khoo & smith - future of american hegemony in asia pacific

8/9/2019 Khoo & Smith - Future of American Hegemony in Asia Pacific

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Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 56, No. 1, pp. 6581, 2002

The future of American hegemony in the

Asia-Pacic: a Concert of Asia or a clearpecking order?

NICHOLAS KHOO AND MICHAEL L. SMITH

Americas goals are to promote peace, sustain freedom, and encourage pros-

perity. U.S. leadership is premised on sustaining an international system that isrespectful of the rule of law.

Department of Defense,

Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 30 September 2001, p. 1.

Achieving a full-edged Asia-Pacic Concert of powers will be difcult Yet

an effort to forge a Concert should be undertaken even if it is unable to reach

the ambitious standard of the nineteenth century Concert of Europe and

achieves only ad hoc multilateralism or regular consultations among the powers.

Susan Shirk

(former US Deputy Assistant-Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs)1

I met Murder on the Way

He had a mask like Castlereagh

Percy Bysshe Shelley

(from The Mask of Anarchy, 1819)2

It might be argued that the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in the United States in

September 2001 has crucially altered the premises of US f oreign policy. In this

putative new era, it might be suggested, everything will be subordinated to theso-called war against terrorism. This will override previous foreign policy consid-

erations, most notably the tendency in US policy towards the maintenance of an

explicit position of hegemony in the world order (Wohlforth 1999). Aspects of

ofcial American rhetoric proclaiming how the evil forces of terror have initiated

a war against America and its way of life (Rumsfeld in Department of Defense

2001: iii) would appear to lend support to such a thesis. According to this view, thepriority of combating the threat of international terror will supersede disagreements

among the major powers and lead to a toning down of any further disposition in1 (Shirk 1997)2 This extract comprises part of the second stanza of The Mask of Anarchy written by Shelley to commemorate

the killing of 15 people by local yeomanry during a demonstration for parliamentary reform in St Peters Field,

Manchester, England, on 16 August 1819: an event subsequently called the Peterloo Massacre, a play of words

on the Battle of Waterloo (1815), which, following the defeat of Napoleon, ushered in the period known as the

Concert of Europe.

ISSN 1035-771 8 print/ISSN 1465-332 X online/02/010065-17 2002 Australian Institute of International Affairs

DOI: 10.1080/1035771022012084 7


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66 N. Khoo and M. L. Smith

the Bush Administration towards foreign policy unilateralism. For practical en-

dorsement of this proposition, observers might point to a new willingness on the

part of the US to thaw relations with China and Russia (see Goldstein 2001b;

Wastell 2001). The changed atmosphere, therefore, stands to herald a new spirit of

international cooperation characterised by coalition building and shared approachesto the management of regional problems.

Notwithstanding the undoubted, yet still unclear, repercussions on the inter-

national system of the events of 11 September, this article argues that as far as the

stability of the Asia-Pacic region is concerned, the transformative impact of the

war against terrorism should not be permitted to obscure the continuity in the

underlying dynamics of regional relations. We shall argue that the discussion about

how to manage a fundamentally volatile region either through multilateral or

unilateral means is an important one that has yet to be adequately discussed in the

literature on the region. Consequently, this article examines the debate about how

to preserve order in the Asia-Pacic. In particular, we shall assess the validity of

two contrasting arguments about how to address the sources of instability in the

region. The rst approach we analyse is the advocacy for a multilateral system

based on a concert of major powers in Asia-Pacic, an idea that has been canvassed

since 1997. Against this view, we also evaluate the contending argument that

regional stability can most desirably be upheld through the preponderance of

American political and economic power.3

Throughout, the argument pursued in this paper is clear: that multilateralistschemes, and specically those ideas that relate to a concert of powersand

variations on the themelack credibility. This paper will evaluate the unlikelihood

of the events of 11 September to rehabilitate the notion of a concert of powers in

Asia, as will become evident when we analyse the problems extant in the Sino-USrelationship . In the end, though, we conclude that the basic pattern of bilateral

relations between the two states will remain unchanged, thus continuing to make

the Sino-US relationship the most intractable of great power rivalries in the

twenty-rst century. Ultimately, this paper points to the value of a benign American

hegemony in the Asia-Pacic and acknowledges the desirability of seeking in-

creased US involvement and leadership in the region.

Maintaining stability in a volatile region

It is clear from ofcial statements that the United States continues to assign great

importance to the provision of a stable balance in Asia (see Department of Defense,

2001: 1). This understanding is premised on the belief that Americas political,diplomatic, and economic leadership contributes directly to global peace, freedom,

and prosperity It provides a general sense of stability and condence, which is

crucial to the economic prosperity that benets much of the world (Department of

Defense 2001: 1). Essential to this goal is to prevent the emergence of hostile

3 It should be noted that we do not deal with every conceivable option for US foreign policy. In particular, we do

not evaluate the arguments for isolationism.


