k » m < èm - nato archives...

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S E C R E T

SECRET - NATO COPY NO.

NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE

COMITE MILITAIRE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

Standing Group Groupe Permanent

SG 256 (Final Decision) R E G R A D E D N A T O UNCLASSIFIED

T l S ^ r Î 9 3 r ' Per Authority iMSM-431 -99

Pages 1 By . . C M M S M .. Date M.-J.l,-//!..

FINAL DECISION ON SO 256

A Report by the Standing Group

on

LIST OF POTENTIAL NUCLEAR TARGETS IN ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE

1. At its 417th Meeting on 7 January 1959» the Standing Group

approved SG 256.

2. This Decision now becomes a. part of and shall be attached

as the top sheet of SG 256. Page numbering of the complete

document, when this Decision is attached, is indicated below.

3. Attention is drawn to the Conclusions of the

report.

( A£*J

FOR THE STANDING GROUP:

4 > i « Ä - t - Ä , . ' a . /\ c

MAURICE E. KAISER Colonel, U.S. Army Secretary

hi

S.

Pages - when attached to basic:SG 25b (Final Decision) Pages - i SG 256 Pages 1 - 7 , Incl.

IMS Control N' j . Æ

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1

SECRET - NATO COPY NO._____________

3.130 256 ')

7 January 1959

Fages 1^7_j inal.

A REPORT BY THE INTERNATIONAL PLANNING TEAM

to the

STANDING GROUP

on

LIST OF POTENTIAL-NUCLEAR TARGETSIN ....

ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE

References: a. SGM-179-57b. SHAPE Itr AG 1250 AD

of 8 Februa.ry 195Ö

SECTION I

SUMMARY

INTRODUCTORY MEMORANDUM

1 1. The International Planning Team ha.s examined reference

2 b_, SHAPE'S proposed list of potential nuclear targets in

3 Allied Command Europe. Its report is contained in Section II.

4 , 2. At its 378th Meeting on Tuesday, 8 A p r i l 1958, the .

5 Standing Group approved MC 32/12, “Limiting Criteria and

6 S t a n d a r d s for M a j o r W a r t i m e H e a d q u a r t e r s , " f o r s u b m i s s i o n

7 to national authorities for comments and/or approval. At

8 this meeting, however, the Standing Group, while accepting

9 the Appendix containing the list of potential nuclear targets

10 in Allied Command Europe a.s an essential part of MC 32/12,

11 appreciated that Its contents were of a. wider significance

12 and interest, and agreed that this Appendix should ultimately

13 be issued as a sepa.rate Standing Group or Military Committee

14 document.

DISTRIBUTION: Al-13, B1 3-9 C2 3 D ElO F G He J3 L l l .

J ^ CÜ t 3 ^ G ^ @ [ L Ä ® ^ 9 | [ i l ^ E C R E TA P P R O V E D F O R PUBLIC D IS C L O S U R E

SECRET - NATO -1.- - SECTION I

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SECRET - NATO

1 3. When MC 32/12 was forwarded to the Ministries of

2 Defense with the Appendix containing the list of potential

3 nuclear targets in Allied Command Europe attached, the

4 Ministries of Defense accepted and agreed with the paper

5 and the Appendix. Since then the International Planning

6 Tea.m has made a minor amendment to the Appendix, originally

7 included in MC 32/12, by leaving out of the "Counter-Nuclear”

8 targets (subparagraph 8.a. of the Appendix to MC 32/12),

9 "(5) Ports and harbours with large POL stora.ge and/or pipe

10 line dispersal facilities," and instead, under "Interdiction

11 and Other" targets (subparagraph 9b of this report), they

12 have inserted "(7) Major port complexes . 1

13 4. The International Planning Tea.m considers that

14 this minor amendment to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe

15 original proposal is logical and necessary, and it is of

16 the opinion that the change is not of sufficient importance

17 to warrant any further comment or agreement being sought

18 from the Ministries of Defense.

CONCLUSIONS

19 5. The International Planning Team concludes that:

20 a. The listing of potential nuclear targets

21 according to their priority as in paragraph 9 of

22 Section II of this report is valid;

23 b. Priorities ma.y change as surface-to-surface

24 missiles are introduced in ever-increasing numbers.

RECOMMENDATIONS

25 6. It is recommended that:

26 a. The list of potential nuclear targets as set

27 out in paragraph 9 of Section II of this report be

28 approved by the Standing Group;

SECRET - NATO -2- SECTION I

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1 b. This list be revised on a yearly basis, ta.king

2 into account the possible evolution in the posture of

3 our deterrent forces, and the estimate of Soviet

4 strength and capabilities contained in the SG l6l

5 series.

SECRET - NATO SG 256

- 3 - SECTION 1

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SECTION II

LIST OF POTENTIAL NUCLEAR TARGETS

IN NATO EUROPE*

1 THE PROBLEM

2 1. To establish a comprehensive list, in order of priority,

3 of potential nuclear targets in NATO Europe.

4 FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROBLEM

5 2. The probable courses of action by the Soviet Bloc in the

6 event of general war are set forth in Part I, Section 4 of SG l6l

7 series document.

8 3. In light of the above, the primary aims of a potential

k9 enemy would be to destroy, as quickly as possible, Allied nuclear

10 forces both land and sea based, to preserve the effectiveness of

11 his military machine, and to prevent the destruction of his own

12 country. Therefore, the first priority targets for him to attack:

13 are those associated with the nuclear delivery capability. Because

14 of the aspects of nuclear control, the major control centres, and

15 particularly SHAPE and major subordinate headquarters, are likely

16 targets. Moreover, because of the relatively small number of

17 those key control centres, attack on them would probably occur

18 simultaneously with attacks on the bases and launching sites of

19 the nuclear strike forces themselves.

20 4. It is considered impracticable to categorise the

21 remaining potential targets into more than one priority, since the

22 sequence in which they might be engaged could vary considerably.

23 xFor the purpose of this paper "NATO Europe" is defined24 as being the area of Allied Command Europe plU3 the25 United Kingdom.

NATO SECRET - 4 -SG 256 (Page revised by Corrig. 10, 27.June I966)

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N A T Œ S E C R E T

1 5 . Targets such as major cities,.important administrative

2 or industrial centres, and those upon which attack is required

3 in support of an invasion of Western Europe fall in this second

4 category.

5 ,6. Bearing in mind the above Justification potential

5 nuclear targets could be sub-divided in the following categoriœs:

7 a. First Category - Counter-nuclear8 (Sub-categories in order of priority)

9 (l) (Equal priority within sub-category)

10 (a) Nuclear strike bases, land and sea;

11 (b) Surface-to-surface missile launchers.*

12 land and sea, and their related support facilities.

