july 2000 alerts - federal aviation administration · july 2000 faa ac 43-16a 1 u.s. department of...

AviationMaintenanceAlerts

AAAAAC No.C No.C No.C No.C No. 43-16A 43-16A 43-16A 43-16A 43-16A

ALERT NO. 264JULY 2000

Improve Reliability-Interchange ServiceExperience

ALERTS

CONTENTSCONTENTSCONTENTSCONTENTSCONTENTS

AIRPLANESAIRPLANESAIRPLANESAIRPLANESAIRPLANES

AMERICAN CHAMPION ...................................................................................................... 1BEECH.................................................................................................................................... 1CESSNA .................................................................................................................................. 4LAKE ....................................................................................................................................... 7LOCKHEED ............................................................................................................................ 7PIPER ..................................................................................................................................... 8SHORTS ................................................................................................................................ 11

HELICOPTERSHELICOPTERSHELICOPTERSHELICOPTERSHELICOPTERS

BELL ..................................................................................................................................... 11EUROCOPTER..................................................................................................................... 11HILLER ................................................................................................................................ 12

AMAAMAAMAAMAAMATEUR,TEUR,TEUR,TEUR,TEUR, EXPERIMENT EXPERIMENT EXPERIMENT EXPERIMENT EXPERIMENTAL,AL,AL,AL,AL, AND SPOR AND SPOR AND SPOR AND SPOR AND SPORT AIRCRAFTT AIRCRAFTT AIRCRAFTT AIRCRAFTT AIRCRAFT

FISHER................................................................................................................................. 12RAND ROBINSON ............................................................................................................... 13TITAN ................................................................................................................................... 13VAN’S .................................................................................................................................... 13

AAAAACCESSORIESCCESSORIESCCESSORIESCCESSORIESCCESSORIES

CARBURETOR FLOATS .................................................................................................... 14

AIR NOAIR NOAIR NOAIR NOAIR NOTESTESTESTESTES

AGE ....................................................................................................................................... 15ELECTRONIC VERSION OF THEFAA FORM 8010-4, MALFUNCTION OR DEFECT REPORT ......................................... 15SERVICE DIFFICULTY PROGRAM DATA AVAILABLE ON THE INTERNET.......... 16ADDRESS CHANGES.......................................................................................................... 16SUBSCRIPTION FORM ...................................................................................................... 17IF YOU WANT TO CONTACT US ...................................................................................... 17AVIATION SERVICE DIFFICULTY REPORTS .............................................................. 18

July 2000 FAA AC 43-16A

1

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

WASHINGTON, DC 20590

AVIATION MAINTENANCE ALERTS

The Aviation Maintenance Alerts provide a common communication channel through which the aviation community caneconomically interchange service experience and thereby cooperate in the improvement of aeronautical product durability,reliability, and safety. This publication is prepared from information submitted by those who operate and maintain civilaeronautical products. The contents include items that have been reported as significant, but which have not been evaluated fullyby the time the material went to press. As additional facts such as cause and corrective action are identified, the data will be publishedin subsequent issues of the Alerts. This procedure gives Alerts’ readers prompt notice of conditions reported via Malfunction orDefect Reports. Your comments and suggestions for improvement are always welcome. Send to: FAA; ATTN: DesigneeStandardization Branch (AFS-640); P.O. Box 25082; Oklahoma City, OK 73125-5029.

AIRPLANESAIRPLANESAIRPLANESAIRPLANESAIRPLANES

AMERICAN CHAMPIONAMERICAN CHAMPIONAMERICAN CHAMPIONAMERICAN CHAMPIONAMERICAN CHAMPION

American Champion; Model 8KCAB;American Champion; Model 8KCAB;American Champion; Model 8KCAB;American Champion; Model 8KCAB;American Champion; Model 8KCAB;Decathlon; Aileron Control System Restriction;Decathlon; Aileron Control System Restriction;Decathlon; Aileron Control System Restriction;Decathlon; Aileron Control System Restriction;Decathlon; Aileron Control System Restriction;ATA 2710ATA 2710ATA 2710ATA 2710ATA 2710

While performing aerobatic maneuvers, thepilot placed the aircraft in a right roll. Whenhe attempted to stop the roll, the aileroncontrol jammed. After using all his force on theaileron control and full left rudder input, theaircraft entered a steep slip. After a fewseconds, he felt a “pop” and regained control ofthe aircraft. He made an immediate and safelanding.

While inspecting the aircraft, a technicianfound a pin-and-ring assembly, which heidentified as the emergency door release pin,loose on the bottom skin just below and aft ofthe right lower aileron bellcrank. He alsofound a freshly-made impression on theemergency door release pin. He speculated theloose pin found its way into the aileronbellcrank which caused the jam.

The submitter recommended that preflightinspections include a thorough search for anyloose items, especially the emergency doorrelease pin.

Part total time not reported.

BEECHBEECHBEECHBEECHBEECH

Beech; Model A36; Bonanza; AlternatorBeech; Model A36; Bonanza; AlternatorBeech; Model A36; Bonanza; AlternatorBeech; Model A36; Bonanza; AlternatorBeech; Model A36; Bonanza; AlternatorFailure; ATA 2421Failure; ATA 2421Failure; ATA 2421Failure; ATA 2421Failure; ATA 2421

The pilot reported the alternator failed duringflight. After landing, the pilot reported thisdefect to maintenance personnel.

During an investigation, the techniciandetermined the alternator (P/N 649304) hadinternal damage. He found the outboard brushwore into the copper shunt and cut a deepgroove in the slip ring. He also discovered thestator shorted “to ground.” The submitter didnot offer a cause for this defect.

Part time since overhaul-1,500 hours.

Beech; Model A36TC; Bonanza; ElectricalBeech; Model A36TC; Bonanza; ElectricalBeech; Model A36TC; Bonanza; ElectricalBeech; Model A36TC; Bonanza; ElectricalBeech; Model A36TC; Bonanza; ElectricalSystem Failure; ATA 2432System Failure; ATA 2432System Failure; ATA 2432System Failure; ATA 2432System Failure; ATA 2432

The aircraft experienced a complete electricalsystem failure while the pilot completed thebefore-takeoff checklist.

During an initial investigation, the techniciandiscovered the aircraft battery smoking;however, none of the circuit breakers, fuses, orcurrent limiters had opened (popped). Whenthe technician disconnected the battery cablesand removed the battery cell caps, he foundeach cell was almost completely dry. Duringfurther investigation, he discovered anelectrical short circuit between the positive

FAA AC 43-16A July 2000

2

battery cable and the throttle cable(P/N 36-380061-1). The throttle cable chafedagainst the battery cable and penetrated thecable insulation which caused a directelectrical short from the positive battery cable“to ground.” (Refer to the followingillustration.)

The restricted area of the engine compartmentmakes maintaining proper security andclearance of critical components difficult andvery important.


Beech; Model 58; Baron; Engine Mount Defect;Beech; Model 58; Baron; Engine Mount Defect;Beech; Model 58; Baron; Engine Mount Defect;Beech; Model 58; Baron; Engine Mount Defect;Beech; Model 58; Baron; Engine Mount Defect;ATA 7120ATA 7120ATA 7120ATA 7120ATA 7120

During a scheduled inspection, the inspectordiscovered a crack in the left engine mount.

The technician found the crack located in theupper crossover tube adjacent to a weld at theupper inboard engine attachment point. (Referto the following illustration.) AirworthinessDirective (AD) 91-15-20, datedSeptember 3, 1991, deals with this subject andreferences Beech Service Bulletin 2362,Revision 1. The requirements of AD 91-15-20were complied with on this aircraft 2,344operating hours prior to this finding. Therepair action taken at that time, in accordancewith paragraph (a)(2)(i) of AD 91-15-20 andBeech Kit 58-9007-1S, terminated the

repetitive inspection requirements. The repairkit gives instructions for repair orreplacement of the original engine mount tube(P/N 96-910010-61) with a new tube(P/N 96-910010-67).

While reviewing the maintenance records, thetechnician discovered an entry for “suddenengine stoppage” 1,161 operating hours priorto this finding. Maintenance records showedthe technician overhauled the engine andinspected the engine mount tube for damage.The submitter speculated the sudden enginestoppage caused metal fatigue in the mounttubes which culminated in the development ofthe reported crack.

Part total time-10,525 hours.

A 58-910038-9 REINFORCEMENT ISUSED TO REPAIR A CRACK IN EITHER

OF THESE TWO LOCATIONS

A 58-910038-11 REINFORCEMENT ISUSED TO REPAIR A CRACK IN EITHER

OF THESE TWO LOCATIONS

CLEAN THESE AREAS ANDINSPECT FOR CRACKS.

ENGINE MOUNT ASSEMBLY

FORWARD

Beech; Model 58; Baron; Autopilot Pitch ServoBeech; Model 58; Baron; Autopilot Pitch ServoBeech; Model 58; Baron; Autopilot Pitch ServoBeech; Model 58; Baron; Autopilot Pitch ServoBeech; Model 58; Baron; Autopilot Pitch ServoFailure; ATA 2215Failure; ATA 2215Failure; ATA 2215Failure; ATA 2215Failure; ATA 2215

The pilot reported the autopilot pitch axisfailed after flying through turbulence. Thepitch servo remained engaged; however, itwould not follow the flight director.


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The technician confirmed the discrepancy andremoved the pitch servo (Bendix-King,Model KS270A). When he rotated the unitfrom side to side, he noticed an unusual noise.Further investigation disclosed several looseinternal components inside the case. He didnot determine the cause of this defect. Hereturned the servo to the manufacturerunopened (in compliance with warrantyrequirements).

Part total time-149 hours.

Beech; Model 76; Duchess; Inadvertent ParkingBeech; Model 76; Duchess; Inadvertent ParkingBeech; Model 76; Duchess; Inadvertent ParkingBeech; Model 76; Duchess; Inadvertent ParkingBeech; Model 76; Duchess; Inadvertent ParkingBrake Activation; ATA 3242Brake Activation; ATA 3242Brake Activation; ATA 3242Brake Activation; ATA 3242Brake Activation; ATA 3242

The submitter discovered the parking brakemay be inadvertently activated by the pilot’sfoot.

During engine-out training, if the pilot fullydepresses the right rudder pedal, and thepilot’s foot is large or placed high on the pedal,it may interfere with the parking brakeactuating arm. This may lead tounintentionally setting the parking brakeduring flight. If this occurs and goesundetected, the main landing gear tires mayfail during landing which may result in loss ofdirectional control.

The submitter suggested the manufacturerrelocate the parking brake valve and actuatorarm to eliminate the possibility of inadvertentparking brake activation. All pilots should beaware of these circumstances and ensure theparking brake is fully released prior tolanding.

Part total time not applicable.

Beech; Model C90A; King Air; Engine ExhaustBeech; Model C90A; King Air; Engine ExhaustBeech; Model C90A; King Air; Engine ExhaustBeech; Model C90A; King Air; Engine ExhaustBeech; Model C90A; King Air; Engine ExhaustSystem Crack; ATA 7800System Crack; ATA 7800System Crack; ATA 7800System Crack; ATA 7800System Crack; ATA 7800

During an engine inspection, the techniciandiscovered a crack in the exhaust system.

The right engine inboard exhaust stack(P/N 109-950000-1) displayed a crack adjacentto a weld at the nacelle inlet deice tubeattachment point. The crack wasapproximately 1.5 inches long. The submitterstated this is the sixth occurrence of this

defect on the same aircraft. The techniciandiscussed the problem with the manufacturer,and a service bulletin release is pending.


