Evil, Divine Omnipotence, and HumanFreedom: Vedanta's Theology of KarmaFrancis X. Clooney, S.J. I Boston College

In the eighth century C.E. the Hindu Vedanta theologian Sankara tracedthe inequalities and suffering of the world back to the beginninglessseries of prior actions of every being. People suffer because of their pastdeeds in this and previous lives and likewise enjoy benefits based on pastgood deeds. Hence, brahman, the transcendent and conscious source ofthe universe, cannot be charged with cruelty or arbitrary judgment.

This is, of course, a form of the ancient karma theory, a theory that isrooted in pre-Hindu India and developed in a rich diversity of ways overthe millennia. It deserves, and indeed has received, detailed considerationin recent years.' In the following pages, however, I am interested not inthe karma theory per se but in the Vedantic rendering of it in Saiikara'snondualist {advaita) school, variations developed precisely to show thatbrahman, as known from Scripture, is the single, omnipotent, and intelli-gent source of the universe,^ its material cause and the cause of all action,and to defend it against the accusation that it is cruel and unfair becausethe world is full of inequality and pain.

It is these variations that should be of the greatest interest to thoseengaged in a serious theological consideration of the problem of evil, for

1 Wendy D. O'Flaherty, The Origins of Evil in Hindu Mythology (Berkeley: University of Califor-nia Press, 1976), Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions (Berkeley: University of Califor-nia Press, 1980); see also Charles F. Keyes, Karma: An Anthropological Inquiry (Berkeley:University of California Press, 1983); Ronald W. Neufeldt, Karma and Rebirth: Post ClassicalDevelopments (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986); for an interesting study of howhuman freedom relates to karma, see Christopher Chappie, Karma and Creativity (Albany: StateUniversity of New York Press, 1986).

2 Brahman is the name that properly refers to the absolute, highest reality in the nondualist{advaita) Vedanta; "Cod" or "lord" ^ara) is used in this Vedanta in acknowledgment of ordinaryusage regarding the divine principle. In other systems of Vedanta the two are almost synonymous,and even Sankara seems at times to use them so. I will have occasion to use both, depending on thecontext. In another borrowing from a broader theological vocabulary, I use the word "Scripture"to refer to the variety of authoritative texts the Vedantins have in mind, particularly the revealed{^sruti) texts of the Vedas and upanisads. My use of "Scripture" is not meant to imply written texts,or that the upanisads have exactly the same role in Vedanta as the Bible in Christian theology.

1989 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0022-4189/89/6904-0004$01.00

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Theology of Karmathey are efforts to explain karma in a situation wherein the nature of God,human freedom, and the integrity of scriptural testimony also are atissuethat is, the Vedanta thinks about evil in a situation much like theone in which Christian theologians have done so. By giving attention tothem, we will be able to compare not only theodicies as more or less ade-quate solutions but also as sets of methods and conclusions in the confinesof which evil is thought and written about. We can thus become moreskillful in our methods of choosing contexts for the problem of evil. In thisessay I will set forth these distinctive features in three sections. Section Iprovides a description of the theory as presented in the early Vedanta ofBadarayana (fifth century), Safikara (eighth century), and Vacaspati Misra(ninth century); Section II describes the metaphysical underpinnings ofthe theory in Vedanta; Section III discusses the way in which Scripturewas used to set the boundaries of the discussion of evil.

I. THE VEDANTA THEODICY^

The basic Vedanta position is sketched by Badarayana (fifth century C.E.)in the basic Vedanta text, known as the Uttara Mimamsa Sutras (hence-forth UMS), in section 2.1.34-36. In three (exceedingly) brief remarks,Badarayana deals with the charge that if brahman is the source of theworld, this reflects a flaw in brahman: "Inequality and cruelty are notproblems, because [brahman's action] depends on [beings' past deeds asthe basis for distributing rewards and punishments], texts show us this"(2.1.34). [The adversary says,] "This cannot be so, because [at the begin-ning] karma is not differentiated [so as to be able to justify treating beingsunequally.] No, [we respond], because there is no beginning" (2.1.35)."Our view on this matter is reasonable and is known [from tradition]"(2.1.36).'' Sartkara elaborates these sutras as follows. First, the adversary is

^ Arthur Herman's The Problem of Evil and Indian Thought (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1976)surveys the arguments set forth by Sarikara and Ramanuja (eleventh century) in regard totheodicy in UMS 2.1; apparently following Ramanuja, Herman includes the preceding section2.1.32-33 on creation as motiveless play (fi/o) as part ofthe defense of brahman's flawlessness.Since (here at least) Sarikara does not link the Rid argument with theodicy, I have omitted thatsection. Although I have certain reservations regarding Herman's interpretation and also ana-lyze sections he does not considerUMS 2.2 and UMS 2.3his accounts in the book are helpfulguides to the overall positions.

" Throughout I will use, with slight modifications, G. Thibaut's translation of Sarikara: TheVeddnta Sutras of Bddardyarta with the Commentary ofSankara, The Sacred Books ofthe East, vols. 34,38 (reprint. New York: Dover, 1962). Vacaspati Misra's BKdmaU has never been fully translated,and all translations given here are my own, from the Sanskrit edition edited by J. L. Shastri,Brahmasutra Sahkarabhdsyam (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980). All references to Badarayana,Sarikara, and Vacaspati Misra will be given in the text in standard form, by reference to book(adhydya), chapter (pdda), and verse (sutra). Thus, UMS 2.1.34 refers to Badarayana's 34th sutra inthe first padfl ofthe second adhydya. Note that the discussion in the Sutras ofthe possible responsi-

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made to voice the standard objections: either brahman is not the world'smaker or is a cruel and unfair maker. Safikara then states the Vedantareply, that brahman only responds to human activity, rewarding the goodand punishing the evil. The apparent innate differences among beings,and the differences experienced by beings during their lives, are due notto an unfair or cruel lord but to those beings themselves, what they haddone previously. The activity of brahman is, in fact, unchanging andeverywhere uniform, but this uniform causality interacts differently witheach set of local conditions, each person as constituted by his or her deeds;it is like the rain that falls uniformly on all things and with the samepotency, but interacting with each so that each may grow according to itsown inner capacity. Brahman "catalyzes" the deeds of each into good andbad results.^

This is already a significant variation on the general karma theory, for,according to this view, actions have results only indirectly, via brahman.There is no unbreakable causal chain, no immutable law of cause andeffect; only the divine decision to respond to each deed ensures the conti-nuity of karma. The next objection, of course, is that brahman will thenappear as the original cause for the behavior to which brahman laterreacts. For in the beginning there could have been no distinctions basedon past behavior, but only distinctions conjured up by brahman. Sartkarareplies (in UMS 2.1.35) that the notion of an absolute beginning is merelya detour that confuses the issue and merely postpones the problem; it ismore reasonable to assume that the world has no beginning and that therewas never a tabula rasa prior to good and bad actions.