13 (c) Control centres and war headquartersî

14 (2) Reconnaissance air bases with specific

15 importance for strike missions;.

16 (-3) Airfields (other than strike bases and

17 reconnaissance air bases with specific importance for

18 strike missions);

19 (4) Special ammunition storage;

20 (5) SAM sites protecting offensive strike power;

21 (6) Main vital signal communications centres anä

22 facilities, and electronic navigation aids;

23 (7) Radar sites (Main stations with control

24 facilities);

25 (8 ) Concentration of ACE ground force nuclear delivery

26 weapons systems.

27 b. Second .Category - Interdiction and other .28 (Ko priority within category) ~

29 Bridges;

30 Key Rail, Road, and Air Transportation Facilities;

31 Inland waterways;

32 POL dumps and depots;

33 Troop concentrations;NATO' SECRET - 5 -S G -256 (Page r e vised by Corrig. 10, 27 June I 9 0 6)

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1 dëhters of' govêi*ftfflêht and centers of population2 and industry;

3 Major port cortißli&fes;

ij. Naval concentrations (other than strike);

5 Radar sites (other than Included in first6 category. Sub~category(7)

y 7 . There are so many courses of action which a potential

8 enemy could pursue that it is considered impossible to differentiate

9 between the relative Importance of the targets listed under sub-

10 paragraph 6 b above. Much will depend on the enemy's assessment

11 of the results of the initial nuclear exchange and no doubt his

12 plans will be flexible enough to enable him to exploit the situation

13 by selecting the most lucrative of the remaining targets for further

14 attacks. Accordingly, no special priority has been allotted to

15 targets under sub-paragraph 6 b.

16 8. Changes in the capabilities and vulnerabilities of both

17 sides may require the priorities enumerated above to be changed

18 from time to time.

19 CONCLUSIONS

20 9* For the present time, the listing of potential nuclear

21 targets according to their priority as set out in paragraph 6 is

22 valid.

23 10. Priorities may alter due to future changes in the

24 capabilities and vulnerabilities.of both sides.

NATO SECRET - 6 -SG 255 "" . (Page revised by ôôrï?ig©Mttm No. 1 Apr 64

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- NATO .COPY NO.

24 March 195Q


COMITE MILITAIRE DE L 'ATLANTIQUE NORD


CORRIGENDUM NO. 1

Pages 1

to SGX256

1. Holders of SG 256 (List of Potential Nuclear Targets

In Allied Command Europe ) are requested to replace pages 6 - 7

with the attached pages.

2. Replaced pages are to be destroyed by burning or reducing

to pulp.

3. This cover page is regra.ded RESTRICTED-NATO when

separated from classified enclosure,


V - •

H. V. FRASER Colonel, British Army Deputy Secretary

HVF/vv

1 ENCLOSURE (l page change) pages 6-7 of SG 256

DISTRIBUTION: sa,me as for basic paper

t.- NATO- Corrigendum No . 1

-1-

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29 March i960

COPY NO.

N ORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE



CORRIGENDUM NO. 2 Pages 1

to SG 256 (Final)

1. Holders of SG 256 (Final) (List of Potential

Nuclear Targets in Allied Command Europe) are requested to

replace pages 4-7 with the attached pages.

2. Removed pages are to be destroyed by burning or

reducing to pulp.

3. This cover page is regraded RESTRICTED - NATO

when the a.tta.ched pages have been removed.


J . Ç r n M s r -

H . V. FRASER Colonel, British Army Deputy Secretary

1

HVF:McC

1 ENCLOSURE (2 page changes) Pages 4-7 of SG 256 (Final)

DISTRIBUTION: as for basic paper

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21 March I96I



Standing Group Groupe permanent

CORRIGENDUM NO. 3

Pages 1

to SG 256 (Final)

1. Holders of SG 256 (List of Potential Nuclear Targets

in Allied Command Europe) are requested to replace pages 4-5 with

the attached page.

2. The removed pages will be destroyed by burning or

reducing to pulp.

3 . This cover page is regraded RESTRICTED-NATO when

attached pages have been removed.


M. P. I. SCHWARZ Lt. Colonel, Belgian Army Assistant Secretary

MPIS/vv

1 ENCLOSURE (l page change) Pages 4-5 of SG 256 (Final)

DISTRIBUTION: same as for basi<

- NATO -1-SG 25o - Corrigendum No. 3

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COPY NO,


COMITE MILITAIRE DE L'ATLANT IQUE NORD


0 0 1

2 March 1962

CORRIGENDUM NO. 4

to SG 256 (Final)

1. Holders of SG 25 6 (Final) ( List of Potential Nuclear

Targets in Allied Command Europe) are requested to replace pages

4 and 5 with the attached pages.

2. Removed pages are to be destroyed by burning or

reducing to pulp.

3 . This cover page is regraded NATO RESTRICTED when the



H. DOSWELL Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Assistant Secretary

GHD/imm

1 ENCLOSURE (2 page changes)Pages 4 and 5 of SG 256 (Final)

DISTRIBUTION: as for basic paper

SG 25Ö (Final) -- 1

Corrigendum No. 4.This document consists of three pages.

1 f y l ^ | J*j


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COPY NO, 001NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE



25 February 1963

CORRIGENDUM NO. 5

to SG 2 5 6 (Final)

1, Holders of SG 256(Final)(List of Potential Nuclear Targets

In Allied Command Europe) are requested to replace pages 4 through

7 with.the attached pages.

2, The removed pages will be destroyed by burning or

reducing to pulp.

3, This cover page is regraded NATO RESTRICTED when attached

pages have been removed.


Major, Italian Army Assistant Secretary

MDL/vv

1 ENCL0SURE(4; page changes) Pages 4-7-of SG 256(Final)

DISTRIBUTION: same as for basic

NATO -1-"SG"'256(Final)-Corrigendum No.5

/ Ü

APPROVED FC

This document consists, of 5 pages.

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S tanding Group Groupe Permanent

27 February I9 6 3

CORRIGENDUM NO. 6

to SG 2 5 6 (Final) .

1 . Holders of SG 2 5 6 (Final)(List of Potential Nuclear Targets

in Allied Command Europe) are requested to replace pages 4 through

7 with the attached pages.

2. The removed pages will be destroyed by burning or reducing

to pulp.

3. This cover page is regraded NATO RESTRICTED when attached


& L L l ^

MARIO DI LORENZO Major, Italiarf Army Assistant Secretary

1 ENCLOSURE (4 page changes Pages 4-7 of SG 256{Final

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o E C R E T

NATO SECRET COPY NO.



