Karl Plagge – Struggle for Life

A Confrontation SS versus Wehrmacht

A report on the background of the documents of HKP 562, released by the Museum for jewish History in Vilna, of the testimonies in the denazification file of Karl Plagge and the remembrances of survivors.

Preface

I have seen the end of the war and the years after as a child. With growing interest in history in my school-times I was attracted by the German military history when I joined the Federal Armed Forces in 1962. By then all senior officers had served in Hitler’s Wehrmacht and often it was talked about, what they had suffered, encountered and seen. Several had served in the Waffen-SS (Armed SS) – the front-line units of the SS. Keywords like „Oradour“ and „partisan-war“ fell unavoidably and they mostly cut off the conversation.1 Having served for 25 years, specialized in logistics on several general staff appointments, I retired and started my own business. For several years similarely I had been a guest-lecturer on logistics at the General Staff and Command Academy in Hamburg and in the army’s reserve.

Michael Good has described how I came in touch with Karl Plagge’s story. The vivid discussions within the Plagge-group accompanied my technically oriented business-life as a living alternative. Then I recieved the documents about HKP 562 from the Vilna Gaon Jewish Museum in Vilnius. I cannot remember reading lists with names and dates with such fascination like those in Irina Guzenberg’s documentation of HKP 562 in the time of 1943 to –44. Although there remained only 3 letters of February 1944 and one work-report of March 1944 and otherwise nothing but lists (mainly names and roll-calls from September 1943 to May 1944), the documentation gives much insight into the internal working of HKP, if read with an eye, trained in german military thinking and procedures. Until then I only knew the remembrances of the few survivors, letters, written by Karl Plagge after the war and the testimonies from Karl Plagge’s denazification triel, but no original documents from HKP.

Reading the letters and lists questions came up – in particular about the image as drawn about Plagge’s acting in Vilna during the denazification trial. Rereading the many e-mails we had exchanged in the Plagge-group and guided by the still open questions, the image became much clearer. On the background of the testimonies and remembrances the explanation for that what had happened in the context of the three letters and the work report became logical.

Having analyzed the documents as published by Irina Guzenberg in Vilna, there still was the question, whether there are still other sources to find more about Karl Plagge and his time in Vilna.

There was a point at which rose the suspicion that right after the war Karl Plagge had been on a search list of the US intelligence service OSS. That would have been plausible, as Plagge officially had been something like a commander of a Conzentration camp or at least a slave-labor camp. Everyone not familiar with the more complex relations between SS and Wehrmacht, must have seen Karl Plagge as the responsible person the Subocz-Street camp, for the murder and crimes committed there. Having been in such a position, the OSS had all reasons to put Karl Plagge on a search-list. If so there must have been testimonies and a file.

1 Questioned to one of his medals my then company commander answered: „That is the kroatian ‚Saint Mary’s Order for the Fight against Communism‘ – but I won’t tell you anything about. I will never be allowed to go to Yugoslavia“. Hed had served by then in the Waffen-SS unit – „Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler“ (Personal Flag-Unit Adolf Hitler)

As the Plagge-Group had used the internet so successful until then it was my first idea to contact the US-authorities and simply ask for help at the search for a Plagge-file. Unfortunately the OSS-files seem to be in the CIA-archives and for understandable reasons – possibly also in the context of the political situation in summer 2003 – my attempts to invade deeper into the CIA than to fill up a lengthy questionnaire about myself, which wa sreturned to me on my request, turned out to be rather futile.

Again Marianne Viefhaus went ahead with much more success: Since long she had planned to contact the Central Archives for Nazi-crimes in Germany (Ludwigsburg), where all files of trials against Nazi- and war criminals are kept. And she found what we had searched for: Further information about Karl Plagge and the situation in Vilna. There are several documents:

A summary of the most important persons in Vilna by the Centre. (Doc Sum .......)

Questioning of the witness Jehoshua Rosenfeld about the SS staff in Vilna (Doc. JR) including Goeke and „Golosheika“ Richter.

Questioning of Elias Gurewitz (Gurvicz) about the SS – important, as Gurewitz was employed as a plumber at the SS-headquarter in 1942 – 1944 (Co. EG)

Questioning of lawyer Dr. Stumpf, who had been the adjudant of Karl Plagge in 1942 (we kno him from the denazification trial). Stumpff was accused to have taken part in the Kinder Action, but at no time he had been member of the SS and at that time he was stationed in Paris.

Questioning of Karl Plagge in the claim of Zwi Kleijnberg against the State of Baden-Wuerttemberg for payment for unjustified imprisonment (Doc.KP) and last but not least

Questioning of Karl-Heinrich Proepper, member of the „OT“2, manager of a vehicle repair-parts warehouse in Vilna and therefore in close contact with Plagge and even more with SS, SD and Gestapo (Doc. KHP)

Of course it was for me the most important question, whether these sources would support the image we had painted of Karl Plagge or whether we had to change the deductions we had drawn until then. To cut it short, at one or the other point we had to do some corrections, at others the image was rectified. Very carefully the last days of the Subocz-Street camp had to be envisaged, as by now there was information, which stood in contrary to our first estimates.

Surprisingly we received a list of three persons from the „WASt“, who were in one or the other connection to HKP 562. I wrote to all three of them, as they had sent an official agreement to be contacted. Unfortunately only one person answered – Mrs. Erika M. – who turned out to have been the secretary of Plagge’s paymaster. She had married him after the war. She was 19, when she came to Vilna in the Army Service Corps („Wehrmachtshelferin“) and she remembered only little, mainly her thoroughly caring house-lady. She rememberd Plagge as a very serious man and that he had inviivited them after the war to discuss with her husband the denazification trial. But, as she wrote, she did not remember any other details, except the hurry, when she and another girl burnt the files and papers of HKP before they left Vilna. Explicitly the Jewish slave-laborers and the Subocz-Street camp were out of her remembrances.

There were more contacts – for example Mr. Zwi Rejshewski in Israel, survivor of camp Kailis, Mr. Arnold Kerr in Chikago and Meir Shapiro, who were also in Kailis briefly – but 2 OT: Organization Todt, a large semi-civil organization with the task to build for and support the Wehrmacht.

none of them could provide any really new information. Therefore the attempt to highlite by the description of camp Kailis, how significant the difference to the life in Subocz-Street was, had to fail.

Only through Simon Malkes we heard of the Swirski case. As far as we know the father of David Swirski had studied in Darmstadt at the same time as Karl Plagge and they knew each other. When Swirski was caught at the smuggeling food into the camp, Plagge had saved him of being shot by an SS-officer. Details have been investigated by Yad Vashem directly, as Swirski is living in Israel.

It is my aim to describe a different layer of the events, what happened in the offices and brains of Wehrmacht and SS, unvisible for the surving prisoners.

Again and again the role and the motif of Plagge is questioned for his way to lead HKP in a different way to the other slave-labor camps it was only possible to guess or deduct from secondary sources. By the survivors we have the memoirs of Samuel Esterovicz, his daughter Pearl and many personal reports, which naturally display a very personal view to the events in the Subocz-Street camp, the view of mostly thankful survivors. The denazification trial mirrors the view of witnesses to the events in HKP in a post-war situation, which must leave some doubts about the complete truth of testimonies in those times. So I was unsecure about the motifs and trustworthyness of the witnesses in this trial. Now the documents open a direct (although limited) insight into that what was the game between Wehrmacht and SS in Vilna and what were the reasons behind Plagge’s organization of HKP. Since I have seen the documents from Vilna I am convinced that Plagge at least since 1943, when he had established the Subocz-Street camp, had to fight for the life of so many endangered as possible. Men, women and children – all he was fighting for was protection for „his“ laborers. His weapons were administrative measures (in difference to others he could not bribe the SS, except a fef furnitures and furs). The shield was his carefully established organization.

Everyone who played a game against the SS, was personally endangered on the long run – even Generals of the Wehrmacht war not secure before revenge of SS and Nazis (Major-general Lindeman, persecuted after the futile coup against Hitler on 20th of July was shot by the SS in the home of my mothers godfather). Therefore I have combined and interpreted the documents together with the materials of the Plagge-Group to draw a picture of Karl Plagge’s actions and motivation, but also to highlight the threat on his deeds.

Only since Michael’s book had been published – right at the ceremony hohoring Karl Plagge in Darmstadt on the 15th of April 2005 – there turned up a soldier of Plagge’s unit. The draftee by then A.v.D. is now in his eighties mit with precise remembering and luckily he remembers many details of his time in Vilna from spring 1942 until July 1944. He was the leader of the spare parts shop in HKP 562 and responsible there for management and logistics. During the 70ies and 80ties he was in contact to survivors of his team of Jewish laborers. He recognized only by the media reports of the honoring of Karl Plagge in Yad Vashem and of the work of the Plagge-Group. These news and his own remembrances moved and shocked v.D. so much that he felt unable to join us in Darmstadt right then. In his place his daughter – psychologist Irmgard Vosshaar – appeared and she helped with her sensibility us to start our questioning of Mr. v.D.

Aside of several confirming facts there were a number of new details, but first of all we could recognize through the reports of Mr. v.D. more abour Plagge’s leadership. And Bill Begell found the soldier on guard, who dod not shoot on him, when e fled via the blacksmith shop.

At the footnotes and deductions I tried to make use only of those reports, whose analogy and reliability is given by other sources. I based my arguments in many cases on the volominous

e-mail correspondence. All these e.mails are kept professionally on hard-copies by Dr. Marianne Viefhaus of the TUD.

September 1943

The history of the Jews in Vilna has been told impressively by Michael Good.Until Autumn 1943 the vast majority of the Jeews in Vilna – 60 to 70.000 people – had been killed with the liquidation of the two ghettos on only those were alive, which found employment at the Wehrmacht, Gestapo and SS. Repeatedly the importance of „rescue by labor“ has been described. Which role Plagge took here in Vilna and which importance he had facing the SS becomes distinct in the report of Karl-Heinrich Proepper.

Proepper – former car dealer and pilot, unfit for the military service – had been the manager of a spare-part warehouse of the OT on Vilna. As he needed local work-force, he employed like Plagge a number of Jewish „specialists“. He had been quite acquaintant with most of the SS and SD-men and it must be assumed that he had worked together with them closely. But he had the same problems to fulfill his job like others: Repeatedly men of his Jewish work-force „disappeared“, who had been trained for their jobs – arrested and killed by Lithuanian police, SS or SD. He complained at the SD-headquarter an d was refused by Bruno Kittel3:

„...and it was indicated rather clearly that I ad not to complain, I should not become impudent...This I reported to the comandant of HKP 562, captain Plagge, who was promoted to major in 1943. Mr. Plagge is an engineer. When I had spoken with captain Plagge about this case, it became better, the liquidations stopped – as for as my laborers were concerened – and I could continue my job“

In other words the „end of liquidations“ was to be attributed to Plagge’s influence.

"At disbandment of the Jewish Ghettos in Vilna V.P./East/562 achieved by immediate protest at the superior SD-Command in Riga / Superior Leader Piffrader4/ that ca. 500 Jewish specialist labourers shall be preserved for V.P.E. 562 for vehicle repair tasks. The pre-condition was set up that these were to be employed in a closed concentration camp.As the motivation and effectiveness of the Jewish labourers is essentially dependent of the fact that not only the men but also their wives and children can remain in Vilna, by expressed accordance by the SD the associated women and children were held back as well and transferred to the work camp Subocz street. At this time 1,243 Jewish persons are in the work camp. Out of these are 499 men, 554 women and 190 children."

These are the words of Major Plagge in his letter to the Army Lodging Service Vilna, written February 17th, 1944 (see appendix). There is no reason to question the truth of his words, as they were written in a critical moment and had to stand proof to any investigation by the SS. It was his personal initiative to have succeeded in setting up an "own" work-camp for the Jews, employed at the vehicle park, not only for male vehicle repair workers but also all-in for their "families", counted at wife and two children. This led to many pro-forma families, (if someone had none) and also to the creation of new jobs at HKP, if there were additional family members to rescue.

