juncos and pomorska 2008

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Does Size Matter? CFSP Committeesafter EnlargementAna E. Juncos a & Karolina Pomorska ba Department of European Studies and Modern Languages,University of Bath, UKb Department of Politics, Maastricht University, The Netherlands

Version of record first published: 27 Aug 2008

To cite this article: Ana E. Juncos & Karolina Pomorska (2008): Does Size Matter? CFSP Committeesafter Enlargement, Journal of European Integration, 30:4, 493-509

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European IntegrationVol. 30, No. 4, 493–509, September 2008

ISSN 0703–6337 Print/ISSN 1477–2280 Online/08/040493-17 © 2008 Taylor & FrancisDOI: 10.1080/07036330802294771

Does Size Matter? CFSP Committees after Enlargement

ANA E. JUNCOS* & KAROLINA POMORSKA**

*Department of European Studies and Modern Languages, University of Bath, UK**Department of Politics, Maastricht University, The Netherlands

Taylor and FrancisGEUI_A_329644.sgm10.1080/07036330802294771Journal of European Integration0703-6337 (print)/1477-2280 (online)Original Article2008Taylor & Francis304000000September 2008Dr [email protected]

ABSTRACT This article examines the impact of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements onCFSP committees. It aims to determine in which manner enlargement has affected thedeliberative nature of CFSP committees and in which ways formal and informalmechanisms have contributed to overcoming deadlock in the decision-makingprocess. The article concludes, first, that formal and informal adjustment mechanismshave ensured a smooth functioning of the CFSP. Second, socialization and consensualdecision-making are still prevalent in the practice of CFSP bodies and have preventeddeadlock. Moreover, learning processes remain crucial in committee governance,allowing newcomers to familiarize themselves with CFSP practices. As regardslegitimacy, however, a less positive assessment can be made. By increasing theinformality of CFSP negotiations and the role of ‘like-minded’ groups, and decreasingthe role of formal meetings, enlargement may have contributed to an erosion of theCFSP’s democratic legitimacy.

KEY WORDS: Enlargement, CFSP, EU committees, governance, formal and informal rules

Introduction

The enlargement of the European Union (EU) from fifteen to twenty-five,and then to twenty-seven, member states gave rise to numerous concerns inthe area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It was fearedthat not only would enlargement bring with it new ‘sensitive’ issues, butthat the mere presence of more member states around the table wouldcomplicate the adoption of decisions in the ‘shadow of the veto’. The

Correspondence Address: Ana E. Juncos, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Department ofEuropean Studies and Modern Languages, University of Bath, Bath BA2 7AY, UK. E-mail:[email protected]

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494 Ana E. Juncos and Karolina Pomorska

argument behind such fears was that the increase in the committees’ sizewould perturb the negotiating atmosphere for the CFSP, often labelled asconsensual and characterized by the ‘esprit de corps’ shared by participants(de Schouthetee 1980; Nuttall 1992). Thus, this research was foremost fedby the desire to determine in which manner, firstly, enlargement hasaffected the deliberative nature of CFSP committees and, secondly, formaland informal mechanisms have contributed to overcoming deadlock in thedecision-making process. In other words, have CFSP committees found newways of overcoming the problems associated with the growth in the numberof participants? How important have formal and informal mechanisms beenin this regard?

Looking at existing institutional arrangements, some authors have pointedat enlargement as a potential threat to an efficient decision-making process(Missiroli 2003, 12; Sjursen 1998). In spite of the accession of twelve newmember states, against all odds the empirical research conducted by theauthors and the formal record of CFSP decisions (see Table 1) shows thatCFSP internal effectiveness has not been hindered.1 To understand thispuzzling phenomenon, it is necessary to examine formal and informal rules,as well as processes of socialization and learning. This contribution willshow that socialization and consensual decision-making are still prevalent inthe practice of CFSP bodies and have actually prevented deadlock. Learningprocesses remain crucial in committee governance, allowing the newcomersto familiarize themselves with CFSP practices. As will be discussed, formaland informal adjustment mechanisms have ensured a smooth functioning ofthe CFSP. As regards legitimacy, however, a less positive assessment can bemade. By increasing the informality of CFSP negotiations and the role of‘like-minded’ groups, as well as decreasing the role of formal meetings,enlargement might have contributed to an erosion of the CFSP’s democraticlegitimacy. This is because more is done secretively, in the shadow of thecorridors, and in ‘closed’ groups.

Table 1. CFSP decisions (2000–2007)

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Declarations 184 186 200 143 141 150 148 114Common positions 33 20 23 24 23 29 26 30Joint actions 21 19 23 34 30 66 61 62Common strategies 1 – – 2 1 – – –Decisions 5 6 – 3 5 5 2 4Conclusion of international agreements – 2 3 15 8 17 16 2TOTAL 244 233 249 221 208 267 253 212

Note: This table includes data about new CFSP/ESDP decisions, as well as extension of past decisions.Sources: 2000–2001: Wessels (2002, 19); 2002–2007: own calculations based upon the Annual Reports of the Activities of the EC/EU (see the Liste des actes juridiques PESC 1993–2007, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ACTES_JURIDIQUES_PESC_2007.pdf).