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The future of American hegemony in the Asia-Pacic 67

domination of competing powers, which might disturb American dominion

(Department of Defense 2001: 2). The US, however, acknowledges that maintain-

ing order in the East Asia littoral will be a complex task given the vast distances

in the Asian theatre and the fact that the density of U.S. basing and en route

infrastructure is lower than in other crucial regions (Department of Defense2001: 4).

US concerns about East Asian stability are warranted. If the history of the

twentieth century is any guide, Washington will continue to have its hands full

dealing with the Asia-Pacic. Historic animositie s4 and unresolved Cold War

disputes,5 combined with more recent territorial disputes ranging from the South

China Sea to the East China Sea make for a volatile region (Freidburg 2000a;

Freidburg 1993/94b; Betts 1993/94). To complicate matters, there is the issue of

how to deal with China, a rising power and traditional hegemon in the region

(Khalilzad 1999; Betts and Christiensen 2000; Shambaugh 1994; Goldstein 1997/

98: Johnston and Ross 1999: Roy 1994; Shinn 1996). Until the East Asian nancial

crisis of 1997, drawing attention to these underlying elements of instability that

twenty years of economic growth had obscured would have been deemed unneces-

sarily alarmist. However, the succeeding years since 1997 have overturned many of

the previously accepted assumptions about the evolving security environment in the

Asia-Pacic. As a result of the economic crisis, governments have fallen in

Indonesia, Thailand, and South Korea, or come perilously close to the precipice, as

in Malaysia, and have made only faltering political and economic progress since.Tougher times are still ahead. While there was a brief bout of optimism during

1999/2000 at the slight, though very patchy, economic recovery (Holland 2000) and

the seeming return of a semblance of political stability, with the global recessionary

forces setting in, uncertainty has increased.6 Furthermore, in the aftermath of theevents of 11 September, the open secret of Southeast Asian politics that the region

is a haven for Islamic extremist groups has become evident for all to see. The

revelations that fundamentalist Islamic groups linked with the Al-Qaeda movement

maintain a network of cells in Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia

could not have come at a worse time (see Mydans 2001; Lander 2001; Far Eastern

Economic Review 2001; Asian Wall Street Journal 2001). In Northeast Asia, China

is struggling, inter alia, to maintain social and political stability as it reforms its

economy to adapt to the terms it acceded to in negotiating its entry into the World

Trade Organisation. Moreover, issues affecting regional stability that have hitherto

received insufcient attention include the ongoing separatist conicts in Indonesia,

the worlds fourth largest state (in terms of population). Internal secession move-

ments currently exist in Aceh (Murphy 2001; Chandrasekaran 2000a; Dhume

2000), the Moluccas Islands (Pereira 2001) and Irian Jaya (Maynard 2000).Additionally, tensions remain over the recent independence of East Timor (Tanter

4 In particular, since the turn of the nineteenth century, the Japanese-Chinese relationship has been a persistent source

of instability in East Asia as Japan emerged as a competitor to China, the traditional regional hegemon.5 Most prominent among these are the Taiwan issue and the conict on the Korean peninsula.6 Disturbingly, many states, particularly in Southeast Asia, but also in Northeast Asia (such as South Korea) have

used the limited turnaround in 1999 as an excuse not to undertake comprehensive reform. (See Arnold 2000).


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et al. 2000), while ethnic conict is of real concern in Kalimantan (Chandrasekaran

2001b; Sims 2001).

In the midst of this tumult, what is required, some observers maintain, is a stable

and predictable pattern of multilateral-based diplomacy to manage rivalry and

reduce tensions. Before the onset of the 1997/98 Asia-Pacic nancial crisis, muchdiplomatic and scholarly opinion held that the Association of Southeast AsianNations (ASEAN) could provide the basis for a new era in regional security

management (Acharya 1993a: 3 7). In particular, its pan-Pacic offshoot, the

ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was invested with high hopes. Established in 1994,

the ARF is a heterogeneous multilateral grouping intended to address regional

issues in an ostensibly transformed post-Cold War era. Before the crisis struck, the

ARF, it was maintained, would extend the harmonious and inclusive practices of

the ASEAN way across the Pacic (see Leifer 1996a). By bringing together both

the ASEAN states and twelve dialogue partners including China, Japan, the United

States, Australia and the European Union into non-confrontationa l dialogue, it was

hoped that the security of the Asia-Pacic would be guaranteed through process-

oriented condence building . A particular goal of the ARF in this respect,

according to Leifer, was to educate an irredentist China in the canons of good

regional citizenship and to sustain the active engagement of the United States in

regional affairs(Leifer 1995b).

While the ARF gained admirers who saw it as an exciting experiment in

cooperative security (Khong 1997: 298), the limitations of its non-binding, consen-sus-oriented approach were graphically exposed by the aforementioned economic

crisis (Cotton 1998: 17 21). By late 1998, even voices in some of ASEANs more

heavily controlled media began to acknowledge that it had played only a marginal

role in warding off the worst effects of some members economic and socialcollapse (Straits Times 11 December 1998). Not surprisingly, the impotence of

both ASEAN and the ARF in the face of nancial meltdown and accompanying

political turmoil has caused analysts to rethink their previous endorsement of

regional multilateralism (Dibb, Hale and Prince 1999: 5 20; Leifer 1999c: 25).

