justin submission

7/31/2019 Justin Submission

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Remaking

JapanThe difficulty of escaping the shadowsof the past

Wang Shouming Justin HUSTEP 15107707


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The tragedy of the 3/11 great Tohoku earthquake and the subsequent Fukushima

Daiichi Nuclear plant meltdown, is arguably the greatest crisis Japan has faced since

World War II. The Japanese government, did not only have to deal with challenges

presented by the immediate rescue, recovery and reconstruction of the areas

ravaged by the earthquake and Tsunami; it had to manage and bring under control a

nuclear meltdown of three reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear plant. Its

response and efforts at crisis-management, revealed many aspects of policy-making

and the structure of governance in contemporary Japan.

This presents an unprecedented opportunity to examine how the policy-making

process and the structure of Japanese politics have changed since the end of the

bubble era. Through the huge trove of reports and media articles generated during

the crisis, it is possible to identify specific case examples to assess and evaluate the

effects of political and bureaucratic reform. This provides a new understanding of

how the Japanese institutional structure has evolved or changed as a result of

reforms and also enables the comparison to earlier models of the institutional

structure in Japan.1

Hypothesis

This paper argues that in spite of reforms and initiatives to reform the chief agents ofpolicy-making, in particular the bureaucracy and elected politicians, there has been

little change in the policy-making process in Japan. This outcome is because

institutions are reluctant to embrace the changes and reforms because of their

vested interests in the status quo alignment of institutional structure and functions.

They either resist the changes, reforms and initiatives or assume and subvert it to

resemble the old functions and institutions. This means that the basic structure of the

iron triangle and administrative state models suggested by Johnson, Vogel and Van

Wolfren still remains intact, albeit in a different form.2

This paper uses Historical institutionalism (HI) as a framework to organize and

explain how the 3/11 and Fukushima disaster response. It uses HI as an analytical

1This paper compares the current structure of the Japanese policy making process, to the typologies identified by

Johnson, Van Wolferen and Vogel. All three argued that Japans policy making process was driven by the bureaucracyand termed Japan an administrative state. Johnson is famous for his argument about the Japanese iron triangle andfor his sketch of how METI controlled Japanese industry through administrative guidance. Van wolfren argued that thepre-bubble success of Japanese industry and society, stemmed from cultural values. Wolfren argued that theadministrative-state created and perpetuated by the bureaucracy, extended into many aspects of Japanese society.

Vogel was a sociologist who made the argument that Japan was number one because of its superior way of public

administration. Vogel argued that the efficiency of the administrative-state and relative incompetence of politicians wasone of the key reasons for Japans continued success.2

Ibid 1


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tool to reveal changes in policy-making process and political structure. It argues that

despite reforms and changes undertaken since the bubble period, that Japan has not

seen drastic institutional change. This can be evidently seen in the examples

generated during the immediate 3/11 aftermath and Fukushima accident.

Organization

In the introductory section of this paper, it discusses why historical institutionalism

offers such compelling explanatory value in spite of its flaws and introduces the

papers hypothesis. In the second section, this paper looks at the pre-Fukushima

crisis period and argues how the bureaucracy is resistant to change, through an

example of bureaucrat-business relations. In a second example, this paper examines

the governments response during the period of crisis and argues that the failure to

respond quickly and cohesively stems from how the bureaucrats resist political

control. Using examples revealed during the crisis, it argues that politician-

bureaucratic relations are resistant to change. In the third and final example provided

in this paper, it analyses the post-crisis political battle to make policy in the twisted

parliament. It makes the argument that the political reforms to strengthen the party

and destroy factional control have not been entirely successful and that the continued

existence of factions might have actually exacerbated the crisis.

Introduction: Sticky Historical Institutionalism

At the surface level, Historical Institutionalism (HI) seems like an appropriate

framework for analyzing and understanding Japans contemporary public policy

making process because it conceives of change in the process of making public

policy as part of a historical development process. HI explains who makes policy and

how policy changes in a defined, incremental pattern. It draws upon detailed

historical research to identify actor roles and outcomes. It addresses the issue of

agency by explaining how actors deal with change and enables the prediction ofpolicy making process. With the exception of turbulent uncertain periods where

institutions are unable to respond with incremental change, it argues that change

occurs in policy-making process can be measured across large, relatively stable

time-periods.3

This large time-frame of study allows HI to explain agency, identify the relationship of

causality between actors and policy and demonstrate how a pattern of altered policy

3B. Guy Peters, Jon Pierre, Desmond S. King, "The Politics of Path Dependency: Political Conflict in HistoricalInstitutionalism." The Journal of Politics, Vol. 67, No. 4 (Nov., 2005), 1275-1300


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outcomes emerges. It assumes that political change proceeds according to a logical

trajectory, with agent behaviour controlled, influenced and shaped within a political

structure made up of and supported by institutions.4 HI illustrates and explains the

Structure or institutional framework that the policy-making process takes place in.

Through structure and incremental policy change, HI argues that institutions establish

a path dependency for policy choices and outcomes. This means that because policy

choices and outcomes are unlikely to experience wild, radical shifts because the

structure and agents are conditioned to behave and pursue certain policy courses.

However, this explanation neglects the interaction of agency and structure. It does

not explain why institutional structures have staying power even though agents and

their priorities are constantly changing or may be in conflict. It also neglects to

explain why institutional structures are resistant to change and under what

conditions, would change occur. Due to its inability to answer these questions, this

has given rise to some of the critiques against historical institutionalism discussed in

the following paragraph.

Critiques of HI argue that it only offers a limited understanding ofwhat kind of

change. While it offers an insight into agency and an explanation of how policy

changes occur, it often lacks casual complexity. For instance, an independentvariable may be the cause of a policy change at T1 point in time, but subsequent

development over time may mean that the same independent variable may have

changed into a dependent variable or intervening variable at T3. It does not take into

account possible changes in the ordering of cause and effect of the policy-making

process. This makes HI weak as it lacks does not incorporate casual complexity into

its model.

Furthermore, HI does not take into account ideational changes or changes and shiftsin the political environment that could lead to a modification of preferences held by

agents and subsequent policy change. While HI offers high explanatory power for the

processes of policy formation and agency, it often struggles to explain how intra-

agent, inter-agent policy and political conflict contribute to the policy-making process.

It neglects the role of conflict in influencing the effect of policy-making process. 5 It is

mainly because of these three reasons, HI as a model struggles to deal with

4 Ibid 35 Ibid 3


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uncertain large, sudden shifts in policy direction or critical junctures where agents

may seek to realign or modify institutional structures.

While this may seem to suggest that HI is an inappropriate model and unsuitable for

analyzing Japans current political climate, this paper rejects this line of reasoning.

This paper utilizes HI, as a theoretical lens, to offer an explanation for the reason why

there is a change (or the lack thereof) in the policy making process. It demonstrates

how HI is able to explain the policy-making process even if the state is in the midst of

a large policy shift or at a potential critical juncture, by using a tweaked version of HI

to explain agent behaviour (agency) and structure.