Beech; Model C90; King Air; Cabin DoorBeech; Model C90; King Air; Cabin DoorBeech; Model C90; King Air; Cabin DoorBeech; Model C90; King Air; Cabin DoorBeech; Model C90; King Air; Cabin DoorDefect; ATA 5210Defect; ATA 5210Defect; ATA 5210Defect; ATA 5210Defect; ATA 5210

During a passenger-carrying flight, theflightcrew heard a loud bang followed by lossof cabin pressure. The flightcrew followed theappropriate emergency procedures and madea safe landing.

An inspection by a maintenance technicianrevealed the clevis pin (P/N 131323-2C15),used as the pivot for the upper cabin door(P/N 100-430075-601) latch hook, broke.Phase-3 inspection requirements include theinspection of this item. At the time of thisincident, the aircraft was 5 months away froma Phase-3 inspection.

The submitter suggested that all maintenanceentities give special attention to the cabindoor latching mechanism during allinspections.


Beech; Model 99A; Airliner; Main Landing GearBeech; Model 99A; Airliner; Main Landing GearBeech; Model 99A; Airliner; Main Landing GearBeech; Model 99A; Airliner; Main Landing GearBeech; Model 99A; Airliner; Main Landing GearCracks; ATA 3210Cracks; ATA 3210Cracks; ATA 3210Cracks; ATA 3210Cracks; ATA 3210

While inspecting the landing gear, thetechnician found several cracks in the maingear scissors assembly.

The cracks appeared in the right main gearscissors (P/N 50-810323-7) near the machinedsurfaces where the two sections connect. Thesubmitter determined that the cracks weredue to the torque knee attaching hardwarebeing loose. An inspection of the left main gearscissors assembly did not reveal any cracks.However, the inspection did reveal loosehardware and excessive wear on the bushing.This area deserves close attention duringinspections and maintenance.



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Beech; Model 99; Airliner; EngineBeech; Model 99; Airliner; EngineBeech; Model 99; Airliner; EngineBeech; Model 99; Airliner; EngineBeech; Model 99; Airliner; EngineCompartment Fuel Leak; ATA 7320Compartment Fuel Leak; ATA 7320Compartment Fuel Leak; ATA 7320Compartment Fuel Leak; ATA 7320Compartment Fuel Leak; ATA 7320

During a postflight inspection, the inspectornoticed fuel leaking from the left lower enginecowling.

After opening the engine cowling, thetechnician discovered the fuel originated froma high-pressure stainless steel fuel line thatruns from the fuel control unit to the startflow control unit.

The fuel line had a small crack adjacent to aferrule at one end of the tubing. The submitterspeculated this defect may be the result ofimproperly bending (hand forming) the line tofacilitate installation or a defect caused duringmanufacture and assembly of the line.


Beech; Model 2000; Starship; Defective EngineBeech; Model 2000; Starship; Defective EngineBeech; Model 2000; Starship; Defective EngineBeech; Model 2000; Starship; Defective EngineBeech; Model 2000; Starship; Defective EngineFire Extinguisher Security; ATA 2620Fire Extinguisher Security; ATA 2620Fire Extinguisher Security; ATA 2620Fire Extinguisher Security; ATA 2620Fire Extinguisher Security; ATA 2620

During a scheduled inspection, the inspectorfound the left and right engine nacelle fireextinguisher bottle support assemblies(mounting brackets) (P/N 122-570002-5)cracked.

The submitter reported finding this defect onseveral like aircraft. According to thesubmitter, the replacement mountingbrackets, supplied by the manufacturer, failafter a short time in service. The submittingrepair station uses FAA, DesignatedEngineering Representative (DER) approvalfor manufacturing a heavier replacementmounting bracket to correct this situation. Hesuggested that all maintenance personnelcheck the mounting brackets for cracks atevery opportunity.


CESSNACESSNACESSNACESSNACESSNA

Cessna; Models as Indicated Below; Seat RailCessna; Models as Indicated Below; Seat RailCessna; Models as Indicated Below; Seat RailCessna; Models as Indicated Below; Seat RailCessna; Models as Indicated Below; Seat RailReplacement; ATA 2510Replacement; ATA 2510Replacement; ATA 2510Replacement; ATA 2510Replacement; ATA 2510

The following article is printed as it wasreceived from the FAA, Aircraft CertificationOffice, (ACE-118W) in Wichita, Kansas.

Aircraft Affected:Cessna Models 150, 152, 170, 172, 172RG,175, 177, 177RG, 180, 182, R185, T182, 185,188, 190, 195, 206, P206, 210, P210, 210-5,T303, 336, and 337 series airplanes.Specific serial number applicability islisted in Airworthiness Directive (AD)87-20-03 Revision 2.

Introduction:This special alert is to advise all ownersand operators of the necessity to install allrequired fasteners when seat rails arebeing replaced.

Background:There are various seat rails, identified bypart number, which are required to beinstalled in airplanes affected byAD 87-20-03, Revision 2. Many of theserails are manufactured with pilot holesonly and do not contain all holes requiredfor installation of the seat rail in theairplane. It is, therefore, necessary for theinstaller to assure that there are sufficientholes to accommodate all requiredfasteners.

Recommendations:a. When replacing a seat rail, note thenumber and location of all fastener holeson the seat rail being removed.

b. Match these holes against the holes inthe replacement seat rail. If thereplacement seat rail does not have all ofthe same holes at the same locations, theyshould be drilled.

c. Since it is difficult to install many of therivets required to attach the seat rail, it ispermissible to substitute Number 6


5

structural screws, such as MS35206-XXX orAN520, with lock nuts, provided the holesare ream fit and spot-faced.

For Further Information Contact:Federal Aviation Administration, WichitaAircraft Certification Office,Eual M. Conditt, Senior Engineer,Airframe and Services, 1801 Airport Road,Room 100, Wichita, Kansas, 67209,telephone: (316) 946-4128,fax: (316) 946-4407.

Cessna; Model 172L; Skyhawk; Defective FuelCessna; Model 172L; Skyhawk; Defective FuelCessna; Model 172L; Skyhawk; Defective FuelCessna; Model 172L; Skyhawk; Defective FuelCessna; Model 172L; Skyhawk; Defective FuelSelector Valve; ATA 2823Selector Valve; ATA 2823Selector Valve; ATA 2823Selector Valve; ATA 2823Selector Valve; ATA 2823

Maintenance personnel installed a new fuelselector valve (P/N 0513123-200) in accordancewith the manufacturer’s technical data andconducted extensive leak and operationaltests.

The tests included fuel flow to the carburetorat each of the three selector valve positions.The technician conducted the test with8 gallons of fuel in each of the fuel tanks. Healso conducted an engine operational test for5 minutes in each of the three selector valvepositions. Since all tests proved satisfactory,he approved the aircraft for return to service.

After approximately 2.5 hours of flight time,the pilot experienced engine failure caused byfuel starvation. He was able to land safely at anearby airport.

A technician investigated and discovered theselector valve was not allowing fuel flow fromthe left tank with the valve in the “both”positions. Fuel flow was normal in all otherselector valve positions.

The fuel starvation incident occurred whenthe right fuel tank was empty with the fuelselector being in the “both” positions. The fuelremaining in the left tank could not flow pastthe selector valve.

All maintenance personnel should be aware ofthese circumstances and conduct tests whichensure fuel flow from both tanks when theselector valve is in the “both” positions.

Part total time-2.5 hours.

Cessna; Model R182; Skylane RG; DefectiveCessna; Model R182; Skylane RG; DefectiveCessna; Model R182; Skylane RG; DefectiveCessna; Model R182; Skylane RG; DefectiveCessna; Model R182; Skylane RG; DefectiveRudder Pedal Security; ATA 2720Rudder Pedal Security; ATA 2720Rudder Pedal Security; ATA 2720Rudder Pedal Security; ATA 2720Rudder Pedal Security; ATA 2720

A technician submitted reports on fivedifferent aircraft with identical defects. All ofthese aircraft had approximately 10,000 hoursoperating time. The FAA Service DifficultyProgram data base contains one additionalreport that is similar.

During an annual inspection, he discoveredcracks in the inboard rudder pedal bar bearingblock brackets. In order to inspect the area, hemoved the rudder pedals and noticed thebearing blocks flexed. After he cleaned thearea, he discovered the cracks on the left andright bracket assemblies (P/N’s 0713628-5and –6). (Refer to the following illustration.)The submitter suggested that all maintenancepersonnel clean the area well and conduct adiligent inspection of the brackets duringscheduled inspections.

Part total time as indicated above.

BRACKET(TYPICAL, BOTH SIDES)


6

Cessna; Model 182N; Skylane; DefectiveCessna; Model 182N; Skylane; DefectiveCessna; Model 182N; Skylane; DefectiveCessna; Model 182N; Skylane; DefectiveCessna; Model 182N; Skylane; DefectiveEngine Mount Installation; ATA 7120Engine Mount Installation; ATA 7120Engine Mount Installation; ATA 7120Engine Mount Installation; ATA 7120Engine Mount Installation; ATA 7120

While conducting an annual inspection, thetechnician discovered that all four enginemount attachments were installed improperly.

The engine mount safety locks (P/N 0851559)were missing from all of the attachmentpoints. Evidently, the previous installer usedan extra washer on each mount to take up theextra bolt length and discarded the locks.Consulting the appropriate technical datawould have eliminated this defect and thehazardous condition it created.


Cessna; Model 182S; Skylane; Autopilot RollCessna; Model 182S; Skylane; Autopilot RollCessna; Model 182S; Skylane; Autopilot RollCessna; Model 182S; Skylane; Autopilot RollCessna; Model 182S; Skylane; Autopilot RollServo Defect; ATA 2215Servo Defect; ATA 2215Servo Defect; ATA 2215Servo Defect; ATA 2215Servo Defect; ATA 2215

While complying with Bendix/King ServiceBulletin (SB) KS271C-5, the maintenancetechnician discovered problems with theautopilot roll servo assembly unrelated to theSB.

The roll servo idler gear attachment nutbacked off the threads. The output gearbearings were contaminated with dirt andmetal shavings from an unknown origin. Thesubmitter stated, “Failure could cause theservo to remain engaged when the autopilot isdisengaged.” All maintenance personnelshould check for these conditions whencomplying with SB KS271C-5.


Cessna; Model 310C; In-Flight Engine Failure;Cessna; Model 310C; In-Flight Engine Failure;Cessna; Model 310C; In-Flight Engine Failure;Cessna; Model 310C; In-Flight Engine Failure;Cessna; Model 310C; In-Flight Engine Failure;ATA 7300ATA 7300ATA 7300ATA 7300ATA 7300

During a critical stage of flight, the aircraftexperienced right engine failure. All efforts torestart the right engine failed and anoff-airport accident occurred.

During an investigation, the inspectordiscovered the right engine mixture controlcable conduit (P/N 0850250-189) broken. Dueto the broken conduit, the mixture controlcable flexed when the pilot exerted pressureon it instead of moving the mixture control on

the fuel control unit. When the conduit failed,the engine mixture control went to “idlecut-off,” and the pilot could not move it fromthat position.

The available evidence indicated the conduitfailed due to metal fatigue caused by lack ofadequate support.


Cessna; Model 337G; Skymaster; AirframeCessna; Model 337G; Skymaster; AirframeCessna; Model 337G; Skymaster; AirframeCessna; Model 337G; Skymaster; AirframeCessna; Model 337G; Skymaster; AirframeCorrosion; ATA 5330Corrosion; ATA 5330Corrosion; ATA 5330Corrosion; ATA 5330Corrosion; ATA 5330

During a 100-hour inspection, the techniciandiscovered severe corrosion on the fuselageskin.

The technician removed a piece of loosesoundproofing or dampening material frominside the fuselage skin and found a large areaof severe corrosion just below the left aft sidewindow. He speculated the damage occurreddue to window leakage, and the accumulationand retention of moisture, as well as othercontaminates. The dampening material heldthese materials in contact with the skin.

