Equi-Asia Placement, Inc. v. Department of Foreign Affairs and Department of Labor and Employment

GR 152214 September 19, 2006

O FW Manny dela Rosa Razon died of acute cardiac arrest while asleep at the dormitory of the Samsong Textile Processing Factory in South Korea. As a result thereof, the OWWA requested

petitioner Equi-Asia, the agency responsible for Razon‘s recruitment and deployment, to provide for Prepaid T icket Advice (PTA) and assistance for the repatriation of Razon‘s remains. Equi-Asia denied responsibility for providing such assistance arguing that Razon violated his employment contract by unlawfully escaping from his company assignment without prior authorization. In lieu of such assistance,

it suggested that Razon‘s relatives can avail of the benefits provided for by OWWA in cases involving undocumented/illegal Filipino workers abroad. OWWA, in response to petitioner‘s denials, invoked Sections 52 to 55 of the Implementing Rules Governing RA 8042 provding that ―the repatriation of OFW, his/her remains and transport of his personal effects is the primary responsibility of the principal or agency

and to immediately advance the cost of plane fare without prior determination of the cause of worker's repatriation‖. In consequence thereof, Equi-Asia filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the legality and constitutionality of said provisions in the implementing rules on the ground

that it expanded Section 15 of RA 8042. It contends thus - Sec. 15 of R.A. 8042 clearly contemplates prior notice and hearing before responsibility thereunder could be established against the agency that sets up the defense of sole fault in avoidance of said responsibility -.Besides, the sections in question unduly grant the powers to require advance payment of the plane fare, to impose the corresponding penalty of suspension

in case of non-compliance therewith, within 48 hours and to recover said advance payment from the dead worker's estate upon the return of his remains to the country before the NLRC, when the law itself does not expressly provide for the grant of such powers.

Issue: Whether or not Sections 52, 53, 54 and 55 of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 8042, issued by DFA and POEA, is illegal and/or violative of due process such that POEA acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and/or in grave abuse of discretion in issuing said order to pay said expenses.

Held: The petition of the petitioner should be dismissed on the following grounds:

(1) [Procedural] For a petition for certiorari to prosper, the writ must be directed against a tribunal, a

board or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Citing Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, the Court prefatorily defined and distinguished between quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative powers exercised by administrative agencies. In exercising its quasi-judicial function, an administrative body adjudicates the rights of persons before it , in accordance with the standards laid down by the law.

The determination of facts and the applicable law, as basis for official action and the exercise of judicial discretion, are essential for the performance of this function. On these considerations, it is elementary that due process requirements must be observed. Other hand, quasi-legislative power is exercised by administrative agencies through the promulgation of rules and regulations within the confines of the

granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegation of certain powers flowing from the separation of the great branches of the government. Prior notice to and hearing of every affected party, as elements of due process, are not required since there is no determination of past events or facts that have to be established or ascertained. In this case, petitioner assails certain provisions of the Omnibus Rules. However, these

rules were clearly promulgated by respondents Department of Foreign Affairs and Department of Labor and Employment in the exercise of their quasi-legislative powers or the authority to promulgate rules and regulations. Because of this, petitioner was, thus, mistaken in availing himself of the remedy of an original action for certiorari as obviously, only judicial or quasi-judicial acts are proper subjects thereof.

(2) [Delegation of Administrative functions; Rationale] It is now well-settled that delegation of legislative power to various specialized administrative agencies is allowed in the face of increasing complexity of modern life. Given the volume and variety of interactions involving the members of today's

society, it is doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws dealing with the minutiae aspects of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to administrative bodies, as the principal agencies tasked to execute laws with respect to their specialized fields, the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and effectuate its policies. All that is required for the valid exercise of this power of

subordinate legislation is that the regulation must be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; and

that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law. Under the first test or the so-called completeness test, the law must be complete in all its terms and

conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it . The second test or the sufficient standard test, mandates that there should be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.

(3) [Compliance with test of delegation] Section 53 of the Omnibus Rules is not invalid for contravening Section 15 of the law which states that a placement agency shall not be responsible for a worker's repatriation should the termination of the employer-employee relationship be due to the fault of the OFW.

The statute merely states the general principle that in case the severance of the employment was because of the OFW's own undoing, it is only fair that he or she should shoulder the costs of his or her homecoming. Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042, however, certainly does not preclude a placement agency from establishing the circumstances surrounding an OFW's dismissal from service in an

appropriate proceeding. As such determination would most likely take some time, it is only proper that an OFW be brought back here in our country at the soonest possible time lest he remains stranded in a foreign land during the whole time that recruitment agency contests its liability for repatriation.

Repatriation is in effect an unconditional responsibility of the agency and/or its principal that cannot be delayed by an investigation of why the worker was terminated from employment. To be left stranded in a foreign land without the financial means to return home and being at the mercy of unscrupulous individuals is a violation of the OFW's dignity and his human rights. These are the

same rights R.A. No. 8042 seeks to protect.

CABRERA vs. LAPID (Fish Pond)

Facts:

Petitioner accused respondents of violating Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and

Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.

Petitioner stated that she entered into a lease agreement with the Municipality of Sasmuan over a tract of land for the purpose of devoting it to fishpond operations. According to petitioner, she had spent

approximately P5,000,000.00 for its construction before the fishpond operations commenced in August 1995. A month later, petitioner learned from newspaper reports of the impending demolition of her fishpond as it was purportedly illegal and blocked the flow of the Pasak River. Thus, petitioner sent the fishpond administrator to dissuade respondents from destroying her property.

Despite pleas from petitioner, respondents ordered the destruction of petitioner's fishpond. The property was demolished on 10 October 1995 by dynamite blasting. Petitioner alleged that the demolition was

purposely carried out in the presence of media representatives and other government officials to gain media mileage. Petitioner imputed evident bad faith on respondents Mayor Baltazar and Vice-Mayor Cabrera in allowing the destruction of the fishpond despite their prior knowledge of the existence of the lease agreement. She also charged respondents Governor Lapid and Senior Superintendent Ventura with

gross inexcusable negligence for ordering the destruction of the fishpond without first verifying its legality.

Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Resolution, arguing that under Sec. 149 of Republic Act (R.A.)

No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges is vested in the municipalities. Petitioner also questioned the certification by the Municipal Health Officer, alleging that the same was issued before the ocular inspection of the property

which took place only on the day of the demolition. Petitioner also contended that a judicial proceeding was necessary to determine whether the property indeed had caused the flooding.

Respondents filed

separate oppositions to petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed a reply to the opposition

and respondent Governor Lapid filed a rejoinder to the reply.

Issue: WON the issuances of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 is valid.

Ruling: Neither can petitioner avail of Sec. 27 of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman

Act of 1989. The provision allowed direct appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the O ffice of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court. The right to appeal is granted only in respect to orders or decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases.

The provision does not cover resolutions

of the Ombudsman in criminal cases.

However, an aggrieved party in criminal actions is not without any recourse. Where grave

abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction taints the findings of the Ombudsman on the existence of probable cause, the aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The remedy from resolutions of the Ombudsman in preliminary investigations of criminal cases is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

But in this case, petitioner has taken the position that the Ombudsman has decided questions of substance contrary to law and the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court. That is a ground under a Rule 45 petition. Indeed, from a reading of the assignment of errors, it is clear that petitioner does not impute grave

abuse of discretion to the Ombudsman in issuing the assailed Resolution and Order. Rather, she merely questions his findings and conclusions. As stated earlier, direct appeal to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari is not sanctioned by any rule of procedure. By availing of a wrong remedy, the

petition should be dismissed outright.

Even if the Court treats the instant appeal as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, its dismissal is nevertheless warranted because petitioner failed to present, much more substantiate, any grave abuse of

discretion on the part of the Ombudsman.

A careful reading of the questioned Resolution reveals that the Ombudsman dismissed petitioner's

criminal complaint because respondents had validly resorted to the police power of the State when they effected the demolition of the illegal fishpond in question following the declaration thereof as a nuisance per se. Thus, the Ombudsman was of the opinion that no violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act or of Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code was committed by respondents. In the

words of the Ombudsman, "those who participated in the blasting of the subject fishpond were only impelled by their desire to serve the best interest of the general public; for the good and the highest good."

The other errors raised by petitioner pertain to the Ombudsman's opinion on the lack of probable cause to

indict respondents. These are purported errors in judgment which can be corrected by an appeal, although not via a direct appeal to this Court. Direct resort to this Court may be had only through the extraordinary writ of certiorari and upon showing that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion, which

petitioner failed to demonstrate.

The instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.

BO KINGO VS CA (Land) Facts:

- Petitioner is one of the defendants in the complaint for injunction and damages filed by Ernesto

Campos et al. with the RTC. From the complaint, Campos and co-claimants assert to have a better right to file a public land application covering the subject land as petitioner‘s and his co-claimants‘ application for the tit ling of the subject land was dismissed by the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer.

- Petitioner lodged with the Court of Appeals motion to dismiss alleging that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim, since his contention is that the value of the

land at issue was less than 15k, and thus jurisdiction properly belongs to the MTC. Acting thereon, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss and ruled in favor of Campos‘.

- Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision dismissing the said petition for lack of merit , in fact and in law. It ruled that the remedy of certiorari is unavailing since the denial of the motion to dismiss is considered an interlocutory order.

Issue : - Whether or not an interlocutory order can be the subject of an extraordinary petition for

certiorari.

Held/Ratio:

- Court of Appeals properly sustained that the mere fact that petitioner failed to move for the

reconsideration of the court a quo‘s order denying his motion to dismiss was sufficient cause for the outright dismissal of the said petition. No error can therefore be had in the dismissal by

the Court of Appeals of petitioner‘s petition for certiorari filed therewith. Certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the respondent court to allow it an opportunity to correct its errors, if any. Petitioner did not proffer any compelling reason to warrant deviation by the Court of Appeals from this salutary rule.

- In any case, the petition lacks substantive merit. Judging by the contents of the complaint by the private respondents, the action was not yet a possessory one, but an injunction to prevent Bokingo from stopping them from performing a survey of the land in question.

- As further observed by the Court of Appeals, petitioner failed to even allege grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court, a quo in rendering the order denying his motion to dismiss.

GO NZALES vs ABAYA (Military Courts)

FACTS: In relation to the celebrated Oakwood mutiny where a total of 321 soldiers including petitioners herein declared their withdrawal of support to the Commander-in-chief, President Gloria Macapagal-

Arroyo declared a state of rebellion and ordered the arrest of the said soldiers. In order to avoid a bloody confrontation, the government sent negotiators to dialogue with the soldiers. After several hours of negotiation, the government panel succeeded in convincing them to lay down their arms and defuse the

explosives placed around the premises of the Oakwood Apartments. Eventually, they returned to their barracks. The NBI investigated the incident and recommended that the military personnel involved be charged with

coup d'etat defined and penalized under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The Chief State Prosecutor of the DOJ recommended the filing of the corresponding Information against them. Meanwhile, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War, respondent General Narciso Abaya, then AFP

Chief of Staff, ordered the arrest and detention of the soldiers involved in the Oakwood incident and directed the AFP to conduct its own separate investigation . On August 5, 2003, the DOJ filed with the RTC Makati, an Information for coup d'etat against those

soldiers, Subsequently, this case was consolidated involving the other accused. On August 13, 2003, the RTC directed the DOJ to conduct a reinvestigation. On the same date, respondent Chief of Staff issued Letter Order No. 625 creating a Pre-Trial Investigation Panel tasked to determine the propriety of filing

with the military tribunal charges for violations of Commonwealth Act No. 408, 4 (otherwise known as "The Articles of War"), as amended, against the same military personnel. Of the original 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, only 243 (including petitioners herein) filed

with the RTC, Branch 148 an Omnibus Motion praying that the said trial court assume jurisdiction over all the charges filed with the military tribunal. They invoked Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7055.