Standing Group Groups Permanent

1 April 1964

/ f A Y

CORRIGENDUM NO. 7

to SG 256{Flnal)

1. Holders of SG 25ö(Final) (List of Potential Nuclear

Targets in Allied Command Europe) are requested to replace

pages 4 through 7 with the attached pages.


reducing to pulp.

3« This cover page is regraded NATO RESTRICTED when


1 ENCLOSURE (3 page changes Pages 4-6 of SG 256(Final


NATO SECRET - 1SG 256(Final) - Corrigendum No. 7

- C S ^

This document conbistfs of four pages

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NA T O SECRET COPY NO. 0 0 1




10 April 1964

CORRIGENDUM NO. 8

to SG 256 (Final)

1. Holders of SG 256(Final) (List of Potential Nuclear

Targets in Allied Command Europe) are requested to replace

pages 6 and 7 with the attached page.


reducing to pulp,

3. On SG 256 (Final Decision) sheet, page i, in the lower

left hand corner change "SG 256 Pages 1 - 7 Incl." to read SG 256

Pages 1 - 6 I n c l ,.

4. This cover page is regraded NATO RESTRICTED when the


[JOHN L. H ERNDONX t Colonel, U.S. Marine CorpsAssistant Secretary r

This document consists of two pages

1 E NCLOSURE1 page change - page 6 to SG 256(Fina:iJ

DISTRIBUTION: Same as basic

NATO SECRETSG 256(Final) - Corrigendum

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NATO SECRET COPY NO.




2 March 1965

CORRIGENDUM NO. Q

to SG 2 5 6 (Final)

1. As a result of the annual updating of SG 256(Final)(List

of Potential Nuclear Targets in Allied Command Europe), the following

two amendments became necessary:

s.- Page 4, line 6:'3.G I6I/I8" instead of "SG I6I/I6".

k.* Page 5 Lines 21 and 22: delete 3.he part of the sentence

in parenthesis.

2. Holders of SG 256(Final) are requested to replace pages

4-5 with the attached pages.

3. Replaced pages are to be destroyed by burning or reducing

to pulp.

4. This cover page Is regraded NATO RESTRICTED when attached



\ERNST FERBERMajor General, German Army Director '

1 ENCLOSURE (2 page changes Pages 4-5 of SG 256(Final


NATO SECRET -1=SG 256(Final) - Corrigendum N o . 9

This document consis' 3 pages.

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Standing Group


0 0 1

COPY NO.



Groupe Permanent

27 June 1966

CORRIGENDUM NO. I O

to SG 256(Final)

1. As a result of the annual updating of SG 256(Final)(List

of Potential Nuclear Targets i n ;; Allied Command Europe), the following

amendments became necessary:

£.• Page 4 , Section II, para 2, line 6, change to read:

”..... event of general war are set forth in Fürt I, Section

f4 current SG 161 series document,"

lo. Page 4 , Section II, pa^a 3, line 13, change to read*.

" ..... are those associated with the nuclear delivery

C_£apai5ï ï i t y . Because o f . . ...... "

£.• Page 5 1 Section II, para 6 a_ (l)(b), line 11, change

to read:

" ....... Surface-to-surface missive launchers, land and

sea, and^fcbeir related support facilities."

dT^ Page 5, Section II, para 6 a_ (6), change to read:

"Main vital signal communications centres and facilities

electronic navigation aids;”

e_. Page 5, Section II, para 6 b, line 29, change to read:

L ^ l C e y Rail, Road, and Air Transportation Facilities ; '1

2. Holders of SG 256(Final) are requested to replace pages

4-5 with the attached pages,

ENCLOSURE (2 page changes)Pages 4-5 of SG 256(Final)

DISTRIBUTION : same as for basic

NATO SECRET - 1SG 25b(Final) - Corrigendum No. 10

This document consists of 4 pages.

N A TOAPPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

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3 . , The? removed papgesawill toe destroyed

reducing to p u l p .

4. . This cover- page is : regraded NATO

pagea. have been removed:.

FOR THE STANDING. GROUP :

\

by burning. or

’ED when

iV■M&jQCaGene^aL,_.. German Director

NATO SECRETSG 25b(Final). - CorrigendunrNb;„ 10

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NATO SECRET

1 THE PROBLEM

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

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20

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2225

SECTION II


IN NATO EUROPE*

' ' ' a ;LL1. To establish a comprehensive list, in order of priority,

.■ . ■ ' . d-hi/' of potential nuclear targets In NATO Europe hi'

FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROBLEM

2, The provable courses of action by the Soviet Bloc in the

event of general w a r a ^ e set forth In Part I, Section 4 of SG

"Soviet Éloc Strength and Capabilities".

aims of a potential

ickljr as . o s s i b l e , Allied n uclear

3. In light of the above,, ,the,

enemy would be to destroy, as

forces both land and sea based, to'rpresj^ve the effectiveness of

his military machine, and to prevent the destruction of his own

country. Therefore, the first priority targets for him to attack

are tîose associated with the aAepîuciear^caâbili^. Because of

the aspects of nuclear control, the major control centers, and

particularly SHAPE and major subordinate headquarters, are likely

targets. Moveover, because of the relatively small number of

those key control centers, attack on them would probably occur

ses and launching sites ofsimultaneously with attacks

the nuclear strike forces t

4. It Is considered Impracticable to categorize the

remaining potential targets into more than one priority, since the

sequence In which they might be engaged could vary considerably.

♦For the purpose of this paper *'NATO Europe" ls defined as being the area of A^-êd Command Europe plus the United Kingdom

NATO SECRET & T 2 5 6 ------

- 4 ^(Page revised by Corrigendum No. 9, 2 Mar $5 )


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NATO SECRET

1 5 * Targets such as major cities, Important administrative

2 or industrial centers, and those upon which attack is required

3 in support of an invasion of Western Europe fall in this second

4 category.