The reasons for beginninglessness are two. First, a world with a begin-ning could not be the evolute of some cause and so would be a case ofcauseless, spontaneous existence; if so, such a world could just as wellspring into existence time and again, even after the apparently final libera-tion of all beings. Second, if there were an absolute beginning, at whichpoint everything is uniform, there would indeed be no reason for the evi-dent inequalities and diversities we see around us, and brahman would beto blame. Both points are arguable, but what is most interesting is thatthey are not so much proofs for the beginninglessness of the world as

bility of brahman for evil follows on a demonstration that brahman is the material cause of theworld: the unique, nondualist brahman-world relationship is not proposed in order to do awaywith the problem of evil by denying its reality. This is what John Hick terms the monistic argu-ment: "The universe forms an ultimate harmonious unity, [in which] evil is only apparent andwould be recognized as good if we could but see it in its full cosmic context" {Evil and the God ofLove [London: Macmillan, 1966], p. 21). The Vedanta position on divine causalityheld for awider range of theological and philosophical reasons (which I shall treat below)differs, seeingthe problem of evil as all the viore urgent once it has been said that brahman is the material as wellas efficient cause of the world.

5 See Herman, pp. 277-78.

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articulations of underpinnings which make plausible what is alreadyknown from Scripture. Scripture promises final, irreversible salvation,and so unexpected and uncaused recurrences of the situation of heing inthe world are impossible. Scripture tells us that brahman is fair, and sincethere is no one else to point a finger at as responsible for original inequity,it is best to posit a beginningless world.^ The Vedantins do not say thatbeginninglessness can be proved; rather, it is simply the most useful andconvincing hypothesis, the one not liable to the problems and disadvan-tages accruing to the alternative views. If one is ultimately going to rely onthe Scripturesthe big Vedantic "if" on which the entire Vedanta ispremisedbeginninglessness is the best working hypothesis.

Divine responsibility for a world full of suffering and unfairness is con-sidered again near the end of UMS 2.3. In that section of the SutrasBadarayana has been determining the relationship between brahman andthe various conscious selves; his goal throughout is to defend withoutqualification divine omnipresence, omnipotence, and so forth, while alsodefending a distinct realm for a human agency capable of free action,reward and punishment, and so on.

Uttara Mimamsa Sutras 2.3.41-42 addresses directly the paradox ofdivine omnipotence and human freedom, and highlights the "both/and"nature of the conclusionbrahman alone is the cause of everything, andhumans are free: both truths are given to us in Scripture, and hence con-stitute the truth to which reason will have to conclude as best it can, at thevery least by showing that alternative theories are less satisfying. UttaraMimamsa Sutras 2.3.41 introduces the key objections to the idea that ulti-mate responsibility lies with brahman by recalling the argument in UMS2.1 that one would thereby attribute to brahman the responsibility for ine-quality, and so on.' Sartkara reaffirms his respect for reason by notingthat, even if in UMS 2.1 brahman has already been absolved of suchresponsibility, the attribution of responsibility to humans is plausible onlyif it can be shown that humans are free actors, and that that view does not,in turn, again contradict the view that brahman is the omnipotent cause ofall. Even Scripture cannot be thought to contradict reason casually.

The adversary's main point in UMS 2.3.41-42 is that the only way tosalvage divine justice is to hold that the human selves are true agents and,hence, that brahman is not the cause of all. Sartkara responds as follows:"The self in the state of ignorance is blinded by the darkness of ignorance

8 In the context of arguments with heterodox schools of thought (in UMS 2.2), alternativehypotheses about the original cause of differencessuch as the Buddhist attribution of causalityto ignoranceare shown to be unconvincing since these, too, either include in them some priorseeds of difference or make difference appear to be a purely uncaused, inexplicable event.

' Here "inequality" is no longer that of states of life (as in UMS 2.1.34) but lies in the results of(identical) actions.

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The Journal of Religionand hence unable to distinguish itself from the complex of effects andinstruments; the samsara-state in which it appears as agent and enjoyer isbrought about for this self through the permission of the Lord who is thehighest Self, the observer of all actions, the witness residing in all beings,the cause of all intelligence; and we must therefore assume that finalrelease also is effected through knowledge caused by the grace of theLord" (2.3.41).* Whatever the effect of this appeal to the problem of igno-rance, the point in Sartkara's mind is not to undercut the reality of theworld and thereby to reduce human freedomand evilto an illusionbut, rather, to reaffirm the Lord's omnipotence and the inefficacy ofactions of any sort and thereby to rule out independent human agency.To decide on the basis of one's experience that one is a free actor is anattractive way to resolve the problem of responsibility for evil, but since itleaves as a casualty the coherence of Scripture, it belongs among the deadends to which one is invariably led by an independent reason that analyzesexperience without the guidance of Scripture.

After saying that due to Scriptural evidence we know that the Lordalone is the agent of all actionseven if our everyday experience does notshow thisSankara still has to confront the obvious objection that if thereis no human responsibility there should also be no blame or punishment{UMS 2.3.41). He counters by recalling the arguments from UMS 2.1 onthe Lord's attention to past deeds and insists that "although the soul is notindependent, yet the soul does act. The Lord indeed causes it to act, but itacts itself" {UMS 2.3.42); the Lord cannot be said to be truly respondingto past deeds unless there are such deeds to respond to. It is then possiblesimply to restate, for reasons seen already in UMS 2.1, that the Lordcauses each self to act in a way strictly appropriate to its previous action.^

In the third section of this essay, I will comment on the Scripture/reason relationship regarding these arguments and comment on the wayin which what is said here satisfies or fails to satisfy. But let us stop for amoment to assess where we are in relation to some modern Western com-ments on karma. Peter Berger has offered this succinct (and Weberian)characterization ofthe theory: "In the ingenious combination ofthe con-ceptions oi karma (the inexorable law of cause and effect ruling all actions,human or otherwise, in the universe) and samsara (the wheel of rebirths)every conceivable anomy is integrated within a thoroughly rational, all-

^ The problem of "reality" and "illusion" in Vedanta is a large one that cannot be treated inthis context. Two remarks suffice: the distinction is not thought to be an easy way out ofthe prob-lem of evil (as if to claim, "there is no real evil"), and it does not function so as to undercut the sig-nificance of the everyday (vyavaKdrika) world because of a higher reality (the paramarthika).