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Common Foreign and Security Policy Committees 495

The article commences by discussing the modes of governance in CFSP andits committees in the Council. It then provides an overview of the challengesto effectiveness in the second pillar that can be associated with the effects ofenlargement. This section will briefly introduce the rules that were observedin the literature and/or identified by the authors in their empirical work,before the article moves on to assessing what role these rules played in over-coming the challenges of enlargement. In conclusion, the article reflects onhow CFSP committee governance might develop in the future. It takes up theissue of legitimacy in the area of European foreign policy and discusses howit could be affected by the changes caused by recent enlargements.

The article is based on more than thirty-two in-depth interviews withnational representatives to the Council committees and EU officials(Commission and the Council Secretariat General) in 2005, 2006 and early2008. Overall, the empirical research included interviews with diplomatsfrom eighteen member states: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Poland,Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.2 The evidence iscomplemented by participant observation in the Council working groupmeetings in 2005 and secondary literature.

CFSP Governance and the Role of Committees

One of the main aims of this contribution is to determine the way in whichenlargement has affected the governance mode in the CFSP and how thisgovernance system has adapted to such a challenge. Governance is definedhere as ‘the authority to make, implement, and enforce rules in a specifiedpolicy domain’ (Smith 2004, 176). In the EU, governance is usually under-stood as a complex, dynamic, multi-level and non-hierarchical process,which hence differs from the traditional understanding of ‘government’ atthe national level. This is particularly the case in European foreign policy,where a clear centralized hierarchical structure resembling a foreign ministryis lacking and where one would rather talk of foreign policy governancewithout government (Allen 1998, 48).

This governance system has suffered several changes over the years.Nonetheless, there are some key aspects that have remained untouchedthroughout these reforms. The Treaty of Maastricht formalized the coordi-nating structures that had sustained the European Political Cooperationfrom the 1970s, without altering its basic intergovernmental nature. Inother words, unanimity is still the prevailing rule in CFSP. The memberstates retain a veto power in CFSP and dominate the decision-makingprocess; however, the national ministries of foreign affairs have beenincreasingly displaced from the core of the decision-making process by theintergovernmental bodies located in Brussels through the so-called processof ‘Brusselisation’ (Allen 1998). It is also interesting to note that, unlike inthe Community policies of the first pillar, the involvement of the Commis-sion, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice is limitedat best. The main institution is the Council of Ministers, although power

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can still be seen as shared across different actors and levels, including bothnational and supranational levels.

In the area of CFSP, as is the case in other intergovernmental sectors suchas the Economic and Monetary Union or Justice and Home Affairs, the needto coordinate national policies seems particularly necessary given therestricted competences of supranational actors. Governance in these policyareas can be thus conceptualized as ‘Coordination among IndependentActors’ (Puetter 2003, 110). CFSP committees appear as a link betweennational and European foreign policy-making. Unlike the comitologycommittees, which are often regarded as a ‘re-nationalisation’ of communi-tarian policies and as fora for member states to control the Commission(Christiansen and Kirchner 2000, 1), in the area of CFSP many scholarshave portrayed committees as an arena for the Brusselization of nationalforeign policies, a policy area traditionally subject to close scrutiny by themember states (Tonra 2000; Duke 2007). Yet, even the most reluctantmember states nowadays acknowledge the need for closer coordination inthis field and hence the ensuing transfer of authority to Brussels-basedbodies. This context of non-hierarchical governance explains the emergenceof multiple committees where policy can be discussed and coordinated(Christiansen and Kirchner 2000, 3). This article focuses on the latter aspect— ‘governance through committees’ in CFSP (Christiansen and Kirchner2000, 4).

By CFSP committees, we mean those intergovernmental bodies meeting inBrussels other than the ministerial or heads of state/government meetings. Inother words, they include high-level committees at ambassadorial level,such as COREPER II and the Political and Security Committee; otherspecialized committees, like the EU Military Committee and the Committeefor Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management; and the CFSP working groups.These bodies are generally composed of national representatives based inthe permanent representations in Brussels,3 where their role is to discuss,draft and implement CFSP decisions. Attention has often focused on thehigher levels of decision-making (European Council or General Affairs andExternal Relations Council), but it is at the committee level where most ofthe decisions are discussed and reached, either in the Council workinggroup meetings of experts or at the level of ambassadors.

