k&ligates k&l gates - typepadamlawdaily.typepad.com/kodakitcreview.pdf · • summary of...
TRANSCRIPT
K&LIGATES
February 17,2011
ViaEDIS
Marilyn R. Abbott Secretary United Stated International Trade Commission 500 E Street, SW Washington, DC 20436
K&l Gates ll' 1601 K Street NW Washington. DG 20006-1600
T 202.778.9000
Eric C. Rusnak D 202.778.9212 F 202.778.9100 [email protected]
www.klgates.com
Re: In the Matter of Certain Mobile Telephones and Wireless Communications Devices Featuring Digital Cameras, and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-703
Dear Secretary Abbott:
Pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 21 0.4(f)(3 )(ii), please find attached Complainant Eastman Kodak Company's non-confidential version of the following:
• Summary of Complainant Eastman Kodak Company's Petition for Review of the Final Initial and Recommended Determinations
If you have any questions, please let me know.
Sincerely,
Eric C. Rusnak
cc: Counsel of Record
ECR:ajs
PUBLIC VERSION
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C.
In the Matter of
CERTAIN MOBILE TELEPHONES AND WIRELESS COMMUNICATION DEVICES FEATURING DIGITAL CAMERAS, AND COMPONENTS THEREOF
Investigation No. 337-TA-703
SUMMARY OF COMPLAINANT EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY'S PETITION FOR REVIEW OF THE FINAL INITIAL AND RECOMMENDED DETERMINATIONS
PUBLIC VERSION
Table of Contents
Page
I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
II. BACKGROUND OF THE '218 PATENT ............ .. ...... .. ....... .. ...... .. ...... ... ...... .. ...... .. ......... 2
III. SUMMARY OF ERRORS REQUIRING REVIEW ...... .. ...... .. ....... .. ...... .. ...... .. ....... .. ........ 2
IV. THE FINAL ID ERRONEOUSLY CONSTRUED THE CLAIM TERMS ...................... 2
A. The Final ID Erroneously Added A "Distinct In Circuitry" Limitation To The Terms "Motion Processor" And "Still Processor" .................................................. .2
B. The Final ID's Construction Of "At Least Three Different Colors" Erroneously Relied On A Lay Dictionary, Ignored Intrinsic Evidence, And Excluded the Preferred Embodiment In The'218 Patent ........................................ .4
C. The Final ID Erred By Importing Limitations From The Preferred Embodiment And Inconsistently Applying Its Construction To The Term "Initiating Capture of a Still Image While Previewing the Motion Images" ........... 5
V. UNDER THE PROPER CLAIM CONSTRUCTION, THE ACCUSED RIM AND APPLE CAMERA PHONES INFRINGE CLAIM 15 OF THE '218 PATENT ................ 5
VI. THE FINAL ID ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT CLAIM 15 IS INVALID .... .. ....... .. 7
PUBLIC VERSION
Federal Cases
Bell & Howell Document Mgmt. Products Co. v. Altek Systems, 132 F.3d 701 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ............................................................................................. 3
Brandv. Miller, 487 F.3d 862 (Fed. Cir. 2007) .............................................................................. 8
Certain Mobile Telephones and Wireless Communications Devices Featuring Digital Cameras and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-663, Initial Determination (Dec. 17, 2009) ....................................................................................................... 1, 3, 4, 5
Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., 807 F.2d 955 (Fed. Cir. 1986) .......................... 7
Insituform Techs. v. Cat Contracting, 385 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .......................................... 6
KSR Intern. Co. v. Telejlex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) ............................................................... 8,9
Liebel-Flarshem Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ............................................ 3
Linear Tech. Corp. v. lTC, 566 F.3d 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ....... .. ...... .. ....... .. ...... .. ...... .. ....... .. ........ 3
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) ........................................ 3,4,5
Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 989 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ................ 9, 10
Ultra-Tex Surfaces, Inc. v. Hill Bros. Chem. Co., 204 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ....................... 7
Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronics, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ......................................... 4
Statutes
19 U.S.C. § 1337 ..... .. ....... .. ...... .. ...... ... ...... .. ...... .. ...... ... ...... .. ...... .. ....... .. ...... .. ...... .. ....... .. ...... ... ........ 2