^ For good measure, he adds the argument that if there were no true human agency, the scrip-tural injunctions and prohibitions would have no human addressee, and presumably only theLord would be the one so addressed; to this point I shall return in the third part of this essay.

534

Theology of Karmaembracing interpretation ofthe universe. Nothing, so to speak, is left out.Every human action has its necessary consequences and every human situ-ation is the necessary consequence of past human actions. Thus the life ofthe individual is only an ephemeral link in a causal chain that extends infi-nitely into both past and future."'^ Nothing need be left unexplained, andGod (when there is such a figure in a given Hindu or Buddhist version ofthe karma theory) cannot be held responsible for the suffering thatoccurs. Berger locates the karmic explanation near the purely rationaliz-ing end of his rational-irrational spectrum of theodicies and implies atleast that it is too rationalistic to be satisfying. Too much is proven, theworld is shown to be more reasonable than we experience it to be; toomuch (all kinds of suffering, large and small) is explained by too little(one's own previous karma) and little comfort is given to the suffering per-son who is usually thought not to remember anything of the culprit pastdeeds. Referring (apparently) to the upanisadic view of karma which is themajor source ofthe Vedantic view, Berger says that "there is a stark harsh-ness about these conceptions that was mitigated in popular Hinduism in avariety of waysmagical practices, devotional and mystical exercises,intercessions with various divinities to intervene in the inexorable pro-cesses oi karma-sams'araand, most basic of all, the simple faith that obe-dience to one's dharma will improve one's lot in future reincarnations."''

Whatever the validity of Berger's points regarding karma as an abstracttheory, his comments do not directly engage Vedanta thinking. On theone hand, the Vedanta viewpoint is not rationalistic; in adhering to Scrip-ture and therefore holding on to both human freedom and divine omnip-otence, it frustrates reason's quest for a neat explanation by maintainingthe irreconcilable poles of freedom and predestination. Likewise, the miti-gation of karma in Vedanta is not that of popular religiosity, but rather atheological mitigation which puts the karma theory in a wider philosophi-cal and theological context, reserving to brahmanwho is pure intelli-gence and being and joythe efficacy of the system; this is meant toensure that humans are not hopelessly lost in the system or at the mercy ofimpersonal forces.

Wendy O'Flaherty's The Origins of Evil in Hindu Mythology, while bydesign limited to mythology, is at present the foremost study we have ofthe notion of evil in Indian thought. Near the beginning of her work, shepresents three major arguments against karma as a solution to evil, towhich we can usefully pose the Vedantic responses.'^ First, the karma the-ory violates divine omnipotence. This was anticipated by the Vedantins,

' " Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967), p. 65." Ibid., p. 66.'^ O'Flaherty, Origins of Evil (n. 1 above), pp. 14-17.

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The Journal of Religionwho held that brahman's attention to karma is a freely chosen self-limitation. Vacaspati Misra observes (at UMS 3.2.41) that when a greatking chooses to reward or punish his subjects based on their behavior, thisrestraint on his exercise of power does not diminish him. Arbitrariness,we would say, is not a necessary characteristic of omnipotence, nor is fair-ness a diminishment.'^ The second objection is that divine control overkarma makes brahman ultimately responsible. This point is, as we haveseen, raised explicitly in UMS 2.3.41-42 where the Vedantins concedethat there is a "mystery" here, one on which reason stumbles; Scriptureguides us by telling us that both divine omnipotence and human responsi-bility must be preserved. The third objection is that the argument from"beginninglessness" serves to "ignore rather than solve the problem ofevil." True, the argument for beginninglessness does not solve the prob-lem, but in Vedanta it is not meant to do so. It is intended, rather, to pre-clude appeals to origins, the (familiar) kind of theodicy in which evil istraced back to some initial "fall" or other mishap. Conceding beginningsdoes not solve the problem according to the Vedantins, and as OTIahertyamply shows in the bulk of her study. The broader Vedanta position isthat appeals to "beginnings" or "nonbeginnings" are not successful inresolving issues of theodicy. By this kind of balancing strategy, theVedanta replicates in itself some of the symmetries and polarities that arethe substance of the mythological response.'"'

II. VEDANTA'S THEORY OF CAUSALITY AND RELATIONSHIP

The view that brahman is responsible for karma relies in large part on theallied position that neither of the other candidates for responsibilitymatter and actionhas the capacity to produce effects; both lack therequired conscious intentionality. The soteriological doctrine of karma ismerely a case whereby the general principle ofthe inefficacy of matter andaction is illustrated; why this is so will be the subject of the next few pagesas I sketch briefly the Vedanta positions on the lack of a creative capacityin matter and action.'^

'^ For a discussion of J. L. Mackie's work on omnipotence and the general question ofthe lim-its of omnipotence in relation to theodicy, see Jeff Johnson, "Inference to the Best Explanationand the Problem of Evil," yourna/ of Religion 64, no. 1 (1984): 54-72.

'* As a fourth argument, O'Flaherty (as well as Berger) raises the question whether the theoryis "emotionally satisfying." The Vedanta response here might be twofold. First, the Vedanta ver-sion ofthe theory, which ultimately subordinates karma to the will ofa good, intelligent sourcewho also provides a way out of karma, mitigates the more depressing aspects of the theory; sec-ond, theology is not a kind of pastoral counseling.

