the decision not stating the

declaratory statement but rather focusing on the cancellation of the alien

certificate. The fiscal appealed before the SC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not declaratory relief is a proper remedy to have a judicial declaration

of citizenship.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled against Santiago. Although amended, the proceeding

initiated and originally prayed for is a declaratory relief to have him be declared as

a Filipino. Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial

declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for the

settlement of justifiable controversies, which imply a given right, legally

demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a

remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an accident only

of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy, the court may pass

upon, and make a pronouncement relative to, their status. Otherwise, such apronouncement is beyond judicial power. Thus, for instance, no action or

proceeding may be instituted for a declaration to the effect that plaintiff or

petitioner is married, or single, or a legitimate child, although a finding thereon

may be made as a necessary premise to justify a given relief available only to one


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enjoying said status. At times, the law permits the acquisition of a given status,

such as naturalization, by judicial decree. But, there is no similar legislation

authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is

part of our citizenry.


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TITLE: DAZA VS. SINGSON


FACTS:

On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized,

resulting in a political realignment in the House of Representatives. Twenty four

members of the Liberal Party formally resigned from that party and joined the LDP,

thereby swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly reducing their former party

to only 17 members.

On December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of representatives consistingof the original members except the petitioner and including therein respondent

Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP.

The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal

from the Commission on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by

the respondent. Briefly stated, the contention of the petitioner is that he cannot

be removed from the Commission on Appointments because his election

thereto is permanent under the doctrine announced in Cunanan v. Tan.

For his part, the respondent argues that the question raised by the petitioner is

political in nature and so beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. He also maintains

that he has been improperly impleaded, the real party respondent being the

House of Representatives which changed its representation in the Commission on

Appointments and removed the petitioner. Finally, he stresses that nowhere in the

Constitution is it required that the political party be registered to be entitled to

proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUE:

a.Whether petitioners removal is unconstitutional.

b.Whether the election of Sen. Cuenco and Delgado to the Electoral Tribunal is

unconstitutional.

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order dated

January 13, 1989, is LIFTED. The Court holds that the respondent has been validly


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elected as a member of the Commission on Appointments and is entitled to assume

his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. No

pronouncement as to costs.

If by reason of successful election protests against members of a House, or of their

expulsion from the political party to which they belonged and/or of their affiliation

with another political party, the ratio in the representation of the political parties in

the House is materially changed, the House is clothed with authority to declare

vacant the necessary number of seats in the Commission on Appointments held by

members of said House belonging to the political party adversely affected by the

change and then fill said vacancies in conformity with the Constitution.

In view of the Allied Majority of 1961

In the election for the House of Representatives held in 1961, 72 seats were won by

the Nacionalista Party, 29 by the Liberal Party and 1 by an independent.

Accordingly, the representation of the chamber in the Commission on Appointments

was apportioned to 8 members from the Nacionalista Party and 4 from the Liberal

Party. Subsequently, 25 members of the Nacionalista Party, professing discontent

over the House leadership, made common cause with the Liberal Party and formed

what was called the Allied Majority to install a new Speaker and reorganize the

chamber.

It noted that the Allied Majority was a merely temporary combination as the

Nacionalista defectors had not disaffiliated from their party and permanently joined

the new political group. Officially, they were still members of the Nacionalista Party.

The reorganization of the Commission on Appointments was invalid because it was

not based on the proportional representation of the political parties in the House of

Representatives as required by the Constitution.

The Court held: The constitutional provision to the effect that "there shall be a

Commission on Appointments consisting of twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12)

members of the House of Representatives elected by each House, respectively, on

the basis of proportional REPRESENTATION OF THE POLITICAL

PARTIES THEREIN," necessarily connotes the authority of each House of Congress

to see to it that this requirement is duly complied with. As a consequence, it maytake appropriate measures, not only upon the initial organization of the

Commission, but also, subsequently thereto.

In view ofCongress authority


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Lastly, we resolve that issue in favor of the authority of the House of

Representatives to change its representation in the Commission on Appointments to

reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its

membership. It is understood that such changes must be permanent and do

not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving

severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of

allegiance from one political party to another.

In view of the Courts intervention

The Court would have preferred not to intervene in this matter, leaving it to be

settled by the House of Representatives or the Commission on Appointments as the

bodies directly involved. But as our jurisdiction has been invoked and, moreimportantly, because a constitutional stalemate had to be resolved, there was no

alternative for us except to act, and to act decisively. In doing so, of course, we are

not imposing our will upon the said agencies, or substituting our discretion for

theirs, but merely discharging our sworn responsibility to interpret and apply the

Constitution. That is a duty we do not evade, lest we ourselves betray our oath.


