SECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 131282 January 4, 2002GABRIEL L. DUERO,petitioner,vs.HON.COURT OF APPEALS, and BERNARDO A. ERADEL,respondents.QUISUMBING,J.:This petition for certiorari assails the Decisionl dated September 17, 1997, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP No.. 2340- UDK, entitledBernardo Eradel vs. Non. Ermelino G. Andal, setting aside all proceedings in Civil Case No.1075,Gabriel L. Duero vs. Bernardo Eradel, before the Branch 27 of the Regional Trial Court of Tandag, Surigao del Sur .The pertinent facts are as follow.Sometime in 1988, according to petitioner, private respondent Bemardo Eradel2entered and occupied petitioner's land covered by Tax Declaration No. A-16-13-302, located in Baras, San Miguel, Surigao del Sur. As shown in the tax declaration, the land had an assessed value of P5,240. When petitioner politely informed private respondent that the land was his and requested the latter to vacate the land, private respondent refused, but instead threatened him with bodily harm. Despite repeated demands, private respondent remained steadfast in his refusal to leave the land.On June 16, 1995, petitioner filed before the RTC a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership with Damages and Attorney's Fees against private respondent and two others, namely, Apolinario and Inocencio Ruena. Petitioner appended to the complaint the aforementioned tax declaration. The counsel of the Ruenas asked for extension to file their Answer and was given until July 18, 1995. Meanwhile, petitioner and the, Ruenas executed a compromise agreement, which became the trial court's basis for a partial judgment rendered on January 12, 1996. In this agreement, the Ruenas through their counsel, Atty. Eusebio Avila, entered into a Compromise Agreement with herein petitioner, Gabriel Duero.Inter alia, the agreement stated that the Ruenas recognized and bound themselves to respect the ownership and possession of Duero.3Herein private respondent Eradel was not a party to the agreement, and he was declared in default for failure to file his answer to the complaint.4Petitioner presented his evidenceex parteon February 13, 1996. On May 8, 1996, judgment was rendered in his favor, and private respondent was ordered to peacefully vacate and turn over Lot No.1065 Cad. 537-D to petitioner; pay petitioner P2,000 annual rental from 1988 up the time he vacates the land, and P5,000 as attorney's fees and the cost of the suit.5Private respondent received a copy of the decision on May 25, 1996.On June 10, 1996, private respondent filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging that he has been occupying the land as a tenant of Artemio Laurente, Sr., since 1958. He explained that he turned over the complaint and summons to Laurente in the honest belief that as landlord, the latter had a better right to the land and was responsible to defend any adverse claim on it. However, the trial court denied the motion for new trial.1wphi1.ntMeanwhile, RED Conflict Case No.1029, an administrative case between petitioner and applicant-contestants Romeo, Artemio and Jury Laurente, remained pending with the Office of the Regional Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in Davao City. Eventually, it was forwarded to the DENR Regional Office in Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur .On July 24, 1996, private respondent filed before the RTC a Petition for Relief from Judgment, reiterating the same allegation in his Motion for New Trial. He averred that unless there is a determination on who owned the land, he could not be made to vacate the land. He also averred that the judgment of the trial court was void inasmuch as the heirs of Artemio Laurente, Sr., who are indispensable parties, were not impleaded.On September 24, 1996, Josephine, Ana Soledad and Virginia, all surnamed Laurente, grandchildren of Artemio who were claiming ownership of the land, filed a Motion for Intervention. The RTC denied the motion.On October 8, 1996, the trial court issued an order denying the Petition for Relief from Judgment. In a Motion for Reconsideration of said order, private respondent alleged that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case, since the value of the land was only P5,240 and therefore it was under the jurisdiction of the municipal trial court. On November 22, 1996, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration.On January 22, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for Execution, which the RTC granted on January 28. On February 18, 1997, Entry of Judgment was made of record and a writ of execution was issued by the RTC on February 27,1997. On March 12,1997, private respondent filed his petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.The Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition, maintaining that private respondent is not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction 'of the RTC, Branch 27 in Tandag, Surigao del Sur, when private respondent filed with said court his Motion for Reconsideration And/Or Annulment of Judgment. The Court of Appeals decreed as follows:IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is GRANTED. All proceedings in "Gabriel L. Duero vs. Bernardo Eradel, et. al. Civil Case 1075" filed in the Court a quo, including its Decision,Annex "E"of the petition, and its Orders and Writ of Execution and the turn over of the property to the Private Respondent by the Sheriff of the Courta quo, are declared null and void and hereby SET ASIDE, No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.6Petitioner now comes before this Court, alleging that the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it held that:I....THE LOWER COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MA TTER OF THE CASE.II...PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT THEREBY ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER COURT EVEN AFTER IT SUCCESSFULLY SOUGHT AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF THEREFROM.III...THE FAlLURE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO FILE HIS ANSWER IS JUSTIFIED.7The main issue before us is whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it held that the municipal trial court had jurisdiction, and that private respondent was not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC after he had filed several motions before it. The secondary issue is whether the Court of appeals erred in holding that private respondent's failure to file an answer to the complaint was justified.At the outset, however, we note that petitioner through counsel submitted to this Court pleadings that contain inaccurate statements. Thus, on page 5 of his petition,8we find that to bolster the claim that the appellate court erred in holding that the RTC had no jurisdiction, petitioner pointed toAnnex E9of his petition which supposedly is the Certification issued by the Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel, Surigao, specifically containing the notation, "Note: Subject for General Revision Effective 1994." But it appears thatAnnex Eof his petition is not a Certification but a xerox copy of a Declaration of Real Property. Nowhere does the document contain a notation, "Note: Subject for General Revision Effective 1994." Petitioner also asked this Court to refer toAnnex F,10where he said the zonal value of the disputed land was P1.40 per sq.m., thus placing the computed value of the land at the time the complaint was filed before the RTC at P57,113.98, hence beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal court and within the jurisdiction of the regional trial court. However, we find that these annexes are both merely xerox copies. They are obviously without evidentiary weight or value.Coming now to the principal issue, petitioner contends that respondent appellate court acted with grave abuse of discretion. By "grave abuse of discretion" is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to an excess or a lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.11But here we find that in its decision holding that the municipal court has jurisdiction over the case and that private respondent was not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC, respondent Court of Appeals discussed the facts on which its decision is grounded as well as the law and jurisprudence on the matter.12Its action was neither whimsical nor capricious.Was private respondent estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC? In this case, we are in agreement with the Court of Appeals that he was not. While participation in all stages of a case before the trial court, including invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively bars a party by estoppel from challenging the court's jurisdiction,13we note that estoppel has become an equitable defense that is both substantive and remedial and its successful invocation can bar a right and not merely its equitable enforcement.14Hence, estoppel ought to be applied with caution. For estoppel to apply, the action giving rise thereto must be unequivocal and intentional because, if misapplied, estoppel may become a tool of injustice.15In the present case, private respondent questions the jurisdiction of RTC in Tandag, Surigao del Sur, on legal grounds. Recall that it was petitioner who filed the complaint against private respondent and two other parties before the said court,16believing that the RTC had jurisdiction over his complaint. But by then, Republic Act 769117amending BP 129 had become effective, such that jurisdiction already belongs not to the RTC but to the MTC pursuant to said amendment. Private respondent, an unschooled farmer, in the mistaken belief that since he was merely a tenant of the late Artemio Laurente Sr., his landlord, gave the summons to a Hipolito Laurente, one of the surviving heirs of Artemio Sr., who did not do anything about the summons. For failure to answer the complaint, private respondent was declared in default. He then filed a Motion for New Trial in the same court and explained that he defaulted because of his belief that the suit ought to be answered by his landlord. In that motion he stated that he had by then the evidence to prove that he had a better right than petitioner over the land because of his long, continuous and uninterrupted possession asbona-fidetenant-lessee of the land.18But his motion was denied. He tried an alternative recourse. He filed before the RTC a Motion for Relief from Judgment. Again, the same court denied his motion, hence he moved for reconsideration of the denial. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he raised for the first time the RTC's lack of jurisdiction. This motion was again denied. Note that private respondent raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction, not when the case was already on appeal, but when the case, was still before the RTC that ruled him in default, denied his motion for new trial as well as for relief from judgment, and denied likewise his two motions for reconsideration. After the RTC still refused to reconsider the denial of private respondent's motion for relief from judgment, it went on to issue the order for entry of judgment and a writ of execution.Under these circumstances, we could not fault the Court of Appeals in overruling the RTC and in holding that private respondent was not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the regional trial court. The fundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be waived by the parties, or even cured by their silence, acquiescence or even by their express consent.19Further, a party may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal.20The appellate court did not err in saying that the RTC should have declared itself barren of jurisdiction over the action. Even if private respondent actively participated in the proceedings before said court, the doctrine of estoppel cannot still be properly invoked against him because the question of lack of jurisdiction may be raised at anytime and at any stage of the action.21Precedents tell us that as a general rule, the jurisdiction of a court is not a question of acquiescence as a matter of fact, but an issue of conferment as a matter of law.22Also, neither waiver nor estoppel shall apply to confer jurisdiction upon a court, barring highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances.23The Court of Appeals found support for its ruling in our decision inJavier vs. Court of Appeals, thus:x x x The point simply is that when a party commits error in filing his suit or proceeding in a court that lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same, such act may not at once be deemed sufficient basis of estoppel. It could have been the result of an honest mistake, or of divergent interpretations of doubtful legal provisions.If any fault is to be imputed to a party taking such course of action, part of the blame should be placed on the court which shall entertain the suit, thereby lulling the parties into believing that they pursued their remedies in the correct forum.Under the rules, it is the duty of the court to dismiss an action 'whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.' (Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court) Should the Court render a judgment without jurisdiction, such judgment may be impeached or annulled for lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 30, Rule 132, Ibid), within ten (10) years from the finality of the same. [Emphasis ours.]24Indeed, "...the trial court was duty-bound to take judicial notice of the parameters of its jurisdiction and its failure to do so, makes its decision a 'lawless' thing."25Since a decision of a court without jurisdiction is null and void, it could logically never become final and executory, hence appeal therefrom by writ of error would be out of the question. Resort by private respondent to a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was in order .In holding that estoppel did not prevent private respondent from questioning the RTC's jurisdiction, the appellate court reiterated the doctrine that estoppel must be applied only in exceptional cases, as its misapplication could result in a miscarriage of justice. Here, we find that petitioner, who claims ownership of a parcel of land, filed his complaint before a court without appropriate jurisdiction. Defendant, a farmer whose tenancy status is still pending before the proper administrative agency concerned, could have moved for dismissal of the case on jurisdictional grounds. But the farmer as defendant therein could not be expected to know the nuances of jurisdiction and related issues. This farmer, who is now the private respondent, ought not to be penalized when he claims that he made an honest mistake when he initially submitted his motions before the RTC, before he realized that the controversy was outside the RTC's cognizance but within the jurisdiction of the municipal trial court. To hold him in estoppel as the RTC did would amount to foreclosing his avenue to obtain a proper resolution of his case. Furthermore, if the RTC's order were to be sustained, he would be evicted from the land prematurely, while RED Conflict Case No.1029 would remain unresolved. Such eviction on a technicality if allowed could result in an injustice, if it is later found that he has a legal right to till the land he now occupies as tenant-lessee.1wphi1.ntHaving determined that there was no grave abuse of discretion by the appellate court in ruling that private respondent was not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC, we need not tarry to consider in detail the second issue. Suffice it to say that, given the circumstances in this case, no error was committed on this score by respondent appellate court. Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case, private respondent had justifiable reason in law not to file an answer, aside from the fact that he believed the suit was properly his landlord's concern.WHEREFORE, the petition isDISMISSED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals isAFFIRMED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No.1075 entitledGabriel L. Duero vs. Bernardo Eradel, its Order that private respondent turn over the disputed land to petitioner, and the Writ of Execution it issued, areANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Costs against petitioner .SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 129638 December 8, 2003ANTONIO T. DONATO,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, FILOMENO ARCEPE, TIMOTEO BARCELONA, IGNACIO BENDOL, THELMA P. BULICANO, ROSALINDA CAPARAS, ROSITA DE COSTO, FELIZA DE GUZMAN, LETICIA DE LOS REYES, ROGELIO GADDI, PAULINO GAJARDO, GERONIMO IMPERIAL, HOMER IMPERIAL, ELVIRA LESLIE, CEFERINO LUGANA, HECTOR PIMENTEL, NIMFA PIMENTEL, AURELIO G. ROCERO, ILUMINADA TARA, JUANITO VALLESPIN, and NARCISO YABUT,respondents.D E C I S I O NAUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,J.:Before us is a "petition for review on certiorari" filed on July 17, 1997 which should be a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It assails the Resolutions1dated March 21, 1997 and June 23, 1997 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41394.2The factual background of the case is as follows:Petitioner Antonio T. Donato is the registered owner of a real property located at Ciriaco Tuason Street, San Andres, Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 131793 issued by the Register of Deeds of the City of Manila on November 24, 1978. On June 7, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint before the Metropolitan Trial Court (Branch 26) of Manila (MeTC) for forcible entry and unlawful detainer against 43 named defendants and "all unknown occupants" of the subject property.3Petitioner alleges that: private respondents had oral contracts of lease that expired at the end of each month but were impliedly renewed under the same terms by mere acquiescence or tolerance; sometime in 1992, they stopped paying rent; on April 7, 1994, petitioner sent them a written demand to vacate; the non-compliance with said demand letter constrained him to file the ejectment case against them.4Of the 43 named defendants, only 20 (private respondents,5for brevity) filed a consolidated Answer dated June 29, 1994 wherein they denied non-payment of rentals. They contend that they cannot be evicted because the Urban Land Reform Law guarantees security of tenure and priority right to purchase the subject property; and that there was a negotiation for the purchase of the lots occupied by them but when the negotiation reached a passive stage, they decided to continue payment of rentals and tendered payment to petitioners counsel and thereafter initiated a petition for consignation of the rentals in Civil Case No. 144049 while they await the outcome of the negotiation to purchase.Following trial under the Rule on Summary Procedure, the MeTC rendered judgment on September 19, 1994 against the 23 non-answering defendants, ordering them to vacate the premises occupied by each of them, and to pay jointly and severallyP10,000.00 per month from the date they last paid their rent until the date they actually vacate, plus interest thereon at the legal rate allowed by law, as well asP10,000.00 as attorneys fees and the costs of the suit. As to the 20 private respondents, the MeTC issued a separate judgment6on the same day sustaining their rights under the Land Reform Law, declaring petitioners cause of action as not duly warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case and dismissing the case without prejudice.Not satisfied with the judgment dismissing the complaint as against the private respondents, petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court (Branch 47) of Manila (RTC).7In a Decision8dated July 5, 1996, the RTC sustained the decision of the MeTC.Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals (CA for brevity), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 41394. In a Resolution dated March 21, 1997, the CA dismissed the petition on two grounds: (a) the certification of non-forum shopping was signed by petitioners counsel and not by petitioner himself, in violation of Revised Circular No. 28-91;9and, (b) the only annex to the petition is a certified copy of the questioned decision but copies of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition are not annexed, contrary to Section 3, paragraph b, Rule 6 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA).10On April 17, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,11attaching thereto a photocopy of the certification of non-forum shopping duly signed by petitioner himself12and the relevant records of the MeTC and the RTC.13Five days later, or on April 22, 1997, petitioner filed a Supplement14to his motion for reconsideration submitting the duly authenticated original of the certification of non-forum shopping signed by petitioner.15In a Resolution16dated June 23, 1997 the CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration and its supplement, ruling that "petitioners subsequent compliance did not cure the defect in the instant petition."17Hence, the present petition anchored on the following grounds:I.RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION BASED ON HYPER-TECHNICAL GROUNDS BECAUSE:A. PETITIONER HAS SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR NO. 28-91. MORE, PETITIONER SUBSEQUENTLY SUBMITTED DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE PROCEEDINGS A DULY AUTHENTICATED CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING WHICH HE HIMSELF SIGNED AND EXECUTED IN THE UNITED STATES.B. PETITIONER HAS SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH SECTION 3, RULE 6 OF THE REVISED INTERNAL RULES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS. MORE, PETITIONER SUBSEQUENTLY SUBMITTED DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE PROCEEDINGS COPIES OF THE RELEVANT DOCUMENTS IN THE CASES BELOW.C. PETITIONER HAS A MERITORIOUS APPEAL, AND HE STANDS TO LOSE SUBSTANTIAL PROPERTY IF THE APPEAL IS NOT GIVEN DUE COURSE. THE RULES OF PROCEDURE MUST BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED TO DO SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE.II.RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF UNLAWFUL DETAINER ARE PRESENT IN THE CASE AT BAR.III.RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE RTC MANILA, BRANCH 47, COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF MTC MANILA, BRANCH 26, THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE EJECTED FROM THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WITHOUT VIOLATING THEIR SECURITY OF TENURE EVEN IF THE TERM OF THE LEASE IS MONTH-TO-MONTH WHICH EXPIRES AT THE END OF EACH MONTH. IN THIS REGARD,A. