Taranatha’s "Twenty-one Differences w ith regard to the Profound M eaning"1 — A Possible Starting-Point for Studies in the gZhan stong M adhyamaka

Klaus-Dieter Mathes Kathmandu

1. Abstract

The distinguishing feature of gzhan stong hermeneutics is the fact that it normally restricts the validity of the common Madhyamaka assertion "all phenomena are empty of an own-being" to phenomena on the level of apparent truth. The ultimate is taken to be endowed with certain Buddha qualities which are not "empty of an own-being" (rang stong), but "empty of other" (gzhan stong), i.e., accidental stains and so forth. Such a stance is mainly based on the Tathága taga rbhasütras, but also Yogácára works are adduced, since their theory of trisvabMva ("three natures", i.e., the imagined, dependent and perfect nature) allow such a distinction between rang stong and gzhan stong.

Till not long ago gzhan stong was mainly mentioned by Western scholars as a heretical view, and therefore it usually has been presented—mostly on the basis of something other than its own textual tradition—as a non-Buddhist stance to be refuted. Although the controversial exegesis of gzhan stong has received somewhat more attention in recent years, it is probably still little known that proponents of it had and still have substantially different views on what is exactly empty of what, for example, or, to use the technical terms, how the negandum (Tib. dgag by a), the basis of negation (Tib. dgag gzhi) and the mode of being empty (Tib. stong tshul) are defined. Such differences are far from being only hairsplitting doctrinal details of a few philosophers. Even in Tibetan backwaters like Nubri in Nepal, lamas are nowadays well aware of mainly two different systems of gzhan stong.2 The famous gzhan stong proponent Kong sprul bio gros mtha' yas (1813-1899) defines in his Encyclopedia of Knowledge (Shes bya Jcun khyab mdzod) the negandum of gzhan stong Madhyamaka as being the imagined and the dependent natures, the basis of negation being exclusively the perfect nature, the dharmadhatu or suchness. The mode of being empty is taken as the absence of these two neganda in the basis of negation.3 Kong sprul, however, is quick to add that gSer mdog pain chen Shákya mchog ldan (1428- 1507) holds a view different from this, in that he restricts the negandum to the imagined nature alone. The basis of emptiness is the dependent, the entire mind, which takes on various forms of a perceived object and perceiving subject.4

This brief introduction to the gzhan stong Madhyamaka points up the fact that Shákya mchog ldan, who was one of the most prominent proponents of this exegetical

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tradition, holds views somewhat different from that of the most famous master of the Jonang school, Kun mkhyen Dol po pa Shes rab rgyal m tshan (1292-1361), and thus different from the main Jonangpa strands of gzhan stong. Of particular interest is the fact that Dol po pa and Shakya mchog ldan enjoyed a full-scale Sakya education before they enunciated their respective gzhan stong views. Also, both of them seem to have been influenced by the Karmapas, Dol po pa by the Third Karmapa Rang byung rdo rje (1284-1339) and Shakya mchog ldan by tire Seventh Karmapa Chos grags rgya mtsho (1454-1506).5

For a short but brilliant analysis of the positions of Dol po pa and Shakya mchog ldan we are very much indebted to the Jonang master Taranatha (1575-1634), who is considered to be a follower and proponent of Dol po pa's doctrine.6 In each of the twenty-one points a fictive initial statement of Shakya mchog ldan is followed by a similarly fictive reply of Dol po pa, Taranatha being, of course, well aware of the fact that this is all ahistorical.7

To be sure, it is not possible to establish Shakya mchog Idan's or Dol po pa's views on the basis of this short text alone, but it does sharpen our awareness of the subtle aspects of the gzhan stong when studying the bulky and often not very systematic works of these masters.8 It is in this sense that I take the Twenty-one Profound Points as a possible starting point for studies in the gzhan stong Madhyamaka. Furthermore, critically evaluating these doctrinal differences against the background of the pertinent Indian texts in such traditions as the Madhyamaka, Yogacara and Tathagatagarbha promises to be a second interesting task. Both are, however, beyond the scope of this paper.

After a synoptical description of Taranatha’s text,9 such an evaluation will, however, be undertaken with regard to the different presentations of the above-mentioned trisvabhdva as an example of how one might proceed. In the Madhydntavibhdga, one of the main Yogacara works adduced by the gzhan stong proponents, different trisvabhdva models can be identified. It will be shown that the logical tension between these different models can be variously resolved and thus lead to the doctrinal differences mentioned above.

2. The Twenty-one Differences with regard to the Profound Points

Taranatha begins his somewhat delicate task of comparing the two masters Dol po pa and Shakya mchog ldan in a conciliating manner by explaining that both supposedly see w hat is profound reality and hence should not have different thoughts about it. Only due to the different needs of their disciples did they enunciate variant views. Even though the essential gzhan stong view and meditation of both masters are the same, there are a lot of minor differences regarding tenets (grub mtha') when ascertaining the view on the level of apparent truth.

The first four of the twenty-one points address differences in the exegesis of the Madhyamaka and Maitreya texts, which are considered to be commentaries on the Buddha's intention of the second and third turning of the Wheel of the Dharma.10

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Points 5-8 embody Shàkya mchog ldan’s and Dol po pa's different understanding of non-dual wisdom. In points 9-16, their views on the trisvabhâva theory are distinguished. In a related topic, Tàranâtha also elaborates the different understandings of self-awareness (point 11), entities and non-entities, and conditioned and non-conditioned phenonema (point 13). Next, our attention is draw n to different ways of relating the four noble truths to the apparent and ultimate (point 17). The last four points deal with the two masters' views on the Buddha-nature.

2.1. The middle and the final turning of the Wheel of the Dharma and the Maitreya works

Shâkya mchog ldan:

The views of the Pràsahgika and Svâtantrika-Madhyamaka schools are logically correct and accurately represent the Buddha's intention in the middle turning and the corpus of analytical works.11 The actual teaching of the middle turning has to be taken literally and the corpus of analytical works is not in accordance w ith the actual teaching of the last turning.

The five works of Maitreya do not only teach gzhan stong. In the Abhisamayàlayikâra the tenets of rang stong and gzhan stong can be found: when cutting through mental fabrications w ith the help of the view, rang stong, i.e., Pràsahgika and Svâtantrika, is taught. These views are also the rang stong brought forth in the following three Maitreya works: Mahâyânasütràlarftkâra, Madhyàntavibhâga and Dharmadharmatâ- vïbhàga}1 The practice of meditation, however, is explained according to the gzhan stong. Thus the last four Maitreya works (the three mentioned above and the Ratnagotravibhâga) teach only gzhan stong (???).13 In them two different explanations of potentials14 are found. The Ratnagotravibhâga teaches ultimately only one single path and refutes the possibility of a cut-off potential. In the other three Maitreya works ultimately three paths and a cut-off potential are asserted.