As Quaglia, De Francesco and Radaelli (2008, 156) put it: ‘EU committeesare hybrids between formal institutions for decision-making, generally basedon intergovernmental bargaining and power politics, and informal fora fordeliberation and socialisation. At the same time some are also gatherings of“experts”, where the logic of argumentation and technical knowledge carriesmuch weight’. Indeed, committees are usually portrayed as encapsulating themain features of the European integration process (Christiansen and Kirch-ner 2000, 8), usually emphasizing the deliberative and consensual aspects ofthe decision-making process, but also allowing for the possibility of strategicbargaining and the exchange of information (Puetter 2003); as arenas forlearning (Christiansen and Kirchner 2000, 9); and as populated by epistemiccommunities (Haas 1992).

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In the case of CFSP, the ‘expert’ component may not be so importantsince CFSP committees mostly comprise diplomats, as opposed to civilservants and experts in first pillar committees. Yet, one could argue thatthe development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) hasbrought more military ‘expertise’ to Brussels committees. The diplomaticculture in which CFSP representatives are trained, although variable fromcountry to country, often emphasizes the need for empathy and mutualunderstanding and therefore facilitates the achievement of consensus withinthe group. In this regard, the other characteristics mentioned above —learning, socialization and deliberation — are very much present in CFSPcommittees (Duke 2007; Juncos and Pomorska 2006; Tonra 2000). Indeed,CFSP committees appear as arenas for learning in various ways. On the onehand, they allow the member states to familiarize themselves with the EUsystem. On the other hand, interactions within CFSP committees facilitatethe exchange of information and, as a result, impact on the definition ofnational interests, even facilitating the emergence of national positionswhere previously there has been no position defined.

As regards socialization, the first accounts of these phenomena date backto the establishment of European Political Cooperation in the 1970s, withthe emergence among the members of the Political Committee of an ‘auto-matic reflex of consultation brought about by frequent personal contactswith opposite numbers from the other Member States’ (Nuttall 1992, 312).The ‘club-like atmosphere’ prompted by formal and informal interactionswas deemed to be crucial in the process of facilitating consensus (as opposedto strategic bargaining) within the group.4 The danger with enlargement wasthat the increase in the number of participants in CFSP committees mightaffect the CFSP mode of governance by reducing the possibilities for social-ization and, therefore, consensual decision-making, leading to a stalemate insuch a sensitive policy area. The empirical evidence gathered by this researchpoints, on the contrary, to the fact that consensual decision-making is stillevident in the daily practice of CFSP committees, an issue that will bediscussed in more detail below. The socialization and learning processesundergone by newcomers, as well as adjustment to formal and informalrules, might help explain this phenomenon.

Challenges of Enlargement in the Area of CFSP

The prospect of a ‘Big Bang’ enlargement in 2004 posed a considerablechallenge for the institutional design of the EU. In the area of CFSP this testwas even greater, as unanimity remains the prevailing rule of decision-making in the second pillar. The fears concerning the impact of enlargementwere not only caused by the unreadiness of the candidate states, but also bythe inadequate state of the EU institutions themselves. Hence the centralpoint of the debate about the ‘threats of enlargement’ revolved around theissue of effectiveness and ways to avoid institutional deadlock. The mainproblems identified in the literature were: (1) potential divergences betweenthe interests of newcomers and the old member states; (2) problems relating

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to time constraints during meetings; and (3) disparities in the administrativecultures of the newcomers.

Even though the candidate states were obliged to adopt the so-called CFSPacquis politique during the pre-accession phase, this did not lead to a totalconvergence between old and new member state foreign policies, as thisprocess was characterized by its declaratory nature and flexibility. As is oftennoted in the pre-enlargement literature, the new member states were likely tobring to the table their own foreign policy interests, namely a strongerconcern for Eastern Europe, Russia and the western Balkans (Archer 2004;Missiroli 2003; Whitman 1999).5 While this did not imply an increase in thescope of the EU’s external action — most of these issues were already beingdiscussed in CFSP committees — it was expected that new advocacy groupsconsisting of the new member states would emerge around these issues(Whitman 1999, 144). It was also feared that reaching consensus wouldbecome much more difficult in such a complex environment.

Related to the problem of divergent interests was the issue of timeconstraints, given the drastically increased number of member states seatedat the table in the various Council bodies. It became clear that usually therewould not be enough time for all delegations to justify their positions nor todeliberate and argue in an attempt to convince their partners. While this wastrue of formal meetings, similarly time for informal consultation was now alsolimited, constraining the access of new member state delegations to the offi-cials from the Council Secretariat or the Commission. In the case of these twoinstitutions, the challenge of consulting twenty-five, and later twenty-seven,member states on their positions in a reasonably short time became an evermore challenging task. Nevertheless, it was expected that precisely becauseof this need, their significance in the negotiation processes would increase.

Finally, it was unknown to what extent the newcomers, with wide-rangingdiplomatic and administrative experience, would grasp and respect theinformal ‘rules of the game’ in the Council, including the consensus-buildingpractice. Some of the early candidates’ declarations in the field of foreignpolicy suggested a temptation to play the role of ‘national champion’. Also,distinct working traditions were mentioned as a potential problem by someof the interviewees, such as the tight control exercised by the national minis-tries of foreign affairs over the experts. For example, some new member statesdelegations had to ‘clear’ an issue with their capital after agreeing to it inBrussels, while others needed official approval first. Most of the administra-tive systems of the candidates were highly centralized and the decision-pathwas relatively long (e.g. on Poland, see Pomorska 2007). But CFSP requiresflexibility and swift reactions to real-time world developments. For the olderEU states this has meant giving experts some room for manoeuvre and moreresponsibility vis-à-vis their capitals.