In order to do so, this necessitates a relook at the theoretical underpinnings of HI.

If we adopt a constructivistperspective to conceptualize institutionalism, as Ikenberry

has suggested, HI acquires a third dimension. According to Ikenberry, HI is able to

explain institutional stickiness.Ikenberry defines institutions as overarching

patterns of relations that define and reproduce the interests and actions of individuals

and groups. 6 This means that institutions are social constructs that create, establish,

amalgamate and sustain the interests and actions of members of society. Ikenberry

argues that even if change occurs, change would have to occur through these social

constructs that affect and have influence over how agents think and perceive issues,which have a direct influence over agent preference or choices. The institutional

structure, consisting of organizations and array of structures that help to implement

change, may choose to shape, constraint or oppose change in a myriad of ways

beneficial to the individual agent in the policy making process. Agents are thus

incentivized, to operate within the existing confines of institutions as they are familiar

with it and to sustain its existence as its continued relevance is beneficial to their

interests. This creates the phenomenon of increasing returns to institutionalism.

This means that, it is difficult for new institutions to emerge and replace oldinstitutions. Moreover, the costs of changing to new institutions and uncertainty in

new institutions may discourage agents from switching to new institutions even if the

supposed benefits from new institutions outweigh the costs of switching. Ikenberry

terms this effect as the liability of newness. Increasing returns to institutionalism

and liability of newness, when operating together, means that drastic changes in

6Ikenberry argued that a constructivist reading of HI defines agency as the Institutions provide normative andcognitive maps for interpretation and action, and they ultimately affect the identities and social purposes of the actors,and structure as the formal and informal organizations, rules, routines and practices that are embedded within the

wider political order and define the landscape in which actors operate.G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan,Socialization and Hegemonic Power.International Organization. Vol. 44, No. 3 (Summer, 1990), pp. 283-315


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policy-making process occuronly ifthere are clearly favourable amount of benefits

offered by the new institution and weakness within the inherent institutional structure.

This has led some scholars to argue that this is likely to be the reason why drastic

policy change occurs only in a periods of extreme crisis, or in episodic instances

where the situation is stark or clear enough that existing institutions and/or the policy

making processes are no longer able to fulfil the needs of agents, that agents switch

and create new institutions. 7 This paper uses this typology of institutions to analyse

and understand the post 3/11 events in Japan.

Section 2: using HI to analyze specific case examples

METI, TEPCO and the Nuclear Village

In the aftermath of the Fukushima plant nuclear accident, media reports about the

close relationship between the nuclear regulatory agency, the Nuclear and Industrial

Safety Agency (NISA), its parent ministry, the ministry of Economy, Trade and

Industry (METI) and the operator of the plant, Tokyo Electric Power Company

(TEPCO) emerged.8Most of the reports argued that an overly close relationship

between the regulatory agency and the nuclear industry had led to a lack of oversight

and failure to ensure that TEPCO complied with more stringent safety rules.9 In

Johnsons seminal work about the Japanese administrative state, he argued howMETIs predecessor shaped industrial policy and the development of specific

industries through the process of administrative guidance and oversight. This

process relied upon the process ofamakudari, or the placement of ex-MITI

bureaucrats in positions where they could influence or control industry decisions.

Johnson claimed that administrative guidance was critical in ensuring Japans high

speed growth period by creating state directed industries that achieved economies of

scale and were more efficient due to state directed cooperation with each other

rather than through wasteful competition with each other.

This changed in the 1990s. The 1990s saw Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro

embark on a program of administrative reform and adopt a coercive approach to the

7 Ibid 38Hidenori Tsuboya and Nishikawa. FUKUSHIMA LESSONS: Government admits failures in Fukushima crisis AsahiJapan Watch. 08 June 2011. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201106080560

9For instance, one such report reveals the extent of the collusion.KATSUHISA KURAMAE, "Bureaucrat blasts handling of Fukushima accident in book." Asahi.com (02 JUNE 2011):http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201106010191.html
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201106080560http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201106010191.htmlhttp://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201106080560http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201106010191.html


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bureaucracy. 1011Hashimotos administration decided to downsize and force

ministries to shed staff by reducing the number of divisions and organizations within

the ministries.Implementing the recommendations of the administrative reform

committee, the Hashimoto administration used the reorganization of ministries as an

expedient tool to consolidate greater political control over the decision-making

process. Along with other reforms, for instance, an information disclosure law, these

reforms were designed to shift the public policy making process away from

administrative guidance to a more open, rule-based process with greater political

control and public scrutiny.12 HI reveals a more detailed picture of the extent of the

changes in bureaucrat-business relations since then. From the current Fukushima

crisis, we can see some continuity with the past, in particular the close relationship

between METI and select industries it views as strategically important,

The Fukushima reactor accident has revealed new insights on how METI continues

to be in a position to control and influence certain industries. A former governor of

Fukushima, Eisaku Sato claimed in a media report, that the NISA had ignored

whistleblowers or deliberately chose to downplay reports of repeated safety lapses in

the operation of TEPCOs nuclear powerplant.13Attempts by TEPCOs employees to

reveal serious safety flaws were covered up and even leaked back to TEPCO, which

led to TEPCO whistleblowers being sacked.

14

Addressing such safety lapses wouldoften mean a revision of design and increased spending on measures to fix these

lapses.15 This would mean additional cost pressures on a company that spends 500

billion yen (about 6.19 billion US dollars) on the operation and maintenance of

nuclear reactors annually.16 Such behaviour reflects the desire of agents involved

with making policy for nuclear energy generation, such as METI, the regulatory

agency NISA and TEPCO, to ensure that costs to generate energy are kept and

maintained low.17 The primary beneficiary of such lower energy costs, would happen

to be the industrial users of energy that fall into METIs purview. If METI (via its

10Toshiyuki Masujima Administrative reform in Japan: past developments and future trends International Review

of Administrative Sciences 2005 71: 29511

Kunio Tanigaki Reforming the Japanese civil service: evaluation of the Hashimoto Reform, 1996-1997Japan and the World EconomyVolume 13, Issue 1, 1 January 2001, Pages 83-9312

Ibid 1013JUN HONGO Ex-governor blasts Tepco's cozy ties The Japan Times online, 07 April 2011,http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110407a5.html14Ibid 1015UNKNOWN AUTHOR, Nuclear crisis: How it Happened/ Government, TEPCO brushed off warning from all sides

Yomuri Shimbun Online, 12 JUNE 2011, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110611002697.htm16

ATSUSHI KOMORI, Behind the myth: Nuclear village rules itself in TEPCOs hierarchy Asahi Japan Watch,