Finally, rang stong is considered to be more profound when mental fabrications are cut through with the help of the view. When it comes to the practice of meditation, however, gzhan stong is more profound. gZhan stong is not wrong, because it accords with the meaning found in meditation. Even though rang stong is superior with regard to the view, gzhan stong goes beyond Cittamâtra and also belongs to the Madhyamaka.

Dol po pa:

Even though the Pràsahgika- and Svâtantrika-Mâdhyamika are proud of their interpretation of the middle turning and the corpus of analytical works, it is not free of mistakes. Moreover, although the teaching of the analytical works appears to be consistent, it is not so in a number of cases. Since many passages of the treatises of the middle turning clearly teach gzhan stong, the actual teaching of the middle turning and the analytical works should not be taken literally. The genuine teaching of most

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passages of the middle turning and the analytical works contradicts neither the Prasangika and Svatantrika nor the gzhan stong. Nevertheless, for those quoting from the tenet known as rang stong,it has become the basis of confusion. On the other hand, on the grounds that these texts do not teach different tenets and that there are in fact many extraordinary passages teaching only gzhan stong, the middle turning and the analytical works were taught in accordance with gzhan stong Madhyamaka. From these texts of the middle turning, however, the uncommon gzhan stong—i.e., following only the lines of the commentary of the last turning—has not clearly emerged.15 The tenets of the Prasangika and Svatantrika, nowadays known as the rang stong view, were not taught in the middle turning; nevertheless, this rang stong is widely presented as the intention of the Buddha and his sons.

There are no different tenets in the Maitreya works at all. Even in the Abhisamayalarp- kara the tenet of the so-called rang stong is not taught. In the Mahayanasutralarjikara and so forth ultimately three paths and a cut-off potential are not explained at all as ultimately valid.

The view of the rang stong, as it is taught by the Buddha and his sons, is superior in cutting through mental fabrications. Nevertheless, it is contained in the gzhan stong and therefore not a view opposed to it. To think that rang stong, as it is known nowadays, i.e., Prasangika and Svatantrika, is the view of the Mahayanasutralaijikara, Madhyantavibhaga and Dharmadharmatavibhaga, with the implication that these texts are ultimately not true, is wrong. Hence it is wrong to explain these Yogacara works in terms of cutting through mental fabrications with the help of the view, because this would be a false denial.

Given also the fact that rang stong goes beyond Cittamatra, it belongs to the Madhyamaka within the system of the four tenets. It is not the pure ultimate, however, the highest view being gzhan stong only.

2.2. Non-dual wisdom

Shakya mchog ldan:

Non-dual wisdom is not analyzed in the Maitreya works. Wisdom, which is understood by means of excluding its opposite, does not w ithstand a critical analysis that ascertains the ultimate. Thus, as has been pointed out above, the view of rang stong is more profound. Nevertheless, wisdom is experienced uninteruptedly and accords with the meaning found in meditation, i.e., gzhan stong. Non-dual wisdom is momentary awareness (rig pa), impermanent, and non-abiding. On the grounds that it is knowledge (shes pa), wisdom is an entity and thus conditioned.

Dol po pa:

Wisdom does withstand a critical analysis.17 Therefore, this very analysis in itself is confusion. Wisdom is neither momentary nor impermanent, in that it is beyond the three times, past, present and future. It is neither an entity nor a non-entity, and also

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not conditioned.

2.3. The three natures (trisvabhava)

Shakya mchog ldan:

If one isolates its specific aspects (rang Idog), all knowledge is—as generally accepted in Tibet—only clarity and awareness, and thus a dependent entity. The isolation of the specific aspects of mere dualistic appearances results in the imagined nature. Clarity and awareness is the dependent nature when endowed with these dualistic appearances. From the perspective, however, that it is unstained by this duality since beginningless time, this clarity and awareness is the perfect nature. Based on that, dependent entities as such are by nature the same as the perfect nature, even though they are different as isolates (Idog cha) and different in terms of their respective marks. Therefore, the imagined nature pertains to what is not true, the perfect to what is true and the dependent to both.

The perfect nature is emptiness. The imagined nature is not emptiness, even though it is nothing but empty (i.e., it is only the negandum). Emptiness belongs to the ultimate truth.

The basis of emptiness is the dependent, which is empty of the imagined (negandum). This is, how the ultimate is taken to be em pty of the apparent.

Even though the "pure dependent" is widely known in Tibet, it does in reality not belong to the dependent, but rather to the "perfect in terms of being unmistaken." It is part of the actual perfect nature. Since the usage and origin of the term "pure dependent" is not clear, it should not be used.

Dol po pa:

The imagined aspect, which is imputed by the m ind’s m ultitude of thoughts, and its appearances in the form of external objects, is the perceived. The isolation of its specific aspects is the imagined nature. The isolation of the specific aspects of the mind and mental factors results in the dependent nature being the consciousness of apparent truth. Clarity and awareness, by nature free from mental fabrication, are the perfect nature. Thus the imagined and the dependent are the same substantially; their marks are different, however. The perfect and the dependent are not only different as isolates and in terms of their marks, but they are also not the same by nature (ngo bo gcig pa).18 Both, the imagined and the dependent, belong exclusively to what is not true.

Everything, phenomena and their true nature, m ust be called emptiness. Emptiness does not exclusively pertain to the ultimate truth. It does not belong unambiguously to the synonyms of the ultimate: emptiness is related to the ultimate only in a general sense.

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The basis of emptiness is the perfect. It is empty of the two neganda, the dependent and the imagined, in the sense that the ultimate is empty of the apparent. The explanation of the dependent as empty of the imagined applies only when ascertaining the apparent truth.

Even though the origin of the term "pure dependent" is not clear—the term is not found in the treatises—, its meaning is fully established in them and therefore it is proper to use it. This follows from the fact that the Buddha's teaching is based on meaning rather than words, and that in olden times in Tibet all agreed on such a convention. Also, the transmitted special instruction stemming from Maitreya should be w ithout any fault. In some passages of the Maitreya works the wisdom of the path is explained as "the perfect in terms of being unmistaken." That, too, is what the ground appearing as gold for those who have attained the Bodhisattva levels is called. In such cases it is appropriate to use the term "pure dependent". Being unmistaken is only taught as being the perfect in a metaphorical sense. Likewise, the twelve limbs of Buddha’s speech are also said to be the perfect. Thus the perfect in terms of being unmistaken—in contrast to the unchangeable perfect nature—is in reality the pure dependent and the perfect only in a metaphorical sense. The unmistaken which is the same as the unchangeable perfect, is the ultimate "perfect in terms of being unmistaken." It is nothing but unchangeable.19 Therefore, when one ascertains the true state of being, only that ultimate "perfect in terms of being unmistaken" can be included under the perfect nature. W hen one explains different aspects, both types of the perfect (i.e., the unchangeable and the perfect in terms of being unmistaken) are presented.

