THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY November 28, 1959

Kerala: A Post-mortem A N impor t an t feature o f contem­

p o r a r y po l i t i c a l discussion i n this country is the great interest shown in communis t theory and pract ice in the i r re la t ion to the I n d i a n s i tuat ion. There has been considerable speculation since the last General Elections about the role o f the Communis t Par ty i n I n d i a n poli t ics- Can the C P I provide an effective opposi t ion and an alterna­t ive government to the r u l i n g pa r ty? W i l l the A m r i t s a r thesis succeed in accommodat ing the p r inc ip les of communism to the pr inc ip les of the I n d i a n Const i tu t ion? These questions have often been asked. The attempt to put the A m r i t s a r thesis in to prac­t ice in Ke ra l a , discussion of the direct action in Kera la and of the prospects of an Entente between the major non-communist parties not on ly in Ke ra l a but elsewhere too, as well as the repurcussions of the Chinese actions in T ibe t and on I n ­d ian borders on the in ternal pol i t ics of this c o u n t r y — a l l these are evidences of the g r o w i n g s igni f i ­cance of the p rob lem of communism. Such evidence has led p o l i t i c a l ob­servers to analyse the in ter - re la t ion-ships between the experience of Ke­rala, the g r o w i n g f i rmness of Pandi t N e h r u on the issue of Chinese ag­gression, his s trong invectives against communists at home and even the decision to spli t the b i l i n ­gua l Bombay State, w h i c h w o u l d isolate the communists f r o m other leftist parties.

I M P O R T A N C E O F T H E K E R A L A

E X P E R I E N C E

In this general p ic ture the exper i ­ence of Communis t rule in Kera la occupies a central place. It has led some to charge the Congress Par ty w i t h wan t ing to monopolise all p o l i ­t i ca l power in the coun t ry ; others have questioned the efficacy of a p o l i t i c a l system where the machine­ry o f democrat ic government cou ld become the ins t rument of a pa r ty w h i c h , to a l l interests and purposes, is bent upon subvert ing democracy itself . The s i tua t ion as i t developed in Kera la na tura l ly attracted atten­t i o n a l l over the country . Qui te apar t f r o m its w ide r ramificat ions ment ioned above, the story of Ke­ra la in i ts most s to rmy pe r iod de­serves a careful s tudy in i tself . I t

led to a great deal of controversy in the count ry almost r i g h t since the communists came to power in that State. I t is one of the meri ts of Dr Singh's w o r k * that i t takes the rea­der into the heart of this controver­sy by presenting divergent interpre­tations of the more impor tan t events in Kera la in a luc id and in te l l ig ib le manner. It is the first serious study of the Kera l a s i tuat ion and is based on the personal observations of the author.

As much of the book had been wr i t t en before the 'd i rec t act ion ' started in Kerala , the author has not given his own analysis of that move­ment. Th i s is, in a way, unfortunate . On the other hand, there is ample mater ia l in the book on the crisis that was developing in K e r a l a . I t is the purpose of this review to ana­lyse and evaluate on the basis of Dr Singh's observations the crisis w h i c h culminated in the direct act ion and led to the fa l l of the Communis t Government. Such an analysis, it is hoped, w o u l d b r i n g out the nature and dynamics of a conflict that took place under circumstances where a government wedded to the commu­nist ideology t r i ed to funct ion w i t h i n the f ramework of a par l iamentary democracy.

A S S U M P T I O N O F P O W E R

I t seems that i t is possible to w o r k out the sequence of events that led to the final showdown. The start was, in a sense, ominous. The op­posi t ion parties in Ke ra l a "doubted the s incer i ty of the communist at­tempt to w o r k c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y " They believed that " the communist tact ic" was " to inf i l t ra te in to various bodies and d is rup t them f r o m ins ide ." Thus the Communis t Par ty came to power in Kera la in an atmosphere of sus­p ic ion and distrust . To that extent, i t can be said to have started w i t h an i n i t i a l disadvantage. On the other hand, there was a fund of goodwi l l f o r the communists among large sections of the people who wanted to give them a chance and who also vaguely believed that they migh t solve the problems of poverty

* Communist Rule in Kerala by J i tendra S ingh . D i w a n Chand I n d i a n In fo rma t ion Centre. New Delh i , 1959. P p V I I I + 136. Pr ice Rs 3.

and unemployment that were so rampant i n Kera la . W h a t d i d the Government do to remove the suspi­cion of its opponents and vindicate the hopes of its sympathisers?