07 JUNE 2011, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ20110607048417

in fact, one of the oft mentioned reasons for the failure to build a higher tsunami wall which may have prevented theFukushima plant meltdown, was cost. ibid 15
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/09221425http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/09221425http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=PublicationURL&_tockey=%23TOC%235997%232001%23999869998%23230647%23FLA%23&_cdi=5997&_pubType=J&view=c&_auth=y&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=94e0fcc11255bdce3c6e29e8f2524cd4http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110407a5.htmlhttp://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110611002697.htmhttp://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201106070484http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/09221425http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=PublicationURL&_tockey=%23TOC%235997%232001%23999869998%23230647%23FLA%23&_cdi=5997&_pubType=J&view=c&_auth=y&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=94e0fcc11255bdce3c6e29e8f2524cd4http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110407a5.htmlhttp://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110611002697.htmhttp://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201106070484


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control over NISA) were to adopt a drastic change in its relationship with the nuclear

industry, it could affect the power and scope of its ministry as it would lose its ability

to influence electrical power supply and cost. This could cost METI the policy

initiative. For instance, if nuclear generators are taken offline due to stringent safety

policies, electricity costs may skyrocket as utilities turn to more price-volatile and

higher cost per unit of energy sources, such as thermal energy sources like oil or

natural gas. This may affect the production costs of large users of electricity and

encourage them to relocate their production base overseas, effectively curtailing

METIs sphere of policy control and influence.18

As the example illustrates, in spite of earlier discussed reforms, actors are locked

into a system of overarching beneficial relations and committed to them due to

increasing returns to institutions. METI, NISA and TEPCO are all invested in the

current institutional structure and would stand to lose too much if they were to

change or adopt a radical policy shift away from close relations with businesses. HI

thus, would be able to explain why there was a consistent pattern of safety lapses

and lax oversight over TEPCO. Agents simply had too many interests at stake and

were committed to ensuring that the structure remained the same.

HI also offers some understanding of casual complexity and inter-agent conflict. Inpost-Fukushima media reports, articles alleged that responsibility for the accident

could be attributed to the nuclear village community comprised of top METI officials,

executives of TEPCOs nuclear power division and other agents of power.1920 In

reality, however, there were no such neat lines denoting agent relationships, agent

preference and shared beliefs. Even within METI and TEPCO, there were intra-agent

policy preferences and conflict. For instance, a retired senior official of METI was

quoted as saying that TEPCOs nuclear division was beyond the ministrys control.

18 This scenario is already occurring as power shortages force large industrial users of electricity to consider relocatingproduction out of Japan. METIs response, has been to include subsidies to incentivize producers to stay within Japanin the 3rd supplementary budget for the year. See the following article for how METI has offered subsidies to encouragecompanies to retain operations in Japan.NAOYUKI FUKUDA Industry Ministry to pay firms to stay in Japan Asahi.com, 23 JUNE 2011-07-25,http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201106220167.html19

Ibid 15,1620

Some articles about the nuclear village even extend as far as implicating the rational-legal authority behind the mythof nuclear safety. For instance, one source claimed a todaibatsu or the lateral links between key personnel in TEPCOsnuclear division and other agents who share a similar background in graduating from todai, shared common interests inpositively influencing how the public conceives and accepts the idea of nuclear safety. See the following article for moreinformation. HIROKI OGAWA TODAI Cliques and TEPCO thediplomat.com, 03 MAY 2011,http://the-diplomat.com/a-new-japan/2011/05/03/todai-cliques-and-tepco

Another possible reason for doing so, is because Todai (Tokyo University) was first university in Japan to establish itselfin Nuclear engineering. Most of the current generation of senior tepco staff (professional/technical authority) anduniversity professors (rational-legal authority) in the field of nuclear engineering, can directly identify themselves withTodai. Admitting the failure of nuclear engineering in the case of Fukushima , directly implicates and weakens theinstitutional prestige and undermines the basis of Todai (and their individual) rational-legal authority. (personalcorrespondence with Prof Suzuki)
http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201106220167.htmlhttp://the-diplomat.com/a-new-japan/2011/05/03/todai-cliques-and-tepcohttp://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201106220167.htmlhttp://the-diplomat.com/a-new-japan/2011/05/03/todai-cliques-and-tepco


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"The nuclear power division is an adobe of demons The division issupported by TEPCO as well as by the entire economic society."21

One such policy preference issue presents this issue in stark clarity. A faction of

METI bureaucrats, led by Seiji Murata, favoured breaking up the regional monopolies

controlled by power companies in order to force competition and bring power costsdown. They favoured a policy which required power companies to give up control

over transmission networks, which would lead to greater competition within a certain

areas power grid and consequently lower energy prices for energy consumers. Such

action however, is opposed by nuclear power companies because having exclusive

regional power transmission networks equates to effective regional monopolies and

allows them to recoup their investment in power plants, especially nuclear power

plants which require a large initial investment, but relatively low costs to run.22As

such legislation would affect power companies and their nuclear power divisions,

inter and intra-agent conflict resulted.

In order to force the nuclear industry to be compliant to its plans, METI bureaucrats

supposedly leaked information about lapses in nuclear safety. They leaked

information about TEPCOs safety lapes in 2002. While it is unclear if they intended

to decapitate and directly intervene in the executive position of TEPCOs nuclear

division, the leak developed into a scandal and caused the unprecedented

replacement of the executive in charge of TEPCOs nuclear division with an outsider

from its thermal power division.23 However, TEPCOs nuclear division still wielded

effective executive control because it was the only institution which possessed the

relevant technical-rational authority to make effective decisions on nuclear power

within TEPCO. As a result, its nuclear division was not welcoming of an outsider

executive and resented working with one.24 As the following comment released by

the unfortunate replacement illustrates,

"There are many more procedures (for nuclear power plants) than for

thermal power plants. I cannot find which (parties) I should work on,"Shirato said when he headed the division. "I feel as if I have got lost afterstraying into the nuclear village whose chief is absent.25

21Ibid 16

22Ibid 15

23Another source mentions that this information was known to METI in 2000. but the leaks took place only in 2002. It

is likely that the timing of the disclosure was controlled by METI and released only when the situation benefited METIsinterests. ibid 16. Also see ibid 13.24

The complex and highly technical nature of nuclear engineering meant that the nuclear energy division was insular toa certain extent. Coupled with its importance to TEPCO as a division for generating baseline energy requirements, it

wielded tremendous influence and power within TEPCO. Even the TEPCO president cannot intervene easily with itsaffairs. Its senior executives, all hold advisory positions to the president of TEPCO or have posts which involve making

key decisions. Prior to the leak, TEPCOs president and his three predecessors were all former Nuclear Division seniorexecutives. Ibid 1625

Ibid 16


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The Nuclear division counter-attacked, lobbying politicians to block the passage of a

coal-tax which METI officials wanted. Brazenly, several officials on a leave of

absence from TEPCOs nuclear division, helped a LDP politician to conceptualize

and draft a basic energy law that favoured nuclear power. They mobilized affiliates

related to the nuclear industry to lobby in support of the law and also urged politicians

with links to the energy sector to support the draft legislation and to block the coal

tax. Seiji Murata and his METI faction were forced to back down from their plans to

reform and liberalize the energy industry in order to save another METI policy

initiative from being sacrificed.26This example not only illustrates the difficulty of

making a radical policy shift or sudden change due to the locked-in nature of

increasing returns to institutions, as agents resist change to the status quo of the

institutional structure that they are invested in, but also shows how casual complexity

and agent preferences/inter agent conflict can be explained by HI . As the diagram

on the following page illustrates, while the outcome is similar in both examples, the

casual relationship which leads to the policy outcome is different. Both casual

processes took place concurrently/simultaneously.

