kemalism and post-kemalism. turkish state in search of palatable citizen forever

8/9/2019 Kemalism and Post-Kemalism. Turkish State in Search of Palatable Citizen Forever

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TJP Turkish Journal of Politics Vol. 5 No. 2 Winter 2014

Sevgi Kuru AçıkgözFatih University, [email protected]

Kemalism and Post-Kemalism:urkish State in Search of Palatable CitizenForever

Abstract

Homo-LASus was the constructed palatable citizen model of Kemalist tutelary regime. It didnot include all the segments in the society. Identities exclusion was implemented in several ways.Te exclusion of urkey’s identities from urkey’s political system has been an obstacle on urkishdemocratic consolidation. AKP’s emergence to power flourished the expectation of urkey becom-

ing more democratic and embracing all its citizens equally. However, after a decade of AKP rule,urkey seemed to enter a post-Kemalist tutelary era which has its own criteria for the palatablecitizen and which, just like Kemalism, tries to exclude and oppress some parts of the society. EitherKemalist or post-Kemalist Islamist, it seems that the state’s reflex to shape the citizen identitydoes not alter for urkey.

Keywords

Kemalism, Post-Kemalism, Identity, AKP, Homo-LASus.


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Introduction

Each nation-state came up with certain

values that constructed its identity. Teidentity of urkish republic was definedthrough Kemalism, urkish nationalismand Lausannian Islam which gave birth tothe palatable citizen, Homo-LASus. It isimportant to define the building blocks ofthis identity since some ethnic and religiousgroups in the country were excluded fromHomo-LASus. Te first part of the paperwill give a definition of Homo-LASus and

seek to explain the history of this identityand how it was constructed through judicial,social, political instruments.

Te modern urkey inherited the ter-ritories of the Ottoman Empire, the Ana-tolia and eastern Trace. Tese territorieswere hosting divergent ethnic and religiousidentities. Beside the Sunni urks, therewere Armenians, Greeks, Jews, Alevites andKurds in the region. Te second part of the

paper will try to focus on the fate of theseidentities during and after the formationof Homo-LASus. Another focus will be onpractising Muslim population who preferredto put Islam on the centre of their social lifebut were constrained with the establish-ment of the secular Republic.

With the experience of AKP rule in 2002,Homo- LASus began to lose its importance,while the identities which were vilified, op-

pressed, ignored throughout the Republi-can era, started to be more visible and rela-tively tolerable. Tis visibility and tolerancehad firstly been regarded as a step towardsdemocratization. Terefore, different seg-ments of the society that personally did notshare the way of life of the AKP rulers, gavesupport to the party for the sake of moredemocratization. With a continuous and in-creasing support from different segments of

the society, AKP managed to overcome the

tutelary regime of Kemalism; some indica-tive incidents in this struggle were the 27

April e-memorandum, the Sledgehammer

and Ergenekon trials and the referendumfor a new Constitution in 2010. Te periodfrom 2002 to 2010 can be marked as an erain which Kemalism got weakened and thestate took some steps to normalize its rela-tion with the identities that were excludedpreviously.

In 2011 general elections AKP took49.9% of the votes in urkey. Te party whichhad already been criticized for ‘one man’ au-thoritative behaviour, began to intense itsmajoritarian policies and regulations. Teeducation system was changed in such a waythat the only state secondary school alterna-tive to the regular secondary school becamethe imam-hatip schools which aimed to raiseimams and preachers in the country. No oth-er profession, science or language based sec-ondary schools were promoted in the 4+4+4system. Erdoğan repeatedly declared that

AKP’s aim was to raise a pious generation.While some progressive negotiation hadseemingly been taking place with the Kurds,the government could not come to compro-mise with the Alevis’ demands in the coun-try. Polarization and ideational- politicalexclusion intensified with the Gezi incidentsof June 2013, the regulation of prep-schoolsclosure and lastly the corruption probes ofDecember 2013. Each of these topics couldbe a paper on their own. Tis paper is just abrief comparison of two identity impositionperiods of urkish republic; the Kemalisttutelary, the transition, the post –Kemalisttutelary.

Te First Steps of A New Nation in the Late Ottoman imes

Te building blocks of Homo-LASus

can be rooted back to the late Ottoman pe-


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riod. Te first interaction of the empire withnationalism was through uprises in Balkanterritories. Te populations demanded au-

tonomy and insurrection mainly due to theabuses of local Muslim landowners and the

janissaries.1 Nationalism has flourished inthe nineteenth century throughout the Em-pire (including the Asiatic provinces) andproved to be the most important factor fordestruction of the Empire (Zürcher 2007:26). Competing ideological debates werebrought up by the Ottoman elites in orderto cope with this destruction. Some people

favored Ottomanism, which supported thatdifferent communities could unite aroundthe Ottoman throne. Pan Islamists argued,on the other hand, that the empire couldregenerate on the basis of Islamic practisesand solidarity could be maintained withinthe Islamic Ümmet (Community), where-as pan urks sought to the union of urkicpeople under the Ottoman Empire (Zürcher2007: 127) .

I.A. urkish Nationalism beforethe Republic

urkish had already become the state’sofficial language in 1876 Constitution. Butit was after the Second Constitutional Peri-od in 1908 that urkish nationalism becamepublicly more visible under the rule of Com-mittee of Union and Progress (CUP) (Ülker2005: 617).

Actually the official ideology of 1908was Ottomanism. Te new constitutionalstate was expected to promote equal rightsto all loyal citizens regardless of their ethnicor religious differences. However in 1912,

1 Te uprses began n Serba n 1808. ‘It was nota concdence that the movements leader was a rch pgexporter called Kara George.’ (see detals n Zürcher,

2007: 26. )

the Balkan War took place upon which theEmpire lost its richest and most developedprovinces (Macedonia, Albania, Trace)

which it used to hold for 500 years. Nu-merically the loss was 60 000 square mileswith about 4 million inhabitants. After thisevent, first time in Ottoman history, urksbecame the majority ethnic group in the re-maining country (Zürcher 2007: 109). Espe-cially the loss of Albania made the CUP (the

Young urks) conclude that Ottomanismwould not be capable to unite the empire(Ibid.: 130). Under these circumstances, the

Young urks turned their face more towardsurkification.

urkification has been implementedin several areas. One of the most import-ant issues was the nationalization of theeconomy. Te national economy was to beled by the Muslim- urk bourgeoisie. Tisbourgeoisie, in the end, should supplant thedominance of Armenian and Greek commer-cial classes. Te Language Reform of 1915

prohibited the use of foreign languages ineconomic transactions. Non- Muslim trad-ers were boycotted. Te locals’ non- urkishnames were replaced by urkish names (Ülk-er 2005: 622-624).