2.4. Self-awareness

Shakya mchog Id an:

All self-awareness—understood as the isolation of its specific aspects—belongs exclusively to the ultimate truth.

Dol po pa:

On the ground that all self-awareness of consciousness belongs exclusively to the apparent truth, self-awareness, too, has an apparent and an ultimate aspect.

2.5. Entity and non-entity, conditioned and non-conditioned

Shakya mchog ldan:

The works on valid cognition, Abhidharma, etc., are written in accordance with general Dharma terminology. The attainment of pacification belongs to both categories, that of entities and non-entities;20 knowledge (shes pa)21 to that of entities. The ultimate is not an entity. Since it is not conditioned, it is a non-entity, like the sky and so forth. There are different aspects of the non-conditioned, for example, suchness not being conditioned by causal defilements,22 or mere clarity and awareness not really being

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produced, etc. Therefore, when enumerating categories, they are designated as non­conditioned. They are, however, not the real non-conditioned as opposed to the conditioned ('du byed) and marks (mtshan nyid); therefore they are non-conditioned only in a metaphorical sense.

Dol po pa:

Explanations of valid cognition, Abhidharma, etc., belong to traditions that mainly ascertain the apparent truth. Here, with regard to the definitive meaning, when it is mainly the ultimate truth, that is ascertained, the apparent is constituted by entities as well as non-entities, and entities and non-entities by the apparent.23 The ultimate truth is neither an entity nor a non-entity; therefore, the attainm ent of pacification24 does not belong to the ultimate. Otherwise, wisdom would be a non-entity—while being knowledge at the same time. Therefore, knowledge would not be an entity either, and the ultimate truth would be a non-entity. And such assertions contradict the Dharma.25 In the tradition of the Vastusatpadarthavadin26 the ultimate is asserted to be entities. All non-entities like the sky, etc., which the Abhidharmikas take to be non-conditioned, are there considered to be conditioned, and for this reason, both, entities and non-entities, belong to the conditioned. The ultimate is the real non- conditioned. The sky, etc., are thus non-conditioned entities only in a metaphorical sense.

2.6. The four noble truths

Shakya mchog ldan:

The noble truth of the path also belongs to the ultimate truth.

Dol po pa:

Among the four noble truths the truth of cessation is the ultimate, and the other three are the apparent truth. To be more precise, only the actual cessation which exists since beginningless time, pertains to the ultimate truth. The other three noble truths and the analytical cessation belong in reality to the apparent truth. Hence the actual truth of the path belongs in reality to the apparent, and the actual truth of cessation to the ultimate truth. This follows from the fact that the tru th of the path in its ultimate aspect is one with the beginningless. Because it is in reality the truth of cessation, this ultimate aspect is the truth of the path only in a metaphorical sense.

2.7. Buddha nature

Shakya mchog ldan:

There is no Buddha nature in the mindstream of ordinary sentient beings. The clear light-nature of mind is only the cause of the Buddha nature and its basic potential (khams). Therefore, there is a Buddha nature as a cause or basic potential in all ordinary sentient beings, but this is not the actual Buddha nature, which is rather the

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same as Buddha wisdom. The passage in the Ratnagotravibhaga stating that the Buddha-nature is endowed with inseparable qualities, refers only to the fruit of the path. On the level of the cause, the qualities still have to be developed. Having this capability, the Buddha-nature exists only as seeds in ordinary sentient beings. The major and minor marks of a Buddha are not qualities of the dharmakaya.27

In the mantrayana, only the seeds of the fruit are naturally present as the luminous nature of mind. They ripen on the path by meditating, until the fruit manifests.

Dol po pa:

The actual Buddha nature is already present in the m indstream of ordinary living beings. If a Buddha has the actual Buddha-nature, then ordinary beings are also endowed with it, because it is the dharmata of living beings. This is proven, in particular, by a num ber of canonical passages. W hat is m eant in the explanation of the Buddha nature as basic potential and cause, is a cause different from the sphere/elem ent (dbyings), given that the latter is not a generating cause or basic potential.28 The naturally present inseparable qualities already exist in the Buddha nature of the basis. These inseparable qualities are the Buddha-nature adorned by the qualities of the ultimate, because something that arises—in the sense of being newly acquired—may possibly be not naturally present, because the division of basis, path, and fruit applies only to the level of apparent truth, and because there is only one Buddha nature.

With regard to the various kinds of Buddha qualities, there is an aspect that belongs to the ultimate qualities of the dharmakaya, and appears only to the Buddha himself, and another aspect that pertains to the qualities of the form kdyas. The latter pertain to the apparent truth and appear to others, i.e., the disciples of the Buddha.

In the mantrayana, wisdom is spontaneously present from beginningless time as a man ala of the ultimate truth. On the path, stains are removed by meditating, and the ever-present wisdom becomes manifest.

2.8. Taranatha’s conclusion

After having elaborated Shakya mchog ldan's and Dol po pa's views in twenty-one profound points, Taranatha concludes by pointing out one fundamental difference, to which all the other ones basically refer: Shakya mchog Idan takes non-dual wisdom to be not something single, but multiple and momentary, whereas Dol po pa explains it provisionally as something single, but in reality as transcending one and many. Dol po pa infers from this omnipresence of non-dual wisdom that all qualities of a Buddha are already present in ordinary beings. For the same reason, non-dual wisdom can not be harm ed by reasonings, such as that of being neither one nor many, and hence withstands analysis. On these grounds the tenets of the Prasangika and Svatantrika, which assert the destruction of non-dual wisdom by analysis, is wrong, and hence these Prasangika and Svatantrika views are impure. One comes to know this by way of analysis which makes use of reasoning without

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distorting the orginal intention of the middle turning. Dol po pa and Shaky a mchog Idan agree, however, that ultimately the Buddha element is beyond words and thoughts, and the unmistaken object of non-conceptual wisdom.