Even as METI tried to force TEPCOs compliance to its policy preferences, TEPCOs

nuclear division resisted through its hegemony of technical-rational authority and its

lobbying with legislators. METI sought a change that was beneficial to it as an agent,

but unfortunately was not beneficial to the nuclear power division in TEPCO. METItried to maximize its success of change by creating an intra-agent split in TEPCO,

with the subversion of the nuclear village hegemony. As TEPCO nuclear village

insiders were invested in the current institutional arrangement, they would have been

disadvantaged both by the implications of METIs policy and its attempt at altering the

internal power structure of TEPCO. Hence, they responded by threatening and

opposing another of METIs policy initiatives, forcing it to choose between confronting

the nuclear village or the political survival of its policy initiative.

26Ibid 16

Casual relationship in first example (E1)

Control Outcome:METI (via NISA)~~ TEPCO -------- low power costs

Cause Policy initiative

Casual relationship in the second example (E2)

oppose Outcome:TEPCO~~ METI ---------------------- low power costs

Policy initiativePoliticians Cause


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This process of inter-agent and intra-agent conflict can be understood as one of

rational, interest-maximizing, and balancing between agents to achieve this. It also

suggests despite increased public scrutiny and the introduction of new measures to

control and restrain the relationship between bureaucrats and business, the

bureaucracy still retains substantial power and remains an integral part of the

Japanese policy-making structure. As the example of TEPCO and the sheer effort it

took to resist bureaucratic control illustrates, the reach and power of bureaucrats still

remains strong in spite of reforms.

Fukushima, the Bureaucracy and Political Control over Policy

The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government handling the 3/11, Fukushima

reactor crisis and its response and recovery efforts, was heavily criticized by the

Japanese media. In the aftermath of the crisis, the policy making process appeared

to have stalled and the DPJ seemed to be unable to deal with and manage both

crises effectively because of it. Critics of the DPJ have frequently blamed their

campaign manifesto to wrestle political control and decision-making back from the

bureaucrats, as the key factors contributing to the slow and sluggish government

response. This segment utilizes sticky HI to argue that the reason for a slow,

inefficient response was because bureaucrats resisted the DPJ initiated change. It

uses liability of newness to explain why bureaucrats resisted cooperation with theDPJ and how this contributed to inefficient public policy making process.

Prior to the DPJs historic election victory in 2009, which handed it control over the

lower house and the upper house of the Diet, Japans political landscape has been

dominated by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in an almost unbroken single-party

regime (save for a brief period of 3 months in 1994). This long period of LDP

domination was characterized by free party politics, where party members were free

to promote their own policy platforms and agendas.27

Factions within the partybecame points where party members could aggregate their interests and use their

collective bargaining power to shape or influence policy in their interest. Policy

formulation and implementation was left to the bureaucracy. This resulted in the

creation of a strong, centralized and very powerful administrative-state that was

administered by bureaucrats. Some academics, such as Van Wolfren, have argued

that this created a public policy process which was centred around and sustained by

the bureaucracy. Legislators/politicians would function as interest aggregators and

27STEVEN R. REED What has Japan's Regime Change Brought About? Chuo University in collaboration with The

Daily Yomuri, 28 OCTOBER 2010, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/adv/chuo/dy/opinion/20100628.htm
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/adv/chuo/dy/opinion/20100628.htmhttp://www.yomiuri.co.jp/adv/chuo/dy/opinion/20100628.htm


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approve bills and policies, while the bureaucrats would do the actual decision-

making. The bureaucracy would be responsible for the realizing entire policy process,

from its conception, its drafting, implementation and management.28 This meant

tremendous normative power, or the ability to define and establish what would be

norms, values and standards and by extension, exclude what it considered

undesirable, was centred in the hands of the bureaucracy.

The DPJ regime that was elected into power in 2009 vowed to change this. In its

period as the opposition, it debated amongst itself and developed campaign

manifestos that meant a unified party policy on certain issues.29 This reduced the

effect of free party politics and meant clearer policy conceptualization, common

party policy goals and objectives. One of these campaign manifestos was to end de

facto rule by bureaucrats and replace it with one run by elected DPJ politicians. The

DPJ sought to build upon the Hashimoto reforms that weakened bureaucratic control

and seize control of the entire policy making initiative from the bureaucrats. In the

first few months of its regime, the DPJ pursued this aggressively. For instance, it took

away the power from administrative vice-ministers by drastically limiting their job

scope and responsibilities; it also put teams of lawmakers in charge of ministries and

displaced senior bureaucrats. In an unprecedented measure, had lawmakers

become involved in supervising the day to day operations of the ministries they wereresponsible for. Another measure it undertook, which was designed to put ministries

firmly under the control of elected politicians, was to create an agency which is

responsible for the promotion and posting of top bureaucrats, and to put this agency

under the Prime ministers office.3031 These measures took away some of the

hegemonic power from the bureaucrats as they no longer had free reign over policy

conceptualization, implementation and responsibility over their ministerial function.

However, these measures also alienated and produced bureaucratic resistance andhad become a source of great frustration for the bureaucracy. Even before the 3/11

and Fukushima crisis, some of these were beginning to become apparent. A senior

official was quoted as saying

Before, politicians just left everything to the bureaucrats, said Masahiro Sakata, aformer director general at the bureau who retired in 2006. Now, the Democrats are

28MARTIN FACKLER Japan Leader Aims to Root Out Bureaucrats The New York Times, 24 March2010,

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/25/world/asia/25japan.html

29UNKNOWN AUTHOR In Major Shift, Cabinet decides to reach out to Bureaucracy Asahi.com, 30 DECEMBER

2011,http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201012290216.html30Ibid 30

31Ibid 28
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/25/world/asia/25japan.html?pagewanthttp://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201012290216.htmlhttp://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201012290216.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/25/world/asia/25japan.html?pagewanthttp://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201012290216.html


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treating bureaucrats like an unnecessary hindrance.32

For instance, when the DPJ first came into power and pursued some of these

measures to gain control over the bureaucracy, some bureaucrats fought back by

publishing damaging leaks to the media. Some ministries, retaliated by using powersin their scope of responsibility. For instance, there was an increase in the number of

public prosecutors from the Justice ministry, who investigated political parties for illicit

financial transactions.33 Other bureaucrats, simply refused to cooperate and share

information. For example, the foreign minister, suffered from a lack of information

about their Chinese counterparts during the fishing trawler diplomatic incident as

senior MOFA staff who were excluded from policy meetings simply didnt share their

information and expert knowledge.34 This constituted a mix of passive and active

resistance from bureaucrats who were responding to their policy-making power beingusurped.

