klomp de haan-jes_2010_inflation_and_cbi
TRANSCRIPT
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6419.2009.00597.x
INFLATION AND CENTRAL BANKINDEPENDENCE: A META-REGRESSION
ANALYSISJeroen Klomp
University of Groningen, The Netherlands
Jakob de Haan
University of Groningen, The NetherlandsCESifo, Munich, Germany
Abstract. Using 59 studies, we perform a meta-regression analysis of studiesexamining the relationship between inflation and central bank independence(CBI). The studies considered are very different with respect to the CBI indicatorused, the sample of countries and time periods covered, model specification,estimators used and publication outlet. We conclude that there is a significantpublication bias. However, we also find a significant genuine effect of CBIon inflation. Differences between studies are not caused by differences in CBIindicators used.
Keywords. Central bank independence; Inflation; Meta-analysis
No wonder politicians often find the Fed a hindrance. Their better selvesmay want to focus on America’s long-term prosperity, but they are far moresubject to constituents’ immediate demands. That’s inevitably reflected in theireconomic policy preferences. If the economy is expanding, they want it to expandfaster; if they see an interest rate, they want it to be lower. (Greenspan, 2007,pp. 110–111)
1. Introduction
During the last two decades, many countries granted their monetary authoritiesgreater independence. It is widely believed that central banks otherwise willgive in to pressure from politicians who may be motivated by short-runelectoral considerations or may value short-run economic expansions highly whilediscounting the longer-run inflationary consequences of expansionary policies(Walsh, 2005).1 If the ability of politicians to distort monetary policy results inexcessive inflation, countries with an independent central bank should experiencelower rates of inflation. Indeed, beginning with Bade and Parkin (1988), animportant line of empirical research focusing on the relationship between centralbank independence (CBI) and inflation suggests that average inflation is negatively
Journal of Economic Surveys (2010) Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 593–621C© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 MainStreet, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
594 KLOMP AND DE HAAN
related to measures of CBI (see Eijffinger and De Haan, 1996a; Berger et al.,2001; Crowe and Meade, 2007, for summaries). However, this evidence has beencriticized by various authors, claiming that the results are sensitive with respect tothe measure of CBI used (see, for instance, Forder, 1996), the specification of themodel (see, for instance, Posen, 1995; Campillo and Miron, 1997) or the inclusionof high-inflation observations (see, for instance, De Haan and Kooi, 2000).
Using meta-regression analysis (MRA), this paper addresses two issues. (1) Towhat extent has the literature confirmed that there is a negative association betweenCBI and inflation? (2) Can we explain the pattern in the results of empirical researchon the relationship between CBI and inflation? Using 59 studies we find that, onaverage, there exists a significant relation between CBI and inflation. We also findthat the results reported in the studies in our sample suffer from a publication bias.Studies report the strongest relationship between CBI and inflation if they focuson OECD countries (especially when studies control for outliers) and include the1970s. Furthermore, we find that when a bivariate regression is used or if the modelincludes the labour market the significance of the CBI indicator increases. We donot find significant differences between studies based on a cross-country settingand those that use panel models. Differences between studies are also not causedby differences in CBI indicators used.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the mainissues in the empirical research on the relationship between CBI and inflation.Section 3 outlines the methodology of the MRA and the studies used in ouranalysis, while Section 4 contains the MRA. Section 5 offers our conclusions.
2. Measuring Central Bank Independence
To examine whether there is any relationship between CBI and inflation, one needsan indicator of the extent to which the monetary authorities are independent frompoliticians. Most empirical studies use either an indicator based on central banklaws in place, or the so-called turnover rate of central bank governors (TOR).
The most widely employed legal index of CBI is from Cukierman (1992) andCukierman et al. (1992),2 although alternative measures have been developed byAlesina (1988) and Grilli et al. (1991) among others (see Arnone et al. (2006) for anextensive comparison of the various CBI indicators). Even though these indicatorsare supposed to measure the same phenomenon and are all based on interpretationsof the central bank laws in place, their correlations are sometimes remarkably low(Eijffinger and De Haan, 1996a).