3. A Discussion of Shákya mchog ldan's and the Jonangpas' Different Presentations of the trisvabhdva

The following abbreviations are used:

MAV MadhyantavibhagaMAVBh Madhydn tavibhdga bha$yaMAVT Madhydntavibhága fíká

Is Táranátha right in his anti-gzhan stong description of Shákya mchog ldan's view?Later Tibetan thinkers had difficulties in pinning down Shákya mchog ldan's position. Thus, he fully endorses the gzhan stong view only in works written after his first meeting with the Seventh Karmapa in 1484.29 But even in earlier works, like the dBu ma mam nges chos kyi bang m d z o d Shákya mchog ldan does not follow the mainstream Madhyamaka and defines the two truths as "identical by nature and different as isolates" (ngo bo gcig la Idog pa tha dad). He is rather in line with the Jonangpas' formula ngo bo gcig pa bkag pa'i tha dad: the two truths are only different in the sense that their identity is negated.

Táranátha is right, however, when he says, that the basis of emptiness is the dependent nature for Shákya mchog ldan. But Shákya mchog ldan takes the dependent to exist ultimately only when describing Cittamátra, at least in his later works.31 The Madhyamaka, according to Shákya mchog ldan, is divided into Asvabhávaváda- and Yogácára-Madhyamaka. With regard to the view, their respective objects of negation differ. In the Asvabhávaváda all three natures are ascertained to be em pty of an own-being. Even a residual phenomenon called emptiness is not postulated. In the Yogácára-Madhyamaka, the imagined nature is empty of an own-being, and the dependent nature empty of an "other-being". What remains, which is not empty of an own-being, is the own-being of the dependent nature and this own-being is the perfect nature. Both tenets agree on w hat noble beings experience while in meditative equipoise: wisdom of dharmadhdtu.32 The description of the state after meditation, however, differs. The Yogácáras call it "unchangeable perfect nature," which is in reality the same as dharmadhdtu-wisdom, non-dual wisdom and the ultimate truth; they label it the real self; a stable permanent, indestructible peace, and the truly established. The Asvabhávavádins maintain that there is even not something like the existence of the non-real,33 because the negandum is not established as something real.34

In explaining gzhan stong under the aspect of cutting through mental fabrications, Shákya mchog ldan distinguishes two possible identifications of the basis of emptiness. In Yogácára works, the basis of emptiness is the dependent nature and the negandum the imagined nature. The dependent being empty of the imagined, is explained to be the perfect nature or the true nature of phenomena. In the

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Ratnagotravibhdga and the Brhatfika, it is the perfect nature which is taken to be empty of the imagined.35 Nevertheless, it seems impossible for Shakya mchog ldan to maintain even here that the perfect nature is empty of both the imagined and dependent natures.36

This is also clear in one of his later works, the Zab zhi spros bral gyi bzhad pa stong nyid bdud rtsi'i lam po che (written in 1496),37 where Shakya mchog ldan first says that in Tibet the following gzhan stong presentation had been popular:

The apparent [truth], all conditioned entities, is em pty of an own-being {rang stong), and the ultimate, the non-conditioned [entities], is empty of other {gzhan stong). This explanation is the assertion of the great Madhyamika Vasubandhu, because this is how it is explained in the Brhattikd.3*

This, states Shakya mchog ldan, does not hold true, because it is not in accordance with the Maitreya works and contradicts the gzhan stong presentation in the works of Asariga, Dignaga and Dharmaklrti. The meaning of gzhan stong should be explained in the sense that the dependent nature is empty of the negandum, the imagined nature, but not that the dharmata, the perfect nature, is empty of the dependent and the imagined natures. To support this, MAV 1.1. is adduced: "False imagining (equated with the dependent nature) exists. Duality (equated with the imagined nature) is not found in it." Non-dual wisdom, according to Shakya mchog ldan, is explained as the "actual entity of emptiness" {stong pa'i dngos p o f9 but not as the basis, which is em pty of something other {stong pa'i gzhi). The dependent nature, or false imagining, exists in terms of its own-being, specific marks and its own nature, but not truly, on the level of ultimate truth, or in reality. It is like an illusion.40

From what has been said till now, it becomes clear that the way, Taranatha summarizes Shakya mchog ldan's view on trisvabhdva, is not so accurate. Even though the dependent nature is undoutedly taken to be the basis of negation, Shakya mchog ldan describes it to exist ultimately only in the Cittamatra, but not in the Yogacara. And it is the presentation of the trisvabhdva in the Yogacara, which reflects his gzhan stong view. It is also questionable, if wisdom is really only a conditioned entity for him; as we have seen above, Shakya mchog ldan explains the unchangeable (!) perfect nature to be non-dual wisdom.

The presentation of Dol po pa’s view can be justified on the basis of Dol po pa’s most important works, the Ri chos nges don rgya mtsho41 Taranatha also follows Dol po pa, when describing his own trisvabhdva model in the gZhan stong snying po. In the latter he equates, mainly based on the initial stanzas of the MAV (1.1-2), the imagined and dependent natures w ith the apparent truth, and the perfect nature w ith the ultimate truth.42 This presentation of trisvabhdva;which is typical of the Jonangpas, can be traced back to bTsan Kha bo che (bom 1021).43

4. The theory of trisvabhdva in die Madhyantavibhdga and its commentaries

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The Madhyantavibhaga plays an important role for the gzhan stong pas, in that it describes the old Buddhist concept of the Middle Path (madhyamd pratipat) in a more positive way than Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka. In the initial stanzas of the treatise the Middle Path is defined by three philosophical propositions: (a) False imagining exists, (b) Subject-object-duality, created by false imagining, is not found in that, (c) False imagining is found in relation to emptiness in the sense that emptiness is found in false imagining as its true nature.44 One has to bear in mind that the root text, which does not make much use of the trisvabhdva terms in the initial stanzas, equates the perceived object with the imagined nature, false imagining with the dependent nature, and the absence of duality, or emptiness, with the perfect nature in MAV 1.5.

As I have discussed the initial stanzas and its commentaries in detail already in another paper,45 a brief summary shall be sufficient here. In short, the main questions are, in which way false imagining exists (a) and how the relationship between false imaging and emptiness is explained (c).46 It is possible to identify at least two interpretations.

The central focus of the first interpretation lays on a false imagining which really or ultimately exists. Duality and emptiness are just two different aspects of false imagining, i.e., the way it appears and it really is. Emptiness is thus just an abstract quality of false imagining, its being empty of duality. Given the equation of false imagining with the dependent nature, it is not easy to explain how to subsume the pure dharmas of the path under false imagining, a false imagining, that is explained to be all the defilements, and that must be given up, to attain liberation.47 Vasubandhu indicates that this model only describes a samsaric state of mind.48

Sthiramati’s third and fourth explanations of initial stanzas allow a second interpretation: false imagining does not exist ultimately, and emptiness, as all- pervading true nature, can exist without false imagining. From MAVT on m.22b-d one could follow, that the dharmas of the path participate also in the non-conditioned perfect nature and are only conditioned in the sense that they have to be brought forward.49 The qualities of the path etc. would then exist (in the sense of the Jonangpas) since beginningless time and could be included in false imagining as its true nature. Still, a "pure" dependent nature seems to be necessary to explain, where the manifestation of the perfect nature occurs on the level of apparent truth. Its manifestation coincides, however, with the cessation of false imagining.