3 Proepper reports about the fate of Kittel: „With regard to Kittel I state that on a partisan-action he drove on a mine, whereas both his legs were torn off. In his rucksack many golden items were found. Whether Kittel is dead is not known to me.“4 Piffrader was of Austrian origin. He came to Germany in 1934 as a refugee, as he had been an activist of the Austrian Nazi-party, which was forbidden by then in Austria. He soon made his carreer in Darmstadt, where he became the commandant of the Gestapo until 1942, responsible for the deportation of all Jews from Darmstadt. Plagge as a member of the Nazi-party at least knew him by name from Darmstadt and used this contact to speak directly to Piffrader, who had been promoted to the chief of the Gestapo with the rank of „Standartenfuerer“ (colonel) in the Baltic states in 1942. In summer 1944 Piffrader joined the SS-headquarter in Oranienburg near Berlin and led the persecution of the men and women, who faild to assassin Hitler on the 20th of July.

"The park employed for example Jews as haircutters, shoemakers, tailors, and cooks. Jewish women and girls worked as cleaning workers and garden workers. Additionally, there was a Jewish doctor for the observation of the civil workers' health. Naturally the park wasn't allowed to employ such people and Mr.. Plagge could have gotten in serious trouble by doing so...... These people were camouflaged to the outside as professional workers of the motor vehicle Repair Park "5.

It must have been absolutely clear to anyone in the military community in Vilna, what happened to all those Jews, who had no job at one of the work-shops, the Spanish hospital or the headquarters in Vilna. The killing in Ponary had carried on since summer '41 and as even the Jews in the Ghettos knew about, it would be more than implausible, if the know-ledge about the mass killing in the forests would not have spread to the Wehrmacht6.

In his 1947 testimony - "Vilne under Nazi Oppression", Page 23, Moses Feigenberg wrote:

"The HKP camp was established on September 17th, 1943 and had employed up to 1500 workers (families included). At the beginning of September 1943, the chief of HKP, Major Plagge, found out that the Ghetto of Wilno would be soon liquidated. He was a cultured and benevolent man who wanted to rescue his Jewish workers. Thus he then organized a work-camp for his workers, named Jewish Work- Camp HKP. He established the camp in the two big Jewish buildings on Subocz 37."

Searching the literature about similar work camps, this seems to be the unique one, where "the motivation and effectiveness of the Jewish labourers" was based on the integration of family members. Anywhere else the tools for "motivation" to work under German rule and supervision were snapping dogs, whips, guns and terror. The survivors of HKP 562 have asked the question repeatedly, how this was possible, but had no answer:

"The rules for bringing in Jews into this labour camp were obviously different, and it is here that another great point should be chalked off for Plagge's pro Jewish activity. A lot of older people and children were allowed to be taken along."7

That is how the HKP camp in Subocz street became one of the last major refuges8 of what was left of the Vilna Gaon after the extinction of the ghetto.

"Into the ensuing dismal days filled with the fear for our lives there came a sudden ray of hope: tidings came to the ghetto that Major Plagge, the chief of H.K.P. 562, had succeeded, after lots of requests ( he even had to go to Berlin to achieve this 9) to contrive a work camp for the Jews working in his establishment.

5 cited from: Lawyer Alfred Stumpf, officer under Plagge's command in 1942, declaration in lieu of an oath, Plagge denazification file. Here are a number of other cases, wherein Plagge supposedly accepted people into the camp beyond the technical specialists, namely Dr. Wolfson and his father. 6 "The Jews would die in the concentration camps, that was what we knew when we wouldn't protect them anymore." Lawyer Alfred Stumpff, declaration in lieu of an oath, Plagge denazification file. Stumpff served with HKP only from June to October 1942!7 cited from William Begell, e-mail to the Plagge group, dated 13 June 018 The other refuges were the "Kailis" work camp, where the labourers were reduced step by step, the Spanish Hospital with some 40 Jewish labourers and a small group, which was detached to work at the SS headquarter.9 This was a widespread rumour among the prisoners, but no document has been found about such travel. At least Major Plagge had been very active to convince his superior headquarter and even more the SD about the need for several hundred civilians to run the HKP. He relates to his protest at the SD headquarters in Riga in his letter to H.U.V. 190

The authorities designated for this camp the buildings of the so-called "cheap housing" on Subocz street."10

It must be taken into consideration that the allowance by the SS to take the families into the work camp aimed only at having a tool to blackmail the labourers by threatening the women and children. Such intention would fit into the picture of the SS, being ready for any conceivable vicious plan. But we will see later that brutalities executed against the families of the prisoners had a contraire effect. The assumption by Plagge of these kinds of devious intentions can be dismissed, since the permission to allow families was granted on the basis of the request of Major Plagge who was known to be fair to his  (Jewish) workers.

There were families in the "Kailis" work camp as well. This camp - first under supervision of Oskar Glick - was set up in winter 1941-1942 in Vilna, when the German Army suffered from an extreme shortage of winter clothing. Here all the furriers from Lithuania, who were by 90% Jews, were concentrated. It can be assumed that in these families the women normally co-operated in fur-making and therefore were "of use" for the Wehrmacht. Jewish women had never been employed in vehicle repair or other mechanical jobs, therefore Plagge's argument of "motivation" must be called unique.

Major Plagge knew of Kailis, for several times he had taken prisoners from Kailis who had been endangered into HKP11. In one case a group of 100 people were transferred from Kailis to HKP. These transfers took place with full knowledge of Plagge. The fate of Kailis12 must have been a clear warning to Plagge: The manager of Kailis, Oskar Glick, had provided as many people as possible with work permits and a number of "illegals" lived in the Kailis factory, which was not guarded by SS. But when the SS found out that Glick was a Jew himself, he was arrested and killed, the factory came under complete control of the SS and repeated and brutal roll calls unearthed all the “illegals”. They and a great number of "not useful" prisoners were killed.

Witness Elias Gurewitz, questiones about the SS staff in Vilna testified:

“The following names of members if the gestapo in Vilna are known to me: ...Dietz, master-sergeant (3 stripes), responsible for administration, short but sturdy, 53 years old, took part in WW I, limped due to an ols war-injury, told me that his home had been bombed.110 Jews had hidden in Rudnitzka No 6. They were discovered and brought to the Gestapo prison. Kammermacher, the Jewish leader of the Jewish work-force at the Gestapo and Kolis, leader of the Jewish laborers at HKP (about 1.300) asked Major Plagge of HKP for help. He sent a request for 200 men for an emergency mission to the Gestapo. Thereon Diez handed out all 110 prisoners, which with no doubt were shot otherwise.”

The same SS-sergeant Dietz was described by witness K-H Proepper as such:

„Questioned for the name Dietz of the EK (Einsatzkommando) I declare that I had package for him ... to the Reich. In this way I got to know that this included a parcel with 2 kg of gold, diamonds and the such. This parcel I have sent on his directive to Berlin-Schoenwalde.“ (Proepper indicated hereby that it was sent to the private address of Dietz)

10 cited from Samuel Esterowicz, Memoirs. Translated from Russian and edited by Pearl Esterowicz Good, available at www.hometown.aol.com//michaeldg/11 "Mula Gerstein, wife Nina and son Gary, after being taken to the Gestapo from a maline were saved and taken to Kailis, they were again terribly endangered. My Mother begged Kolysz to get them transferred to HKP, but to no avail until my Mother's cousin (Zusman Shapiro?) intervened - his daughter-in-law was Kolysze's wife's sister and Kolysz arranged for the SS-man "Golosheyka" to bring them to HKP." Pearl Good, e-mail to the Plagge group 1 June 200312 for details see the letter from Zwi Rejzewski, dated 4 June 2003 to the author.

Dietz was not described by Elias Gurewitz as a „murderer“, but he must have had good reasons to follow Plagge’s request. Normally the SS did not „obey“ orders of the Wehrmacht, but here we can assume that both came together: the distict appearance of Plagge and bribes from Kammermacher and Kolysh. At another case we have already heard that Plagge took over onehundred people fromcamp Kailis – following the request of the camp-senior Kolysh and with acknowledgement of SS-sergeant „Golosheika“ Richter, the supervisor of both camps – Kailis and Subocz-Street. Here we have another example for the prompt and successful aid Plagge granted to those in danger of their leives.

At the same time of Plagge’s request for 200 the SS was very busy liquidating the ghetto and to kill al those they found there. Therefor Plagge could dare to fake an „emergency-mission“. But there was the danger that SS-supervisor Richter could get the idea to check the case and to look after the extra repair job, for which Plagge at least needed 200 men, a job of a truely visible size.

Additionalla Plagge had to provide rooms and work for these 110 Jews. As the „emergency-mission“ was non-existent he had to rely on the co-operation of his men.

The Camp – February 1944

HKP and the Subocz Street camp was set up in a strict organisation. Everything was aimed at productivity: repair of military vehicles, conversion of vehicles to gas generators, production and repair of uniforms and the repair of other minor military equipment. Everybody was attached to a dedicated job, all labour was set up in a professional work flow. A captain – a civilian manager of a publishing house – was entirely responsible for operations scheduling. Plagge looked with great diligence on order and obedience. Actually he was running a production site of some complexity and size: It consisted of the headquarters and the subordinate military organisation of 250 men - mostly skilled specialists in all kinds of vehicle repair. They were non commissioned officers, men of the reserve army at an age, at and above their forties, young draftees with technical professions, electricians, locksmiths, welders, blacksmiths, mechanics as well as shoemakers, carpenters and tailors. They all ran their workshops and had attached a number of civilians - who were designated as "specialists" and skilled labourers. Mostly the civilians were trained on the job for their task, many of them had never done manual labour in their life before13.

"we were allowed to bring to HKP, under one family "coverage," 3 people, my grandmother, my mother, and myself. I was the "professional" because I had worked in the ghetto machine shop for a couple of years before that time."14

The broad variety of "specialists" included even such professions like roofers, turners, farm workers and masons, skills hardly useful in vehicle repair15.

"Initially, there was not a lot of work for the prisoners. Some of them were woodworkers and cabinetmakers, so Plagge set up a wood working shop and had them make furniture."16

The number of civilians in a given workshop was shifted from one to the other according to the workload and availability of spare parts and materials17. To keep HKP with all its 17

13 "Her father was a fairly skilled worker, but Mira says that many of the HKP Jews were not skilled but brought to the workshop by Plagge." Memoirs of Mira Trocki, available at: hometown.aol.com//michaelDG/14 cited from an e-mail by (survivor) William Begell to the author, dated Tue, 12 Jun 200115 see documentation "The H.K.P. Jewish Labour Camp 1943 - 1944" by Irina Guzenberg, published by Vilna Jewish Museum 2002, page 188.16 cited from an interview, held by Michael D. Good with (survivor) Harry Sheres on 10. June 2001

locations spread all over Vilna and different labour busy was only one of the daily organisational challenges of Plagge's headquarters.

In total some 1.250 soldiers and civilians were working in HKP, some 250 children also lived there. It was the initiative of Major Plagge to invite two private companies to set up their textile work shops in the buildings in Subocz street. He had managed to get 100 sewing machines from the netherlands. In doing so, the women were now employed "for Wehrmacht purposes" in the uniform production, tailor shops and knitting rooms, some were employed in the kitchen and others put to work cleaning the blocks. There was a reasonable medical service and a chemical laboratory - the latter quite unusual and hardly needed for vehicle repair, but another hint on Plagge's initiatives to find additional employment in his unit. Plagge, the trained engineer for chemical processing together with a Jewish chemist tested there the production of starch-flour from potato-peels collected at all the kitchens in Vilna as additional nourishment for the prisoners. And to keep the workshops in a good shape (there were a lot of repairs needed in the houses and premises which had been neglected for years) out of a total of 490 labourers a construction and repair team of up to 120 men - including a construction bureau - was on duty for a broad variety of work to keep the workshops warm in the cold winter and the area clean18 - a work force surprisingly strong compared to the number of labourers in the vehicle workshops. For several years Plagge had been the technical manager of an industrial company - the Hessenwerke in Darmstadt. Looking at the inefficient industrial productivity at HKP- a ratio of 360 "productive" labourers to 890 in "support"-jobs, more or less inefficient to vehicle repair (see Plagge's letter and his arguments) it is safe to assume that issues other than productivity were motivating Major Plagge.

The documents recently published by the Jewish Museum in Vilna show that there were detailed work descriptions and lists of specialists needed for each job assigned. Plagge also planned meticulously for the future, not only to expand the space of workshops considerably by construction of a "large production hall"19, but he also had ordered the establishment of training courses for the Jewish workers and the rigging of class-rooms for apprentices to cover the anticipated need for more labourers. The single work report of a construction team we have as an example, is a model of a typical German engineer’s work flow organisation within HKP.