5

6

78

9

10

li

12

1314

16IT

18

19

2021

6. Bearing in mincL.^he above justification, potential

nuclear targets coul^C^^^^ivided in the following categories!

a. First •Càtegby' ~ Counter-nuclear.(Sub-cätegöries In order of- priority)

(l) (Equal priority within sub-category)

. (a) Nuclear strike bases, land and sea;

(b) Sur fa c e -1 o -jsurfa c e miss

( c ) ’C o n t r o T c e n l r ^ ö a n 3 w ^ n e a d q u a r t er s ;

(2) Reconnaissance air bases with specific Importance for strike missions;

(3) Airfields (other than strike bases and reconnaissance air bases with specific Importance for strike missions);

(4) Special amtnunÿ, 4 hia G(5) SAM sites 'vp^pt

( 6 ) Mal£& vita fa c i l ities, • nd clo

storage;

g offensive strike power;

1 communications centres andonic nuvigat'^A/ôid s ;

CL 74(T) Radar sites (Main stations with control

facilities);

(8 ) Concentration of ACE ground force nuclear delivery weapons systems.

b. Second Category - Interdiction and other (rio priority within categoj '

Bridges

Ä 9 — Jfe

Sri-- 3 ^ r i 3 /

3 2 - T

Inland waterways;

POL dumps and depots;

N A T O SE C R E TSa 256 - 5 -(Page revised by Corrigendum N o . <J, 2 in,r )

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m m ( y j m a g M i i ®APPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

1 H ^ r . To establish a comprehensive list

2 priority of potential nuclear targets in NATQi

FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROBLEM ..---------------------------- - 3.' 3.63.'3.\ ..

3 2, In war, the main defènse task of our forces would be

4 to protect NATO's offensive strike power, the weapons, the

;5 Installations and the guidance system of the nuclear strike

6 forces both land and sea based, so that the retaliation can

f be swift and effective.

8 3. Ä second task would be to hold the ener»ty land forces

9 Until our nuclear counter-offensive registered its full effects,

10 and meanwhile to keep open the sea approaches. .

11

12

13

14

15

16

IT

18

19

20

21

22

S3

/

4* Along with the above, it would be necessary to

maintain the,,inorale and will to fight of the civilian population.

■ 'X'àWS'-aMkl, probable courses of action by the Soviet Bloo

in thè^event of general war are set forth in Part I, Section 5

of SG 161/ 35, "Soviet Bloc Strength and Capabilities."

6. Within the above-cited framework, the primary almB

of a potential enemy therefore would be to destroy, as quickly■ i ' \ i i a : ■■ ■ 5

as possible, Allied nuclear forces both land and sea based, to

preserve ^ % C ^ W % ene3i; °* **is military ïnâchine, and to

prevent t h ^ | ^ ^ Ö ^ * f o n of his own country. Therefore, the

first priority targets for him to attack are thoso associated

with the air/nuclear capability. Because of the direct control

over the nuclear program exercised by the Supreme Allied Corrmarder

/ SECRET - NfVTO S0"^25?>

- 4 - SECTION II

Page revised by Corrig. Nc. 6, 27 F e b ’63 )

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SECRET - NATO

Europe, the major control centers, and particularly SHAPE and

major subordinate headquarters. likely targets. Moreover,. hiahi\YM

3 because of the relatively small number of those key control. ' \ a ■ \ XJ JV 1 j ■ \ \, \ -

4 centers, attack on them would probably occur simultaneously

5 with attacks on the bases and launching sites of the nuclear

6 strike forces themselves.

7. It is considered impracticable to categorize the

remaining I^jiÄjitiaI targets than one priority, since

the s ^ l j ^ î ^ ^ j ^ rhich they m ï ^ i ^ ^ ^ n g a g e d j:ould vary

8. Targets such as major cities, important administrative

or industrial centers, and those upon which attack is required

in support of a land Invasion of Western Europe fall in thl

second category. ;hi\hi

9. Bearing in mind the above justification, p o t e n t i M

nuclear targets could be subdivided in the following categories

in accordance with their importance:

a.. First Category - Counter-nuclear(Sub-categories in order of priority)

(l) (Equal priority within sub-category)

(a) Nuclear strike bases, land and sea;

(b) Surface-to-surface missile sites;

(o) Control j^nd war headquarj

es with §1(2) Reconnaiss for strike missions

rtanoe

(3) Airfields (other than strike basesv and reconnaissance air bases with specific Importance for strike missions);

(4) Special ammunition storage;

(5) SAM. sites protecting offensive strike power;

(6) Main vital signal communications centers and facilities (PTT switching centers, VLF, HF, and microwave radio stations, forward scatter terminals), and electronic navigator aids; ,

SECRET - NATOS3~256

- 5 SECTION II

(Page r e vised by C o r r i g . N o .5, 25 F eb 6 3 )

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NATO SECRET

SECTION II


IN NATO EUROPE*

1

2

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4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

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20

21

22

232425

THE PROBLEM

1. To establish a comprehensive list, in order of priority,

of potential nuclear targets In NATO Europe.


2. The probable courses of action by the Soviet Bloc In the

event of general war are set forth in Part I, Section 5 of SG 161/ I6

"Soviet Bloc Strength and Capabilities".

^ El P-“P. "

In light of the eÇgbve^ llp|impiry alms of a potential

enemy would be to destroy, as quickly as possible, Allied nuclear

forces both land and sea based, to preserve the effectiveness of

his military machine, and to prevent the destruction of his own

country. Therefore, the first priority targets for him to attack

are those associated with the air/nuclear capability. Because of

the aspects of nuclear control, , the major control centers, and

particularly SHAPE and ma^or subordinate headquarters, are likely

targets. Moveover, because of the relatively small number of

those key control centers, attack on them would probably occur

simultaneously with attacks on the^bases and launching sites of

the nuclear strike forcé® .nagiseJ


remaining potential targets Into more than one priority, since the

sequence in which they might be engaged could vary considerably.

*For the purpose of this paper "NATO Europe" is defined as being the area of Allied Command Europe plus the United Kingdom

NATO SECRET - 4 -SG 256 (Page revised by Corrige

V. 7 , 1 Apr 64)


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NATO SECRET

2

3

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7â

9

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12

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1617

18

1

20212223

2425

2627

2829

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33

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5. Targets such as maj

" . Ior industrial centers, and t h

in support of an invasion of

category.

cities, important admin is trative

u p o n which a t tack is ï*equired

' e m Europe fall In this second

6. B e aring in m ind t n ^ S b o v e justification, potential

nuclear targets could be subdivided in the following categories:

a. First C ategory - C o u n t e r - n u c l e a r .^[Sub^ca"tegorles in order of priority)

(l) (Equal priority w i thin sub-category)

(a) Nuclear strike bases, land a n d sea;

(b) S u r f ace-to-surface missile sites;

(c) Control and war headquarters;

(2) Reconnaissance importance for strike^

bases with specific ons;

(3) Airfields than strike bases andreconnaissance air bs^ggs with specific importance for

(4) Special a%ggy$ition storage;

(5 ) SAM sites protecting offensive strike power;

(6) M a i n vital signal communications centers and facilities (PTT switching centers, VLF, HF, and m i c r o wave radio stations, forward scatter terminals), and electronic n avigator aids;

(7) R a d a r sites (Main stations w i t h control f a c i l i t i e s );

(8) Concentra t ion of A C E ground force nuclear delivery weapons systems.

b. S econd C ategory ^PLnjjgfodiction a n d other (no pr i o r i t y w i t C a t e g o r y )

"a “

Bridges; J

aRail Centers;

i ` a Inland w a t erways ;

POL dumps an d. depots;

T roop concentrations;

NATO SECRETSG 25b_ (Page revised b y Corrigendum No. J , 1 A

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SECTION II



THE PROBLEM

1 1. To establish a comprehensive list in order of

2 priority of potential nuclear targets in NATO Europe.