Evaluating a Concert of Asia

Recently, the notion of a Concert of Asia has been canvassed as an alternative

(Shirk 1997: 245 70; Acharya 1999b; Stuart 1997). The Concert idea implicitly or

explicitly takes as its model the Concert of Europe, which lasted between 1815 and

1854. Conceived after the fall of Napoleon, the Concert was a coercive diplomatic-

security institutio n in which Britain, Austria, Russia, Prussia, and later France,

managed the European order in a manner consistent with their perceived interestsin upholding the internal stability and territorial integrity of the continental state

system (Kissinger 1964; Holbraad 1970; Bridge and Bullen 1980; Medlicott 1956).

Over the years, the Concert of Europe has attracted the attention of numerous

observers who perceive the Concert idea as a viable mechanism to manage regional

affairs (see Wheeler and Booth 1987: 317 18). One writer, in proposing the

Concert model for contemporary Asia, has noted that the recent occurrence of


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bilateral summitry between the regions four great powersthe US, China, Japan

and Russiacould, like the Concert of Europe, be formalised into a system that is

able to contain rivalry, maintain order and preserve the peace (Acharya 1999b:

84 5). On the surface this may seem a plausible idea. Closer inspection, however,

reveals such advocacy to be based on a suspect historical interpretation of theConcert of Europe that renders its applicability in Asia highly questionable.

Rather, a much more compelling case can be made that peace and stability in the

Asia-Pacic will ow from a unipolar distribution of power that is predicated on

American preeminence (for theoretical support concerning this point of view see

Blainey 1973: 114; Gilpin 1981: 9 49; Wohlforth 1999). This view does not

receive a ringing endorsement from many quarters. The French Foreign Minister

Hubert Vedrine, in referring to the United States as a hyperpower, has expressed

his dissatisfaction with what he believes are American pretensions to dictate the

global agenda for the twenty-rst century (Whitney 2000). More recently, the

Peoples Daily in China, reecting the views of the Chinese leadership, slammed

an ofcial White House report that called for American global leadership in the

new century, saying that leadership in this respect is synonymous with American

hegemony (Agence France Presse 2000).

As both the Chinese and French reactions show, the desirability of a unipolar

distribution of global power is a contentious issue. Indeed, since the end of the

Cold War, the French, Chinese and Russians have regularly called for a return to

a multipolar system reminiscent of that which existed in the nineteenth century.Notwithstandin g these views, a close examination of the nineteenth century

multipolar Concert system reveals that a skewed distribution of power in Washing-

tons favour, both globally as well as in the Asia-Pacic, has much to recommend

it.

Problems with a Concert of Powers in Asia

Writing on the eve of World War Two, E. H. Carr observed that establishin g

methods of peaceful economic and political change constituted the fundamental

problem of international relations (Carr 1964: 208 23). Sixty years later, many

decision-makers in Asia would undoubtedly agree with Carrs insight. In Southeast

Asia, other than Singapore, the core states of ASEAN are facing various forms of

internal dissension that have attended the prolonged wake of the nancial crisis of

1997. Secessionist movements in Indonesia and the Philippines, or domestic

political transitions (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines ) have

challenged the straight-line projections of unrelenting economic growth that were

proffered in the early and mid-1990s. In Northeast Asia, governments in Taiwanand South Korea both face strong domestic opposition parties that resist current

domestic and foreign policies. For its part, China is struggling to pacify the

seemingly intractable Falungong movement (Agence France Presse 2001), even as

it faces the innumerable difculties associated with the modernisation of its

economy. What is needed is a period of stability at the strategic level as domestic

arrangements in the region are stabilised. Given these multiple challenges to the


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regional order in the Asia-Pacic, it is doubtful that a Concert of Asia is the best

instrument available to accomplish this task.

Despite the claims of contemporary enthusiasts, the Concert of Europe was not,

in fact, primarily an exercise in the management of change. It was an attempt to

protect the old dynastic order against the dangerous democratic forces unleashedby the French revolution. The crushing of popular uprisings across Europe in 1848was an example of the Concert in action. But Concert of Asia advocates present a

Concert as if it were an institution facilitating mutual self-restraint, benignly akin,

say, to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (Acharya 1999: 85,

89 90; Wheeler and Booth: 318). Given that the Concert of Europe had as much

to do with the suppression of domestic order as the preservation of peace between

its members, the doubtful relevance of the idea to Asia is at once clear.