In fact, Plagge was running a large factory of some productivity and - as documented by the "Wehrwirtschaftsaussenstelle Vilna" - of considerable value to the economic needs of the Wehrmacht. But there was the other aspect to Plagge's camp at Subocz Street: Unlike most Nazi run factories with slave labour, HKP had integrated both the labourers and their families completely into the work flow. Where others just whipped the slave labourers to the job and did not give a damn on how they slept and survived, aside of integrating the families Plagge had provided for heated rooms, food at least to survive, a minimum medical care20 and most significantly he educated his men to treat the prisoners as human beings21. Anyone who violated his rules of behaviour was immediately detached to a front-line unit as it was the case with a younger sergeant, who was discovered attacking and kicking a Jewish prisoner and who defended himself with the argument that the Jews were all enemies. Plagge made him understand that he might fight the "enemy" at the front against the Russians, where he

17 see documentation as above. The shifting of the labour force relates to the documented lists of "daily number of workers", in particular as given on page 53, 55 and 57.18 see documentation as above, page 101, "Work Report" (translation in English see attachment)19 see documentation as above, page 101, "Work Report" No II.20 see documentation as above, page 69 "Report on Medical Personnel..., pointing out 5 med. doctors, 3 dentists (out of which 2 were not fully trained) and 5 nurses. Compared to the numbers on the sick lists, pages 143 ff., the staff can be called "reasonable"21 "..a German soldier named Berger who had been assigned to our automobile repair ... exclaimed while watching the Jews being driven to their deaths: " What this scum perpetrate here in the name of the German nation - centuries will not suffice for us to cleanse ourselves!" cited from S. Esterowicz, Memoirs

could carry a gun. Indeed, the sergeant - in spite of threatening Plagge with his membership in the "Allgemeine SS" - was moved to the front22.

"...everybody knew of Plagge’s HKP. He became famous for his fair treatment of his Jewish workers and for his constant fights with the SD, SS, and Gestapo to keep his working force intact."23

In unison survivors tell that there was no pressure at the job. Although the working times from 6 to 6 with an hour pause were surely in excess of what would have been allowed by a union, the speed of labour was comparatively low. This describes the typical pace of a logistic establishment, which in the case of HKP was dominated by mostly elderly rank and file members. Of course these men, working hand in hand with the prisoners or being even dependent on their work, made the prisoners follow their example. Typically the labourers were frankly asked by the drivers of vehicles being repaired at HKP, not to do the job too fast, as they were not interested to go back to the battle too soon. This attitude was accepted by the men of Plagge's unit, comrades of the drivers, and of course by the prisoners who were "compensated" by the drivers for "sabotaging" the timely repair with food24. Such impressions of sabotage by the prisoners were not in contradiction to Plagge's intention to show off a busy, active unit, as the more important argument was the quality of work he delivered in addition to the files and reports about the labour being done. Everybody was aware of the life-saving need of work. The soldiers, if not suffiently employed, also were threatened by the so called “heroes-theft” – the replacement to a front-line unit. At any inspection by external authorities, the speed of work, of the German sergeant as well as of the prisoners, would rise significantly as can be seen in every military unit in the world. The consistent testimony of survivors about the differences of the outer image and the true goings-on in HKP 562 give one more hint to Plagge's cleverness and success in convincing his superiors and the SS of HKP's number of labourers and management to Germany's final victory.

Plagge also took care of a myriad of details. We see examples such as the large and diligently painted road sign directing visitors to the HKP workshops25 (something like the visit card of his unit), the tidiness of workspace and camp (always a decisive factor in inspection reports due to the normal ignorance of higher ranks to technical requirements and complications), the distribution of work, the availability of spares down to shovels for the construction team, the timber for his carpenters, the textiles for the tailor shops, the ovens and water supply, the roll-calls, the reports and overall high quality production. HKP could be called an exemplary unit, run by an engineer of the best tradition, to whom accuracy, order and clean work is self evident. Major Plagge criticised inferior work and wastage of materials explicitly and on the spot26.

But also the care for the labourers was part of the same attitude and Plagge used the order in HKP and the carefully worked out work flow, the precisely kept and differentiated names and employment lists and organisation of HKP and the civil labourers as a shield. No one in HKP should even look as if he or she was superfluous or underemployed. That is why reports like the one we have from the construction team were diligently completed and even children were integrated into the production as early as possible. They also should become indispensable wheels in the HKP production machine. Any SS inspector should be convinced by the perfect image of a well organised and versatile vehicle repair park. They should be convinced that everything in HKP was aimed only towards the "final victory" of the 22 see denazification file Karl Plagge - case witnessed by Lawyer Alfred Stumpff - Declaration in lieu of an oath23 cited from William Begell: "MAJOR PLAGGE - HKP - VILNO 17 September 1943 - 30 June 1944"24 "...in fact even the soldiers indirectly asked not to repaired too fast & gave us food for it. They didn't want to go to the east front." cited from Simon Malkes, e-mail to the author, dated 22 April 200325 see documentation as above, photo on page 2926 cited from Michael D. Good, interview with Harry Sheres, www.hometown.aol.com//michaelDG/

Wehrmacht. Exact reports, professionalism in every detail and high motivation on the job were the tools to demonstrate the sense and effectiveness of Plagge's management of HKP and to blind the inspectors at the same time.

This task brought a lot of troubles to Plagge. On the one hand, he was the one who had to care for hundreds of details in the work shops and camp to cover the discrepancy between the number of labourers - men, women and youngsters - demanded by HKP - and paid for at the SS - and the real need for the work to be done. On the other hand there was always the threat from the SS to draw off the civil labour force, at least anyone in the camp, who even gave the slightest impression of being unable to work27 - by age, health or education. Even ony limited times of unemployment had to be avoided, therefore the shifting of men and women within the park and the two textile workshops. Therefore Plagge had set up the organisational details, and that is why he was keenly interested in the careful use of materials, without which the prisoners would be unemployed. As the SS was generally corrupt28, there were also some jobs to be done in HKP, which definitely were not for the Wehrmacht, but clearly for civil - SS - purposes: furniture and fur coats. Plagge had to be careful in all directions - he had to be aware that any word from him could be reported to the SS. The Lithuanian guards were complete slaves of the SS, they were selected for their job especially for their anti-Semitism, agitated by the rumours that all Jews had co-operated with the Reds in the time of the Soviet occupation29.

Formally all labourers in HKP were prisoners of the SS and literally owned by the SS. As such, there were creatures like the SS Unter-Scharfuehrer (sergeant lowest grade) "Golosheyka" Richter30, who infested HKP and the blocks on Subocz Street with a sharp eye for any chance to harass and intimidate the civilians and also to retaliate for Major Plagge's "frivolity" - in the eyes of the SS - to save 1200 Jews, the majority useless women and children - of the final extinction of all Jews of Vilna, to the last one. The public and demonstrative execution in the HKP camp of the Zalkind family and the killing of 36 women next day was such an example for the never ending zeal of the SS to kill anyone at any opportunity. David Zalkind and his wife had fled from the camp, were caught and brought back to the camp. Zalkind was shot after the rope of the gallow had broken twice, his wife and their daughter as well. Yes, this is a "dark spot" in the Plagge story. Following his letters (to Mr. Greisdorf), his declaration at the denazification trial and the description by the survivors it is to be assumed that he was a dominantly intellectual, led in his doings by patterns of moral. At one point in his interrogation by the denazification court he said:

"I always believed in compromise"31.

This would imply that in the Zalkind tragedy he had to appreciate, whether he had a chance to interfere successfully and what would be the result. Following such thinking, he could do nothing, as the Zalkinds had offended the camps rules: They were caught on the escape, which was known to be threatened by the death penalty. Here Plagge had no chance to interfere, to the contrary, any attempt to intervene into the execution would have been an open breach of his deal with the SS and included the possibility that the whole camp would

27 see footnote 40!28 The incredible extension of bribery, corruption and drawing of personal profits within the SS is described by Prof. Eugen Kogon in his documentation "Der SS-Staat", Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt am Main 1947, page 290-306 "Das Drohnendasein der SS" (The Drone Livelyhood of the SS)29 To the question of denunciators within the Jewish prisoners see the e-mails attached at the end30 not to be mistaken with Obersturmbannfuehrer (SS LtCol) Richter, the last Area Commissioner of Vilna, successor of Hingst and Neugebauer. Richter could be bribed as well. The Jewish representative of the camp Kolysh "arranged" via Richter in several cases the transfer of prisoners from Kailis to HKP. See Pearl Good, Memoirs and Pearl Good, e-mail to the Plagge group, dated 1 June 2003.31 cited from: Plagge's Denazification File, interrogation by the court on Feb 8th 1948, hometown.aol.com//michaelDG/

be deprived of the Wehrmacht's protection and come under full control of the SS. As normally the SS would have killed the Zalkinds immediately wherever they caught them, the public execution in the camp was also a threat to Plagge and his men under the motto: "keep a better eye on our prisoners!" The dramatically developing scene when the child turned up was unforeseeable. This is the picture of a man, who carefully appreciated his possibilities, but not in his personal favour, but in the overall interest of the prisoners in total. In such situations, tragedy is inevitable.

Plagge's exemplary unit was a permanent offence to SS ideology. Unfortunately for the SS, Plagge and his fabulous Vehicle Repair Park was under protection of the Wehrmacht, although a rather vulnerable haven, as the SS and SD in unison with the secret Military Police had demonstrated at the case of Sergeant Schmid. Schmid had helped Jewish resistance fighters and was shot after military trial for the faked accusation of being corrupt. This case was well known and remembered in the Vilna military community32. Schmid's case demonstrated that anyone under any suspicion of the SS could be court-martialled for any offence. The military courts didn't hesitate to take as truth without questioning any accusations from the SS33. It was thanks to the generosity of German military judges in decisions on death sentences - some 20,000 throughout the war34 - that members of the Wehrmacht unsympathetic to Nazi ideology were continually threatened. From the point of view of the SS, Plagge consistently gave false and exaggerated numbers of labourers required for his HKP operations. Even in terms of the Wehrmacht he violated the strict and clear rules to treat Jews as enemies everywhere and at all times35. The true extend of the threat may be illustrated by the directive of the chief of personal affairs of the army headquarter, General Schmundt, from 1942:

"...Therefore there must not be, even not the most informal, relation between an officer and a member of the Jewish race. The actual hard fight against the Jewish-bolshevist world-enemy demonstrates with eminent clarity the true face of Judaism. Therefore the officer must reject from his inner conviction Judaism and any relation to it. Whoever violates this non-compromised standing, is unbearable as officer. The subordinate officers are to be instructed in an appropriate manner."36

The directive had been made to regular orders of the field commanders and were well known everywhere in the Wehrmacht. Violation of these orders such as personal contacts or even protection of Jews were capital offences and in terms of the military courts good enough for a

32 "All soldiers of the German army knew what kinds of inhuman decisions and judgements were given to those who committed similar "crimes" from the military court." cited from Karl Plagge, testimony, in denazification file. Here Plagge refers to an officer, who had said that Hitler should be shot. Looking on Plagge's action in this case, witnessed also by his paymaster, one can see his cunning handling of delicate cases.33 "The longer the war lasted, the more the military courts became instruments of terror: The judges were not independent, sentences were not derived from the single case and in many cases were fixed already in advance. Only the formalities of justice were used. Tens of thousands were sentenced to death and executed, more than in all other countries taken together" cited from B. Hirsch, Vice President of the German Bundestag in: Deutsches Sonntagsblatt "Urteile ohne Recht und Moral", 30.08.9634 An overall evaluation of these files had been successfully denied by the same military judges, who, together with other Nazi-judges, rose in post-war Germany to high and highest positions like: Dean of the juridical faculty, chancellor Adenauer's chief of staff, president of the Federal Court of Germany or Prime Minister of a German federal state. Aside of the existing 90.000 files of military trials another 40.000 have been destroyed deliberately and traceable after the war.35 "Therefore none, not even the slightest connection between an officer and a member of the Jewish race is allowed." cited from General Schmundt, Chief of Army Personnel Affairs, decree from October 1942, wherein a clear-cut anti-Semitic pose of German officers is demanded.36 cited from Wolfram Wette: "Retter in Uniform"

death sentence. A KZ commander, fraternizing with Jewish prisoners, as described in the following quote was more than what was required:

"The chief of H.K.P. 562, Major Plagge, would come to encourage us after these events. Obviously embarrassed about the latest "achievements of his fellow Germans", he told us, among other things: "Regrettably, the war has destroyed moral values as well as the material ones"37.