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TITLE: GARCIA VS. BOARD OF INVESTMENTS

CITATION: 191 SCRA 288. November 1990

FACTS:

Former Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), now Luzon Petrochemical

Corporation, formed by a group of Taiwanese investors, was granted by the BOI its

have its plant site for the products naphta cracker and naphta to based in

Bataan. In February 1989, one year after the BPC began its production in Bataan,

the corporation applied to the BOI to have its plant site transferred from Bataan to

Batangas. Despite vigorous opposition from petitioner Cong. Enrique Garcia andothers, the BOI granted private respondent BPCs application, stating that the

investors have the final choice as to where to have their plant site because they are

the ones who risk capital for the project.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in yielding to the

application of the investors without considering the national interest

RULING:

The Supreme Court found the BOI to have committed grave abuse of discretion in

this case, and ordered the original application of the BPC to have its plant site in

Bataan and the product naphta as feedstock maintained.

The ponente, Justice Gutierrez, Jr., first stated the Courts judicial power to settle

actual controversies as provided for by Section 1 of Article VIII in our 1987

Constitution before he wrote the reasons as to how the Court arrived to its

conclusion. He mentioned that nothing is shown to justify the BOIs action in letting

the investors decide on an issue which, if handled by our own government, could

have been very beneficial to the State, as he remembered the word of a great

Filipino leader, to wit: .. he would not mind having a government run like hell by

Filipinos than one subservient to foreign dictation.

Justice Grio Aquino, in her dissenting opinion, argued that the petition was not

well-taken because the 1987 Investment Code does not prohibit the registration of

a certain project, as well as any decision of the BOI regarding the amended


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application. She stated that the fact that petitioner disagrees with BOI does not

make the BOI wrong in its decision, and that petitioner should have appealed to the

President of the country and not to the Court, as provided for by Section 36 of the

1987 Investment Code.

Justice Melencio-Herrera, in another dissenting opinion, stated that the Constitution

does not vest in the Court the power to enter the realm of policy considerations,

such as in this case.


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TITLE: PACU VS. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION

CITATION: 97 Phil. 806

FACTS:

The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities made a petition that Acts No.

2706 otherwise known as the Act making the Inspection and Recognition of private

schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instructionand was

amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared

unconstitutional on the grounds that 1) the act deprives the owner of the school

and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without dueprocess of Law; 2) it will also deprive the parents of their Natural Rights and duty

to rear their children for civic efficiency and 3) its provisions conferred on the

Secretary of Education unlimited powers and discretion to prescribe rules and

standards constitute towards unlawful delegation of Legislative powers.

Section 1 of Act No. 2706It shall be the duty ofthe Secretary of Public Instruction

to maintain a general standard of efficiency in all private schools and colleges of the

Philippines so that the same shall furnish adequate instruction to the public, in

accordance with the class and grade of instruction given in them, and for this

purpose said Secretary or his duly authorized representative shall have authority to

advise, inspect, and regulate said schools and colleges in order to determine the

efficiency of instruction given in the same,

The petitioner also complain that securing a permit to the Secretary of Education

before opening a school is not originally included in the original Act 2706. And in

support to the first proposition of the petitioners they contended that the

Constitution guaranteed the right of a citizen to own and operate a school and any

law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could

exercise the said right On the other hand, the defendant Legal Representative

submitted a memorandum

contending that 1) the matters presented no justiciable controversy exhibiting

unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional question; 2) Petitioners are in

estoppels to challenge the validity of the said act and 3) the Act is constitutionally

valid. Thus, the petition for prohibition was dismissed by the court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Act No. 2706 as amended by Act no. 3075 and Commonwealth Act

no.180 may be declared void and unconstitutional?


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RULING:

The Petitioner suffered no wrong under the terms of law and needs no relief in the

form they seek to obtain. Moreover, there is no justiciable controversy presented

before the court. It is an established principle that to entitle a private individualimmediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury and it is not sufficient that he

has merely invoke the judicial power to determined the validity of executive and

legislative action he must show that he has sustained common interest to all

members of the public. Furthermore, the power of the courts to declare a law

unconstitutional arises only when the interest of litigant require the use of judicial

authority for their protection against actual interference. As such, Judicial Power is

limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies and the authority to pass

on the validity of statutes is incident alto the decisions of such cases where

conflicting claims under the constitution and under the legislative act assailed as

contrary to the constitution but it is legitimate only in the last resort and it must be

necessary to determined a real and vital controversy between litigants. Thus,

actions like this are brought for a positive purpose to obtain actual positive relief

and the court does not sit to adjudicate a mere academic question to satisfy

scholarly interest therein. The court however, finds the defendant position to be

sufficiently sustained and state that the petitioner remedy is to challenge the

regulation not to invalidate the law because it needs no argument to show that

abuse by officials entrusted with the

execution of the statute does not per se demonstrate the unconstitutionality of such

statute. On this phase of the litigation the court conclude that there

has been no undue delegation of legislative power even if the petitioners appended

a list of circulars and memoranda issued by the Department of Education they fail

to indicate which of such official documents was constitutionally objectionable for

being capricious or pain nuisance. Therefore, the court denied the petition

for prohibition.