35 U.S.C. § 103 ............................................................................................................................... 2
Rules
19 C.F.R. § 210.43 .......................................................................................................................... 2
11
PUBLIC VERSION
I. INTRODUCTION
Within the past year, two separate Commission ALJ s inconsistently construed the same
terms, in the same claim, in the same patent, analyzed by two of the same experts. The Final ID
in the 663 Investigation found claim 15 of Kodak's U.S. Patent No. 6,292,218 ("the '218
patent") valid and infringed by the accused Samsung camera phones. Certain Mobile
Telephones and Wireless Communications Devices Featuring Digital Cameras and Components
Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-663, Initial Determination at 106 (Dec. 17, 2009) ("663 ID"). _
inconsistent final determinations alone should compel Commission Review. But the Chief
ALJ's Final ID not only departed (without explanation) from the 663 ID, it also contradicted:
• The December 2010 conclusion of three expert Examiners at the United States Patent & Trademark Office ("USPTO"), who considered the same prior art cited in the Final ID and confirmed the patentability of the '218 patent;
• The arguments of the impartial Office of Unfair Import Investigations ("the OUII") , which consistently advised against the claim constructions and validity conclusions adopted in the Final ID; and
•
The Chief ALJ's wholesale departure from the conclusions of three respected and independent
authorities-the USPTO, the OUII and another Commission ALJ, as well as the judgment of the
digital camera industry-provides extraordinary support for Kodak's Petition to Review.
The Chief ALJ's legal errors stem from a failure to apply bedrock Federal Circuit law
governing claim construction and invalidity, and a basic misunderstanding of the invention of the
'218 patent. These errors resulted in improper claim constructions, which drove the Chief ALJ's
conclusion that none of the accused products infringes claim 15 of the' 218 patent. These errors
PUBLIC VERSION
likewise resulted in a finding that claim 15 was invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Accordingly, the
Commission should grant review, reverse the Chief ALJ, and find a violation of 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337 ("Section 337").
II. BACKGROUND OF THE '218 PATENT
The '218 patent describes a digital camera that uses one image processing technique for
displaying color preview images and another for capturing and processing still images. (JX-l at
col. 2:24-32) ('218 patent).) Before the '218 patent, digital cameras could not quickly and
effectively generate color preview images and high quality still images. (Id at col. 2: 1-5, 13-21.)
The digital camera described in the '218 patent allows a user to initiate capture of a still image
while previewing color motion images on the color display.
III. SUMMARY OF ERRORS REQUIRING REVIEW
The Chief ALJ erred in construing the following terms in claim 15 of the '218 patent:
"motion processor," "still processor," "at least three different colors," and "initiating capture of a
still image while previewing motion images." Based on his flawed claim construction, the Chief
ALJ committed clear error in finding no infringement. He also committed legal error and abused
his discretion in finding claim 15 invalid as obvious in light of prior art references, which were
analyzed by the USPTO during reexamination. These errors justify review under 19 C.F.R.
§ 210.43(b)(I)(i)-(iii), (d)(2).
IV. THE FINAL ID ERRONEOUSLY CONSTRUED THE CLAIM TERMS
A. The Final ID Erroneously Added A "Distinct In Circuitry" Limitation To The Terms "Motion Processor" And "Still Processor"
The Chief ALJ erred on multiple grounds in holding that the "motion processor" and the
"still processor" in claim 15 must be "distinct in circuitry." First, the language of claim 15 does
not require that the "motion processor" and "still processor" be distinct in circuitry. (JX-l at
2
PUBLIC VERSION
claim 15; Linear Tech. Corp. v. lTC, 566 F.3d 1049, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2009).) Indeed, the Chief
ALJ admitted there is "nothing in claim 15 which would indicate whether . . . the motion
processor and still processor share or do not share circuitry." (Markman Order at 20.) In
addition, a "distinct in circuitry" limitation for claim 15 is incompatible with dependent claim 17,
which requires the motion and still processors of claim 15 be "integrated into a single integrated
circuit," i.e., overlapping circuitry. (JX-l at claim 17 (emphasis added).)