In this context, it is interesting to note that in Sthiramati's four different commentaries on the initial stanza (MAV 1.1) emptiness is only taken as the absence of duality in false imagining, when a more ontological status of the latter is emphasized. When false imagining is understood in a more epistemological sense, however, the absence of duality (emptiness) is also described in a positive way.

Thus, two trisvabhava-models, can be identified. They come close to what Sponberg (1981, p. 99) calls the pivotal and progressive exegetical model of trisvabhdva. The first model is centered on the dependent nature which is taken to exist ultimately. The imagined and perfect natures are just the way, the dependent nature appears to be and really is. The dependent is thus a carrier of the perfect, which is understood as

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something abstract, like the state of suffering or impermanence. In the progressive model the focus lies more on an emptiness, which pervades or transcends all phenomena of the dependent nature. This all-pervading emptiness possesses positive qualities and can exist, contrary to the first model, in its own right. H ie three natures represent three levels, each revealing a progressively deeper degree of reality.

One might argue that the Yogacara does not distinguish existence on two levels of truths, its trisvabhava theory being rather an alternative to the apparent and ultimate truth of the Madhyamaka. Many passages in the Madhydntavibhdga support this. This becomes particularity evident in the third chapter on reality, where older concepts relating to truth/reality , such as the four noble truths of early Buddhism or the apparent and ultimate truth of the Madhyamaka are explained in terms of the new trisvabhava. Even the noble truth of cessation under the aspect of the imagined, dependent and perfect natures. Thereby, the continuity between the mainstream Buddhist thought and Yogacara is established.

It is noteworthy, however, that in the case of the ultimate tru th of the Madhyamaka only the perfect nature is accepted as a fit candidate, the dependent nature, or false imagining, being dismissed as something to be ultimately given up. If one applies this to the definition of the madhyamd pratipat in the initial two stanzas, one would be safe to say that proposition (a) and (b), i.e., existence of false imagining and non­existence of duality, refer to the level of apparent truth, while proposition (c), i.e., the m utual existence of false imagining and emptiness, defines the relation between apparent and ultim ate truth. Resorting to two levels of truth not only explains the initial stanzas in a meaningful way, but also solves some of the tensions between the two parallel trisvabhava models mentioned above. And this is exactly what Santarak$ita did when he explained the theory of trisvabhava in terms of his favoured Yogacara-Svatantrika-Madhyamaka.51

These to some extent incompatible models and passages probably reflect different strands of thought not yet completely harmonized. This is fairly typical of the early Yogacara school, which not only draws on early Mahayana thought, but also has a rich background of Abhidharma analysis. The commentaries' uncertainty about the ontological status of false imagining may thus reflect the Abhidharmic background of this early Yogacara material. So it is generally asserted in the Hinayana schools that conditioned, dependently arising entities really exist.52 On the other hand, such a stance would of course be incompatible with a M adhyamaka understanding of the Yogacara53, which is at least in some passages attempted.

It is thus not surprising that Tibetan schools had different views on these texts and interpreted them in the context of their hermeneutical systems.

5. Condusion

Given the tensions between different trisvabhava models in the pertinent passages of

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the Madhyantavibhaga and its commentaries, it is not surprising that this Yogacara work can be quoted to equally back the different stances of Dol po pa and Shakya mchog ldan.

Both, Shakya mchog ldan and Dol po pa, try to solve the above-mentioned tensions between two unbalanced trisvabhava models in restricting the ontological status of false imagining to the level of apparent truth. Shakya mchog ldan remains more faithful, however, to the m ain strands of the MAV and takes, contrary to Dol po pa, false imagining or the dependent nature as the basis of negation. Thus, the dependent nature keeps its central position between the imagined and perfect natures.

Dol po pa follows from the restriction of the pivotel model of trisvabhava to the level of apparent truth, that die basis of negation can be only the perfect nature. He includes the qualities of the path in the ever-existing true nature (dharmatd). Thus they constitute the ultimate truth, are in reality beyond space and time,54 and exist independently. As already mentioned above, this positive description of the ultimate is also supported by the equation of emptiness with the luminous nature of mind in MAV I.22c. Since it is possible to transcend space and time at any place and at any time, each instant of false imagining possesses (dharmiri) emptiness and its qualities as true nature, or better, as alternative epistemological option. Dol po pa restricts the perfect nature to its unchangeable aspect by saying that the perfect in terms of being unmistaken actually belongs to the pure dependent nature. Wisdom arises in this model only in the sense, that it becomes manifest in a mindstream when the hindering defilements are purified. This understanding of trisvabhava entails a sharper distinction between the two truths, for what the Jonangpas had been often critizised. One has to keep in m ind, however, that the "difference" between the two truths is understood as "a [non-implicative] negation of an identity" (gcig pa bkag pa'i tha dad pa), which transcends identity and difference. To some extent this is supported by Sthiramati’s commentary on die initial propositions (MAVT on 1.1, 4th expl.) and on the meaning of the conditioned and non-conditioned (MAVT on m.22b-d), where it is said that the path is non-conditioned on the grounds that it is constituted by the non-conditioned, i.e., emptiness, and not fabricated by ordinary karma and klesa- defilements. It is only conditioned in the sense that it has to be brought forward. Logically it is not a big step to procede from the predicate "conditioned and non- conditioned" to the Jonangpas' description of the ultimate truth as being "neither conditioned nor non-conditioned". In MAV HE.ll, however, the path is only defined as being conditioned.

The Jonangpas profit from the tensions between the two trisvabhava models, in that they offer a creative interpretation fitting their gzhan stong view. But not only non- Yogacara works, like the Brhatfikd or the Ratnagotravibhdga, seem to support their stance; also Vasubandhu explains in his Sutrdlarpkdrabhd?ya, for example, that non­dual reality exists as the perfect nature, and not as the imagined and dependent natures.ss

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Endnotes

1. TAra n a th a : "Zab don nyer gcig pa bzhugs so". In: rje btsun taranatha'igsung 'bum bzhugs so, Vol. 4, pp. 781-795. According to the colophon "Zab don khyad par nyer gcig pa".