3 2. In war, the main defense task of our forces would be


5 installations and the guidance system of the nuclear strike

6 forces both land and sea based,- so that the retaliation can

7 be swift and effective.

8 3 . A second task would be to hold the enemy land forces

9 until our nuclear counter-offensive registered its full effects,

10 and meanwhile to keep open the sea approaches.

11 4.- Along with the above, it would be necessary to

12 maintain the morale and will to fight of the civilian population.

13 5. The probable courses of action by the Soviet Bloc

14 in the event of general war are set forth in Part I, Section 5

15 of SG 1.6l/l4, “Soviet Bloc Strength and Capabilities."

16 6. Within the above-cited framework, the primary aims

17 of a potential enemy therefore would be to destroy, as quickly

18 as possible, Allied nuclear forces both land and sea based, to

19 preserve the effectiveness of his military machine, and to

20 prevent the destruction of his own country. Therefore, the

21 first priority targets for him to attack are those associated

22 with the air/nuclear capability. Because of the direct control

23 over the nuclear program exercised by the Supreme Allied Commander

SECRET - NATO - 4 - SECTION IIc?1 p r hi 1

0 Page revised by Corrig. No.4, 2 Mar 62)


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SECRET - NATO

1 Europe, the major control centers, and particularly SHAPE and

2 major subordinate headquarters,are likely targets. Moreover,

3 b e cause of the relatively small number of those key control

4 centers, attack on them would probably o ccur simultaneously



Y 7. It is considered impracticable to categorize the

8 remaining potential targets, into more than one priority, since. • \\

9 the sequence in which they «light be engaged „could vary

10 considerably.

11

12

13

14

8. Targets such as major cities, Important administrative

or industrial centers, and those upon which attack is required

in support of a land invasion of Western Europe fall in this

second category.

15 9. Bearing in mind the above justification, potential

16 nuclear targets could be subdivided in the following categories

17 in accordance with their Importance:

18 a. First Category,..- CburAer-nuc 1 ear19 (Sub-category's' in ordÿr of priority)

20 (l) (Equal priority within sub-category)

21 (a) Nuclear strike bases, land and sea;

22 (b) Surface-to-surface missile sites;

23 (c) Control centers and war headquarters;

24 (2) Reconnaissance air bases with specific importance25 for strike missions;

26 (3) Airfields (other than strike bases and recon-27 naissance air bases with specific importance for strike28 missions);

29 (4) Special ammunition storage;

30 (5) SAM. sites protecting offensive strike power;

31 (6) Main vital s i ^ ^ l ® « i ® W i c a t i o n s centers and32 facilities (PTT switcMM|\$^h||rs, VLF, HF, and microwave33 radio stations, forwa 3 P;^.t?igrt.hierminals), and electronic34 navigator aids;


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A PPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

SECTION II . . . ■

LIST V ! . f f d 9 n L NUCLEAR TARGETS

À * Ï E D COMMAND EUROPE

THE PROBLEM

1. To establish a comprehensive list in order of

priority of potential nuclear targets in NATO Europe.


2. In war, the main

to protect NATO's of

installations and the

’ense task of our forces would be

ike power, the weapons, the

system of the nuclear strike

forces both land and sea based, so that the retaliation can

be swift and effective.

3. . . A second task would be to hold the enemy land forces

until our nuclear counter-offensive registered its full effects,

and meanwhile to keep open the sea approaches.

11 4. • Along with the above, it would be necessary to

12 maintain the morale and will to fight of the civilian population.

13 5 . The probable courses of action by the Soviet Bloc

14 in the event of general war are set forth in Part I, Section 5

15 of SG l6l/l4, "Soviet Bloc Strength and Capabilities."

16 6. Within the above-cited framework* the primary aims

17 of a potential enemy therefore would be to destroy, as quickly

18 as possible, Allied nuclear forces both land and sea based, to


20 prevent, the destruction of his own country. Therefore, the

21 first priority targets for him to attack are those associated

22 w i t h the air/nuclear capability. Because of the direct control

23 over the nuclear program exercised by the Supreme Allied Commander

SECRET - NATO SG 256 ' '

V hi .- 4 - 6 , 1 SECTION II

Page revised by Corrig . No.4, 2 Mar 62)

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SECRET - MATO

1 Europe, the m^jbr control centers, and particularly SHAPE and

2 major subordinate headquarters, are likely targets. Moreover,

3 because of the relatively small number of those key control

4 centers, attack on them would probably occur simultaneously



7 7. It is considered impracticable to categorize the

8 remaining potential targets into more than one priority, since

9 the sequence in which they might be engaged could vary

10 considerably. .

11 8 . Targets such as major cities, important administrative

12 or industrial centers, and those upon which attack is requiredd i ■ ■ .13 in support of a land invasion of Western Europe fall in this

14 second category. .

15 9- Bearing in mind the above justification, potential

16 nuclear targets could be .subdivided in the following categories

17 in accordance with their importance: .

a.1819

20

i i JL

22

23

2425

26

2728

29303132

33

34

First Category - Counter-nuclear "(Sub- categories In order of priority)

(l) (Equal priority within.sub-category)

(a) N u c l e a r b a s e s , land and sea;

(b) S u r f â ^ ^ % ' ^ ÿ % c e missile sites;

(c) Contro%Jlem^ers and war headquarters;

(2) Reconnaissance air bases with specific importance for strike missions;

(3) SAM sites protecting offensive strike power;

(4) Concentration of ACE ground force nuclear delivery weapons systems;

(5 ) Main vital signal communications centers and facilities (PTT switching centers, VLF, H F and m i c r o wave radio stations, forward scatter terminals), and electronic navigator aids;

(6) Radar sites (main stat

(7 ) Special ammunition sto:

iferol facilities );

SECTION II

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THE PROBLEM


SECTION II


IN .