On the background of the decree of the Nazi-administration, found in the Vilna state-

archives, by such words Plagge as an employer of slave labour had committed the most

serious offences.

Guideline and bulletin for the employment of Jewish labour" dated April 7, 1942:

„The Jew is our enemy and the lone culpable of the war. Therefore there is no difference between Jew and Jew, they are all the same. The employment to work is forced labour, therefore any non-official acquaintance with Jews as well as any private communication and wheeling and dealing is strictly forbidden. Whoever keeps private company with Jews, has to be treated as a Jew accordingly."

The Letter from the SS Commandant38

Following an inspection of HKP in January 1944 by the commandant of the Kowno concentration camp ObStubaF (LTC) Goeke, to which the HKP-camp at Subocz Street belonged as a dependace and a discussion with Major Plagge, Goeke insisted by letter on a "burden"39 of administrational work at the HKP headquarters, which was - in Goekes eyes - not capable of making up correct files for the HKP and the civil firms labourers according to the demands of the SS. With view on the perfect organization of HKP, this was an "unfriendly" and threatening imputation to Plagge in itself. The paperwork and personnel, needed for the accounting of 1.200 prisoners according to SS standards was considerable. There was the complicating fact that within HKP were workshops of private firms, which produced for the Army and Airforce as well, but were their own organisational units. Plagge had invited the uniform firms to establish their production sites inside of the HKP camp and taken over the task to shift the women employed at these two firms between HKP and the firms jobs according to actual workload40. This "unauthorised" personal action of Plagge was fully in line with the Wehrmacht's traditional philosophy of task oriented decisions, leaving to the local responsible officer all the freedom to employ his resources in favour of the overall task. However, this was not acceptable to the SS sworn in to unlimited obedience and conflicted with their aim of total and permanent control of their prisoners and their overall aim to extinguish the Jewish race as soon as possible.

Thanks to Plagge's employment policy - he even thought of support to the air defence units in Vilna by "his" prisoners41 - and his diligent organisation, Goeke could and did not question the number of prisoners working in and for HKP directly. So he used the "burden for the headquarter" of HKP by administrational work as a valid argument to demand by written instruction - he could not give orders to a Wehrmacht officer - an immediate review of the system of roll calls and reports. He "proposed" that HKP and the private firms should each report separately for their demand of labour42. Goeke demanded "immediate action" - which

37 cited from Pearl Good, Memoirs (see footnote 3) - about Plagge's reaction on the "children's action." Also compare with the decree of Gen. Schmundt (footnote 15) 38 see the attached English Translation of the original, as in the documents from Vilna. 39 Goeke presumably refers to the many hand-written amendments on the roll-call lists as can be seen on the documents published by the Vilna Museum.40 Survivor Molly Kadan remembers in an interview: " She worked in both the carpentry shop, the laundry and the kitchen.", available at hometown.aol.com//michaelDG/41 see letter of Major Plagge to HUV42 For the understanding of the organization please see the attached graphs.

he underlined by sending SS sergeant Richter with the letter and the newly prepared lists. He thus gave more weight to his expectation to receive the new lists "immediately" i.e. one or two days later. SS officer Goeke somehow mistrusted the beautiful set-up at Plagge's HKP43, supposing some deals between Plagge and the uniform manufacturers out of his direct control and against his never ending zeal to get hold of any "non-useful" worker for Ponary. And although camouflaged by the bureaucratic language, the mistrust of SS-officer Goeke is seen in the threatening undertone in his letter to Plagge. It was a clear affront to Major Plagge and therefore the proof for the mistrust, to send a low ranking SS-sergeant, Richter, to control the handling of the name-lists at HKP and the uniform works by Major Plagge.

Plagge's reaction is dated 9 days later, showing that he had neglected the demand for the "immediate action" as requested clearly by camp commandant Goeke. To follow Goeke's instructions would have deprived Plagge of the freedom to decide about the internal employment of the women in the camp on his own - a severe danger to his well organised scheme to keep away close scrutiny by the SS into his management and also a threat to productivity, because such reports would reveal immediately that in fact there were more women in the camp than needed for the production. His next move was aimed at first to trade for time by diverting things into an administrative problem with the need for the involvement of as many authorities as possible, and then to outflank the intentions of Goeke and the SS. On the one hand his rank as a major was not high enough to bluntly decline Goeke's instruction, on the other he saw a chance to keep things running as they were by forwarding the instruction - superficially a simple administrational matter - to the local Wehrmacht office, which was in charge of checking the invoices of the SS for release of prisoners and ordering the money to the SS - the Army Lodging Service - using Goekes letter to start a major and time consuming administrational affair. Sending his letter to the Army Lodging Service (HUV) - remarkably without copy44 to Goeke, which would have been self explaining in a truly sheer administrative case - can only be interpreted as an attempt, not to inform Goeke too early about his intentions.

Plagge argued straight away with the HKP's task of logistic support to the Army and the subsequent need for highly motivated civil labour and proposed a simple move: complete rent in total of the whole Subocz street camp inmates by the Wehrmacht administration. In this way the accounting and administration of the prisoners could be simplified and HKP relieved of substantial paper work - which would block off Goeke's initial imputation, solve the problem and would answer Goeke's demand.45 It can be taken for granted that at that time nobody in Vilna or the Wehrmacht staff there was in any doubt about what would be the fate of anyone superfluous in the Subocz street camp in the eyes of the SS46.

"... if for other reasons for the SS the employment in Vilna appears less important than at another place"

writes Plagge in his letter to HUV and his intense arguments at this point are only explicable, if we take into consideration his awareness that the women would be killed at Ponary. Next attention has to be drawn, to whom the letter of such importance47 was sent: The addressee of his proposal was just a low ranking warrant officer, independent of Plagge in

43 The SS had confidants in the Subocz street camp: "Collaborators were (in HKP and all the ghettos ...) a routine and obvious event and occurrence. Even a young man, such as I ... was not only aware but fully knowledgeable of the Averbuchs and others who were working for the Germans. .... It was a natural occurrence." cited from an e-mail to the author by William Begell, dated May 15, 2003.44 as the letter was documented in the unit's "letterbook", it would have had a "copy to" note, if such copy would have been sent to Goeke. The note in the letterbook was essential to protect Plagge against accusations of being dormant. 45 For the understanding of Plagge's proposal see the attached graph.46 Oskar Schoenbrunner describes in his memoirs, how he madet SS Sturmfuehrer (lieutenant) Neugebauer drunk in the officers club (1943) until he told in detail about the killing at Ponary. see MSG 2, Vol. 2822 Bundesarchiv – Militärarchiv Freiburg, page 7

his task to check and pay the invoices of the SS, but in a support function to HKP. If Plagge as a Major, commandant of HKP and deputy commander of the superior engineers regiment was not in a position to reject Goekes demands, how could he expect that the warrant officer48 of HUV would be in a position to counteract to Goeke? The only explanation can be the logic, after which Plagge deliberately used HUV as a time-gaining detour for his application.

The leader of HUV must have immediately recognised the true meaning of Plagge's proposal. The mutual stalking of the SS and Plagge regarding the dispute about handling of the HKP prisoners was known by many minor clashes between SS and Plagge's men49. Now Plagge demanded that he should be responsible for the account of the prisoners and sign with his name the number requested. At least HKP, a permanent installation of 250 soldiers plus 1250 civilian - men, women and children - day by day contacted by all kinds of military personnel coming and going with the trucks and vehicles on repair or conversion at HKP, was one of the main objects aside of all the other more or less important offices and headquarters in Vilna.

Plagge's proposal brought the officer in charge of the Army Lodging Service into an inconvenient situation: to follow the proposal would have posed him right in front to the SS - a position in which nobody would feel comfortable. So he looked for excuses to deny the proposal and as reasons he found that he was not entitled to having the men to do this additional administrative work and secondly, but decisively he indicated that the administration had no one to run the guard at Subocz Street. Well, this was visibly a fake argument , the guards were Lithuanian policemen and they would have carried on, only under the supervision of the Wehrmacht - logically Plagge's unit.

The Army Lodging Service did, what all administration levels are doing in questionable or such cases which would enlarge their responsibility - the proposal was answered as "not being entitled" and "we suggest you forward the case to our superior office". This was unwillingly well done, as this could only be the aim of Plagge - to mark up the case on a decision level, which could not be neglected by the SS. In addition, time had been gained, the answer was written on 21st of February and by pointing to the superior headquarter as being the correct addressee, some more days or weeks were available to find a way to outmanoeuvre Goeke’s demand. As long as there was no final decision on the case initiated by Plagge, he could neglect the dangerous change of procedures.

A minor slip-up in the answer to Plagge (by mentioning that the superior office could possibly arrange the "take over of the work camp" - a term, Plagge had not used in his letter to HUV) shows us in writing the true point of discussion - it was not the reorganisation of some paperwork, but a frontal attack on the SS - the "take over" of the Subocz street camp and all the prisoners by the Wehrmacht, depriving the SS of their prey.

March 1944 - Kinder AkzyeFrom here on onwards we have no documents about the further development of the exchange of arguments. There is only a brief remark in Plagge's answers to the denazification court's questions, which may be related to this particular case:

47 The importance is clarified by listing the letter in HKP's letterbook. Also the length - unusual for military issues at that level - points to the importance given to the case by Plagge.48 Such administrational institutions were led by officers of the special "Intendantur"-branch, ranking below regular officers. 49 Rescuer Oskar Schoenbrunner describes similar incidents. The witnesses of Plagge's denazification trial reported cases, when Jews were retrieved from the SS by Wehrmacht men at gun point. See also footnote No 12.

"I think the reason for the closing of the motor vehicle repair park had to do with the fact that my regiment commander accused me of being too soft in the treatment of my workers."50

These few words can be interpreted as an indication for the final denial of Plagge's request. The timely coincidence possibly points to the consequences.

The daily reports as found in the documents mirror the terrible action that was taken briefly after Plagge's attempt to outmanoeuvre the SS: In the raid on 27th of March the SS snatched and killed those, who were not listed belonging to the workshops or construction team - 200 children and elderly of Subocz street and a number of women, who seemed to be not really employed:

"Harry's mother was killed after the children's action in March of 1944. She had been working in the mending shop when the action started. Not knowing what kind of action this was to be, she left her workplace and hid. However she was discovered and since she was not at the workplace where she was supposed to be, she was taken with the children and Harry never saw her again."51

Remarkably they raided the camp, when Plagge was absent52.

"The "children's aktzye" shook the camp to its very foundations. The air was filled with moans of the disconsolate mothers, people moved around the camp like shadows."53

On the daily lists for the following 2 weeks we find the simple remark "not worked"54 - the prisoners were not driven to the workshops, at least interpretable as a gesture of sympathy by Plagge and his men.

There is no written evidence of a correlation between Plagge's move to get better control over the Subocz street camp and the children's action, but according to the frequently witnessed operational pattern of the SS it is allowed to assume that Goeke started the children's action in the concentration camps within his area of responsibility more or less working for the Wehrmacht, as a demonstration of his overruling power. Goeke didn't need necessarily an order "from above" for his actions, if he only wanted to demonstrate his "pre-emptive obedience" to Nazi ideology. As Plagge had pointed on (SS-Colonel) Piffraders - Goekes superior - allowance for the camp, it would have been the logic consequence for Goeke to take Plagge’s delaying maneouvres as the cause for a consultation with Piffrader with the effect of the children's action throughout the Lithuanian and possibly the Latvian KZs.