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT TENANTS UNDER P.D. 1517 MAY BE EVICTED FOR NON-PAYMENT OF RENT, TERMINATION OF LEASE OR OTHER GROUNDS FOR EJECTMENT.B. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT THE ALLEGED "PRIORITY RIGHT TO BUY THE LOT THEY OCCUPY" DOES NOT APPLY WHERE THE LANDOWNER DOES NOT INTEND TO SELL THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, AS IN THE CASE AT BAR.C. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS LOCATED WITHIN A ZONAL IMPROVEMENT AREA OR APD.D. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS UNDER THE LAW RESULT IN THE WAIVER OF PROTECTION AGAINST EVICTION.E. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE ENTITLED TO PROTECTION UNDER P.D. 2016 SINCE THE GOVERNMENT HAS NO INTENTION OF ACQUIRING THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.F. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING THAT THERE IS AN ON-GOING NEGOTIATION FOR THE SALE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AND THAT IT RENDERS THE EVICTION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS PREMATURE.G. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT THE ALLEGED CASE FOR CONSIGNATION DOES NOT BAR THE EVICTION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.IV.RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS SHOULD PAY PETITIONER A REASONABLE COMPENSATION FOR THEIR USE AND OCCUPANCY OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IN THE AMOUNT OF AT LEASTP10,000.00 PER MONTH FROM THE DATE THEY LAST PAID RENT UNTIL THE TIME THEY ACTUALLY VACATE THE SAME, WITH LEGAL INTEREST AT THE MAXIMUM RATE ALLOWED BY LAW UNTIL PAID.V.RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS SHOULD PAY PETITIONER ATTORNEYS FEES AND EXPENSES OF LITIGATION OF AT LEASTP20,000.00, PLUS COSTS.18Petitioner submits that a relaxation of the rigid rules of technical procedure is called for in view of the attendant circumstances showing that the objectives of the rule on certification of non-forum shopping and the rule requiring material portions of the record be attached to the petition have not been glaringly violated and, more importantly, the petition is meritorious.The proper recourse of an aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a petition for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, if the error, subject of the recourse, is one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was perpetrated by a court with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper remedy available to the aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. As enunciated by the Court inFortich vs. Corona:19Anent the first issue, in order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is proper or not, it is necessary to draw a line between an error of judgment and an error of jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. This error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.20(Emphasis supplied).Inasmuch as the present petition principally assails the dismissal of the petition on ground of procedural flaws involving the jurisdiction of the courta quoto entertain the petition, it falls within the ambit of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.At the time the instant petition for certiorari was filed, i.e., on July 17, 1997, the prevailing rule is the newly promulgated 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. However, considering that the CA Resolution being assailed was rendered on March 21, 1997, the applicable rule is the three-month reglementary period, established by jurisprudence.21Petitioner received notice of the assailed CA Resolution dismissing his petition for review on April 4, 1997. He filed his motion reconsideration on April 17, 1997, using up only thirteen days of the 90-day period. Petitioner received the CA Resolution denying his motion on July 3, 1997 and fourteen days later, or on July 17, 1997, he filed a motion for 30-day extension of time to file a "petition for review" which was granted by us; and petitioner duly filed his petition on August 15, 1997, which is well-within the period of extension granted to him.We now go to the merits of the case.We find the instant petition partly meritorious.The requirement regarding the need for a certification of non-forum shopping in cases filed before the CA and the corresponding sanction for non-compliance thereto are found in the then prevailing Revised Circular No. 28-91.22It provides that the petitioner himself must make the certification against forum shopping and a violation thereof shall be a cause for the summary dismissal of the multiple petition or complaint. The rationale for the rule of personal execution of the certification by the petitioner himself is that it is only the petitioner who has actual knowledge of whether or not he has initiated similar actions or proceedings in other courts or tribunals; even counsel of record may be unaware of such fact.23The Court has ruled that with respect to the contents of the certification, the rule on substantial compliance may be availed of. This is so because the requirement of strict compliance with the rule regarding the certification of non-forum shopping simply underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded, but it does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances.24The petition for review filed before the CA contains a certification against forum shopping but said certification was signed by petitioners counsel. In submitting the certification of non-forum shopping duly signed by himself in his motion for reconsideration,25petitioner has aptly drawn the Courts attention to the physical impossibility of filing the petition for review within the 15-day reglementary period to appeal considering that he is a resident of 1125 South Jefferson Street, Roanoke, Virginia, U.S.A. were he to personally accomplish and sign the certification.We fully agree with petitioner that it was physically impossible for the petition to have been prepared and sent to the petitioner in the United States, for him to travel from Virginia, U.S.A. to the nearest Philippine Consulate in Washington, D.C., U.S.A., in order to sign the certification before the Philippine Consul, and for him to send back the petition to the Philippines within the 15-day reglementary period. Thus, we find that petitioner has adequately explained his failure to personally sign the certification which justifies relaxation of the rule.We have stressed that the rules on forum shopping, which were precisely designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective26which is simply to prohibit and penalize the evils of forum-shopping.27The subsequent filing of the certification duly signed by the petitioner himself should thus be deemed substantial compliance,pro hac vice.In like manner, the failure of the petitioner to comply with Section 3, paragraph b, Rule 6 of the RIRCA, that is, to append to his petition copies of the pleadings and other material portions of the records as would support the petition, does not justify the outright dismissal of the petition. It must be emphasized that the RIRCA gives the appellate court a certain leeway to require parties to submit additional documents as may be necessary in the interest of substantial justice. Under Section 3, paragraph d of Rule 3 of the RIRCA,28the CA may require the parties to complete the annexes as the court deems necessary, and if the petition is given due course, the CA may require the elevation of a complete record of the case as provided for under Section 3(d)(5) of Rule 6 of the RIRCA.29At any rate, petitioner attached copies of the pleadings and other material portions of the records below with his motion for reconsideration.30In Jaro vs. Court of Appeals,31the Court reiterated the doctrine laid down inCusi-Hernandez vs. Diaz32andPiglas-Kamao vs. National Labor Relations Commission33that subsequent submission of the missing documents with the motion for reconsideration amounts to substantial compliance which calls for the relaxation of the rules of procedure. We find no cogent reason to depart from this doctrine.Truly, in dismissing the petition for review, the CA had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in putting a premium on technicalities at the expense of a just resolution of the case.Needless to stress, "a litigation is not a game of technicalities."34When technicality deserts its function of being an aid to justice, the Court is justified in exempting from its operations a particular case.35Technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate justice. While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, granting substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal.36The Courts pronouncement inRepublic vs. Court of Appeals37is worth echoing: "cases should be determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice would be better served."38Thus, what should guide judicial action is that a party litigant is given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his action or defense rather than for him to lose life, honor or property on mere technicalities.39This guideline is especially true when the petitioner has satisfactorily explained the lapse and fulfilled the requirements in his motion for reconsideration,40as in this case.In addition, petitioner prays that we decide the present petition on the merits without need of remanding the case to the CA. He insists that all