'^ The Vedantins spell out these views at great length in the Sutras. For instance, in thelengthy debates with the Samkhyans; see UMS 1.1.5-11, where the debate concerns the meaningofthe primary Scripture texts; UMS 2.1.1-3, where several traditional or smrti texts are debated;

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from and into various forms, but they insist that this transformation can-not be explained due to a dynamism in matter itself. Matter can change,but cannot by itself direct or motivate change coherently; it requires theguidance ofan intelligent agent. Sartkara states the basic rule: "We pointout that a non-intelligent thing which, without being guided by an intelli-gent being, spontaneously produces effects capable of subserving the pur-poses of some particular person is nowhere observed in the world" {UMS2.2.1). Vacaspati repeatedly emphasizes the same point, that what is non-intelligent requires the guidance of the intelligent in order to achieve itstransformation (e.g., at UMS 3.2.38). Thus, while grass is transformedinto milk "naturally" as it were, this transformation occurs only within amother (instinctively) intending good for her offspring. Grass alone neverbecomes milk {UMS 2.2.3).'6

To put it another way: the Vedantins believe that neither evil nor goodis merely material or accidental, "natural;" the intelligent is never merelynor finally the victim of nature. What is ordered requires an orderingprinciple; the higher one reaches in complexity and orderparticularlyin relation to human beingsthe more urgent becomes the necessity todiscover a rational force giving the being its teleology.

Ifthe intrinsic dynamism of matter cannot account for the evident pur-poseful transformations that make up the world, action, too, is unable toprovide the intelligible continuity. By nature temporal, action perisheseach moment, and hence lacks that capacity for continuity which thecau.se-effect relation presupposes. The ensuing necessary "gap" betweenwhat happens and its effect is a gap that cannot be reasonably bridged byother actions or by a series of ever more minutely subdivided mediatingacts. A pure action/karma theory, in either a radically Buddhist form (inwhich there is only karma as a series of instantaneous, nonenduring, andperishable moments)'^ or in some modified Hindu form, which shiftsexplanation from things to events, cannot satisfactorily explain how oneaction leads to another, much less how present suffering and enjoymentare due to past good and evil deeds. Brahman must intervene to make thelegitimate connections.

This critique ofall theories of causality based in the capacities of matter

and UMS 2.1.4-6 and 2.2.1-10 where the Samkhyan position is debated without reliance onScripture. Good summations of Vedanta's philosophical positions can be found in M. Hiriyanna'sOutlines of Indian Philosophy {London. Allen &Unwin, 1951); and in P. T. Raju's Structural Depthsof Indian Thought (Albany; State University of New Vork Press, 1985).

'^ Compare t/M5 2.1.24 for therelatedanalogy that fcraAmon creates out of its own self, just asmilk turns itself into curd without outside material being introduced.

' ' The Buddhist position on causality is refuted in UMS 2.2.19-21, although the Vedanta wasstrongly influenced by the Buddhist positions to which it objects.

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The Journal of Religionand action confronts us not only with the mystery of evil but also with the"mystery ofthe good": why or how does anything good happen? Good isjust as much a mystery as evil, hoth day hy day, when we reflect on thehasic continuities that make life possihle, and in the long run, when lifegoes well, progress is made, and so forth; what we do does not add up toour general well-heing. We tend to take the good for granted, and its"why and how" usually do not hother or preoccupy us.'^ But on analysisone has to conclude that the good, too, requires the intervention of ahigher intelligent agent.

If neither good nor evil, nor the result of either, is self-sufficient or per-manent, the Vedantic corollary is that hoth have to he escaped if salvationis to he won. It is not reasonable to assume that the good will accumulateto the accomplishment of final salvation, nor that any escape from evil onemight manage is going to he permanent. If every effect is already presentin its cause and thus the world is heginningless, and if every effect is acause, the process of results, good or had, is going to he endless. It will he afair process, hut "steady state" and never progressive. There is no way toeffect a final, permanent good not suhject to further evolution. To put itin moral terms: good works do not save.

The spiritual attitude toward good and evil one is thereby led to is spelledout at the beginning of UMS 3.1.1, where Sartkara introduces from theChandogya Upanisad an explanation as to why careful attention to the pre-and postmortem world process is necessary: "In this first chapter the jour-ney through samsara is delineated hased on the 'meditation on the fivefires' {Chandogya 5.3-10), to bring ahout desirelessness; for it says at theend (of the section), 'He should hecome disgusted [with the world proc-ess'].'" The Vedantic "solution" to the problem of evil does not include arenewed confidence that life is worth living, that good will triumph overevil, that in the end all things will work out; neither is it a surrender to pessi-mism and passivity. Rather, it insists that we understand evil and good asthey figure in an overall view ofthe world as a "closed," continuous systemthat leads nowhere and suggests that understanding this leads to a detach-ment from any hope in the efficaciousness of what one does. To put it posi-tively, the way out of suffering is to know brahman, to know the world ashaving brahman as its self, and to lose interest in the world in itself.

Vedanta's view of cause and effect is philosophically articulated as thesatkaryavada theory, according to which effects are simply evolved.

'* Good is easier to explain because it appears harmonious with the working of a good God,Vedanta, however, is cautious about the analogy of human experiences of the good and thatgoodness which is brahman. For a consideration of a theory of the good as relevant to the discus-sion of evil, see Michael Galligan, God and Evil (New York: Paulist Press, 1976), pp. 11-13,54-60.

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formed states of causes. Julius Lipner gives us a good summary of the the-ory: "[Satkaryavada is] the doctrine that the effect (karya) is somehowpreexistent (sat) in its material cause, though I wish to include in themeaning of 'emanation' the Ahsolute's free efficient causality in initiatingand continuing the process of world production. In our context, thismeans that the finite order, in the variety of its being, when consideredinsofar as it is being is an effect that has an ontological nexus with Brahman,which acts freely as its material cause ('Material cause' must be understoodhere in the technical sense of 'substratum out of which somethingoriginates')."'^ Causality works because activity brings about changes inthe cause itselfits (partial or full) transformation into its effect.^"

In keeping with satkaryavada, the relation between brahman and theworld is explained as that of ia.datmya: brahman is the "self" ofthe worldwhich remains in a state of M^O^ i difference and nondifference from brah-man.^^ This position seeks to preserve distinction without conceding sep-arateness; for, in the Vedanta's view, trying to establish a correctrelationship between brahman and a world extrinsic to brahman is anendeavor doomed to failure. This is shown in UMS 2.2.38, where Safikaraargues that, if the world is not evolved from within brahman, there is noreasonable way for them to be connected:

Difficulties still remain, since a Lord distinct from the pradhana and the soulscannot be the ruler ofthe latter without some relationship to them. The relation-ship cannot be conjunction [samyoga], because the Lord, as well as the pradhanaand souls, is of infinite extent and devoid of parts. Nor can it be inherence[samavaya], since we are not defining here a relation of the subsistent and that inwhich it subsists. Nor is it possible to assume some other connection, the specialnature of which would have to be inferred from the effect, because it is the rela-tion of cause and effect which is not proven. According to the logical analysis car-ried out (most importantly) among the Hindu logicians (the Naiyayikas,) a samyogais an extrinsic relationship connecting two things which can exist apart from oneanother; their connection only partially defines their reality. Realities that areeternal, pervasive and partlesssuch as brahman, the prime matter ofthe world,and selvescannot be connected temporarily, or at only some one point or

'^Julius Lipner, "The Christian and Vedantic Theories of Originative Causality: A Study inTranscendence and Immanence," Philosophy East and West 28, no. 1 (1978): 53-68.