Second, the Chief ALJ ignored the intrinsic evidence in the specification and prosecution
history that demonstrates the "motion processor" and "still processor" can share circuitry and
perform combined operations. (JX-l at col. 4:15-26, col. 9:4-25; JX-2.ll5; Phillips v. AWH
Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-14, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en bane.)
Third, the Chief ALJ improperly relied on extrinsic evidence (expert testimony and an
unrelated patent) to effectively rewrite the file history. See Bell & Howell Document Mgmt.
Products Co. v. Altek Systems, 132 F.3d 701, 706 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[E]xperts should also not be
heard to inject a new meaning into terms that is inconsistent with what the inventor set forth in
his or her patent.").
Fourth, the Chief ALJ erred by finding that Kodak disclaimed overlapping circuitry for
the "motion processor" and "still processor," when the intrinsic record contains no such
disclaimer. Liebel-Flarshem Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906-07 (Fed. Cir. 2004). As a
result of these legal errors, the Chief ALJ construed claim 15 incorrectly and inconsistently with
ALJ Charneski's prior constructions and the OUII's suggested constructions in both the 663
Investigation and this Investigation. (663 ID at 68.)
3
PUBLIC VERSION
B. The Final ID's Construction Of "At Least Three Different Colors" Erroneously Relied On A Lay Dictionary, Ignored Intrinsic Evidence, And Excluded the Preferred Embodiment In The'218 Patent
For image processing in a digital camera, "color" is a well-defined technical term
referring to a numerical representation of a specific point in three-dimensional color space. The
Chief ALJ's construction, which required "color" to be humanly perceptible, failed to reflect the
uncontroverted technical understanding of those skilled in the art.l The Chief ALJ' s construction
of "at least three different colors" is flawed because he disregarded the intrinsic record in favor
of a non-technical lay dictionary. In doing so, he adopted a construction of "color" that none of
the parties had proposed and that excludes the preferred embodiment.
Contrary to Federal Circuit precedent, the Chief ALJ disregarded the clear intrinsic
evidence, which explains that color image data is numerically represented in the "motion
processor" and "still processor" in one of several color formats. (JX-1 at col. 9:26-39, Fig. 10;
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312-14, 1324.) For example, the specification refers to processing of
"RGB image data," which are in a numerical color format. (JX-1 at col. 8:57-63 & Fig. 10.) It
also refers to JPEG compression, which typically is performed on data in YCC format, another
numerical color format. (JX-1 at col 9:38-39; Hearing Tr. at 643:3-12,645:5-19,648:23-649:8,
652:14-20,653:3-4; 661:2-18; 663 ID at 71-72.)
Moreover, the Chief ALJ's construction excludes the preferred embodiment-another
legal error. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronics, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (claim
The expert testimony from both sides confirmed that digital cameras use numbers to represent colors during processing. For example, Apple's expert testified that binary digits are used to represent a color inside a camera. (Hearing Tr. at 3322:3-3322:25.) RIM's expert likewise testified that colors in the claimed "motion processor" and "still processor" are represented by numbers. (Hearing Tr. at 2984: 18-21.) Because the color inside the digital camera is abstractly represented by numbers, it is not humanly perceptible. (Hearing Tr. at 956:7-12.)
4
PUBLIC VERSION
terms normally cannot be construed to exclude the preferred embodiment). In fact, the Chief
ALJ's construction of "at least three different colors" would exclude all digital cameras because
they use numerical values that are not humanly perceptible to represent color image data. The
Chief ALJ even departed from his own construction by concluding that colors represented by
numbers in RGB format somehow are "colors" but colors represented by numbers in YCC
format are not. (Final ID at 20; Markman Order at 57-62.) Nothing in the intrinsic evidence
supports that distinction. Finally, the finding that YCC data does not represent a "color" directly
contradicts the 663 ID, which relied on the same intrinsic evidence to conclude that "YCC is a
way of representing color." (663 ID at 71.) The OUII agrees with Kodak's construction of this
term.