The very first steps taken by the communists accentuated the fears of their opponents. A l l pol i t ica l p r i ­soners, a m a j o r i t y of w h o m were communists, were released. A l o n g w i t h this, there was also a wi thdra ­wal , on the Government 's own re­ckoning , of more than 350 c r i m i n a l cases f r o m the Courts, Later on, Chief Justice Shankaran characteris­ed these large-scale remissions as "legalised d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . " As he said then, "There is always the r isk of motives being imputed to the exercise of these powers by a de­mocratic government ." A s imilar feel ing was created by the announce­ment of the Government 's new Po­lice po l i cy regard ing disputes invol­v i n g workers, tenants, students, debt­ors, etc. Comment ing on the pre­va i l ing practice of the police taking security measures in the event of such a dispute, the Communist Gov­ernment took the view "that such use of the police in favour of the o w n i n g classes is a v io la t ion of the fundamental r ights of the t o i l i n g classes." This and s imi la r state­ments by the communists soon after-assumption of power could ha rd ly create a climate of confidence among those who were already apprehensive of the communists.

G O O D W I L L FOR G O V E R N M E N T

In spite of these measures, how­ever, there were large sections of the people in Kerala who viewed the communist exper iment i nc lud ing the measures discussed above w i t h sym­pathy. An examinat ion of the com­munist rule in Kera l a shows, how­ever, that instead of consolidat ing its posi t ion among these sections, the Government took steps w h i c h gradua l ly estranged and antagonised them one after another.

Let us look, for example, at the positive p rogramme of the Govern­ment. The Government stood by a p rogramme of increased employ­m e n t speedy industr ia l isat ion and a fa i r deal f o r the ' exploi ted ' sec­tions. The f a m i l i a r techniques em­ployed by communists elsewhere, however, were not avai lable to them

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Rajni Kothari

November 28, 1959 T H E E C O N O M I C W E E K L Y

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in Kera la . They could not nationalise foreign-owned plantat ions in the State, they could not l iquidate other p r iva te enterprise in the State; they could not even expand the scope of State action any more than i t was possible in other States. In other words, the communists in Kera la found themselves in a posi t ion where they could not 'expropria te the expropr ia tors . ' On the contrary, to fur ther thei r economic goal they were led in the opposite d i rec t ion . They t r i ed to placate b i g business by offering l ibera l economic incen­tives in the f o r m of special conces­sions of the type w h i c h even the Congress Governments were reluc­tant to offer in their respective States. Such a pol icy inflamed the progressive elements in the State. There were also sharp differences between the Government and the Communist Party on this issue in Kerala . The incident brought out the conflict between ideology and practical considerations.

Loss OF P R E S T I G E

The Government suffered a fur-ther loss of prestige over its appro­ach to the problems of labour un­rest in the State. Af ter reviewing the various incidents in considerable factual detai l . Dr Singh comes to the conclusion that "the Communist Government has been par t ia l to workers belonging to its own trade unions." When a r i va l union was involved, the "Kera la Government d i d all that lay in its power to pro­tect the management." When, how­ever, the union concerned belonged to the communists, the Government followed the pol icy of police neutra­l i t y . This at t i tude of the Govern­ment alienated a sizeable section of the w o r k i n g class and also led to a considerable loss of prestige among the progressive sections of the people.