^^ In UMS 2.1.18 Sarikara refutes the contrary theory, asatKdryavdda, which claims that effectsare not preexistent in their causes. In his view asatkdryavdda is unable to explain the continuity ofa cause and its effect: ifthe effect is truly nonexistent before it is caused, how does the cause influ-ence it? And, why should not any effect arise from any cause? Or, why would effects not arise sud-denly, causelessly? Sarikara's discussion shows that asatkdryavdda is not the doctrine of creation exnihilo; he presupposes, as part ofthe asatKdryavdda position, that effects different from the causeand not preexistent there subsist elsewhere, apart from their "future" cause.

2' On tdddtmya, see Kuppuswami Shastri, A Primer of Indian Logic (Madras: KuppuswamiSha.stri Research Institute, 1961), pp. 30-33, and Hiriyanna, pp. 371-73.

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another. A samavaya relates two things which exist only in relation to the other,as long as they exist. Vacaspati says that since samavaya presumes that the thingsrelated are otherwise unable to exist, this relationship is inappropriate, sincebrahman is not in any way dependent on matter and persons. Brahman remainsalways free, and this freedom is best preserved by the ladatmya relationshipwhich relates the world to brahman without binding brahman to the world in thesame ^^

III. SCRIPTURE AND REASON IN THE THEODICYAll Vedanta positions are rooted in Scripture; like other communities thatidentify their worldviews through forming authoritative canons of texts,the Vedantins sought to explain all relevant issues and resolve all prob-lems from within a scriptural horizon. As should be evident from theexamination in the preceding sections of Vedanta's basic theory of karmaand its underpinnings in theories of time and causality, reason functionswithin a realm defined by Scripture. Indeed, an appreciation of this cen-tral role of the Scriptures, srutithe Vedas in general, but in particularthe upanisadsis the major point essential to understanding the specifi-cally Vedantic, theological position on karma and theodicy. I wish now tohighlight several of the ways in which Scripture structures the Vedanticarguments in relation to the content ofthe problem of evil and regardingthe extent to which reason can be used in solving it.

First, the analysis of causality we saw in the preceding sectionactionsare in themselves inefficacious, but do, because of brahman's intention,occasion effectsis rooted in the Mimartisa-Vedanta theory of ritualwhich is a scripturally informed understanding of action. The Vedantaposition on causality grew largely out of the intense analysis of ritualaction (karma) begun in the older school of MTmaiiisa! and carried forwardon slightly different terms by Vedanta. In the MTmartisa, the debate overthe efficacy of action was most properly a debate about the meaning andveracity of scriptural claims about ritual: does a properly performed sacri-fice itself cause for its performer the effects he desires; or does it please theinvoked deity who then offers the desired results; or does nothing come ofit at all?

The MTmartisa and Vedanta commentators agree that mere actionritual or moraldoes not bring about its own result; they disagree on howresults are brought about by sacrifices. Sabara (ca. 200 C.E.), the first com-mentator on Jaimini's Purva Mim'ams'a Sutras, said that ritual acts, in coor-

^^ For a fuller explanation of samyoga and samavaya, see Shastri, pp. 28-29. The parallelsbetween this brahman-vior\d relationship and that of God and the world in Thomistic thought arepartly developed by Lipner.

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Theology of Karmadination with the authorized materials, produce a potency, the "new" orapurva, which leads to the results after a period of time.^^ By means of thisapurva, the rites lead to their own results, without the intervention of agod. The Vedantins reject Sahara's apurva theory and insist that it is sim-pler to believe that the rites provide the data on the basis of which theLord, directly or through propitiated deities, assigns results. In UMS3.2.38-41, Badarayana seeks to refute the MTmarhsa view, in order toreserve to brahman alone the power to reward and punish. Sartkara arguesthat ritual actions do not endure, lack consciousness, and are unable tobring about long-term resultsfor example, future sons, going to heavenafter death. It makes more sense, he claims, to read in context those textsthat promise that rites are efficacious: after all, people offer sacrifices in-tending to propitiate various gods who will then reward the performers ofsacrifices. Rites achieve nothing directly, and it is ultimately the one lord,brahman, who chooses to operate through the gods' taking into accountofferings and rewards them.^ "* The Veda in its description of ritual givesus access to the order, efficacy, and intelligibility brahman has bestowed onaction.

This scripturally rooted debate over ritual activity and the Vedantic res-olution of it in favor of divine intervention affords us the basis for the gen-eral Vedantic reading of the world; for the sacrifice is a microcosmshowing us how causality in general works. It is this specificity of ritualcontext that turns the general idea of karmic retribution into a properlyVedantic doctrine. The karma theory is shown to be not so much a prod-uct of reason as a reading of activity through ritual and scriptural lenses. Ifthere are difficulties with understanding how the Vedantins came to theirconclusions about karma, the detective work must begin with theMTmarhsa-Vedanta view of ritual, the scripturally illuminated view of

^^ Jaimini, "author" of the Purva Mimarnsa Sutras, did not take up the question of the efficacyof ritual action as a problem to be solved in part because the larger question ofthe results of sacri-fice for its human performer was a secondary (though legitimate) question. The doctrine ofapurva as a proper doctrine can be traced only to Sabara; on this, see Francis X. Clooney, TheRetrieval ofthe Purva MimZmsa offaimini, de Nobili Research Series 17 (Vienna: University ofVienna, in press), chap. 7. See also Wilhelm Halbfass's comments on apurva in his essay, "Karma,Apurva, and 'Natural' Causes: Observations on the Growth and Limits of Samsara," inO'Flaherty, Karma and Rebirth (n. 1 above), pp. 268-302.