Subsequently, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Final Pre-Trial Investigation Report to the

JAGO, recommending that, following the "doctrine of absorption," those charged with coup d'etat before the RTC should not be charged before the military tribunal for violation of the Articles of War . For its part, the RTC, on February 11, 2004, issued an Order stating that "all charges before the court

martial against the accused . . . are hereby declared not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d'etat." The trial court then proceeded to hear petitioners' applications for bail.

Colonel Julius A. Magno, in his capacity as officer-in-charge of the JAGO, reviewed the findings of the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel. He recommended that 29 of the officers involved in the Oakwood incident, including petitioners, be prosecuted before a general court martial for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War. The same was approved by the AFP.

The AFP Judge Advocate General then directed petitioners to submit their answer to the charge. Instead of complying, they filed with this Court the instant Petition for Prohibition praying that respondents be

ordered to desist from charging them with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War in relation to the Oakwood incident. Petitioners maintain that since the RTC has made a determination in its Order of February 11, 2004 that

the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is not service-connected, but is absorbed in the crime of coup d'etat, the military tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its jurisdiction.

ISSUE: 1.Whether the court martial may assume jurisdiction over those who have been criminally charged of coup d‘état before the regular courts.

2. Whether the doctrine of absorption of crimes is applicable.

HELD: 1. Yes. Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected. This is expressly provided in Section 1

(second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. It bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly -constituted authorities. Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. In short, the charge has a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of

the "service-connected" nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same — dismissal from the service — imposable only by the military court. Such penalty is purely disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military discipline.

Hence, there is no merit in petitioners argument that they can no longer be charged before the court martial for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War because the same has been declared by the RTC in its Order of February 11, 2004 as "not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the

alleged crime of coup d'etat," hence, triable by said court (RTC). The RTC, in making such declaration, practically amended the law which expressly vests in the court martial the jurisdiction over "service-connected crimes or offenses." What the law has conferred the court should not take away. It is only the

Constitution or the law that bestows jurisdiction on the court, tribunal, body or officer over the subject matter or nature of an action which can do so. And it is only through a constitutional amendment or legislative enactment that such act can be done. The first and fundamental duty of the courts is merely to apply the law "as they find it , not as they like it to be. Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes

grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void.

2. No. The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by holding that the charge of Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman is absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged crime of coup

d'etat. Firstly, the doctrine of ‗absorption of crimes' is peculiar to criminal law and generally applies to crimes punished by the same statute, unlike here where different statutes are involved. Secondly, the doctrine applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction over both offenses. Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over service-connected offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles of

War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not applicable to this case.

INIEGO vs. PURGANAN, (money claims)

FACTS :

• PR Fokker Santos filed a complaint for quasi-delict and damages against Pinion, the driver of a truck

involved in a traffic accident, and against petitioner Iniego, as owner of the said truck and employer of Pinion.

• The complaint stemmed from a vehicular accident when a freight truck allegedly being driven by Pinion

hit PR‘s jitney which PR was driving at the time of the accident.

• Petitioner filed a Motion to Admit and a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground,

among other things, that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the cause of action of the case.

• Public respondent Judge Purganan (RTC) denied the Motion to Dismiss of the petitioner and the Motion to Declare Defendant in Default of PR because it gave merit to IÑEGO while alleged that he never

received the Order.

• PR: RTC has exclusive jurisdiction because the cause of action is the claim for damages, which

exceeds P400,000.00. The complaint prays for actual damages in the amount of P40,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00, and exemplary damages in the amount of P150,000.00. Excluding attorney‘s fees in the amount of P50,000.00, the total amount of damages being claimed is P490,000.00.

• RTC : This court is of the view that the main cause of action is not the claim for damages but quasi-delict. But since faultor negligence (quasidelicts) could not be the subject of pecuniary estimation, this court has exclusive jurisdiction.

• CA: affirmed.

• PETITIONER: Actions for damages based on quasi-delict are actions that are capable of pecuniary estimation; hence, the jurisdiction in such cases falls upon either the municipal courts or theRegional Trial Courts, depending on the value of the damages claimed. Further, that the moral and exemplary damages claimed by PR be excluded from the computation of the total amount of damages for

jurisdictional purposes because the said moral and exemplary damages arose, not from the quasi-delict, but from the petitioner‘s refusal to pay the actual damages.

HELD:

Respondent Judge concluded that since fault or negligence in quasi-delicts cannot be the subject of pecuniary estimation, the RTC has jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed respondent Judge in this respect.

• Respondent Judge’s observation is erroneous. • It is crystal clear from B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, that what must be determined to be capable or incapable of

pecuniary estimation is not the cause of action, but the subject matter of the action.

• A cause of action is "the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff."

• The "subject matter of the action" is "the physical facts, the thing real or personal, the money, lands, chattels, and the like, in relation to which the suit is prosecuted, and not the delict or wrong

committed by the defendant."

• Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are primarily and effectively actions for the recovery of a sum of money for the damages suffered because of the defendant‘s alleged tortious acts. The damages

claimed in such actions represent the monetary equivalent of the injury caused to the plaintiff by the defendant, which are thus sought to be recovered by the plaintiff. This money claim is the principal relief sought, and is not merely incidental thereto or a consequence thereof.

• We therefore rule that the subject matter of actions for damages based on quasi-delict is capable of pecuniary estimation. Petitioner argues that in actions for damages based on quasi-delict, claims for damages arising from a different cause of action (i.e., other than the fault or negligence of the

defendant) should not be included in the computation of the jurisdictional amount.

• We cannot give credence to petitioner‘s arguments.

• The distinction he made between damages arising directly from injuries in a quasi-delict and those arising from a refusal to admit liability for a quasi-delict is more apparent than real, as the damages sought by respondent originate from the same cause of action:the quasi-delict.

• All claims for damages should be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court regardless of whether they arose from a single cause of action or several causes of action.

• Rule 2, Section 5, of the Rules of Court allows a party to assert as many causes of action as he may have against the opposing party. Subsection (d) of said section provides that where the claims in all such joined causes of action are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the

test of jurisdiction.