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TITLE: TAN VS. MACAPAGAL


FACTS:

Petition for declaratory relief as taxpayers an in behalf of the Filipino people. The

petitioners seeks for the court to declare that the deliberating Constitutional

Convention was "without power, under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution and

Republic Act 6132, to consider, discuss and adopt proposals which seek to revise

the present Constitution through the adoption of a form of a government other than

the form now outlined in the present Constitution [the Convention being] merely

empowered to propose improvements to the present Constitution without altering

the general plan laid down therein."

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petitioners has locus standi.2.

Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:

1. NO.Justice Laurel: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a

statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he

has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.

"Pascual vs. The Secretary of Public Works: validity of a statute may be

contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury, in consequence of its

enforcement. Taxpayers only have standing on laws providing for the

disbursement of public funds. Expenditure of public funds, by an officer of the

State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a

misapplication of such funds, which may be enjoined at the request of

a taxpayer.

2. NO.At the time the case was filed the Con-Con has not yet finalized any resolution that would

radically alter the 1935constitution therefore not yet ripe for judicial review. The case


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becomes ripe when the Con-Con has actually does something already. Then the

court may actually inquire into the jurisdiction of the body. Separation of power

departments should be left alone to do duties as they see fit. The Executive and

the Legislature are not bound to ask for advice in carrying out their duties, judiciary

may not interfere so that it may fulfill its duties well. The court may not interfere

until the proper time comes ripeness.


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TITLE: DUMLAO VS. COMELEC


FACTS:

Petitioner Dumlao questions the constitutionality of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg.

52 as discriminatory and contrary to equal protection and due process guarantees

of the Constitution. Sec. 4 provides that any retired elective provincial or municipal

official who has received payments of retirement benefits and shall have been 65

years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be

elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he

has retired. According to Dumlao, the provision amounts to class legislation.

Petitioners Igot and Salapantan Jr. also assail the validity of Sec. 4 of Batas

Pambansa Blg. 52, which states that any person who has committed any act of

disloyalty to the State, including those amounting to subversion, insurrection,

rebellion, or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified for any of the offices

covered by the act, or to participate in any partisan activity therein: provided that a

judgment of conviction of those crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and

the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or

military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of suchfact.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the aforementioned statutory provisions violate the

Constitution and thus and will be declared null and void

RULING:

In regards to the unconstitutionality of the provisions, Sec. 4 of BP Blg. 52 remains

constitutional and valid. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws

is subject to rational classification. One class can be treated differently from

another class. In this case, employees 65 years of age are classified differently

from younger employees. The purpose of the provision is to satisfy the need for

new blood in the workplace. In regards to the second paragraph of Sec. 4, it

should be declared null and void for being violative of the constitutional

presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused. Explicit is the constitutional

provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent

until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and

counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation, according to the

fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes

the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from


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running for public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against

him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In

ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a

person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges have been

filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office. A

person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been

filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already

convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory

penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence

(Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).

And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and

therefore, may be rebutted, yet there is "clear and present danger" that because ofthe proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts

of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence

against him.

Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before

the Courts rather than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A

highly possible conflict of findings between two government bodies, to the extreme

detriment of a person charged, will thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a

legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be

substituted for a judicial determination.

Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only

that objectionable portion is mandated. It is separable from the first portion of the

second paragraph of section 4 of BP Blg. 52 which can stand by itself.

Wherefore, the first paragraph of section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is hereby declared valid

and that portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is hereby

declared null and void, for being violative of the constitutional presumption of

innocence guaranteed to an accused.


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TITLE: OPLE VS. TORRES


FACTS:

The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the

shrinking of the right to privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most

comprehensive of rights and the rightmost valued by civilized men." Petitioner Ople prays that

we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized

Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, (1)it is

a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and(2)it impermissibly intrudeson our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to

be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion. A.O. No. 308 was

published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997.

On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive

Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the

Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308.

On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner has the stand to assail the validity of A.O. No. 308

RULING:

YES.

As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the

standing to sue of the petitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically,

respondents aver that petitioner has no legal interest to uphold and that the implementing rules

of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic

ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is

possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No.

308 is a usurpation of legislative power.

As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can

also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to

implement A.O. No. 308. The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by


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the fact that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner

Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not

premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the

respondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for

the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the

publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card.

Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announced that representatives from the

GSIS and the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national identification system. All

signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we

need not wait for the formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light,

the dissenters insisted that weights the rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its

result would be to throttle an important constitutional principle and a fundamental right.


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TITLE: NORTH COTABATO VS. REPUBLIC

CITATION: G.R. No. 183591. October 14, 2008

FACTS:

The Government and the MILF were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of

Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) aspect of the GRP-MILF

Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The GRP-MILF

agreement is the result of a formal peace talks between the parties in Tripoli,

Libya in 2001. The pertinent provisions in the MOA-AD provides for the

establishment of an associative relationship between the Bangsamoro JuridicalEntity (BJE) and the Central Government. It speaks of the relationship between the

BJE and the Philippine government as associative, thus implying an international

relationship and therefore suggesting an autonomous state. Furthermore, under the

MOA-AD, the GRP Peace Panel guarantees that necessary amendments to the

Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the said MOA-AD constitutional?