Since this material is used extensively in thecabin area, technicians should be suspect ofany anomaly found during inspections ormaintenance.


Cessna; Model 340A; Electrical Power Failure;Cessna; Model 340A; Electrical Power Failure;Cessna; Model 340A; Electrical Power Failure;Cessna; Model 340A; Electrical Power Failure;Cessna; Model 340A; Electrical Power Failure;ATA 2400ATA 2400ATA 2400ATA 2400ATA 2400

During flight, the pilot experienced avionicselectrical power system failure. The flight wasbeing conducted under visual flight rules(VFR), and the pilot landed the aircraft safely.

A technician investigated the problem andfound the avionics bus bar, located behind thecircuit breaker panel, had worn througha chafe strip and contacted the aircraftstructure. The avionics bus bar was .25-inchlonger than the adjacent bus bars whichcaused it to bear hard on the chafe stripinstalled between it and the structure. As acorrective action, the technician trimmed the


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bus bar to provide additional clearance andinstalled a new chafe strip.

Technicians should exercise extreme cautionwhen installing electrical system componentsto ensure the components are properlyinsulated and adequate clearance ismaintained.


Cessna; Model 421C; Golden Eagle; Split Flap;Cessna; Model 421C; Golden Eagle; Split Flap;Cessna; Model 421C; Golden Eagle; Split Flap;Cessna; Model 421C; Golden Eagle; Split Flap;Cessna; Model 421C; Golden Eagle; Split Flap;ATA 2750ATA 2750ATA 2750ATA 2750ATA 2750

During a landing approach, the pilot selectedthe wing flaps to the “full down” position, andthe aircraft entered a steep right bank. Thepilot regained and maintained control by usingfull left aileron deflection and engine power,and landed the aircraft safely.

During an investigation, the techniciandiscovered the right flap down cable(P/N 5000008-62) frayed and broken. The cablefailed approximately 2.5 inches inboard of thelocation where the flap preselect system cableclamp was installed. When the cable broke, theright flap went to the “retracted” position andpulled the preselect system and flap indicatorto the full “up” position rendering the flapselector inoperative.

The submitter suggested the manufacturermake design changes to the wing flap systemto prevent this type of occurrence. Althoughaccess to the location of the cable failure isdifficult, using all means and effort necessaryfor a diligent inspection is recommended.


Cessna; Model 550; Citation; Elevator TrimCessna; Model 550; Citation; Elevator TrimCessna; Model 550; Citation; Elevator TrimCessna; Model 550; Citation; Elevator TrimCessna; Model 550; Citation; Elevator TrimFailure; ATA 2731Failure; ATA 2731Failure; ATA 2731Failure; ATA 2731Failure; ATA 2731

The pilot reported that during a landingapproach he noticed the elevator electric trimwas unresponsive. The manual elevator trimwheel turned freely with no response, and theelevator control was heavy and hard to move.The crew made a safe landing and turned theaircraft over to maintenance personnel.

During an investigation, the technician founda control cable lying loose in the bottom of theaircraft. He also found the elevator trimsystem cable forward attachment chain masterlink (P/N C419175) dislodged and in thebottom of the aircraft along with the attachinghardware. The submitter did not offer a causefor the chain master link failure.


LAKELAKELAKELAKELAKE

Lake; Model LA-250; Elevator Horn Cracks;Lake; Model LA-250; Elevator Horn Cracks;Lake; Model LA-250; Elevator Horn Cracks;Lake; Model LA-250; Elevator Horn Cracks;Lake; Model LA-250; Elevator Horn Cracks;ATA 2730ATA 2730ATA 2730ATA 2730ATA 2730

While completing an annual inspection, thetechnician found the elevator horn attachmentbrackets broken.

The breaks appeared in the upper ears of bothattachment brackets (P/N 3-2255-29). Thesubmitter believes metal fatigue caused thedefects. He replaced the elevator hornattachment brackets. He suggested closelychecking this area during scheduledinspections and maintenance.


LOCKHEEDLOCKHEEDLOCKHEEDLOCKHEEDLOCKHEED

Lockheed; Model 1329-25; Jetstar II; VerticalLockheed; Model 1329-25; Jetstar II; VerticalLockheed; Model 1329-25; Jetstar II; VerticalLockheed; Model 1329-25; Jetstar II; VerticalLockheed; Model 1329-25; Jetstar II; VerticalStabilizer Structural Defects; ATA 5530Stabilizer Structural Defects; ATA 5530Stabilizer Structural Defects; ATA 5530Stabilizer Structural Defects; ATA 5530Stabilizer Structural Defects; ATA 5530

During a scheduled inspection, the technicianfound cracks in the vertical stabilizer frontspar cap doublers.

The cracks appeared on both the left and rightouter spar cap doublers. (Refer to thefollowing illustration.) The submitter reportedthis is the fourth instance of this defect hefound in the past month. He recommendedusing an eddy-current inspection technique toinspect the vertical stabilizer front spar capdoublers during each applicable scheduledinspection. He also recommended this areaimmediately receive a one-time inspection onall Models 1329-23 and 1329-25 series aircraft.


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The FAA published two AirworthinessDirectives (AD) 84-23-01 and 91-11-13 whichdeal with a similar subject on the rear spar.The submitter suggested that maintenancepersonnel inspect the front spar cap at thesame time they comply with these ADs. Themanufacturer does not stock replacementdoublers; however, authorized repairprocedures, on a case-by-case basis, includefabrication of new doublers.


CRACKS WERE LOCATED ON BOTHSPAR CAP OUTER DOUBLERS IN THEMACHINED CUT OUT AREA.

PIPERPIPERPIPERPIPERPIPER

Piper; Model PA 23-250; Aztec; Main LandingPiper; Model PA 23-250; Aztec; Main LandingPiper; Model PA 23-250; Aztec; Main LandingPiper; Model PA 23-250; Aztec; Main LandingPiper; Model PA 23-250; Aztec; Main LandingGear Retraction Defect; ATA 3230Gear Retraction Defect; ATA 3230Gear Retraction Defect; ATA 3230Gear Retraction Defect; ATA 3230Gear Retraction Defect; ATA 3230

While conducting a landing gear retractiontest during an annual inspection, thetechnician discovered the left main landinggear would not fully retract into the wheelwell.

A gap of approximately 1.5 inches remainedbetween the gear doors at the completion ofthe retraction cycle. The technicianinvestigated and found a section of the

actuating cylinder (P/N 35030-02) rod brokenout of the threaded end and the end capseverely damaged.

The submitter speculated an improperadjustment of the cylinder during previousmaintenance caused the end cap damage. Hesuggested close attention to detail wouldprevent this type of defect.


Piper; Model PA 28-140; Cherokee; MainPiper; Model PA 28-140; Cherokee; MainPiper; Model PA 28-140; Cherokee; MainPiper; Model PA 28-140; Cherokee; MainPiper; Model PA 28-140; Cherokee; MainLanding Gear Strut Cracks; ATA 3213Landing Gear Strut Cracks; ATA 3213Landing Gear Strut Cracks; ATA 3213Landing Gear Strut Cracks; ATA 3213Landing Gear Strut Cracks; ATA 3213

After a flight, the student pilot reportedexperiencing shimmy and vibration during thelanding rollout.

A maintenance technician investigated andfound the left main gear strut (P/N 65319-04)attachment ears for the upper torque linkbroken. (Refer to the following illustration.)The broken ears left the wheel assembly freeto rotate, restrained only by the brake line.

The submitter speculated side loads imposedon the gear during landing might have causedthis damage. Also, age, metal fatigue, andimproper landing techniques may becontributing factors.

The FAA Service Difficulty Program data basecontains 11 additional reports concerningsimilar failures. Piper Service Letter 760,dated November 12, 1975, deals with thissubject and gives inspection procedures.Although the “dash number” following thestrut part number varies, the basic partdesign, with the upper torque link attachmentears, is the same for models PA28-140, -151,-161, -181, and PA32 aircraft. Most of thesedefects occurred on aircraft with operatingtime equal to, or greater than, this aircraft.

All maintenance personnel should be aware ofthese findings and exercise due diligenceduring maintenance and inspections.



9

CRACK

Piper; Model PA 28-181; Archer; DefectivePiper; Model PA 28-181; Archer; DefectivePiper; Model PA 28-181; Archer; DefectivePiper; Model PA 28-181; Archer; DefectivePiper; Model PA 28-181; Archer; DefectiveStarter Armature; ATA 8011Starter Armature; ATA 8011Starter Armature; ATA 8011Starter Armature; ATA 8011Starter Armature; ATA 8011

This submitter reported finding sixElectrosystem starter armatures(P/N MHB2399S) with the drive end splineworn or stripped away.

The metal debris produced by the splineremoval, contaminates the gear case causingdamage to the roller bearings. The submitterreported the drive gear did not displaydamage, and the shear pin remained intact inall cases.

It is the submitter’s opinion that the armaturespline area metal is too soft for thisapplication. He speculated the armature driveend spline area may not be properlyheat-treated or the shear pin may be too hard.


Piper; Model PA 28R-201; Arrow; Main LandingPiper; Model PA 28R-201; Arrow; Main LandingPiper; Model PA 28R-201; Arrow; Main LandingPiper; Model PA 28R-201; Arrow; Main LandingPiper; Model PA 28R-201; Arrow; Main LandingGear Crack; ATA 3213Gear Crack; ATA 3213Gear Crack; ATA 3213Gear Crack; ATA 3213Gear Crack; ATA 3213

During a scheduled inspection, the techniciandiscovered a hydraulic leak in the left mainlanding gear area.

After further investigation, he discovered acrack in the landing gear trunnion(P/N 67926-16) at the point where the webjoins the trunnion tube. This is a typical areafor crack development, especially on high-timecomponents used in a training environment.


Piper; Model PA 28R-201; Arrow; DefectivePiper; Model PA 28R-201; Arrow; DefectivePiper; Model PA 28R-201; Arrow; DefectivePiper; Model PA 28R-201; Arrow; DefectivePiper; Model PA 28R-201; Arrow; DefectiveWing Attachment Bolts; ATA 5710Wing Attachment Bolts; ATA 5710Wing Attachment Bolts; ATA 5710Wing Attachment Bolts; ATA 5710Wing Attachment Bolts; ATA 5710

As part of a wing repair process, the submitterremoved the wing attachment bolts.

All the bolts (P/N AN176-X) displayed severecorrosion and required replacement. Thesubmitter stated the bolts appeared to be ingood condition. However, he discovered thedamage when he removed the bolts.

This was the third occurrence of this defectfound by the submitter in the past 6 months.He cautioned all maintenance personnel togive the wing attachment bolts specialattention at every opportunity. This defectpresents the possibility of in-flight wingseparation and demands close scrutiny.


Piper; Model PA 31-325; Navajo; Cabin FuelPiper; Model PA 31-325; Navajo; Cabin FuelPiper; Model PA 31-325; Navajo; Cabin FuelPiper; Model PA 31-325; Navajo; Cabin FuelPiper; Model PA 31-325; Navajo; Cabin FuelOdor; ATA 2820Odor; ATA 2820Odor; ATA 2820Odor; ATA 2820Odor; ATA 2820

After a flight, the pilot reported a strong fuelodor in the aircraft cabin.

A maintenance technician investigated andfound a cracked reducer (P/N 484-297) on thefuel cross-feed line drain. Fuel seeped throughthe crack, and he found a puddle beneath theassembly.

The submitter did not give a cause for thisdefect. Fuel fumes in an aircraft cabin, orother enclosed areas, create a very hazardouscondition and can lead to explosion and/or fire.Maintenance personnel should be ever vigilantfor fuel leakage and eliminate the leak sourceas quickly as possible.