• Hence, whether or not the different claims for damages are based on a single cause of action or different causes of action, it is the total amount thereof which shall govern. Jurisdiction in the case at bar

remains with the RTC, considering that the total amount claimed, inclusive of the moral and exemplary damages claimed, is P490,000.00. In sum, actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are actions that are capable of pecuniary estimation. As such, they fall within the jurisdiction of either

the RTC or the municipal courts, depending on the amount of damages claimed. In this case, the amount of damages claimed is within the jurisdiction of the RTC, since it is the claim for all kinds of damages that is the basis of determining the jurisdiction of courts, whether the claims for damages arise from the same or from different causes of action.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari ishereby DENIED for lack of merit

BERNAS VS SO VEREIGN VENTURES

Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Quezon City. Respondent claims that the same property is also registered in its name. Since the same property is covered by conflicting titles, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a verified Petition for Quieting of T itle with application for a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the Register of Deeds of Quezon

City from annotating notices of lis pendens on his tit les. Respondent alleged that such notices will prejudice its plan to sell the property.

RTC, on February 26, 1996, issued an Order directing the parties to maintain the status quo. Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion assailing the said Order on the ground that he was not notified of the raffle of the case. During the hearing of petitioner's Omnibus Motion on March 7, 1996, petitioner orally moved for the re-raffle of the case and pleaded for a re-hearing of the "propriety of the issuance of a restraining

order." The trial court denied his motion, holding that the absence of a notice of raffle was "cured" by the present hearing wherein all the parties are present. Petitioner reviewed the records of the case and failed to see any notice of raffle. But when he again examined the records after two weeks, he found among the records the notice of raffle sent to him at the Castillo Laman Tan Pantaleon and San Jose Law Offices,

where he previously worked as an associate attorney.

Petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari, He alleged that the trial court, in issuing the Order

restraining the parties from causing the annotation of lis pendens on the land titles, committed grave abuse of discretion. Court dismissed the petition for petitioner's failure to attach to his petition an affidavit of service of copies thereof to respondent. Petitioner again filed with this Court a similar petition, dismissed the petition for being late; and that a similar petition (G.R. No. 125058) was dismissed in a Resolution

dated July 1, 1996 which had become final and executory.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction due to lack of notice of raffle to him. the trial court issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss and

directing petitioner to file his answer to the complaint. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, the appellate court rendered its Decision dismissing the petition, holding that the trial court did not gravely abuse its

discretion since petitioner was notified of the raffle as shown by the records of the case. Moreover, petitioner having voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court, the latter has acquired jurisdiction over his person.

ISSUE

1. The sole issue for our resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, in issuing the Order directing the parties to maintain the status quo prior to the filing of the complaint and restraining them from causing the annotation of lis pendens on the titles of the subject property.

HELD:

1. NO.. From the foregoing, it is clear that the prerequisites for conducting a raffle when there is a prayer for temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction are: there must be a notice of the raffle to the adverse party or the person to be enjoined; and the raffle must be conducted in the latter's presence. The Rule also provides that the notice shall be preceded or

accompanied by a service of summons to the adverse party or the person to be enjoined. Petitioner has no reason to complain. The trial court sent the notice of raffle t o

petitioner at his previous business address, the Castillo Laman Tan Pantaleon and San Jose

Law Offices, and it was received by Glenda Jamora, a receptionist there. The trial court cannot be blamed for sending the notice to the said law firm because it was the address stated in respondent 's petition for quieting of tit le.

Moreover, as held by the trial court, petitioner voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the said court. Records show that on March 27, 1996, he filed a Motion for a

Bill of Particulars; on May 13, 1996, he filed a Motion to Cite Respondent and Counsel in Contempt of Court, praying for "other reliefs, just and equitable." Also, he filed an Omnibus Motion assailing the trial court's order restraining the annotation of lis pendenson the tit les of the property in litigation. He participated in the hearing of this motion. And lastly, he filed a

motion to dismiss the petition. A court generally acquires jurisdiction over a person through either a valid service

of summons or the person's voluntary appearance in court. As shown by the records, petitioner has brought the same issue before this Court three times. He is, therefore, warned that,

henceforth, no similar petition shall be entertained.

UNIO N BANK VS SEC

private respondent Mabasa & Company, Inc. (Mabasa) owned and held certificates of stock representing 4,532 shares in International Corporate Bank (ICB). Private respondent Mabasa also acquired from Vicente Tan certificates of stock representing 3,098 ICB shares. Private respondent repeatedly requested ICB to allow it to inspect ICB's corporate books and to record the transfer of the 3,098 shares it acquired

from Tan. ICB, however, failed to act on private respondent 's requests.

private respondent filed with the Prosecution and Enforcement Department (PED) of public respondent

SEC an action to compel ICB to allow it to inspect ICB's corporate books and to record the transfer of the 3,098 shares it acquired from Tan. PED dismissed the case without prejudice to the filing of another complaint with the Securities Investigation and Clearing Department (SICD) of public respondent SEC where jurisdiction properly pertained.

Meanwhile, ICB merged with petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP), with the latter as the surviving corporation. Under the terms of the merger, petitioner assumed all the liabilities and obligations

of ICB so that any accrued claims or pending actions or proceedings against ICB may be prosecuted against petitioner.

Accordingly, private respondent Mabasa filed a Petition[5] with the SICD against petitioner UBP, praying: (a) that it be allowed to inspect petitioner's corporate books; (b) for petitioner to record the

transfer to private respondent of the 3,098 shares it acquired from Tan; (c) to replace or reissue private respondent's shares and the dividends due thereon; and (d) if replacement or reissuance is not possible, to pay the fair market value thereof plus damages.

