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Addis Ababa’s Monthly Magazine

Volume 03, Issue 06

JUNE 2012 | 30.00 ETB

KEEPING THE Peace

Istanbul: One City,

Two Continents

A CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR

IBRAHIM GAMBARI

Stainless InkAlchemy in Addis10 Tips to Create Happiness in Life

Photo by Zach Abubeker54 | ZOMA

ZOMACOVER STORY

KEEPING THEPEACE

A CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR IBRAHIM GAMBARI

“Save Darfur” was this generation’s humanitarian cause, following in the footsteps of the campaign for di-vestment from apartheid-era South Africa in the ‘80s and ‘90s and the Peace Movement against the Vietnam War in the ‘70s. The international media’s focus on Darfur has of-ten been limited to following the visits of celebrities like George Clooney and Mia Farrow. Despite the simplicity of the calls to “save Darfur,” the whys and hows of the conflict are complex, not least of which is the mounting pressure that desertification and climate change put on local com-munities. The fighting began in earnest in 2003 when rebel groups in Darfur mounted attacks against the government of Sudan for its marginalization and negligenceof the re-gion. Between 2003 and 2010, 2 million people were dis-placed in Darfur, and about 300,000 people have died, ac-cording to the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters. In the early years of the conflict, most deaths were due to violence, but since 2004, disease has been the major cause of death.

The United Nations and the African Union acted to in uni-son to appoint a Joint-Special Representative to lead the United Nations –African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), which is to date the largest peacekeeping mis-sion in the world with an annual budget of over $1.6 billion USD. Constituted in 2007 in Resolution 1769, UNAMID’s mandate is “to contribute to the restoration of necessary security conditions for the safe provision of humanitar-ian assistance and to facilitate full humanitarian access throughout Darfur” as well as “to contribute to the protec-tion of civilian populations under imminent threat of physi-cal violence and prevent attacks against civilians, within its capability and areas of deployment, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan” (Report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the hybrid operation in Darfur, para-graph 54). UNAMID’s responsibilities also include ensur-ing implementation of cease-fires and peace agreements, as well as long-term measures that contribute to the protection of the rights and freedoms of the civilians of Darfur.

Mornei camp: El Geneina: UNAMID JSR Ibrahim Gambari meets sheiks in Monrei IDP Camp, near El Geneina. Photo by Albert Gonzalez Farran/UNAMID

by Rebecca Emiru

ZOMA | 21

The Nigerian diplomat and scholar Professor Ibrahim Gambari has been Joint-Special Representative of the AU and the UN in Darfur for two years and four months. On a recent trip to Addis Ababa, he cleared some space in his demanding schedule to talk about UNAMID’s achievements, challenges, and ambitions. Seat-ed behind an imposing desk in Addis Ababa’s UNAMID office, Professor Gambari and his colleagues greeted select members of the press. Plunging straight into facts, he provided a background of UNAMID’s current situation, starting with its achievements. “For UNAMID, the success is that we are almost fully deployed, almost 30,000 [total];military [accounts for] 18,000; police about 6,000; the rest are civilians. Secondly, in terms of achievements, we have contributed to the increasing security in Darfur. And thirdly, we are a lot more robust in how we perform our principal mandate of protection of the civilian population in Darfur because we have doubled our patrols of joint military and police from about 90 per day to about 160 per day. Our target is to do about 200 patrols so that we show strength, instill confidence in the civilian population and we deter those who would like to attack them by the frequency and robustness of our patrols.

“I think we have also contributed to the peace process by being part of the process that led to the singing of the only peace agreement on the books which is the DDPD, the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. We contributed in two ways: one is by chairing several of the committees that produced the final chapters that the parties

signed. But even more importantly, we contributed by making the process possible. We used to transport hundreds of IDPs [internally displaced persons], civil societies, refugees, and nomadic people so that the outcome of the discussion would be enriched by the presence of these people. And now we are also supporting the new DRA, the Darfur Regional Authority, which is a mechanism estab-lished by the DDPD.

“And finally in terms of progress we are now doing our best to fa-cilitate programs of early recovery and development. So we bring the builders of peace to the people of Darfur through our quick-impact projects.”