10

Piper; Model PA 31-350; Chieftain; NumerousPiper; Model PA 31-350; Chieftain; NumerousPiper; Model PA 31-350; Chieftain; NumerousPiper; Model PA 31-350; Chieftain; NumerousPiper; Model PA 31-350; Chieftain; NumerousMagneto Problems; ATA 7414Magneto Problems; ATA 7414Magneto Problems; ATA 7414Magneto Problems; ATA 7414Magneto Problems; ATA 7414

This aircraft is equipped with TextronLycoming Model TIO-540 and LTIO-540engines using the Teledyne ContinentalMotors (TCM)/Bendix dual magneto system.

According to the aircraft maintenance records,this aircraft experienced numerous andrecurring problems which included “unusualdrop-off, completely dead magneto, hardengine starting, and the engine failing tostart.” The records attributed all these defectsto faulty capacitors. The technician contactedTCM concerning the repetitive nature of theseproblems. TCM representatives informed himthat TCM Service Bulletin (SB) 662A listedcapacitors coded prior to 9946 which shouldhave been removed from service and replacedwith newer code-number capacitors. Aftercomplying with SB 662A, engine operation hasbeen satisfactory for this operator.


Piper; Model PA 31-350; Chieftain; EnginePiper; Model PA 31-350; Chieftain; EnginePiper; Model PA 31-350; Chieftain; EnginePiper; Model PA 31-350; Chieftain; EnginePiper; Model PA 31-350; Chieftain; EngineStarter Failure; ATA 8011Starter Failure; ATA 8011Starter Failure; ATA 8011Starter Failure; ATA 8011Starter Failure; ATA 8011

The pilot reported that efforts to start theright engine failed.

A maintenance technician investigated andfound both of the field brush leads broken. Theavailable evidence indicated one of the brushleads separated due to electrical arcing. Thisplaced the entire starting load on the otherbrush lead, causing it to fail at the leadattachment point. Otherwise, the starterappeared to be in good condition, and therewas very little brush wear. The submitterspeculated “a poorly-constructed brush/leadassembly” caused arcing and resulted in theoriginal failure.


Piper; Model PA 32R-301; Saratoga; MainPiper; Model PA 32R-301; Saratoga; MainPiper; Model PA 32R-301; Saratoga; MainPiper; Model PA 32R-301; Saratoga; MainPiper; Model PA 32R-301; Saratoga; MainLanding Gear Cracks; ATA 3213Landing Gear Cracks; ATA 3213Landing Gear Cracks; ATA 3213Landing Gear Cracks; ATA 3213Landing Gear Cracks; ATA 3213

During an annual inspection, a technicianfound cracks in both of the main landing gearstrut assemblies.

Using a magnifying glass, the techniciandiscovered cracks adjacent to the two top axlebolt holes on both the left and right strutassemblies. (Refer to the followingillustration.) These six holes attach the wheelbrake anchor plate to the strut. The metal isthinnest at this location. The aircraftmaintenance records did not include anydamage history or hard landings. Thesubmitter stated this defect resulted from ageand metal fatigue.

The FAA Service Difficulty Reporting programdata base contains five other similar defects.


CRACKS


11

Piper; Model PA 39; Twin Comanche; WingPiper; Model PA 39; Twin Comanche; WingPiper; Model PA 39; Twin Comanche; WingPiper; Model PA 39; Twin Comanche; WingPiper; Model PA 39; Twin Comanche; WingStructural Damage; ATA 5711Structural Damage; ATA 5711Structural Damage; ATA 5711Structural Damage; ATA 5711Structural Damage; ATA 5711

The pilot reported experiencing an unusualvibration during flight. He also noticed theright wing tip tank trailing edge “fluttering”approximately 1 inch. The pilot reduced powerand made a safe, precautionary landing.

During an inspection, a technician discovereda crack extending through the lower spar capand approximately 1 inch up into the face ofthe aft wing spar at wing station (WS) 132.Several solid rivets, originally used to attachthe upper wing skin to the rib and aft spar atWS 132, had been replaced with “cherry type”rivets during previous maintenance.

The technician reviewed the aircraftmaintenance records which stated the aircraftexperienced a hard landing 2 years prior. Atthat time, a technician made repairs whichincluded replacing the right main landing gearand repair of the aft tail bulkhead. Hespeculated the previous technicians repairedthe right wing area at the same time but failedto record it in the maintenance records.

The submitter obtained DesignatedEngineering Representative (DER) approveddata to repair the damage. He suggested thattransferring or using fuel from the tip tanksprior to landing may help prevent unnecessarystress on the wing structure during landing.

Aircraft total time-3,376 hours.

SHORTSSHORTSSHORTSSHORTSSHORTS

Shorts; Model SD3-30; Burning Odor in theShorts; Model SD3-30; Burning Odor in theShorts; Model SD3-30; Burning Odor in theShorts; Model SD3-30; Burning Odor in theShorts; Model SD3-30; Burning Odor in theCockpit; ATA 3060Cockpit; ATA 3060Cockpit; ATA 3060Cockpit; ATA 3060Cockpit; ATA 3060

The flightcrew noticed a burning odor in thecockpit during flight. The pilot followedemergency procedures and made a safe,precautionary landing.

A technician discovered the right propellerheat deicer system timer (P/N 3E1150-10) andthe associated relay displayed heat damaged.He speculated the heat damage caused theburning odor in the cockpit. He found the

propeller deicer system circuit breaker open.After changing these components andresetting the circuit breaker, the systemoperated properly during an operational test.

The submitter did not offer the cause of thisdefect or a recommendation to prevent areocurrence.


HELICOPTERSHELICOPTERSHELICOPTERSHELICOPTERSHELICOPTERS

BELLBELLBELLBELLBELL

Bell; Model 206-B3; Jet Ranger; Tail BoomBell; Model 206-B3; Jet Ranger; Tail BoomBell; Model 206-B3; Jet Ranger; Tail BoomBell; Model 206-B3; Jet Ranger; Tail BoomBell; Model 206-B3; Jet Ranger; Tail BoomBulkhead Crack; ATA 5500Bulkhead Crack; ATA 5500Bulkhead Crack; ATA 5500Bulkhead Crack; ATA 5500Bulkhead Crack; ATA 5500

During a routine inspection, the techniciandiscovered a crack in the tail boom structure.

The hairline crack appeared in the tail boomaft bulkhead (P/N 206-030-4461F) skin. The tailrotor gearbox is mounted at this location andtransmits vibrations to the structure. Thesubmitter believes excessive vibration causedthis defect. He suggested that techniciansbalance and track the tail rotor assembly atmore frequent intervals. He also suggestedinspecting the bulkhead area and the tail rotorgearbox casting for damage at everyopportunity.

The FAA Service Difficulty Reporting programdata base contains four additional similarreports.


EUROCOPTEREUROCOPTEREUROCOPTEREUROCOPTEREUROCOPTER

Eurocopter; Model EC-120B; Colibri; In-FlightEurocopter; Model EC-120B; Colibri; In-FlightEurocopter; Model EC-120B; Colibri; In-FlightEurocopter; Model EC-120B; Colibri; In-FlightEurocopter; Model EC-120B; Colibri; In-FlightDoor Separation; ATA 5210Door Separation; ATA 5210Door Separation; ATA 5210Door Separation; ATA 5210Door Separation; ATA 5210

Prior to a photography flight, the pilot stowedthe sliding right door and locked it in the openposition.

During the flight, the door separated from theaircraft. The airstream pulled the door out of


12

the lower forward rail attachment first, andthen the upper forward attachment. For ashort time, the door remained attached to theupper and lower aft hinge points and impactedthe airframe structure aft of the door severaltimes before separating from the aircraft.

The submitter recommended close tolerancebe maintained between the door frame railsand the rollers.


Eurocopter; Model AS350BA; Ecureuil; TailEurocopter; Model AS350BA; Ecureuil; TailEurocopter; Model AS350BA; Ecureuil; TailEurocopter; Model AS350BA; Ecureuil; TailEurocopter; Model AS350BA; Ecureuil; TailRotor Spider Defect; ATA 6500Rotor Spider Defect; ATA 6500Rotor Spider Defect; ATA 6500Rotor Spider Defect; ATA 6500Rotor Spider Defect; ATA 6500

During a maintenance inspection after the lastflight of the day, the technician discovered acastellated nut on the tail rotor spiderassembly (P/N 350A33.2004.06) lost torque.

The castellated nut secures the rotating andnonrotating assemblies of the spider assembly.The technician removed and replaced theentire spider assembly. He could notdetermine a cause for the nut losing torque.He suggested the manufacturer increase thetorque value for installation of the castellatednut.


Eurocopter; Model AS350B2; Ecureuil;Eurocopter; Model AS350B2; Ecureuil;Eurocopter; Model AS350B2; Ecureuil;Eurocopter; Model AS350B2; Ecureuil;Eurocopter; Model AS350B2; Ecureuil;Hydraulic System Failure; ATA 2913Hydraulic System Failure; ATA 2913Hydraulic System Failure; ATA 2913Hydraulic System Failure; ATA 2913Hydraulic System Failure; ATA 2913

During flight, the pilot experienced a total lossof hydraulic system pressure and made a safeprecautionary landing.

A technician discovered the female splines atthe hydraulic drive coupling and the malesplines at the hydraulic pump failed due topremature wear.

The submitter believes the spline engagementfor this application is insufficient for the drivedemand. The appropriate technical datarequires inspection of this assembly at500-hour intervals or 18-month intervals. Hesuggested reducing the inspection interval

100-hours. He also suggested checking thearea for the accumulation of wear andcollecting the data for trend analysis tracking.


HILLERHILLERHILLERHILLERHILLER

Hiller; Model UH-12E; Main Rotor Blade SkinHiller; Model UH-12E; Main Rotor Blade SkinHiller; Model UH-12E; Main Rotor Blade SkinHiller; Model UH-12E; Main Rotor Blade SkinHiller; Model UH-12E; Main Rotor Blade SkinSecurity; ATA 6210Security; ATA 6210Security; ATA 6210Security; ATA 6210Security; ATA 6210

During a scheduled inspection, the techniciandiscovered that a main rotor blade(P/N 53200-03) skin was debonded. Afterremoving the blade, he returned it to therepair shop.

During an initial inspection, the inspectordetermined compliance with the bondingprocess was not adequately accomplished. Itappeared the cleaning and metal preparationwas not sufficient to attain a secure bond.

The submitter recommended all operatorsreview their bonding procedures and ensurethe metal preparation process is adequate andin accordance with the appropriate technicaldata.


AMAAMAAMAAMAAMATEUR,TEUR,TEUR,TEUR,TEUR, EXPERIMENT EXPERIMENT EXPERIMENT EXPERIMENT EXPERIMENTAL,AL,AL,AL,AL, AND AND AND AND ANDSPORT AIRCRAFTSPORT AIRCRAFTSPORT AIRCRAFTSPORT AIRCRAFTSPORT AIRCRAFT

FISHERFISHERFISHERFISHERFISHER

Fisher; Celebrity; Propeller Crack; ATA 6114Fisher; Celebrity; Propeller Crack; ATA 6114Fisher; Celebrity; Propeller Crack; ATA 6114Fisher; Celebrity; Propeller Crack; ATA 6114Fisher; Celebrity; Propeller Crack; ATA 6114

This aircraft is equipped with a TeledyneContinental, Model C-90 engine and aMcCauley, Model 1B90 propeller.

During an annual condition inspection, thetechnician noticed a suspect area. Using adye-penetrant inspection procedure, he found


13

a crack in the propeller hub. The crackradiated away from the center pilot holetoward one of the mounting bolt holes.

The submitter gave no cause or cure for thisdefect.