Another important implementation ofurkification was the settlement and forcedmigration policies. Te aim of this policy wasto purify the demographic structure of Ana-tolia in favour of the Muslim urks. A popu-

lation exchange was formulated in the treatysigned after the second Balkan War. Uponthis formulation, in 1913 and 1914, morethan 45 000 Muslims from Bulgaria came tothe Empire and more than 45 000 Bulgariansmigrated from the Empire to Bulgaria. TeCUP suggested a similar agreement also toGreece. In order to force the Greek govern-ment to consent population exchange, theCUP immediately started to drive forcefullythe Greek population of Trace and Aegean


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coast to interior parts of Anatolia. Short-ly after, the Greek government announcedthat population exchange could take place

voluntarily and simultaneously, but the Ot-toman Empire entered WWI and the nego-tiations were suspended. Before and duringWWI, about 435 000 Muslim immigrantsentered the Ottoman territory. Tese weremainly settled to the villages of non- Muslimpopulations, especially of the Greeks (Ibid.:625). In May 1915 the CUP passed a law reg-ulating the relocation of the groups whichwere seen as potential traitors. Many Arme-

nians died during these deportations due todisease, starvation, plunder of bandit.2 As aresult of this policy, about at least 700,000

Armenians and 500,000 Greeks were forcedto leave their homes and hometowns.

Te deportation policy was implement-ed in another way to the Muslim non- urkimmigrants. Te immigrants from Bosniaand Albania, were not allowed to settle nearthe Balkans, also not to those cities where

the overall population of the Muslim urkswould fell below 90 percent. Tey were rath-er scattered to Anatolian towns where theywould not make more than 10 percent of thepopulation. Te government’s major con-cern in this policy was to assimilate this pop-ulation into the urkish culture (Ibid.:627).Te Arab and Kurdish refugees were settledto places where they would not make themajority. Te already settled refugees ofDiyarbakır, Erzurum, Elazığ and Sivas were

also sent to inner Anatolia.

In almost ten years, the CUP policies to-gether with war conditionalities, altered thedemographic structure of Anatolia drastical-

2 Famne was a regular stuaton n those years, es-pecally n Lebanon, Syra, Palestne. In Autumn 1916,only due to famne, 60 thousand people were reportedto have ded n Lebanon. In the wnter of 1916, a totalof 150 thousand people were reported to have ded. (see

detals Lewy, 2011: 95-105).

ly.3 Te policies were only implemented in Anatolia and sought to create a lebensraum for the urkish ‘nation’ which was challenged

by the Greeks in the west, and the Arme-nians in the east.

Te Sevres reaty in 1920, which wasregarded as born death due to several rea-sons including disagreements within theEntente and the Ottoman government’slack of legitimacy in eyes of its people, fore-saw an independent Armenia in eastern

Anatolia, whereas left Aegean coastal re-gion to Greece. Tis treaty has partly beenattempted to realize and could not succeed,but it has become a source for threat per-ception throughout the Republican historyuntil recently. Serves reaty has been madereference in the history books within theeducational system to remember the grow-ing generation on the ambitious intentionsof the outside world on urkey’s territorialintegrity.

I.B. Citizen ConstructingInstruments in the late OttomanPeriod

In 1910, in the Ottoman AssemblyGrand Vizier İbrahim Hakkı expressed that:

Coming to the point of citizen, learningurkish has greatest importance in that casetoo. Since, a person who does not know urk-

ish will be deprived of some rights [hukuk].For example, he will not be able to be depu-ty. But there is one more important thing.What is it? Citizens should be of the sameopinion on the matters that are connected

3 Te territories of urkey lost about 90 percentof both its Greek and Armenian population between1913 and 1923. Muslim percentage before the wars was80 percent and by 1923 it has reached 98 percent dueto the immigrations and deportations. (Zürcher 2007:

170-172).


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to the life of the state. Namely, they shouldinterpret and view the future of the state inthe same manner and they should possessthe same sentiment. Tis is absolutely theobjective that the Government and Kanun-i Esasi are looking for. Te homogeneity ofeducation and culture (terbiye) is desired.(Ülker 2005: 619)

In the late Ottoman period, there was aneffort to define the rights and duties of thecitizens who were previously seen as meretax giving subjects of the Sultan. Citizenship

was tried to be standardized by law in orderto build a collective identity and a qualifiedunited public sphere. Secular celebrationdays (Te Day of Constitutional Declaration,Te Day of Assembly) were invented afterthe declaration of the Second Constitutionto lessen the level of distinction betweenreligions (and religious feast days). (Üstel2004: 28)

Tere were two important institutions

in modern central state building process(‘the community of citizens’); the militaryand education (Ibid. : 29). A law has passedwhich made military duty obligatory also forthe non-Muslim males. In case they wantedto get exemption, they had to pay money.

After the Second Constitutional period,school courses were formulated to give col-lective consciousness through Ottoman Ge-ography, Ottoman History and urkish.

II. Building the Kemalist Nation Stateand Constructing Its Citizens: Te Identityof urkish Republic

After the War of Independence inwhich Mustafa Kemal made emphasis onIslamic brotherhood to mobilize all Muslimentities in Anatolia, the urkish Republicwas established in 1923 with the treaty ofLaussanne which defined not only the ter-ritorial but also the ideational borders of

the new Republic. Te population exchanges

which started in the CUP period have beenrewritten and shaped in the treaty of Laus-sanne. A few hundred thousand immigrants

entered urkey from the Balkans within adecade. Not all were urkish speaking. Butthey were Muslim and the state consideredthat they had the potential to ‘cope’ withurkish identity. (Ülker 2007: 10- 12)

A national enclosure defines also thecultural- national boundaries of a particularcitizenship identity. Te more a nation- statecould built an integrated homogenous na-tional political identity, the more a genuinebasis it would have for legitimacy (İçduyguand Kaygusuz 2004: 34). urkish nation-state building was a process of constructingKemalism through social practices, normsand institutions.

Mustafa Kemal and his comrades werefrom the Young urk tradition. Te early pe-riods of the urkish Republic was economi-cally, politically and ideologically much morea continuation of the Young urk era4. How-ever, despite this continuation, the Kemal-ists did not want the Empire to be regardedas the ancestor of the Republic. Te aim wasa Western type rapid modernization whichwould decrease the differences between ur-key and the West and avoid the Western ori-entalist mind set and imperialist ambitions.5 Te process of modernization was also theprocess of identity building for urkey, andKemalism was to construct the path and the

citizens of the urkish Republic.

4 Zürcher ponts to the smlarty between the Young urk II. Consttutonal Era and the frst years ofthe urksh republc. He ponts that n each phase thegovernments began wth a pluralstc and rather freeenvronment (1908- 1913 and 1922-1925 respectvely)but fnally get engaged establshng a hegemony (1913-1918 and 1925-1945) (Zürcher 2007: 163- 172).

5 ‘Identty dfferences ncreased otherness, whereas smlartes dmnshed ths otherness and become ameans of survval.’ See detals n Blgn, 2008; 39; pp.593-613.


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II.A. Instruments of Kemalismand urkification

Te path for construction was multi-dimensional. Tere were economic, politi-cal, cultural and geographical means whichserved the construction of Kemalist stateand citizenship. By these means, differentidentities and subjectivities were articu-lated into a common project, and a new so-cial order was brought by, out of a varietyof dislocated elements. So both the politicalpractises and the outcomes had hegemonic

characters (Çelik 2009: 224-225). Kemalismwas a top- down project in which the rulingelite aimed to shape people accordingly.