C. The Final ID Erred By Importing Limitations From The Preferred Embodiment And Inconsistently Applying Its Construction To The Term "Initiating Capture of a Still Image While Previewing the Motion Images"
The Chief ALJ erroneously construed the term "initiating capture of a still image while
previewing the motion images." His claim interpretation contained two critical legal flaws.
First, it violated Federal Circuit authority by importing a "timing and controls section" limitation
from the preferred embodiment. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. Second, it construed "initiating
capture" to require that a single signal-rather than a sequence of two signals-be used to
"initiate capture." That interpretation contradicted both the intrinsic evidence and the Markman
Order's conclusion that the signal only begins capture. (Markman Order at 72.)
v. UNDER THE PROPER CLAIM CONSTRUCTION, THE ACCUSED RIM AND APPLE CAMERA PHONES INFRINGE CLAIM 15 OF THE '218 PATENT
When claim 15 is properly construed, the accused camera phones literally infringe the
'218 patent. Apple and RIM concede that their accused devices meet elements 15(a) (image
sensor), 15(c) (display), and 15(f) (memory). RIM also concedes that its accused devices meet
5
PUBLIC VERSION
element 15(d) (capture button). Under the correct constructions (i.e., ALJ Charneski's, the
OUII's, and Kodak's), Apple and RIM do not dispute that their accused camera phones infringe
the remaining elements of claim 15 of the '218 patent.
Even under the Chief ALJ' s erroneous construction of "at least three different colors," the
accused products infringe under the doctrine of equivalents. The Chief ALJ, however,
improperly found that Kodak filed a narrowing amendment and is therefore estopped from
relying on this doctrine. But Kodak's amendment had nothing to do with numerical format for
color data (YCC or RGB), and therefore prosecution history estoppel does not apply. Insituform
Techs. v. Cat Contracting, 385 F.3d 1360,1368-71 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Finally, the Chief ALJ erred in concluding that the iPhone 4 does not meet element 15(d)
Thus, the iPhone 4 literally meets element 15( d) even under the Chief ALJ' s
construction. 2
2
6
PUBLIC VERSION
VI. THE FINAL ID ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT CLAIM 15 IS INVALID
The Federal Circuit requires substantial deference to reexamination findings when, as
here, the Examiners have analyzed all the prior art and confirmed patentability. Ultra-Tex
Surfaces, Inc. v. Hill Bros. Chem. Co., 204 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The Chief ALJ did
not mention, let alone defer to, the December 2010 decision by the USPTO's Central
Reexamination Unit that confirmed claim 15's patentability over the very same references
applied by the Chief ALJ' s invalidity findings. In addition, his invalidity analysis fundamentally
ignored a critical innovation in the '218 patent-effective processing of motion images for color
preview. Instead, his findings relied on prior art techniques for still image processing that would
have been unsuitable for use with the claimed motion processor.
During the reexamination, the USPTO conducted a de novo reVIew of the same
references relied upon in the Final ill, including Mori, Sasaki, Tredwell, and the Parulski '335
patent. In fact, the same Examiners simultaneously reexamined the Parulski '335 patent and
were well aware of its relationship to the '218 patent. Kodak even provided the USPTO with the
report of Apple's invalidity expert, whose testimony is cited in the Final ID. Recognizing the
importance of the reexamination, the Chief ALJ repeatedly requested that the parties keep him
apprised of its status. The parties did so, submitting preliminary rulings and the USPTO's
Notice of Intent to Issue Ex Parte Reexamination Certificate. But the Chief ALJ failed even to
acknowledge the reexamination findings-which as the Federal Circuit has instructed-are
entitled to significant deference. See Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., 807 F.2d
955,961 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
The Chief ALJ also erred in basing his invalidity conclusions on combinations of prior art
and evidence not provided by the Respondents. This constituted two fundamental errors. First,
the Chief ALJ substituted his own analysis for the Respondents' lack of clear and convincing
7
PUBLIC VERSION
evidence. Second, he deprived Kodak of the opportunity to rebut those invalidity combinations.