This resistance to political control created problematic situations where

inexperienced political appointees had to make decisions without sufficient

information and/or faced situations where the top three political appointees in each

ministry, were swamped with a deluge of work from simply running the daily affairs of

each ministry. Coupled with the DPJs fear of being perceived as continuing LDP

style governance, with Bureaucrats taking a dominant role, this led to an outcome

where political appointees overextended themselves into the decision-making

process and denied bureaucrats any contributing role. Instead of establishing

oversight of policy execution and managing the decision-making at the macro-level

policy process, the DPJ political appointees interfered with the basic operating

functions of ministries, delving into the micro-level policy making process and

obstructed key bureaucrats from functioning. This inter-agent conflict hampered the

policy-making process, making it inefficient and ineffective as bottlenecks were

created in the policy-making process. The DPJ and Bureaucratic mistrust of each

other led them to obstruct and interfere with the policy-making, upsetting and

affecting the flow of policy-making process.

The DPJs response to these incidents was to soften their approach to bureaucrats

and try to coopt them into cooperating with the DPJ government, and to

32

Ibid 2833

Ibid 2834

Ibid 30


14/24

soften/backtrack on its stance of firm political control.35Neither measure succeeded.

The 3/11 and Fukushima crisis management simply saw these problems being

replicated on a larger and broader scale. The office of incumbent Prime Minister,

Naoto Kan, represented the apex of this failure of the decision-making process. In

the immediate aftermath of the 3/11 earthquake, Tsunami and Fukushima nuclear

accident, Kan chose to exclude bureaucrats or officials, in particular, those from

METI and TEPCO from his advisory circle. He appointed non-government related

experts in these fields rather than using the bureaucracy and conventional policy-

making process in which bureaucrats could utilize their experience, contribute input

and influence over policy-making process to deal with problems.36 Kan resorted to

the creation of new committees which caused great confusion in the administrative

chain of command. These committees did not only replicate functions performed in

ministries, they also constituted parallel expertise and decision-making centres

without being legally empowered to make policy or carry out policy outcomes.37 Such

inter-agent conflict only served to prolong the policy-making deadlock and created

much confusion.

This inability to achieve politician-bureaucrat cooperation can be explained by the

liability of newness. The DPJs manifesto presented a new and radical change to the

policy making process in Japan. It would shift the onus of policy-making andoversight to the politicians and lead to a relative decline and weakening of power for

the bureaucracy. Given the likely cost and relative decline in power for bureaucracy,

with the DPJs pledge and subsequent policy actions to carry out its manifesto,

bureaucrats had little incentive to switch to and cooperate with the DPJ in its

envisioned structure of policy making. The occurrence of active resistance in the form

of reprisals such as leaks and increased scrutiny, and possible passive resistance,

such as the refusal by MOFA officials to brief their minister on information relevant for

the handling of a diplomatic crisis, indicates a reluctance to give up and shift to a newinstitutional structure which may marginalize their role and influence. Even with

sweeteners made by the DPJ leadership, such as a relaxing of the rule of no

bureaucratic vice ministers at policy meetings, do not represent a genuine

compromise such as a clear sharing or division of power and responsibility.38

35Ibid 28 and 29

36YUKI TATSUMI Viewpoint Japan: Whos in charge Stimson center, in collaboration with the BBC, 01 APRIL 2011,

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/world-asia-pacific-12933010

37 UNKNOWN AUTHOR EDITORIAL: Politicians and Bureaucrats must be on the same side for rebuilding 11 JUNE2011,http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/editorial/T110611002581.htm38

Ibid 29
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/world-asia-pacific-12933010http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/editorial/T110611002581.htmhttp://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/editorial/T110611002581.htmhttp://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/editorial/T110611002581.htmhttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/world-asia-pacific-12933010http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/editorial/T110611002581.htm


15/24

While the DPJ may have declared firm plans and implemented mechanisms for

reforms aimed at bringing bureaucrats more firmly under political control, such as the

agency for promotions and having elected politicians take an active interest and

control over political process; Certain policy moves, such as the decision to exclude

bureaucratic vice-ministers from policy-decision meetings for fear of them influencing

policy outcomes as it was during the LDP period, are in fact, counter-productive as

they communicate the DPJs lack of trust in bureaucrats and serve further to isolate,

deny and discourage career bureaucrats and the DPJ from cooperating. The gap

between its rhetoric about involving and co-opting bureaucrats, and its actions in

reality, such as the refusal to take input from METI officials, creation of predominantly

non-bureaucratic advisory committees and retaining tight political control over

decision-making process and power, does not help improve administrative efficiency.

Rather, it only serves to widen the gap between the bureaucracy and the DPJ as it

struggles to reconcile its manifesto promise to control the bureaucracy and its need

to co-opt the bureaucracy with its policy-making process.

As demonstrated in the preceding arguments, the intra-agent conflict between the

DPJ and the bureaucrats is not likely to be resolved anytime soon as the new DPJ

institutional structure is too weak. Bureaucrats have little or almost no incentive to

shift towards the new DPJ institutions governing the policy-making process. Theideological bias present in the DPJs campaign manifesto give it little room for

concessions or manoeuvre to incentivize bureaucrats.39This tension between the

new DPJ institution of tightly controlled policy making by politicians and the old

classic model that the formerly empowered bureaucracy favours, is unlikely to be

resolved in the short term unless a compromise or acceptable division of power and

responsibility can be reached between them and the DPJ. Another alternative

outcome would be for the bureaucracy to become socialized into a new DPJ

structure of policy-making and accept its weakened power and status in policy-making. However, this is likely to require a long period before normative change can

take place and a norm cascade before agents make the switch to the DPJ

institutional framework. This is highly unlikely to happen given the DPJs tenacious

hold on power, having lost the upper house election in 2010. Assuming that all

agents are self-interested, rational actors, a HI analysis of the post crisis response

39One possible way that the DPJ could be doing so, is to give bureaucrats new rights to bargain and improve their pay

benefits. A recent bill proposed in the diet, could incentivize the bureaucracy to become a docile and compliant to DPJcontrol, in exchange for better pay and remuneration.UNKNOWN AUTHOR Bargaining rights in works for local public servants Kyodo New Network, 07 JUNE 2011,http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110607a9.html
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110607a9.htmlhttp://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110607a9.html


16/24

would suggest that there is likely to be a prolonged administrative deadlock and

inefficiency.

Intra-DPJ power struggles and the resilience of the faction

In the final example, this paper analyzes the political stalemate forced by the twisted

parliament power structure, where the DPJ controls the lower house but does not

have a majority to force a resolution through the LDP controlled upper house. The

political stalemate that ensued, led to an attempt to oust Prime Minister Kan from

office by the DPJ. It revealed deep political divisions in the DPJ and calls into

question the extentof which the Japanese political system has been changed since

the implementation of multiple political reforms since the post bubble burst. It

suggests that the two-party system with strong political parties has not emerged and

suggests that factions still play an influential, if not important, role in the Japanese

political system. This distraction of an intra-DPJ battle and conflict, prevented

politicians from focusing and dealing with the immediate political challenges such as

cooperating with smaller parties and the opposition LDP to pass and create

reconstruction bills and other much needed legislation to deal with the recovery

process. It has compounded the deadlock in the policy-making process argued in the

previous section. HI allows us to glean a better understanding and help explain why

this is so.