The aforementioned arguments were used to support introducing someformal, institutional reforms in the decision-making process, in particularduring the debate over the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty. However, it is arguedhere that, in order to fully explain the process of adjustment, both formal andinformal rules must be analysed, as we proceed to do in the following section.

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Formal and Informal Mechanisms of Adaptation in CFSP

A lot of attention has been paid to the formal institutionalization ofEuropean governance generally and to CFSP and ESDP in particular(Cameron 1999). Changes in the institutional setting of CFSP throughtreaty changes or other formal agreements have been crucial for ensuringeffective decision-making. However, as this article argues, formal institu-tional arrangements are not sufficient to explain the conduct of the EU’sforeign policy. Informal practices have to be brought into the picture if onewants to make sense of CFSP governance (Nuttall 2000; Smith 2004). Onlyin this way can the impact of enlargement be adequately assessed. Onlyrecently have scholars examined the informal aspects of European gover-nance (see Christiansen and Piattoni 2004), although these studies haveremained limited to the first pillar. In the case of CFSP, one could arguethat informal developments are more likely than in first pillar mattersbecause of the sensitivity of the issues discussed, which are often felt to beat the core of national sovereignty. The introduction of new formalarrangements is usually met with suspicion, in particular where it mightupset the supranational/intergovernmental balance (Duke 2007). For thisreason, new developments tend to be informal in nature and onlyinstitutionalized both when they prove to work and are accepted by allparticipants (Smith 2001; 2004). Given the intergovernmental nature ofdecision-making in this policy area, informal contacts and negotiations alsoseem to be crucial in order to prevent stalemate.

The 2004 and 2007 enlargements have, if anything, confirmed thesignificance of informal arrangements in CFSP committees as will be shownbelow. However, when looking at the impact of enlargement in CFSP, theliterature has mainly focused on policy substance (Archer 2004; Cameronand Primatarova 2003; Edwards 2005; Missiroli 2003), whereas issues ofgovernance have largely remained unexplored. Less common, however, havebeen analyses of the CFSP governance system and the impact of enlargementon it. In such cases, attention has been limited to the formal institutionalsetting and, in particular, linked to the discussions surrounding institutionalreform (e.g. Cameron and Primatarova 2003; Whitman 1999). This articleexplores both the formal and informal adjustment mechanisms put in placeto overcome the challenges posed by recent enlargements in the CFSP area.Before discussing how this adjustment process has taken place, it is impor-tant to outline some formal and informal rules governing the second pillar.

Formal Rules

When talking about formal rules a distinction should be made between (1)formal ‘constitutional’ norms and (2) internal formal rules, also known asrules of procedure. The first are laid out in the treaties and refer to the basicaspects of the CFSP decision-making process — i.e. the voting system, thetypes of decisions and the division of competencies between different actors.The second refer to the internal rules that guide negotiations within the

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Council — the duration and order of interventions, the chairing arrange-ments, etc. — and are compiled in the Council’s Rules of Procedures.Changes in the former are less frequent and require a treaty change. Forinstance, in the case of CFSP, the Nice Treaty of 2001 did not significantlyalter the decision-making process in the wake of enlargement. As for thelatter, changes in the internal rules of the Council were agreed upon for allEU policy areas in order to facilitate negotiations within Council committees,and not exclusively for the CFSP. These formal internal rules constitute thefocus of this section.

In 1999, five years prior to enlargement, the Helsinki European Councilexpressed the need to conduct a reform of the Council’s working methods inorder to maintain effectiveness (Presidency of the EU 1999). Annex III to thePresidency Conclusions contained a large number of proposals on how todeal with many more member states being involved in negotiations. Manyproposals were later repeated in Annex II to the Presidency Conclusions ofthe Seville European Council in 2002 (Presidency of the EU 2002). As a result,the aforementioned recommendations were reflected in the amendmentsto the official Council’s Rules of Procedure in Annex IV, entitled ‘WorkingMethods for an Enlarged Council’ (Council of the EU 2004).

As shown by the empirical research, identifying the formal rules ofnegotiations did not pose a major challenge for the new member state repre-sentatives. They had a right to attend Council meetings as ‘active observers’long before actual enlargement took place. However, even the larger statesamong the candidates did not manage to attend all meetings from the verybeginning. This was due mainly to a lack of experts in the permanentrepresentations, but also to a lack of interest on the part of the variousministerial departments in attending the meetings. Soon, the number ofpeople employed in the permanent representations increased dramaticallyand new coordination mechanisms were introduced in order to adjust therhythm of work to EU agendas. With participation in Council meetings,processes of learning and socialization intensified. Those attending themoften acted as ‘agents of change’ in relation to their capitals. By providingfeedback to their home ministries and making recommendations for change,they were often the frontrunners of needed reforms.