SICD ruled in favor of private respondent Mabasa

Petitioner UBP filed a Motion for Reconsideration[8] of the SICD's decision, to no avail. petitioner filed an appeal with the SEC en banc

Meantime, Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as the Securities Regulation Code, was approved by then President Joseph E. Estrada on July 19, 2000. The law transferred the SEC's original and exclusive jurisdiction over intra-corporate cases to the courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional

Trial Court (RTC) except for "pending cases involving intra-corporate disputes submitted for final resolution which should be resolved within one (1) year from the enactment of [the] Code."[11]

On June 15, 2001, the SEC en banc affirmed the decision of the SICD with respect to the 4,532 shares but

reversed it with respect to the 3,098 shares acquired from Tan

CA AFFIRMED

ISSUE

whether the SEC, after its decision in a case belonging to the above category of intra-corporate cases has become final and executory, retains the power to execute its subject decision.

HELD

Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause or the right to act in a case. The general rule is

that where there is jurisdiction of the person and subject matter, the resolution of all questions arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction.[34] The grant to a tribunal or agency of adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and adjudge cases, should normally and logically be deemed to include the grant of authority to enforce or execute the judgments it renders, unless the law otherwise provides.[35]

This is so because the authority to decide cases is inutile unless accompanied by the authority to see to it that what has been decided is carried out.[

[S]ince jurisdiction over said category of cases has been retained by the SEC, the 1-year period from the

enactment of the law within which the cases should be resolved was more of a directive to the SEC to hasten the resolution of the cases. A contrary holding results in absurdity, for, assuming that the cases were not resolved after the 1-year period and the effect was that the SEC would lose jurisdiction over the

cases, there would then be no court or body that could resolve the cases since jurisdiction over them was not transferred to the RTC.

Another excerpt of the deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on the Securities Act of

2000 confirms the intent for the SEC to finish the pending cases involving intra-corporate disputes already submitted for final resolution.[45] This must be deemed as including the power to execute as "execution is the fruit and end of the suit , and is very aptly called the life of the law

We further take light from the presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and courts are not to give words a meaning which would lead to absurd or unreasonable consequences.[47] As correctly argued by private respondent Mabasa and public respondent

SEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, petitioner's interpretation that the SEC retains jurisdiction over the category of intra-corporate cases under Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799 for the purpose of deciding the same on the merits but, once decided, transfers said jurisdiction to the RTC for execution would only result in needless delays. Indeed, we have emphasized that splitt ing of jurisdiction is

obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.[48]

Since the power of the SEC to execute its decisions in intra-corporate cases over which it retained jurisdiction pursuant to Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799 is clear, petitioner 's objection against public

respondent SEC's enlistment of the aid of a sheriff to execute its final and executory decision in the instant case has no leg to stand on

GO LANGCO VS FUNG (entrapment)

FACTS : Respondent is an employee of the POEA and was, at that time, assigned as Officer-In-Charge of the Operations and Surveillance Division, Anti-Illegal Recruitment Branch, Licensing and Regulation Office, under the auspices of the DOLE. Some inspectors of the POEA Licensing and Regulation Office

went to the office of G&M (Phil.) Inc. and inquired from petitioner Golangco, the President of G&M (Phil.) Inc., about the allegation that the agency collected excessive fees from its applicants. Petitioner Golangco denied such allegation. The operatives recommended that an entrapment operation be conducted on the employees of the agency. A joint POEA-CIS team headed by respondent with eight

others as members, including SPO4 Bonita and SPO2 Zacarias, proceeded to the premises of G&M (Phil.) Inc. to conduct the said operation. During the arrest of Encenada, petitioner Golangco was not

around. When he arrived, he, too, was arrested by the PO EA-CIS team and was brought to the PO EA Headquarters for investigation. Aggrieved by his arrest, petitioner Golangco filed a criminal complaint against respondent before the Office of the Ombudsman for arbitrary detention and violation of Section 3, paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. An administrative complaint for oppression, abuse of authority, gross inefficiency, gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct arising from the same

incident was likewise filed against respondent.

The administrative complaint against respondent, proceeded independently of the criminal complaint. In a Resolution dated 13 March 1995, GIO II Celso R. Dao found respondent guilty of the

administrative charges against him and recommended his dismissal from the service for cause with the accessory penalties of forfeiture of his leave credits and retirement benefits and disqualification from further re-employment in the government. This Resolution was disapproved by Assistant Ombudsman

Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr. who recommended the reassignment of the case to another graft investigating officer so that the administrative aspect of the case can "be reconciled with the facts found in the criminal aspect of the case." The recommendation of Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr. was later approved by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco A. Villa and the case was reassigned to GIO Onos.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT A QUO HAS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE FINDINGS OF PROBABLE CAUSE BY THE OMBUDSMAN, MUCH LESS DIRECT THE LATTER TO WITHDRAW SAID CASE ALREADY FILED WITH REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,

NOTWITHSTANDING THAT ITS APPELLATE JURISDICTION PERTAINS ONLY TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY CASE WHICH IS DISTINCT AND INDEPENDENT OF SAID CRIMINAL CASE.

HELD: The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over orders, directives, and decisions of the Office of t he Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases only—it cannot review the orders, directives, or decisions of the O f f i c e o f t h e O m b u d s m a n i n c r i m i n a l o r n o n - a d m i n i s t r a t i v e

c a s e s . The Court of Appeals did not err when it held that respondent is not liable for the administrative charge hurled against him. Likewise, petitioners Golangco and the Office of the Ombudsman assail the actuation of the Court of Appeals in taking cognizance of the criminal case against respondent and directing the Office of the Ombudsman to withdraw Criminal Case No. 96-149144. This, according to

petitioners, is in violation of established jurisprudence stating that the Court of Appeals has no authority to review the finding of probable cause by the Office of the Ombudsman.

MISO N VS NATIVIDAD

Butch Martinez informed the Commissioner of Customs that there were knocked down vehicles at the compound of CVC Trading, which is owned by a certain Mr. Castro in Pampanga. National Customs Team immediately took possession and control of the motor vehicles. Thereafter, two members of the team were designated to secure a warrant of seizure and detention from the Collector of Customs in Clark.