2. I.e., tiie different gzhan stong presentations of Shakya mchog ldan and the Jonangpas.

3. In the subchapter on ascertaining the view (7.3.) the tradition of the gzhan stong Madhyamaka is defined as follows: "The basis of negation is the perfect, the [dharmajdhatu, suchness, what is beyond [any] mentally fabricated object. The negandum is both, the mark of the imagined and the dependent. The mode of being empty is: 'empty of these two neganda on the basis of negation'. Hence, only the perfect is em pty of other. Thus says the Yogacara, the proponents holding the tradition of gzhan stong" (dgag gzhi yongs grub dbyings de bzhin nyid spros pa'i yul las 'das pa / dgag bya kun brtags dang gzhan dbang gi mtshan nyid gnyis / stong tshul dgag bya de gnyis kyis dgag gzhi la stong pas yongs grub nyid gzhan gyis stong pa yin ces mal 'byor spyod pa ste gzhan stong gi srol 'dzin pa mams smra'o /, (Ko n g sprul Blo gros m th a ’ yas: Shes bya kun khyab mdzod, Vol. ID, p. 61).

4. Kong sprul blo gros mtha' yas quotes Shakya mchog ldan's work "Zab zhi spros bral gyi bzhad pa stong nyid bdud rtsi'i lam po che zhes bya ba bzhugs so", in: gSer mdog pan chen shd kya mchog ldan gyi gsung 'bum legs bshad gser gyi bdud rtsi glegs bam,Vol. 4, p. 114,11. 3-4 and p. 114,1. 7 - p. 115,1. 2. Shakya mchog ldan's stance is rendered without any distortion.

5. For a presentation of the lives of Dol po pa and Shakya mchog ldan see Stearns 1996.

6. See Stearns 1996, pp. 105ff.

7. TARANATHA: Op. cit., p. 792,1. 4.

8. As we will see in the descriptions of trisvabhdva, Taranatha often misrepresents Shakya mchog ldan's view as too anti -gzhan stong.

9. In many cases my synopsis comes close to a literal translation. I have chosen, however, not to give a complete translation of Taranatha's text, because some of the twenty-one points are repetitions. A few sentences are also very long and technical so that a continous literal rendering would have created unnecessary extra hindrances to the understanding of a text whose content is already difficult to follow.

10. The Indo-Tibetan exegetical traditions summarize the teachings of the Buddha in three "[turnings of the] Wheel of the Dharma" (dharmacakra). See M athes 1996, p. 155.

11. I.e., the analytical works of Nagarjuna like the Mulamadhyamakakdrika.

12. Cf. also TARANATHA: Op. cit., p. 784,1. 5.

13. This contradicts the statement that the Prasahgika and Svatantrika views are in line with the rang stong of the Mahdydnasutrdlaipkara etc. According to Shakya mchog ldan's commentary to the Dharmadharmatavibhaga, this probably has to be understood in the sense, that the teaching of an dlayavijhana,a w isdom and fundamental transformation are not contradicting the Prasahgika and Svatantrika, since these terms are only used for those who cannot abide the direct teaching of emptiness; in fact,

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they are only synonyms of emptiness. Thus these works teach emptiness with regard to the view, and alayavijnana etc. with regard to the conduct (see M athes 1996, p. 176).a Though not literal in the root texts of the Maitreya works.

14. Usually a cut-off potential and the potentials to enter to the paths of the ¿rdvakas, Pratyekabuddhas and the Mahdydna respectively are distinguished.

15. Contrary to the Samdhinirmocanasutra, in which it is said that the middle turning is provisional and surpassed, the Jonangpas regard the m iddle turning to be in some sense definitive too. If one has gained deep insight in a gzhan stong sense, one understands the rang stong teaching of the middle turning as being restricted to phenomena under the apparent truth. The second turning thus supports the gzhan stong of the last turning and is definitive in this sense. Kapstein calls these hermeneutical strategies a "hierarchical ordering of the teaching and esotericism" (see Kapstein 1997, pp. 457 & 461).

16. W hat Dol po pa wants to say is that the Yogacara works do describe emptiness or the ultimate to be more then the mere denial of mental fabrications, and that these positive statements are not just synonyms for a rang stong emptiness of non-implying negations.

17. For it is beyond one and many. Moreover, wisdom is omnipresent, in that the Buddhas embrace with their non-dual wisdom the all-pervading suchness of all phenomena (cf. 2.8. Taranatha's conclusion).

18. This negation of identity has been often misunderstood and represented in a wrong way. (Cf. NEWLAND, who wrote that for Dol po pa the two truth are different entities (ngo bo tha dad pa). Instead of referring to the Jonang material, however, he quotes Seyfort Ruegg , H opkins and Thurm an (N ew land 1992, pp. 30 & 260). Dol po pa’s negation of identity rather defines a difference between the two truths, which merely results from a non-implicative negation of an identity by nature (ngo bo gcig pa). Thus Dol po pa explains in his "Sim illuminating the two truths" ("bDen gnyis gsal ba'i nyi ma", in: Kun mkhyen Dol po'i gsung 'bum, p. 23, 11. 2-3), that "the two truths should be called neither identical (de nyid) by nature nor different (gzhan) [by nature].9 [Between them there is only] the difference [resulting from] the negation of identity (bden gnyis ni ngo bo de nyid dang gzhan du brjod du med pa gcig pa bkag pa'i tha dad pa yin te). See also Dol po pa: "bKa bsdu bzhi pa'i don gtan tshigs chen po", Kun mkhyen Dol po'i gsung ‘bum, p. 366,1. 6 - p. 367,1. 2, where this "difference [resulting from] the negation of identity by nature" is specified: "The two truths can not be the same by nature, nor different by nature. It is also not the case that they are not different at all." (bden gnyis ngo bo gcig pa mi srid la / ngo bo tha dad pa yang ma yin zhing / tha dad gtan nas med pa'ang ma yin te / ngo bo gcig pa bkag pa'i tha dad do [). A few lines later the relation between the two truth is compared with that of phenomena and their true nature (dharma and dharmatd). In view of the Dharmadharmatdvibhdga, which is also adduced by Dol po pa in this context, there is only a difference between the two truths (related to dharma and dharmatd), in that an "identity by nature" (ngo bo gcig pa) is negated. This negation, however, does not implicate its opposite, "difference by nature" (ngo bo tha dad pa).9 For Tib. de nyid dang gzhan, Skt. tattvanyatva, see Madhyantavibhdgabhdsya on I.13d (N agao 1964, p. 23).