See Brand v. Miller, 487 F.3d 862, 870 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that "the Board improperly
substituted its own opinion for evidence of the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art" and
noting that "it is particularly important that the agency's decision on issues of fact be limited to
the written record made before the agency"). It was Respondents' burden-not the Chief
ALJ's-to demonstrate invalidity through clear and convincing evidence.3 Because Respondents
failed to meet their burden, the Chief ALI' s obviousness conclusions amounted to impermissible
hindsight reconstruction of the claimed invention. See KSR Intern. Co. v. Telejlex, Inc., 550 U.S.
398,421 (2007).
Each prior art combination adopted in the Final ID relies on the Parulski '335 patent for
its alleged teachings regarding "pixel reduction." (Final ID at 75, 95.) The Chief ALJ, however,
grossly misstated the teachings of that reference and fundamentally ignored the invention of the
'218 patent. Element (b) of claim 15 requires far more than "pixel reduction" in the motion
processor; it requires "generating a second number of color pixel values provided in a second
color pattern and representative of a series of motion images to be previewed." (JX-l, claim 15
('218 patent) (emphasis added).)
The '218 patent discusses the fundamental differences between the motion and still
processing techniques of the claimed invention, such as the quality of the images and processing
rates-equating motion preview to "real-time operation." (JX-l at col. 4:61-5:13 ('218 patent)
("In this camera, the image processing used to create the preview mode is done in the timing and
control ASIC 27, since the processing must be done rapidly. About 60 images per second are
3 The only evidence Respondents presented at the hearing regarding the Parulski '335 patent was the combination of prior art identified in the Final ID's Conclusions of Law NO.3. (Final ID at 151.) Respondents never proposed the Parulski '335 patent in combination with the Sasaki reference alone or with other references cited in the Final ID. (Id.)
8
PUBLIC VERSION
processed in preview mode.").) Because the Parulski '335 patent teaches processing appropriate
for capturing still images only, one skilled in the art would not have reasonably expected success
in combining the Parulski '335 patent's teachings with other cited prior art to arrive at the
claimed motion processor. KSR, 550 U.S. at 421.4
The Chief ALJ also found it would have been obvious to combine Mori with the Parulski
'335 patent. Mori, however, teaches away from combining its invention with the still processing
in the Parulski '335 patent. It explains that a processor and memory as described in the Parulski
'335 patent should not be used for image reduction because "time is required to store all pixel
information ... and a long time is required before the image is displayed on the monitor." (RX-
29.003.) Thus, Mori explicitly criticizes the combination cited in the Final ID.s
The Chief ALJ also erred in finding claim 15 of the '218 patent obvious over Sasaki in
view of Tredwell and the Parulski '335 patent, or Sasaki in view of Mori and the Parulski '335
patent. (Final ID at 151.) His analysis of Sasaki fundamentally ignored the invention of the '218
patent. Sasaki operates like the prior-art analog NTSC cameras disclosed and criticized in the
'218 patent that use LCD circuitry to drive the display. (JX-l at col. 2:5-12.) The Chief ALJ
never explained why one of ordinary skill in the art would have modified the Sasaki camera to
4
S
Indeed, the Chief ALJ should not have considered the '335 Parulski patent at all. Kodak presented extensive evidence that the inventors conceived of the invention before the filing date of the Parulski '335 patent and were diligent in reducing the invention to practice, thereby "swearing behind" the reference. The Chief ALJ disregarded this evidence.
Respondents presented only superficial testimony from Dr. Bovik that failed to even explain why one of ordinary skill in the art would have attempted to combine the teachings of the Parulski '335 patent with Mori or why there would have been a reasonable expectation of success. Such conclusory evidence is insufficient to prove invalidity. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 989,995 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
9
PUBLIC VERSION
use a digital processor, remove the LCD circuitry, and modify the processor to perform the
claimed functions of the '218 patent. 6
In sum, the Final ID is riddled with legal and factual errors. It cannot be reconciled with
the asserted claim and the intrinsic evidence, the OUll's claim constructions, the 663 ID, or the
USPTO's findings confirming patentability of the '218 patent on reexamination. Accordingly,
Kodak respectfully requests that the Commission grant review, reverse the Chief ALl, and find a
violation of Section 337.