May 1944 - Red Army Closing in

The Wehrmacht had started her last major initiative at the Eastern Front in the summer of 1943 at the battle of the Kursk salient. 4000 German tanks had attacked the well prepared Soviet defences and came to a grinding halt. The immediate counteroffensive caught the Germans on the wrong foot and since then the front was closing in to Vilna slowly but quite

50 cited from Plagge's answers to the denazification court in: Plagge's Denazification file, hometown.aol.com//michaelDG/51 cited from Michael D. Good, e-mail to the Plagge group, telephone interview with Harry Sheres, dated June 21st, 0152 "We later found out that this only happened because Major Plagge was on leave in Germany, and was not there to object" Memoirs of Mark and Anna Balber, available at "hometown.aol.com//michaelDG/" and: "The Balber's trust in Major Plagge's power is really touching - they thought that if only Plagge was not on vacation he could have saved the children from the "Aktzye" which was also taking place simultaneously in the Kaunas ghetto." cited from Pearl E Good, e-mail to the Plagge group, dated 3 Jul 2001.53 cited from Pearl Good: Memoirs54 "I did not return to work after the Kinder Aktzye. I did not go to the Apellseither" cited from Pearl E Good, e-mail to the Plagge Group, dated 21 Jan 2003

visibly to everyone. In the spring of 1944 it was only a question of time, when the Soviets would overrun Vilna. Many prisoners of Subocz street started arly to look for hideaways for that case early and immense covert activities started, malines - even a tunnel out of the camp, which was detected too early by treason - were dug and built within Subocz street blocks for as many people as possible. Perl Good has described these preparations forcefully.

"When the news of the advancing Russian army reached us some began building hiding places in the cellars, under the roof, just any place they could think of, fearing that the Germans would shoot us before retreating."55

Looking on the drawing of the blocks56 and the malines in there, the blocks must have been hollowed like a rabbit's burrow.

In the end possibly 400 or more found shelter in these malines. All this was done in buildings in which were some of the workshops and where the German soldiers were at least present throughout the day. The many contacts between the soldiers and prisoners and their presence on the spot make it implausible that Plagge's men did not recognise any of the preparations in the camp. At least the Germans themselves were thinking about what would happen, when the front comes nearer. The SS would have been very interested in knowing about these activities. But the survivors speak about the need to hide the malines from everyone except the few who were to hide there. First there would have been too many, who would try to get into the maline and secondly, those rejected from entering could give notice to the enemy, hoping to save their own lives57.

1st of July 1944

The summer offensive of the Red Army against German Army Group Centre had started on May 1, 1944 and the closing in of the Soviets must have been audible in Vilna for days or even weeks, as the thunder and the nozzle-fire of the hundreds of artillery pieces can be heard and seen in the summer nights on a distance of more than one hundred kilometres58. At the rear headquarters and logistic installations of the German Army Group Centre in Vilna the hectic activities accompanying the defensive operations must have been visible to everyone. The drivers coming with their vehicles for repair from the front would have told about the goings-on, so that nobody in HKP and the Subocz street camp was really unprepared for decisive changes. The Jews, still employed at the SS headquarters, forwarded to the camp the information they necessarily picked up there. There had also been a radio in the camp, used to listen to the BBC59. From there the prisoners knew already that the Germans had killed all Jewish prisoners on their retreat.60 Without any doubt there must have been growing a tremendous tension in the camp about the coming events, possibly the inescapable death to all.55 cited from Boris Greisdorf: Escape-HKP story 1956 ...(source?)56 Drawing provided by Michael D. Good. The original is drawn by architect Gary Gerstein.(see attachment)57 In the Annex are two letters concerned with the question whether there were denunciators in the camp.58 I remember the late summer 1944, when I was with my mother, sisters and brothers evacuated from East Prussian Gumbinnen to a village, a hundred km to the West. Here in the nights and on silent evenings the far away growling of the front, still 150 km East, was a permanent background noise.59 The extensive reporting of BBC about the situation is documented at many places, f.e. as audio documents at: WWW.gimarc.com/1941.html: Reel George Productions - Jan. 19, 1943 Russian Front News (1:13). Even in POW-camps existed radios: http://www.merkki.com/powwow.htm60 "According to the British Radio station BBC, before retreating the Germans had shot without mercy all the Jewish inmates of the camps." cited from Pearl Good, Memoirs

It is the scene which all survivors of HKP remember similarly: On Saturday, 1st of July 1944 about 7 p.m. Major Plagge appeared in the camp and called together whoever was around. With him turned up the SS-Sergeant Richter. Plagge informed the prisoners that the situation demands to move HKP west and the prisoners will be moved out of the camp under the "care" of the SS. His words are well remembered:

"Major Plagge warned us that the German army was leaving Wilno and our camp would be evacuated westward in connection with the nearing of the Russians. To emphasize his warning Major Plagge informed us in his speech that we would stop being a H.K.P. work camp and would be entirely in the hands of the S.S. - he then carefully commented: „And you all know full well how well the S.S. takes care of their Jewish prisoners“.61

It has been stated that Plagge left the prisoners simply to their fate, when he got the order to move HKP out of Vilna. But remembering the activities the months before his declaration to the prisoners - and as far as we know now the warning of sergeant Grammer, one of the supervisors in the work shops - get an additional meaning: not only "run for your life" but also now "hide where you can" - knowing well that there were hideaways. It was foreseeable for Plagge weeks before July '44 that he would have to leave with his unit well before a Soviet attack on Vilna. It was foreseeable that the Wehrmacht would not allow any transport for civilian labour62: Due to the Red Army’s successful offensive trucks as well as rail-transport were extremely short to the Wehrmacht on the Eastern front in the summer of 1944. Plagge chose the only path that was logically available to him: to keep HKP running in Vilna under his command as long as possible and warning the prisoners of impending danger at the last possible moment. In the best case he would have held on, until the SS, belonging to the "rear area formations" and not yearning for becoming involved in battles, would have had to leave Vilna as well. Leaving Vilna too early would have left too much time for the SS to search Subocz street. Warning the prisoners too early would have revealed the disappearance of the prisoners to the SS guards. Once ordered to leave Vilna, he could not argue that the task of his unit would become impossible without the civil labour, as his unit consisted of 250 men already, for which - last but not least - he was responsible as the commandant. He did not have the financial resources to buy transport or bribe the SS. HKP was ordered to a new location in East Prussia.

But Plagge did more than just to warn. Although every single man was needed for the preparation and execution of the move of HKP – e great number of tolls, machines and spares had to be loaded, Plagge ordered a guard of his men for the Subocz street camp. He must have got order, not to let escape anyone from there, until the SS could liquidate the camp. Plagge could have handed over the camp immediately after his warning to the SS, his military mission in Vilna had ended with the order to move, the Subocz street and the prisoners without any further use, but he ordered his men to guard the camp. Private A.v.D. reports that right before a colonel – assumably the commander of the superior Engineer regiment – had talked with him about the importance and the organization for retrieval of the spare parts. Against this high priority v.D. together with two comrades he spends the night from 1st zo 2nd of July on guard at Sobocz street behind a machine gun. He had the order from the guards officer to prvent any escape. Aside of him was his comrade and friend C. who as the supervisor of the blacksmith shop told him that the prisoners already had cut the iron bars of the shop’s windows. In the dawn of the summer night they saw repeatedly someshadows running from the blocks to the blacksmith shop, undoubtedly running for escape but he does not fire. When the third guard asked critically about, he answerd

61 cited from Pearl Good, Memoirs62 "..in his speech warning his Jewish workers in July of 1944, Plagge said that he wanted to take the HKP workers with him along with his unit. He said he had asked the administration in Vilna and then in Kaunas (Harry thinks that he said that he actually went to Kaunas to make this request) but was turned down. As a result, Plagge said that the workers would no longer be under his protection, but rather would be under the direct jurisdiction of the SS. He said this with an SS officer standing right next to him." cited from Michael D. Good, telephone interview with Harry Sheres on June 18th, 01

evasive: “But they are ours”. As v.D. reports he was dedicated from the very beginning to allow the escape to as many as possible, even on threat to his own life. Next morning the guards recognize some SS men entering the camp together with some scratched Wehrmacht soldiers of an unknown unit and starting to gather and count the prisoners – now also the life of the guards is endangered, if it is recognized that quite a number of prisoners is missing. The chaos of the precipitate retreat becomes their own rescue.

v.D. reports that he as anyone else never had got a directive or order how to treat the prisoners. He had worked together with the prisoners for a long time and had helped them in different ways at many times. Now Plagge’s examplary attitude yield success, as even the simple soldier in his unit feels supported in following his concience. This is leadership at it’s best.

The retreat was executed on 2nd of July. Until the morning of the 3rd when the SS came together with the Lithuanin police to liquidate the camp, 36 hours had been gone since Plagge’s speech, 36 hours the prisoners had won either to escape or to hide, before the killing started. Down in the overcrowded malines these 36 hours were hell on earth.

Plagge held his speech on Saturday evening, the first escapes were made on the same night. On Sunday the HKP packed up in great hurry and moved off on Sunday evening, night to Monday. The roll-call on Sunday morning was followed by 24 hours of comparatively silence, until on Monday morning the SS together with the Lithuanian police searched the camp and shot all who could not flee or hide. About half of the malinas were detected ond those found there shot on the spot. At the next morning – Tuesday the 4th – the SS and Lithuanian police disappeared.

"Discovering that a large percentage of inmates did not appear at the inspection, the Germans started a search of both buildings and those discovered there, (numbering about 200) were shot immediately in the yard. The Germans mobilised the surrounding gentile population for burial of the corpses, after which they lifted the guard and abandoned the camp on Tuesday, July 4th."63

Not belonging to the front-line troops, Gestapo and SS as well as all other Nazi-organizations had good reasons to leave Vilna at the earliest possible moment. Already the next day, the camp was left for pilferage by the Gentiles and Vilna was swept by the retreating Wehrmacht. Actually in these days the German Army Group Centre disintegrated under the Soviet onslaught.

The interval between the retreat of Plagge and the retreat of the SS gave as little time as possible for the SS to search the camp. The sequence of action and timings demonstrate that Plagge and his men, conforming a rather immobile logistic support unit, kept on in Vilna right until the complete rear organization disappeared and fighting in Vilna started. Any other commanding officer of such a unit, who would have been interested only in the safety of his men, envisaging the speedy attack of the Soviets, would have made any attempt to leave Vilna days earlier, like many other military installations.

Only since we saw Plagge’s testimony of April 1956 in the Ludwigsburg papers we know of two important points: HKP was orderd only about 200 km west to East Prussia and secondly that Plagge returned to the Subocz street camp on Monday, 3rd of July, only to hear the shooting and to be prevented to enter the camp.

„When in summer 1944 the HKP was oredered to go to East Prussia, we had the intention to take with us the Jews. In the gerneral chaos during the retreat it was reported to me thta a cleaning commando of the SD would be in the camp and that there was shooting. When I drove there, I was prevented to enter. Only much later I learned from a Jew that a part of them could escape.“

63 cited from S. Esterowicz, Memoirs

Reading this testimony my first question was, why Plagge did not speak about his warning to the Jews and the aim to save them at his denazification trial. He did not even speak about this with the lawyer Dr. Stumpf:

„After the war I met several times with major Plagge. I had searched him after the war, because I wanted to help him in his denazification trial. Plagge had told me a lot about his experiences with HKP until the end of the war. But he never mentioned the liquidation of about 1.500 members of the HKP camp in Vilna in July 1944 or another time. Also about the Kinder Action in camp Kailis in Mai 1944 nothing is known to me.“64

Is there the possibility that Plagge gave false information about the events? Why did he speak only 8 years past his denazification trial about his futile attempt to save the Subocz street?

Having considered all possibilities, only this was left as an explanation: Being orderd to relocate in East Prussia the distance was as such as to leave the hope to Plagge to take with him the prisoners – for this he even had good reasons, as in the Reich there would not be slave-labour available. Additionally the technical problem for the transport of some 1.000 people on 200 km to East Prussia could be solved. Still in 1944 the bulk of the Wehrmacht marched on their flat feet – and this gave the pace of average military movements. Also the speed of the Red Army’s attack was dominated by the infantry. The distance for the march of the Subocz street prisoners from Vilna via Kaunas to Gumbinnen – a traffic node in East Prussia – was nearly 200 km.

„Of course most of the HKP-Jews could have made it to East Prussia, if we were allowed to walk slow. We neither were starving nor exhausted, But assumably the 3rd of July would have been too late, the day, when we should have been evacuated.“65

Could there have been a realistic chance for the prisoners of Subocz street not to be liquidated like all other Jews in the concentration camps on the retreat of the Wehrmacht? We know that the SS without any mercy tried to delete any trace of their crimes. Information about had reached also Vilna – as described by Samuel Esterovicz. But on the other side there were many cases – in particular to the end of the war – when the prisoners of concentration camps were marched – admittedly under horrible losses – to other camps out of the reach uf the Russians.