The next step of the Government involved one of the chief supporters of the communists, namely the stu­dent-community in Kerala . The de­cision of the Government-controlled Water Transpor t Corpora t ion to squash the one-anna concession en­joyed by the students of Ku t t anad led to a headlong struggle between a recalcitrant Government which treated the incident as a 'pres-tige issue' and a determined body of students who felt humi l i a t ed by such an at t i tude on the par t of the Government. The dispute according

to the author u was a show of stren­g th between the communists and the students," There were also other i n ­cidents i n v o l v i n g the students. Such incidents cost the Government the support and sympathy of a large section of the younger generation, as became evident f r o m the results of college union elections w h i c h showed that "whereas former ly the communists had control over more than 30 unions, they now control less than 8 unions." Th is loss of support of the students was to prove even more costly later d u r i n g the agi tat ion against the Educat ion B i l l .

R E C O R D O F T H E G O V E R N M E N T

Thus the communists began by their own actions to alienate i m ­portant sections of the people of Kerala. Nor had the Government any noticeable achievement to its credit w i t h wh ich i t could enthuse the s t i l l uncommit ted sections of the people or jus t i fy its c la im of being the only par ty that could deliver the goods. It even fai led to utilise f u l l y the financial al lotment made to Ke­rala under the Second Plan. W i t h only two years more to go, Rs 47 crores out of a total of Rs 87 crores s t i l l remained unspent and as the P lann ing Commission's yearly evaluation Report U 9 5 8 ) admit ted, " i t w i l l be almost impossible for the State Government to uti l ise this amount before the close of 1960-61." The Government of Kerala also fa i l ­ed to raise its own share of the financial target (Rs 48 crores) f r o m internal resources as was admit ted in the Governor 's address to the le­gislative assembly. There was also, on the Planning Commission's and the Government's own admission, in­creasing evidence of the growth of non-Plan and non-developmental ex­penditure. Nor could the Govern­ment take credit for any outstanding piece of legislat ion.

On the Agra r i an Relations Bi l l , itself a mi id measure of agr icu l tura l reform based on the recommenda­tions of the land re form Panel of the Planning Commission, the Govern­ment found its own par ty sharply d iv ided on the issue of p rov id ing special concessions to the small land­holders of Travancore-Cochin who were po l i t i ca l ly inc l ined towards the communists. The result of this " long drawn-out debate w i t h i n the Com­munist Par ty of K e r a l a " was that the passinsr of the B i l l was delayed un t i l barely two months before the

Government fe l l f rom power. Thus the electoral promise " to make fun-damentat changes in agrar ian rela­t ions" remained unfulf i l led as a re­sult of vested interests w i t h i n the pa r ty . Another much-publicised promise made by the communists before they came to power was "to put down cor rup t ion , nepotism, and favour i t i sm and thereby give a clean and efficient adminis t ra t ion to the State." The A n d h r a Rice Deal, the cor rupt ion w i t h i n the State-inspired co-operatives and the "decidedly communal game" played by the Gov­ernment on the question of reserva­t ion of government jobs for back­ward classes in order to retain the support of the Ezhava communi ty stood in sharp contrast to such a promise.

E D U C A T I O N B I L L

It is against this background that the agi tat ion against the Education R i l l has to be viewed. Of course, the B i l l itself created much passion and i l l feel ing. But without the ge­neral dissatisfaction w i t h the par ty in power and the estrangement of large sections of the people as dis­cussed above, the agitat ion could not have spread as it d i d .

The Education B i l l completed the process of isolating the communists in Kera la . Among other things, i t brought the r iva l communities of Nairs and Christians together on a common p la t fo rm. Accord ing to the findings of an unpublished research used by the author of the book un­der review, the Nairs. who had be­come seared of the g rowing Chris­t ian influence over the Congress, hail du r ing the 1957 elections cast as many votes, for the communists (2 lakhs) as they d i d for the Con­gress. It is said that the Educat ion B i l l was itself enacted by the com­munists to isolate the Christians f rom the Hindus, who constitute 61 per cent of the popula t ion . The move misfired. The Nairs found out. f irst ly, that as they themselves own-ed a great number of educational endowments they were going to be as much affected by the B i l l as the Christians and. secondly, that the 50 per cent reservation of seats for the backward classes meant "the Christians ' loss would only benefit the backward classes, not the Na i r s . " When the communsists received

proposal of the Adminis t ra t ive Re­forms Committee that in view of changed economic conditions of dif-