ALL-IFLg ^ M A N D EUROPE

m m *

1 1. To establish a comprehensive list in order of

2 priority of potential nuclear targets in NATO Europe.


3 2. In war, the main defense task of our forces would be


5 Installations and the guidance system of the nuclear strike

6 forces both land and sea. based, so tha.t the retaliation can


8 . 3. A second task would be to hold the enemy land forces

9 until our nuclear counter-offensiveat^egistered its full effects,

10 and mean?jhile to keep open the sea. approaches.

11 4. Along with the above, it would be necessary to

12 maintain the morale and will to fight of the civilian population,

13 5. The probable courses of action by the Soviet Bloc

14 in the event of general war are set forth in Section V, Part I

15 of SG 1 6I/II j "Soviet Bloc Strength and Capabilities."

16 6. Within the above-cited framework, the primary aims

17 of a. potential enemy therefore would be to destroy, as quickly

18 as possible, Allied nuclear forces both land and sea ba.sed, to



21 first priority targets' for him to attack are those associated

22 with the a.ir/nuclea,r capability. Because of the direct ■ control

SECRET - NATO

SG 256- 4 SECTION II

» M r e l L Ä s s D lF l i ®APPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

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7

8 7- It is considered Impracticable to categorize the

9 remaining potential targets into more than one priority, since


11 considerably.

■ ' (• ■12 8. Targets such as major cities, important administrative

■ , VA13 or industrial centers, and those upon which attack is required

14 in support of a land invasion of Western Europe fall in this

15 second category.

16 9. Bearing in mind the above justification, potential

17 nuclear targets could be subdivided in the following categories

18 in accordance with their importance:

19 a. First Category - Counter-nuclear20 (Sub^categories in order of priority)

21 (l) Nuclear strike bases, land and sea;

22 (2) Surface-to-surface missile sites;

23 , (3) Reconnaissance air bases with specific Importance24 for strike missions;

25 (4) SAM! sites protecting offensive strike power;

26 (5) Concentrations of ACE ground force nuclear27 delivery weapons systems;

28 (6) Control centers and war headquarters;

29 (7) Main vital signal communications centers andSO facilities (PTT switching centers, VLF, HF and microwave31 radio stations, forward scatter terminals), and32 electronic navigation aids ;

33 (8) Radar sites (main stations with oontro.l34 facilities;

35 (9) Special ammunition storage.

SECRET - NATOSG '25'6 - 5 - SECTION II

(Page revised by Corrig.No.3 j 21 Mar 6l)

w e m « » o r e ®APPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

. jm « M BAPPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

over the nuclear program exercised by the Supreme Allied Commander

Europe, the major j ^ a ^ r o l centers, and particularly SHAPE and

major suborc^r%feeV\^4aa^uarte(r*s, are likely targets. Moreover,

because of thfe«-r^#M`vely small number of those key control

centers, attack on them would probably occur simultaneously

with attacks on the bases and launching sites of the nuclear

strike forces themselves.

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SECTION II

TENTIAL NUCLEAR TARGETS

IN

'ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE

THE PROBLEM

1 1. To establish a comprehensive list in, order of

2 priority of potential nuclea.r targets in NATO Europe.


3 2. In wa.r, the main defense task of our forces would be


5

6

installations and the of the nuclea.r strike/(\/\ \(

forces both land and r W that the reta.lia.tion can


8 3 . A second task would be to hold the enemy land forces

9 until our nuclea.r counter-offensive registered its full effects,

10 and meanwhile to keep open the sea. approaches.

11 4. Along with the above, it would be necessary to

12 maintain the morale and will to fight of the civilian population,

13 5 » The probable courses of action by the Soviet Bloc

14 in the event of general wa.r a.re set'■forth in Section V, Part I

15 of SG I6I/II, "Soviet Bloc Strength and Capabilities."

11 ■■■ ' ari4” ,

lo 6. Within the above-cited framework, the primary aims

IT of a potential enemy therefore would be to destroy, as quickly

18 as possible, Allied nuclear forces both land and sea. ba.sed, to



21 first priority targets- for him to attack a.re those associated

22 with the a.ir/nuelea.r capability. Because of the direct control

SECRET - NATO

SG 256

;SE-CTION II

m m « H Ä n r e i sAPPROVED FOR PUBLIC D ISCLOSURE

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SECRET - NATO

1 over* the nuclear program exercised by the Supreme Allied Commander

2 Europe, the ma.jor control centers, and particularly SHAPE and

3 major subordinate headquarters, are likely targets. Moreover,

4 because of the relatively small number of those key control' • . / t •

5 centers, attack on them would probably occur-simultaneously



8

9

7. It is considered impracticable to categorize thehi V

remaining potential targets into more than one priority, since


11 considerably.

12 8. Targets such as major cities, important administra.-

13 tive or industrial centers, and those upon which attack is

14 required in support of a, land invasion of Western Europe fall

15 in this second category.

16

17

18

19

20

21

2223

24

25262728

2930

31

9. Bearing in mind the above justification, potential

nuclear targets could be subdivided In the following categories

in accordance with their impo

a. First C a t e g o r y ^ ^ w m l ^ i u c l e a r(Sub-categories in ordei` ’of priority)

(1) Nuclear strike bases, land and sea.j

(2) Surface-to-surface missile sites;

(3) Reconnaissance a.ir bases with specific importance for strike missions;

(4) Control centers and war headquarters;

(5) Main vital signal communications centers and facilities (PTT switching centers, VLF, HF and microwave radio stations, forward scatter terminals), and electronic navigation aids;

(6) Radar sites (main stations with control facilities);

(7) Special ammunition

SECRET - NATOS G 256

- 5 SECTION II

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12

13

14

15

16

17

16

19

mC

21

SECTION II

LIST OF POTENTIAL NUCLEAR- TARGETS

a M ^ ^ Q | n D EUROPE

THE P R O B L E M . . •

1. To establish a comprehensive list In order of

priority of potential nuclear targets in NATO Europe.


2. In war, the main defense task of our forces would

be to protect NATO's offensive strike power, the weapons, the

installations and the guir^uar.R system of the nuclear strike

forces both land a n % ^ S ® E s « d , so that the retaliation can be

swift and effective»^!

3. A second task would be to hold the enemy land forces

until our nuclear counter-offensive registered Its full

effects, and meanwhile to keep open the sea approaches.

4. Along with the above, it would be necessary to

maintain the morale and will to fight of the civilian population.

SECRET - NA T O APPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

5. The p r o b a b M «qjSätS of action by the Soviet Bloc in

the event of general w m ^ r c e set forth in Section V, Part 1

of SG I61/II, "Soviet Bloc Strength and Capabilities."