Respectfully submitted,
Dated: February 7, 2011 EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY
By: tUl.! 6
The addition of the Tredwell or Morl references falls far short of clear and convincing evidence of obviousness. They teach the unremarkable proposition that digital processors were known, which was conceded in the Background of the Invention.
10
Paul F. Brinkman Alston & Bird LLP The Atlantic Building 950 F Street, NW Washington, D.C. 20004-1404 Phone: 202-239-3404 Fax: 202-654-4984
PUBLIC VERSION
11
Michael J. Bettinger Stephen M. Everett Elaine Y. Chow Curt Holbreich K&L Gates LLP Four Embarcadero Ctr., Ste. 1200 San Francisco, CA 94111 Tel: (415) 882-8200 Fax: (415) 882-8220
Michael J. Abernathy Sanj ay K. Murthy Brian J. Arnold Christopher E. Hanba K&L Gates LLP 70 West Madison St., Ste. 3100 Chicago, IL 60602-4207 Tel: (312) 372-1121 Fax: (312) 287-8000
Eric C. Rusnak K&L Gates LLP 1601 K Street, NW Washington, DC 20006 Tel: (202) 778-9000 Fax: (202) 778-9100
Counsel for Complainant Eastman Kodak Company
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C.
In the Matter of
CERTAIN MOBILE TELEPHONES AND WIRELESS COMMUNICATION DEVICES FEATURING DIGITAL CAMERAS, AND COMPONENTS THEREOF
Inv. No. 337-TA-703
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Apriljoy H. Sanchez, hereby certify that on February 17, 2011, the foregoing
NON-CONFIDENTIAL VERSION OF SUMMARY OF COMPLAINANT EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY S PETITION FOR REVIEW OF THE FINAL INITIAL AND RECOMMENDED DETERMINATIONS
has been served on the following parties as indicated:
Marilyn R. Abbott, Secretary U.S. International Trade Commission 500 E. Street, SW Washington, DC 20436
[ ] Via Hand Delivery [ X] Via EDIS [ ] Via Overnight Mail [ ] Via Facsimile [ ] Via Electronic Mail [ ] N/A
The Honorable Paul J. Luckern U.S. International Trade Commission 500 E. Street, SW Room 317-H Washington, DC 20436 (2 copies)
[ X] Via Hand Delivery [ ] Via Overnight Mail [ ] Via First Class Mail [ ] Via Facsimile [ ] Via Electronic Mail
Vu Q. Bui, Esq. Investigative Attorney Office of Unfair Import Investigations U.S. International Trade Commission 500 E Street, S .W., Washington, DC 20436 (202) 205-2582
[ X] Via Hand Delivery [ ] Via Overnight Mail [ ] Via First Class Mail [ ] Via Facsimile [ X] Via Electronic Mail
- 2 -
Thomas L. Jarvis J. Michael Jakes Paul C. Goulet Anthony D. Del Monaco Finnegan , Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP 901 New York Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20001-4413
[ X] Via Hand Delivery [ ] Via Overnight Mail [ ] Via First Class Mail [ ] Via Facsimile [ X] Via Electronic Mail
Mark Davis Robert T. Vlasis Annaka Nava Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP 1300 Eye Street, N.W., Suite 900 Washington, DC 20005
[ X] Via Hand Delivery [ ] Via Overnight Mail [ ] Via First Class Mail [ ] Via Facsimile [ X] Via Electronic Mail
Mathew D. Powers Steven S. Cherensky Anne M. Cappella Joseph H. Lee Stefani Smith Alexandra O. Fellowes Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP 201 Redwood Shores Parkway Redwood Shores, CA 94065
[ ] Via Hand Delivery [ ] Via Overnight Mail [ ] Via First Class Mail [ ] Via Facsimile [ X] Via Electronic Mail
Dated: February 17, 2011 Apriljoy H. Sanchez IP Litigation Paralegal