Te 1924 Constitution defined all peopleof urkey as ‘urks’ regardless of their racialor religious basis (Şeker 2005: 64). Tis defi-nition goes parallel with the above formula-tion and gives the first idea on the ‘common’element of Kemalism. urkish has alreadybeen declared as the official language in the

Ottoman Empire. In 1928, a campaign hasbeen mobilized: ‘Citizen! Speak urkish’.With this campaign, the usage of other lan-guages in public was banned.

In the Ottoman Empire, the econom-ic facilities were mainly concentrated inthe hands of non-Muslim minorities, theGreeks, the Armenians, the Jews. Startingwith the CUP era, the economy was tried tobe ‘nationalized’ (urkified) and this con-

tinued during the Republican era. Due tothe population exchanges and deportations,the country has lost much of its economi-cally qualified class and the replacement ofthis class by a Muslim urkish one was bothseen necessary and desired in the Kemalistregime. In 1923, non-Muslim traders wereexcluded from Istanbul rade Chamber. In1926, a law has passed which made the useof urkish language in the trade- business

transactions obligatory. Te same year, with

informal notifications, the foreign compa-nies were dictated to employ at least 75%Muslim urk employee in their companies.Te Surname Law of 1934 banns the usageof surnames which make reference to otherethnicities (Aktoprak 2010). Indeed, it isstill the case in urkey, that by taking urk-ish citizenship, a person has to take a urk-ish name.

Te geographical reconstruction of thecountry continued after Lausanne sincethe urkish government agreed on popula-

tion exchange with Greece. Tese exchangeswere made on the basis of religion. Chris-tians were exchanged with Muslims regard-less of the language they spoke natively. Aurk was presupposed to be Muslim and aMuslim was foreseen to become a urk. Teimmigrant Muslim non-urkish populationswere settled as such proportions that theycould be assimilated within the majorityurkish speaking inhabitants. Especially theSettlement Law of 1934 was a very detailed

process of assimilation in which all ethnicgroups were classified and redefined and de-cided to be settled accordingly.6

Te educational system was one of thecrucial chains of the identity constructionprocess. Te aim was to build a duty- basedcitizen consciousness. Te Malumat-ı Me-deniye ( Acknowledgment of Civilization) lec-tures in schools were renamed as Malumat-ıVataniye (Acknowledgment of Homeland).

Although the books of these lectures wereteaching a rather constitutional civic citizenmodel between 1924 and 1926, after theSheih Said rebellion in 1925 the citizenshipexpression has changed to a more authorita-tive one. Te new lecture books made moreemphasis on the duties of the citizens. Teaccession of the citizen into the political

6 For a clear prescription of the Law in 1934, see

Ülker, 2008.


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system was only through vote, tax and mili-tary duty (for the male). Acknowledgementon Homeland books did not include directvilification of other ethnic groups, insteadthey ignored and made the others invisible(Altınörs 2010: 44-45). Moreover, a lot ofemphasis has been made on urks moral vir-tues. Tese definitions were formulated andinstitutionalized in the urkish History Te-sis which made the urks the descendants ofall important civilizations of Mesopotamia,Egypt, Aegean and Anatolia. Additionally,the Sun Language Teory was formulated

which claimed that most major languagesin the world originated from urkish (Şeker2005: 65). Te elementary school educa-tion was seen as particularly important andurkification elements in teaching historyand identity consciousness were given care-fully and constantly. National consciousnesswas tried to be strengthened and supportedthrough the celebration of national feastdays. Institutions like the Public Houses

(Halkevleri) and Village Institutes (Köy En-stitüleri) aimed to mobilize people as mod-ern, loyal and productive7 citizens. In 1928,the Latin alphabet was adopted whichcaused a clear cut break with the previoustradition (the Ottoman Empire). Tis breakwas also one of the steps towards Laicism.

II.B. Laicism (Secularism) andKemalism

Religion was the most centrifugal deter-minant of the social and political life in the1920s’ urkey. Tis centrality of religion wasregarded as an obstacle for the economic andsocial transformation of the Republic. Tefounders’ of the Republic wanted to dimin-ish the role of religion in political sphere and

7 Productve n the sense that he/ she becomesuseful to state. It was not an ndvdualst productve-

ness.

convert it into a solely private life issue (Gül-alp 2005: 356). Laicism aimed to distancethe state from religion and serve as a meansfor modern civilization. Te social, cultural,economic and educational programs had tobe introduced without the influence of reli-gion. Tis was believed to be the ideal pathwhich could serve the Republic catch up the‘civilized’ world. Religion had to be con-trolled, so that it did not burden the trans-formation (Bilgin, 2008).

Laicism was a process which began with

the abolishment of the Caliphate in 1924.In 1925, the Western Style Dress Codewas passed as a constitutional code whichbrought the hat as headgear to social life.Te message of this law was to show the‘civilized world’ that the urks were not dif-ferent, but similar to them. Although it wasargued that it would help to unify societysince it banned religious symbols as mark-ers of difference (Bilgin 2008: 602), the per-ception in the society had become that lai-

cism was something against religion since itbanned the religious symbols (Saygın- Önal2008: 39). In 1926, the new Civil Code wasintroduced from Switzerland together withthe Gregorian Calendar. wo years later,Islam was written out of Constitution andthe Latin alphabet was adopted. In the be-ginning of 1930s the Western metric systemand Sunday as holiday was recognized. Fi-nally in 1937, Laicism was introduced in the

Constitution as one of the key elements ofthe Republic. It was a constructed and con-trolled project which aimed to fulfill the goalof modernization and westernization of thecountry (Kadıoğlu 2010: 492).

Te acceptance of Laicism was tried tobe fortified by vilification of the other, Islam.Incidents such as Menemen Vakası8 were told

8 It s a unque case n the early years of Repub-

lc where a hodja was clamed to have klled brutally


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over and over to make people threatened ofIslam and of practicing Muslim people, sothat they would refer to shelter under Lai-

cism. Domestic threat was constructed in or-der to make masses define the Kemalist eliteas the safe guardians. Vilifications were sup-ported by the high censored press.

It is also argued that Laicism has beenadopted in order to position the state equal-ly distant to all belief systems and avoid theWestern powers interference into domesticissues for Christian minorities (Bilgin 2008).However, it is a question whether this pointwas in favour of the non-Muslims. For ex-ample, with the adoption of Civil Code, non-Muslims’ marriages in their churches andsynagogues would not be legitimate withoutthe stately defined marriage.

II.C. Sunni Identity or theLausannian Islam

‘Our real citizens are Muslims, belong to

Hanefi denomination and speak urkish’.

Celal Nuri Bey, National Assembly(BMM), 1924 Constitution Discussions.