While most formal rules were grasped by the newcomers relatively easily,identifying and adjusting to informal practices was a greater challenge. Asone EU official claimed: ‘the new countries have not yet absorbed [theinformal rules], but it takes time, they cannot just appear [and] read the threelittle books on the rules of the Council’ (anonymous interview, intervieweeD1). To a large degree, informal practices define the work of diplomats inthe committee and may better explain why the expected deadlock in thedecision-making did not take place.

Informal Rules

Some of the formal rules were simply the codification of informal practicesthat had already been taking place during the negotiations in the Council.

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However, in the strive to prevent institutional deadlock, such formal ruleshad to be complemented in everyday practice with an informal ‘code ofconduct’. In general, the 2004 enlargement caused a shift in workingpractices to ‘the corridors’ and informal meetings. This has resulted in agreater complexity to the new working environment. Some of these rules,such as the functioning of ‘like-minded’ groups of states, have been formallyacknowledged and incorporated into the Council’s Rules of Procedure.Many others are not codified, even though they are identified and respectedby diplomats in their everyday work.

One of the first informal rules identified in the conduct of European foreignpolicy was a coordination reflex, which can be defined as a common practiceof information-sharing before any decisions are taken, often even before thenational position is formulated. This practice has been documented in theCFSP literature (de Schouthetee 1980; Nuttall 1992; Smith 2004; Tonra2001) as an increase in communicative practices among CFSP officials. Thesetake place through formal channels, such as the CFSP telex system or themailing lists of the committees, but also informally. Informal contacts aremaintained through the usual channels of e-mails, mobile phone calls andfrequent meetings with other colleagues in the corridors and ‘over lunch’.6

Another code of conduct that has been identified in the CFSP literature isa practice of consensus-building, that is, a tendency to adopt decisions basedon a wide consensus among member states (Tonra 2001). The fact that CFSPis subject to intergovernmental bargaining where states retain their vetopowers (with few exceptions) may suggest that hard bargaining and thethreat of veto dominate CFSP negotiations. By contrast, empirical researchhas highlighted a general practice of keeping everyone on board, a very strongimpulse to reach a compromise among representatives of CFSP committees,and a desire to avoid isolation. Exceptions to this rule might occur, however,in cases of strong national interest.7 This picture at the micro level may differsomewhat from well-documented examples of disagreements among memberstates on foreign policy issues, such as those during the Iraq crisis in 2003.Arguably, these are the exceptions that confirm the rule. In many of thesecases discussions were kept consciously out of the Brussels-based bodies bythe member states because of the sheer sensitivity of the issues.

Another important principle is that of maintaining vertical and horizontalconsistency. This means endeavouring to avoid contradicting the positiontaken earlier on a lower level once it reaches the committee, and to not openup issues in a higher level political forum if they previously have been agreedat a lower level. Finally, it also implies being aware of an informal rule notto contradict the positions of different forums. Breaking this rule was consid-ered a ‘clear breach of procedures’ by one diplomat (anonymous interview,interviewee B). Another claimed that such behaviour is not only ‘badlyperceived’, but for the others ‘it seems that you are not serious, that yoursystem does not work’ (anonymous interview, interviewee F).

Finally, another practice that had to be learnt by the representatives ofthe new member states refers to ‘agreed language’. During the formal nego-tiations national representatives have to respect the language of policy

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agreed previously in the Council conclusions, which constitute part of theacquis politique.

Overcoming the Challenges: The Role of Formal and Informal Rules

This section offers an overview of how the different challenges related toenlargement identified above were overcome, and what the role of the formaland informal rules was in this process. At the same time, the section showshow certain rules changed as a result of the increased number of participantsat the table.

The problem of the expected divergence of interests and potential dead-lock in decision-making process was tackled in a number of ways. The 2004enlargement was often perceived as endangering the consensus-buildingpractice since it would increase the heterogeneity in the EU’s membership(Cameron and Primatarova 2003; Sjursen 1998). In fact, recent enlarge-ments have brought new sensitivities to the CFSP and modified the balanceof interests regarding certain issues and geographical areas. However, thisimpact of enlargement has been uneven throughout the different CFSPcommittees. In some, the incorporation of ten new member states has nothad a significant impact on the discussions and did not increase the numberof intervening actors. For example, this has been the case in the Committeedealing with civilian crisis management. The newcomers often do not speakduring meetings, either because they have no instructions or because they donot have the relevant expertise. In other cases, enlargement has altered thestatus quo or the balance between the member states. Thus, in the Politicaland Security Committee, the EU Military Committee and the WorkingGroup on Transatlantic Relations, enlargement has not changed the dividebetween Atlanticists (supportive of the strengthening of NATO) and Europe-anists (pro an autonomous defence capacity). Nonetheless, it has increasedthe weight of the former, since most of the new member states haveexpressed the need to maintain a close relationship with the US.