RULING:

No. The SC ruled that the MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present

Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept

underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP

and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated

entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence, it

said. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary

amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in

place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make

such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation

of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, orthe people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the

Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue

influence or interference with that process. While the MOA-AD would not amount to

an international agreement or unilateral declaration binding on


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the Philippines under international law, respondents act of guaranteeing

amendments is, by itself, already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-

AD fatally defective.

Justice Santiago said, among others, that the MOA-AD contains provisions whichare repugnant to the Constitution and which will result in the virtual surrender of

part of the Philippines territorial sovereignty. She further said that had the MOA-

AD been signed by parties, would have bound the government to the creation of a

separate Bangsamoro state having its own territory, government, civil institutions,

and armed forces. The sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines would

have been compromised.

Notes: In this case, The Court explained that the Presidential Adviser on the PeaceProcess committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the

pertinent consultation process, as mandated by EO No. 3, RA 7160, and RA 8371.

EO No. 3 is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national

and local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building.

R.A. 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991) requires all national offices to

conduct consultations before any project or program critical to the environment and

human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of

people residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar

program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to

the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the

diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total

environment.

R.A. 8371 (the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997) provides for clear-cut

procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails,

among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent

(FPIC) of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples.


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TITLE:KILOSBAYAN VS. GUINGONA JR.


FACTS:

Pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169, as amended by

B.P. Blg. 42) which grants it the authority to hold and conduct charity sweepstakes

races, lotteries and other similar activities, the PCSO decided to establish an on-

line lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying

its sources of funds. Sometime before March 1993, after learning that the PCSO

was interested in operating an on-line lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad, a

multinational company and one of the ten largest public companies in Malaysia,

became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO. As an initial step,

Berjaya Group Berhad (through its individual nominees) organized with some

Filipino investors in March 1993 a Philippine corporation known as the Philippine

Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC), which was intended to be the medium

through which the technical and management services required for the project

would be offered and delivered to PCSO.

Before August 1993, the PCSO formally issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the

Lease Contract of an on-line lottery system for the PCSO. On 15 August 1993,

PGMC submitted its bid to the PCSO. On 21 October 1993, the Office of the

President announced that it had given the respondent PGMC the go-signal to

operate the countrys on-line lottery system and that the corresponding

implementing contract would be submitted not later than 8 November 1993 for

final clearance and approval by the Chief Executive.

On 4 November 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to President Fidel V. Ramos

strongly opposing the setting up of the on-line lottery system on the basis of

serious moral and ethical considerations. Considering the denial by the Office of the

President of its protest and the statement of Assistant Executive Secretary Renato

Corona that only a court injunction can stop Malacaang, and the imm inent

implementation of the Contract of Lease in February 1994, KILOSBAYAN, with its

co-petitioners, filed on 28 January 1994 this petition.

Petitioner claims that it is a non-stock domestic corporation composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns, and lay leaders. The rest of the petitioners,

except Senators Freddie Webb and Wigberto Taada and Representative Joker P.

Arroyo, are suing in their capacities as members of the Board of Trustees of

KILOSBAYAN and as taxpayers and concerned citizens. Senators Webb and Taada
http://mycasedigests.wordpress.com/2012/04/07/kilosbayan-vs-guingona/http://mycasedigests.wordpress.com/2012/04/07/kilosbayan-vs-guingona/http://mycasedigests.wordpress.com/2012/04/07/kilosbayan-vs-guingona/


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and Representative Arroyo are suing in their capacities as members of Congress

and as taxpayers and concerned citizens of the Philippines. The public respondents,

meanwhile allege that the petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant suit,

citing the Courts resolution in Valmonte vs. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi

2.Whether or the Contract of Lease in the light of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as

amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conductinglotteries in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association,

company or entity, whether domestic or foreign. is legal and valid.

RULING:

We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The

ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral

well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the

counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery

system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal

standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its

sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the

respondents tried to take advantage of.

The language of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169 is indisputably clear. The PCSO cannot

share its franchise with another by way of collaboration, association or joint

venture. Neither can it assign, transfer, or lease such franchise. Whether the

contract in question is one of lease or whether the PGMC is merely an independent

contractor should not be decided on the basis of the title or designation of the

contract but by the intent of the parties, which may be gathered from the

provisions of the contract itself. Animus hominis est anima scripti. The intention of

the party is the soul of the instrument.

Undoubtedly, from the very inception, the PCSO and the PGMC mutually understood

that any arrangement between them would necessarily leave to the PGMC the

technical, operations, and management aspects of the on-line lottery system while

the PSCO would, primarily, provide the franchise. The so-called Contract of Lease is

not, therefore, what it purports to be. Woven therein are provisions which negate


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its title and betray the true intention of the parties to be in or to have a joint

venture for a period of eight years in the operation and maintenance of the on-line

lottery system.

We thus declare that the challenged Contract of Lease violates the exceptionprovided for in paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg.