(Bayır 2010: 141)

Although melted distinctively, it was im-possible to completely exterminate religionfrom social life. Terefore it was crucial tocontrol, shape and teach the religion, Islam,

so that ‘the poor folk’ would be informed onhow much and what kind of religiosity to be‘proper’. Islam was to be formulated in sucha ‘modern’ way that it would serve the estab-lishment of Kemalist regime. Tis ‘modern’version was found to be within the Sunni tra-dition and named as the Lausannian Islamwhich makes emphasis on its unique charac-

an army offcer. Many speculatve scenaros have been

drawn about the ncdent.

ter shaped by the Kemalist rhetoric(Yılmaz2005: 389). So the state based a religion inorder not to become a religion- based state

(Altan 2010: 92). It is a contradiction withinitself since laicism means the separation ofstate from religious affairs, and then thestate does conduct in religious affairs in fa-vour of a certain type.

Actually in 1920, urkey’s founder andfirst president Mustafa Kemal Atatürk de-fined the basis of nation over religion, sincethe War of Independence was fought withthe Muslim Kurds of Anatolia. But after theLausanne reaty and the formation of theurkish Republic, the emphasis for nationalidentity shifted to secularism and urkishnationalism.

Te Directorate for Religious Affairs (Di-yanet) was established in order to formulateIslam in such a way that it would become aservant of the Kemalist ideology. Diyanet9 became an instrument of the Regime to im-plement state politics (Kadıoğlu 2010: 493).

At an environment where all other religiousorders and lodges were formally prohibit-ed, Diyanet was the only alternative possi-ble for the moderate Muslim population ofurkish Republic. Islam which was not con-trolled by the state began to be perceived asa symbol of backwardness (Ibıd.: 497) andas a path which was not equally legitimateas the stately palatable Lausannian Islam.Tus an entity which couldn’t be equally

legitimate, would likely be suspected as apotential ‘threat’ in the country. Terefore,the formally prohibited, but informally ex-isting religious orders and lodges of urkeywere to be accused as being a source of re-actionarism and a domestic security threatfor the urkish Republic whenever the state

9 For the year 2013, Dyanet had a budget morethan 2.5 bllon USD wth emplyees excedng 115 tho-usand and mosques 85 thousand. See detals Yılmaz

2013, 116.


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tended to be more oppressive, which wasvery often the case since urkey faced mil-itary interventions of several types almost

within each ten years of time.10 Te contentof the Friday sermons were (and still are)centrally delivered by the Diyanet to all themosques in urkey, even to the mosques inEurope which are operating under Diyanet.Te state, be it civil or military, has been de-termining the contents of these sermons.11

urkification has been an importantcharacteristic of Lausannian Islam, especial-ly in the one party era, when the (prayer call)ezan was made in urkish. Just as referringto a urk meant that he/she was Muslim,calling a person Muslim would automaticallyrecall that he/she was Sunni. So LausannianMuslims would make up the preferred pal-atable subject citizen model in the KemalistRepublic of urkey. Tey would satisfy theirreligious affiliations as much as the stateallowed. Tey would pray in private, butwould refrain to do so in public, for exam-

ple in their official work places. Te most fa-voured Sunni Muslims were those ones whowould call themselves Muslims but were notpractising at all.12 Te women were expectedto be unveiled in order to exist in the pub-lic as educated and professional citizens.

10 Te 1960 Coup, the 1971 Memorandum, the1980 Coup, the February 28 1997 nterventon, the

Aprl 2007 E-Memorandum. One should also note thatseveral extra-ordnary and unsolved volant ncdents

took place n between each nterventon whch becamea justfcaton for the state to reman oppressve con-tnuesly.

11 After February 28 1997, the mltary not onlydetermned the content of the sermons, but also lle-gally montored relgous communtes and ndvdualsby usng Dyanet bureaucracy and facltes. AccessedNovember 5, 2014. http://haber.stargazete.com/gun-cel/buda-28-subatin-balyozu/haber-711592.

12 If they would feel free to consume alcoholcbeverages under certan occasons and celebrtes, thscould well be regarded as a further postve characte-rstcs for the mage of the ctzens n the eyes of the

Kemalst state.

So the citizens would call themselves SunniMuslims however would not carry any vis-ible characteristics about this identity. Te

identity would refer more to secular, culturaland socio –political basis, than piety (Yılmaz2013: 110).

II.4.Te Homo-LASus

After all, Kemalism managed to estab-lish its own middle class, the good citizen,the Homo-LASus, laic, Ataturkist, Sunni,urk citizen (Yılmaz 2013: 108). Each ele-

ment of Homo-LASus is a self in relationto another ideational element. Laicismaimed to serve the citizen’s modernizationwhich was identical with westernization. Itwould make the Muslims as modern as thenon-Muslims. Since it has been impossibleto eliminate religion totally, it should serveKemalism and should have an urban struc-ture. Tis was established with the Laussa-nian type Sunni Islam.

Although they are often used synony-mously, Kemalism and Ataturkism refer todifferent identities. A Kemalist has morehostile affiliations towards Islam and sup-ports an elitist top down construction of thesociety. An Ataturkist, on the other hand,can also be a practising Muslim. He/shedoesn’t have to be, but this is a possibility.

Ataturkism stands for the respect to Ataturkand what he has done for the independence

and reconstruction of urkey.13

urkishness, as an identity, aimed

to homogenize the society’s divergentethnicity. All other ethnic identities wereaimed to get assimilated or at least invisi-

13 Yılmaz, 2013: 110. Kemalst and Ataturkst aregenerally used nterchangebly. However a Kemalst hasa more assertve secularst characterstc, whle an Ata-turkst can have a deep respect not only to Ataturk but

also to Islam.


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ble through urkification. In the Laussannereaty, minorities were defined on religiousbasis. So non-Muslims were minorities, but

Muslims that had immigrated from differentlands like, Caucasus, Crimea, Balkans wereall regarded as urks, even if they hadn’t anethnic root for urkishness.14 Some of thesepopulations kept their mother language, butmost of them were totally assimilated. It isa usual case that these non-ethnic urks ad-vocating urkishness in a very enthusiasticmanner. Tis can be regarded as a success ofthe Kemalist nation-building policies (Yıl-

maz 2013: 110). Overall, the Homo-LASus people

can be defined as the successful outcomeof the hegemonic imposition of the Kemal-ist regime. Tey believed sincerely and en-thusiastically to what they have been told.

According to Homo-LASus people, urkeyhas had many outside and inside enemies15 and protecting the country from these en-emies needed and needs a lot qualification.

Tis qualification was only seen present intheir identity as being western, enlightened,modern, civilized and loyally bound to urk-ish nationality. So, together with the assis-tance of the army 16, the Homo-LASus eliteswere the masters and the guardians of thecountry, the Republic of urkey.17

14 Ülker, 2007. Tus as the non-Muslims wereminorities and the aim was a homogenous society, hav-ing less minority was a preferred condition. Terefore

Christians who were linguistically speaking urkishwere exchanged with Greece, while Muslims who spokeno urkish were welcomed.

15 An anonymous sayng: ‘A urk has no other frendthan another urk’ (‘ürk’ün ürkten başka dostu yoktur.’).

Also Ataturk n hs ‘Address to Youth’ speech states thaturkey would always have enemes abroad and nsde.