In other cases, enlargement has introduced new interests. This has been thecase in the Working Group on Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and partic-ularly as regards the EU’s policies towards Russia, Ukraine, Belarus andMoldova, since some of them share borders with these countries. Most of thenew member states are very active in this working group because theyperceive it to be one of the highest priorities within their activities in the EU.The balance of the group has naturally changed, as well as the discoursewithin it. Some of the new member states, in particular Poland and the Balticstates, have been often accused of being anti-Russian. Other intervieweesstressed the fact that these new member states have brought a ‘new realism’to policies towards this region. According to another diplomat, ‘the balancehas changed after the enlargement […] there is a clear divide at the Councilmeetings into the new and old Europe’ (anonymous interview, intervieweeE1). This suggests that they have changed the dynamics within the group,although another question might be what their impact on the policysubstance has actually been.

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In spite of an increase in the number of actors and the broadening of therange of interests, according to the interviewees generally the consensus-building atmosphere is still evident in the meeting room. The consensus-building rule, therefore, has played an important role in accommodating thenew member states’ interests. Levels of conflict have not increased, or at leastnot substantially, and the degree of effectiveness of the group — understoodas the ability to reach agreements — has also remained constant. Even morethan before, a readiness for compromise is required. As one practitionermentioned, ‘the fact that we are twenty-five now obliges everyone to refrainfrom being too restrictive on specific issues, more than before’ (anonymousinterview, interviewee Z). The increasing number of informal negotiationsmight have also helped to overcome potential deadlocks. The new memberstates have gradually learnt how to better present their strategies, so as notto endanger the consensus atmosphere. They have also come to realize thatradical positions are often condemned through ostracism — that is, beingperceived as radical within the group is a losing strategy.

However, it is true that in the first stages of the adaptation process, thenew member states were not always aware of this consensus-buildingpractice and, on some occasions, concentrated their energies on defendingtheir national positions without reflecting upon the need for compromise orwithout taking into account the general atmosphere within the group. Whilethere is no doubt that the old member states are also concerned about theirnational interests, they often employ a more consensual strategy or try toappeal to the ‘European interest’. For instance, Finland’s more pragmaticapproach towards Russia, engaging others in its proposals for partnershipson environment or development, has often been given as an example of amore successful approach than those of the Baltic countries or Poland. Bycontrast, the Polish ‘veto’ on the mandate for the Commission to negotiate anew agreement with Russia in 2006, and the isolation of Poland on this issue,was given as an example of a ‘nightmare scenario’ for any member state(anonymous interview, interviewee F1).

Another serious threat to effectiveness was time constraints, directlyrelated to the increased number of member states involved in the negotia-tions. This was overcome with the help of both formal and informal rules.In Annex IV to the Council’s Rules of Procedure, dealing with timeconstraints was considered crucial to prevent deadlock (Council of the EU2004). A number of solutions were proposed in this document regardingthe preparation and conduct of meetings: full tours de table were discour-aged; it was advised that items on the agenda of COREPER which were forinformation only, such as briefings over the meetings with third states,should be avoided; the delegations were asked to respect strict time limits.Furthermore, diplomats were asked to avoid repeating points made byother speakers and, unless indicated otherwise by the presidency, silencewould be considered as agreement with a certain proposal. At the sametime, the document encouraged the ‘like-minded delegations’ to holdconsultations prior to the formal meetings and then to delegate a singlespokesperson to present a common line. Such informal practice of states

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cohering around an issue had long existed within the Council, but was inthis way institutionalized in the Council’s Rules of Procedure. This exampleshows that the boundaries between formal and informal rules are notalways clear-cut and can change over time.

The rule of coordination reflex and ‘pre-cooking’ issues on the agendaprior to the meeting also played an important role in overcoming timeconstraints. After the enlargement, as some representatives argued, morenegotiations than before were taking place informally, outside the negotia-tion rooms. As one representative from a new member state claimed, ‘Ibelieve that 90 per cent of issues are resolved in the corridors’ (anonymousinterview, interviewee C1). As there is often not enough time during theformal meetings to explain the motivations behind certain positions,informal contact beforehand has become indispensable. At the same time,there is a common understanding that interventions need to be shorter andmore focused. In sum, according to one diplomat, ‘much more of the nego-tiations take place outside the meetings and […] the formal meetings havebecome just the place where you finalize the discussions’ (anonymous inter-view, interviewee Z).

Due to this increasing complexity, many issues on the agenda need to be‘pre-cooked’ in order to increase the effectiveness of the group. Like-mindedgroups of states have become the perfect setting for such negotiations.Sometimes these groups prepare common amendments and discuss thestrategy for the meeting, including the order of participants taking the floor.Like-minded groups operate on a very informal basis and usually participantscredit each other with trust. However, as one of the diplomats pointed out,such intensive cooperation within the like-minded groups could eventuallybecome a threat to the overall cohesion and socialization dynamics within thecommittee at large (anonymous interview, interviewee F1).