the elements of unlawful detainer are present in the case. He further argues that the alleged "priority right to buy the lot they occupy" does not apply where the landowner does not intend to sell the subject property, as in the case; that respondents cannot be entitled to protection under P.D. No. 2016 since the government has no intention of acquiring the subject property, nor is the subject property located within a zonal improvement area; and, that assuming that there is a negotiation for the sale of the subject property or a pending case for consignation of rentals, these do not bar the eviction of respondents.We are not persuaded. We shall refrain from ruling on the foregoing issues in the present petition for certiorari.1wphi1The issues involved are factual issues which inevitably require the weighing of evidence. These are matters that are beyond the province of this Court in a special civil action for certiorari. These issues are best addressed to the CA in the petition for review filed before it. As an appellate court, it is empowered to require parties to submit additional documents, as it may find necessary, or to receive evidence, to promote the ends of justice, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 9, B.P. Blg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, to wit:The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings.WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Resolutions dated March 21, 1997 and June 23, 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41394 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings in CA-G.R. No. 41394, entitled, "Antonio T. Donato vs. Hon. Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 47, Filomeno Arcepe, et al."SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 142037 October 18, 2004Spouses EDGARDO and CECILIA GONZAGA,petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses ALFONSO and LETICIA ABAGAT,respondents.D E C I S I O NCALLEJO, SR.,J.:This is a petition for the review of the Decision1and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48687 filed by the Spouses Edgardo and Cecilia Gonzaga.The Antecedents On October 22, 1991, the respondents, Spouses Abagat, filed a complaint against the petitioners, Spouses Gonzaga, for the recovery of possession of a parcel of land identified as Lot 11, Block No. 15. The lot was located in Baclaran, Paraaque, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 128186 issued in their names, as owners.The respondents alleged, inter alia in their complaint that they were the owners of a small hut (barong-barong) constructed on the said lot, which was then owned by the government. On February 22, 1961, when he was still single, the respondent Alfonso Abagat filed an application for a sales patent over the said parcel of land. The hut was, however, gutted by fire on January 26, 1973. According to the respondents, after the fire the Spouses Miguel and Violeta Gregorio built a two-storey house on the property without their consent. As such, they filed a complaint for ejectment against the Spouses Gregorio but the complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because in their answer to the complaint, the petitioners therein claimed ownership over the house. Thereafter, the Spouses Gregorio sold the house to the petitioners forP100,000.00 under a deed of conditional sale, in which Spouses Gregorio undertook to secure an award of the land by the government in favor of the petitioners. On January 2, 1986, the Bureau of Lands granted the application of respondent Alfonso Abagat for a sales patent over the property on the basis of which TCT No. 128186 was issued by the Register of Deeds to and in his name. The respondents demanded that the petitioners vacate the property, but the latter refused to do so. The respondents prayed that judgment be rendered in their favor, thus:WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed before this Honorable Court that judgment be rendered in favor of the plaintiffs 1. Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming rights under them to vacate Lot 11, Block 15 located at 2063 Bagong Sikat Street, Baclaran, Paraaque, Metro Manila and to demolish at their own expense the house constructed thereon;Ordering the defendants:a) to payP10,000.00 as attorneys fees, plusP500.00 as appearance fee for every court hearing;b) to payP45,500.00 as compensatory damages representing the unearned rentals on the subject premises from March 1984 to October 1991, andP500.00 as land rental every month thereafter;c) to payP20,000.00 as exemplary damages;d) to pay the costs of this suit.PLAINTIFFS pray for such other and further reliefs as may deemed (sic) equitable in the premises.2In their Answer to the complaint, the petitioners averred that they purchased the house from the Spouses Gregorio forP100,000.00 under a deed of conditional sale with the understanding that Miguel Gregorio would secure an award in their favor over the lot. However, the Spouses Gregorio failed to do so. Thereafter, they and the Spouses Gregorio executed a Deed of Final and Absolute Sale over the property. According to the petitioners, their refusal to vacate the property was justified in view of the Memorandum of Agreement executed between them and the Spouses Gregorio, whereby they agreed to rescind the deeds of conditional sale and final and absolute sale they earlier executed. The said agreement was made in consideration of the refund of the amount ofP90,000.00 to take place on or before December 15, 1991, which amount was earlier paid by them to the Spouses Gregorio under the deed of conditional sale. Until then, the petitioners alleged, they had the right to remain in the property. The petitioners prayed that the court render judgment in their favor, thus:1) Dismissing the complaint for lack of merit;2) Awarding defendants moral damages in such amount as may be proven during the trial and exemplary damages in such amount as may be awarded by this Honorable Court;3) Ordering plaintiff to pay the cost of suit.Defendants likewise pray for such other relief just and equitable under the premises.3On September 29, 1992, the petitioners filed a motion for leave to file a third-party complaint against the Spouses Gregorio, appending thereto the said third-party complaint. They prayed that judgment be rendered in their favor, thus:WHEREFORE, Third-Party Plaintiffs pray for judgment ordering Third-Party Defendants to indemnify Third-Party Plaintiffs for whatever is adjudged, if any, against the latter in favor of Plaintiffs in the main case now pending with this court.FURTHER, praying for such and other reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable.4The petitioners likewise appended a copy of the deed of conditional sale executed between them and the third-party defendants which contained the following terms, among others:11. The VENDOR herein shall bear the costs of notarization of this deed of conditional sale.12. The VENDOR herein warrants that he is the legal owner in full, without any lien and encumbrance, of such house, and the VENDOR herein warrants to defend his ownership over such house against unlawful claims by any third parties. The VENDOR herein further warrants to indemnify the VENDEE herein for any material damage that may be caused by any unlawful claims from third parties.5Even before the Court could resolve the said motion, the Spouses Gregorio filed their Answer to the Third-Party Complaint, alleging that the petitioners were entitled to indemnify them for any award which may be adjudicated in favor of the respondents. Thus:WHEREFORE, herein third-party defendants voluntarily manifest their full admission of the truth and veracity of the entirety of Pars. 1 to 9 of the Third-Party Complaint, and that the defendants/third-party plaintiffs are entitled to the legal benefit ofindemnity or subrogation, as against the herein third-party defendants, under Sec. 12, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court.6Although he was already the counsel of the petitioners, Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. entered his appearance as counsel of the Spouses Gregorio.7The latter, with the assistance of Atty. Laserna, Jr., likewise, filed a motion for intervention and filed their Answer-In-Intervention in which they alleged that the respondents were able to secure a sales patent over the residential lot in question through fraud and deceit; and prayed that the complaint be dismissed.8On November 12, 1992, the trial court issued an Order granting the motion of the Spouses Gregorio to intervene and admitting their Answer-in-Intervention. The trial court also granted the respondents motion to strike off the appearance of Atty. Laserna, Jr. as counsel of the Spouses Gregorio as he was already the petitioners counsel of record. The trial court, however, no longer resolved the motion of the petitioners for leave to file a third-party complaint against the Spouses Gregorio.The Evidence for the RespondentsOn February 22, 1961, respondent Alfonso Abagat, then single, filed a sales application patent over a residential lot, particularly Lot 11, Block 15, Bagong Isla Subd., Baclaran, Paraaque, Rizal, Philippines.9He built a house thereon and declared the house for taxation purposes beginning 1961.10He later paid the realty taxes for the house for the period of 1969 to 1970.11Pending the processing of his sales patent application, respondent Alfonso Abagat leased the hut to the Spouses Miguel and Violeta Gregorio at a monthly rental of seventy pesos (P70.00). On January 26, 1973, the house was destroyed by fire. The Spouses Gregorio, along with the other residents, near the area were evacuated to the Baclaran Elementary School.In light of the certification of the Committee on Resettlement of Baclaran Fire Victims, on February 28, 1973, the respondents were allowed to return to the property and to build a make-shift house out of the ruins. They allowed his nephew, Roberto "Boy" Abagat, to occupy the said "house," but for some reason, he left and resettled somewhere.In August 1973, the Spouses Gregorio, surreptitiously occupied the abandoned make-shift house of the respondents. The couple "remodeled" the make-shift structure into a two-storey house. On April 7, 1977, the respondents, thru counsel, demanded payment of rental for his house for the period from 1976 to March 977 amounting toP350.00 but Miguel Gregorio offered to pay only the amount ofP280.00 which the plaintiffs refused. On April 25, 1977, Miguel Gregorio wrote respondent Alfonso Abagat that, in view of his persistent refusal to accept the amount ofP280 for the rent covering the period of January to April 1977, he would consign the amount to the court.12Respondent Alfonso Abagat filed