42, and is, therefore, invalid for being contrary to law. This conclusion renders

unnecessary further discussion on the other issues raised by the petitioners.


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TITLE: KILOSBAYAN vs. MORATO

CITATION: G.R. No. 118910. November 16, 1995.

FACTS:

In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA)

wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of

4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or at least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30%

of the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to

employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of

lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition

was filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease

Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Lease. It is still violative of

PCSO's charter. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It violates Sec.

2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution. Standing can no longer be questioned

because it has become the law of the case Respondent's reply: ELA is different from

the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to determine if ELA

is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have

funds. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do not have alegal standing because they were not parties to the contract

ISSUES:

Whether or not the petitioners have standing?

RULING:

NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of

the petitioners is a departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest

because no constitutional issues were actually involved. LAW OF THE CASE cannot

also apply. Since the present case is not the same one litigated by theparties before

in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as

the law of this case. The parties are the same but the cases are not. RULE ON

CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon

and determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future

action between the same parties involving a different cause of action. But the rule

does not apply to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated claims are

involved. When the second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction


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identical with, but in a form separable from the one dealt with in the first

proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to make an independent

examination of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a different contract, the

previous decision does not preclude determination of the petitioner's standing.

STANDING is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is

actually involved. The more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are REAL

PARTIES in INTEREST.


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TITLE: JOYA VS. PCGG

CITATION: G.R. No. 96541. August 24, 1993

FACTS:

The Republic of the Philippines through the PCGG entered into

a Consignment Agreement with Christies of New York, selling 82 Old Masters

Paintings and antique silverware seized from Malacanang and the Metropolitan

Museum of Manila alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late Pres.

Marcos, his relatives and cronies. Prior to the auction sale, COA questioned

the Consignment Agreement, there was already opposition to the auction sale.

Nevertheless, it proceeded as scheduled and the proceeds of $13,302,604.86 were

turned over to the Bureau of Treasury.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PCGG has jurisdiction and authority to enter into an agreement with

Christies of New York for the sale ofthe artworks

RULING:

On jurisdiction of the Court to exercise judicial review

- The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a

law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is

compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: that the question

must be raised by the proper party; that there must be an actual case or

controversy; that the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity;

and, that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to

the determination of the case itself. But the most important are the first two (2)

requisites.

Standing of Petitioners

- On the first requisite, we have held that one having no right or interest to protect

cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an action. This is

premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides that every action

must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, and

that all persons having interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the

relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. The Court will exercise its power of

judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal


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standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing" means a

personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or

will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being

challenged. The term "interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and to be

affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question

involved, or a mere incidental interest. Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff

must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right

of some third and related party.

EXCEPTIONS TO LEGAL STANDING: Mandamus and Taxpayers Suit

- There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions to

the rule on legal standing, as when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procurethe enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of a public right recognized by

the Constitution, and when a taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act

authorizing the disbursement of public funds.

Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists deeply concerned

with the preservation and protection of the country's artistic wealth, they have the

legal personality to restrain respondents Executive Secretary and PCGG from acting

contrary to their public duty to conserve the artistic creations as mandated by the

1987 Constitution, particularly Art. XIV, Secs. 14 to 18, on Arts and Culture, and

R.A. 4846 known as "The Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act,"

governing the preservation and disposition of national and important cultural

properties. Petitioners also anchor their case on the premise that the paintings and

silverware are public properties collectively owned by them and by the people in

general to view and enjoy as great works of art. They allege that with the

unauthorized act of PCGG in selling the art pieces, petitioners have been deprived

of their right to public property without due process of law in violation of the

Constitution.

Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in law. They

themselves allege that the paintings were donated by private persons from different

parts of the world to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation, which is a

non-profit and non-stock corporations established to promote non-Philippine arts.

The foundation's chairman was former First Lady Imelda R. Marcos, while its

president was Bienvenido R. Tantoco. On this basis, the ownership of thesepaintings legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the members thereof,

although the public has been given the opportunity to view and appreciate these

paintings when they were placed on exhibit.

Similarly, as alleged in the petition, the pieces of antique silverware were given to


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the Marcos couple as gifts from friends and dignitaries from foreign countries on

their silver wedding and anniversary, an occasion personal to them. When the

Marcos administration was toppled by the revolutionary government, these

paintings and silverware were taken from Malacaang and the Metropolitan

Museum of Manila and transferred to the Central Bank Museum. The confiscation of

these properties by the Aquino administration however should not be understood to

mean that the ownership of these paintings has automatically passed on the

government without complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of

due process and just compensation. If these properties were already acquired by

the government, any constitutional or statutory defect in their acquisition and their

subsequent disposition must be raised only by the proper parties the true owners

thereof whose authority to recover emanates from their proprietary rights whichare protected by statutes and the Constitution. Having failed to show that they are

the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become publicly

owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their

alleged unauthorized disposition.