The Cukierman index is based on four characteristics of the central bank’s charter.First, a bank is viewed as more independent if the governor is appointed by thecentral bank board rather than by the government, is not subject to dismissal, andhas a long term of office. Second, the level of independence is higher the greaterthe extent to which policy decisions are made without government involvement.Third, a central bank is more independent if its charter states that price stabilityis the sole or primary goal of monetary policy. Fourth, independence is greater ifthere are limitations on the government’s ability to borrow from the central bank.Journal of Economic Surveys (2010) Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 593–621C© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
INFLATION AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE 595
Legal measures of CBI may not reflect the true relationship between the centralbank and the government. Especially in countries where the rule of law is lessstrongly embedded in the political culture, there can be wide gaps between theformal, legal institutional arrangements and their practical impact (Walsh, 2005).This is particularly likely to be the case in many developing economies. Cukierman(1992) argues that the actual average term in office of the central bank governormay therefore be a better proxy for CBI for these countries than measures based oncentral bank laws. The TOR is based on the presumption that, at least above somethreshold, a higher turnover of central bank governors indicates a lower level ofindependence.3 According to Cukierman’s data, TOR values range from a minimumof 0.03 (which corresponds to an average term in office for the governor of some33 years) to a maximum of 0.93 (which corresponds to an average term in officeof just 13 months). Cukierman’s data suggest that TORs in developing countriescover a much broader range of values than in OECD countries, where values areall below 0.20 turnovers per year.4
The next step is to employ these indicators in a particular model forinflation and estimate it for a specific group of countries and a sample period.Initially, the research focused on industrial countries using legal CBI indicators.Most of the older studies, which generally used simple cross-country bivariateregressions for particular periods, reported that CBI was negatively correlated withaverage inflation (see, for instance, Alesina and Summers, 1993). The estimatedeffect of independence on inflation turned out to be significant – in both astatistical and economic sense – especially during periods with flexible exchangerates.
While researchers found that legal CBI indicators were negatively associatedwith inflation among industrial countries, this was not the case for developingcountries. However, initial findings suggested that in these economies the TOR ofcentral bank governors is positively correlated with inflation, therefore also lendingsupport to the hypothesis that CBI and inflation are negatively related. Countriesthat experienced rapid turnover among their central bank heads (i.e. countries witha low level of CBI) also tended to experience high rates of inflation (see, forinstance, Cukierman, 1992). This is a case, however, in which causality is difficultto evaluate: Is inflation high because of political interference that leads to rapidturnover of central bank officials? Or are central bank officials tossed out becausethey cannot keep inflation down? (Walsh, 2005).
The empirical work attributing low inflation to CBI has been criticized alongvarious dimensions. First, some studies suggest that the results for the relationshipbetween CBI and inflation may differ across estimation periods. However, onewould expect a different impact of CBI on inflation under fixed and under floatingexchange rate regimes. Under the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates,countries were committed to an exchange rate target and had little room to conductan autonomous domestic monetary policy. Thus, the relation between CBI andinflation is likely to be much less straightforward before 1973. Indeed, Jonsson(1995) concludes that CBI has the strongest impact on inflation under floatingexchange rates.Journal of Economic Surveys (2010) Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 593–621C© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
596 KLOMP AND DE HAAN
Second, studies on the relationship between CBI and inflation often fail tocontrol adequately for other factors that might account for cross-country differencesin inflation. Countries with independent central banks may differ in ways thatare systematically related to average inflation. A good example of this line ofcritique is the work by Posen (1993, 1995) who argues that both low inflationand CBI reflect the presence of a strong financial sector constituency for lowinflation. Average inflation and the degree of CBI are jointly determined bythe strength of political constituencies opposed to inflation. Posen argues thatonce these constituencies are taken into account, the coefficient of CBI is nolonger significant in models explaining cross-country inflation differentials.5 AlsoCampillo and Miron (1997) claim little role for legal CBI when control variablesrelating to the degree of openness, political instability and a country’s inflation anddebt history are introduced. However, this result has been criticized as Campillo andMiron’s sample includes many developing countries for which legal CBI indicatorsmay not be appropriate. Sturm and De Haan (2001) use TORs in a similar modelas Campillo and Miron and conclude that the coefficient of this CBI indicator issignificant in a multivariate model.6
A recent strand of literature argues that the effects of CBI should not be analysedindependently of labour market institutions. Trade unions may, for instance, beinflation averse. The reason usually given is consistency: unions encompass mostof society, which in its majority is inflation averse, at least according to the standardRogoff (1985) model of monetary policy. Inflation-averse unions will make realvariables in equilibrium a function of the institutional set-up like the degree ofcentral bank conservatism given a certain degree of CBI. The more conservativethe central bank, the lower output will be and the higher the level of unemploymentin equilibrium. In that sense, monetary policy has real effects in these models. Alsothe effects of CBI on inflation will be different in this setting compared to thestandard Rogoff-type of model (see Berger et al. (2001) for a further discussion).A good example of this line of research is the study of Cukierman and Lippi(1999). Using data for 19 OECD economies for the period 1980–1994, they findthat the inflation reducing impact of CBI is stronger at intermediate levels of unioncentralization.