Arguably the most notorious example of the factions role in Japanese politics, is

Tanaka Kakuei and the Lockheed scandal. Through this incident, an encapsulated

understanding of the extent which the faction system shaped Japanese politics can

be obtained. Rather than go into a detailed explanation about factions and their

functions, this paper uses the Tanaka incident to provide a brief explanation of

factions and introduce the post-1994 reforms that weakened factions and paved the

way for a two-party system in Japan. The Tanaka faction in the LDP was found guiltyof having accepted bribes from Lockheed martin, to influence or push All Nippon

Airways (ANA) to purchase its Lockheed Tristar airliner. The Prime Minister, several

members of the faction and faction leader Tanaka, were all indicted and some were

jailed. It revealed how certain factions, accepted funding from business and other

interests groups, and shaped its policy preferences to accommodate its sponsors.

Factions would use the influence and responsibilities associated with political

positions for personal gain. This created policy-zoku or policy tribes within the elected

politicians that favoured certain policy preferences or expenditure. The fundsgenerated by such means, were also used to finance campaign expenditure. Tanaka


17/24

summed up the nature of the factional system of politics elegantly in the following

statement.

Politics requires Power; Power requires numbers and numbers, require money40

Election candidates would seek factional support and influence, which often includedmonetary support and party leader endorsement, in exchange for their continued

loyalty and bloc voting in line with factional interests. In turn, they would receive

opportunities to attain political office under a unofficial proportional representation

rule within the LDP41Under this system, central party control remained weak and the

LDP consisted of several factions with different policy inclinations.42 This was made

possible by other structural factors. There were weak legal controls on party

donations and finances and this made it possible for party leaders to raise the

necessary funds to sustain factions. The electoral system often featured multipleseats for a single electoral district. What emerged from this was the fact that the LDP

would often field multiple candidates for the same seat, meaning that there was intra-

party and inter party competition for power. Candidates would appeal to voters based

on a narrow band of interests, which they could achieve with factional support. This

made factional support for virtually all candidates, absolutely essential.43 This led to a

system where political power was concentrated on individual factions within the LDP

rather than central party control. This contributed to the aforementioned free-party

system, where the party was centred around individual politicians, with affiliations to

groups with certain policy inclinations rather than a party with common shared

political objectives and policies.44

However, several political reforms undertaken since the post-1994 elections have

changed the political system dramatically. Chief among these reforms, have been the

end of the Single Non-Transferrable Vote (SNTV) electoral system, funding reforms

and Koizumis strengthening of the party system. The SNTV system was replaced

with a system of single member district and multimember districts, which were based

on a ranked list. The switch to a single member district and multimember districts

reduced the role and power of a faction, as the influence, collective bargaining clout

and money of a faction, bore little resemblance to the broad-based appeal,

40Mathew D. Mccubbins and Michael F. Thies As a Matter of Factions: The Budgetary Implications of ShiftingFactional Control in Japan's LDPLegislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Aug., 1997), pp. 293-32841

Chalmers Johnson, Tanaka Kakuei, Structural Corruption, and the Advent of Machine Politics in Japan Journal ofJapanese Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Winter, 1986), pp. 1-2842

Ibid 36

43 Japan's Shift toward a Westminster System: A Structural Analysis of the 2005 Lower House Election and ItsAftermath. Margarita Estvez-Abe Asian Survey, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 2006), pp. 632-65144

Ibid 36


18/24

understand and meet local constituent desires necessary to renewed political

success. Furthermore, new campaign rules removed the right of faction leaders to

raise funds. This was to be replaced by a system of state funded grants for politicians

to use while having elections.45 Factions became outmoded and irrelevant as a

result.

Koizumis intra-LDP party conflict illustrates the effect of these reforms. In response

to intra party refusal to back his hallmark reform policy of restructuring Japan post,

Koizumi utilized structural reforms that had undercut factional power and influence

within the LDP. Koizumi used the power of endorsements, to cut away the financial

lifeline of candidates. Without an endorsement from the prime minister and party

secretary-general, the candidate was unable to obtain funds for elections and had to

rely on limited personal assets or sources of funding. Koizumi stripped his opponents

of their LDP endorsements and forced them to either retire from politics or utilize their

own resources. Few of the party rebels managed to garner electoral success without

the LDP party machinery and funds. Rebels were denied from regaining LDP

membership. This incident illustrates how the reforms caused a change in political

structures, from being individual and faction-centred, to party centred and driven. By

using the party secretary-generals power of nomination, Koizumi established a

milestone of effective centralized party political control and signalled the demise offactions.

In light of these political developments and reforms in Japan, the ensuing political

crisis in the post 3/11 and Fukushima seems puzzling. For instance, reports emerged

indicating that prior to a vote of no-confidence against Kan for his alleged

mishandling of crisis management, there was a gathering of approximately 70 DPJ

politicians affiliated to key DPJ politician, Ichiro Ozawa.46 They met and media

reports suggested that they had come to an agreement to join the opposition LDP inthe vote of no-confidence against the DPJ. This motion failed when Kan announced

before the vote that he would step down after certain reconstruction related policies

were passed.47Ozawa abstained in voting and the move to oust Kan from within the

party collapsed. In the aftermath of the failure of the vote of no-confidence, reports

revealed a brokered truce between two senior DPJ members, Kitazawa and Hirano,

45Ibid 40

46UNKNOWN AUTHOR No confidence motion fails after Kans offer to step down Asahi Japan Watch, 02 JUNE

2011,http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ20110602035247

McCURRY, JUSTIN. Why Japans Prime Minister Kan survived outer bid Yahoo news in collaboration withChristian Science Monitor, 02 JUNE 2011,http://news.yahoo.com/s/csm/20110602/wl_csm/387976
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201106020352http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201106020352http://news.yahoo.com/s/csm/20110602/wl_csm/387976http://news.yahoo.com/s/csm/20110602/wl_csm/387976http://news.yahoo.com/s/csm/20110602/wl_csm/387976http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201106020352http://news.yahoo.com/s/csm/20110602/wl_csm/387976


19/24

who brokered an agreement between Kan and Hatoyamas group, on a agreement to

oppose the vote of no-confidence, in order to preserve party unity and possibly, party

survival.48This incident is significant because of the sizeable amount of DPJ

politicians who were willing to go against the institution of a strong centralized party.

Given the similar possibility of them losing their party endorsements and becoming

cut adrift from the DPJ, it seemed irrational that they would choose such a course of

action.