Requisites for a Mandamus Suit

- Further, although this action is also one of mandamus filed by concerned citizens,

it does not fulfill the criteria for a mandamus suit. In Legaspi v. Civil Service

Commission, this Court laid down the rule that a writ of mandamus may be issued

to a citizen only when the public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of

the state are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution. In the case at bar,

petitioners are not after the fulfillment of a positive duty required of respondent

officials under the 1987 Constitution. What they seek is the enjoining of an official

act because it is constitutionally infirmed. Moreover, petitioners' claim for the

continued enjoyment and appreciation by the public of the artworks is at most a

privilege and is unenforceable as a constitutional right in this action for mandamus.

When a Taxpayer's Suit may prosper

- Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Not every action filed by

a taxpayer can qualify to challenge the legality of official acts done by the

government. A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the governmental acts being

questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the

expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose ofadministering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds,

which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. Obviously, petitioners are not

challenging any expenditure involving public funds but the disposition of what they

allege to be public properties. It is worthy to note that petitioners admit that the


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paintings and antique silverware were acquired from private sources and not with

public money.

Actual Controversy

- For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case of

controversy one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite

legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or

academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by

a court of justice. A case becomes moot and academic when its purpose has

become stale, such as the case before us. Since the purpose of this petition for

prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials from holding the auction sale of

the artworks on a particular date 11 January 1991 which is long past, theissues raised in the petition have become moot and academic.

At this point, however, we need to emphasize that this Court has the discretion to

take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of an actual case

or legal standing when paramount public interest is involved. We find however that

there is no such justification in the petition at bar to warrant the relaxation of the

rule.


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TITLE: CHAVEZ VS. PUBLIC ESTATE AUTHORITY

CITATION: G.R. No. 133250. July 9, 2002

FACTS:The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing agency tasked to

undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling

functions of the DENR insofar as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore lands

are concerned.

PEA sought the transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34

hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of

submerged areas of Manila Bay to AMARI.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the transfer is valid.

RULING:

No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to

PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on

private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands

comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of

PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of submergedareas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain.

Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation,

ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being

contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private

corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of

290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for

being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the

alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.

Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and

other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,


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wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With

the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be

alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall

be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly

undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or

production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations

at least sixtyper centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such

agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not

more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be

provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply fisheries, or

industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be

the measure and limit of the grant.

The State shall protect the nations marine wealth in its archipelagic waters,

territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment

exclusively to Filipino citizens.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by

Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence

fishermen and fish workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving

either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and

utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general

terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic

growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall

promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance

with this provision, within thirty days from its execution.


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TITLE: GONZALES VS. NARVASA

CITATION: G.R. No. 140835. August 14, 2000

FACTS:

Petitioner Ramon Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails the

constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional

Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and

assistants.

The PCCR was created by Pres. Estrada by virtue of EO 43 in order to study and

recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the Constitution, and the

manner of implementing them.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to file the case

RULING:

In assailing the constitutionality of EO 43, petitioner asserts his interest as a citizen

and taxpayer.

A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual

or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government;

the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be

addressed by a favorable action. Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or

in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR

and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. Neither

does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being

violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of

the issues raised.

In his capacity as a taxpayer, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a

constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have disbursed

in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. Thus, payers action is

properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or

spending power. In the creation of PCCR, it is apparent that there is no exercise by

Congress of its taxing or spending power. The PCCR was created by the President

by virtue of EO 43 as amended by EO 70. The appropriations for the PCCR were


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authorized by the President, not by Congress. The funds used for the PCCR were

taken from funds intended for the Office of the President, in the exercise of the

Chief Executives power to transfer funds pursuant to Sec. 25(5) of Art. VI of the

Constitution. As to the creation of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers

and assistants, the petitioner has not alleged the necessary facts so as to enable

the Court to determine if he possesses a taxpayers interest in this particular issue.


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TITLE: UMALI VS. GUINGONA

CITATION: G.R. No. 131124. March 21, 1999

FACTS:

Osmundo Umali the petitioner was appointed Regional Director of the Bureau of

Internal Revenue by Pres Fidel V. Ramos. He assigned him in Manila, November 29,

1993 to March 15, 1994 and Makati, March 16, 1994 to August 4, 1994. On August

1, 1994, President Ramos received a confidential memorandum against the

petitioner for alleged violations of internal revenue laws, rules and regulations

during his incumbency as Regional Director, more particularly the following

malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance. upon receipt of the said confidential

memorandum, former President authorized the issuance of an Order for the

preventive suspension of the petitioner and immediately referred the

Complaint against the latter to the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and

Corruption (PCAGC), for investigation. Petitioner was duly informed of the charges

against him. And was directed him to send in his answer, copies of his Statement of

Assets, and Liabilities for the past three years (3), and Personal Data Sheet. Initial

hearing was set on August 25, 1994, at 2:00 p.m., at the PCAGC Office. On August

23, the petitioner filed his required answer. After evaluating the evidence on record,

the PCAGC issued its Resolution of September 23, 1994, finding a prima facie

evidence to support six (6) of the twelve (12) charges against petitioner. On

October 6, 1994, acting upon the recommendation of the PCAGC, then President

Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 152 dismissing petitioner from the service,

with forfeiture of retirement and all benefits under the law.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or Not AO No. 152 violated petitioner's Right to Security of Tenure.

