klj_sil assessment report_26 july 2014

SIL Assessment for Chlorinated Paraffin Wax Plant

KLJ Organic - Qatar W.L.L

Prepared For:

KLJ Organic - Qatar W.L.L

Project Location:

Mesaieed Industrial City

Prepared By:

Velosi Certification LLC

26-Jul-14

SIL ASSESSMENT REPORT of 20

Report Type: SIL Assessment for Chlorinated Paraffin Wax Plant

Project Title: Chlorinated Paraffin Wax Plant SIL Assessment

Client Company Name: KLJ Organic - Qatar W.L.L

Issued By: Mike Snakard

Date: 26-Jul-14

Document Production & Approval Record

Issue No. Name Signature Date Title

Prepared by Syed Quraishy

26-Jul-14 HSE Consultant

Revised by Mike Snakard

26-Jul-14 SIL Assessment Chairman

Approved by Mark Kenyon

pp

26-Jul-14 Regional HSE Consultancy Manager

Document Revision Record

Issue No. Date Details of Revision

Rev 0 26-Jul-14 Initial report

COPYRIGHT

© This report is the copyright of Velosi Certification LLC. Any unauthorised reproduction or

usage by any person other than the addressee is strictly prohibited.


LIMITATIONS

VELOSI Certification LLC (Applus+ VELOSI) has prepared this report for the sole use of KLJ

Organics Qatar in accordance with the agreement under which our services were performed.

No other warranty, expressed or implied, is made as to the professional advice included in

this report or any other services provided by us. This report may not be relied upon by any

other party without the prior and express written agreement of Applus+ VELOSI.

Unless otherwise stated in this report, the assessments made assume that the sites and

facilities will be used for their current intended purpose without significant change. The

conclusions and recommendations contained in this report are based upon information

provided by others and upon the assumption that all relevant information has been provided

by those parties from whom it has been requested. Information obtained from third parties

has not been independently verified by Applus+ VELOSI, unless otherwise stated in the

report.

Where inspections have been carried out, these have been restricted to a level of detail

required to achieve the stated objectives of the services. The results of any measurements

taken may vary spatially or with time.


LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS/NOMENCLATURE

API : American Petroleum Institute

CL2 : Chlorine Gas

CPW : Chlorinated Paraffin Wax

DP : Design Pressure

DT : Design Temperature

EIA : Environmental Impact Assessment

EMS : Emergency Management System

ESD : Emergency Shutdown

FRP : Fibreglass Reinforced Plastic

H2 : Hydrogen Gas

HAZID : Hazard Identification Study

HAZOP : Hazard & Operability Study

HCl : Hydrochloric Acid

HSE : Health Safety & Environment

IPF : Instrumented Protective Functions

ITM : Inspection Testing and Maintenance

MOE : Ministry Of Environment

MIC : Mesaieed Industrial City

N2 : Nitrogen

NFPA : (US) National Fire Protection Association

PPE : Personnel Protective Equipment

PTW : Permit To Work

PVC : Polyvinyl Chloride

QP : Qatar Petroleum

QRA : Quantitative Risk Assessment

SIL : Safety Integrity Level

SIMOPs : Simultaneous Operations


SOP(s) : Standard Operating Procedure(s)

STEL : Short Term Exposure Limit

TLV : Threshold Limit Value

UPS : Uninterruptable Power Supply


Table of Contents

1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY...................................................................................... 7

2 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 8

2.1 STUDY INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 8

2.2 REPORT OVERVIEW ............................................................................................... 8

2.3 TEAM COMPOSITION ............................................................................................. 8

3 BACKGROUND, OBJECTIVE & SCOPE .............................................................. 10

3.1 DESCRIPTION OF FACILITY ..................................................................................... 10

3.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE SIL ASSESSMENT ...................................................................... 10

3.3 SIL ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY ............................................................................ 10

3.3.1 Consequence/Severity ................................................................................ 11

3.3.2 Occupancy ................................................................................................. 12

3.3.3 Probability of Avoiding the Hazard ............................................................... 12

3.3.4 Demand Rate ............................................................................................. 13

3.3.5 Calibrated Risk Graph ................................................................................. 13

4 SIL ASSESSMENT STUDY FINDINGS .............................................................. 16

5 RECOMMENDED FOLLOW UP ACTIONS .......................................................... 18

6 CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................... 19

APPENDIX A ......................................................................................................... 19


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report describes the scope, methodology, findings and recommendations from the

Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Assessment workshop conducted for the KLJ Organics Qatar

WLL (KLJ) plant to be constructed in Mesaieed Industrial City, Qatar. The primary objective

of this study was to determine the appropriate level of reliability needed to manage the risks

associated with each Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) identified in the HAZOP review

completed for the project.