16 urkey has had 2 drect (1960, 1980) mltarynterventon to ts parlamentary system alongsdewth an ultmatom n 1971. Tereafter the mltary wason the scene n 1997 wth a post modern nterventonand n 2007 wth a post modern cyber ultmatom.

17 A much refered sentence within the elite: ‘My

Ata! We are the loyal watchmen of the Republic that you

Tere are threat perceptions based onpast, like what the others did to urks.Tere are also threat perceptions of pres-

ent, that each identity that does not fit toHomo-LASus is a potential danger for theRepublic. Combining the past and the pres-ent, an average Homo-LASus is likely toconstruct a threat perception of the future.Tese threat perceptions, in the end, formu-late the attitudes and actions of the identi-ty. Te education of the identity started inelementary with the daily oath18, continuesin middle school with Vatandaşlık Dersi (Cit-

izenship Course) and İnkilap arihi (Historyof Revolution), finally ends up in universitywith the rereading of İnkilap arihi (Historyof Revolution) regardless of the faculty thestudent attends.

III. Te Others of urkey: TeIdentities of urkish Society

Te Homo-LASus, the white urks of

the country, had to govern the country in-side and represent it respectfully outside.Tere were also the Negro urks and themountain urks in urkey 19, and also those‘unfortunates’ who could not be put to anycategory of urks at all. All of these have tobe focused on, in order to understand con-temporary urkish society and politics.

commended us’ (‘Atam! Emanetin olan Cumhuriyetin sadıkbekçileriyiz’)

18 Te daly oath ceremony was lfted recently; tstarted wth the words ‘I am a urk, I am hard wor-kng…’ ended up sayng ‘…how happy the one who callshmself a urk!’

19 See Akyol, 2011. Akyol roughly classfed theMuslm ctzens of urkey as Whte urks (the eltstSeculars), Negro urks (the practsng Muslm perp-hery) and Mountan urks (the Kurds).


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III.A. Te non- Muslims

‘On the one hand, we say citizens of [the

state]…are completely urk. On the other hand,the government is struggling to make sure for-eign companies will dismiss Greek and Arme-nian workers. When we attempt that….[and] ifwe are told that ‘No, in line with the law passedby your parliament they are urks’ what would

your answer be? Te word citizenship would notbe enough to abate a desire which is in the mindand heart… there is one reality, they cannot beurk… there is no possibility’

(Hamdullah Suphi Bey, BMM, 1924 Con-stitution Discussions)

(Bayır 2010: 142)

Based on this assumption, urkish par-liament passed a law in 1926, which statedthat only ‘urks’ can become state officers.Te law was under practise until 1965, whenthe precondition was changed to ‘urkishcitizenship’.

Te non- Muslims, Armenians, Greeks,Jews were citizens but did not belong to the‘national community’. Tey were seen as thepotential collaborators of foreign states whowere seen as not giving up their ambitionson urkey. So the real national communityshould always be alert against the collabora-tors.

Until recently, the Land Registry Law

referred to non- Muslims as ‘the foreign-ers whose existence has been recognized bythe urkish Republic’ (Ibid.: 142). Althoughthey were ‘foreigners’, they were forced topay the highest taxes between 1942 and1944. Te Wealth ax (Varlık Vergisi) aimedto deal with the war profiteers. But it wasnot applied properly and resulted in the dis-crimination of the non-Muslim community.Te 55 percent of the total tax revenue has

been taken from the non-Muslim business

people in Istanbul and Izmir. If they couldnot pay, they were deported or sentenced toforced labour in countryside. Most of themsold their properties and businesses to Mus-lim businessmen in order to pay. Tis periodcaused an irreparable damage on the confi-dence of non-Muslims to the urkish state(Zürcher 2007: 208).

III.A.1.Te Armenians

Te Armenian population has declineddramatically due to the 1915 deportations.

Among the discursive Armenian inhabitantnumbers, the Armenian population in Ot-toman Empire, before 1915, can concludedto be more or less 1,5 million (Lewy 2011:366-367). In 1923, the urkish Republichad about 65 thousand Armenians left. Teproperties (houses) of the deported Armeni-ans were given to the new immigrant urks(Muslims) with the Settlement regulationsof the Republican era. Te Armenians who

left their homes by deportation and sur-vived the bad conditions, did not return.Tey instead settled to western countriesand formulated the Armenian Diaspora.

Te Armenian Diaspora constructed itsidentity on 1915 events. Beginning with1965, the Diaspora tried to make the inter-national community recognize the deporta-tions as genocide. In the 1970s, the armedreactionary Armenian group, ASALA, at-

tacked and killed several urkish diplomatsall over the world. ASALA also attacked ci-vilian international targets like the Orly

Airport in 1983. Tereafter it ceased fireand concentrated more on the recognitionof genocide in the international arena (Lewy2011: 397-398). oday 20 countries someof whom are urkey’s significant trade part-ners (such as Germany, Netherlands, Italy)are recognizing the 1915 events as genocide.

Most of the US federal states (42 out of 50)


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have also recognized the 1915 events asthe Armenian genocide. Tis situation putsmuch burden on urkish foreign policy and

is likely to intensify as 2015 marks the 100th anniversary of the deportations.

Te remaining Armenians in urkeyavoided confrontation with the urkishstate. Tey rather preferred to be invisibleuntil recent, when issues like minority rightshave begun to be discussed in public. Teyhave most of the time tried to differentiatethemselves from the Diaspora. But still theycould not avoid to become target of urkishnationalism. Hrant Dink, a leading journal-ist of urkish Armenian community, was tri-alled on the law of ‘Insulting urkishness’.20 During the trials he was harshly accused bythe mainstream media as being a betrayer.In January 2007, he was killed by a urkishultra nationalist boy who was afterwardssentenced with lifelong imprisonment. ByOctober 2014, the Case have not concludedyet, since the investigations showed that the

boy was not alone.In 2012, the Armenian elementary

school students visited the Education min-ister and requested the removal of humiliat-ing expressions about Armenians from theschool text books.21 But in the school textbooks of 2014 there were still problematicexpressions and descriptions about the Ar-menian identity.22

20 ‘Insulting’ is very interpretive in urkey, espe-cially if the issue in concern is urkishness or Atatürk.For the ‘insulting’ articles of Hrant Dink see, ---------- “Hrant Dink’i ‘yakan’ yazılar”, Radikal, October 10,2005. Accessed January 13, 2012. http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=166485

21 See detal odayszaman, January 5, 2012. Acces-sed January 13, 2012. http://www.todayszaman.com/news-267705-dncer-lstens-to-armenan-students-clam-of-msrepresentaton-n-textbooks.html

22 See araf, September 2014. http://www.taraf.

com.tr/yazlar/taner-akcam/kastla-nefret-sucu-slen-

III.A.2. Te Greeks

Te Greek population of Anatolia was

about 2 million in the late Ottoman era. Tepopulation shrunk to 120 thousand due toimmigrations and population exchanges(Zürcher 2007: 172). As mentioned above,they were mostly seen as the collaborators ofGreece. Although their rights were definedin Laussanne, these were easily suspendedwhenever relations deteriorated with Greece(Aktoprak 2010: 37-38).