Advocates of a Concert system for Asia also overlook an important ingredient

that accounts for what is said to be its success in Europe, namely, the homogeneous

nature of the continents political regimes. The fact that all the major powers of

Europe were monarchies, the ruling families often being related to each other

through inter-marriage, gave these states a shared interest in the preservation of the

status quo. By contrast, in Asia there exists a plurality of regimes (as well as a host

of ethnic, religious and other divisions), which do not provide for a similarity of

outlook. American liberalism, for instance, sits ill with Chinas authoritarianism,

Japans corporate political culture and Russias faltering experiment in oligopolis-

tic-based democracy.This illustrates a key problem for a Concert of Asia. For it to have meaning, a

Concert must have rules. States must agree to restrain their ambitions, to refrain

from actions that would destabilise the region, and to support each other in times

of crisis. A commonalty of interest is essential if a Concert is to succeed. Tomaintain an Asia-Pacic Concert, the leaders of China, the United States, Japan and

Russia must be willing to agree to preserve largely intact the status quo at both the

domestic and international levels.

It is unlikely to nd much consent for these terms. China may wish to preserve

its domestic order, but would never agree to be constrained internationally (Roy

1994; Segal 1996). It will not accept restrictions over its policies towards, say,

Taiwan or the rate of the Peoples Liberation Armys military modernisation. Nor

is it probable that the Chinese would indenitely support the continued American

military presence in the region, particularly if the US seriously moves to extend its

Theater Missile Defense system to Asia while continuing to thwart Beijings ability

to bring Taiwan back into its fold (see Christiensen 2000: Cambone 1997).

Conversely, while the United States may see some virtue in adhering to the

current international status quo, it is unclear that the necessary domestic support forthis position can be sustained in the long run. This is particularly the case if Beijing

continues its egregious record on human rights (Nathan 1997: 246 62; Pan 2001;

Seymour 1998: 217 38). In any event, American public opinion would not support

Washington going to Beijings aid if Communist party rule were ever seriously

threatened. However, the need to maintain the legitimacy of a Concert system

would require such US support. Is it realistic to expect the United States to assist


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the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) if its rule was ever seriously challenged, in

the way that in accordance with the terms of the Concert of Europe, the Russian

army marched into Hungary in April 1849 in order to crush a secessionist rebellion

and restore Austrian rule?

Of course, advocates of a Concert of Asia do not articulate such implications .Indeed, they may entirely refute any suggestion that the United States should, as inthe hypothetical example above, provide succour to the CCP. The point is, though,

that if one takes the example of the Concert of Europe as ones framework, then

one has to defend the integrity of the model. One cannot simply pick and choose

those aspects of the Concert of Europe deemed to be positive, while ignoring all

the other characteristics integral to that system. The fact is that the expectation of

a Concert system, as practised in nineteenth-century Europe, was that in the face

of a regime change or any alteration in the regional rmament, the ultimate logic

of the Concert is that it must always be prepared to reinstate the status quo ante.

These difculties merely preface many other questions about the viability of a

Concert of Asia. Would a Concert be acceptable to the smaller ASEAN nations

who would be asked to follow the strategic diktat of states that they either suspect

of harbouring designs to impose traditiona l patterns of dominance (China), or

whom they have still not completely forgiven for acts committed more than half a

century ago (Japan)? In fact, it might be further contended that the very idea of a

Concert system undermines the entire ASEAN construct, premised as it is on the

principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. By contrast,the fundamental rationale of a Concert, certainly as practised in nineteenth-century

Europe, is precisely that it is based on the precept of interference in domestic

affairs to ensure that the traditional order is maintained. In this respect, the implicit

dilution of the concept of sovereign inviolabilit y under a Concert system wouldundoubtedly contradict ASEANs much stated commitment to national resilience,

through which regional resilience, it has always been assumed, would ensue.

Thus, by legitimising external interference in internal political arrangements and

sanctifying deference to great power management of the regional order a Concert

would contravene the aspiration to both national and regional resilience, and

thereby strike at the very heart of ASEANs purpose.

If the notion of a Concert is problematic in relation to Southeast Asia, which

would inevitably limit its applicability, other questions may be posed across the

Asian region more generally. For example, to reect accurately the distribution of

power in the region, would India and a united Korea not also have to be included

in any Concert? Would Beijing accept the inclusion of other regional rivals into the

pact, like India for example? Conversely, should a retrenching Russian Common-

wealth be included in any Concert? Likewise, does Japans self-containing foreign policy make it a reliable candidate for membership?7

All these questions arise even before we consider whether Concert diplomacy

7 Perversely, once in a Concert, hard-liners in Japan could actually argue that in order to full its military obligations,

the Japanese military would need to speed up its process of becoming a normal nation in terms of acquiring a

forward projection capability and other military capabilities.


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would really resolve the potentially explosive disputes, territorial or otherwise, in

both Northeast and Southeast Asia (see Yahuda 1996: 255 89; Valencia 1995).

Here we encounter even more difcult issues. How, for instance, would violations

of the rules of the Concert be handled? The coherence of a Concert demands that

the rules be enforced. As a practical matter, to have any claim to legitimacy, aConcert would have to reach some agreement regarding what is arguably the mostcontentious issue in regional security, namely, the Taiwan issue (Freidburg 2000c).