Without any doubt Plagge knew the aim of the SS to escape with as much loot as possible and of course he knew their weakness: Receptable for bribes. Unfortunately here one man turned out to be different. Jehoshua Rosenfeld describes in his characteristics of the SS KZ-commander Goeke as such:

„Goeke, SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer and commander of the concentration camp Kaunas was from Karlsruhe (an acquaintant named Hoffmeckler, leader of the Jewish camp orchestra, has visited Mrs. Goeke in Karlsruhe), about mid-40, medium size, very good looking, claimed to be called by the enemy’s radio the „mass-killer with the kid-gloves“, came fom KZ Mauthausen to Kaunas, his personal attitude in the camp cannot be objected, was well acquainted – if not even friend – with ghetto inmate Hoffmeckler, as he himself was a a music-fan, the foundation of the camp orchestra was his initiative (has for example selected at the camp-police action those, who were members of the camp-orchestra, before they were brought to Fort IX)66

Goeke has liquidated the camp, an offer from Dr. Elkes, to spare the camp until the entrance of the Russians and to receive for that 1 Million US $, he rejected with the remark, he could not betray his uniform. How far Goeke was responsible for the „Elder and Kinder Action“

64 Stumpf was questioned, as Rosa Zusman-Schufian had mentioned, „a certain SS-officer named Stumpff had been the resposible leader of the children’s action“. Stumpf had been at no time member of the SS and at the questinable time been in Paris.65 Pearl Good, answering this question in an e-mail dated October 200366 „Fort IX“ was the killing ground of the Kaunas KZ

during his time, I cannot say as his contribution consisted in the allowance to the Gestapo for the execution. Late in autumn 1944 I read in the „Schwarzes Korps“67, Goeke had assumably been killed in Italy.“

So Goeke was determined to kill all Jews at the retreat of the Wehrmacht and SS. By chance we have the testimony of Proepper to this.

„On 1st of July the order came from Kaunas (the superior SS-headquarter) to dissolve the office until 3rd of July. The order was as such:

The dependance Vilna has to be dissolved immediately, all charts, files etc. are to be destroyed. All prisoners in the local camps are to be liquidated immediately. The other Jews in the „safe houses“ in the ghetto are to be send to special treatment68. At any incidents the ghetto is to be blasted. Execution is to be reported.

Signed Schmitz, SS Sturmfuehrer (captain)

Dr. Richter (SS-major Richter and by then leader of the SD in Vilna) released the liquidation order at 6 a.m. In the afternoon, when I loaded the baggage to a rail-car at the station, someone of the SD told me that the safe house in the ghetto had been blasted and the torn bodies had flown through the air.“

Under these circonstances there was no chance for Plagge’s idea, to evacuate the Jews from Subocz street in the midst of the general chaos. Why hasn’t he spoken earlyer about all this. If I remember his words in the letter to the Greisdorfs, I am convinced that he was deepla ashamed about his incapability for real help in a decisive situation. Since his last appearance at the camp’s gate he must have believed that all his attemts in the last years, all his tricka management of the HKP, all arguing against the SS and last, but not least the risks he had taken had been futile at the end: All the prisoners had been killed! He must have accused himself – „I did only, what was allowed to me“ – these words got their whole tragic content since we learned, what must have moved him, when he helplessly recognized the murder in Subocz street. Therefore he never spoke about the two most serious cases, when he neither could prevent nor interfere: the Kinder Action and the liquidation of the camp – even not with Dr. Stumpff – the lawyer who came to his help. Until the end of the denazification trial he must have had assumed that all his prisoners had been killed, only at the end of the trial he heard from Mrs. Eichamueller – the unexpected witness – that there are survivors! Plagge’s brother-in-law, Dr. Madsen, who had attended the whole trial, descibed the appearance of Mrs. Eichamueller „like a movie-scene“. Immediately after that Plagge wrote to the Greisdorfs. Only then he recognized that his attempts to save lives, had not been totally futile. Now he could speak about the events.

Leadership in HKP

The official orders of the Wehrmacht how to treat Jews were known to all soldiers. Plagge mentiones in his curriculum vitae for the Spruchkammer the „Soldiers Letters“, which on behalf of the Wehrmacht-command demanded to appear in the occupied countries as „Herrenmenschen“ – „Master-humans“. The Schmundt-directive, cited above talks a clear language. Entirely open, officially and whithout any scuples Poles and Russions are called sub-human beings, Jews are rated in total and whithout any exemption as enemies. At least with the orders for the war of extinction against Russia the Wehrmacht leaders had incorporated the racist Nazi ideology. The step-by-step depreviation of rights of the Jews in Germany until the November pogrom of 1938 had bee accompanied by brutal Nazi-actions and big.mouthed propaganda. The pauperization and expellance of the German Jews from society could not been hidden to anyone – many had profided of that. Also the brutal

67 „Schwarzes Korps“ (Black Corps) was the name of the SS-newspaper68 „Special treatment“ (Sonderbehandlung) was the camouflaged SS-term for killing

excesses of the SS – partially also of Wehrmacht units69 - against Jews in Poland and the more in occupied Russia had been for sure – even more than to the front-line units – aware to all soldiers in Vilna. Not to forget, the SS-announcement cited above was published openly.

In his magister-thesis „Salvation by Labour“ Kai Christian Primel describes that in other repair parks the slave labourers were treated by the Wehrmacht all in the sense of the SS and whithout any difference to the concentration camps. The more astonishing it is, how major Plagge could lead his unit for years in a way, which made his 250 men to treat the Jews in HKP in his sense, i.e. with good will – exemptions like the beating Schirrmeister included. But even such a man does not think of – or better abstains from – denouncing to the SS, SD, Gestapo or Secret Military Police. The sergeant caught kicking a prisoner, threatens with but abstains from reporting, although he was forced to move from the safe heaven in HKP to a front-line unit . Plagge had argued him skillfully into a situation, which would have disclosed him as a shirker if he had reported the case. It must be mentioned that denouncing was an eminent feature of the Nazi-regime. Where-ever the police-files are available and complete it becomes very clear, how terrifying large was the number of denounciators and denounciations – everywhere „blockwardens“ could be found, whose main task was to spy behind their neighbors. In no way the Wehrmacht was free of such „blockwardens“ – the the Nazis ideas and men and society was carried into the Wehrmacht by „National-Socialist Leading Officers“ – a function comparable to the commissars in the Red Army.

Plagge guarded the fate of the slave labourers whithin his responsibility not like most saviours of Jews as a single person, but in using his complete unit. He is only able to protect the slave labourers, because he relies on the silend accordance or only just silence of his soldiers, wich has worked „like a miracle“ (private A.v.D.). He presented a far reaching trust into his 250 men by fostering a behaviour, wich was clearly in contrary to the „public“ norms as demanded by Nazi-party, SS and Wehrmacht-leaders. All testimonies by his soldiers at the denazification trial and in particular the answers of the by then private v.D.70 aimed at this point are similar in saying that Plagge had released no orders to the treatment of the prisoners, there had never been a unit call to this point, no affiche to the black-board. Nevertheless there there had been single directives or verbal orders by Plagge, to take care for additional nutrition for example. Even as it still discussed whether there was a daily additional soup for the prisoners, more important was the openly accepted swap- and black-market in the Subocz street camp with Polish and Lithuanian gentiles.Plagge had argued for his measures to establish the uniform shop, for the missions to the construction team, the rabbit cages, the chemical laboratory again and again by the military needs. But his men must have known how things were run in other camps like Kailis.

Remarkable as well is the role of SS-sergeant Richter – „Golosheika“. Being the official SS-supervisor for the dependence Subucz-street and Kailis of the Kaunas-KZ the differences of the prisoner’s life here to other camps could not been overseen. He had all the reasons to report the conditions of life in Plagge’s camp to his superior Goeke. He may have done so – the consequence was the „inspection“ of Subocz street by Goeke in February 1944 and possibly the Kinder Action in March 1944 and the following murder of the 36 women on the following day. But no action was taken by the SS against Plagge and his men. Richter and his attitude are to be taken as an example for the effect and success of Plagge’s permanent

69 DER SPIEGEL reports in his issue 41/2005, page 22 under „Bugged Generals“ about general von Choltitz in a British POW-camp: „(he) disclosed in the recorded talks that his ‚most difficult mission“ had been the ‚liquidation of the Jews‘ ... nevertheless I have completed this mission to the last consequence“.70 v.D. had been active in the catholic youth movement and had rejected to join the Hitler-Youth. Already his parents stood in opposition to the Nazis, his father had been arrested for several times. v.D. was well trained in the methods of illegality by the meetings with his illegal catholic group. Being a stict opponent to Nazism and race-ideology he searched and found similar minded soldiers in HKP.

arguments of reason against the purely ideologically motivated actions of the SS. Even is such an environment a consequently intelligent and straight forward attitude prevailed. Thereby Plagge gave to his men an example, which could not been overseen.

Plagge was much concerned in a serious and personal contact with his unit, of course at first with his officers and sergeants. The were daily conferences with the leaders of the workshops, which were used to discuss the actual workload, questions of man-power and organization, technical issues and solutions. From the work report of the construction team we know, how detailled the reports were, Plagge demanded about the work done and how closely he took care of precise work.

In such way his soldiers were assured that he knew well the goings-on in his unit and that in no way he would concede the upcoming of uncontrolled Nazi-cells whithin his large and dislocated at many places unit. Such informal structures whithin military organizations often gain considerable inportance and an arbitrary life completely blocked from the knowledge and will of the superiors. During the Cold War the Red Army was infested by such informal structures, draftees could be maltreated by informal leaders, exploited, even kept as personal slaves of the senior soldiers. My Lai may be an example for a lieutenant, who could commit serious war-crimes literally under the nose of his superiors. In the latest times the on-goings at the military prison in Baghdad are another example for such informal structures, which undermine any military leadership and diszipline.

On one hand Plagge kept distance to his men, far enough that for everybody he kept to be the leader and deciding one in HKP. His consequently attitude of high morale formed a visible distance to his men, which became the main building block of his authority. Simultaneously in his reason-oriented non-ideological manner he was appreciable for his soldiers, they knew his unchanging thinking and what was important for him. This personal distance is always a dominating element of the authority, whereby he earned the respect of his soldiers. His inner doubts and nightmares at the same times, which he described in his letters to Dr. Strauss 10 years later, he kept for his own.

On the other hand he was close enough to all his men to permanently keep an eye on their doings. Also the indifferent were erforced to follow his rules of the game and to stick to those levels of discipline set by him. They had to be aware that he knew well and at any time, what was going on in HKP. Plagge’s authority combined with the mutually bound trust enabled men like lieutenant Stumpf, who reported the kisking sergeant, sergeant Grammer, warned befor the liquidation of the camp, private Beck, who helped smuggling bread, sergeant Berger, who openly declared his fury about the SS to the prisoners and the many other soldiers in HKP, abouth whom the prisoners spoke positively to present their humane believes in the daily life in the camp. In such environment private v.D. and his comrade Collien could decide for the life of the escapees in the decisive moment.

At least the remakable art of leadership, or better leader’s personality of major Karl Plagge must be stated. By diligent and well understood supervision in his unit, by non-ideological directives and orders understandable for everyone, by his personal example and last but not least by the confidence he offered to his men reserve officer Plagge – the „civilian in uniform“ – gave an example for excellent leadership, which a professional officer hardly could superceed. For this he and his men should be a model for all those, who want to become responsibel for others.

June 1947

With the destruction of the Nazi regime in Germany not all those who were responsible for and involved in the Nazi terror disappeared. The dreams of the German opposition to

establish a government of democrats and punish all those who carried guilt for terror and murder had already vanished. The Allied occupation regime had swiftly recognised that they needed specialists and experienced administrators as well as those who knew how to run German factories as well as the courts, hospitals, schools and universities. Particularly the juridical organization was crucial. The simple "by chance" fact that in Nazi-Germany judges were not necessarily members of the Nazi party (calling tradition they pretended not to be biased), made the Allies believe the German judges were not culpable - a tragic error. Those, who in 1933 were with the first to expel Jews from their courts and chambers, who were responsible for thousands of terror sentences not in the name of law, but explicitly in the name of the Nazi ideology and "the peoples healthy judgement" were now in charge of trials, wherein they had to judge about the responsibility of Nazi party members for terror, crime and suppression.