RAND ROBINSONRAND ROBINSONRAND ROBINSONRAND ROBINSONRAND ROBINSON

Rand Robinson; Model KR-2; Engine FailureRand Robinson; Model KR-2; Engine FailureRand Robinson; Model KR-2; Engine FailureRand Robinson; Model KR-2; Engine FailureRand Robinson; Model KR-2; Engine FailureAccident; ATA 7320Accident; ATA 7320Accident; ATA 7320Accident; ATA 7320Accident; ATA 7320

This aircraft is equipped with a Volkswagonengine. Fuel starvation caused an enginefailure which resulted in an aircraft accident.

The accident investigator traced the fuelstarvation and engine malfunction to the mainmixture control adjustment needle lockingdevice. The broken locking device allowed themixture control to migrate to the rich positionwhich caused increased fuel consumption,poor engine operation, and eventually enginefailure.

The submitter recommended modifying thelocknut by adding an additional safety,replacing the (POSA carburetor) mixturecontrol with a more reliable component.


TITANTITANTITANTITANTITAN

Titan; Tornado II; Engine Failure; ATA 2840Titan; Tornado II; Engine Failure; ATA 2840Titan; Tornado II; Engine Failure; ATA 2840Titan; Tornado II; Engine Failure; ATA 2840Titan; Tornado II; Engine Failure; ATA 2840

During a flight, the pilot experienced acomplete engine failure. The loss of enginepower resulted in an off-airport landing andsubstantial damage to the aircraft.

During an accident investigation, theinspector found the engine failed due to fuelstarvation even though adequate fuelremained in the tank. Further investigationrevealed a fuel quantity sending unit in thetank was installed using a silicone sealingmaterial. The silicone material dissolved anddislodged when it was exposed to fuel, and the

residue clogged the fuel filter. Close attentionand proper use of fuel system materials mayhave prevented this accident.


VAN’SVAN’SVAN’SVAN’SVAN’S

Van’s Aircraft; Models RV-3, RV-4, RV-6,Van’s Aircraft; Models RV-3, RV-4, RV-6,Van’s Aircraft; Models RV-3, RV-4, RV-6,Van’s Aircraft; Models RV-3, RV-4, RV-6,Van’s Aircraft; Models RV-3, RV-4, RV-6,RV-6A, RV-8, and RV-8A; Improper FuelRV-6A, RV-8, and RV-8A; Improper FuelRV-6A, RV-8, and RV-8A; Improper FuelRV-6A, RV-8, and RV-8A; Improper FuelRV-6A, RV-8, and RV-8A; Improper FuelPick-Up Positioning; ATA 2820Pick-Up Positioning; ATA 2820Pick-Up Positioning; ATA 2820Pick-Up Positioning; ATA 2820Pick-Up Positioning; ATA 2820

The following article is printed as it wasreceived from Mr. Steve McCreary of theNational Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).

This article concerns aircraft with wingtanks that have fixed (non-flop) fuelpick-up tubes. The NTSB investigated anaccident involving the forced landing of aVan’s RV-8, which occurred immediatelyafter takeoff.

The investigation determined that theaircraft had approximately 10 gallons offuel in the right wing (21.0 gallon capacity)fuel tank, which had been selected fortakeoff. A post-crash examination revealedthat the fuel pick-up tube in the right tankwas crimped just outboard of its threadedfitting, and the tube had rotated more than180 degrees. This resulted in the pick-upintake end of the pick-up tube beingpositioned midway between the top andbottom of the tank (Refer to the followingillustration.) The pilot/builder reportedthat several weeks previous to the event,he had accomplished maintenance on theright fuel tank and had tightened the nut,which secured the fuel pick-up tube90-degree elbow fitting to the right fueltank access plate.

Examination of the aircraft designdrawings for the left tank (reversed for theright tank) revealed that the nut whichsecured the 90-degree elbow fitting tightagainst the access plate, would betightened by rotating the nut clockwisewhen looking outboard. With no opposingforce on the elbow, it would be possible to


14

rotate the elbow and thus inadvertentlydeform and reposition the fuel pickup tubewithin the tank while tightening the nut.This condition would not be recognized,unless the access panel was removed andthe pick-up tube examined visually afterthe tightening process.

The original design drawings for the RV-8fuel system were dated 9/25/96. A laterversion (R6), dated 8/99, shows amodification which addresses theinstallation of an “Anti-rotation bracket onthe fuel line.” The design drawings issuedon or after September 1999, contained thedetails for the anti-rotation bracket designand installation. The registration date ofthe accident aircraft was 6/11/98, and theaircraft underwent an annual inJuly of 1999. The anti-rotation bracket wasnot installed on the aircraft’s right fueltank access panel.

The aircraft manufacturer, Van’s Aircraft,is notifying all RV series aircraft ownersthrough their website, and a newsletterarticle which will be issued in August 2000,describing the details of the anti-rotationbracket. Installation of the bracket isapplicable to all RV aircraft with wingtanks that have fixed fuel pick-up tubes(not those with “flop-tube” pick-ups). Foraircraft completed and already flying, noaction is required until and unless the fuelline fittings at the tank are tightened,loosened, or removed. Any time the fuelline fittings at the fuel tank are tightenedloosened, or removed, the fuel pick-up tubeinstallation should be modified inaccordance with the details provided in theNewsletter.

Additional details may be obtained fromthe kit-plane producer: Van’s Aircraft, P.O.Box 160, North Plains, OR 97133,telephone: (503) 647-5117,fax (503) 647-2206. E-mail address:http://www.vansaircraft.com


MIS-POSITIONED PICK-UP TUBE

PROPERLY POSITIONED PICK-UP TUBE

AAAAACCESSORIESCCESSORIESCCESSORIESCCESSORIESCCESSORIES

CARBURETOR FLOATSCARBURETOR FLOATSCARBURETOR FLOATSCARBURETOR FLOATSCARBURETOR FLOATS

A carburetor overhaul shop reported findingseveral leaking plastic (Delrin) carburetorfloats. The floats (P/N 30800) have threechambers and are used in Precision, ModelHA6 carburetors.

Fuel leaking from the carburetor throat iscommon with reports accompanying theseunits. Most of the problems involved fuelfilling the float chamber furthest from thepivot point, causing the float to sink. When thefloat sinks, the bowl overfills and fuel exits atthe point of least resistance. The excessivefuel in the carburetor causes a fire hazard andresults in an excessively rich fuel/air mixturebeing delivered to the engine. This willproduce poor engine operation and, in somecases, engine failure.

The FAA Service Difficulty Reporting programdata base contains two additional similarreports. The submitter believes the integrityof the adhesive used to join the float halves iscompromised by exposure to aviation fuel(100LL). He suggested the manufacturer


15

evaluate the bonding process for the floathalves and revise their procedures toeliminate this defect.


AIR NOAIR NOAIR NOAIR NOAIR NOTESTESTESTESTES

AGEAGEAGEAGEAGE

It is true that all things created by manhave a natural tendency to revert to theirnatural state!

The critical factors in this process are timeand the environment to which they areexposed. I know this hypothesis to be truewhen I observe the deteriorating state ofmy body. With time (age), eyesight dims,joints ache, energy diminishes, hearingfades, and basically things just don’t seemto work as they once did. (Hopefully, oneattribute of increased age is a proportionalincrease in knowledge.)

Likewise, the products of man’s creationtend to digress from their created state tothe natural state of the raw materials ofwhich they are composed.

As recent events have proven, aviationproducts are not excluded from the agingprocess. With many aircraft over 70 yearsold still operating, the effects of age arevery evident. The passing of time isdirectly proportional to the state ofdeterioration with the variant ofenvironmental exposure affecting the rate.In addition to time and environment, thefrequency of operation induces wear andstress which affect the rate of decay. Aswith environment, operational frequencyor use is a variant particular to eachindividual aircraft. This brings to mind thephenomenon of an aircraft that sits in thehangar and breaks! Some have said, withtongue in cheek, that each aircraft has aunique character and personality and whenleft unattended for long periods of time

they become depressed, despondent, and“break” for no apparent reason. As weattempt to maintain older aircraft in anairworthy condition, the challenges becomeincreasingly difficult and costly; requiringmore diligence, time, and attention.

The deterioration (corrosion) of metalaircraft parts is probably the mostdetrimental factor related to the agingprocess. However, fabric (external coveringand interior upholstery), wiring, rubberproducts, and even aviation fluids willdecompose over time. Exposure to theenvironment, harshness of environmentalconditions, and the length of exposure timeare all factors that affect the rate ofdeterioration. We can control the exposureof our aircraft to the environment bykeeping them in a climate-controlledhangar. We can even use preservatives onthe various aircraft components to delaythe effects of time. However, we cannotalways control the harshness ofenvironmental conditions during operationof the aircraft. The value of enjoyment anduse of our aircraft must be weighed againstthe desire to stop the deteriorating effectsof time. This might be compared to noteating a cake because we want to keep it!

However, if we subjected our aircraft to allknown precautions and preventivemeasures, we can only delay, we cannotprevent, the deteriorating effects of time.

The underlying message here is that therate of required maintenance is directlyproportional to the age of the aircraft.

ELECTRONIC VERSION OF THEELECTRONIC VERSION OF THEELECTRONIC VERSION OF THEELECTRONIC VERSION OF THEELECTRONIC VERSION OF THEFAA FORM FAA FORM FAA FORM FAA FORM FAA FORM 8010-48010-48010-48010-48010-4, MALFUNCTION OR, MALFUNCTION OR, MALFUNCTION OR, MALFUNCTION OR, MALFUNCTION OR

DEFECT REPORTDEFECT REPORTDEFECT REPORTDEFECT REPORTDEFECT REPORT

One of the recent improvements to theAFS-600 Internet web site is the inclusion ofFAA Form 8010-4, Malfunction or DefectReport. This web site is still under


16

construction and further changes will be made;however, the site is now active, usable, andcontains a great deal of information.

Various electronic versions of this form havebeen used in the past; however, this newelectronic version is more user friendly andreplaces all other versions. You can completethe form online and submit the informationelectronically. The form is used for all aircraftexcept certificated air carriers who areprovided a different electronic form. TheInternet address is:<http://av-info.faa.gov/isdr/>.

When the page opens, select “SDRSubmissions Forms” and, when complete, usethe “Add Service Difficulty Report” button atthe top left to send the form. Many of you haveinquired about this service. It is now available,and we encourage everyone to use this formatwhen submitting aviation, service-relatedinformation.

SERSERSERSERSERVICE DIFFICULVICE DIFFICULVICE DIFFICULVICE DIFFICULVICE DIFFICULTY PRTY PRTY PRTY PRTY PROGRAMOGRAMOGRAMOGRAMOGRAMDDDDDAAAAATTTTTA AA AA AA AA AVVVVVAILABLE ON AILABLE ON AILABLE ON AILABLE ON AILABLE ON THETHETHETHETHE

INTERNETINTERNETINTERNETINTERNETINTERNET

The FAA, Service Difficulty Reporting (SDR)Program is managed by the Aviation DataSystems Branch, AFS-620, located inOklahoma City, Oklahoma. The informationsupplied to the FAA in the form of Malfunctionor Defect Reports, Service Difficulty Reports,or by other means, is entered into the SDRdata base. This information has been availableto the public through individual writtenrequest. This method has provided theaviation public with an invaluable source ofdata for research or finding specific problemsand trends.

The Service Difficulty Reporting Programrelies on the support of the aviation public tomaintain the high quality of data. AFS-620 hasincluded the SDR data on an Internet web site,

which is now available to the public. Using theweb site will expedite the availability ofinformation. The Internet web site address is:

http://av-info.faa.gov

On this web site, select “Aircraft” along thetop of the page, next select “Service DifficultyReporting,” and then select “Query SDR Data.”

This web site is now active; however, it is stillunder development and improvements arebeing made. We ask for your patience, ideas,and suggestions. If you find the web siteuseful, let us know. Also, spread the wordabout the availability of information on theweb site. To offer comments or suggestions,you may contact the web master or callTom Marcotte at (405) 954-4391.