Yet, regardless of any prior Concert agreement on this issue, in a crisis situation,

how would the United States react if China launched a pre-emptive attack on

Taiwan, or if Taiwan unilaterally declared independence?

The numerous problems identied above underscore the difculties in getting a

Concert to function effectively. Even those who argue for its application to Asia

acknowledge that its European variant only worked well for eight years, from 1815

to 1823 (Acharya 1999: 85), before slowly descending into rival feuding that

culminated in the Crimean War, when Britain and France declared war against

Russia. Arguably, the short-lived nature and debatable effectiveness of the Concert

of Europe should itself provide grounds for scepticism about the relevance of such

an idea to the Asia-Pacic.

In this respect, one might contrast the Concert of Europe with the most

successful multinational security enterprise of recent times that has undoubtedly

contributed to peace and stability in Europe for the best part of 50 years, namely

the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). But this classic example of analliance-based organisation is premised on the preponderance of American power

in Western Europe and corresponds little with notions of a Concert based multilat-

eral security architecture.

Furthermore, those who espouse the Concert system insist that one of theprinciples to which one must adhere is that of equality of status among those key

powers who assume responsibility for maintaining regional order (Acharya 1999:

90). Yet, the main reason for NATOs success and longevity is precisely that it is

characterised by the dominance, both in decision making and military presence, of

one single great powerthe United Statesthat is, uniquely, external to the

continent.

Therefore, if one suggests that schemes f or a Concert have proved relatively

short lived in Europe, often foundering on the rocks of political and national

difference, then they are even less likely to be efcacious in a much more

geographically disparate and heterogeneous continent like Asia. Moreover, if one

can criticise analysts for not realising the rarity or ephemeral nature of Concert

systems in European history, they seem also not to comprehend that Asia has even

less experience of multipolarity , let alone a Concert. The only example of amultipolar system in Asia in modern times has been a negative one, covering the

period of chaos, war and colonialism between 1839 and 1945. There has been

nothing resembling a Concert in Asia. Instead, regional unipolarity has been the

rule. This is reected in the preponderance of Chinese power until the start of the

Opium Wars in 1839 (Fairbank 1968) followed by US dominance in the post-1945

period.


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The tacit consensus on American hegemony

This understanding somewhat undermines the starting point of Concert of Asia

advocates who believe that because the region is a hotbed of tension and rivalries,

it needs to be managed through a multilateral framework. It does not. Presently, abenign American hegemony prevails in the Asia-Pacic and is the key to managing

change in a uid economic and strategic environment (Walt 2000a: 64 9). More-

over, there are both theoretical and empirical bases on which to believe that this is

a favourable state of affairs.

From a theoretical perspective, US military preponderance reduces the intensity

of the security dilemmaa process where defensive actions taken to maintain a

states security are perceived as offensive threats and lead other states to take

actions that reduce the rst states securityin the region (Jervis 1978). In essence,

a robust forward US military presence mitigates the likelihood that the manypotentially explosive territorial and sovereignty dispute s will be resolved in a

manner that disrupts regional security. To cite but one example, it is the US

commitment to Taiwan since 1950 that has prevented Beijing from launching a

full-edged invasion of Taiwan. Decision-makers in Beijing, who view Taiwan as

part of their sovereign territory, have been deterred by the US military presence in

East Asia from taking what they see as defensive actions to recover Taiwan.

From an empirical perspective, American hegemony generally nds tacit and

widespread support across the region, particularly among the ASEAN states that

see the US presence as necessary to counteract possible Chinese irredentism or a

revival of Japanese militarism. For example, Singaporean Senior Minister Lee

Kuan Yew has been quoted as saying that the golden rule for Asia-Pacic securityis that of using the American presence in the region to forestall the excessive

growth and inuence of either China or Japan (quoted in Funabashi 1998; see also

Lee 2000). In recent years, such rhetoric has been backed up by Singapores

extension of naval and air force facilities to the United States.8 Arguably, even the

Chinese themselves, although they would prefer not to see the United States prevail

in the long run, discreetly defer to American power, not least, by tacitly recognisingAmericas role in helping to check any prospective Japanese or Russian adventur-

ism (Walt 2000a: 69; Zakheim 2000: 10 11).

Finally, it may be added that the best way to keep the United States rmly

anchored in the Asia-Pacic region is to accept rather than challenge its de facto

hegemony. Since the founding of the United States, ideas of seeking hegemony

have sat uneasily with American self-perceptions. Contrary to the stereotype of a

rampaging hyperpower, more often an isolationist, or at least an America rst,

policy has prevailed, which has often explicitly sought to eschew major foreign

entanglements beyond it own backyard in Central America. It is a position that

8 The Changi naval base in Singapore that is currently in the process of being constructed will possess extensive

facilities to service US aircraft carriers. See US Department of Defense website, Defense Link, Douglas Gilbert,

Cohens Visit Produces Harbor Promise, available at http://www.defenselink.mil. In addition, in recent years more

informal arrangements in terms of the provision of naval facilities and regular port visits have been extended to

US forces by Malaysia and Indonesia.