a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Paraaque for unlawful detainer against the Spouses Gregorio, docketed as Civil Case No. 3898. On January 14, 1983, the court rendered a decision dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.13Unknown to Alfonso Abagat, the Spouses Gregorio, as vendors, and the Spouses Edgardo and Cecilia D. Gonzaga, as vendees, executed a Deed of Conditional Sale over the house for the price ofP100,000.00 under the following terms and conditions:2 The VENDOR herein hereby acknowledges receipt of the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), Philippine currency, in cash, from the VENDEE herein, as part and representing the FIRST DOWNPAYMENT.3 The VENDEE herein shall remit and pay to the VENDOR herein the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00), Philippine Currency, in cash, within the month of May, 1984, as part of and representing the SECOND DOWNPAYMENT of this sale.4 The VENDOR herein shall apply, file with and work for the issuance, approval and release of the government order, decree and award of the official ownership over the government land on which the said house now stands in favor of the VENDOR, after which, the VENDOR herein shall transfer such right over said government award to and in favor of the VENDEE herein.5 Upon the approval, release and issuance of such government award, as mentioned in the immediately preceding paragraph, the VENDEE herein shall remit and pay to the VENDOR herein the amount of FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00), Philippine Currency, in cash, as part of and representing the FINAL AND FULL PAYMENT in settlement in full of the obligation of the VENDEE.6 The VENDOR herein shall see to it that such government award of ownership over the government land on which the said house now stands shall be made, done and processed by the concerned government agency with utmost speed and facility.7 The VENDOR herein shall shoulder all the official and incidental costs and fees relative to the filing and application for, and the processing of, such government award.14During the period of April 13, 1984 to July 11, 1985, Miguel Gregorio received from the petitioners the total amount ofP55,000.0015thereby leaving a balance ofP30,000.00. For Miguel Gregorios failure to secure an award from the government, as agreed upon, they further agreed to reduce the balance of the purchase price of the house toP25,000.00. Petitioner Edgardo Gonzaga paid to Miguel Gregorio following the latters execution on July 12, 1985 of a Deed of Final and Absolute Sale in favor of Edgardo Gonzaga, under the following terms and conditions:1. That the VENDOR shall exert utmost effort, diligence and speed in securing a government award over the said property for subsequent transfer to the VENDEE within one (1) year from the execution hereof.2. That all costs and expenses relative to such government award shall be for the account of the VENDOR;3. That all costs and expenses relative to the execution of this Deed of Final and Absolute Sale shall be for the account of the VENDOR;4. That all costs and expenses for the future or subsequent issuance of Torrens Title over the said property shall be for the account of the VENDEE;5. That the VENDOR hereby grants and affords the VENDEE a WARRANTY AGAINST EVICTION, and that the VENDOR shall be liable to the VENDEE for damages that might arise from any false representations as to the prior validity of her rights, interest, or ownership over the said property.16When Miguel Gregorio learned that respondent Alfonso Abagat had earlier filed an application for a sales patent over the property, he and petitioner Edgardo Gonzaga filed a protest in the Bureau of Lands. On January 2, 1986, the Bureau of Lands rendered a decision ordering the dismissal of the protest and granting the application of respondent Alfonso Abagat for a sales patent. The Spouses Gonzaga were, likewise, ordered to vacate the property. The decretal portion of the said decision reads:WHEREFORE, it is ordered that the protest filed by spouses Miguel Gregorio and Violeta Gregorio against the Insular Government Property Sales Application No. (IV-1) 191 of Alfonso Abagat be as hereby it is, dismissed and this once, dropped from the records. Protestants and their privies the spouses Edgardo Gonzaga and Cecilia Gonzaga, are hereby directed to vacate the land in question and remove whatever improvements introduced thereon within sixty (60) days from a receipt of a copy hereof. The I.C.P.S.A. No. (IV-1) 191 of Alfonso Abagat shall be given further due course.17After the decision of the Bureau of Lands had become final and executory, respondent Alfonso Abagat filed motions for execution of the decision and the demolition of the house thereon on August 12, 1986 and February 17, 1987.On May 22, 1987, the Bureau of Lands issued an Order of Execution directing the District Land Officer:WHEREFORE, and pursuant to the provisions of Section 1844 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3077, you are hereby enjoined to repair to the premises of the land in question and enforce the aforementioned decision by ordering the claimants-protestants, their tenants, relatives and all those acting for and in their behalf to vacate the said land, remove their improvements therefrom and placing the applicant-respondent in peaceful possession thereof.In complying herewith, you should set forth the whole proceeding in writing signed by the parties and witnesses, if possible, and submit the returns to this Office within sixty (60) days from this date to be used as evidence should it be necessary to institute action, criminal or otherwise, against any party who may refuse to obey the same.SO ORDERED.18The Director of Lands executed a Deed of Sale over the parcel of land in favor of respondent Alfonso Abagat19who also paid the realty taxes over the property.20Alfonso Abagat made demands to Edgardo Gonzaga to vacate the property in two Letters dated June 17, 1990 and August 8, 1991, but Edgardo Gonzaga refused. On August 19, 1991, Edgardo Gonzaga and Gregorio executed a Memorandum of Agreement in which they agreed to rescind the deed of conditional sale and the deed of final and absolute sale they had earlier executed, and that Miguel Gregorio would refund the amount of P90,000.00 on or before December 15, 1991, and that in the meantime, Edgardo Gonzaga would remain in the property until his receipt of the said amount.21However, even before Miguel Gregorio could refund theP90,000.00 to petitioner Edgardo Gonzaga, Alfonso Abagat filed a complaint against the petitioners for recovery of possession with damages in the Regional Trial Court of Makati.Evidence for the PetitionersUnknown to the petitioners, the respondents had filed an application with the Bureau of Lands for a sales patent over the land. On March 30, 1984 the Spouses Gregorio, as vendors, and the petitioners as vendees, executed a deed of conditional sale over the house forP100,000.00, payable on installment basis.The Decision of the Trial CourtOn October 10, 1994, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the respondents and against the petitioners and intervenors. The fallo of the decision reads:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:1. Ordering defendants-spouses Gregorios and Gonzagas and all persons claiming rights under them to vacate the premises at Lot 11, Block 15 located at No. 2063 Bagong Sikat, Paraaque, Metro Manila, and for defendants-spouses Gregorios to demolish at their own expense, the house constructed thereon;2. Ordering defendants-Gregorios to pay plaintiffs the amount ofP45,000.00 representing unearned rentals on subject premises from March, 1984 up to October 1991, andP500.00 land rental every month thereafter;3. Ordering defendants-spouses Gonzagas and Gregorios jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs the amount ofP10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and4. Ordering defendants-spouses Gregorios and Gonzagas jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs the costs of suit.22The intervenors did not appeal the decision. The petitioners appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, contending that:e. Assuming arguendo that plaintiffs now have the right to compel defendants to remove their house on the questioned land, should not the third-party defendants spouses Gregorio be mandated to REFUND the purchase price paid by defendants/3rd-party plaintiffs plus damages arising out of this case to which defendants were implicated by reason of spouses Gregorios failure to comply with their 1984 and 1985 agreements with defendants/3rd party plaintiffs?In such a scenario, spouses Gregorio have the legal duty to refund spouses Gonzaga the purchase price the latter paid to the former in 1984 and to answer for all damages that spouses Gonzaga may sustain by reason of any judgment in favor of plaintiffs against defendants.It will be noted that third-party defendants spouses Gregorio have filed a voluntary Appearance and a Manifestation admitting the truth and fairness of the Third-Party Complaint filed by defendants spouses Gonzaga against them.23The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court on December 19, 1997. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error afflicting it, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.24On the plea of the petitioners that the trial court should have ordered the intervenors to refund to them theP90,000.00 the latter had received as payment for the house, the appellate court ruled that a separate complaint should have been filed against the Spouses Gregorio, instead of appealing the decision of the trial court.Dissatisfied, the Petitioners filed the instant petition, raising the sole question of whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in not ordering the intervenors to refund to them theP90,000.00 they had paid for the house and which the latter promised to do so under their Memorandum of Agreement.The petitioners aver that in the light of the admission made by the intervenors in their pleadings in the trial court, including their Answer to the third-party complaint and their urgent motion for intervention, that they were liable to the petitioners for any judgment for damages adjudged by the trial court in favor of the respondents, the trial court should have ordered the intervenors to refund to them the aforesaid amount ofP90,000.00. The petitioners assert that while the trial court did not rule on their motion for leave to file a third-party complaint against the Spouses Gregorio, the caption of the Order dated March 8, 1993, included the Spouses Gregorio as intervenors and third-party defendants.25The petitioners aver that the interest of substantial justice and the avoidance of multiplicity of suits should likewise be considered by the Court.In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that the liability of the intervenors to the petitioners in the Memorandum of Agreement is personal. Since they were not privies to the Agreement, the respondents contend that the claim for refund of the petitioners against the intervenors must be presented in a separate action against the latter. Moreover, the respondents insist that the petitioners did not pray, in their third-party complaint, for the refund by the Spouses Gregorio of the amount ofP90,000.00. Hence, the respondents assert, even if the trial court had granted leave to the petitioners to file a third-party complaint against the Spouses Gregorio and admitted the said complaint, the petitioners would not have been entitled to a refund of the said amount.The petition has no merit.We agree with the petitioners that a judgment should be complete by itself. It should not leave open any judicial question to be determined by others.26The Court is to dispose finally of the litigation so as to preclude further litigation between the parties on the same subject matter thereby avoiding a multiplicity of suits between the parties and their privies and successors-in-interests. However, the Court has no authority to roam at will and grant relief to the parties prescinding from their pleadings and prayers. The rule is that a party is entitled only to such relief consistent with and limited to that sought by the pleadings or incidental thereto. A trial court would be acting beyond its jurisdiction if it grants relief to a party beyond the scope of the pleadings.27Moreover, the right of a party to recover depends, not on the prayer, but on the scope of the pleadings, the issues made and the law. A judgment which determines questions not within the courts jurisdiction, because not in issue, is, to that extent, void.28There is no principle better established than that what is not juridically presented cannot be juridically decided.29Also, where a party has prayed only for specific relief or reliefs as to a specific subject matter, usually no different relief may be granted.30A judgment which grants reliefs of a character not sought is void.31Where a prayer for general relief is added to the demand of specific relief, the court may grant such other appropriate relief as may be consistent with the allegations and proofs.32In this case, the petitioners failed to file any pleading against the Spouses Gregorio for the enforcement of the deed of conditional sale, the deed of final and absolute sale, and the Memorandum of Agreement executed by them. The petitioners filed their motion for leave to file a third-party complaint against the intervenors, the Spouses Gregorio, and appended thereto their third-party complaint for indemnity for any judgment that may be rendered by the court against them and in favor of the respondents. However, the petitioners did not include in their prayer that judgment be rendered against the third-party defendants to refund theP90,000.00 paid by them to the Spouses Gregorio. Worse, the court denied the petitioners motion. The petitioners failed to assail the trial courts order of denial in the appellate court. Even after the trial court had granted leave to the Spouses Gregorio to intervene as parties-defendants and the latter filed their Answer-in-Intervention, the petitioners failed to file a cross-claim against the intervenors for specific performance for the refund of theP90,000.00 they had received from the petitioners under their deed of conditional sale, the deed of final and absolute sale and the memorandum of agreement and pay filing and docket fees therefor. Hence, the trial court had no jurisdiction to render judgment in favor of the petitioners ordering the intervenors to refund theP90,000.00 to them. In fine, if the trial court had rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners by ordering the enforcement of the deeds executed by the parties and directing the intervenors to refund theP90,000.00 paid by the petitioners for the house on the subject property, the courta quowould have acted beyond its authority.We agree that the intervenors admitted their liability for the payment ofP90,000.00 in their Answer to the Third-Party Complaint of the petitioners. However, the said answer was of no legal consequence because the court denied the motion of the petitioners for leave to file a third-party complaint against the intervenors. Moreover, the intervenors, it appears, were inveigled by the petitioners to engage their lawyer, Atty. Laserna, Jr. as their counsel as intervenors, which the trial court rejected.The petitioners did not raise in their pleadings the issue of their entitlement to the said refund.33The only issues raised by the petitioners in their Pre-Trial Brief are the following:1. Who owns the house constructed in 1973 by the Sps. Gregorio using their own funds and at their own expense at 2063 Bagong Sikat St., Baclaran, Paraaque, Metro Manila?2. Who owns the parcel of lot located at 2063 Bagong Sikat St., Baclaran, Paraaque, Metro Manila?3. Who has the right of possession of the house and/or lot mentioned above, or both?4. May the plaintiff legally demand the defendants to vacate the lot in question and demolish the subject house at the latters expense?5. Was there gross bad faith and value on the part of the defendants in refusing to vacate the lot in question and to demolish the subject house?34On the other hand, the reliefs prayed for by the petitioners are as follows:X.Reiteration of the Defendants Prayer:In consideration of the foregoing, defendants respectfully pray for them:1. Dismissal of the Complaint for lack of merit2. Awarding in favor of the defendants moral damages for the undue harassment and loss of reputation continuously experienced by the defendants as well as the mental anguish suffered by the defendants because of the acts of the plaintiffs.3. Order plaintiffs to pay costs of suit.35The petitioners did not include in their Pre-Trial Brief a prayer for the refund of the amount ofP90,000.00 to be made by the intervenors.IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING,the petition isDENIED DUE COURSE. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals areAFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.SECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 124644 February 5, 2004ARNEL ESCOBAL,petitioner,vsHON. FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, Atty. Luisabel Alfonso-Cortez, Executive Clerk of Court IV of the Sandiganbayan, Hon. David C. Naval, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 21, Luz N. Nueca,respondents.D E C I S I O NCALLEJO, SR.,J.:This is a petition forcertiorariwith a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction filed by Arnel Escobal seeking the nullification of the remand by the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan of the records of Criminal Case No. 90-3184 to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch 21.The petition at bench arose from the following milieu:The petitioner is a graduate of the Philippine Military Academy, a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine Constabulary, as well as the Intelligence Group of the Philippine National Police. On March 16, 1990, the petitioner was conducting surveillance operations on drug trafficking at theSa Harong Caf Bar and Restaurantlocated along Barlin St., Naga City. He somehow got involved in a shooting incident, resulting in the death of one Rodney Rafael N. Nueca. On February 6, 1991, an amended Information was filed with the RTC of Naga City, Branch 21, docketed as Criminal Case No. 90-3184 charging the petitioner and a certain Natividad Bombita, Jr. alias "Jun Bombita" with murder. The accusatory portion of the amended Information reads:That on or about March 16, 1990, in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court by virtue of the Presidential Waiver, dated June 1, 1990, with intent to kill, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and maul one Rodney Nueca and accused 2Lt Arnel Escobal armed with a caliber .45 service pistol shoot said Rodney Nueca thereby inflicting upon him serious, mortal and fatal wounds which caused his death,and as a consequence thereof, complainant LUZ N. NUECA, mother of the deceased victim, suffered actual and compensatory damages in the amount of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVEN & 95/100 (P367,107.95) PESOS, Philippine Currency, and moral and exemplary damages in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND (P135,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency.1On March 19, 1991, the RTC issued an Order preventively suspending the petitioner from the service under Presidential Decree No. 971, as amended by P.D. No. 1847. When apprised of the said order, the General Headquarters of the PNP issued on October 6, 1992 Special Order No. 91, preventively suspending the petitioner from the service until the case was terminated.2The petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the RTC, while accused Bombita remained at large. The petitioner posted bail and was granted temporary liberty.When arraigned on April 9, 1991,3the petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter, on December 23, 1991, the petitioner filed a Motion to Quash4the Information alleging that as mandated by Commonwealth Act No. 408,5in relation to Section 1, Presidential Decree No. 1822 and Section 95 of R.A. No. 6975, the court martial, not the RTC, had jurisdiction over criminal cases involving PNP members and officers.Pending the resolution of the motion, the petitioner on June 25, 1993 requested the Chief of the PNP for his reinstatement. He alleged that under R.A. No. 6975, his suspension should last for only 90 days, and, having served the same, he should now be reinstated. On September 23, 1993,6the PNP Region V Headquarters wrote Judge David C. Naval requesting information on whether he issued an order lifting the petitioners suspension. The RTC did not reply. Thus, on February 22, 1994, the petitioner filed a motion in the RTC for the lifting of the order of suspension. He alleged that he had served the 90-day preventive suspension and pleaded for compassionate justice. The RTC denied the motion on March 9, 1994.7Trial thereafter proceeded, and the prosecution rested its case. The petitioner commenced the presentation of his evidence. On July 20, 1994, he filed a Motion to Dismiss8the case. Citing Republic of thePhilippines v. Asuncion, et al.,9he argued that since he committed the crime in the performance of his duties, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over the case.On October 28, 1994, the RTC issued an Order10denying the