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T H E E C O N O M I C W E E K L Y November 28, 1959

November 28, 1959 T H E E C O N O M I C W E E K L Y

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THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY November 26, 1959

ferent communit ies in the last 60 years, the special reservation f ac i l i ­ties should be extended to the poor of a l l communit ies , the Nai r s were f inal ly antagonised. The Na i r s now j o i n e d the Christ ians and the Mus­l ims in a common f ron t against the Educat ion B i l l .

The other effect of the Educat ion B i l l was to force a l l opposi t ion par­ties to j o i n on a common p l a f o r m . An impression s t i l l prevai ls among some that the opposi t ion part ies in Kera la conspired together and start­ed the movement against the Govern­ment in that State. The fact is qui te the contrary . When the Congress showed an ambivalent a t t i tude to the agi tat ion, the Christ ians and also a section of Na i r s who were its m a i n supporters, are said to have made i t clear that they w o u l d j o i n the P S P and R S P-Ied movement even* if the Coagress stayed out. I t is this that explains the actions of the local Congress Party despite directives f r o m the Congress H i g h Command u r g i n g i t to keep away f r o m the movement. On p a i n of be­ing totally isolated, the Congress in Kerala was forced to j o i n the move­ment. Later on , Shr i Nehru jus t i ­fied the Congress pa r t i c ipa t ion as a res t ra ining influence on the d i rec t action but the fact of the matter was qui te di f ferent . "The leaders of Kerala were surprised and swept away by the response of the people." Even S h r i N a m b o o d i r i p a d had to admi t " tha t a l l the b i g and smal l grievances of different sections of the people of Kera la had been cana­lized in to this movement."

L A W A N D O R D E R S I T U A T I O N

That the agi tat ion against the Educat ion B i l l became so wide­spread, so sustained and so effective was the result of many other fac­tors besides the uncompromis ing at t i tude taken by the Government on the B i l l i tself. Cer ta in actions taken by the Communists gave a sharp edge to the g r o w i n g opposi­t i o n to their ru le . The Government began to tamper w i t h the adminis­t r a t i o n of just ice. T h i s was na tu ra l fo r a government w h i c h placed its loya l ty to the Pa r ty above any other ' formal is t ic ' considerations. But those sections of the people that had i m b i b e d a democratic value were bound to be seriously dis turbed by such a development.

T h e subservience of the govern-

mental process to the interests of the Communis t Par ty began to pervade a l l po l i t i ca l relations i n K e r a l a . The pa r ty cells in towns and villages began to wie ld increasing power. The unchallenged au thor i ty of the local secretary and his accomplices began to replace the normal chan­nels of adminis t ra t ion . W h e n such power was given to local potentates, i t was natura l f o r lawlessness to fo l low. There were several incidents of i n t i m i d a t i o n and harassment of non-communists w h i c h led to an i n ­creasing sense of insecuri ty.

R U L E B Y T H E P A R T Y

A l l this created an impression that Government and A d m i n i s t r a t i o n were becoming synonymous w i t h Par ty . Instead of adjust ing the ends of the Communis t Par ty to the dic­tates of a democratic consti tut ion it became clearer and clearer that it was the latter that was being sacri­ficed to the former . This gave rise to a sense of oppression among the people. Rather than wai t and see, more and more people began to j o i n the agi ta t ion . The direct act ion was on, what began as a protest against a specific measure of pol icy trans­formed itself in to a widespread popular movement against the Gov­ernment. The process was cumula­t ive, being the result of so many factors.