"Aside of the widespread interest then to brush under the carpet as much distress as possible, the extremely strong personal continuity between courts and juridical administration of the young German democracy and of those of the Nazi regime offers an explanation ...."71

In June 1947 Plagge by routine was called to a denazification trial72, as all Germans, who had joined the Nazi party before 1933. At that time several witnesses could be found, not only his employer before the war, Mr. Hesse, who declared that he had taken Karl Plagge into his factory management also, because he needed someone in his factory trustworthy to the Nazi organizations and to avoid an official NS-party supervisor in his factory. But as a clear demonstration of his humanistic conviction, already in 1938, shortly after the November pogrom, Karl Plagge became the godfather of Hesse's son Konrad, although the wife of Mr. Hesse was rated by the notorious Nuremberg Laws as a Jew. Becoming the godfather was an official act and everywhere were denunciators - at least the clerk, who noted the godparenthood in the official "family book". Openly Plagge - as member of the Nazi party - demonstrated his close relation to a "half Jew" or "non Aryan" against the wordings of the Nuremberg laws73.

All other witnesses, without exception men of his military unit HKP 562, declared that Plagge had employed many more people and their families in HKP and given them shelter in Subocz street, than were needed. The witnesses pointed out that Plagge against the threat of the SS had protected "his" labourers and that he had tried to obstruct the attempts of the SS to draw away and kill the Jews in Subocz street as far as he could.

Of course there might have been some bias with these witnesses, as any anti-Nazi behaviour of the unit's commander would throw a favourable light on their own reputation, which was officially helpful in Germany under the Allied Commission. But two facts - aside of the memoirs of the survivors - could contribute to the finding of the truth: First - there is not the slightest contradiction in the declarations of the witnesses, second - on the last day of the trial Mrs. Maria Eichamueller, unknown to Plagge until then, appeared and declared that she was in search for Karl Plagge on behalf of Jews from Vilna, who lived in Ludwigsburg by now and who wanted to find and thank Karl Plagge for the help they had received from him.

71 to the role of Nazi-judges in post-war Germany see H. Daeubler-Gmelin: "Rehabilitierung und Entschädigung von Deserteuren" Ansprache Februar 1997, published under: www.spd-tuebingen.de 72 see original documents (Hessisches Hauptstaatsarchiv Wiesbaden 4.3.1, Department 520 / Spruchkammer / Dl / Plagge, Karl) and transcripts in English as provided by Michael D. Good73 "However, in 1936, my father was confronted with the question as to whether he should separate himself from his non-Aryan wife or whether he would accept being excluded from all public offices, associations and clubs. My father decided for his wife. This caused the loss of his “friends” and “acquaintances” with the exception of the two friends mentioned above, i.e. Plagge and Gunther." cited from: Konrad Hesse, letter to Michael D. Good, dated April 2001

Being found by the few survivors of the HKP prisoners, they contacted Karl Plagge. He was invited by the Greisdorf family for a visit. We have letters74, written by Karl Plagge after the visit at the Greisdorfs.

Remembering the situation in 1947 it is unrealistic to assume that a survivor of the Holocaust would invite to his home anyone, of whom he would not been convinced to be someone to trust, a friend. A German commandant of Jewish prisoners, who carried only a minimum of guilt for the killings and atrocities, hardly would have dared to set a foot into a DP-camp in 1947.

Although the court accepted Plagge's actions as being in favour of the Jewish prisoners, he was rated a "fellow traveller" of Nazism by the court and sentenced to a fine of 9,100 RM, a rather negligible sum at the time75, but a slap in Plagge's face, compared to the many high ranking Nazis, who escaped any punishment.

"The help offered by the deported Jews in Ludwigsburg shows that the person in question participated in an uncommon manner in the saving of lives of persecuted people."76

Looking on the Nazi ideology, which consisted at its core of Anti-Semitism and had called the Jews the eternal deadly enemies of the German race, which was aimed at the complete extinction of every Jew, it is illogical to rate Plagge a "fellow traveller" in the sense of the Nazi-ideology and simultaneously concede that he had saved the lives of Jews. In particular the judges at that time were best acquaintant with the Nazi-ideology, it’s content and aims. The summary of these two statements does not make sense, but there are reasons for the conclusion of the court. First, Karl Plagge had asked for this rating by himself and secondly, the plea of Karl Plagge helped the judges out of their dilemma to find a sentence for something unwanted in those days: The recognition of the simple fact that it had been possible to help the threatened, to protect the persecuted and to act against the Nazis, the SS and Gestapo without being shot on the spot. This fact was denied by all those functionaries, true fellow travellers of the Nazis and those who looked away, it could not and was not conceded to be true. The full inconsistency of the sentence is displayed by the last words of the denazification court:

"Resulting from the belief that the anti-national-socialistic motive of his actions is not proven, that probably his human attitude was more important, the chamber finishes the trial with the categorisation of the person in question into group 4 of the fellow travellers or hanger-ons. The reason is that he has to be seen through his attitude as a nominal member of the NS movement."77

These words, which hypothesize that Nazism could have a "humane attitude", mirror the then widespread allegation of all the "minor" Nazis that not the Nazi ideology itself was an evil, and all the crimes were the responsibility only of a few evildoers like Hitler and the leaders of SS and Gestapo78. Now the rating of Plagge as a fellow traveller made sense for all those, who claimed that having been a convinced Nazi was not to be blamed by itself - an argument, which was "politically correct" in the post war years and the beginning cold war.

74 originals (deposited by Lazar Greisdorf to the Jewish Gaon Museum in Vilnius) and English transcript provided by Michael D. Good, available at www.hometown.aol.com//michaelDG/75 20 Reichsmark was the price for one cigarette, half a kg butter was equivalent to 20 cigarettes.76 cited from the decision of the denazification court 77 see denazification file78 "The jury accepted these testimonies as exonerating evidence but, in a remarkable volte d’argumentation, made a slight but significant differentiation. Although Plagge’s rescue efforts, so the verdict reads, had shown his humanity, this did not necessarily mean that his actions had resulted from any anti-national socialist intentions." K.C. Primel in: "The neglected chapter of Holocaust history in Lithuania: Efforts to rescue the Jews of Vilnius by some of the Wehrmacht military" The International Conference on Holocaust Research and Education, Vilnius September 23 - 25 2002

Karl Plagge himself felt guilty and in his letters to Mr. Greisdorf he clearly says "I have done only, what was allowed to me" - not more. But he had done far more than the majority of the Germans under Nazi rule, he had exploited the limits and in doing so he enabled the survival of at least some 200 men, women and children.

"As was mentioned by me before, it was thanks to the endeavours of Major Plagge, who was guided by his desire to protect his Jewish workers, that the dwellers of H.K.P., numbering over 1000, were able to avoid, at least temporarily, the fate of those Jews who remained in the ghetto.Not surprisingly, therefore, Major Plagge, our protector (who, in addition, according to those who had personal contact with him, was a man of the highest moral character - as we also ascertained later) was much beloved and respected by us".79

The „anti-national-socialist motive“, which was denied by the court nobody could better describe than Karl Plagge in his precise and convincing words – written down in a letter to the pastor Mochalski in Darmstadt, dated 2nd January 1956:

As you see from my letters to Mr. Strauss, I try to live according to a principle that must seem very despairing to an evangelical Pastor and that I wish to approximately describe with the words of Dr. Rieux (Camus, “The Plague’): “The attempt to be a saint, without God.” I would not like, however, to leave this sentence standing there so naked and so presumptuous, but say: The attempt, to remain good and respectable, without a constant invocation of God, without the guarantee of God and without claim of any prospective meeting with or reward through God. So I would like to live as if there be none, on the contrary, that only I, and alone, take responsibility for myself as if there be no God and as if there be no one near by to help one. But never would I wish to spend my life “in the certainty, that God lives”. I know that having made this decision in life, one takes on a huge obligation and one sees every thought, every word and each deed put before an omnipresent judge and therefore one must double check everything and examine one’s moral value.

Obviously, one must not under any circumstance undertake to impose80 such neck-breaking thoughts on others or to make others disconcerted. Everything must ensue in the quietness of one’s own breast. In this way I also come to the strict rejection of the military service obligation and put the expression: “A saint without God” in the political field aside the expression “A patriot without sword”. What I have taken as my mode of religious life, to which also belongs my position on refusing to serve in the armed forces, I take for the most radical and uncompromising method to stand in opposition to materialism. In Christianity, as it is often practiced and preached today, there still sticks for me one unbearable vast abundance of combined objectives, upon one’s own blessed considered form of belief, subjugated coercion of belief and intolerant fanaticism that, so truly from my heart, is repugnant to me.

79 cited from S. Esterovicz, Memoirs, www.hometown.aol.com//michaelDG/80 I’m a little unsure of this word but it seems to fit the sense of the passage.

Attachments (all translations by the author)

Translation of the Letter SS ObStubaF Goeke to HKP 562

(Handwritten: 59)Copy

Concentration-Camp Kauen Command HQFileNo.: Work.Deploy. 16/2.44-AU. The 8th of February 1944

Subj.: Deployment of Jewish WorkforceReference: verbal meeting on January 13th 44Attachments: 3 Applications

ToV.P./East/562

Vilna.

Referring to the meeting on the occasion of the review of the places of employment with Major Plagge about the offset against the Jewish labourers working for company REITZ attention is invited to the following:

It cannot be dismissed that the prisoners employed at the companies Reitz and Herbert Meier are a burden for the offices there. Still it must be welcomed and acclaimed that V.P./East/ successfully strives to employ productively elsewhere those prisoners, which are not employed in the vehicle workshops. But as it is otherwise not acceptable that the accounting of the labourers of V.P./East and the companies is done between them, it is invited to renew the application for release of labourers for the vehicle workshops of V.P./East/ at this headquarter on the attached forms. On this application only those prisoners are allowed to be listed, which are actually employed there. For the companies Reitz as well as Herbert Meier the information is needed by V.P./East/ which and how many labourers are employed for these firms in the repair shop and knitting room respectively, as for these separate applications by the firms must be handed in. The remaining rest of labourers is to be distributed by percentage to the three employers, as it is here prisoners, which are detached to run the camp functions and whose costs the three have to share.

At this opportunity it is invited to send SS-Unterscharfuehrer Richter (Golosheyka?) together with the as well attached applications to the companies, as so the applications can be belaboured in total after reception.

Immediate execution is invited.sig. G o e c k e

SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer and Camp Commandant

For correctness of the copy.: (hand-written signature)

Captain and Adjutant

Translation of Major Plagge's letter to H.U.V. 190

Vehicle Park (East) 562___Letter Book No 12069/44

O.U. the 17th February 1944.

Subj.: Employment of Jewish Labourers.Ref.: Letter from Concentration Camp Headquarter Kauen File: Work. Deploy.

16/2.44-Au. dated 8.2.44 to V.P./East/ 562.

ToArmy-Housing Administration 190V i l n a .

At disbandment of the Jewish Ghettos in Vilna V.P./East/562 achieved by immediate protest at the superior SD-Command in Riga / Superior Leader Piffrader/ that ca. 500 Jewish specialist labourers shall be preserved for V.P.E. 562 for vehicle repair tasks. The pre-condition was set up that these were to be employed in a closed concentration camp.

As the motivation and effectiveness of the Jewish labourers is essentially dependent of the fact that not only the men but also their wives and children can remain in Vilna, by expressed accordance by the SD the associated women and children were held back as well and transferred to the work camp Subocz street. At this time are 1243 Jewish persons are in the work camp. Out of these are 499 men, 554 women and 190 children.

To get the at first unemployed women post-haste to productive work, these by consultation with the War-Economy Extern HQ Vilna / Capt. Klipfl/ were brought to employment as well. For this purpose 311 women were attached to (Fa. = firm) Reitz Uniform works and (firm) Herbert Meier, which have to perform assignments for Army- and Air Force clothing offices. Within the work camp appropriate rooms were provided, where those firms have established their machines and installations for the repair of blankets, coats, stockings etc.

During month November the Concentration Camp of V.P./East/562 in the wake of regulation valid for all C.C. in the East released by the SS_Economy Main Administration - Office D 2, Oranienburg-Berlin was taken over administratively and sub-ordinate to C.C. Kauen. From this time on all prisoners are distributed and charged on application to the pertinent offices, in this case V.P.E. 562 and accounted at Marks 4.- for a specialist, Marks 3.- for an assistant worker, M 3.- for a female specialist and M. 2.50 for an assistant female worker. The invoices as have handed in by now were forwarded for balance and control respectively to H.U.V. 190.

please turn

By letter dated 8.2.44, which is attached in copy, C.C. Kauen now asks by now for separate applications for those labourers in the vehicle work shops and those employed at the firms, whereas the firms have to hand in the applications themselves.