^^ To the objection that this demeans the sovereignty ofthe godsthat they are influenced byand respond to human activitythe counterargument, noted earlier, points to the analogy of agreat king who freely chooses to reward good subjects and punish bad ones. For a discussion ofdebate between Mimamsa and Vedanta over the efficacy of sacrifice and the role ofthe gods, seeFrancis X. Clooney, "Devatadhikarana: A Theological Debate in the Mimamsa-Vedanta Tradi-tion,"/ourna/ of Indian Philosophy 16 (1988): 277-98.

^^ The general principle that neither good nor bad action contributes to salvation applies to

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The Journal of ReligionTo turn now to a second point: Vedanta's reliance on scriptural quota-

tions suggests that the solution cannot be discovered from experience orby reason alone. In UMS 2.1.34, for example, the contours of the properanswer are identified with three quotations:He becomes worthy by worthy deeds, a sinner by sinful deeds. [BrhadaranyakaUpanisad 3.2.13]As they approach me, in that manner I make them share in me. [BhagavadGtta 4.11]For he makes him, whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds, do good deeds;and the same makes him, whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds, dobad deeds. [Kausttaki Brahmana 3.8]The first two quotations are adduced to indicate that the Lord distributespain and pleasure according to the good and evil done by each person.Even if the relationship of divine power and human responsibility is astubborn problem, both are announced to be enduring factors, not to bediscarded in a satisfactory solution. Reason must work within these guide-lines, even if it ultimately cannot understand them.

The Kausitaki text makes it appear illegitimate to blame anyone forwhat he or she does; it prevents the Vedantin from placing limits on divinepower over karma. Vacaspati blocks the easy way out of the dilemma:This should not be said [on the basis of the Kausitaki text]:

"[if the Lord is creator, it will appear to be] the Lord who, under the impulse ofhate and favoritism, impels people to good and evil deeds and then sends themto heaven or hell. Therefore, lest he be thought guilty of unequal treatment,let him not be [thought of as the cause of the world]." [We reject this view,]since to say that he does not create [the world] would conflict [with what Scrip-ture says, that] "after bringing about action he creates happy selves and suffer-ing selves."

Brahman is responsible for all action, yet he is only responding to whathumans have done. Scripture forces the exegete/theologian into this

ritual action only in a modified form, due to the privileged ritual-Scripture relationship; theVedantins are unwilling to conclude that prescribed rituals are superfluous. In the latter part ofthe Sutras (VMS 3.4.26-27, 32-34, and 4.1.16-19) Sankara explains that even if ritual action isnot the cause of release it purifies the performer and arouses in him the desire to know, setting upthe situation in which knowledge happens. The notion that ritual action purifies us leads ustoward Hick's "Irenaean theodicy," the view that the experience of evil in this world is "soul mak-ing" and contributory to the growth to maturity of the individual involved. (See C. RobertMesle's summation of Hick's position in "The Problem of Genuine Evil: A Critique of JohnHick's Theodicy," yourna/ of Religion 66 [1986]: 415.) But Hick and the Vedanta do not agreecompletely. Vedanta is not saying that suffering, either as ritual and ascetical practices or in gen-eral, is actually for the good of the agent. Rather, painful (but in theory also enjoyable)experienceadjustment to that which is outside oneself and not existent for one's sakeis sim-ply part of the world in which humans become human. It is not invented with human progress inmind but offers a way to maturity.

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Theology of Karmauncomfortable position of balancing human responsibility and divinepower, even if Scripture does not show exactly how this is to be done. Itmerely precludes simplistic solutions that opt for one or the other side.

Vacaspati defends his understanding of the Kausitaki text by appealingto other texts: we cannot conclude from it that brahman is unfair, becausemany other texts show us that the "leading up" and "leading down" arealways correlated with past good and bad deeds, and such texts cannotcontradict the Kausttaki text, since Scripture never contradicts itself.Therefore, by the logic of Scripture, the Lord's leading selves in eitherdirection does not imply a lack of respect for their freedom.

When the adversary raises the point (in UMS 2.3.42) that if brahman isthe true agent of all actions, as the Kausitaki text suggests, humans aretherefore not true doers and not responsible, Sartkara again appeals toScripture. Scripture is full of injunctions and prohibitions that can beaddressed only to free persons. If the Lord alone were free, all scripturalcommands would have to be addressed solely to the Lord, but this is notthe case. Therefore, if they do apply to humans, humans must be free,able to choose how to act, and hence deserving of reward or punishment.Otherwise Scripture would be misleading, and that is not possible.^^

Uttara Mlm'afns'a Sutras 2.2.37-41 shows us how the Vedantins markprecisely the limits of reasoninferenceas a tool for solving the prob-lem of evil. For here Sartkara refutes three arguments that he defended,in slightly different form, in UMS 2.1.34-37: (1) (The adversary says)"The Lord is the maker of the world"but (Sartkara says) the world's ine-qualities suggest that, given the state of the world, such a creator, as effi-cient cause, would be as marred by desires and biases as humans are; howthen can the Lord be such a creator? (2) "The Lord rewards and punishesthe deeds of creatures fairly"but this is a vicious circlethe Lord is

^^ It is illuminating to see why Sankara rejects, in UMS 2.2.38, the efforts of other schools tofind in Scripture support for their view that brahman is only the efficient causearrangerofthe world and not its material cause. He reasons as follows: In their theology, the Lord is the cre-ator of everything and so is also the author of (a previously unformulated) Scripture. This Scrip-ture can hardly be used as an authoritative source for establishing the authority of its creator,since "the omniscience of the Lord would be established on the doctrine of Scripture, and theauthority of Scripture established on the omniscience of the Lord" {UMS 2.2.38). Vacaspatiexplains (recalling UMS 1.1.3) that the Vedanta position is not circular because it holds that brahrman and the Vedic Scriptures are in a beginningless tadatmya relationshiplike that of brahmanand the world. Scripture comes forth beginninglessly from brahman and is not something brah-man authors. Rather, in what is really the linguistic version of satkaryavada. Scripture is the eter-nal manifestation of brahman, a constitutive part of reality, beginningless like brahman and karmaand hence is also the innate and most useful source for right words about evil. If one accepts this,there is nothing circular about referring to brahman to validate Scripture, and vice versa. For afurther consideration of the MTmamsa and Vedanta views on the text-author relationship, seeFrancis X. Clooney, "Why the Veda Has No Author: Language as Ritual in Early Mimamsa andPost-Modern Theology," yournai of the American Academy of Religion 55 (1987): 659-84.