When the team was about to haul the motor vehicles away, 2 RTC sheriffs arrived with a TRO issued by the RTC of San Fernando. The plaintiff in the said case is the private respondent in this petition. The order restrained the Bureau of Customs and/or Customs Police from seizing or confiscating the vehicles until further ordered. Private respondent alleges that he is the owner of several vehicles which are legally registered in his name and that he has paid all the taxes and "corresponding licenses".

A warrant of seizure and detention having already been issued, presumably in the regular course of official duty, the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga was indisputably precluded from interfering in the said proceedings. That in his complaint in Civil Case No. 8109 private respondent alleges ownership over several vehicles which are legally registered in his name, having paid all the taxes and corresponding

licenses incident thereto, neither divests the Collector of Customs of such jurisdiction nor confers upon the said trial court regular jurisdiction over the case. Ownership of goods or the legality of its acquisition can be raised as defenses in a seizure proceeding; if this were not so, the procedure carefully delineated by law

for seizure and forfeiture cases may easily be thwarted and set to naught by scheming parties. Even the illegality of the warrant of seizure and detention cannot justify the trial court 's interference with the Collector's jurisdiction. In the first place, there is a distinction between the existence of the Collector's power to issue it and the regularity of the proceeding taken under such power. In the second place, even if

there be such an irregularity in the latter, the Regional Trial Court does not have the competence to review, modify or reverse whatever conclusions may result therefrom. In Ponce Enrile vs. Vinuya, this Court had the occasion to state:

Respondents, however, notwithstanding the compelling force of the above doctrines, would assert that respondent Judge could entertain the replevin suit as the seizure is illegal, allegedly because the warrant

issued is invalid and the seizing officer likewise was devoid of authority. This is to lose sight of the distinction, as earlier made mention of, between the existence of the power and the regularity of the proceeding taken under it . The governmental agency concerned, the Bureau of Customs, is vested with exclusive authority. Even if it be assumed that in the exercise of such exclusive competence a taint of

illegality may be correctly imputed, the most that can be said is that under certain circumstances the grave abuse of discret ion conferred may oust it of such jurisdiction. It does not mean however that correspondingly a court of first instance is vested with competence when clearly in the light of the above decisions the law has not seen fit to do so. The proceeding before the Collector of Customs is not final. An

appeal lies to the Commissioner of Customs and thereafter to the Court of Tax Appeals. It may even reach this Court through the appropriate petition for review. The proper ventilation of the legal issues raised is thus indicated. Certainly a court of first instance is not therein included. It is devoid of jurisdiction."

In Mison v. Natividad, this Court held that the exclusive jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs cannot be interfered with by regular courts even upon allegations of ownership. The Collector of Customs has exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings and trial courts are precluded from assuming

cognizance over such matters even through petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus.

CO MMISSIO NER O F CUSTO MS vs. THE CO URT O F APPEALS

FACTS : The whole controversy revolves around a vessel and its cargo. On January 7, 1989, the vessel M/V "Star Ace," coming from Singapore laden with cargo, entered the Port of San Fernando, La Union (SFLU) for

needed repairs. The vessel and the cargo had an appraised value, at that t ime, of more or less Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000). When the Bureau of Customs later became suspicious that the vessel‘s real purpose in docking was to smuggle its cargo into the country, seizure proceedings were instituted under S.I. Nos. 02-89 and 03-89 and, subsequently, two Warrants of Seizure and Detention were

issued for the vessel and its cargo.

Respondent Cesar S. Urbino, Sr., does not own the vessel or any of its cargo but claimed a preferred

maritime lien under a Salvage Agreement dated June 8, 1989. To protect his claim, Urbino initially filed two motions in the seizure and detention cases: a Motion to Dismiss and a Motion to Lift Warrant of Seizure and Detention. Apparently not content with his administrative remedies, Urbino sought relief with the regular courts by filing a case for Prohibition, Mandamus and Damages before the RTC of SFLU,

seeking to restrain the District Collector of Customs from interfering with his salvage operation. The RTC of SFLU dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction because of the pending seizure and detention cases. Urbino then elevated the matter to the CA. The Commissioner of Customs, in response, filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings, advising the CA that it intends to question the jurisdiction of the CA before this

Court. The motion was denied. Hence, in this petition the Commissioner of Customs assails the Resolution "F" recited above and seeks to prohibit the CA from continuing to hear the case.

ISSUE: Whether Urbino's claim is a preferred lien in this case.

HELD: No. First of all, the Court finds the decision of the RTC of Manila, in so far as it relates to the vessel M/V "Star Ace," to be void as jurisdiction was never acquired over the vessel. In filing the case,

Urbino had impleaded the vessel as a defendant to enforce his alleged maritime lien. This meant that he brought an action in rem under the Code of Commerce under which the vessel may be attached and sold. However, the basic operative fact for the institution and perfection of proceedings in rem is the actual or

constructive possession of the res by the tribunal empowered by law to conduct the proceedings. This means that to acquire jurisdiction over the vessel, as a defendant, the trial court must have obtained either actual or constructive possession over it . Neither was accomplished by the RTC of Manila.

In his comment to the petition, Urbino plainly stated that "petitioner has actual[sic] physical custody not only of the goods and/or cargo but the subject vessel, M/V Star Ace, as well." This is clearly an admission that the RTC of Manila did not have jurisdiction over the res. While Urbino contends that the Commissioner of Custom‘s custody was illegal, such fact, even if true, does not deprive the Commissioner

of Customs of jurisdiction thereon. This is a question that ought to be resolved in the seizure and forfeiture cases, which are now pending with the CTA, and not by the regular courts as a collateral matter to enforce his lien. By simply filing a case in rem against the vessel, despite its being in the custody of customs officials, Urbino has circumvented the rule that regular trial courts are devoid of any competence to pass

upon the validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted in the Bureau of Customs, on his mere assertion that the administrative proceedings were a nullity.

On the other hand, the Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction over the res ahead and to the exclusion of the RTC of Manila. The forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Bureau of Customs are in the nature of proceedings in rem and jurisdiction was obtained from the moment the vessel entered the SFLU port. Moreover, there is no question that forfeiture proceedings were instituted and the vessel was

seized even before the filing of the RTC of Manila case.