Maintaining consistency was another rule that helped to minimize timespent on negotiations during the formal meetings. With the arrival of the tennew member states, the fear was that if this rule was not respected there wouldbe chaos in the decision-making process, as issues previously closed could bere-opened at higher levels. In general, it seems that the newcomers identifiedthis rule (the observation period helped in this regard) and that it was usuallyapplied. On some occasions, however, respecting this practice proved to bea challenge for the new member states; breaching it mostly resulted from thelack of efficient coordination mechanisms or insufficient knowledge of pastCFSP dossiers.

The role of institutional actors, such as the Commission or the CouncilSecretariat, has also been key to ensuring an efficient decision-makingprocess. Since most of the new member states are small, they are moredependent on the information they receive from EU institutions. Therefore,enlargement has put a lot of pressure on the Commission’s services that haveto deal with twenty-seven states. In the case of the Council Secretariat,enlargement has strengthened its role in providing logistical support andmaintaining the CFSP institutional memory. The evidence also demonstratesthat the presidency has become a key actor, even more so than before, by

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ensuring a smooth functioning of CFSP committees in its role as chair of themeeting, primus inter pares and agenda-setter. Diplomats generally agreethat the effectiveness of the meetings after enlargement is, to a large extent,conditioned by a good presidency, particularly when it comes to negotiatingintricate deals.

Finally, as mentioned before, there was a fear that different negotiationand organizational experiences would negatively influence decision-making.Here, the period when acceding countries were active observers played animportant role. The newcomers had a chance to participate in the meetingsand learn some of the rules that were respected there. Some individualdiplomats were already suggesting necessary changes to organizationaldesigns, for example, shortening the decision-making path or creditingexperts in the committees with more trust and responsibility. Many of themalso had to convince their colleagues that working within the multinationalenvironment of the EU required a new approach, quite distinct from thetraditional bilateral relations that they were used to.

Regarding the adaptation process that the representatives from the newmember states underwent, it arguably all comes down to learning a new nego-tiating strategy, one that allows reconciling consensus and national interest.The first thing the newcomers had to learn was to present their instructionsin a less aggressive manner. As some diplomats noticed, there has been achange in the behaviour and language that the new representatives use in thecommittees, with them becoming more pragmatic and ready to negotiate.Referring to changes observed in their behaviour, an EU official commentedthat the new member states’ representatives ‘now speak differently than theydid one year ago. They make things softer, they have gained some confidenceand friendship with other colleagues so they feel confident to present thingsless radically than their capitals might wish, but in the end they get moreresults’ (anonymous interview, interviewee W). This is arguably a result ofthe socialization process that the national representatives from the newmember states are subjected to in the Council. On the other hand, CFSPcommittees have also served as learning arenas for representatives of the oldmember states and the EU officials, who could discover how the candidatesbehaved, the organizational designs of their national ministries andcoordination mechanisms.

In sum, the previous account has shown that, overall, formal and informalpractices have served as a way out of institutional deadlock. Yet, if we lookat other aspects of governance, in particular at legitimacy aspects, any suchevaluation might not be so positive. This issue is further discussed in theconcluding section.

Conclusions: Implications for CFSP Legitimacy

This article has examined the challenges that recent enlargement has posedto the effectiveness of the day-to-day functioning of the Council committeesdealing with CFSP. It contributes to the bulk of literature analysing the impactthat recent enlargement has had on the EU and its decision-making process,

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but also offers some insights into the specific mode of governance of thesecond pillar. This contribution argues that formal institutional arrangementsare not enough to explain the conduct of the EU’s foreign policy. Informalpractices have to be properly considered if one wants to make sense of CFSPgovernance. Only in this way can the impact of enlargement be adequatelyassessed.

The prospect of such ambitious EU enlargement sparked an intense debateabout formal institutional arrangements and ways to accommodate ten newmember states. The fact that they would join the negotiating table withdifferent experiences, administrative backgrounds and interests, while theunanimity rule remained in place, was considered by some as a recipe forstalemate in CFSP. Fears about deadlock were amplified by the rift over theinvasion of Iraq in 2003. In spite of the challenges posed by enlargement, theaccession of twelve new member states does not seem to have had a negativeimpact on CFSP output which, as shown in Table 1, remains overallunchanged in terms of the number of decisions agreed. There have, however,been changes in the nature of some of the issues discussed, particularlyregarding policies towards Eastern Europe, since the new member states havebrought with them their foreign policy concerns.