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The Journal of Religionreacting to deeds that are themselves the result of the Lord's priorarrangement of the world; (3) "The sequence of deedreward/pun-ishment is a beginningless one, and hence the Lord is not responsible forits beginning"but all this does is make the vicious circle a beginninglessone, an eternal fallacy!

Sartkara is objecting to the presentation of these three positions insofaras they are presented as reasonable inferences from experience. He doesnot believe that such positions are convincing except as hypothesesoffered in support of Scripture. Reason by itself should, by its own lights,end up saying there is no God or no worldor no evil or no good God.Reason may incidentally approximate what Scripture says, but this doesnot warrant a trust in reason alone.

Vacaspati explains why reason cannot independently suggest views thatreplicate Scriptural positions:

That the Lord is merely the efficient cause has to be shown from Scripture or bysome other means of knowledge, either inference or presumption,^' But [theproof] cannot be from Scripture, since it has been shown many times that Scrip-ture expresses the view that the Lord is both material and efficient cause. Sosome other means of proof is required, either inference or presumption.Inference is not possible. For inference must proceed in accordance with experi-ence, and it is this accord that is lacking [i.e., the reasonably postulated perfec-tion of the Lord conflicts with the obvious imperfections of the world, etc.]Scripture's proof of the Lord need not conform to experience, since there is nodirect experience of heaven, apurva and the deitieswe know about these fromScripture.^^ For Scripture need not proceed in conformity with experience.Even if many unseen elements are adduced in support of Scripture, and are yetthe reverse of what is seen, still they are not at fault, for their authority is fromScripture. But insofar as they do connect with what we experience, that is merelywelcome confirmation. But inference, which is independent of Scripture, mustproceed in conformity with what we experience.

It is a mistake to speak ofa lord who arranges the world extrinsically with-out being its material cause because we would still have to explain the rela-

^' Presumption is the positing of something not known directly in order to preserve the truthof what is directly known from experience or Scripture, Although the commentators do not iden-tify precisely which sections of the argument are "by inference" and which are "by presumption,"it seems that the inference pertains to knowledge of God gained from examining the world, andpresumption, to the various supporting and conjectural positions taken to explain that inference.For brief explanations of inference and presumption, see Shastri (n. 21 above), pp, 188-249 and140-46, respectively.

^ On the presupposition that Scripture is correct and that therefore the necessary supportingunseen realities need also exist, the MImamsakas presumed the existence ofthe gods, heaven, andthe apurva, the intermediate and unseen cause linking rites and their delayed results; none ofthethree is available to ordinary experience.

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Theology of Karmation of that lord to the world and the deeds he rewards and punishes.Vacaspati of course has in mind the objections raised to the samyoga andsamavaya theories, mentioned earlier in this essay, and he believes thatreason cannot convincingly construct the necessary brahman/v/or\drelationshipfor the imperfection of the world speaks against a perfectcreator god.

Scriptural truths should, if possible, be harmonized with experience,but their validity does not rest on the possibility of such harmonization.Reason, by contrast, has no comparable independent authority and sois caught trying to follow experience and honor Scripture at the sametime. The postulation of a good, omnipotent lord who arranges theworld flies in the face of the evidence we see around us (it appears thatGod has somehow botched the job)and so has to be discounted; butthe hypothesis of a world not created by brahman contradicts Scrip-tures, and it, too, has to be discounted. Reason is always caught, andalways falls on its face, except when it is presenting the best possibledefense of what Scripture

To conclude, distinguished by its highly sophisticated reworking ofthe karma theoryand not by the theory itselfand by its location of itin a wider context of causality, relationship, the respective competenciesof Scripture and reason and so forth, the Vedanta offers more than sim-ply one solution to the problem of evil. Its broad project sheds valuablelight on other, including modern, efforts to construct a satisfactorytheodicy and therefore should be of interest even to those who are notscholars of Indian thought per se. In the concluding paragraphs of thisessay, I wish to suggest several ways in which the Vedanta view is usefulon a comparative level.

Eirst, the Vedanta allies itself with those schools of theodicy that avoidboth rationalist and fatalist solutions. It is not rationalist since it believesthat reason working alone is eventually confronted with insoluble prob-lems; reason works best, says Vedanta, only in a world imbued with faithand Scripture's guidance. It is not fatalist, threatening to submerge the

Vedantins are thus, oddly enough, in partial agreement with Jeff Johnson's position:"the hypothesis that an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being does not exist pro-vides a good, though abbreviated, explanation for the widespread pain, suffering, misery, moraldepravity, and general disorder we find in this world" (Johnson [n. 13 above], p. 54). Vedantaagrees that reason cannot prove the existence of a good God in a way that also explains the worldas we experience it, but the Vedantins see thelackof proof as a deficiency of reason, not as a signthat there is no God. In their view, a proof of the nonexistence of God would have to include aproof of why Scripture evidence should not count in this regard; it would be interesting to seehow Johnson's position would be developed on this point.

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The Journal of Religionindividual, since karma is made to rely on the fact of human freedom(because one can be rightfully rewarded and punished only if free), onintelligence (because one needs to be able to know the Scripture and tbeworkings of karma in order to understand bow and wby actions bave tberesults tbey do, and also bow to get free of tbem), and on relationsbip(because it is brahman wbo repeatedly intervenes to reward and punisband save). Everything depends on tbe intelligent activity of brahman asthis is expressed in Scripture; no appeal can be made to nature's inberentperfection or tbe brute fact of tbe way tbings "bave to be."^"

Second, its rejection of absolute beginnings and final ends witbin tberealm of time and action, and of tbeologies tbat deny to God material cau-sality, calls into question tbeodicies tbat take sucb for granted. Or, at least,it sbould make tbose of us wbo do build tbeodicies witb tbese buildingblocks ask ourselves if we must necessarily do so. Mytbs of tbe origins ofevil are precluded, not because beginninglessness is a solution, but be-cause tbe appeal to beginnings only apparently tells us wby tbings are astbey are, temporarily postponing a new stage of inquiry into wbat pre-ceded tbese beginnings. In Vedanta, and given tbe finite, feeble nature ofevery worldly event, tbe problem of evil is repbrased as tbe problem ofgood and evil; escbatological restorations of tbe lost good, points in tbefuture at wbicb all will be balanced out, are also precluded along witb tbegenealogies of evil.