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still nds resonance in US foreign policy making, especially toward the right-wing

of the Republican Party. Arguably, only since 1945 has the United States adopted

a more explicit policy of seeking pre-eminence (Layne 1998: 10; Etzold and

Gaddis 1978: 401) in world affairs to a point where notions of world leadership are

more readily accepted within both popular and elite opinion (Berger 1999: 3 4;Walt 2000a: 78 9). However, the element of the reluctant hegemon still residesbelow the surface of American foreign policy. A continued demonstration by the

Asia-Pacic region that the American role is appreciated will go a long way

towards ensuring that there is no inadvertent scaling down of that presence. One

needs only to consider the 1992 decision by the Philippine s to close down

American bases at Clarke Air Field and Subic Bay to appreciate the fact that

American decision-makers do know when they are not wanted. A critic might argue

that rising Filipino nationalism meant that a United States pullout was inevitable.

However, the elation within some quarters of the Filipino population that ac-

companied the withdrawal of the American forces has been short-lived. It has since

given way to a more sober assessment of regional security in Manila. In particular,

following the United States pullout, the Philippines has been experiencing problems

with Beijings hawkishly expansive claims in the South China Sea (Valencia 1995;

44 8). These claims now stretch into the Philippines 200 nautical mile maritime

Exclusive Economic Zone. Chinas aggressiveness in the South China Sea has led

Manila to negotiate a Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with the United States

(Richardson 1998).9 The Filipino example merely highlights the fact that notwith-standing the Vietnam War interlude, it has been Americas hegemonic position that

has underpinned relative stability in Asia for the better part of two generations.

Departing from that formula brings unintended consequences, as the Filipinos

discovered.

The effects of 11 September on Sino-US relationsanother chance for a

Concert of Asia?

Those sceptical of the virtue of American hegemony might argue that the events of

11 September have had a moderating, if not transforming effect on the international

relations of the region. One possible variant of this argument could be that the

sources of tension identied earlier in this paper have been mitigated because of the

need for cooperative relations in order for the Bush Administration to efciently

prosecute its war on terrorism. It could, therefore, be contended that the concert of

Asia could reassert itself as a possible diplomatic tool. However, a close analysis

of the key regional bilateral relationship in the Asia-Pacic between China and the

US reveals that underlying tensions remain intact and if anything, present newsources of friction (Khoo and Schneider 2001).

Undoubtedly, Washington and Beijing have important mutual interests in con-

9 In arguing for the need for a VFA with the US, former President Estrada specically cited the growing Chinese

assertiveness in Manilas Exclusive Economic Zone. Estrada pointed out: If we cooperate with the US, our security

will be protected. In case of further disputes over the Spratly Islands and the Peoples Republic of China invades

us, how do we defend ourselves? (Quoted in Richardson 1998).


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taining Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia and beyond. Hence, it is no surprise

that both sides have emphasised their common interest in combating terrorism.

After his recent meeting in Shanghai with Chinese President Jiang Zemin, President

Bush declared that the United States and China can accomplish a lot when we

work together to ght terrorism (U.S. Newswire 2001). Chinese ofcials evince asimilar level of enthusiasm about the potential for increased cooperation incombating terrorism. In a press conference after a recent visit to Washington,

Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan stated that we rmly oppose and strongly

condemn all forms of terrorism and both sides agree to carry out even better

co-operation on this question in the future (Mufson 2001). Some academics have

gone even further. Writing in the 18 October 2001 issue of the International Herald

Tribune , David Shambaugh and Robert Litwak have expressed the view that the

current campaign against global terrorism, in which the two governments have

cooperated extensively, offers a chance to improve the relationship.

In this respect, it could be argued that a putative concert involving the US and

China may be emerging and might be able to deal with the major issues aficting

the regional order. According to Goldsteins survey of the potential implications of

movement towards such a state of affairs, a reorientation of bilateral relations

would, in essence, be to reprise, in modied form, the Sino-American entente

inaugurated by President Nixon in 1972 when parallel interests in opposing the

Soviet threat nurtured strategic cooperation between Washington and Beijing,

despite differences over political ideology and disagreements about the future ofTaiwan. Were relations to be recast in this manner, Goldstein continues, it would

mean that human rights, Taiwan, and concerns about whether China may one day

pose a military threat to US interests, would be subordinated to the immediate need

to cope with the tangible terrorist challenge. Further, he maintains, This perspec-tive, in short, argues for a return to viewing China as a strategic partner and in

a fashion that goes well beyond the rhetoric surrounding US China policy during

the Washington and Beijing summits of 1997 and 1998 (Goldstein 2001b).