Please remember that the informationcontained in the SDR data base is only as goodas the input we receive from the aviationpublic. Also, the data used in production ofthis publication is derived from the SDR database. In that regard, we solicit and encourageyour participation and input of information.

This publication, as well as many otherpublications, was previously included on the“FedWorld” internet site. The FedWorld sitewas terminated on April 15, 2000. The datapreviously listed there is presently beingtransferred to the “av-info” web site.

ADDRESS CHANGESADDRESS CHANGESADDRESS CHANGESADDRESS CHANGESADDRESS CHANGES

In the past, the Designee StandardizationBranch (AFS-640) maintained the mailing listfor this publication. Now, the GovernmentPrinting Office (GPO) sells this publicationand maintains the mailing list; therefore,please send your address change to:

U.S. Government Printing OfficeATTN: SSOM, ALERT-2G710 N. Capital Street N. W.Washington, DC 20402


17

You may also send your address change toGPO via FAX at: (202) 512-2168. If you FAXyour address change, please address it to theattention of: SSOM, ALERT-2G.

Whether you mail or FAX your addresschange, please include a copy of your oldaddress label, and write your new addressclearly.

SUBSCRIPTION FORMSUBSCRIPTION FORMSUBSCRIPTION FORMSUBSCRIPTION FORMSUBSCRIPTION FORM

Many of our readers voiced their concernwhen, due to a budget reduction, it wasnecessary to stop printing and distributingpaper copies free of charge.

The Government Printing Office (GPO) agreedto print and distribute the Alerts. However,there will be a 1-year subscription charge forthis service. The charge will be $25 per yearfor domestic mailings and $31.25 per year forforeign mailings. For your convenience,a subscription form is included in thispublication.

IF IF IF IF IF YYYYYOU OU OU OU OU WWWWWANT ANT ANT ANT ANT TTTTTO CONTO CONTO CONTO CONTO CONTAAAAACT USCT USCT USCT USCT US

We welcome your comments, suggestions, andquestions. You may use any of the followingmeans of communication to submit reportsconcerning aviation-related occurrences.

Editor: Phil Lomax (405) 954-6487FAX: (405) 954-4570 or (405) 954-4748

Mailing address: FAA ATTN: AFS-640 ALERTS P.O. Box 25082 Oklahoma City, OK 73125-5029

E-Mail address: <[email protected]>

You can access current and back issues of thispublication from the internet at: http://afs600.faa.gov

This web site also has view, search, E-Mail,and M or D submit functions.


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AVIATION SERVICE DIFFICULTY REPORTSAVIATION SERVICE DIFFICULTY REPORTSAVIATION SERVICE DIFFICULTY REPORTSAVIATION SERVICE DIFFICULTY REPORTSAVIATION SERVICE DIFFICULTY REPORTS

The following are abbreviated reports submitted between May 3, 2000, and June 15, 2000, which have beenentered into the FAA Service Difficulty Reporting (SDR) System data base. This is not an all inclusive listing ofService Difficulty Reports. The full SDR reports can be found on the internet at: <http://www.fedworld.gov/pub/faa-asi/faa-asi.htm>. This internet address takes you to the FAA ASI Library and the SDR reports are listed byweekly entries. This data base is maintained by the FAA, Regulatory Support Division, Aviation Data SystemsBranch, AFS-620 located in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The mailing address is:

FAAAviation Data Systems Branch, AFS-620PO Box 25082Oklahoma City, OK 73125

These reports contain raw data that has not been edited. If you require further detail please contact AFS-620 atthe address above.

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATIONFEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATIONFEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATIONFEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATIONFEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATIONService Difficulty Report DataService Difficulty Report DataService Difficulty Report DataService Difficulty Report DataService Difficulty Report Data

Sorted by Aircraft Make and Model then Engine Make and Model. This Report Derives from Unverified Information SubmittedBy the Aviation Community without FAA review for Accuracy.

This Report Derives from Unverified Information Submitted By the Aviation Community without FAA review for Accuracy

ACFT MODEL ENG MODEL COMP MODEL PART NUMBER PART LOCATION FAA REPORT NO. TSOREMARKS

MCAULY FLYWEIGHT CRACKED 05/22/2000B20268 GOV 2000061700100

RELEVANT CRACK INDICATION ON BASE OF FLYWEIGHT DISC. (X)GARRTT DISK OUT OF 06/01/2000TFE731* 30747522 POST FIR TREE 2000061700502

NEW PART RECEIVED FROM HONEYWELL WITH DAMAGE IN POST FIR TREE AREA. NICK MORE THAN .001 INCH IN DEPTH ON FORWARDSIDE. LOT NUMBER 00P0130. (X)AIRTRC ATTACH CORRODED 05/15/2000 5253AT401 3010610 HORIZ STAB STRUT 2000061700639INTERNAL CORROSION CAUSED FAILURE OF HORIZONTAL STABILIZER STRUT AT LOWER ATTACH FITTING. SUBMITTER RECOMMENDEDLOWER ATTACH POINT DESIGNED SIMILAR TO UPPER FITTING AND LINSEED OIL APPLIED TO INSIDE OF STRUT. (X)AMD RELAY FAILED 05/03/2000FALCON10 B3651M0250 AIRFRAME 2000061700054DURING AIRFRAME INSPECTION, THE REVERSE CURRENT RELAY WAS REMOVED FOR INSPECTION AND RECERTIFICATION. THE RELAY,WHICH WAS FUNCTIONING NORMALLY WHEN REMOVED, WAS ROUTED TO A RATED REPAIR STATION FOR CHECK ANDRECERTIFICATION. UPON RETURN FROM VENDOR, UNIT WAS RE-INSTALLED AND OPER CHKS PER MM. AFTER ELEC POWER APPLIED,EXTENSIVE DAMAGE OCCURRED TO WIRING FROM MAIN POWER JUNCTION BOX TO OVERHEAD PANEL START SWITCHES. REVERSECURRENT RELAY, PN B3651M0-250, SN 2324, WAS DETERMINED DEFECTIVE AND REPLACED. RELAY REPLACED WITH NEW UNIT PNB3651M0-250 AND DAMAGED WIRING REPLACED FROM MAIN POWER JUNCTION BOX TO OVERHEAD PANEL START SWITCHES.SUBSEQUENT OPERBALWKS ENVELOPE DETERIORATED 06/05/2000FIREFLY11 FABRIC PNLS 2000061700642EXCESSIVE AND PREMATURE DETERIORATION OF FABRIC PANELS AT GORE TAPE SEAM. GORE TAPE MATERIAL IS STIFF WITH SHARPEDGES AND CUTS INTO FABRIC PANELS WHERE PANELS OVERLAP TAPE APPROXIMATELY 1 INCH FROM PANEL EDGE. IT APPEARED THEAIRCRAFTMANUFACTURER HAD CHANGED THE GORE TAPE MATERIAL FROM A SOFTER MORE PLIABLE TAPE TO A STIFF TAPE WITHSHARP EDGES. (X)BBAVIA LYC MAGNETO CONTAMINATED 05/05/20008KCAB AEIO320E1B 4150 2000061700326OWNER COMPLAINED OF ROUGH RUNNING/MISSING WHEN ENGINE HOT WHILE AT LOW POWER SETTINGS. RT MAG (4150) REMOVED.EXCESS PLAY IN DIST END BEARING (APPROX PLAY, .030 INCH) SN 9010274. LT MAG REMOVED (4151) SN 9010270. FOUND ENTIREINTERIOR OF MAG CONTAMINATED BY GREASE FROM DRIVE END BEARING. THESE MAGS (4100 SERIES) ARE NOT REBUILDABLE ANDSLICK SB RECOMMENDS REPLACEMENT AND TIS TO BE NOT IN EXCESS OF 800 HRS. ENGINE TT: 494 HRS SINCE NEW.