6. Within the above-cited framework, the primary aims

of a potential enemy therefore would be to destroy, as quickly

as possible, Allied nuclear forces both land and sea based,

to preserve the effectiveness of his military machine, and to

prevent the destruction of his own country. Therefore, the first

priority targets for him to a y ^ â ^ are those associated with

the air/nuclear capabili^ e of the direct control over

SECRET - NATO

SG 256

4 SECTION II

m m « y » ! ®APPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

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2

3

n

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

1920

21

2 c.'

23

2k

25

26

2?

28

oc

1 the nuclear program exercised by the Supreme Allied Commander

Europe, the major control centers, and particularly SHAPE and

major subordinate headquarters, are likely targets. Moreover,

because of the relatively small number of those key control

centers, attack on them v®S3®|kjiidSkbly occur simultaneously1 ftll 1 | %

with attacks on the baseslk&V'IsiÄöhing sites of the nuclearv '

strike forces themselves.


remaining potential targets into more than one priority, since

the sequencé in which they might be engaged could vary

considerably.

8. Targets such as

tive or industrial cent

required in support of a

in this second category.

cities, important administra

t e upon which attack Is

sion of Western Europe fall

9 . Bearing in mind the above justification, potential

nuclear targets could be subdivided in the following categories

in accordance with their importance:

a. First Category - Counter-nuclear(Sub-categories in order of priority)

(1) Nuc lepra avilie bases, land and sea;

(2) Surf i ^ ^ ^ % l ^ a c e missile sites j

(3) Contrai centers and war headquarters;

(4) Main, vital signal communications centers

and facilities (PTT switching centers, VLF, HF and

microwave radio stations, forward scatter terminals),

and clôctrcnic navigation aids;

(5) Radar _s:

(6) Sp€ Ition storage.

SECRET - NATO

SG 256

SECTION 11

t e a ) ( y K M M I E ))VED FOR PUBLIC D ISCLOSURE

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SECRET - NATO

(7) Radar sites (main stations with control facilities); _

(8) Concentration of ACE ground force nuclear delivery weapons systems. .

Second Category - Interdiction and other”(N3.,prIorIty3./ithin6c^a/tegory)' 1

Bridges;

Rail centers;

Inland waterways;


Troop concentrations;

Centers of government and centers of population and industry;

Major port complexes;

Naval concentration s {other than strike);. ■

Radar s i t e s '(other than included in first category. Sub“category (7)).

10. In a global war, there are so many courses of action

which a potential enemy could pursue that lt is considered

Impossible to differentiate between the relative importance

of the targets listed under sub-paragraph 9j2, above. Much will

depend on the enemy's assessment of the results of the initial

nuclear attack and no doubt his plans will be flexible enough to

permit exploit« of the most lucrative targets presented at^

the t i m e n o special priority hasptoeen allotted to

targets u n ® »paragraph 9_b.

11. The priorities: as: enumerated aboveGwIll; be valid;.;asolong

as the NATO deterrent relies mainly on manned bombers to carry

out its mission,

12. In the f u t u r é ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ? f ace-to-surf ace missiles super

sede ' the manned bombe^®/j|gpcQ?Ities In the above listing may

change. The large airfields to which our bombers are now

bound present lucrative targets to the enemy strike forces.

SECRET - NATOSG 6556 6 - SECTION II

(Page revised Corrig.No.6 , 27 Feb 63)

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been introduced in si Leant numbers,

ates may be so dispersed - % it is very

1 Once missile*

2 their

3 doubt enemy will b e , successful in destroying a

4 great number of them In the first attack. This may force him

5 to revise his tactics and to select an alternative target

6 system.

CONCLUSIONS

7 13. For the present time, the listing

8 nuclear target^ according to their prio.

9 paragraph 9 isd£<■. \?>>.

« ,

potential

t out in

10 14. 'dPfeiorit ie s may change as surface-to-surface missiles

11 are Introduced in ever-increasing numbers.

SECRET - NAT'

SG 256

- 7 - ^ v ION II

revised by Corrig. No Mar 6o)


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b . Second Category - Interdiction and other (No within category) "

Brig

Rail!

Inland waterways;

POL dumps and depots ;

Troop concentrations ;

Centers of population and industry;


Airfields (other than strike);

Naval concentrations (other than strike);

10. In a glôbaSlfep^ 'àhere are so many courses of actionG( | Q ■

which a potential en^mgèik'auTd pursue that it is considered

impossible to differentiate between the relative importance of

the targets listed under sub-paragraph 9b above. Much will


nuclear attack and no doubt his plans will be flexible enough

to permit e x p l o i t m o s t lucrative targets presented

at the time. A c c o r s p e c i a l priority has been allotted

to targets under sub-paragraph 9b.

11. The priorities as enumerated above will be valid

as long as the NATO deterrent relies mainly on manned bombers

to carry out its m i s s i o n . .

12. In the future, when surface-to-surface missiles

supersede the manned bomb,er, priorities in the above listing

may change. The large airfields to, which our bombers are

now bound present lucrative targets to, the enemy strike

forces. Once missiles have been introduced in significant

numbers, their launching^sites may be so dispersed that it

is very doubtful if the enemy will be successful in destroy

ing a great number of them in the first attack. This may

SECRET - NATO - 6 - SECTION IISG 256


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1 force him to revise-hîs'' tactics and to select an alternative

2 target system,

CONCLUSIONS

3 13. For the present time, the listing of potential

4 nuclear targets according to their priority as set out in

5 paragraph 9 is valid.

6 14. Priorities ma.y change as surface-to-surface missiles

7 are introduced in ever-increasing numbers;

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Ja. Second Ca.tegory - Interdiction and other (No priority within category)

Bridgesj

, Rail^l

In I a n * ■aMfMlinhi.

POL dumps and depots j



Major port complexes,*

Airfields (other than strike);

Na.val concentrations (other tha.n strike).

\ 1 ff '| m10. In a gll§ilLiÄrJ§| there are so many courses of action

which a potential*'enemy could pursue that it is considered

Impossible to differentiate between the relative importance o f

the targets listed under sub-para.gra.ph 9b above. Much will


nuclea.r atta.ck and no doubt his plans will be flexible enough

to permit exploitation of the.most lucrative targets presented

at the time. Accord% l ^ W r o % P eclal Priority has been allotted to targets u n ^ f ^ a l M a à r a K r a p h 9b.

11. The priorities as enumerated above will be valid

a,s long as the NATO deterrent relies mainly on manned bombers

to carry out its mission.