The SIL Assessment Review Meeting was held on 1st July 2014 and facilitated by Mr. Mike

Snakard via video conference call. The meeting included the participation of key

representatives from QP, and KLJ. Support from the additional KLJ engineering team

members was solicited via video conference as required. This report documents the

discussions held and records the proceedings of the SIL Assessment workshop.

The SIL Assessment workshop analysed the reliability requirements of the eight (8) Safety

Instrumented Functions (SIF’s) identified during the HAZOP review Workshop. During the

SIL Assessment, the following two recommendations were made:

KLJ to consider moving the ESDV 2 and downstream manual isolation valve to

the inlet nozzle of the liquefier to eliminate the piping section downstream of the

ESDV. Note: this will also aid in avoiding a Low Low Pressure shutdown when

the valves are closed.

KLJ to consider adding a High High rate of change alarm on WIZ-540A to avoid

the tripping of ESDV 4 / 6 / 8. Alarm will notify personnel in the building of the

potential for a leak/rupture in the storage tank and instruct them of the potential

need to evacuate the building (secondary protection in the area includes area gas

detection that will alarm on detection of Cl2 gas).


1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Study Introduction

A one-day Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Assessment Workshop was conducted for the KLJ

Organics Qatar WLL (KLJ) Chloro Alkali Plant to be constructed in Mesaieed Industrial City,

Qatar. This report describes the results of the SIL Assessment Study performed by Applus+

VELOSI for KLJ.

The SIL Assessment Review workshop was held on 1st July 2014 in the KLJ 3rd floor

conference room, (SIL Assessment facilitation was done via video conference call). The

meeting involved the participation of key representatives from QP, and KLJ. Applus+

VELOSI provided the SIL Workshop Chairman and Scribe. This report documents the

discussions held and records the proceedings of the SIL Assessment workshop.

The SIL Assessment workshop analysed the reliability requirements of the eight (8) Safety

Instrumented Functions (SIF’s) identified during the HAZOP review Workshop. The SIFs

studied in the SIL Assessment are listed below:

SIF 1:Electrolyzer Outlet Low Low Differential Pressure shuts off Rectifier and close

ESDVs 1A and 1B on momentary delay;

SIF 2: Chlorine Compressor Low Low Discharge Pressure shuts off rectifier and shut

of ESDV’s 1B, 2, 4, 6 and 8;

SIF 3: Chlorine Gas Separator Low Low pressure in vapor outlet line Closes ESDV 2

and 3;

SIF 4: Liquid Chlorine Storage Tanks High High Level closed ESDVs 4;

SIF 5: Liquid Chlorine Storage Tanks High High Level closed ESDVs 6;

SIF 6:Liquid Chlorine Storage Tanks High High Level closed ESDVs 8;

SIF 7: Chlorine Vaporizer outlet Low Low Pressure Closed ESVDs 5, 7, 9, 10 and 11

SIF 8: Activation of Chlorine Area Gas Detection in the Liquid Chlorine Storage

Building

1.2 Report Overview

This report provides a brief description of the KLJ plant facility, the SIL Assessment

methodology employed, and the discussions and findings of the SIL Assessment workshop.

Section 3 describes the scope and objectives of the assessment, methodology employed.

Section 4 and 5 list up specifics findings from this study and recommendations respectively.

Finally, Section 6 gives concluding remarks about the study.

The worksheets documenting the discussions and findings of the SIL Assessment Workshop

are provided in the appendices along with additional reference information.

1.3 Team Composition

A team knowledgeable in the design and operation of the project and equipment as well as

in the SIL Assessment methodology was assembled to conduct the study. The team

consisted of representatives from KLJ, and Qatar Petroleum (QP). Applus+ VELOSI provided

the SIL Workshop chairperson who also acted as scribed. The team assessed the reliability


requirements of each SIF using a structured SIL Assessment methodology. Discussions in

the Workshops were recorded in PHAPro 8using the Calibrated Risk Graph Method format

consistent with the QP Guidelines for Safety Integrity Level Review, SP-GDL-S-030.