Notwithstanding the convergence on the issue of terrorism, major differences in

the two sides interests and perceptions remain, suggesting that, ultimately, any

Sino-US rapprochement based on resisting the threat of Islamic extremism will

only be a temporary expedient. On the broadest strategic level, the US is generally

satised with its position at the top of the global pecking order. From this position,

the Bush Administration has been able to shape the geopolitical map in ways that

it believes advance US interests and which often directly or indirectly impinge on

Beijings interests. In some cases, the Bush Administration has sought to change

the status quo by advancing policies such as NATO expansion and the development

of a National Missile Defense (NMD) system. In other instances, such as insistingthat force not be used to settle the issue of Taiwan, or by de facto vetoing the Kyoto

Accords on the environment, the US has upheld the status quo. Whatever the

specic policy, the goal is similarto perpetuate a global order that bolsters

Washingtons interests (Khoo and Schneider).

Beijing sees the geo-strategic situation very differently. Its government ofcials,

academics and media regularly call for the development of a multipolar world


12/17


where no power is dominant. In this context, China wants to resume its historic role

as regional hegemon, and US dominance is an obstacle to the fullment of its

aspirations. (Pomfret 2001c). Chinese academics and policymakers frequently refer

to the US as a global hegemon: indeed, the Chinese word for hegemon, baguo, has

become a code word for a malign global US domination. In a thinly disguisedexpression of its disapproval of the existing global and regional strategic balance,a Chinese government Defence White Paper released in October 2000 declared:

No fundamental change has been made in the old, unfair and irrational inter-

national political and economic order. Certain big powers are pursuing neo-inter-

ventionism, neo-gunboa t diplomacy and neo-economic colonialism, which are

seriously damaging the sovereignty, independence, and developmental interests of

many countries, and threatening world peace and security (quoted in Pomfret

2000a).

Given the foregoing, it is highly unlikely that either sides position has been

fundamentally altered by the events of 11 September. A review of a few major

issue areas in the bilateral relationship merely reinforces this view. For example,

the two sides continue to perceive the NMD issue very differently. In the aftermath

of 11 September, the Bush Administration appears more determined than ever to

build an NMD system, primarily because it sees such a system as a viable defence

against a nuclear terrorist attack. Even more troubling from the Chinese point of

view, the administration continues to downplay Chinese concerns about NMD even

as it very publicly courts Russias President Putin (Pincus and Sipress 2001).In addition, the two sides continue to hold different views on the issue of

Taiwan. Chinas position is that the island is an integral part of China and that

China reserves the right to use force to reunify Taiwan with the mainland. This

contrasts starkly with the longstanding US position that the issue must not beresolved by force. And the Chinese have recently stressed that Taiwan is the central

issue in bilateral relations. During his recent visit to Washington, Chinese Foreign

Minister Tang stated that Taiwan remained the most important and outstanding

issue in US-China relations (Mufson, 2001).

Yet to view the Sino-US relationship after 11 September 2001 merely through

the prism of the familiar issues of NMD and Taiwan would be to adopt too narrow

a perspective. The events of 11 September and their aftermath also affect Beijings

and Washingtons relationships with other regional powers, namely Russia, India,

Pakistan and Japan. After repeated attempts by both Russia and China to strengthen

their own ties as a counterweight to US hegemony, China must view the current

rapprochement between the US and Russia with some concern. The same is

probably the case regarding Pakistans swing towards the US. Although this shift

does not necessarily constitute a loss for China, it must be disconcerting for Beijingto see both its longstanding rival India and its old friend Pakistan cooperating so

closely with the US. In addition, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, all

partners with China and Russia in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, have

offered support to Washington. Furthermore, US troops are currently operating

from Uzbekistan and Pakistan. This means that US troops now face Chinas eastern

and western frontiers (Khoo and Schneider 2001).


13/17


Perhaps most worrying from Chinas point of view has been the increasingly

proactive posture of the Japanese Self-Defence Forces. The Japanese government

has used the events of 11 September as an opportunity to expand the scope of

Japans armed forces by allowing them to supply logistic support for US operations

in Central Asia (Lague 2001). Given the turbulent history of Sino-Japaneserelations, any attempt by Japan to become a normal power is very troubling toChina. In particular, modication or elimination of Article 9, the provision of

Japans postwar constitutio n that renounces war and the threat or use of force,

would be seen as a threat to Chinas national security interests. The Japanese

Self-Defence Forces, with an estimated annual budget of $50 billion, are the most

sophisticated in East Asia and could be converted fairly easily into an offensive

force directed against China. That Washington is encouraging this shift suggests,

from Beijings point of view, a US attempt to constrain China.

The common interests that the US and China share in the war on terrorism may

indeed provide a momentary llip to bilateral relations. Yet even the war on

terrorism may ultimately lead to a deterioration in bilateral relations. As noted

above, many of the ramications of the war on terrorism are highly problematic for

China. Moreover, if the scope of the war aims changes, for example by expanding

to include the ouster of Saddam Hussein, as advocated by Deputy Secretary of

Defense Paul Wolfowitz, China is likely to oppose Washington (Hayes 2001). US

circumvention of Chinese oppositio n by acting unilaterally would only raise

Chinese fears that the US is a coercive hegemon that must eventually be challenged(Deng 2001). In effect, then, it might in fact be contended that if a putative Concert

of Asia is emerging in any form, it is one that is likely to be premised on the

capacity to contain China, rather than one designed to co-manage the regional

rmament with the Chinese.Whatever the effect of the war on terrorism, important longstandin g issues in

bilateral relations highlighted in this analysis suggest that Sino-US relations remain

basically unchanged. It is still this fundamental divergence that threatens to make

the Sino-US relationship the most intractable great power rivalry in the twenty-rst

century.