One of the most traumatic events which

the community experienced took place inSeptember 6-7, 1955. Te Cyprus issue wasan unsolved problematic between urkeyand Greece which put tension on the re-lations on those days. Te press had a sig-nificant role in increasing the tension andpreparing the conditions for September 6-7(Lengerli 2006: 103). Te events were basedon an information that a bomb has explodednear the urkish consulate in Salonika and

that the house in which Atatürk was bornhad been burned. Tis news have ignited aserious of uncontrolled demonstrations inIstanbul and Izmir in which thousands ofbuildings of Greek citizens were damaged.Several Greeks lost their life and 35 were in-

jured. After this event, another wave of im-migration took place.

urkey was left with even a smaller Greekcommunity, which was still regarded as a po-

tential threat. As the Cyprus crisis peaked inthe first half of 1970s with armed confron-tations, the urkish government closed theClergy School of Greek community whichwas seen crucial for the Greek communityto continue their religious traditions. Teeducation in the Clergy School of Heybe-liada, actually, was formulated and permit-ted under the reaty of Laussanne. How-

mektedr/30841/ . Accessed November 3, 2014.


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ever, in time, urkish public has developeda perception that held the reopening of theClergy School equivalent to loosing nationalsovereignty and promoting missionary ac-tivity. Whereas for the Greek community ofurkey, the reopening of the Clergy School isone of the most important elements of cul-tural continuation.

III.A.3. Te Jews

Te population of the Jews were not asmuch as the Armenians or the Greeks. Teywere settled in Istanbul as well as in Trace,ekirdağ, Çanakkale, Edirne and Kırklareli.Tey were traders and economically well off.Tey were keeping their cultural diversitywhich meant that they could not have been‘successfully urkified’ until 1930s. It is im-portant to note that 1930s were the yearswhen Europe was experiencing the Hitlerrule and anti-semitism.

In 1933, Nihal Atsız who became one ofthe leading names of radical nationalism inurkey later on, was appointed as urkishliterature teacher from Malatya to Edirne.

After he arrived in Edirne, he started towrite provocative articles in local journalsand held meetings within the urkish com-munity saying that they “had to get rid ofthe Jews who were exploiting the urkishpeople”. Tis was one side of the coin. Teother side was that urkey wanted to estab-

lish a military brigade in Trace. Te urkishgovernment did not want to have the Jewsin the region who were trade partners of

American companies. Te urkish govern-ment did not trust the Jews because theywere not urkified. Te propaganda of Atsızwas successful. Te Jewish people were firsteconomically boycotted. Ten the business-es of the Jews were plundered and they werethreatened to be killed if they don’t leave.

Several Jews became victims of brutal physi-

cal violence between June 28 and July 4,1934. Tereafter, all Jews left Trace. Mostof them settled to Istanbul, where as some

immigrated to Greece (Bali 1999).

In 1942 they became subjects of theWealth tax, upon which they lost their con-fidence to urkish state. Tousands of Jewsimmigrated to Israel after 1950.23

III.B. Te Practising Muslims

Tey were the Negro urks of the system

(Akyol 2011). Te Kemalist regime’s secularidentity put hegemonic restrictions on thevisibility and practibility of Islam in dailylife. An officer of state, be it military or pub-lic, should not be a practising Muslim. Tiswould be regarded as a challenge to Laicism.Until recent, the army officers who weredaily practising Muslims and who had veiledwife could have been dismissed from dutywithout any indemnity or retirement salary.It was the case, even if they had a CV fullwith honour rolls. Te army officers’ headscarfed family members, be it mother orwife, were not allowed to enter any buildingwithin the army by headscarf. Especially af-ter February 28 199724, they were even notallowed to military hospitals if they had notcovered their head in a ‘traditional’ way.25

In the 1925 the educations in Medreseand ekke were banned saying that thesewere serving reactionary activities and hin-

23 See Gündem, 2012. Valuable nformaton abo-ut the experences of urkey’s Jews can be fnd n thebographcal book of a well known successful Jewshbusnessman of urkey, Ishak Alaton.

24 Te post modern coup of urkey.25 Interestng termnologes have been developed

for the so-called tradtonal way: rabbt-ear, grannystyle etc. Te state n ths way tred to decompose ts‘proper’ ctzens from ‘mproper’ ones: the beneathmessage amed was: ‘the state s not aganst relgon.But the relgon should exst the way the state defnes

t; all others are source of threat.’


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dering urkey’s path to modern civilization.Many religious leading figures were trialledand jailed during the Republic. Te first ones

were those who opposed to wear the hatand insisted on their headgear sarık. Manypeople were sentenced to death in the Inde-pendence Courts of 1920s. Tus sarık andveil has been perceived as a major challengeto Kemalist modernization since they werevisibly differentiating urkey from Europe.

According to Homo-LASus, the practis-ing Muslims were regarded as primitive andperiphery. As long as they stayed at the pe-riphery, there was no problem. Te conflictsbegan when the periphery challenged thecore socially, economically and politically. Inthe 1980s, with the changing economic andpolitical structure of urkey, the practisingMuslims became more visible at the borderof the core, in the big cities of the country.Tey were taking higher education and be-gan taking office in important state institu-tions. Tis has been regarded as a threat to

Laicism.

More threatening was the issue of thepractising Muslim women. Teir ‘unmoder-nity’, their contradiction with laicism, theheadscarf, was so much visible, that it wasimpossible for the state to have them in thepublic sphere. Te only way practising Mus-lim women to be in public sphere could beeither as subordinate and uneducated butveiled, or educated but unveiled. After the

coup 28 February 1997, some universitiesestablished ‘convince rooms’ for the headscarfed women who were to apply to theuniversities. In these rooms, the universityteachers tried to ‘convince’ the headscarfwomen that their appearance were improp-er. Tey further claimed that it could not bethe women’s own preference, but their fami-lies’ oppression on them that make themcover their head. It has been only a few years

that women can attend to universities with

headscarf in urkey. Now they have becomealso more visible in public duties.

Even at the top of urkish state hierar-chy, the headscarf faced embargo from the

guardians of the regime. When in 2002 the AKP came to power with its leading figures’wifes wearing headscarf, they were lookedupon in suspicion and were invited to officialreceptions of President Ahmet Necdet Sez-er without wife, which was contrary to theusual practises. Also a silent civic embargoexists on the identity in certain non-state

areas. In 2011, a top company, Borusan,cancelled the sponsorship of the womanrally champion, Burcu Çetinkaya after herappearance on the news while giving an in-terview to a head scarfed journalist.26

III.C. Te Alevis

Some of them define themselves as a sectof Islam, while some of them define them-

selves as a separate religious practise. Teymake up about 10 percent of current ur-key’s population. Tey took their share fromlaicism with the closure of Bektaşi dervishlodge in 1920s. Te establishment of the Di-rectorate of the Religious Affairs, Diyanet,continues to be a further obstacle for the

Alevis since it is based on Sunni belief andignores any other belief.