12. In the future, when surfa.ce-to-surfa.ce missiles

supersedes the manned bomber, priorities in the above listing

may change. The large which our bombers are

now b o u n d present l u c r a t ^ ^ ^ m ^ e ^ s to the enemy strike

forces.. Once missiles have been introduced in significant

numbers, their launching sites may be so dispersed that it

is very doubtful if the enemy will be successful in destroy

ing a great number of them in the first a ttack. This may

SECRET - NATO SG 25b ‘ '

- 6 - SECTION II

(Page revised by Corrig.No. 1, 20 Mar 59)

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1 force him to revise his tactics and to select an alternative

2 target system.

3

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CONCLUSIONS

13. For the present ti:

nuclear targets according to'Htÿ

paragraph 9 is valid.

a listing of1 potential

rity as set out in

14. Priorities ma.y change as surface-to-surface missiles

are introduced in eve]?-increasing numbers.

SECRET - NATO 7 -SG 256

SECTION II

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3

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101112

13

1415

ond Category - Interdiction and other priority vsithin category)

Bridges^

Rail centers;

Inland waterways;



Centers of government and centers of population and Industry;


Airfields (other than strike bases and reconnaissance air bases with specific importance fjqr strike missions);

Nav

Radarcateg

|a.tions (other than strike);

. ther than included in first Sub-category (6)).

16 10. In a global wa.r, there a.re so many courses of - action

17 which a potential enemy could pursue that it is considered

18 impossible to differentiate between the relative importance

19 of the targets listed under sub-paragraph 9b above. Much will

20 depend on the enemy's assessment of the results of the initial

21 nuclear attack and no doubt his plans will be flexible enough

22 to permit exploitation of the most lucrative targets presented

23 at the time. Accordingly, no special priority has been

24 allotted to targets under sub-paragraph 9Jb.

2? 11. The priorities a.s enumerated above will be valid as

2o long a.s the NATO deterrent relies mainly on manned bombers

27 to carry out its mission.

28 12. In the future, when surface-to-surface missiles

29 supersedes the manned bomber, priorities in the above listing

30 ma.y change. The la.rge airfields to which our bombers are now

31 bound present lucrative targets to the enemy strike forces.


- 6 - SECTION II

(Page revised by Corrig. No. 2, 29 Mar 60)

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1 Once missiles have been Introduced in significant numbers,

2 their launching sites may be so dispersed that It is very

3 doubtful If the enemy will be successful in destroying a

4 great number of them in the first attack. This may force him


6 system.

CONCLUSIONS d/Pdva

7 13. For thè present time, the listing of potential


9 paragraph 9 is valid,

10 14. Priorities may change as surface-to-surface missiles

11 are introduced in ever-increasing numbers.

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hihidd\

1 (7$ 'vRadarLsïites (main stations with control2 faciliMeW>)^,L\\| -

3 (8) w o % ê e n t ration of ACE ground force nuclear4 delivery weapons systems.

5 b_. Second Category - Interdiction and other5 (No priority within category)

7 Bridges;

8 Rail centers;

9 Inland waterways;

10 POL dumps and depots;. ■ ■ ■■■\

11 Troop concentrations;

12 Centers of government and centers of population and13 industry;

14 Major port complexes;

15 Naval concentrations (other than strike);

16 Radar sites (other than included in first17 category. Sub-category (6)).

18 10. In a global war, there are so many courses of action

19 which a potential enemy could pursue that it is considered

20 impossible to differentiate between the relative importance

21 of the targets listed under sub-paragraph 9Jj above. Much will

22 depend on the enemy's assessment of the results of the initial

23 nuclear attack and no doubt his plans ;will be flexible enough to

24 permit exploitation of the most lucrative targets presented at

25 the time. Accordingly, no special priority has been allotted to

26 targets under sub-paragraph 9b.

27 11. The priorities, as renumerated above .will, be valid, as- long

28 as the NATO deterrent relies mainly on manned bombers to carry

29 out its mission,

30 12, In the future, when surface-to-surface missiles super-

31 sede the manned bomber, priorities in the above listing may

32 change. The large airfields to which our bombers are now

33 bound present lucrative targets to the enemy strike forces.

SECRET - NATOSG 2W - 6 - SECTION II

(Page revised Corrig.No.5, 25 Peb 63)


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1 Once missiles have been introduced in significant numbers,

2 t h e i r .launching sites may be so dispersed that it is very

3 doubtful if the enemy will be successful in destroying a

4 great number of them in the first attack. This ma.y force him


6 system.

CONCLUSIONS

7 13, For the present time, the listing of potential


9 paragraph 9 is valid,

10 14, Priorities may change a.s surface-to-surface missiles

11 a,re introduced in ever-increasing numbers.

g» M a ß » ®APPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLO SURE

SECRET - NATO 7 SECTION II

SG 256(Page revised by Corrig. No, 2, 29 Ma.r 60)

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Naval concentrations (other than strike);

Radar sites (other than included in first category. Sub-category(7 )

Vl .“'7 ,'6\ £ a "a a * -

There are so many coursés of action which a potential

enemy could pursue that lt is considered impossible to differentiate

between the relative importance of the targets listed under sub

paragraph 6 b above. Much will depend on the enemy's assessment

of the results of the Initial nuclear exchange and no doubt his

plans will be flexible enough to enable him to exploit the situation

by selecting the most lucrative of the remaining targets for further

attacks. Accordingly, no special priority has been allotted to

targets under sub-paragraph 6 b.

8. ^vulnerabilities of bothChanges In the capa^i|S■6/ 'tyhiP 1 - P

sides may require the priorities enumerated above to be changed

from time to time.

19 CONCLUSIONS

20 9. For the present time, the listing of potential nuclear

21 targets according to their priority as set out in paragraph 6 is

22 valid.

23 10. Priorities may alter due to future changes in the

24 capabilities and v u l n e r a b i l i t ^æ^o^bdHhi^ldel

NATO SECRET SG 256

- 6 -(Page revised by Corrigendum No.7, 1 Apr 64)

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j.

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Once missiles have been introduced in significant numbers,

their launching sites may be so dispatsed that it is very

doubtful if the enemy will be ^ b s | f u r in destroying a

great number of them i n ^ ^ l ^ L r ö t attack. This may force him

to revise his tactics and to select an alternative target

system.

CONCLUSIONS

7 13. For the present time, the listing of potential


9 paragraph 9 is valid.

'ill10 14<* Prioritie Burface-to-surfaoe missiles

11 are introduced in ever-increasing numbers.

SECRET - SECTION IIS G 256

’PROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLQ£|ME

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