The Court is aware that Urbino seeks to enforce a maritime lien and, because of its nature, it is equivalent

to an attachment from the time of its existence. Nevertheless, despite his lien‘s constructive attachment, Urbino still cannot claim an advantage as his lien only came about after the warrant of seizure and detention was issued and implemented. The Salvage Agreement, upon which Urbino based his lien, was entered into on June 8, 1989. The warrants of seizure and detention, on the other hand, were issued on

January 19 and 20, 1989. And to remove further doubts that the forfeiture case takes precedence over the

RTC of Manila case, it should be noted that forfeiture retroacts to the date of the commission of the offense, in this case the day the vessel entered the country. A maritime lien, in contrast, relates back to the

period when it first attached, in this case the earliest retroactive date can only be the date of the Salvage Agreement. Thus, when the vessel and its cargo are ordered forfeited, the effect will retroact to the moment the vessel entered Philippine waters.

Accordingly, the RTC of Manila decision never attained finality as to the defendant vessel, inasmuch as no jurisdiction was acquired over it , and the decision cannot be binding and the writ of execution issued in connection therewith is null and void.

OSEA vs AMBROSIO

FACTS

Petitioners contend that the breach of contract in view of respondents' failure to comply with the building plans and technical specifications of the residential dwelling involves a violation of the Civil Code which is within the jurisdiction of regular courts, and not with the HLURB whose jurisdiction covers only cases

of unsound real estate business practice and those that may be included within, or is incidental to, or is a necessary consequence of its jurisdiction.

Respondents argue, on the other hand, that the HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction, it arising from contracts

between the subdivision developer and the house and lot buyer or those aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations.

ISSUE

Does the HLURB have jurisdiction in this case?

HELD

Yes, HLURB has jurisdiction.

P.D. No. 957 Section 3 of this statute provides:

―. . . National Housing Authority [now HLURB]. — The National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the provisions of this Decree.‖

The need for the scope of the regulatory authority thus lodged in the HLURB is indicated in the second, third and fourth preambular paragraphs of P.D. 957 which provide:

―WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage, water systems, lighting systems, and other similar basic requirements, thus endangering the health and safety of home and lot buyers;

WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to deliver

t it les to the buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances, and to pay real estate taxes, and fraudulent sales of the same subdivision lots to different innocent purchasers for value;‖

xxx xxx xxx

―WHEREAS, this state of affairs has rendered it imperative that the real estate subdivision and

condominium businesses be closely supervised and regulated, and that penalties be imposed on fraudulent practices and manipulations committed in connection therewith.‖

The provisions of P.D No. 957 were intended to encompass all questions regarding subdivisions and condominiums. The intention was aimed at providing for an appropriate government agency, the HLURB, to which all parties aggrieved in the implementation of provisions and the enforcement of contractual rights with respect to said category of real estate may take recourse. The business of developing

subdivisions and corporations being imbued with public interest and welfare, any question arising from the exercise of that prerogative should be brought to the HLURB which has the technical know-how on the matter. In the exercise of its powers, the HLURB must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts. This ancillary power is no longer a uniquely

judicial function, exercisable only by the regular courts.

As observed in C.T . Torres Enterprises, Inc. v. Hibionada:

The argument that only courts of justice can adjudicate claims resoluble under the provisions of the Civil Code is out of step with the fast -changing times. There are hundreds of administrative bodies now performing this function by virtue of a valid authorization from the legislature. This quasi-judicial

function, as it is called, is exercised by them as an incident of the principal power entrusted to them of regulating certain activities falling under their particular expertise.

In the Solid Homes case for example the Court affirmed the competence of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board to award damages although this is an essentially judicial power exercisable ordinarily only by the courts of justice. This departure from the traditional allocation of governmental powers is justified by expediency, or the need of the government to respond swiftly and competently to the pressing

problems of the modern world. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Furthermore, Executive Order (EO) No. 90 series of 1986, "IDENTIFYING THE GOVERNMENT

AGENCIES ESSENTIAL FOR THE NATIONAL SHELTER PROGRAM AND DEFINING THEIR MANDATES, CREATING THE HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT COORDINATING COUNCIL, RATIONALIZING FUNDING SOURCES AND LENDING MECHANISMS FOR HOME MORTGAGES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," so named the HLURB to recognize its mandate and

authority over the development of housing in general and low-cost housing in particular. Thus Section 1 (c) of said EO provides:

Human Settlements Regulatory Commission — The Human Settlements Regulatory Commission;

renamed as the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, shall be the sole regulatory body for housing and land development. It is charged with encouraging greater private sector participation in low-cost housing through liberalization of development standards, simplification of regulations and decentralization of approvals for permits and licenses.

This Court has thus consistently held that complaints for breach of contract or specific performance with damages filed by a subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the owner or developer fall under

the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB.

Moreover, under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy where the issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion

requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

Under the circumstances attendant to the case, the HLURB has the expertise to determine the basic technical issue of whether the alleged deviations from the building plans and the technical specifications

affect the soundness and structural strength of the house.

Petitioners' position that an action for damages is not incidental to or a necessary consequence of the cases within the purview of the HLURB's jurisdiction does not lie. Being the sole regulatory body for housing

and land development, the HLURB will be reduced to a functionally sterile entit y if, as petitioners contend, it lacks the power to settle disputes concerning land use and housing development and acquisition, including the imposition of damages if the evidence so warrants

Rule 43

Alcaraz vs. Gonzalez

Doctrine

CA may review the resolution of the Justice Secretary in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of

the ROC on the ground that the latter committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to

excess or lack of jurisdiction. Rule 43 is not the proper remedy in such case.

Facts

He w as armed with a .38 caliber pistol. Since Alcaraz intended to use the Skyw ay, he signaled,

and proceeded to the right-most lane w hich w as reserved for vehicles taking the Skyw ay.