The display of the spreadsheet was projected onto a screen in the conference room to

enable the entire team to view the study documentation in real-time. A list of Workshop

attendees is documented in this report provided in Appendix A.


2 BACKGROUND, OBJECTIVE & SCOPE

2.1 Description of Facility

KLJ Organic Qatar W.L.L. (KLJ) is a joint venture company owned by Qatar Industrial

Manufacturing Co. (QIMC) of Qatar and KLJ Organic Ltd. of India. KLJ has acquired a plot

of land in Mesaieed Industrial City (MIC), Qatar to construct a Chlorinated Paraffin Wax

(CPW) plant. The facility will also produce caustic soda, hydrochloric acid, calcium chloride

and sodium hypochlorite ads by-products and co-products.

The plant will have a capacity of approximately 54,500 tons/year of CPW and will produce

66,000 tons/year of caustic soda prills, 97,450 tons/year of 32% HCl, 28,000 tons/year of

calcium chloride and 6,600 tons/year of sodium hypochlorite.

2.2 Objectives of the SIL Assessment

Applus+ VELOSI has completed a HAZOP and QRA for the Chlorinated Paraffin Wax project

KLJ plans to constructed in Mesaieed Industrial City, Qatar. As part of that HAZOP review

effort, eight (8) Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF’s) were identified. These SIF’s require

further assessment to define the reliability requirements of these loops. A SIL Verification

will then be completed during detailed engineering to confirm that the instruments selected

for these SIF’s achieve the required SIL rating (as defined in the SIL Assessment).

2.3 SIL Assessment Methodology

Safety Integrity Levels (SILs) were assigned in the SIL Assessment Workshop using the

Calibrated Risk Graph method following IEC 61511-3. The Calibrated Risk Graph method

provides a correlation of Risk Severity and Risk Likelihood to the SIL Assessment process in

accordance with the QP Corporate Risk Criteria.

For each SIF, the design intent was documented to identify the purpose of the safety

function. Workshop participants then determined the demand scenario by assessing the

potential consequences should the safety function under evaluation fail and the layers of

protection in place to protect against those consequences.

Risk rankings were assessed based on the following four parameters:

Consequence or Severity of the hazardous situation for personnel safety,

environment or economic / asset loss (S, E & A respectively);

Occupancy (probability that the exposed area is occupied) (F);

Probability of avoiding the hazardous situation (P); and

Demand rate (number of times per year that the hazardous situation would

occur in the absence of the safety instrumented function being considered)

(W).

Table 2-1 on the following page gives a description of the risk graph parameters listed

above.


Table 2-1: Description of process industry risk graph parameters

Parameter Description

Severity S Number of fatalities and / or serious injuries, environmental effect and damage to the asset / production likely to result from the occurrence of the hazardous event

Occupancy F Probability that the exposed area is occupied at the time the area is occupied at the time of the hazardous event. This should take into account the possibility of an increase likelihood of persons being in the exposed area in order to investigate abnormal situations which may exist during the build-up to the hazardous event (consider also if this changes the C parameter)

Probability of avoiding the hazard

P The probability that exposed persons are able to avoid the hazardous situation which exists if the safety instrumented function fails on demand. This depends on there being independent methods of alerting the exposed persons to the hazard prior to the hazard occurring and there being methods of escape

Demand Rate

W The number of times per year that the hazardous event would occur in the absence of the safety instrumented function under consideration. This can be determined by considering all failure which can lead to the hazardous event and estimating the overall rate of occurrence. Other protection layers should be included in the consideration

2.3.1 Consequence/Severity

The Consequence or Severity to define the SIL required for a SIF is defined against the

following criteria:

Impact of incident on Personnel Health and Safety

Impact of incident on Environment

Impact of incident on Asset, i.e. production and equipment loss

(commercial loss)

The following Table 2-2 provides the calibrated Consequence or Severity criteria for SIL in

terms of Personnel Health and Safety, Environmental and Assets in accordance with QP

Corporate Risk Assessment Matrix.