There is no doubt that the direct action that took place in K e r a l a was a mass upsurge. F o l l o w i n g their f ami l i a r theme of a conspiracy of reactionary forces, the communists l a id a l l blame at the door of the opposi t ion parties. But as we have already shown, the Opposi t ion par-

ties were forced to j o i n on a com­mon p la t fo rm of ant i -communism by the gather ing temper of the people. It is no less mis leading to charac­terise the direct act ion as a product o f communal i sm. I f the m i n o r i t y communit ies , wh ich were also the worst affected by the communist ru le , j o i n e d the movement th rough the i r respective organisations, that does not change the character of the upsurge f r o m being one in wh ich a l l po l i t i ca l ly conscious sections of the people except the communists jo ined together.

I t is possible, to draw f r o m the above analysis some general con­clusions, f i r s t , there was a conti­nuous tension between the loyal ty of the Government to the communist ideology and the necessity of its func t ion ing w i t h i n the f ramework of a democratic const i tut ion. As we saw, this tension u l t imate ly resulted in t i l t i n g the balance in favour o f the Par ty . Secondly, the r i g i d i t y w i t h wh ich the communists in Ke­rala approached every problem pro­ved them to be incapable of that m i n i m u m sensitivity to publ ic op i ­n ion that is so essential to the effec­t ive funct ioning of a par l iamentary democracy. F i n a l l y , there was a continuous pressure f rom the rank-and-file of the Party on the Govern­ment wh ich led the latter away f rom moderation and pract ical considera­tions and made i t more and more partisan in its general approach. A pre-requisite of democratic govern­ment is that the interests of the na­t ion (or the State) are placed above the interests of the Par ty . This was not achieved in Kerala .

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November 28, 1959 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY

T h i s Announcement I s N o t an I n v i t a t i o n to Subscribe fo r Debenture Stock bu t I s Issued f o r t he Purpose o f Giving I n f o r m a t i o n Concerning: the Company. A F o r m a l Prospectus, Da ted 20th November, 1959, H a s Been Delivered to the Regis t rar of Companies, West B e n g a l ) fo r Reg i s t ra t ion a n d Copies Thereof, a long w i t h App l i ca t i on Forms , A r e Obtainable f r o m the Banks and Broke r s Named Below.

1600

INDIAN ALUMINIUM COMPANY, LTD.

T H E E C O N O M I C W E E K L Y November 28, 1959

1601

Company's plans fo r an in tegra ted expansion of i ts faci l i t ies .

DEVELOPMENT PLANS I t i s proposed to expand the annua l capacity of the

Company's smelter a t H i r a k u d f r o m 10,000 tons to 20,000 tons, thus g i v i n g the Company an ingot capacity of 25,600 tons per year. Simultaneously, the Company plans to t r ip le the capaci ty of i t s a l u m i n a p lan t a t M u r i (and related bauxite faci l i t ies a t Loha rdaga ) to enable the Company to produce 54,000 tons of a l u m i n a per year. In c a r r y i n g out this expansion, process improve­ments r equ i r ing considerable modi f ica t ion of the exist­i n g p lan t w i l l be made. This , in conjunct ion w i t h the e l imina t ion of impor ts of a lumina , should result in sub­s t an t i a l opera t ing economies.

In addi t ion , the Company's r o l l i n g m i l l a t Belur, West Bengal , w i l l be expanded f r o m a capaci ty of 9,000 tons of ro l led products per year to 16,500 tons per year. The expansion of the Belur w o r k s w i l l enable the Com­pany to produce f o i l stock, container stock, s t rong al loy sheet ( inc luding sheet fo r a i r c r a f t product ion) and a wider range of rol led products for const ruct ion, a rchi ­tec tura l and other i ndus t r i a l uses.

The Company also proposes to ins ta l a new ex t ru­sion press a t A l u p u r a m , Kera la , w h i c h w i l l be capable of producing heavy a n d large ext ruded sections and powerful enough to handle an extensive range of med ium and s t rong a l u m i n i u m alloys. The Company believes tha t the new press, in conjunct ion w i t h the present one, w i l l give much greater flexibility to extrus ion operations and w i l l enable the Company to meet the demands for a wide va r i e ty of a l u m i n i u m extrusions. The ra ted capacity o f the press w i l l be approximate ly 2,500 tons of extruded sections per year.