motion to dismiss. It, however, ordered the conduct of a preliminary hearing to determine whether or not the crime charged was committed by the petitioner in relation to his office as a member of the PNP.In the preliminary hearing, the prosecution manifested that it was no longer presenting any evidence in connection with the petitioners motion. It reasoned that it had already rested its case, and that its evidence showed that the petitioner did not commit the offense charged in connection with the performance of his duties as a member of the Philippine Constabulary. According to the prosecution, they were able to show the following facts: (a) the petitioner was not wearing his uniform during the incident; (b) the offense was committed just after midnight; (c) the petitioner was drunk when the crime was committed; (d) the petitioner was in the company of civilians; and, (e) the offense was committed in a beerhouse called "Sa Harong Caf Bar and Restaurant."11For his part, the petitioner testified that at about 10:00 p.m. on March 15, 1990, he was at theSa Harong Caf Bar and Restaurantat Barlin St., Naga City, to conduct surveillance on alleged drug trafficking, pursuant to Mission Order No. 03-04 issued by Police Superintendent Rufo R. Pulido. The petitioner adduced in evidence the sworn statements of Benjamin Cario and Roberto Fajardo who corroborated his testimony that he was on a surveillance mission on the aforestated date.12On July 31, 1995, the trial court issued an Order declaring that the petitioner committed the crime charged while not in the performance of his official function. The trial court added that upon the enactment of R.A. No. 7975,13the issue had become moot and academic. The amendatory law transferred the jurisdiction over the offense charged from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC since the petitioner did not have a salary grade of "27" as provided for in or by Section 4(a)(1), (3) thereof. The trial court nevertheless ordered the prosecution to amend the Information pursuant to the ruling in Republic v. Asuncion14and R.A. No. 7975. The amendment consisted in the inclusion therein of an allegation that the offense charged was not committed by the petitioner in the performance of his duties/functions, nor in relation to his office.lawphi1.ntThe petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration15of the said order, reiterating that based on his testimony and those of Benjamin Cario and Roberto Fajardo, the offense charged was committed by him in relation to his official functions. He asserted that the trial court failed to consider the exceptions to the prohibition. He asserted that R.A. No. 7975, which was enacted on March 30, 1995, could not be applied retroactively.16The petitioner further alleged that Luz Nacario Nueca, the mother of the victim, through counsel, categorically and unequivocably admitted in her complaint filed with the Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) that he was on an official mission when the crime was committed.On November 24, 1995, the RTC made a volte face and issued an Order reversing and setting aside its July 31, 1995 Order. It declared that based on the petitioners evidence, he was on official mission when the shooting occurred. It concluded that the prosecution failed to adduce controverting evidence thereto. It likewise considered Luz Nacario Nuecas admission in her complaint before the PLEB that the petitioner was on official mission when the shooting happened.The RTC ordered the public prosecutor to file a Re-Amended Information and to allege that the offense charged was committed by the petitioner in the performance of his duties/functions or in relation to his office; and, conformably to R.A. No. 7975, to thereafter transmit the same, as well as the complete records with the stenographic notes, to the Sandiganbayan, to wit:WHEREFORE, the Order dated July 31, 1995 is hereby SET ASIDE and RECONSIDERED, and it is hereby declared that after preliminary hearing, this Court has found that the offense charged in the Information herein was committed by the accusedin his relation to his function and duty as member of the then Philippine Constabulary.Conformably with R.A. No. 7975 and the ruling of the Supreme Court in Republic v. Asuncion, et al., G.R. No. 180208, March 11, 1994:(1) The City Prosecutor is hereby ordered to file a Re-Amended Information alleging that the offense charged was committed by the Accused in the performance of his duties/functions or in relation to his office, within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof;(2) After the filing of the Re-Amended Information, the complete records of this case, together with the transcripts of the stenographic notes taken during the entire proceedings herein, are hereby ordered transmitted immediately to the Honorable Sandiganbayan, through its Clerk of Court, Manila, for appropriate proceedings.17On January 8, 1996, the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan ordered the Executive Clerk of Court IV, Atty. Luisabel Alfonso-Cortez, to return the records of Criminal Case No. 90-3184 to the court of origin, RTC of Naga City, Branch 21. It reasoned that under P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975,18the RTC retained jurisdiction over the case, considering that the petitioner had a salary grade of "23." Furthermore, the prosecution had already rested its case and the petitioner had commenced presenting his evidence in the RTC; following the rule on continuity of jurisdiction, the latter court should continue with the case and render judgment therein after trial.Upon the remand of the records, the RTC set the case for trial on May 3, 1996, for the petitioner to continue presenting his evidence. Instead of adducing his evidence, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, assailing the Order of the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan remanding the records of the case to the RTC.The threshold issue for resolution is whether or not the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in ordering the remand of the case to the RTC.The petitioner contends that when the amended information was filed with the RTC on February 6, 1991, P.D. No. 1606 was still in effect. Under Section 4(a) of the decree, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over the case against him as he was charged with homicide with the imposable penalty of reclusion temporal, and the crime was committed while in the performance of his duties. He further asserts that although P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861 and by R.A. No. 7975 provides that crimes committed by members and officers of the PNP with a salary grade below "27" committed in relation to office are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the proper RTC, the amendment thus introduced by R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively. This is so, the petitioner asserts, because under Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975, only those cases where trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan upon the effectivity of the law should be referred to the proper trial court.The private complainant agrees with the contention of the petitioner. In contrast, the Office of the Special Prosecutor contends that the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan acted in accordance with law when he ordered the remand of the case to the RTC. It asserts that R.A. No. 7975 should be applied retroactively. Although the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the crime committed by the petitioner when the amended information was filed with the RTC, by the time it resolved petitioners motion to dismiss on July 31, 1995, R.A. No. 7975 had already taken effect. Thus, the law should be given retroactive effect.The Ruling of the CourtThe respondent Presiding Justice acted in accordance with law and the rulings of this Court when he ordered the remand of the case to the RTC, the court of origin.The jurisdiction of the court over criminal cases is determined by the allegations in the Information or the Complaint and the statute in effect at the time of the commencement of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application thereof. The jurisdictional requirements must be alleged in the Information.19Such jurisdiction of the court acquired at the inception of the case continues until the case is terminated.20Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by P.D. No. 1861, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction in all cases involving the following:(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine ofP6,000.00 .21However, for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under the said law over crimes committed by public officers in relation to their office, it is essential that the facts showing the intimate relation between the office of the offender and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the Information. It is not enough to merely allege in the Information that the crime charged was committed by the offender in relation to his office because that would be a conclusion of law.22The amended Information filed with the RTC against the petitioner does not contain any allegation showing the intimate relation between his office and the discharge of his duties. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction over the offense charged when on November 24, 1995, it ordered the re-amendment of the Information to include therein an allegation that the petitioner committed the crime in relation to office. The trial court erred when it ordered the elevation of the records to the Sandiganbayan. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 amending P.D. No. 1606 was already in effect and under Section 2 of the law:In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.Under the law, even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to his office but occupies a position corresponding to a salary grade below "27," the proper Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, as the case may be, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In this case, the petitioner was a Police Senior Inspector, with salary grade "23." He was charged with homicide punishable by reclusion temporal. Hence, the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the crime charged conformably to Sections 20 and 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691.The petitioners contention that R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively has no legal basis. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 is a substantive procedural law which may be applied retroactively.23IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ.,concur.