Table 2-2: Consequence or Severity SIL based on QP Risk Assessment Matrix

Risk Parameter Personnel Safety Environment Asset

Consequence Risk Parameter

CA (S1 / E1 / A1) Minor Injury or health effects

Minor effect Minor damage (<QR 350,000)

CB (S2 / E2 / A2) Major Injury or health effects

Localized effect Local Damage (<QR 3,500,000)

CC (S3 / E3 / A3) Single Fatality or Permanent Total

Disability

Major effect Major Damage (<QR 35,000,000)

CD (S4 / E4 / A4) Multiple Fatalities Massive effect Extensive damage (>QR 35,000,000)


2.3.2 Occupancy

Once the consequence was defined, the concept of vulnerability was introduced to modify

the consequence parameter, since in many instances a failure does relate to an immediate

fatality.

A receptor’s vulnerability is an important consideration in risk analysis because the dose

received by the receptor is sometimes not large enough to cause fatality. A receptor’s

vulnerability to a consequence is a function of the concentration of the hazard to which the

receptor is exposed to and the duration of the exposure. In this case, the worst case of

receptor exposure during the build up to the event is to be considered. This is defined by

the parameter ‘Occupancy (F)’, which defines the exposure levels of the receptor in the

hazardous zone that is discussed. Table 2-3 below provides the levels of occupancy that was

considered while defining SIL.

Table 2-3: Occupancy Levels

Risk Parameter Description

Occupancy (F) i.e. Frequency of exposure to hazardous zone

F1 Rare to more frequent exposure in the hazardous zone. Occupancy less than 0.1 (10% of working shift)

F2 Frequent to permanent exposure in the hazardous zone

2.3.3 Probability of Avoiding the Hazard

Once the occupancy is defined, the concept of probability of avoiding the hazardous event is

introduced. This is because in many instances even though the receptor is more vulnerable

to the hazard; it can be prevented by alerting the receptor and initiating the shutdown

systems such that the hazard can be avoided or enable the escape of receptor from the

hazardous zone to a safe area. This is defined by the parameter ‘Probability of avoidance

(P)’. Table 2-4 below provides the levels of probability of avoidance that will be considered

while defining SIL.

Table 2-4: Probability of avoiding the hazard

Risk Parameter Description Comment

Probability of Avoidance (PA) i.e. Probability of avoiding the

hazardous event, if the protection

system fails to operate

P1 Adopted if avoidance is possible - through pre-alarms, independent shutdown facilities, adequate response time or evacuation possibilities

PA should only be selected if all the following are true: - Facilities are provided to alert the operator that the SIS has failed; - Independent facilities are provided to shut down such that the hazard can be avoided or which enable all persons to escape to a safe area; - The time between the operator being alerted and a hazardous event occurring exceeds 1 hour or is definitely sufficient for the necessary actions.

P2 Adopted if all or any of the conditions are not satisfied

If conditions listed above in the PA are not satisfied


2.3.4 Demand Rate

Once all other factors have been defined, the Demand Rate is then identified and used to

define the demand requirement of the Safety Instrumented Function. Likelihood or Demand

rate is defined as ‘the number of times per year that the hazardous event would occur in the

absence of the safety instrumented function under consideration’. To determine the

Likelihood or Demand rate, it is necessary to consider all sources of failure that can lead to

one hazardous event. In determining the Likelihood or Demand rate, limited credit was

allowed for control system performance and intervention. Table 2-5 defines the Likelihood or

Demand rate parameters used in the SIL Assessment.

Table 2-5: Demand Rate

Demand Rate Classification based on IEC 61511

Demand rate (W) Likelihood of the unwanted occurrence

W1 A very slight probability that the unwanted occurrence will happen and only a few unwanted occurrences are likely. Once in every 30 to 100 years.

W2 A slight probability that the unwanted occurrence will happen and few unwanted occurrences are likely. Once in every three to 30 years.

W3 A relatively high probability that the unwanted occurrence will happen and frequent unwanted occurrences are likely. More than once in every one to three years.

2.3.5 Calibrated Risk Graph

PHA Pro 7 software was used for documenting the SIL Assignment. The parameters in

above sections like ‘Severity’, ‘Occupancy’, ‘Possibility of Avoidance' and ‘Demand Rate’ were

used as inputs to the Risk Graph and were applied in accordance with the guidelines given

below. The output, which was determined by software following the sequential application

of these parameters, is the SIL rating for each SIF assessed. The SIL required to ensure that

the system/loop under review can meet the design intent were classified as:

No requirements;

a (no special safety requirements);

SIL 1 (target average probability of Failure on Demand of≥ 10-2 to > 10-1;




B (the risk is unacceptably high and requires redesign or a single SIF is not

sufficient).