He conceded that despite their successes, UNAMID’s challenges were considerable. For instance, although the DDPD is the only peace agreement reached thus far, it has not been widely adopted, thus casting a shadow on its credibility and effectiveness. “The agreement is still not fully conclusive, they have armed move-ments that have not joined [the peace process] and my duty as Joint Chief Mediator is to try to encourage and persuade those armed movements to join so we can re-launch the peace process and get an agreement that is more broadly accepted by the population. We fear that if the armed movement continues to refuse to join the peace process and if they continue to fight then the gains that we have made will be eroded. The second is if the relation between the north and South Sudan continues to deteriorate, then it is bound to have a negative effect on us.”

Another major obstacle for UNAMID is the restriction of the movements of its troops and patrols, especially into areas like Je-bel Marra in the north of Darfur where fighting is intense. A related problem is, “the issue of attacks on peacekeepers and criminal-ity, car jacking, and hostage taking, which seem to have increased, although at a lesser rate than previous years.There are still some areas where we have difficulties access, Jebel Marra particularly. And why? Because a lot of fighting is going on there. Even though fighting has subsided generally in 2011 compared to 2010, there is still fighting and we have not been able to access [those areas] but we are making efforts to access them. When we are that challenged in the past, we forced our way and we called it operation Spring Basket. We got the agreement of the government and the armed movement to allow us [to access those areas]. And so we are going to try again to see whether we can gain access [again].”

“”

Between 2003 and 2010, 2 million peo-ple were displaced

in Darfur, and about 300,000 people have

died

Farming in the rainy season:Tawilla: Internally displaced persons (IDP) settled in Dali camp, next to Tawilla (North Darfur), are currently farming the lands rented by local owners for the rainy season. Most of these IDPs came recently to Tawilla fleeing from the clashes in ShangleTubaya at the beginning of 2011.

Opposite, New arrivals in ZamZam IDP camp:Tens of thousands of IDPs fled their village following clashes between the Government of Sudan and rebel movements, and sought protection at ZamZam IDP camp, North Darfur.Photos by Albert Gonzalez Farran/UNAMID

22 | ZOMA

UNAMID’s inability to access certain areas of Darfur has led to criticism that its relationship with the government of Sudan, par-ticularly President Omar al-Bashir is too congenial, allowing the regime to pick and choose with impunity which international di-rectives it will obey and which ones it will disregard. In 2008, the head prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Luis Moreno Ocampo accused President al-Bashir of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in Darfur. The ICC later issued a warrant for al-Bashir’s arrest. The ICC has also issued warrants for several other senior members of the Government of Sudan, most recently in March 2012 for the Defense Minister, Abdel Raheem Muham-mad Hussein. Asked how these indictments affected UNAMID’s ability to work with al-Bashir’s government, Professor Gambari responds with the air of someone who has fielded that question on countless occasions. “Ah. Well, The ICC has its mandate and I have my mandate. So, I stay within my mandate and I think the government of Sudan recognizes the separation of roles. Now, remember too, we would not be in Darfur if the gov-ernment of Sudan says they don’t want [us]… I have to work with the government. I have no choice but to work with the government. So that’s my answer. Oc-ampo has his mandate and Gambari has his own.”

UNAMID’s role in Darfur is another area of conten-tion. On the one hand, a re-strictive mandate is one of the main factors that made the original African Union peacekeeping force in Dar-fur ineffective. On the oth-er hand, given President al-Bashir’s decision to eject most aid agencies from Darfur following the ICC arrest warrant, UNAMID has become increasingly involved in small-scale de-velopment projects which lie outside the scope of tra-ditional peacekeeping. Re-ferring to these programs, Gambari says, “My own personal opinion is that as a matter of fact, the international community should do more on the early recovery and development – to promote the return of IDPs and refugees… But so far, our mandate does not permit us to do that; we don’t have the resources. But what we do have is a small amount of money which we can use [for] quick-impact pro-jects. These projects are little things like repairing schools, build-ing classrooms, health centers, water, and drilling wells. Although they are small, when there are maybe five or six in one community, it does have impact…We are not a substitute for the government of Sudan; it still has responsibility for the welfare of its own people. That’s why we are encouraging them to support the DRA, which was created as a result of this peace agreement so they can deliver to their people.”