This contribution has shown that changes in the formal internal rules ofthe Council have been important in overcoming potential problems. Withouta doubt, adjustments in the informal practices of the CFSP committees andthe learning processes undergone by the new member state representativeshave been crucial in this regard. Changes in formal and informal rules havealso had an impact on the way interactions take place. In the case of formalmeetings, enlargement increased the bargaining component because of timeconstraints and the fact that there were more actors in the room. As forinformal forums and in particular at the level of Council working groups, ithas facilitated more deliberation. This is because in the latter case nationalrepresentatives now have more time to justify and explain their positions, meet-ings have been closed and they have been conducted in a friendly atmosphere.

On the other hand, changes to CFSP rules of procedure resulting fromenlargement may have had a negative impact when it comes to CFSP’slegitimacy. Legitimacy in this policy area (or rather lack thereof) has been thesubject of extensive discussion in the literature (Barbé and Herranz 2005;Bono 2006), and it is not the intention of this contribution to go into detailabout this topic. As regards CFSP, more than in any other policy area we areconfronted by the dilemma of ‘democracy vs. effectiveness’. The degree ofinformality and secrecy becomes even more of an imperative because of thespecific nature of negotiations in this pillar. It has been mentioned elsewhere(Smith 2000) that CFSP can only work in a confidential environment. AsSmith (2000, 616) argues, ‘[w]hile this rule apparently violates some morefundamental rules of European integration (such as democratic legitimacyand openness), it is difficult to see how political co-operation could haveproceeded without it’.

In a context in which formal face-to-face contacts are increasinglydifficult, the fact that enlargement has led to the creation of more informal

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negotiating forums and more informal contacts outside formal meetings canbe seen as the only way in which to preserve the consensual atmosphere. Onthe other hand, this might have only added to the democratic deficit alreadynoted in this policy area. Moreover, the institutionalization of like-mindedgroups can also be seen as a challenge to democratic practice because of therestricted and unequal access of its membership.8 In this way, CFSP mightprevent proper policy learning since dialogue between ‘all’ committeemembers does not take place in these forums. The impact of enlargement onCFSP committees thus shows that striking a balance between efficiency andlegitimacy remains an increasingly difficult issue. By adapting the formaland informal rules in the wake of recent enlargement, European diplomatshave ensured that exchanges in this policy area survive, but at the same timehave made the CFSP even more insulated and complex for the generalpublic.

Any conjectures about how this paradox of European foreign policy isgoing to be resolved can, at present, only be more or less informed guesswork.A stronger role on the part of the national parliaments and the EuropeanParliament in monitoring EU foreign policy could increase the legitimacy ofthis policy without disturbing the negotiating atmosphere in Brussels. It isunclear, however, which mechanisms would be introduced to facilitatepersonal contacts and dialogue in formal meetings among twenty-sevennational representatives (and even more if enlargement continues to thewestern Balkans and Turkey).

Finally, one needs to be cautious about the alleged impact of enlargementon CFSP committee governance, since other factors also need to be taken intoaccount. In this regard, the institutional reforms laid out in the new LisbonTreaty, if ever ratified, will most likely impact upon CFSP governance, as wasthe case with previous treaties. The new High Representative for the ForeignAffairs and Security Policy envisaged in the Lisbon Treaty will replace theexisting rotating presidency in CFSP and, consequently, reduce the opportu-nities for learning and socialization that this position traditionally offered tothe country at the helm. Yet, a permanent chair could facilitate consistencyin the formulation of the agenda and could be seen as a more impartial medi-ator than the current EU presidency. Other factors affecting CFSP governancecan be mentioned here, to name but a few: external events (e.g. internationalcrises), the development of the ESDP (and the consequent role of the CouncilSecretariat) and new technological advances. The cumulative impact of allthese factors on CFSP governance is, however, difficult to anticipate.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Uwe Puetter, Paul Stephenson, RichardWhitman and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments, as well asthe many officials who gave up their time to discuss their work. Ana E.Juncos also gratefully acknowledges the financial assistance of theRiksbankens Jubileumsfond through the European Foreign and SecurityPolicy Studies Programme.

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Notes1. Having said that, one needs to be aware of the limitations of such a quantitative account in that it

does not reflect variations in the substance of the agreed decisions, nor does it take into accountdecisions agreed only informally. The former (changes in the substance of CFSP decisions) arediscussed below.

2. Interviews have been coded using the alphabet to maintain the anonymity of the interviewees.3. That said, the PSC can also meet in ‘political directors’ formation and other CFSP committees can

meet in ‘national capitals’ formation.4. The issue of socialization within CFSP committees has been dealt with elsewhere (Juncos and

Pomorska 2006).5. For instance, countries like Poland and Lithuania were already active in Eastern Europe prior to

enlargement, with the former even trying to promote its own idea of creating an independent ‘Easterndimension’.

6. On this point, one must also take into account recent technological progress that has improved andintensified means of communication, e.g. mobile phones and e-mail.

7. For instance, initial opposition from Cyprus to proceed with the negotiation of an Action Plan withAzerbaijan in 2005 was justified on the basis of this ‘national interest’ (European Report 2005).

8. We are grateful to Uwe Puetter for directing us to this point.

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