For example: if, as Lipner bas suggested, tbe notion tbat tbe world bas abeginning is not essential even to tbe Cbristian doctrine of creation," itmay be useful to reconsider tbe variety of ways in wbicb tbe Genesis mytbof tbe Fall migbt be imaginatively retbougbt in tbe context of a begin-ningless world, perbaps as a narrative about sin's own beginninglessness.Or tbe Vedantic view tbat botb Scripture and tbe world are brahman's

30 It is the details, too, that show us that we are not dealing here with a general explanation, auniversally accessible philosophical explanation of evil. Thus, while Arthur Herman's very favor-able evaluation of the Vedanta positions of Sankara and Ramanuja on theodicy legitimatelyappreciates the subtlety and power of their positions, his general position is misleading if thereader is meant to conclude that the Vedantic version of karma theory is the best (albeit imper-fect) solution weVedantins or nothave to the theodicy problem (in the introduction to hisbook he states that this conclusion is the goal of his book). For it seems almost impossible to gen-eralize the Vedanta position sufficiently to make it satisfying to those who do not accept theauthority of the Veda. And to those who do not, there are simpler explanations than thoseoffered by Sankara, e.g., one might adopt a moral theory of karma without bothering at all aboutthe added complications related to a defense of the omnipotence of God. Particularly sinceHerman dismisses the importance of Scripture as a source of proof in this matter (p. 283), it is notclear that he is really defending the notion of divine power and causality. Herman has distilled aphilosophical theory of karma from Saiikara's (and Ramanuja's) theological positions and hastherefore diverged quite sharply from their positions by giving reason its freedom and makingScripture an optional resource.

S' Lipner (n. 19 above), p. 60.

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Theology of Karma"body" might usefully stir our thinking about how a good God can beunderstood to relate to a suffering worldeven before we enter on specif-ically Christian considerations ofthe Incarnation and death of Christ, andso forth.32

Third, I conclude with another kind of suggestion. The cross-culturalstudy of the problem of evil makes it clear that evil is not one well-definedproblem "out there," to which different cultures offer various, better, orworse solutions. It is only within various cultures' frames of references,and according to their entire set of values, that the problem becomes aproblem, by taking on a specific "name and form" that carries with it pre-suppositions (which may, of course, later on be subject to critique) regard-ing time, matter, causality, and so forth. As we have seen, Vedantinsoperate with certain notions of causality and time and Scripture notshared by many who treat issues of theodicy; they also work, therefore,with a particular version ofthe karma theory and with attendant problemsnot shared by many other Indians. This cultural specificity, or series ofspecificities within cultures, endures no matter how concrete or univer-sally horrifying particular examples of suffering might be, or how simi-larly we, as human beings, respond to instances of suffering far removedfrom our own situation.

To use Ronald Inden's terminology, developed in a different context,we can say that evil is not an exception to the indeterminate or, better,underdetermined, reality in which we live. As Inden explains:A scholar [who wishes to deconstruct the orientalist discourse] would want tomake a conscious break with the assumption (made for the most part uncon-sciously) that the world is constituted as a determinate, single external reality andwith its corollary, a unitary human nature. . . . He or she would want to assumeinstead that all humans are constrained by the same indeterminate reality andmust take that into account in any body of knowledge they produce. The scholarwould also assume that the societies of the world are not more or less "correct"images of a single reality but are themselves differing realities, constructed againand again in relation to those around them, by human thought and action.'^Theodicy is an example of this. We all respond to the real but under-determined experience of suffering and fashion diversely the patterns in

^^ Conversely, of course,one should ask about how the Vedanta positions are open to modernadjustments in the light of Western thought. For example, if the Vedantic view of causality isrecast in the light ofthe abundant Western discussion of that issue, what is gained or lost in theVedantic theodicy? Or if the Vedanta is made to respond to the Christian doctrine of creation,how might that lead, in turn, to changes in the theodicy?

*' Ronald Inden, "Orientalist Constructions of India," Modem Asian Studies 20 (1986): 401 -46. Inden also has some important comments on the nature of evil in India in his essay, "HinduEvil as Unconquered Lower Self," in The Anthropology of Evil, ed. David Parkin (New York: BasilBlackwell, 1985), pp. 142-64. He does not, however, address the problem of evil directly.

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The Journal of Religionwhich "evil" and "divine goodness," "responsibility" and "solution" willmean something for us. Comparison can be a useful tool by which gradu-ally to disabuse ourselves ofthe explicit and underlying aspects ofthe posi-tivist fallacy as it pertains to evil.

This fact of underdetermination and the cultural positing ofa determi-nation necessarily suggests that any reflection on evil is partial and inter-esting because of that partiality; each excludes some possible solutions andcreates certain complications that are its identifying features, by which wecome to differ from one another on matters such as theodicy. Such difl"er-ences are problematicby creating distances that cannot be bridged,competitions that must be won, gaps one is tempted to overlook in optingfor "deeper" issuesonly if we cover over the fact of our making suchdeterminations and ofthe concurrent making of other determinations. If,in the course of understanding the Vedalntic theory as one determinationof karma and hence of the experience of evil, a scholar from the Westbecomes more conscious that evil is not simply "out there," this is a solidcontribution to a broader and less competitive utilization ofthe insights ofvarious cultures into evil.

This is not a relativist position, if the relativist is caricatured as one whooverlooks the substantially different details of positions held in variouscultures and declares all the positions to be the same. My point is, rather,that the differences do matter; they make it possible for us to think acrossformidable boundaries of culture and experience. The specification oftheories through the identification of their contexts and notice of howthey cannot be extracted from those contexts makes possible a more use-ful summation of similarities and differences and hence a more usefulcomparative interchange at every level of the intellectual process.

I am not prepared yet to indicate the likely end point of this process anddo not wish to predict the result of comparative theodicy. Nevertheless,even if evil will not be rendered easy to understand by the mere accumula-tion of diverse viewpoints, our reflection on it and attempt to reconcile itwith our larger worldviews will be aided by skill in comparison: the con-struction of a broad, cross-cultural and cross-religious set of theodiciesthat support and refine one another on the one hand, and, on the other,reveal and deconstruct unquestioned sets of presuppositions about eviland what counts in explanations of it.

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