In light of reforms to the electoral structure and campaign rules, as argued earlier,

there has been a loss of the incentive system for individual politicians to join and

commit to factions. It became increasingly difficult for factions to be attractive to new

and existing elected politicians when a centralized party institution, which dominates

policy-making process and controls the power of nomination, directly undercut the

factions means of ensuring support (party positions and finances). The continued

loyalty of individual party members to certain party leaders such as Ozawa and

Hatoyama, seems a strange anomaly. HI allows us to understand this lingering

presence of the faction as an institution. This example illustrates the stickiness

aspect of institutions. In spite of losing their ability to offer individual candidates

opportunities at power, money or financial support and endorsements, the faction

continues to exist today in an altered form because they are able to offer certainbenefits to the individual members. For instance, the media has dubbed a legion of

freshman politicians (first term or newly minted elected politicians) Ozawas

Children, in recognition of the role and influence, Ichiro Ozawa has had over their

political success and careers. 49 Ozawa was reputed to have offered coaching and

mentoring in the electoral contests preceding the elections, continues to offer advice

and guidance on how to be a backbencher and political survival in subsequent

elections. In return, Ozawa has been able to utilize his Ozawa Children as a power

base, to push for policies and become a dominant force in the DPJs intra-partypower contests and policy battles.50 This gives Ozawa tremendous clout in spite of a

highly centralized party structure.51 This is eerily reminiscent of the patron-client

relationship where the Veteran political figure would offer benefits, in return for the

48UNKNOWN AUTHOR, Behind the scenes: Two Veteran DPJ lawmakers worked to avoid DPJ split

Asahi online, 04 JUNE 2011, http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201106030143.html49

YOREE KOH, Ozawas Children Semi-Revolt: Trouble for Kan WSJ online, Japan Realtime, 17 FEBRUARY 12011,http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2011/02/17/ozawas-children-semi-rev50

Takashi Mikuriya INSIGHTS INTO THE WORLD / Change administrations only after general electionscommentary for Yomiuri Shimbunhttp://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/columns/commentary/T100920001954.htm51 Rajaram Panda, IDSA comments. The Ozawa Phenomena in Japanese PoliticsInstitute for Defence studies and Analysishttp://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/TheOzawaPhenomenainJapanesePolitics. also see ibid 50.
http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201106030143.htmlhttp://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201106030143.htmlhttp://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2011/02/17/ozawas-children-semi-revhttp://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/columns/commentary/T100920001954.htmhttp://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/columns/commentary/T100920001954.htmhttp://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/columns/commentary/T100920001954.htmhttp://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/TheOzawaPhenomenainJapanesePoliticshttp://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/TheOzawaPhenomenainJapanesePoliticshttp://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201106030143.htmlhttp://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2011/02/17/ozawas-children-semi-revhttp://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/columns/commentary/T100920001954.htmhttp://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/TheOzawaPhenomenainJapanesePolitics


20/24

backbenchers loyalty to the senior political figure. It is also pertinent to note that

Ozawa has not entirely given up the old ways of faction leaders as well. As the last

scion of the Tanaka faction, Ozawa has been unable to escape the taint of funding

and financial irregularities.

Such a re-emergence of member affiliation with veteran politicians seems to suggest

that the institution of factions persists, albeit in loose, less formally defined grouping

centred around experienced political heavyweights such as Ozawa, Hatoyama and

Kan. This has contributed to the political stalemate as none of the groupings

command an absolute majority within the DPJ and are dependent on each other to

sustain the DPJ as a party. Neither Kan nor Hatoyama has sufficient clout that they

could lead the entire DPJ without Ozawa, are dependent on Ozawas clout to

maintain party stability and unity, and Ozawa himself faces sizeable opposition within

the DPJ, which prevents him from dominating the DPJ. Personality clashes and

differences in policy standpoints also hamper and make intra-party factional

cooperation difficult.52 Thus, the reason for the DPJs apparent infighting in the

aftermath after the 3/11 earthquake and Fukushima nuclear accident, can be traced

back to the institution of the faction.

HI allows us to analyze and contextualize this aberration in an apparently post-factional institutional era. HI further explains how and why structural changes created

by the political reforms did not lead to immediate institutional abandonment and

redundancy of the faction. As demonstrated, in spite of political reforms, institutions

are not just extensions of power, but contain power in themselves as they embody

norms and have lasting influence. Even when political reforms or change occur and

cause the loss of benefits or advantages that institutions are able to offer agents,

their influence leave lasting imprints on agent behaviour as they have an impact on

agent preferences and choices. This means that even after reforms occur, institutionswill not fade away and disappear overnight as long as they continue to retain

significance and purpose for agents. Arguably so, the resilience of the factional

institution, rather than the failure of policy reforms to create a stronger centralized

party system, has been a key cause of the DPJs inability to create policy. The

continued existence of the faction may prove to undermine the DPJs cohesion and

affect its ability as a party to cooperate effectively to make policy as backbenchers

52TAKAFUMI YOSHIDA, FUTURE OF THE DPJ/ Takashi Mikuriya:A framework for power shifts must take Root

Asahi Shimbun Online, 29 OCTOBER 2011,http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201009210344.html. also see ibid 51.
http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201009210344.htmlhttp://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201009210344.htmlhttp://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201009210344.htmlhttp://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201009210344.html


21/24

vote in line or vote out of consideration for their patron-client relationship rather than

toe the party line.

Conclusion

This paper has looked at the how both the bureaucracy and political institutions such

as the faction are resistant to change in three examples. In the first example,

between METI, NISA and TEPCO, this paper has argued how METI retains

considerable influence and control of industries despite the passage of reforms

meant to reduce ministerial influence and size. It has also shown how HI can explain

casual complexity via its illustration of two casual processes taking place

simultaneously which led to the same policy outcome. In the second example, this

paper argued how the bureaucracy is resistant to political control and used the

concept of liability of newness to explain why agents are reluctant to change and

accept a new institutional structure. It showed and argued why this has lead to

difficulty in getting the DPJ and the bureaucrats to cooperate and get the policy-

making process back on track. In the final example, this paper delved into the past of

factions and explained how the current political infighting in the DPJ which has

hampered and compounded the deadlocked policy-making process. It argues that it

is the resilience of the factional institution, in spite of political reforms undertaken,

that has caused a political stalemate and distraction from the need to form legislationand push ahead with policies for recovery.

Even though it seems that agents in Japans policy-making process appear to be

unable to escape the grip of institutions from its past, the 3/11 and Fukushima

disaster may yet prove to be a turning point. The crisis has devastated the Tohoku

economy and badly affected the lives of residents, its industries and has irrevocably

shaken the confidence of the general public in the institutions of public governance.

The occurrence of the largest protests in Tokyo against nuclear power since the1960 riots and general public frustration with the political battles in Nagata-cho and

the diet, with Kans administration and cabinet floundering in public opinion polls,

suggests that Japan has been plunged into a state ofanomie. It appears that it is no

longer an issue of public discontent or dissatisfaction with the existing framework of

institutions, but rather, the shock at the apparent state of collapse and failure of the

institutions of Japanese state to perform necessary policy-making and in doing so,

effectively govern Japan. To surmise, it is no longer a question of who governs

Japan, but what can govern Japan. It is this legitimacy vacuum, which represents asource of hope.