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19. The distinction between a "perfect in terms of being unmistaken" and an ultimate "perfect in terms of being unmistaken" reflects the Jonangpa's view that wisdom,' like all other Buddha qualities, mainly pertains to the unchangeable ultimate truth and only to some extant to the apparent truth.' In the Yogácára, "the perfect in terms of being unmistaken" usually refers to non- conceptual wisdom cultivated on the path.

20. It belongs to the category of non-entities, in that pacification, or cessation, is non­conditioned.

21. In the context of Abhidharma usually the knowledge of the destruction of passions etc. (Skt. k$ayajñána, Tib. zad pa shes pa) and the knowledge of no further occurence of passions etc. (Skt. anutpádajñam, Tib. mi skye ba shes pa).

22. Skt. karmakleéasatfikleéa (=hetu)sarpkleéa.

23. That means, the totality of entities and non-entities is exactly identical with the apparent truth.

24. Dol po pa restricts the ultimate truth to the actual cessation which exists since beginningless time. The pacification which is attained, still forms together with suffering a dualistic concept yet to be transcended. See also paragraph 2.6. below.

25. This reductio ad absurdum presupposes the inclusion of wisdom under the ultimate truth.

26. dngos smra ba, the Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo (s.v.) explains: dngos po yod par smra ba ste /bdeti grub kyi dngos po yod par khas len pa'i grub mtha' smra ba. According to J. Hopkins 1992 (s.v.) dngos po yod par smra ba is the Tibetan for Skt. Vastusatpadárthavádin.

27. The Yogácáras use the term dharmakdya in an exclusive as well as in an inclusive sense. In its exclusive sense the term dharmakdya is defined as the fundamental transformation, which results in the non-conceptual gnosis of the purity of suchness. In its inclusive sense it refers to the totality of Buddhahood including all kdyas. The interpretation of the dharmakdya as a distinct kdya, which does not include the satpbhogakdya, is also found in the particular four-kdya theory of Haribhadra's commentary on the Abhisamaylarpkdra. Haribhadra defines the dharmakdya for the first time with the bahuvrthi compound jñdndtmakah, "the dharmakdya consisting of wisdom" and understands it to be conditioned jñánas on the level of apparent truth. It is only the svdbhdvikakdya,which comprises thusness, or the ultim ate emptiness of all phenomena. Contrary to that, Arya Vimuktisena understands the dharmakdya to be a synonym of the svdbhdvikakdya, and as such the totality of Buddhahood comprising all kdyas (see J. J. M akransky 1997). Since the Sakyapas generally follow Arya Vimuktisena, it is very unlikely that Shákya mchog ldan understands the dharmakdya to be exactly that.

28. The Buddha nature with all its qualities is already present in one’s mindstream and thus does not need to be generated. Here, Buddha nature as cause means, that focusing on the true nature of mind, which is the Buddha nature, causes the removal of all defilements.

29. See DREYFUS 1997, p. 29.

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30. TARAn Ath a , op. cit.(Collected Works), Vols. 14 & 15. In this work (written in 1477) Shakya mchog ldan describes (without endorsing it) gzhan stong as Yogacara- Madhyamaka (see DREYFUS 1997, pp. 29 & 470).

31. "Shing rta chen po'i srol gnyis kyi mam par dbye ba bshad nas nges don gcig tu sgrub pa'i bstan bcos kyi rgyas 'grel bzhugs so”, in: op. cit. (Collected Works), Vol. 2, p. 476,1. 5. For the rest of this paragraph see ibid., pp. 477 ff. This work was written after Shakya mchog ldan's first meeting with the Seventh Karmapa in 1484. In it Shakya mchog ldan explicitly introduces and advocates the view of gzhan stong, claiming it is a more appropriate way to account for the experiential side of the realization of emptiness ( see Dreyfus 1997, p. 29).

32. It is interesting, that Shakya mchog ldan is using an ambigious genitive construction (chos dbyings kyi ye shes), being probably well aware that the dharmadhatu is not directly equated with wisdom in the Yogacara. "Wisdom of dharmadhatu" could be also understood as non-dual awareness of the dharmadhatu. In the next sentence where he explains w hat the unchangeable perfect nature of the Yogacara really is, he uses the compound chos dbyings ye shes ("dharmadhatu-wisdom").

33. The Yogacaras have such a concept, in that they assert an "existence of the non­existence" or an "entity of non-entity". It implies that the non-existence of duality is not its mere absence, but rather constitutes an existing quality.

34. "Shing rta chen po'i srol gnyis kyi mam par dbye ba bshad nas nges don gcig tu sgrub pa'i bstan bcos kyi rgyas 'grel bzhugs so", in: op. cit. (Collected Works), Vol. 2, p. 483,1. 6 - p. 484,1. 4.

35. Ibid., p. 520,11. 1-3.

36. Cf. "Zab zhi spros bral gyi bzhad pa stong nyid bdud rtsi'i lam po che zhes bya ba bzhugs so", in: op. cit. (Collected Works), Vol. 4, p. 117,1. 6 - p. 118, where Shakya mchog ldan argues: "If one needs to establish the perfect nature w ith a reasoning that establishes emptiness, the predicate of negation 'empty of the imagined and dependent natures' which is based on the subject, leads to the contradictory consequence that when the subject of the dispute is determined, it becomes the predicate of negation. Even w ithout determining the subject of the dispute, the predicate of negation becomes the establishing reason. ... If the own-being of the dependent is not established in reality, the own-being of the perfect nature does also not exist in reality, because the non-dual reality is taken as the own-being of consciousness which takes on the form of duality." The Brhaffikd supports the Jonangpas, however, in that the ultimate, or the perfect nature, is defined as "that which is free from these names (roughly referring to the imagined nature in the Bfhaftika) and the forms of mistaken appearances (i.e., the dependent nature)/ and that which is ineffable and the form of signlessness." (gang ming dang /phyin ci log tu snang ba'i mam pa de dan bral ba brjod du med pa / mtshan ma med pa'i mam pa gang yin pa de ni don dam pa yongs su gmb pa'i ngo bo nyid de /, "'Phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa 'bum pa dang nyi khri Inga stong pa dang khri brgyad stong pa'i rgya cher bshad pa (in short: Bi’hattika)", Karmapa Tanjur, shes phyin, pha (=Tohoku No. 3808), p. 572, 1. 5). The Brhatfikd is also clear about the ontological status of the dependent nature, in that it explains—in favour of Dol po pa—conditioned entities to exist on the level of ap p aren t tru th , b u t n o t u ltim ately (ibid., p . 568, 1. 7).a The expression "forms of mistaken appearances" defines the dependent nature: "The

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forms, which, through the power of ignorance and so forth, appear to the consciousness in a mistaken way as phenomena, are the dependent nature." (ma rig pa la sogs pa’i dbang gis mam par shes pa la chos mams su phyin ci log tu snan ba'i mam pa gang yin pa de ni gzhan dbang gi ngo bo nyid do /, ibid. (Bfhaftika), p. 572,11. 4-5).