Indeed, where does one draw the line between the government of Sudan and UNAMID? Which entity is ultimately responsible for protecting the people of Darfur and which ought to be held ac-countable when something goes wrong? One event that puts this issue in stark relief occurred on September 2, 2010 in Tabara, a small town in Jebel Marra. Armed men in military uniform rode

into the marketplace and opened fire on locals, specifically tar-geting young men. The reported death toll ranges from forty to seventy-four mainly due to the difficulty for UNAMID and other agencies to access Jebel Marra.

While many eyewitnesses believe that the Janjaweed militia, a proxy of the gov-ernment of Sudan, is re-sponsible, there has yet to be any formal prosecution for the Tabara Massacre. Ac-cording to the Joint-Special Representative, the lack of investigation following the massacre is an indication of a failure on the part of the Sudanese government.

“As a result of my own advocacy and public state-ment they actually set up an investigation of the Tabara incident. What we don’t have is the result of that investigation.” In addition, he goes on to say that, “I’m also on record many times that the government has to do more than they are doing on the issue of impunity… We come to protect our-selves and the civilian pop-ulation, but if people attack them and us and they are not arrested or punished, that does not discourage people from trying again.

Having said that, impunity or no impunity we still are not absolved from our responsibility to protect the civilian population.” To il-lustrate the difficult position in which UNAMID often finds itself, he recalls this anecdote: “There was a visit of the Security Council mission from Europe to visit us and we went to an IDP camp and one of the IDPs said, ‘We will not feel secure and we will not feel protected unless and until there is one soldier for every IDP’ and I said, ‘Well, that means we will need 1.7 million soldiers, not even China has that number for their entire army.’ So it’s impossible to be everywhere every time. But we are doing our best.”

And it seems likely that they will continue to try. UNAMID’s man-date is likely to be renewed by the Security Council for another year. In recent months, however, the global spotlight on Darfur has shifted south to the newest independent nation in the world, South Sudan. Despite the short-lived nature of news-cycles, the crisis in Darfur is far from over and UNAMID’s job is far from done.

“ ” Ocampo has his

mandate and Gambari has his own.

ZOMA | 23

2003

2003-2004

2004

2007

2009

2009

2010

2010

2010

Several rebel groups begin to mount attacks against the Sudanese government in what they refer to as self-defense of immediate and long-term harassment from the government

Sudanese military engages rebels directly; when tradi-tional fighting fails, it eventually empowers the Janja-weed as a paramilitary force that is active to this day

The Save Darfur Coalition is founded in New York City to lobby for international intervention (and not human-itarian aid) in Darfur

UNAMID is created to replace the African Union peace-keeping force

ICC issues warrant for arrest of President Bashir for war crimes and crimes against humanity; the crime of genocide is added to his list of charges in 2010

Shortly following the ICC warrant, Bashir evicts 13 aid agencies from Darfur

Professor Gambari appointed as head of UNAMID

Tabara Massacre

Doha Document for Peace in Darfur is signed in Doha, Qatar, notably establishing the DRA, which will over-see the governance of Darfur. The document is signed by the government of Sudan and the Liberty and Jus-tice Movement rebel group. Other rebel groups, the Justice and Equality Movement, and both major fac-tions of the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement do not accept the agreement.

TimelineKassab IDP Camp:El Fasher: A man from Kassab camp for IDPs, in Kutum, North Darfur during the meeting of the local leaders with the UNAMID Joint Special Representative Ibrahim Gambari. More than 25,000 IDPs live in the camp and UNAMID troops organize patrols every day to control the area. Photo by Albert Gonzalez Farran/UNAMID

24 | ZOMA

Doha Document for Peace in Darfur

Darfur Regional Authority

International Criminal Court

Internally Displaced Persons

Justice and Equality Movement

Liberty and Justice Movement

Sudan Liberation Movement/Army- Abdul Wahid Faction

Sudan Liberation Movement/Army – MinniMinawi Faction

United Nations African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur

DDPD

DRA

ICC

IDPs

JEM

LJM

SLM/A-AW

SLM/A-MM

UNAMID

Acronym Guide

ZOMA | 37

Jebel Marra:A member of the coalition of rebel forces (SLA Minni Minawi, SLA Abdul Wahid and LJM) who control Fanga Suk village, in East Jebel Marra, West Darfur.

Photo by Albert Gonzalez Farran / UNAMID