2. Whether or Not Petitioner was denied due process of law.

3. Whether or Not the PCAGC is a validly Constituted government agency and

whether the petitioner can raise the issue of constitutionality belatedly in its motion

for reconsideration of the trial courts decision.

4. Whether or Not the ombudsman's resolution dismissing the charges against the

petitioner is still basis for the petitioner's dismissal with forfeiture of benefits as

ruled in AO No. 152

RULING:


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Petitioner maintains that as a career executive service officer, he can only

be removed for cause and under the Administrative Code of 1987, 6 loss of

confidence is not one of the legal causes or grounds for removal.

Consequently, his dismissal from office on the ground of loss confidence violated hisright to security of tenure, petitioner theorized. After a careful study, we are of the

irresistible conclusion that the Court of Appeals ruled correctly on the first three

issue. To be sure, petitioner was not denied the right to due process before the

PCAGC. Records show that the petitioner filed his answer and other pleadings with

respect to his alleged violation of internal revenue laws and regulations, and he

attended the hearings before the investigatory body. It is thus decisively clear that

his protestation of non-observance of due process is devoid of any factual or legal

basis.

Neither can it be said that there was a violation of what petitioner asserts as his

security of tenure. According to petitioner, as a Regional Director of Bureau of

Internal Revenue, he is CESO eligible entitled to security of tenure. However,

petitioner's claim of CESO eligibility is anemic of evidentiary support. It was

incumbent upon him to prove that he is a CESO eligible but unfortunately, he failed

to adduce sufficient evidence on the matter. His failure to do so is fatal. As regards

the issue of constitutionality of the PCAGC, it was only posed by petitioner in his

motion for reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. It was

certainly too late to raise for the first time at such late stage of the proceedings. As

to last issue, it is worthy to note that in the case under consideration, the

administrative action against the petitioner was taken prior to the institution of

the criminal case. The charges included in Administrative Order No. 152 were based

on the results of investigation conducted by the PCAGC and not on the criminal

charges before the Ombudsman.

In sum, the petition is dismiss on the ground that the issue posted by the petitioner

dont constitute a valid legal basis for overturning the finding and conclusion arrived

at by the Court of Appeals.

However, taking into account the antecedent facts and circumstances

aforementioned, the Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, has decided to

consider the dismissal of the charges against petitioner before the Ombudsman, the

succinct and unmistakable manifestation by the Commissioner of the Bureau ofInternal Revenue that his office is no longer interested in pursuing the case, and

the position taken by the Solicitor General, that there is no more basis for

Administrative Order No. 152, as effective and substantive supervening events that

cannot be overlooked.


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TITLE: LAUREL VS. GARCIA

CITATION: G.R. No. 92013. July 25, 1990

FACTS:

Petitioners seek to stop the Philippine Government to sell the Roppongi Property,

which is located in Japan. It is one of the properties given by the Japanese

Government as reparations for damage done by the latter to the former during the

war.

Petitioner argues that under Philippine Law, the subject property is property of

public dominion. As such, it is outside the commerce of men. Therefore, it cannotbe alienated.

Respondents aver that Japanese Law, and not Philippine Law, shall apply to the

case because the property is located in Japan. They posit that the principle of lex

situs applies.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the subject property cannot be alienated.2. Whether or not Philippine Law applies to the case at bar.

RULING:

1. The answer is in the affirmative.Under Philippine Law, there can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is

convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial. This, the

respondents have failed to do. As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is

outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated.

2. The answer is in the affirmative.We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of law

situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) There is a dispute

over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and

transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect

of the transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be


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determined; and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is

asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to

determine which law should apply.

In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.

The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no

question that the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of

the respondent officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the State. And

the validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is governed by

Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.

The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on the

relevance of the lex situs rule is misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the

alienability of the real properties procured through reparations nor the existence in

what body of the authority to sell them. In discussing who are capable of acquiring

the lots, the Secretary merely explains that it is the foreign law which should

determine who can acquire the properties so that the constitutional limitation on

acquisition of lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly

owned by Filipinos is inapplicable.


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TITLE: HACIENDA LUISITA VS. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM

COUNCIL

CITATION: G.R. No. 171101. November 22, 2011

FACTS:

On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to

DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the

resolutions of the PARC revoking HLIs Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing

the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.

The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the

Court noted that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which

the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the

SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the

original 6,296 qualified farm workers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they

want to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus

ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) toimmediately schedule

meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences

and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be

asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their

signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed

names.

The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the

Court decision.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is available in this case.

2. Whether or not Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?

3. Whether or not the Court order that DARs compulsory acquisition of Hacienda

Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously

held by Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75

hectares covered by HLIs SDP?