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BELL FRAME CRACKED 03/02/2000 2378206B 206031308015 FUSELAGE 2000061700048FRAME CRACKED AT TOP RIGHT HAND POSITION, (1:00 O’’CLOCK). (X)BELL ALLSN BELL BEARING FRETTED 04/15/2000 634407 250C47B 407030801105 TAIL ROTOR G/B 2000061700677WHILE PERFORMING SCHEDULED LUBRICATION OF TAIL ROTOR HANGER BEARINGS, MECHANIC NOTICED METALLIC FRETTING DUSTAROUND TAIL ROTOR GEARBOX MOUNTING AREA. FURTHER INVESTIGATION REVEALED MOVEMENT BETWEEN TAIL ROTOR GEARBOXAND TAILBOOM. THIS MALFUNCTION IS UNDER INVESTIGATION BY MANUFACTURER AND SUBMITTER IS AWAITING RESULTS OF THISINVESTIGATION. (X)BNORM LYC GEAR BROKEN 04/14/2000 6418BN2A26 O540E4C5 CRANKSHAFT 2000061700401 2106ON CRUISE FLIGHT, LEFT ENGINE QUIT. PILOT LANDED, INVESTIGATION REVEALED BROKEN CRANKSHAFT GEAR. ENGINE RETIRED FROMSERVICE AND OVERHAULED ENGINE INSTALLED ON AIRCRAFT. (X)BOLKMS LYC BLADE DAMAGED 09/29/1999 2756BK117A1 LTS101650B1 GAS PRODUCER 2000061700049BLADES SUBJECTED TO CARBON BALL BLASTING. REPLACED WITH NEW UNIT, CORRECTED PROBLEM. (X)CESSNA PLATE MISMANUFACTURE 04/27/2000150L 04120101 FUSELAGE 2000052600211RECEIVED 2 EACH NEW PLATES, P/N 0412010-1. ONE PLATE HAS CASING LINE ACROSS FLAT SURFACE THROUGH TWO MOUNTINGHOLES. THESE TWO PLATES ARE VERY IMPORTANT AND HARD TO INSPECT FOR CRACKS AFTER INSTALLATION. SUBMITTER STATEDPART APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN BURNISHED. (X)CESSNA SHIMMY FAILED 04/22/2000172 08424008 NOSE 2000061700546AFTER LANDING, THE PIC WAS TAXIING TO THE RAMP WHEN THE NOSE WHEEL STARTED TO SHIMMY. HE APPLIED BRAKES AND THEAIRCRAFT MADE A HARD RIGHT TURN CAUSING THE AIRCRAFT TO TOP OVER TO THE LEFT/FRONT SIDE AND THE LEFT WING TIP ANDPROPELLER MADE CONTACT WITH THE GROUND. INSPECTIONS OF THE AIRCRAFT REVEALED THE NOSE GEAR SHIMMY DAMPER ANDBOTH STEERING RODS WERE BROKEN. (X)CESSNA LYC LYC ROCKER BOSS FAILED 03/24/2000172N O320H2AD LW15318 2000061700397 85VALVE ROCKER RETAINING STUD, PN 31-16, SHEARED FLUSH WITH THE CYL HEAD SURFACE. THIS CAUSED PARTS TO MOVE AROUNDAT RANDOM IN THE HEAD. IT IS SUSPECTED THESE LOOSE PARTS INTERFERRED WITH OPER OF INTAKE VALVE MECHANISM CAUSINGTHE INTAKE PUSH ROD TO BEND, CREATING AN OIL LEAK AT THE PUSH ROD HOUSING. SAME PROBLEM OCCURRED 65.7 HRS EARLIERWITH NR 1 CYL, 19.2 HRS SINCE O/H. INSP OF ENG REVEALED EXH ROTATOR CAP DISLODGED, LAYING IN BOTTOM OF VALVE COVERON NR 2 CYL. SUSPECTED EXH VALVES MAY BE STICKING IN OPEN POSITION ALLOWING ROTATOR CAP TO FALL OUT OF POSITION.THE EXCESSIVE CLEARANCE THEN CREATED BETWEEN ROCKER ARM AND EXH VALVE STEM COULD POSSIBLY CAUSE ABNORMALSTRESS TO ROCKER ARMCESSNA LIGHT CHAFED 04/17/2000 953172R WIRING BUNDLE 2000061700038PILOT REPORTED THE RADIO LIGHTS WERE FLICKERING WHILE ENGINE WAS RUNNING. UPON INSPECTION, WIRING BUNDLE THAT RUNSHORIZONTALLY ACROSS BOTTOM OF INSTRUMENT PANEL WAS FOUND CHAFING ON ‘’’RADIO INSTRUMENT LIGHT POTENTIOMETER’’ PNS2091-9(REF: R1002 I CESSNA WIRING DIAGRAM 33-10-01). THE CHAFING HAD DAMAGED AND CREATED BARE SPOTS ON THREEWIRES THAT WERE TRACED TO THE AVIONICS LIGHTING BUS’’’’ CREATING A SHORT AND CAUSING THE FLICKERING OF LIGHTS. THEWIRES WERE REPAIRED AND WIRING BUNDLE WAS SECURED AND REPOSITIONED IN A WAY TO PREVENT FURTHER CHAFING ONPOTENTIOMETER. (X)CESSNA CESSNA BOLT LOOSE 03/07/2000172RG AN743A ALTERNATOR 2000061700194AIRCRAFT EXPERIENCED AN IN-FLIGHT ELECTRICAL FAILURE. UPON LANDING, ALTERNATOR WAS FOUND HANGING FROM THE BELTTENSIONBRACKET. THE PRIMARY MOUNT BOLT, AN7-43A, WAS FOUND IN THE LOWER COWLING. WHEN THE MOUNT BOLT FELL OUT,THE COOLING FAN CONTACTED THE ENGINE CASE AND STOPPED THE ALTERNATOR. WITH THE ENGINE RUNNING AND THE ALTERNATORLOCKED UP, THE ALTERNATOR BELT BURNED UP ON THE ALTERNATOR PULLEY. ALTERNATOR BELT HAD RECENTLY BEEN TIGHTENED.(X)CESSNA BEARING LACK OF LUBE 04/02/2000 1770172RG J199744G16 TRUNNION ASSY N/ 2000061700398AIRCRAFT WOULD NOT STEER ON TAKEOFF ROLL. BRAKES INEFFECTIVE TO TURN. DISASSEMBLED NOSE GEAR TRUNNION AND FOUNDUPPERAND LOWER NACELLE BEARINGS RUSTED AND FROZEN. NO PROVISIONS FOR LUBRICATION AT THESE POINTS. AIRCRAFTMANUFACTURED 1982.CESSNA CESSNA BRACKET CRACKED 06/13/2000 5000177RG 17320312 BEND RADIUS 2000061700500THREE OF FOUR BALANCE WEIGHT SUPPORT BRACKETS WERE CRACKED ALONG THE BEND RADIUS. CRACKS WERE 1.25 INCHES, 1.50INCHES, AND 1.75 INCHES ON EACH. THIS WAS NOTICED DURING STABILIZER BEARING REPLACEMENT WITH THE STABLIZER OFF THEAIRCRAFT.SUBMITTER RECOMMENDED FREQUENT INSPECTIONS. UNKNOWN CAUSE.CESSNA CONT MUFFLER SEPARATED 03/29/2000182G O470R 075016128 EXHAUST 2000061700030DURING ANNUAL INSPECTION, THE LT INTERNAL BAFFLE WAS FOUND TO HAVE SEPARATED AND WAS PARTIALLY BLOCKING THEEXHAUST PORT IN THE MUFFLER. UPON REMOVAL, THE RT EXHAUST STACK WAS FOUND BADLY DETERIORATED WITH SEVERALPIECES MISSING. ONLY MINOR EXHAUST LEAK WAS NOTED FROM UNDER CLAMP. TIME IN SERVICE OF THESE PARTS IS NOT KNOWN.(X)


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CESSNA FLAP TRACK CRACKED 04/11/2000182P 122101015 LT WING 2000061700190SHEARED RIVETS AT FORWARD LOWER END OF FLAP TRACK AND CRACKED FLAP TRACKMOUNTING ANGLE LOWEREND FORWARD. WING FLAP WAS DAMAGED WHEN FLAPS WERE RETRACTED AND CONTACT WAS MADE WITH BRACKET IN FLAPWELL. POSSIBLE CAUSE, OPERATING FLAPS ATHIGHER THAN NORMAL SPEEDS. (X)CESSNA CONT CYLINDER CRACKED 12/01/1999182Q O470U CLASS70 NUMBER4 2000061700399 29THE ENGINE WAS TOPPED WITH 6 ENGINE COMPONENTS INC CERMINIL CYLINDERS. AFTER 29 HOURS OF OPERATION, ENGINE RANROUGH AND WAS LOSING OIL. PILOT WAS ABLE TO FIND A PRIVATE STREET AND LANDED SAFELY. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT NR 4CYLINDER WASCRACKED .8750 INCH AROUND AND 5.4 INCHES DOWN LOOKING INTO THECESSNA HOSE DAMAGED 02/28/2000207A 1118 HYD SYSTEM 2000061000149END OF HOSE WAS CUT OFF WITH A CUT-OFF WHEEL AND HOSE INTERIOR WAS FOUND COLLAPSED. ANOTHER 1.50INCH WAS CUT OFF AND THE SAME CONDITION WAS FOUND. NOTE: SECTION OF HOSE SUBMITTED REPORT FORWARDED TO AEG NE-FSDO-07. (X)CESSNA CONT CONT SPARK PLUG FAILED 03/10/2000207A IO520* NR 2 CYLINDER 2000061700402PISTON TOP BEGAN TO DISINTEGRATE CAUSING SEVERAL SPARK PLUG FAILURES AND ENOUGH POWER LOSS TO CAUSE A FORCEDLANDING. (X)CESSNA SPINNER CRACKED 04/13/2000 120310K 08550301719 LEFT 2000061700328BRAND NEW CESSNA SPINNER DOME INSTALLED ON 4-30-99. LAST INSPECTION ANNUAL ON 7/16/99. APRIL12, 2000, 100-HOURINSPECTION REVEALS ONE INCH CRACK AT ONE MOST FORWARD SCREW. TWO SCREW HOLES ARE OVAL, NOT ROUND. TOTAL PARTTIME PLUS/MINUS 120 HOURS. (X)CESSNA CESSNA MOUNT CRACKED 05/19/2000 5233421C 503403034 LT ENGINE BAY 2000061700193DURING ANNUAL INSPECTION, FOUND ONE INCH CRACK LEFT SIDE, AFT CORNER, LEFT ENGINE BAY, CANTED BULKHEAD TOP CAP.EXHAUST CORROSION IN THIS AREA WAS NOTED. PER AD 2000-01-16 EXHAUST SYSTEM, FOUND CRACKS ON EXHAUST COMPONENTSALSO IN THIS AREA THAT MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THIS FAILURE. (X)CONAER MOUNT CRACKED 04/14/2000 757LA4 LA4180 RT LOWER 2000061700396RIGHT LOWER ENGINE ATTACH POINT CRACKED TO RIGHT STRUT ATTACH POINT. (RADIALLY THROUGH MOUNT TUBE). DETECTEDDURING ANNUAL INSPECTION VISUALLY AND VERIFIED BY DIE/PENETRANT. (X)DHAV PWA CYLINDER CRACKED 05/04/2000DHC3 R134059 NUMBER 7 2000061700137 694UPON CLIMB-OUT AFTER TAKEOFF, PILOT REPORTED ROUGH RUNNING ENGINE AND A LOSS OF POWER. PILOT STARTED TURNING BACKFOR AIRPORT AND DECIDED NOT ENOUGH POWER AND LANDED SAFELY IN A FARMER’’S FIELD. DISCOVERED, NR 7 CYLINDER HEADCRACKED FROM ONE SPARK PLUG HOLE ALL THE WAY TO THE OTHER. MAINTENANCE SUGGESTED ALONG WITH A VISUAL INSPECTIONOF CYLINDER AND WHILE DOING A COMPRESSION CHECK, ALSO DO A SOAP AND WATER CHECK FOR CRACKS WHEN AIR IS PUT TO THECYLINDER. (X)ENSTRM GEAR BROKEN 04/18/2000280C 28135000 T/R GEARBOX 2000052600052PILOT REPORTED NOT BEING ABLE TO SEE OIL LEVEL IN SIGHT GLASS. WHEN SIGHT GLASS REMOVED, A PIECE OF GEAR SET (TOOTH)ABOUT .4375 INCH LONG WAS FOUND INSIDE. ACFT HAD RETURNED FROM FLYING, AND THERE WAS NO VIBS OF NOISE. WEARMARKS ON BROKEN PART GAVE APPEARANCE OF HAVING BEEN BROKEN FOR QUITE SOME TIME. INSP OF CHIP PLUG SHOWED NOMETAL FLAKES OR CHIPS. SUBMITTER RECOMMENDED PULLING SIGHT GLASS AND LOOKING INSIDE TAIL GEARBOX AT EACH 100-HROIL CHANGE/AD 90-01-06 INSPECTING IT FOR METAL FLAKES. (X)GROB PUSHROD TUBE FAILED 05/10/2000 7775G103ATWINII 96 INCH OUT BD 2000061700497LEFT WING AILERON PUSH ROD FOUND MISSING PLASTIC BEARING CAUSING RIVETS TO WEAR THROUGH PUSH ROD IN 2 PLACES. (X)HUGHES HUGHES PINION GEAR FAILED 02/22/2000 7931369D 369D25100505 369D2512511 TRANSMISSION 2000061700547 1778AIRCRAFT WAS FLYING WHEN A NOISE WAS HEARD. A PRECAUTIONARY LANDING WAS MADE. THE PROBLEM WAS A BROKEN GEARIN THE MAIN TRANSMISSION. THE BROKEN PART WAS SENT TO THE MANUFACTURER FORPIPER SPAR CORRODED 06/15/2000PA28160 62015 2000061700717FORWARD LOWER EDGE OF MAIN SPAR INBOARD BEHIND FUEL TANK BADLY CORRODED. DEFOLIATED BY ABOUT 50 PERCENT OFTHICKNESS.MICE NESTS AND FECAL MATTER FOUND. SUBMITTER RECOMMENDED FUEL TANK REMOVAL FOR INSPECTION AT LEASTEVERY 5 YEARS. ALSO, INSTALL INSPECTION HOLE BEHIND TANKS FOR BETTERPIPER LYC CYLINDER CRACKED 04/07/2000 878PA28161 O320D3G AEL6510241 CYLINDER 2000061700316FOUND ZERO COMPRESSION ON ROUGH RUNNING ENGINE. FOUND CRACK FROM TOP SPARK PLUG AROUND OUTSIDE OF EXHAUSTSEAT TO BOTTOM SPARK PLUG. (X)PIPER NARCO SENSOR LEAKING 03/09/2000 1086PA28181 2000061700321* STATIC SYSTEM LEAK GREATER THAN 100 FEET/MINUTE TRACED TO THIS UNIT. AR850 ONLY TWO YEARS IN SERVICE SINCEAIRCRAFT WAS NEW. AR850'’’’’’’’S ARE NOT KNOWN TO BE FAULTY IN THIS MANNER. SUBMITER STATED POSSIBLE NARCO FACTORYDEFECT IN ASSEMBLY OF SENSOR. THIRD FAILURE KNOWN TO SUBMITTER. (X)