Conclusion: spreading the burden

As the Bush Administration attempts to shape Americas Asia policy, it should

keep in mind that American hegemony or leadership is not necessarily incompatible

with a posture that provides incentives for security cooperation. Indeed, all means

to provide stability in a potentially volatile region deserve a full airing. Perhaps,

though, a distinction needs to be drawn between the more formalised versions ofsecurity cooperation such as a Concert of Asia that imply, over the course of an

unspecied time-frame, a diminution of American dominance in the Asia-Pacic,

and the very loose forms of security cooperation that are compatible with United

States leadership in the Asia-Pacic. In this regard, recent calls by Zbigniew

Brzezinski for greater security cooperation between the United States and the

various players (including China) in the Asia-Pacic (Brzezinski 2000a: 6), that are


14/17


implicitly premised on the existing reality of American dominance (Brzezinski

2000b), are far more viable than a Concert of Powers. They have the added merit

of representing a practical attempt to think about ways to spread responsibility for

the regions security affairs, thus avoiding the issue of imperial overstretch that

has tripped up previous global hegemons (Kennedy 1989). After all, why shouldthe United States seek to deal unilaterally on every single issue that crops up(Huntington 1999)? A process of regional consultation among Americas allies and

willing partners to coordinate joint action towards specic problems may go some

way to preserving American resources and capability to project power at a global

level. The Australian-led intervention in East Timor in September 1999, which was

backed up by American logistical support, is one example of such an approach.

Relying on existing American bilateral alliances and loose diplomatic formations

is quite different f rom the notion of an explicit regional management system

encapsulated in the idea of a Concert of Asia. On closer reading, the proposal for

a formalised Concert of Asia along the lines of the Concert of Europe that some

scholars endorse appears to have little to do with the intrinsic condition of the

regions international relations. Rather, it seems to have more to with an attempt

by some advocates to rehabilitate their notions of cooperative security. According

to one commentator, A modern Asian concert is likely to be based on the same

set of norms that underpin the ARF, and it may prove more effective in crisis-man-

agement and preventive diplomacy (Acharya 1999b: 98). Thus, a Concert can be

viewed as a middle way between the realist balance of power assumptions theyoppose, and the multilateral security efforts they once extolled, but which were

revealed as ineffective during the recent Asian economic crisis. If multilateralists

are suggesting that an informal framework of bilateral meetings between the

regions major powers constitute a putative Concert of Asia (Shirk 1997: 269 70),then one might inquire how this differs from routine diplomatic activity the world

over? To label such activity with ostentatious terms like Concert misunderstands

the reality of international relations in the Asia-Pacic.

In conclusion, a Concert of Asia has little to recommend it in practice. The

example of the Concert of Europe on which the idea draws its sustenance was a

regressive construct that inhibited change and arguably contributed to the later

convulsions in the European order (see Langhorne 1981). Whatever the merits of

the Concert idea as a debating point, ultimately, the aws of a short-lived system,

the chief premise of which was to crush internal dissent, is neither an appropriate

model for Asia in the twenty-rst century, nor an inspiring advertisement of foreign

policy enlightenment. As has been argued, an American grand strategy that seeks

to preserve the United States position in the global hierarchy is both plausible and

desirable. Provided American leadership is exercised wisely, there is every reasonto expect that rather than balancing against the United States, the majority of the

regions major powers will bandwagon with, or otherwise defer to, the United

States (see Walt 1987b; Schweller 1994). If anything, the war against terrorism has

only accentuated this phenomenon, with all but the most rejectionist elements in the

international system lining up behind US leadership. Moreover, the relative speed

and effectiveness with which US military action dispatched the Taliban regime in


15/17


Afghanistan merely underscores the dominance of American power rather than

signalling a precursor to new forms of multilateral diplomacy. In so far as the

security of the Asia-Pacic is concerned, one Southeast Asian diplomat encapsu-

lated the prevailing viewpoint among the regions capitals when he observed that:

even with all its problems we still need the United States. Basically our choice isbetween a hegemony in Washington or a hegemony in Beijing. We are stillchoosing the United States (quoted in Pomfret 2001b). The foregoing quote

highlights the relevance of Geoffrey Blaineys crucial theoretical insight, that it is

a clear preponderance of power that is most likely to produce peace (Blainey 1973:

113). Despite claims to the contrary and the temporary alliances forged in the wake

of the 11 September crisis, as it turns out, what is needed to manage the security

in the Asia-Pacic is not a Concert of powers but a clear pecking order, with a

benevolent hegemonthe United Statesat the top.

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