EN BANCG.R. No. 155001 May 5, 2003DEMOSTHENES P. AGAN, JR., JOSEPH B. CATAHAN, JOSE MARI B. REUNILLA, MANUEL ANTONIO B. BOE, MAMERTO S. CLARA, REUEL E. DIMALANTA, MORY V. DOMALAON, CONRADO G. DIMAANO, LOLITA R. HIZON, REMEDIOS P. ADOLFO, BIENVENIDO C. HILARIO, MIASCOR WORKERS UNION - NATIONAL LABOR UNION (MWU-NLU), and PHILIPPINE AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PALEA),petitioners,vs.PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO., INC., MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS and SECRETARY LEANDRO M. MENDOZA, in his capacity as Head of the Department of Transportation and Communications,respondents,MIASCOR GROUNDHANDLING CORPORATION, DNATA-WINGS AVIATION SYSTEMS CORPORATION, MACROASIA-EUREST SERVICES, INC., MACROASIA-MENZIES AIRPORT SERVICES CORPORATION, MIASCOR CATERING SERVICES CORPORATION, MIASCOR AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE CORPORATION, and MIASCOR LOGISTICS CORPORATION,petitioners-in-intervention,x---------------------------------------------------------xG.R. No. 155547 May 5, 2003SALACNIB F. BATERINA, CLAVEL A. MARTINEZ and CONSTANTINO G. JARAULA,petitioners,vs.PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO., INC., MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, SECRETARY LEANDRO M. MENDOZA, in his capacity as Head of the Department of Transportation and Communications, and SECRETARY SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, in his capacity as Head of the Department of Public Works and Highways,respondents,JACINTO V. PARAS, RAFAEL P. NANTES, EDUARDO C. ZIALCITA, WILLY BUYSON VILLARAMA, PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR., HARLIN CAST ABAYON, and BENASING O. MACARANBON,respondents-intervenors,x---------------------------------------------------------xG.R. No. 155661 May 5, 2003CEFERINO C. LOPEZ, RAMON M. SALES, ALFREDO B. VALENCIA, MA. TERESA V. GAERLAN, LEONARDO DE LA ROSA, DINA C. DE LEON, VIRGIE CATAMIN RONALD SCHLOBOM, ANGELITO SANTOS, MA. LUISA M. PALCON and SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA PALIPARAN NG PILIPINAS (SMPP),petitioners,vs.PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO., INC., MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, SECRETARY LEANDRO M. MENDOZA, in his capacity as Head of the Department of Transportation and Communications,respondents.PUNO,J.:Petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention filed the instant petitions for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to prohibit the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) and the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and its Secretary from implementing the following agreements executed by the Philippine Government through the DOTC and the MIAA and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO): (1) the Concession Agreement signed on July 12, 1997, (2) the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement dated November 26, 1999, (3) the First Supplement to the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement dated August 27, 1999, (4) the Second Supplement to the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement dated September 4, 2000, and (5) the Third Supplement to the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement dated June 22, 2001 (collectively, the PIATCO Contracts).The facts are as follows:In August 1989, the DOTC engaged the services of Aeroport de Paris (ADP) to conduct a comprehensive study of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and determine whether the present airport can cope with the traffic development up to the year 2010. The study consisted of two parts: first, traffic forecasts, capacity of existing facilities, NAIA future requirements, proposed master plans and development plans; and second, presentation of the preliminary design of the passenger terminal building. The ADP submitted a Draft Final Report to the DOTC in December 1989.Some time in 1993, six business leaders consisting of John Gokongwei, Andrew Gotianun, Henry Sy, Sr., Lucio Tan, George Ty and Alfonso Yuchengco met with then President Fidel V. Ramos to explore the possibility of investing in the construction and operation of a new international airport terminal. To signify their commitment to pursue the project, they formed the Asia's Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) which was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on September 15, 1993.On October 5, 1994, AEDC submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Government through the DOTC/MIAA for the development of NAIA International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) under a build-operate-and-transfer arrangement pursuant to RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 (BOT Law).1On December 2, 1994, the DOTC issued Dept. Order No. 94-832 constituting the Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) for the implementation of the NAIA IPT III project.On March 27, 1995, then DOTC Secretary Jose Garcia endorsed the proposal of AEDC to the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA). A revised proposal, however, was forwarded by the DOTC to NEDA on December 13, 1995. On January 5, 1996, the NEDA Investment Coordinating Council (NEDA ICC) Technical Board favorably endorsed the project to the ICC Cabinet Committee which approved the same, subject to certain conditions, on January 19, 1996. On February 13, 1996, the NEDA passed Board Resolution No. 2 which approved the NAIA IPT III project.On June 7, 14, and 21, 1996, DOTC/MIAA caused the publication in two daily newspapers of an invitation for competitive or comparative proposals on AEDC's unsolicited proposal, in accordance with Sec. 4-A of RA 6957, as amended. The alternative bidders were required to submit three (3) sealed envelopes on or before 5:00 p.m. of September 20, 1996. The first envelope should contain the Prequalification Documents, the second envelope the Technical Proposal, and the third envelope the Financial Proposal of the proponent.On June 20, 1996, PBAC Bulletin No. 1 was issued, postponing the availment of the Bid Documents and the submission of the comparative bid proposals. Interested firms were permitted to obtain the Request for Proposal Documents beginning June 28, 1996, upon submission of a written application and payment of a non-refundable fee of P50,000.00 (US$2,000).The Bid Documents issued by the PBAC provided among others that the proponent must have adequate capability to sustain the financing requirement for the detailed engineering, design, construction, operation, and maintenance phases of the project. The proponent would be evaluated based on its ability to provide a minimum amount of equity to the project, and its capacity to secure external financing for the project.On July 23, 1996, the PBAC issued PBAC Bulletin No. 2 inviting all bidders to a pre-bid conference on July 29, 1996.On August 16, 1996, the PBAC issued PBAC Bulletin No. 3 amending the Bid Documents. The following amendments were made on the Bid Documents:a. Aside from the fixed Annual Guaranteed Payment, the proponent shall include in its financial proposal an additional percentage of gross revenue share of the Government, as follows:i. First 5 years5.0%

ii. Next 10 years7.5%

iii. Next 10 years10.0%

b. The amount of the fixed Annual Guaranteed Payment shall be subject of the price challenge. Proponent may offer an Annual Guaranteed Payment which need not be of equal amount, but payment of which shall start upon site possession.c. The project proponent must have adequate capability to sustain the financing requirement for the detailed engineering, design, construction, and/or operation and maintenance phases of the project as the case may be. For purposes of pre-qualification, this capability shall be measured in terms of:i. Proof of the availability of the project proponent and/or the consortium to provide the minimum amount of equity for the project; andii. a letter testimonial from reputable banks attesting that the project proponent and/or the members of the consortium are banking with them, that the project proponent and/or the members are of good financial standing, and have adequate resources.d. The basis for the prequalification shall be the proponent's compliance with the minimum technical and financial requirements provided in the Bid Documents and the IRR of the BOT Law. The minimum amount of equity shall be 30% of the Project Cost.e. Amendments to the draft Concession Agreement shall be issued from time to time. Said amendments shall only cover items that would not materially affect the preparation of the proponent's proposal.On August 29, 1996, the Second Pre-Bid Conference was held where certain clarifications were made. Upon the request of prospective bidder People's Air Cargo & Warehousing Co., Inc (Paircargo), the PBAC warranted that based on Sec. 11.6, Rule 11 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the BOT Law, only the proposed Annual Guaranteed Payment submitted by the challengers would be revealed to AEDC, and that the challengers' technical and financial proposals would remain confidential. The PBAC also clarified that the list of revenue sources contained in Annex 4.2a of the Bid Documents was merely indicative and that other revenue sources may be included by the proponent, subject to approval by DOTC/MIAA. Furthermore, the PBAC clarified that only those fees and charges denominated as Public Utility Fees would be subject to regulation, and those charges which would be actually deemed Public Utility Fees could still be revised, depending on the outcome of PBAC's query on the matter with the Department of Justice.In September 1996, the PBAC issued Bid Bulletin No. 5, entitled "Answers to the Queries of PAIRCARGO as Per Letter Dated September 3 and 10, 1996." Paircargo's queries and the PBAC's responses were as follows:1. It is difficult for Paircargo and Associates to meet the required minimum equity requirement as prescribed in Section 8.3.4 of the Bid Documents considering that the capitalization of each member company is so structured to meet the requirements and needs of their current respective business undertaking/activities. In order to comply with this equity requirement, Paircargo is requesting PBAC to just allow each member of (sic) corporation of the Joint Venture to just execute an agreement that embodies a commitment to infuse the required capital in case the project is awarded to the Joint Venture instead of increasing each corporation's current authorized capital stock just for prequalification purposes.In prequalification, the agency is interested in one's financial capability at the time of prequalification, not future or potential capability.A commitment to put up equity once awarded the project is not enough to establish that "present" financial capability. However, total financial capability of all member companies of the Consortium, to be established by submitting the respective companies' audited financial statements, shall be acceptable.2. At present, Paircargo is negotiating with banks and other institutions for the extension of a Performance Security to the joint venture in the event that the Concessions Agreement (sic) is awarded to them. However, Paircargo is being required to submit a copy of the draft concession as one of the documentary requirements. Therefore, Paircargo is requesting that they'd (sic) be furnished copy of the approved negotiated agreement between the PBAC and the AEDC at the soonest possible time.A copy of the draft Concession Agreement is included in the Bid Documents. Any material changes would be made known to prospective challengers through bid bulletins. However, a final version will be issued before the award of contract.The PBAC also stated that it would require AEDC to sign Supplement C of the Bid Documents (Acceptance of Criteria and Waiver of Rights to Enjoin Project) and to submit the same with the required Bid Security.On September 20, 1996, the consortium composed of People's Air Cargo and Warehousing Co., Inc. (Paircargo), Phil. Air and Grounds Services, Inc. (PAGS) and Security Bank Corp. (Security Bank) (collectively, Paircargo Consortium) submitted their competitive proposal to the PBAC. On September 23, 1996, the PBAC opened the first envelope containing the prequalification documents of the Pa