Gonzalez, w ho was driving his Nissan Cefiro car on the right-most lane, w as forced to sw erve

his car to the right to avoid colliding w ith Alcaraz's vehicle and nearly hit the concrete island.

Nonplussed, Gonzalez chased after Alcaraz, opened his w indow s and shouted at Alcaraz.

Alcaraz argued back. Gonzalez reproved Alcaraz and drove on. Alcaraz raised his pistol towards

Gonzalez, f ired tw ice and immediately drove aw ay from the scene, but he w as intercepted by the

PNCC guards at the Skyw ay toll gate. Gonzalez reported the matter to the Parañaque City

Police Station and f iled a criminal complaint for attempted homicide against Alcaraz.

A preliminary investigation w as conducted, but Justice Secretary Gonzalez held it failed to prove

beyond reasonable doubt that Alcaraz had intended to kill him. Gonzalez f iled a motion for

reconsideration only for it to be denied.

Gonzales then f iled a petition for review under Rule 43 of ROC before the CA, seeking the

reversal of the Justice Secretary's Resolution. Alcaraz commented on the petition, averring that

the Justice Secretary is not a quasi-judicial off icer under Rule 43 w hose resolutions may thus be

review ed by the CA. He pointed out that the CA w as w ithout pow er to substitute its ow n

judgment for that of the Justice Secretary Nevertheless CA granted the petition and reversed the

assailed resolutions of the Secretary of Justice. Alcaraz f iled a motion for the reconsideration but

it w as denied.

Issue

Whether the petition for review under Rule 43 of the ROC w as the proper remedy of Gonzalez

Held/Ratio

No. petition is meritorious.

Gonzales resorted to an improper remedy w hen he f iled a petition for review under Rule 43 of

the ROC instead of f iling a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

The resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor is subject to appeal to the Justice Secretary w ho,

under the Revised Administrative Code, exercises the pow er of control and supervision over

said Investigating Prosecutor; and w ho may aff irm, nullify, reverse, or modify the ruling of such

prosecutor. Thus, w hile the CA may review the resolution of the Justice Secretary, it may do so

only in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, solely on the ground that the

Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of

jurisdiction.

The Resolution of the Justice Secretary aff irming, modifying or reversing the resolution of the

Investigating Prosecutor is f inal. Under the 1993 Revised Rules on Appeals (now the 2000

National Prosecution Service Rules on Appeals), resolutions in preliminary investigations or

reinvestigations from the Justice Secretary's resolution, except the aggrieved party, has no more

remedy of appeal to f ile a motion for reconsideration of the said resolution of such motion if it is

denied by the said Secretary. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to f ile a petition for certiorari

under Rule 65 of the ROC since there is no more appeal or other remedy available in the

ordinary course of law .

In the present case, respondent f iled a petition for review under Rule 43 of the ROC. Instead of

dismissing the petition, how ever, the CA gave due course to it and thereafter granted the

petition. Patently, the ruling of the CA is incorrect.

Quinagoran v CA

Facts:

The heirs of Juan dela Cruz, represented by Senen dela Cruz filed a Complaint for Recovery of Portion of Registered Land with Compensation and Damages against Victorino Quinagoran before the RTC Cagayan. They alleged that they are the co-owners of a a parcel of land at Centro, Piat, Cagayan, which

they inherited from the late Juan dela Cruz.

Quinagoran started occupying a house on the north-west portion of the property, by tolerance of the heirs.

The heirs asked petitioner to remove the house as they planned to construct a commercial building on the property but petitioner refused, claiming ownership over the lot.

The heirs prayed for the reconveyance and surrender of the disputed lot and to be paid the amount of P5,000.00 monthly until the property is vacated.

Quinagoran filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, which expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) to include all civil actions which involve tit le to, or possession of, real property, or any

interest therein which does not exceed P20,000.00. He argued that since the lot which he owns adjacent to the contested property has an assessed value of P1,730, the assessed value of the lot under controversy would not be more than the said amount. He likewise avers that it is an indispensable requirement that the complaint should allege the assessed value of the property involved.

The heirs maintain that the contention of petitioner in his Motion to Dismiss before the RTC that the assessed value of the disputed lot is below P20,000.00 is based on the assessed value of an adjacent

property and no documentary proof was shown to support the said allegation. It also contended that the tax declaration which petitioner presented, together with his Supplemental Reply before the CA, and on the basis of which he claims that the disputed property's assessed value is only P551.00, should also not be given credence as the said tax declaration reflects the amount of P56,100.or the entire property.

The RTC denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on t he basis that the action is accion publicciana and therefore, its jurisdiction lies in the RTC, regardless of the value of the property. The CA affirmed

decision of the RTC.

Issue :

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over all cases of recovery of possession regardless of the value of

the property involved?

Held:

NO. Jurisdiction lies in the MTC.

The doctrine that all cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana lies with the RTC regardless of the value of the property -- no longer holds true. As things now stand, a distinction must be made between

those properties the assessed value of which is below P20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila; and P50,000.00, if within.

Republic Act No. 7691 expressly provides:

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is

conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

In Atuel v. Valdez, the Court likewise expressly stated that:

Jurisdiction over an accion publiciana is vested in a court of general jurisdiction. Specifically, the regional trial court exercises exclusive original jurisdiction ―in all civil actions which involve x x x possession of real property.‖ However, if the assessed value of the real property involved does not exceed

P50,000.00 in Metro Manila, and P20,000.00 outside of Metro Manila, the municipal trial court exercises jurisdiction over actions to recover possession of real property.

In the case, Quinagoran maintains that there should be such an allegation of the assessed value of the real property to determine jurisdiction. However, nowhere in said complaint was the assessed value of the

subject property ever mentioned. There is therefore no showing on the face of the complaint that the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the respondents. Absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it cannot be determined whether the RTC or the MTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioner's action. The courts cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or

market value of the land.

Considering that the respondents failed to allege in their complaint the assessed value of the subject property, the RTC seriously erred in denying the motion to dismiss. Consequently, all proceedings in the

RTC are null and void. The CA also erred in affirming the RTC.