At this procedure the park sees a danger insofar, as the SS is now in a position, to control the female labourers at will and transfer them in case even to a non-local work-site f.e. in the C.C. Kauen. This case could materialise particularly then, when by lack of materials the firms operating in the work camp have only a need for a lower number of labourers than the existing, or if for other reasons for the SS the employment in Vilna appears less important than at another place.

Hereby not only the principle would be broken that strictly the male specialists of V.P.E. 562 in the interest of their motivation will stay with their wives, but also the cantonment Vilna will be deprived of most valuable labourers. Therefore the park proposes the following:

H.U.V. 190 in Vilna requests all male and female Jewish labourers existing in the work camp at the SS-Economy Main Administration and controls the distribution of these forces to the single users of Army and Air Force in Vilna, whereby the firms Reitz Uniform Works and Herbert Meier, producing for the Army- and Air Force clothing offices will be kept included. Also V.P./East/ 562 claims it's specialists at H.U.V. 190 and accounts about the dues with this.

Stamp: 18. FEB.1944

A principle decision is invited, if shall be acted according to the proposal of V.P.E. 562.

1 Attachment PlaggeMajor and Park Commandant

Translation of the answer of H.U.V. 190 to Major Plagge:

Army Lodging Administration 190 Vilna, the 21st February 1944FileNo: 27 d__________________

Subj.: Employment Jewish LabourersReference: Your letter dated 17.2.44 letter book No. 12069/44

ToVehicle Park East 562

V i l n a

To the proposal as made in the letter mentioned above, the administration cannot concede, as the necessary labour force is missing.It is invited to contact in this respect the War Economy Forward office in Vilna, as this has a better overview on the employment of certain Jewish labourers at the different demand holders of Army and Air Force, as well as private firms.As the case may be this authority could set up contacts on the take over of the work camp.

hand-written name tag

Remarks:

Plagge had "upgraded" his proposal by inserting the letter into the official letter book of his unit. This letter book was kept at all units to document important written material. The letter book also served Plagge as a document to demonstrate at any time his intentions, which were aimed officially only on highest possible productivity of the HKP!

The "War Economy Forward office in Vilna" was the superior office to HUV 190. The head of HUV 190 simply ducked away. His last sentence gives clear evidence what was the true topic of the discussion: the "take over" of Subocz street by HKP, beyond doubt to get rid of any SS-guards, -controls and creatures like SS-sergeant Richter. The word "take over" (Übernahme) also clarifies that the "missing of labour force" included the men to guard Subocz street. In February 1944 the Wehrmacht was on retreat at all Russian fronts, the invasion of France was expected daily and every man, able to fight was needed in the front-line units, or - like Plagges men - highly needed as specialists, who were not meant to be "wasted" on dull guard jobs. (Here I remember my early days in military service, when briefly I had to guard an ammunition depot....)

Stamp: "Draft"

Charts to illuminate the organizational background to the three letters ObStbFhr Goeke to HKP 562 Major Plagge to HUV Answer to Plagge by HUV

3. Plagge's proposal for a new organization:

Gary Gerstein: Drawing of the malines in Subocz street

This "organization" of course gave some additional administrative work to HKP. So he asked for a "better" solution.SS

Wehrmacht or working for Wehrmacht

1: Existing organization as discussed between Plagge and Goeke on January 13, 1944

this section was not under direct control of Goeke

kept and reported name files

controlled number

delivered money

Guards

requested and paid for workers

Uniformwerke Reitz

Concentration Camp Vilna

Subocz Street

Concentration Camp Kaunas

SS-Headquarter Oranienburg

HKP 562Workshops Uniformwerke

Meier

requested and paid for workers of HKP, UR and UM

proposed by HUV 190

working for Wehrmacht

Plagge's Aim:"flexible distribution of all workers in Subocz Street according to material and

workload"

"Rent" of all workers in

Subocz Street

Uniformwerke Reitz Hermann

Meier

KZ Vilna Subocz Street

HKP 562

HUV 190Vilna

Wehrwirtschaftsaussenstelle Vilna

Army HQ Berlin

KZ Kaunas

SS Headquarter Oranienburg Wehrmacht

Admin. BranchWehrmacht

Army Chain of Command

The setup becomes much clearer, Plagge would have been relieved (!) of admin work and Goeke would have had better control of workers

report name files

guard and allot to HKP, UR and UM

request and pay for workers on separate files

Uniformwerke Meier

Uniformwerke Reitz

HKP 562Concentration

Camp Vilna Subocz Street

Concentration Camp Kaunas

2: Goekes idea of a new organization

Translation of Work Report to HKPThe 1st of March 1944

R E P O R Tabout the construction works performed by the construction office

in the work camp V.P.East 562in the month of February 1944

-----------------------

The compilation of the performed construction works is as such:

I. Barracks construction:1. Covering of a part of the roof ca. 180 m2

2. Finishing of the interior dividing walls - 52 m2 - including the filling of saw dust.

3. Finishing and fitting in of door frames - 3 pieces.4. Finishing of 3 doors.5. Installing & lining of 2 ovens.6. Insulation of exterior walls with oakum / left-overs ca. 180 m2

Levelling of surface in front of the barrack. Earth moving predominantly in frozen soil ca. 100m3 / ca. 30%/

II. Production Hall: Debris moving / predominantly frozen/ from a surface of 1200 m2 / prepared for the construction of a large production hall / up to a distance of 50 - 60 m & piling up of ca. 60 m3.

III. Sewers:Laying of sewers in a depth of maximum 3.5 m in frozen ground including excavation, laying, and refill / 6 inch concrete pipe/ 51 running meters. Installation of gutters & their attachment to the main sewer - 2 pieces.

IV. Waterline:1. Disassembly of old water pipes, their repair & re-connection in the two

staircases of the block, wherein are the special workshops / fire protection measures/.

2. Waterlines up to the chemical laboratory.Total waterline installation 70 running meters3. Dirt-waterline from the chemical laboratory and from the kitchen with

connection to the exterior sewer.

V. Repairs:1. One brick wall /10 m2/ removed in the locksmithery & debris removed.2. One door opening in the wall /110 cm thick/ broken up in the barber shop

& the projection of the door whitewashed. One door frame & one door

stamp (upside down):registered as incoming (?)

mounted. One plank-tambour established & the door opening painted both sides.

3. In the floors & staircase chambers new lodging rooms installed inclusive laying of floors, doors, windows & ovens & whitewashing of walls and ceilings with sand and clay - in total 46 m2 living space.

4. Complete overhaul of ruined rooms with debris removal 28 m3 from the 5th

floor down. a/ covering of ceilings with poured ware insulation b/ windows installation & glass fitting, c/ floor laying, d/ repair of doors & fittings.For the training courses of the youth a surface of 56 m2 was repaired.

5. 32 ovens in the living rooms were repaired, 3 new ovens installed.6. Cleaning from soot & conservation of all smoke channels & the herewith

connected opening & renewal of chimneys.7. Repair and fitting of 24 doors & 35 windows in the living quarters.

VI. Cleaning Works: Cleaning of the courtyard surface all around the work shop & living quarters of frozen debris & garbage after completion of repairs with moving of ca. 70 m3 up ti a distance of 100 m. Cleaning of the area of garbage /45 m3/ with moving to a distance of 100 - 150 m

Remarks:

The report was not written by a German, but obviously by some educated prisoner, who had learned a "higher society" Austro-German. (Does anyone remember, who was in charge of these reports?)

The report is not written by a trained construction worker / engineer. The details of work are described quite pictorial, but not in the manner, a trained bricklayer, locksmith, engineer or architect would do. It looks like another argument for the fact that Plagge employed non-specialists on specialists jobs.

The report is written with great diligence - formally and by language. It shows that it was one of Plagge's demands to deliver as exact work reports as possible, as only in this way he could justify the number of people employed in the "construction office". In this context the remark under point II. about " prepared for the construction of a large production hall" is of interest: It demonstrates that Plagge intended to extend his workshops and capacity inclusive the need for a suitable work force.

Salomon already pointed to the "training courses of the youth" , whereby Plagge tried to justify the existence of children in the camp.

SS-confidants in HKP

e-mail from William Begell to the Author:

Re: Joerg's Paper and Simon's complaintsDate: Thu, 15 May 2003 10:04:56 -0400From: BillBegell@aol.comTo: MichaelDG@aol.com, malesim@noos.fr, klaczko@lopos.deCC: PearlEGood@aol.com, viefhaus@pvw.tu-darmstadt.de, lazargreisdorf@yahoo.com, gwindor@gmx.de, fiebelkorn@lopos.de

Dear AllCollaborators were (in HKP and all the ghettos and probably other camps) a routine and obvious event and occurrence. Even a young man, such as I (I was 16 at that time in HKP) was not only aware but fully knowledgeable of the Averbuchs and others who were working for the Germans. They came and went from the camp as they pleased. They showed off their pistols, they had good looking girl friends and plenty of money which they flashed. For camp inmates, these people were a target of some envy, same disdain and much fear and hatred -- a mixture of feelings. It was a natural occurrence, as I said before. Thus, it is, in my opinion, perfectly normal for all of us, in historical retrospect, to mention these people, to judge them and to discuss them, regardless how they affect different feelings and adversely reflect the entire camp population. So be it!Bill

e-mail from Lazar Greisdorf to the author:

Re: SpiesDate: Sat, 17 May 2003 13:36:52 -0700 (PDT)From: Greisdorf Lazar <lazargreisdorf@yahoo.com>To: fiebelkorn@lopos.de

Hello Joerg,I appreciate your reluctance to use the term "spies". However, I see no advantage in this to anyone. Terrible things were done by these spies and collaborators. I watched as my grandfather Hirsh Greisdorf was led away by two young Jewish policemen to the assembly point from where he and thousands of elderly were taken to Ponar and murdered. I knew a man here in Toronto who literally sold two yellow i.d. cards (gele shaynen) which he managed to acquire for his parents, because he knew that they would not survive no matter what documents they had. My uncle Lew (Leibl) was beaten black and blue a number of times by both German and Jewish guards at the gate, for trying to smuggle food into the ghetto. Two men in our building in HKP were pointed out to me, who's job it was to wander about the streets of Wilna, to sniff out Jews who were living under false documents on the outside. Also, from a brief conversation a few days ago with my cousin Avreml Klok who lives in Detroit, I learned that he remembers the name Dreyzin as one of the known spies in HKP. There is not enough "perfume" in heaven or on earth to hide the stench of people like that. However, it must be remembered under what circumstances these people lived. They were desperately searching for a short-term advantage, to

extend their lives for another few days or months. I would have been very surprised if there had not been such people, ready to dodesperate things under desperate circumstances. The search for short-term advantages is nothing new. It is being practiced in the board-rooms of large and small corporations throughout the world today. These advantages are called by various names; the most popular recently, are called stock options and shareholder value. And it should be remembered that these goodies are sought after by people who are neither hungry nor in fear for their lives.Zai gezunt. (I am sure you can figure out what this means, without any knowledge of Yiddish.) Lazar.

Literature:

Samuel Esterovicz: Memoirs, www.hometown.aol.com//michaelDG/

Pearl Good (Perella Esterovicz): Memoirs, www.hometown.aol.com//michaelDG/

Karl Plagge, Denazification File, Hessisches Hauptstaatsarchiv Wiesbaden 4.3.1, Department 520 / Spruchkammer / Dl / Plagge, Karl. English version under: www.hometown.aol.com//michaelDG/

William Begell: Testimony to Yad Vashem, www.hometown.aol.com//michaelDG/

Irina Guzenberg: "The H.K.P. Jewish Labour Camp 143 - 1944", published by Vilna Jewish Museum 2002

The Plagge Group: Archive of Dr. Marianne Viefhaus, TU Darmstadt

Armin D. Steuer: "Dem deutschen Volke" Jüdisches Museum Berlin, Katalog 2002

Eugen Kogon: "Der SS-Staat", Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt am Main 1947

Kai Christian Primel: "Rettung durch Arbeit" Unpubl. M.A. thesis University of Freiburg, 2002.