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PIPER PIPER BRACE CRACKED 05/23/2000 15290PA31350 4204200 INSIDE RADIUS 2000061700542DURING A DETAILED INSPECTION OF THE LANDING GEAR, THIS PART WAS FOUND TO HAVE A SMALL CRACK. THIS PART CONNECTSTHE HYDRAULIC ACTUATOR TO THE FORWARD SIDE BRACE WHICH EXTENDS AND RETRACTS THE LANDING GEAR. THE WEIGHT OF THEGEAR AND THE SPEED OF MOVING THE GEAR UP AND DOWN EVENTUALLY FATIGUES PARTS. SUBMITTER STATED RECURRENCECANNOT BE AVOIDED. (X)PIPER CONTROLLER DEFECTIVE 05/24/2000 268PA31350 LW1009685 2000061700543ON POST-FLIGHT INSPECTION, PILOT NOTICED OIL ON UNDER SIDE OF ENGINE COWLING AND NOTIFIED MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL.FURTHER INVESTIGATION REVEALED OIL DRIPPING FROM INDUCTION HOUSING DRAIN AND WAS DETERMINED TO BE COMING FROM THESENSE LINE OUT OF THE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE CONTROLLER. (X)PIPER LYC LYC BUSHING FAILED 05/09/2000PA31P TIGO541E1A 75536 2000061700504PILOT EXPERIENCED ALTERNATOR FAILURE ON LT ENGINE IN-FLIGHT. UPON INSPECTION AFTER LANDING, FOUND LT SIDE OF AIRCRAFT COVER IN OIL AND LT ALTERNATOR LYING INSIDE OF COWLING. SUSPECT FAILURE OF GOVERNOR ADAPTER ASSY.BUSHING, PN 75539, CAUSED MIS-ALIGNMENT OF ALT DRIVESHAFT WHICH CAUSED COUPLING, PN LW-14464, TO FAIL IN SUCH AMANNER THAT CAUSED ALTERNATOR ADAPTER ASSY, PN LW-10259, TO FAIL. (X)PIPER SKIN CRACKED 04/26/2000 3372PA32300 6208700 INBD/OTBD EDGES 2000061700138LEFT WING-SKIN ASSY-TOP, INBOARD ROOT HAD NUMEROUS CRACKS AT BOTH ENDS OF BOTH STRINGERS AND FOUND ONE STRINGERINBOARDEND CRACKED. THIS SKIN, AFTER REMOVAL, WAS FOUND HAVING NO REINFORCEMENT DOUBLERS AT THE ENDS OF BOTHSTRINGERS. THE NEW SKIN HAS THE REINFORCEMENT DOUBLERS AND THIS SHOULD PREVENT CRACKING. SUBMITTER RECOMMENEDEDTHAT ALL PIPERS WITH SAME WING DESIGN SHOULD BE CHECKED THAT THE DOUBLERS ARE INSTALLED. (X)PIPER PIPER SPRING BROKEN 03/08/2000 5163PA34200 9652200 NOSE GEAR ASSY 2000061700638DURING A 50-HOUR OIL CHANGE, THE AIRCRAFT WAS JACKED UP IN ORDER TO CHANGE BOTH MLG TIRES. WHILE SPOT-CHECKING NLGTIRE, EXCESSIVE PLAY WAS FOUND IN THE NLG STEERING LINKAGE. CLOSER EXAMINATION REVEALED THE STEERING STOPS WEREDAMAGED AND THE NLG CENTERING SPRING WAS BROKEN. NORMALLY, THE CENTERING SPRING TRAVEL IS GREATER THAN THESTEERING STOPS. SUBMITTER SUSPECTED THE STEERING STOPS WERE DAMAGED DURING TOWING ALLOWING THE STEERING TRAVELTO EXCEED THE STOPS AND BREAK THEPIPER LYC ALCO SWITCH SHORTED 05/14/2000 1350PA44180T TO360E1A6 37756003 INTERNAL OF SW 2000061700135LEFT ENGINE IN-FLIGHT ROUGH AND SMOKE. FOUND ELECTRICAL FUEL PRIMER SOLENOID ACTIVATED AND TIME MASTER SWITCH ON.PUSH TO PRIME SWITCH AT COCKPIT INSTRUMENT PANEL SHORTED TO A CONTINUOUS CLOSED CIRCUIT. REPLACED DEFECTIVE SWITCHWITH SAME PART NUMBER. PROBLEM REPAIRED. (X)PIPER CABLE BINDING 05/19/2000 18PA46350P FLIGHT CONTROL 2000061700139PILOT NOTICED FLIGHT CONTROLS GETTING STIFF IN ROLL DIRECTION. INSPECTED ENTIRE SYSTEM FOR PROPER ROUTING OF CABLESAND CORRECT TENSION ON PRIMARILY AND AUTOPILOT CABLES. NO DISCREPANCY NOTED. WENT THROUGH ENTIRE SYSTEM ANDLUBED ALL ROTATIONAL POINTS UNTIL CONTROLS FREED UP. POSSIBLY CAUSED BY LACK OF LUBRICATION OF FACTORY. AIRCRAFTONLY HAD 18 HOURSSINCE NEW. (X)PIPER LYC RIVET BROKEN 04/27/2000 118PA46350P TIO540AE2A AN470 BAFFLE 2000061700559DURING AN OIL CHANGE, TWO RIVET HEADS (AN470) WERE FOUND IN THE OIL SUCTION SCREEN. THE ENGINE WAS REMOVED AND THEOILSUMP PULLED OFF. TWO RIVET HEADS WERE MISSING FROM THE OIL SUMP BAFFLE. THESE ARE MS20470AD4-4 RIVETS. THEHOLES ON THE DRIVEN SIDE APPEARED TO BE COUNTERSUNK OR EXCESSIVELY DEBURRED, WHICH GAVE LITTLE BEARING SURFACEFOR THE RIVET HEAD. LYCOMING SB489B REFERS TO THESERAYTHN MOUNT WORN 03/29/2000 5807B100 909100141 2000061700400WHILE DOING A HOT SECTION INSPECTION ON THE RIGHT ENGINE AFTER REMOVAL FROM THE AIRCRAFT, NOTICED DAMAGE TO THETUBULARENGINE MOUNT CROSS-MEMBER. AFTER FURTHER INVESTIGATION, FOUND AN ENGINE MOUNT BRACKET RUBBING AGAINSTTHE TUBULAR CROSS-MEMBER. (X)RAYTHN PIN WORN 05/25/2000B200 508103437 MLG DOWNLOCK 2000061700501THE RELEASE LINKS AND PINS IN BOTH MAIN LANDING GEAR DOWNLOCKS WERE REMOVED FROM AIRCRAFT FOR INSPECTION.INSPECTION REVEALED BOTH PINS WERE WORN APPROX .002 INCH BEYOND LIMITS AND BOTH LINK PIN HOLES HAD CIRCUMFERENTIALSCRATCHES INDICATING THAT PINS HAD AT SOME TIME ROTATED IN LINK. PINS AND LINKS WERE REPLACED. ACFT TIME: 8,933.1HOURS, 5,559 LANDINGS. SUBMITTER SUGGESTED THAT HOOK AND LINK ASSYS BE DISASSEMBLED AND INSPECTED AT EACH 6 YEAR8,000 LANDING INSPECTION OF DRAG BRAKE ASSY. (X)RAYTHN JANITROL COMBUSTION DEACTIVATED 04/27/2000B95 51A45 2000061700133JANITROL COMBUSTION HEAD ASSY, PN 51A45, ON HEATER ASSY, PN D83A28, HAD A ONE INCH DIAMETER RUST HOLE. THIS HOLEWAS CAUSED BY AGE, DETERIORATION AND USE. THE HEATER HAD BEEN IN OPERATION SINCE 1960. SUBMITTER RECOMMENDED ARECURRING ADVISORY DIRECTIVE FOR AGING BEECH BARON MODELS 55, A55, B55, AND B55A, AND BEECH TRAVELAIR MODELS 95,B95, B95A, D95A, ANDE95 THAT CORPORATE THE JANITROL 83A28 SERIES COMBUSTION ACFT HEATERS. THERE IS A REGULARLYSCHEDULED MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE CALLED OUT IN THE 83A28 SERIES JANITROL OVERHAUL MANUAL. (X)RAYTHN SHIMMY LEAKING 06/07/1999C23 C1000161A INTERNAL 2000061700394SHIMMY DAMPENER HAS NUMEROUS DEAD SPOTS (AIR INSIDE) WHEN ACTUATED. CAUSES NOSE WHEEL TO SHIMMY REAL BAD. (X)RAYTHN SHIMMY FAILED 06/07/1999C23 C10001618 INTERNAL 2000061700395RETRIEVED SUBJECT SHIMMY DAMPENER FROM STOCK ROOM. ON FUNCTIONAL CHECK, DETERMINED MUCH WORSE THAN THEREMOVED UNIT.


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RAYTHN CONT MUFFLER BULGED 05/11/2000V35B IO550B 70120 LEFT 2000061700637DURING A BASIC VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE ENGINE, THE LEFT MUFFLER WAS NOTED AS HAVING SEVERAL BULGES. UPON REMOVALOF THE MUFFLER AND HEAT SHIELD, THE MUFFLER HAD SEVERAL LARGE HOLES THAT WERE NOT VISIBLE UNTIL THE HEAT SHIELD WASREMOVED. CAUSE UNKNOWN. SUBMITTER SUGGESTED HEAT SHIELD BE REMOVED FOR CLOSER INSPECTION OF MUFFLER DURING 100HOUR/ANNUAL INSPECTIONS. (X)SNIAS DRIVE GEAR FAILED 05/31/2000 370AS350B2 S40 HYD PUMP DRIVE 2000061700136HYDRAULIC PUMP FAILED IN-FLIGHT. PRECAUTIONARY LANDING COMPLETED. INSP REVEALED DRIVE SPLINES AT HYD DRIVE COUPLING(FEMALE SPLINES), AND THE DRIVE SPLINES AT THE HYD PUMP (MALE SPLINES) WERE PREMATURELY WORN. SPLINE ENGAGEMENTINSUFFICIENT FOR DRIVE DEMAND. HYD PUMP DRIVE SPLINES INSPECTED AND GREASED AT BASIC INSP. 500 FLYING HRS OR 15MONTHS BY CALENDER. POSSIBLE CAUSE OF FAILURE UNKNOWN. RECOMMENDED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE, INSPECT HYD DRIVESPLINES WHEN ACFT IS DELIVERED NEW, AND EACH 100-HOUR AIRFRAME INSP INTERVAL UP TO THE 500-HR INSP FOR A TRENDANALYSIS. ENCOUNTER

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

OMB No. 2120-0003

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

MALFUNCTION OR DEFECT REPORT

AIRCRAFT

POWERPLANT

PROPELLER

Enter pertinent data MANUFACTURER

FAA Form 8010-4 (10-92) SUPERSEDES PREVIOUS EDITIONS

MODEL/SERIES SERIAL NUMBER

ATA Code

A/C Reg. No. N-

OPER. Control No.

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Comp/Appl Name Manufacturer Model or Part No. Serial Number

Check a box below, if this report is related to an aircraft7. Date Sub.

8. Comments (Describe the malfunction or defect and the circumstances under which it occurred. State probable cause and recommendations to prevent recurrence.)

Part TT Part TSO Part Condition

Serial No. Part/Defect Location.MFG. Model or Part No.

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5. SPECIFIC PART (of component) CAUSING TROUBLE

6. APPLIANCE/COMPONENT (Assembly that includes part)

Accident; Date

Optional Information:

Incident; Date

REP.

STA

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SUBM

ITTE

D BY

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UMBE

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Use this space for continuation of Block 8 (if required).

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Federal AviationAdministration

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In the December issue of the Alerts, we informed readers of the decision todiscontinue printing the Alerts. The decision was a difficult one to make,and we have heard from many of our readers. There is good news on thehorizon.

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