Te Alevis are not one homogenous en-

tity. Tere are Alevi Kurds, Alevi Zazas and Alevi urks. But the way they have been per-ceived by the Sunnis did not differ much ac-cording to the different ethnicities becausethey were mostly defined over their religiousidentity. However, in respect to the official

26 See detal, odayszaman. 2011.“Borusan can-cels sponsorshp allegedly over company mage con-cerns”, December 28. http://www.todayszaman.com/news-267001-borusan-cancels-sponsorshp-allegedly-

over-company-mage-concerns.html


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perception, Zaza and Kurd Alevis were moredisadvantageous than the urks (Koçan-Öncü 2004).

Alevis faced several violent confronta-tion and discrimination both by state andby public throughout the Republican era.Te first to mention would be the Dersimevents of 1937. Te cultural heterogene-ity and resistance of Dersim to the statewas supressed harshly by the governmentin 1937- 1938. urkish war planes bombedthe region for days. Villages were evacuated.Tousands of people were lost in the events.Many families were forcefully send and set-tled to different places of urkey where theywould be all alone with their identity withinthe Sunni majority. Girls were taken awayfrom their families and were given to armyofficers’ as home servants where they werebelieved to be brought up in a proper man-ner. Recently a documentary has been madeon the lifes of these girls in the aim of tryingto find them.27

On the eve of the last military coupin 1980, the Alevis faced two destruc-tive confrontation with the Sunni popula-tion in two middle range cities of urkey,Kahramanmaraş and Çorum. In both casesthe events lasted for days and the govern-ment was unable to settle them down. Afterthe events, the populations in the respectedregions immigrated to more cosmopolitancities where they would not be visible and

known through their identity.

Te religious education in schools of ur-key are still Sunni based. Te cemevis of the

Alevis are not recognised as worship places.Since cemevis aren’t recognized by Diyanetas worship places, they are not able to getfinancial aid from the state. Each year the

27 For detal see the documentary http://www.

youtube.com/watch?v=295tyDGsDYI

government specifies a significant amountto the Diyanet from the annual budget. TeDiyanet budget has been criticized for serv-

ing in favour of just one part of the society(the Sunni Muslims), although the budget isa result of the taxes collected from all ur-key’s citizens including the Alevis.

III.D. Te Kurds

Tey were initially, the Muslim brotherswho fought the Independence War togetherwith the urks against the non-Muslims. Af-

ter the establishment of the Republic, theybecame the second biggest population. Teirdifferentiation began with the abolishmentof the caliphate in 1924 which alienatedtheir common identity (Muslimhood) insideurkey. Immediately after this, the Consti-tution changed the definition of people liv-ing in urkey. In 1921 Constitution it wasstated as the ‘peoples of urkey’ which wasan inclusive statement that also covered the

Kurdish identity. In 1924 the sentence waschanged as ‘Te people of urkey, regardlessof religion and race, are urks as regard tocitizenship’. Te Sheihk Said Kurdish rebel-lion erupted upon this change.28 Tis eventmarked the end of brotherhood betweenthe Kurds and the urks. Te Dersim eventsfortified the polarization. Beginning withDersim they were defined as the men (thebandit) in the mountains; they were regard-ed as the uncivilized mountain urks which

the state needed to oppress for the sake ofintegrity.

Kurds were not and are still not allowedto learn their mother tongue in state schools.Recently there has been a new regulation toallow private schools teaching Kurdish whichdoesn’t seem very realistic. Because most ofthe population is not in the condition to ef-

28 Esayan, 2010.


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fort private education. Indeed, in 2014, afew private school declared that said theywould start Kurdish courses. Te majorityof the children of Kurdish citizens still haveunequal educational conditions when theystart school since they have no languagethat they can speak.29 Te denial of Kurdishidentity has been so strong throughout theRepublican period, that the urkish stateand society would regard any reference toKurdishness as a threat to sovereignty andintegrity. So when a protest singer, AhmetKaya, at a music dinner in 1999 stated that

he would like to sing Kurdish songs, he waslynched immediately. Tereafter he was ac-cused for being a betrayer in the mainstreammedia and the court opened a trial on the is-sue. He went to exile where he died a yearlater.

Te major problematic attached to theKurdish identity emerged after the 1980coup. Te 1980 military coup was a bru-tally traumatic experience to many peoplein urkey, and especially to Kurds (Matur2011). All kinds of torture and insult werepractised on the imprisoned people whichincluded also insult on identity. After theywere released from prisons, they went tomountains and PKK was formed. An armedconfrontation between PKK and the urkisharmy has been going on for three decadeswhich took the lifes of more than 30 thou-sand people.

Many unknown murder cases took placein 1990s in the Southeast region of urkeywhich decreased the people’s confidence tostate. Many Kurds immigrated to westerncities or to the cities in the region when theirvillages were burned or evacuated.

29 For detal see, “İk Dl Br Bavul”: a documen-tary flm on a urksh teacher from western Anatolaattendng a Kurdsh vllage school n eastern Anatola.

http://www.persanflm.com/school/traler.php

IV. Te Recurrence of History:From Pluralism to Hegemony

AgainEric Zürcher claims that urkish poli-

tics had gone through similar phases under Young urks and under the rule of MustafaKemal and his comrades. In both cases, thepolitical movements initially started to gov-ern with a pluralistic stance and ended upwith oppressive hegemonic politics whichwere based on exclusion of some parts of thesociety. In each oppressive era, the state had

a threat perception which served as a justi-fication for the authoritarian policies. Tethreat perception was fortified through vili-fication in written, oral and visual communi-cation instruments (i.e. books, newspapers,magazines and movies). Rules were regulat-ed according to this constructed perception.Te same path can also be observed todaywith the AKP rule which has been governingthe country for twelve years. AKP, in early

years of its rule, seemed to have a pluralisticstructure. After it felt sure that the militarywould not make a coup and the Constitu-tional Court could not close the party, AKPbegan to give an increasingly majoritarianhegemonic outlook.

IV.A.Te Challenge of the Coreand Expectations for EqualCitizenship

Te first four years (from 2003 to 2007)of AKP rule can be characterized havinga willingness towards more democratiza-tion and for more inclusion of the others inthe society. Coming from an Islamist back-ground whose representative parties wereclosed down by the Constitutional Courtfor several times, AKP in this era, tried toconvince the public as well as the ‘guardians’

of the Republic that it had no intention of


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challenging the basic elements of the Repub-lic. Te party gave a determinant image formore democratization. In this era, urkey

seemed enthusiastically trying to make pro-gress in democratization and EU member-ship. Terefore it gained the support of dif-ferent segments in the country which wouldnormally not vote for an Islamic rooted par-ty. In the absence of productive oppositionparties, AKP became a catchall party whichpromised relative improvement conditionsfor all the disadvantageous ethnic and reli-gious identities that were excluded from Ho-

mo-LASus. In this era, the party’s policieswere pretty much constrained by the Presi-dent Ahmet Necdet Sezer, as well as by athreat of closure on the party. AKP was seenas the supporter of the peripheral identitiesand its rule was regarded as a challenge tothe core. Te 2007 Presidential election wasone of the most important confrontationsof the core statist elites and the peripheral

AKP. Te government faced an e-memoran-dum from the military after nominating

Abdullah Gül for presidency. However AKPshowed a determinant stance against the e-memorandum, which in return, increased itspublic support.