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4. Whether or not the date of the taking (for purposes of determining the just

compensation payable to HLI) November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLIs

SDP?

5. Whether or not the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded landsunder RA 6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were placed under

CARP coverage through the SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989), and thus the qualified

FWBs should now be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third

parties, whether they have fully paid for the lands or not?

6. THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that

the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI be

reconsidered?

RULING:

1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.

The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable

in this case since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not

limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by

the President or the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of

laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced

acts and consequences that must be respected. It is on this score that the operative

fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the

implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The majority

stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5,

2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only were they

allowed to retain the benefits and home lots they received under the stock

distribution scheme, they were also given the option to choose for themselves

whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.

2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.

The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the

constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the

earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case.

Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer

one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its

July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of


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RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave violation of the

Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.

3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DARs compulsory acquisition of Hacienda

Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by

HLIs SDP.

Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation

of the SDP, which only involves 4,915.75 of agricultural land and not 6,443 has.,

then the Court is constrained to rule only as regards the 4,915.75 of agricultural

land. Nonetheless, this should not prevent the DAR, under its mandate under the

agrarian reform law, from subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other

agricultural lands originally held by Tadeco that were allegedly not transferred to

HLI but were supposedly covered by RA 6657.

However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011

Decision appears too restrictive considering that there are roads, irrigation canals,

and other portions of the land that are considered commonly-owned by farm

workers, and these may necessarily result in the decrease of the area size that may

be awarded per FWB the Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves to give the

DAR leeway in adjusting the area that may be awarded per FWB in case the number

of actual qualified FWBs decreases. In order to ensure the proper distribution of the

agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB, and considering that

matters involving strictly the administrative implementation and enforcement of

agrarian reform laws are within the jurisdiction of the DAR,it is the latter which

shall determine the area with which each qualified FWB will be awarded.

On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-

hectare portion of Hacienda Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial

use and have been acquired by intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation

(RCBC) and Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the separate

80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be excluded from the

coverage of the assailed PARC resolution. The Court however ordered that the

unused balance of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and

of the 80.51-hectare land used for the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.

4. YES, the date of taking is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLIs

SDP.
http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=1027845194005507795http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=1027845194005507795http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=1027845194005507795


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For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of taking is

November 21, 1989 (the date when PARC approved HLIs SDP) since this is the

time that the FWBs were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in

Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform

coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP,

that is, on November 21, 1989. Such approval is akin to a notice of coverage

ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. On the contention of the minority

(Justice Sereno) that the date of the notice of coverage [after PARCs revocation of

the SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just compensation that

HLI is entitled to receive, the Court majority noted that none of the cases cited to

justify this position involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not

squarely apply to the instant case. The foregoing notwithstanding, it bearsstressing that the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any

means, final and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an original

action with the RTC acting as a special agrarian court to determine just

compensation. The court has the right to review with finality the determination in

the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.

5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA

6657 has NOT lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified FWBs should NOT yet be

allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties.

Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or

conveyed after 10 years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation

patent (EP) or certificate of land ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs

or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant case, the

10-year prohibitive period has not even started. Significantly, the reckoning point

is the issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the agricultural lands

under CARP coverage. Moreover, should the FWBs be immediately allowed the

option to sell or convey their interest in the subject lands, then all efforts at

agrarian reform would be rendered nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these

lands will just be transferred to persons not entitled to land distribution under

CARP.

6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an

option to remain as stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered.


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The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be

given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs

will never gain control over the subject lands]given the present proportion of

shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted that the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital

stock is just 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this 33.296% unanimously

vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be in the

hands of the FWBs. Control means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one

share of the common shares and other voting shares. Applying the formula to the

HLI stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute the majority is

295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares divided by 2 plus one [1]

HLI share). The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC

substantially fall short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquirecontrol over HLI.


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TITLE: DANTE LIBAN VS. GORDON

CITATION: G.R. No. 175352. January 18, 2011

FACTS:

Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of the

Quezon City Red Cross Chapter, filed with the Supreme Court what they styled

asPetition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the

Senateagainst respondent Gordon, who was elected Chairman of the Philippine

National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors during his incumbency as Senator.

Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of

Governors, respondent Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate pursuant to

Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that[n]o Senator . . . may

hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision,

agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled

corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his

seat.Petitioners cited the case of Camporedondo vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049,

decided August 6, 1999, which held that the PNRC is a GOCC, in supporting their

argument that respondent Gordon automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate

when he accepted and held the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of

Governors.

Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-5, held that

the office of the PNRC Chairman is NOT a government office or an office in a GOCC

for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The

PNRC Chairman is elected by the PNRC Board of Governors; he is not appointed by

the President or by any subordinate government official. Moreover, the PNRC is

NOT a GOCC because it is a privately-owned, privately-funded, and privately-run

charitable organization and because it is controlled by a Board of Governors four-

fifths of which are private sector individuals. Therefore, respondent Gordon did not

forfeit his legislative seat when he was elected as PNRC Chairman during hi

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