F I N A N C I N G A N D F I N A N C I A L I N F O R M A T I O N

The amount required fo r the expansion programme, inc lud ing add i t iona l w o r k i n g capi ta l , i s es t imated to be Rs. 9.1 crores, pa r t of w h i c h w i l l be f inanced by the issue of Rs. 3,00,00,000 6¼% Debenture Stock. In addi t ion , the Company has made ar rangements f o r a do l la r loan f r o m A l u m i n i u m L i m i t e d , Canada. The balance w i l l be financed by depreciat ion reserves, deve­lopment rebate reserves, undis t r ibu ted earnings and bank loans.

I t i s es t imated t ha t , a t the end of December 1959, the w r i t t e n down value o f the F i x e d Assets w i l l exceed Rs. 6.5 crores.

The f o l l o w i n g is an ex t rac t f r o m the accounts of the Company as reported on by i ts A u d i t o r s :

Year ended 31st December 1958 7,42,97,113 1,37,52,940 57,71,738

8 months ended 31st Augus t 1959 6,02,95,303 1,54,96.229 66,80,661

Figures m a r k e d w i t h * have been adjusted in v iew of i n f o r m a t i o n subsequently received f r o m the f igures shown in the Report dated 12th December, 1956, incor-porated in the Prospectus issued by the Company on 20th December, 1956.

Assets and Liabi l i t ies as at 31st August , 1959.

Rs. Fixed Assets—At Or ig ina l Cost less

Depreciation 6,54,29,521 Inves tments—At Cost . . . . 12,519 Current Assets . . . . 5,44,68,802

T o t a l Assets . . 11,99,10,842 Less Liab i l i t i es and other Provis ions . . 5,20,96,929

Net Assets as at 31st August 1959 .. 6,78,13,913

Dividend on Paid Up Capital

Dividends paid on Ord ina ry Shares were 9% for the year ended 31st December 1955, 10% fo r the year ended 31st December 1956, 6% for the year ended 31st December 1957, and 7% for the year ended 31st Dec­ember 1958.

PROSPECTUS AND APPLICATION FORMS

Copies of the Prospectus, on the terms of w h i c h alone applicat ions w i l l be considered, and Appl ica t ion Forms may be obtained f rom the fo l l owing :

(a) any b ranch o f Lloyds Bank L i m i t e d in Ind ia ,

(b) any branch of The F i r s t N a t i o n a l C i ty B a n k of New Y o r k in Ind ia ,

(c) any branch of The B a n k of I n d i a L i m i t e d si tuated at Calcut ta , Bombay, Madras , Delhi , New Delhi , Cochin, Kanpur , Ahmedabad and Hyderabad (Deccan),

(d) Place, Siddons & Gough (Pr iva te ) L i m i t e d , 6, Lyons Range, Calcut ta-1 ,

(e) Messrs. B a t l i v a l a & K a r a n i , Un ion B a n k B u i l d ­ing, D a l a i Street. Port , Bombay-1 ,

( f ) Messrs. Lewis & Jones, B a n k of Baroda Bu i ld ­ing, Apo l lo Street, Fo r t , Bombay-1 ,

(g) Messrs. Paterson & Co., Badsha Bu i ld ing , 22, E r r a b a l u Chet ty Street, P.O. Box 48, Madras-1 ,

(h) Messrs. Harbans Singh Mehta & Co,, S3, Regal Bui ldings, Pa r l i ament Street, P.O. Box 300, New Delh i -1 .

S U B S C R I P T I O N L I S T

The subscript ion l i s t w i l l open a t the commence­ment of b a n k i n g hours on the 1st December, 1959 and w i l t r emain open u n t i l the close o f b a n k i n g hours on the 3 rd December, 1959, or l a t e r a t the discre t ion of the Directors .