The Risk Graph is calibrated in accordance with the QP Risk Assessment Matrix and IEC

61511 requirements which is presented in Figures 2-1 through 2-3, below.


Figure 2-1: Calibrated Risk Graph/Matrix – Personnel Safety

Figure 2-2: Calibrated Risk Graph/Matrix – Environmental Loss


Figure 2-3: Calibrated Risk Graph/Matrix – Asset or Economic Loss

Given that the SIFs identified during the HAZOP review focused on the prevention of Loss of

Containment of Chlorine, Personnel Safety was the controlling concern and thus all risk

rankings recorded in the SIL Assessment were done using the Calibrated Risk Graph/Matrix

– Personnel Safety.


3 SIL ASSESSMENT STUDY FINDINGS

The SIL Assessment findings and session proceedings were recorded using Dyadem’s PHAPro 8 software and are listed in the worksheets, below.

Node: 1. Chlorine System within the Caustic Process Area

Deviation: 1.

Type: Drawings:

Design Conditions/Parameters: Equipment ID:

SIL determination

SIF SIF Status Safeguards (excluding SIF under

consideration)

Risk Graph (Qualitative method) - Initial Recommendations

Risk Graph (Qualitative method) - Final

C F P W SIL C F P W SIL

1.

SIF 1: Electrolyzer Outlet Low Low Differential Pressure shuts off Rectifier and close ESDVs 1A and 1B on momentary delay

Rec 1 Mechanical failure of Electrolyzer membranes in the event of FB rupture or 100 mm hole due to rapid drop in Chlorine pressure causing high differential pressure across Hydrogen & Chlorine sides of the membrane (Electrolyzer damage estimated within 10 seconds).

S3 (CC) F1 P1 W2 SIL 1 S3 (CC) F1 P1 W2 SIL 1

2.

PdZA-229 Alarms High & Low and Shuts of rectifier on High High or Low Low Differential Pressure.

3.

Area Gas Detection

4.

High and High High alarms (226 & 228 and 218 & 216) & shutdowns on H2 & Cl2 - No credit taken - common logic solver [Revalidated]

2.

SIF 2: Chlorine Compressor Low Low Discharge Pressure shuts off rectifier and shut of ESDVs 1B, 2, 4, 6 and 8

Rec 1.

PIA-514 on the outlet of the Mist Eliminator Alarms Low in the DCS - No credit taken for alarm only

S3 (CC) F2 P1 W2 SIL 2 KLJ to consider moving the ESDV 2 and downstream manual isolation valve to the inlet nozzle of the liquefier to eliminate the piping section downstream of the ESDV. Note: this will also aid in avoiding a Low Low Pressure shutdown when the valves are closed

S3 (CC) F2 P1 W2 SIL 2

2.

PIA-510 on the outlet of the Mist Eliminator Alarms Low in the DCS - No credit taken for alarm only

3.

Area Gas Detection

3.

SIF 3: Chlorine Gas Separator Low Low pressure in vapor outlet line Closes ESDV 2 and 3

Rec 1.

PICA-530 Alarms Low in the DCS - No credit taken for alarm only


2.

On imbalance of H2 to Cl2 ratio in the HCl plant (e.g.: caused by medium or large leak / rupture of the Cl2 piping) HCl plant will extinguish the flame in the burner for the synthesis reactor which will in turn close the pressure control valve PV-530A


Node: 1. Chlorine System within the Caustic Process Area

Deviation: 1.

Type: Drawings:

Design Conditions/Parameters: Equipment ID:

SIL determination

SIF SIF Status Safeguards (excluding SIF under

consideration)

Risk Graph (Qualitative method) - Initial Recommendations

Risk Graph (Qualitative method) - Final

C F P W SIL C F P W SIL

3.

Area Gas Detection

4.

SIF 4 / 5/ 6: Liquid Chlorine Storage Tanks High High Level closed ESDVs 4 or 6 or 8

Rec 1.