37. Collected Works, Vol. 4, p. 117,1. 6 - p. 118,1. 3.

38. Kun rdzob 'dus byas kyi dngos po thams cad rang stong dang/don dam 'dus byas mams gzhan stong du 'chad pa 'di ni dbu ma pa chen po dbyig gnyen gyi bzhed pa yin te / yum gyi gnod 'joms las de Itar bzhad pa’i phyir (Collected Works, Vol. 4, p. 117,11. 1-2).

39. Equating emptiness or the dharmadhatu of the Madhydntavibhdga w ith non-dual wisdom is typical of the gzhan stong pa and w ithout a direct support in Yogacara works.

40. Collected Works, Vol. 4, p. 115,11. 3-4.

41. See M athes 1996, pp. 172-3.

42. TAr a n a th a : "gZhan stong snying po", p. 505,11. 1 -3 .

43. See Stearns 1996, pp. 132-3.

44. While (a) and (b) are the padas MAV I.la and I.lb, proposition (c) reflects the double locative relationship between false imagining and emptiness in the second part of MAV 1.1 (But emptiness is found there(, i.e. false imagining) and [false imagining] is found in relation to it (i.e., emptiness) as well). If the second locative (tasyam, i.e., £unyatdydm) is taken literally in the sense that x is found in y, and y in x, x would be y, at least in mathematics x=y follows from xcy and ycx. Total identity, however, of false imagining and emptiness can be excluded on the grounds that the first is considered to be conditioned and the latter not (cf. MAVBh on 1.2). I therefore suggest the preliminary translation "in relation to" for the two locatives.

45. Taranatha's Trisvabhava Presentation in the gZhan stong snying po, to be read at the Xflth Conference of the International Association of Buddhist Studies in Lausanne.

46. Cf. G.M. N a gao 1964, 17-8: abhutaparikalpo 'sti dvayan tatra na vidyate / iunyatd vidyate tv atra tasyam api sa vidyate H na ¿unyatp ndpi cdsunyarp tasmdt sarvam vidhiyate / sattvdd asattvdt sattvdc ca madhyama pratipac ca sa //."False imagining exists. Duality is not found in that. But emptiness is found there, [and false imagining] is found in relation to [emptiness] as well (1.1). Therefore everything is taught as neither empty nor non-empty, because [false imagining] exists, because [duality] does not exist, and because [false imagining] exists [in relation to emptiness, and emptiness in relation to false imagining]. And this is die Middle Path (1.2).The explanations in brackets are according to Vasubandhu's commentary.

47. This follows also from MAV 1.4: (abhutaparikalpatvaip siddham asya bhavaty atah / na tathd sarvathabhdvat (tib. / de biin ma yin ye med min f) tatk$aydn muktir i$yate / / "Therefore its (=consciousness in its different forms as explained in the preceeding verse) [existence] is established as false imagining. For it is not as [it appears], nor is it completely non-existent, [since] it is assumed, that from its cessation liberation results. "(Na gao 1964, p. 19,11. 5-6 & 10). Vasubandhu elaborates that false imagining is not completely non-existent, since it arises as mere deception. Nor is it possible to assert its non-existence, since liberation results from its cessation. Otherwise bondage

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in samsdra, i.e. defilements, and liberation, i.e. purification, would not be possible (N aga o 1964, p. 19,11. 7-9 & 11-12). Boquist (1993, p. 74) does not see the problem, in that she wrongly reads into this passage: "from the cessation of the illusive experience, that is from the cessation of the IN (= imagined nature), liberation follows".

48. In his commentary on the stanza which introduces the terms of trisvabhava (MAV 1.5), Vasubandhu says that false imagining includes the three natures, if mere false imagining exists (abhutaparikalpamdtre sati) and the previous stanza concludes by stating that false imagining has to disappear completely in order to obtain liberation (MAV I.4d). In other words, the three natures are included in false imagining only in a samsaric state.

49. MAVT on 22b-d: margasatyaip punah kitp satpskjiam asarpskftam / sarpskjrtam utpadyatvdt / yadi [karmaklesabhyam anabhisaipskftad asaipskrtena ca prabhdvitatvad (text: prabhdvitdd) a]*samskptam iti bruydn na do$ah sydd ..., "Is the truth of the path now conditioned or non-conditioned? It is conditioned, because it has be brought forward. It should not be a fault[, however,] if one says that it is non-conditioned on the grounds of not being fabricated by karmakleia[-defilements] and of being constituted by the non-conditioned". (Ya m aguchi 1934, p. 163,11. 7-9).* Cf. Tib. gal te las dan non mons pas mnon par 'dus ma byas pa dan / 'dus ma byas kyis rab tu phue ba'i phyir 'dus ma byas ies briod na hes pa med do. Karmapa-Tanjur, sems tsam, bi, p. 537,11. 2-3.

50. See Boquist 1993: 17-22.

51. Against this background, Lin d tn er 's (1997, p. 193) statem ent that £antarak§ita "re-interpret(s) the Yogacara concept of paratantrasvabhdva in terms of the Madhyamaka concept of relative truth, i.e., tathyasarpvrtisatya", seems problematic to me.

52. Cf. v. Rospatt (1995, pp. 69ff.), who observes that in the early Yogacara the contradiction between Abhidharma and Mahayana ontology was solved by way of the doctrine of the existence of momentary caused entities being more or less incorporated into the description of the dependent nature. The Mahayana stance that the momentariness of the dharmas means nothing else than their mere non-existence could then be comfortably brought in line with the imagined nature of the trisvabhava doctrine.

53. Cf. L in d tn e r 1997, p. 189.

54. This follows from the fact that the Jonangpas even include the categories of space and time under the imagined nature (see for example Ta ra nAt h a : "g£an ston sniri po ces bya ba b iugs so", p. 504,11. 5-6).

55. Cf. Sutralatpkdrabhasya on VI.l: "The ultimate truth is non-duality. ... (Its defining mark] is "neither existence", [i.e.,] not as the marks of the imagined and dependent. "Nor non-existence", [i.e.,] as the mark of the perfect" (advaydrtho hi paramarthah / ... / na sat parikalpitaparatantralak^andbhydrp na cdsat parini$pannalak$anena /, LEvi 1907, p. 22.

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