In the second era, from 2007 to 2011,most of the aggrieved identities in urkeycontinued supporting AKP with an expec-tation of more democratization and equalcitizenship for all. Tis support was signifi-cant when high military officers had begun

to be trialled in Sledgehammer and Ergene-kon probes that accused them for coup at-tempts and constructing terror organizationagainst the government. Support for AKPcontinued in 2010 Referandum for Consti-tutional Change which was perceived as ahope for urkey’s democratization. Withthis referendum, closure of political par-ties became harder in urkey. From 2007to 2011, urkey experienced the weaken-

ing of Kemalist tutelary regime. While the

weakening of tutelary was expected to bereplaced by a more democratic system, itturned out that the elitist tutelary was be-ing replaced by a majoritarian tutelary, thepost-Kemalist Erdoğanist regime, and thisnew tutelary regime had its own definitionfor the palatable citizen.

IV.B. 2011-2014: Te New Palat-able Identity of post-KemalistTurkey

Regulations in education and judiciarysystems and the discourses of Erdoğan, showwhat the palatable citizen for the AKP hasbecome. Erdoğan repeatedly declared thatthey were aiming to raise a pious generation.He condemned the university students whowere living in boys and girls together apart-ment flats and said that as a conservativedemocrat government they were determi-nant to bring a new legal regulation aboutthe issue.30 He said he was ‘tolerating’ thosewho had improper dressing.

oday, any social resistance or critiqueto any of the decisions of the governmentis being regarded as a threat to peace andstability in the country. Erdoğan repeatedlyclaims that those who criticized or resisted

AKP’s politics were not willing the countrydevelop and prosper. People, especially jour-nalists are losing their jobs, being targeted31

30 Hürryet Dalynews November 7, 2013. Acces-sed November 5, 2014 http://www.hurryetdalynews.com/regulaton-on-mxed-student-houses-would-be-unconsttutonal.aspx?PageID=238&NID=57504&NewsCatID=341

31 Tere are many cases where journalsts (andacademcans) have been targeted personally n thespeeches of Erdoğan. wo latest examples are the ca-ses of Ambern Zaman and Ihsan Yılmaz. See detalsn http://www.todayszaman.com/blog/turksh-meda-watch/journalsts-react-to-erdogans-targetng-of-zaman_355020.html and http://www.todayszaman.

com/columnst/hsan-ylmaz/erdogan-made-me-a-


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While vilifying all who supported theGezi protests, the rhetoric of Erdoğan be-came extremely polarizing. He abused Islam

to strengthen his supporters’ attachment to AKP. Religion, Islam, was instrumentalised.He claimed that the protesters had entereda mosque with their shoes and had drunkalcohol in there. He insisted that therewere videos about the incident. Te realitywas that the people got into the mosque,because they were injured and affected bymassive tear gas. In the released videosabout the incident, the mosque looked like

a hospital’s emergency department. Anotherclaim of Erdoğan was that a veiled womanwas abused and assaulted by the Gezi pro-testers brutally and that there were again,videos about the issue. Even an interviewwith the subject woman was published inone of the pro-government newspapers. Butthe videos about the incident couldn’t ap-prove that such an event took place. Te aimof Erdoğan in both cases was to justify hisharsh Gezi politics in the eyes of his pious

conservative voters; indeed, he partly suc-ceeded.

Issues concerning the non-Muslim popu-lations have not been solved, either in the

AKP decade. Te Halki Seminary has notbeen opened. Only a small amount of theproperties of non-Muslim Foundations weregiven back; and that after long and exhaust-ing trials. Tis process has been criticized bythe non-Muslim,37 as well as Muslim jour-

nalists. Te murder cases against the non-Muslim citizens38 which happened during

37 See Radkal July 29, 2013. Accessed November4, 2014 http://www.radkal.com.tr/yazarlar/yetvart_danzkyan/onde_25_mlyar_dolar_arkada_uzun_ko-rdorlar-1143793 . Also See Agos October 11, 2013.

Accessed November 4, 2014 http://www.agos.com.tr/rober-koptas-yazd-basbakan-aznlklar-konusunda-y-nyetl-m-5905.html .

38 Te Case of Hrant Dnk, the Case of Prest San-

taro, the Case of Zrve Publshng house.

the AKP rule were not perceived as justly tri-alled, either. Although the murderers werecaught and imprisoned, they were released

after a recent change in law. On the otherhand, Erdoğan’s statement at an interview,“…excuse me saying, they have said even ug-lier things -- they have called me Armenian,”was very much criticized by the democraticcircles, as well as by the Armenians in ur-key.39

Meanwhile, after all the dialogs andseemingly continuing Kurdish democraticprocess, the government by November2014, appeared to be stuck and unable toreach a societal compromise; neither withthe Kurds, nor with the rest of the coun-try concerning the Kurdish issue. Actuallythe so-called democratic process took placewithout the acknowledgment of main politi-cal opposition parties, even without givinginformation to the military, let alone thepublic. While tension increases in the south-east Anatolia once more, a peaceful settle-

ment of the Kurdish issue looks very muchunlikely.

Although AKP seemed to be promoting‘Islamic’ lifestyle and thereby recruiting theliving standard of the practising Muslims,with the recent events before and after De-cember 17 2013, AKP and Erdoğan began totarget also some of the practising Muslimsin urkey, the Hizmet movemet. Erdoğanbegan to defame the Movement and its spir-

itual leader Fethullah Gülen because theyhave opposed the closure of backup studyrooms and they gave support to the investi-

39 odayszaman August 6, 2014. Accessed No-vember 4, 2014. http://www.todayszaman.com/ana-sayfa_pm-uses-offensve-racst-language-targetng-armenans_354746.html . For a comment togetherwth Erdoğan’s vdeo on the ssue see Washngton-post August 6, 2014. Accessed November 4, 2014.http://www.washngtonpost.com/blogs/worldvews/wp/2014/08/06/s-armenan-an-nsult-turkeys-prme-

mnster-seems-to-thnk-so/


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and governors perceive the people living inthe country and how this perception reflectsthe individual’s reality and his/her demandsfrom the state as a citizen. If the perceptionscan meet at a common ground reflecting thereality and if the state as well as the peopleabandon using the term ‘traitor’ so easily,political life might normalize. Besides, peo-ple require a need to trust the state and tobe confident that there is justice in the coun-try. Because in a just environment, a state isunlikely to classify its citizens according tosome criteria of palatability. If there ought

to be any criteria of palatability, then thisshould take universal human rights criteriaas the basic common ground.

References

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Aktar, Cengiz. 2008. “All Citizens exceptnon-Muslims”, HurriyetDailynews, February8. Accessed November 3, 2014. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/all-citizens-except-non-muslims.aspx?pageID=438&n=all-citi-zens-except-non-muslims-2008-08-02

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