22/24

As the apparatus of the state gears up for the reconstruction of Tohoku, it is not only

an opportunity for the region to rebuild, but an opportunity for all of Japan to rethink

the issue of governance. It is a critical juncture at which development of the policy-

making process may be dramatically altered if agents are committed to change. The

old institutions and structures have been discredited and are morally bankrupt. For

instance, it is inconceivable how NISA can possibly remain under the purview of

METI. Neither will a strong administrative state, dominated and controlled by

bureaucrats be allowed to proceed with business-as-usual. The intense local

community opposition to the reopening of nuclear power plants testifies to this. The

current political paralysis and stagnation due to a twisted parliament and factional

infighting in the DPJ will only tear apart the DPJ as a party. The current situation of a

intra-DPJ factional tensions will likely be stabilized as the ongoing political stagnation

means a direct threat to the political survival of individual party members and by

extension, the party. All these factors indicate that an institutional change or

structural realignment is in order, as there is no way the current status quo can be

politically sustainable or acceptable to the Japanese public.

This presents a golden opportunity for institutions to be remade, to strike a new

balance between agents or find the right institutional alignments. For the scope andresponsibilities of bureaucrats to be restrained and yet tapped for the reconstruction

of Japan; for the DPJ to institute effective political control without isolating and

interfering with the duties of bureaucrats; for the DPJ to overcome factional divisions

as a party and present strong party leadership for Japan. What is now necessary, is

the strong leadership, foresight, political will and political capital to make these

changes. While all this may seem uncertain and impossible to accomplish, even

bleak in todays context, Japan can take comfort from its history. From Oda

Nobunaga, to the Meiji restoration leaders, to the Taisho democracy, to thebureaucrats who cooperated with SCAP and MacArthur and Yoshida Shigeru, whose

LDP rebuilt so much of modern Japan, Japan has never found itself lacking in

leaders who were bold and daring to change, rebuild and reform institutions. Why

would this time be any different?

(7,744 Words)


23/24

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ROB GILHOOLY, "Suicides upping casualties from Tohoku catastrophe."JAPAN TIMES. 23 JUNE 2011,http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110623f1.html.

NAOYUKI FUKUDA, "Industry ministry to pay firms to stay in Japan."ASAHI SHIMBUN. 23 JUNE 2011,http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201106220167.html.

UNKNOWN, " Diet session extended by 70 days; fighting continues over Kan's resignation."ASAHI SHIMBUN. 23JUNE 2011, http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201106220149.html.

Unknown, "Reconstruction bill passed; hurdles remain." Yomiuri Shimbun. 22 JUNE 2011,http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110621004658.htm.

MASAMI ITO and NATSUKO FUKUE, "Diet extended but without LDP's OK."Japan times. 22 JUNE 2011,http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110622x1.html.

unknown, "TEPCO seeking debt refinancing."Japan Times. 22 JUNE 2011,http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/business/T110621004699.html
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/09221425http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/09221425http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201106231944http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201106231944http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201106231944http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201106080560http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110622x1.htmlhttp://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110622x1.htmlhttp://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/09221425http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201106231944http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201106080560http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110622x1.html


24/24

Unknown, Bloomberg News Network. "Nation needs nuclear power for main energy source: Kepco head."Japan times.22 JUNE 2011, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nb20110622n2.html

Masami ito, Natsuo Fukue, "Diet extension left to last minute."Japan Times Online . 22 JUNE 2011,http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110622a3.html

Unknown, Editorial. "EDITORIAL: Kan should announce final tasks and departure date."Asahi Shimbun. 22 JUNE

2011,http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201106210211.htm

KATSUHISA KURAMAE, "Bureaucrat blasts handling of Fukushima accident in book." Asahi.com, 02 JUNE 2011,http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201106010191.html

JUN HONGO Ex-governor blasts Tepco's cozy ties The Japan Times online, 07 April 2011,http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110407a5.html

UNKNOWN AUTHOR, Nuclear crisis: How it Happened/ Government, TEPCO brushed off warning from all sidesYomuri Shimbun Online, 12 JUNE 2011, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110611002697.htm

ATSUSHI KOMORI, Behind the myth: Nuclear village rules itself in TEPCOs hierarchy Asahi Japan Watch,07 JUNE 2011, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201106070484

NAOYUKI FUKUDA Industry Ministry to pay firms to stay in Japan Asahi.com, 23 JUNE 2011,http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201106220167.html

HIROKI OGAWA TODAI Cliques and TEPCO thediplomat.com, 03 MAY 2011,http://the-diplomat.com/a-new-japan/2011/05/03/todai-cliques-and-tepco

STEVEN R. REED What has Japan's Regime Change Brought About? Chuo University in collaboration with The DailyYomuri, 28 OCTOBER 2010,http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/adv/chuo/dy/opinion/20100628.htm

MARTIN FACKLER Japan Leader Aims to Root Out Bureaucrats The New York Times, 24 March2010,http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/25/world/asia/25japan.html

UNKNOWN AUTHOR In Major Shift, Cabinet decides to reach out to Bureaucracy Asahi.com, 30 DECEMBER 2011,http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201012290216.html

YUKI TATSUMI Viewpoint Japan: Whos in charge Stimson center, in collaboration with the BBC, 01 APRIL 2011,http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/world-asia-pacific-12933010

UNKNOWN AUTHOR EDITORIAL: Politicians and Bureaucrats must be on the same side for rebuilding 11 JUNE2011,http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/editorial/T110611002581.htm

UNKNOWN AUTHOR Bargaining rights in works for local public servants Kyodo News Network, 07 JUNE 2011,http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110607a9.html

UNKNOWN AUTHOR No confidence motion fails after Kans offer to step down Asahi Japan Watch, 02 JUNE 2011,http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201106020352

McCURRY, JUSTIN. Why Japans Prime Minister Kan survived outer bid Yahoo news in collaboration with ChristianScience Monitor, 02 JUNE 2011,http://news.yahoo.com/s/csm/20110602/wl_csm/387976

YOREE KOH, Ozawas Children Semi-Revolt: Trouble for Kan WSJ online, Japan Realtime, 17 FEBRUARY 12011,http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2011/02/17/ozawas-children-semi-rev

Takashi Mikuriya INSIGHTS INTO THE WORLD / Change administrations only after general elections Commentaryfor Yomiuri Shimbun http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/columns/commentary/T100920001954.htm

Rajaram Panda, IDSA comments. The Ozawa Phenomena in Japanese PoliticsInstitute for Defence studies and Analysis http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/TheOzawaPhenomenainJapanesePolitics

TAKAFUMI YOSHIDA, FUTURE OF THE DPJ/ Takashi Mikuriya: A framework for power shifts must take RootAsahi Online, 29 OCTOBER 2011,http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201009210344.html

UNKNOWN AUTHOR, Behind the scenes: Two Veteran DPJ lawmakers worked to avoid DPJ split

Asahi online, 04 JUNE 2011, http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201106030143.html
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