Secondary containment (Dike) sloped to fully enclosed containment sump vented to neutralization system on activation of Area Chlorine Gas Detection.

S4 (CD) F1 P2 W1 SIL 2 • KLJ to consider adding a High High rate of change alarm on WIZ-540A to avoid the tripping of ESDV 4 / 6 / 8. Alarm will notify personnel in the building of the potential for a leak / rupture in the storage tank and instruct them of the potential need to evacuate the building (secondary protection in the area includes area gas detection that will alarm on detection of Cl2 gas).

S4 (CD) F1 P2 W1 SIL 2

2.

Liquid storage tanks installed within an enclosed building which is vented to the neutralization system.

3.

Area Gas Detection 2oo5

5.


Rec 1.

On Low pressure (PAL) PIC-554 opens PV-554 and routes gas to the neutralization system


2.

Area Gas Detection 2oo3

3.

Piping within the isolatable section from the Vaporizer to the CPW plant contained within the Chlorine Vaporizer Building and the secondary containment ducting

6.

SIF 8: Activation of Chlorine Area Gas Detection in the Liquid Chlorine Storage Building

Rec 1.

FALL or FAHH on FICA-544 A/B to trip Pump P-544A/B on activation.

S4 (CD) F1 P1 W2 SIL 2 S4 (CD) F1 P1 W2 SIL 2

2.

Liquid storage tanks installed within an enclosed building which is vented to the neutralization system.


5 RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations were identified in the SIL Assessment:

KLJ to consider moving the ESDV 2 and downstream manual isolation valve

to the inlet nozzle of the liquefier to eliminate the piping section

downstream of the ESDV. Note: this will also aid in avoiding a Low Low

Pressure shutdown when the valves are closed.

KLJ to consider adding a High High rate of change alarm on WIZ-540A to

avoid the tripping of ESDV 4 / 6 / 8. Alarm will notify personnel in the

building of the potential for a leak / rupture in the storage tank and instruct

them of the potential need to evacuate the building (secondary protection in

the area includes area gas detection that will alarm on detection of Cl2 gas).

It is expected that KLJ will address and close out each of these recommendations prior to

start-up of the plant.


6 CONCLUSIONS

The SIL Assessment was completed for eight (8) Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF’s)

identified during the HAZOP Review Workshop. As an aftermath of the assessment, it was

determined by the SIL Assessment participants that the required reliability for each of the

SIFs falls with the SIL 1 or SIL 2 classification, as shown in the Table 6-1, below.

Safety Instrumented Function SIL Rating

SIF 1: Electrolyzer Outlet Low Low Differential Pressure shuts off Rectifier and close ESDVs 1A and 1B on momentary delay;

SIL 1

SIF 2: Chlorine Compressor Low Low Discharge Pressure shuts off rectifier and shut of ESDV’s 1B, 2, 4, 6 and 8;

SIL 2

SIF 3: Chlorine Gas Separator Low Low pressure in vapor outlet line Closes ESDV 2 and 3;

SIL 1

SIF 4: Liquid Chlorine Storage Tanks High High Level closed ESDVs 4; SIL 2

SIF 5: Liquid Chlorine Storage Tanks High High Level closed ESDVs 6; SIL 1

SIF 6:Liquid Chlorine Storage Tanks High High Level closed ESDVs 8; SIL 2


SIL 1

SIF 8: Activation of Chlorine Area Gas Detection in the Liquid Chlorine Storage Building

SIL 2

The SIL Assignments above, identify the minimum required levels of reliability for each SIF.

The actual levels of reliability will then be completed for each SIF during the SIL Verification

study to be completed in accordance with Qatar Petroleum SIL Guidelines (SP-GDL-S-030).


APPENDIX A: LIST OF SIL ASSESSMENT ATTENDEES

Mike Snakard SIL Assessment Chairman Applus+ VELOSI

Manoj Srivastava KLJ Project Manager KLJ

U. C. Tiwari KLJ Engineering Lead KLJ

Kirti Pratap KLJ Project Team KLJ

Shipra QIMCO Project Engineer QIMCO

Karthik Subbiah A/CHR, Acting Head of HSE Risk QP

Giri Mangalam CHR/4, Risk Assessment Specialist QP

Ganesh Nilangekar Sr Fire Prevention Eng, Industrial Cities QP

klj_sil assessment report_26 july 2014

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