Finally, a few studies have sounded a warning that conclusions on the relationshipbetween CBI and inflation are highly sensitive to influential observations. Forinstance, Temple (1998) finds that if high-inflation countries are added to his sampleof OECD and developing countries, the effect of CBI (proxied by Cukierman’s(1992) legal index) on inflation disappears, while De Haan and Kooi (2000) andSturm and De Haan (2001) report that the TOR indicator only becomes significantif high-inflation countries are included in the sample.
3. Studies on CBI and Inflation
MRA has become an increasingly popular instrument in economics to examineparticular fields of research, especially if there are many alternative specificationsleading to diverging conclusions.7 As Stanley and Jarrell (1989, p. 300) put it:Journal of Economic Surveys (2010) Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 593–621C© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
INFLATION AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE 597
Figure 1. Studies Included in Our MRA.
MRA not only recognizes the specification problem but also attempts to estimateits effects by modelling variations in selected econometric specifications. MRAprovides us with the means to analyze, estimate, and discount, when appropriate,the influence of alternative model specification and specification searches. In thisway, we can more accurately estimate the empirical magnitudes of the underlyingeconomic phenomena and enhance our understanding of why they vary acrossthe published literature.
The issue of CBI lends itself perfectly for such an analysis. However, to the bestof our knowledge, such an analysis has not been done so far. We have gathered 59studies that come up with empirical estimates of the effect of CBI on inflation ina cross-country and/or panel setting, using some proxy for CBI. That means thatcountry-specific studies are excluded from the analysis. We started our search forstudies with the surveys of Eijffinger and De Haan (1996a) and the update thereofin Berger et al. (2001). To find more recent (published and unpublished) studieswe used Google and JSTOR. Table A1 in the Appendix contains all the studies weidentified. We stopped searching at 31 December 2006. Table A1 also shows foreach of these studies the percentage of regressions in which there is a significantnegative relationship between inflation and CBI. We have coded all studies includedin our analysis independently; whenever we coded studies differently initially, thesedifferences were discussed until we both agreed about the proper coding.
Figure 1 summarizes the number of studies according to their year of publication,differentiating between journal articles, (contributions in) books and workingpapers. It follows from Figure 1 that the average number of studies per year isaround three in the 1990s and increases to five at the end of our sample period.Journal of Economic Surveys (2010) Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 593–621C© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
598 KLOMP AND DE HAAN
The average sample size is about 91 observations, while on average about 28countries are included. Most studies examine the effect of CBI on inflation byestimating (variants of) a single-equation model without extensively testing for therobustness of the results. Although most studies report a negative relation betweenCBI and inflation, various papers find a positive or no effect of CBI on inflation.
Drawing on Stanley and Jarrell (1989), we can explain our MRA as follows.Most studies on CBI and inflation involve a standard regression model such as
π = Xβ + ε (1)
where π is the (n × 1) dependent variable vector, i.e. some measure of inflation,X is an (n × m) matrix of explanatory variables, including an indicator of CBI,8
and ε denotes some random error, which is typically assumed to conform to theclassical regression model. As we are primarily interested in the relevance of CBIin explaining inflation, we focus on the estimated t-statistic of the coefficient ofthe CBI indicator. This also forgoes the problem that the coefficients of the variousindicators are not comparable, as their scaling differs. If the TOR is used as a CBIindicator, we multiply the reported t-statistic by −1 so that it becomes comparablewith studies using legal CBI indicators.
Table 1 shows the distribution of the t-statistics across time period, countrysample, and indicator used. The average t-statistic of the CBI indicator of allregressions in our sample is −1.78 if we take all estimates independently. Whenwe account for study differences, the average t-statistic increases to −1.85. Bothaverages indicate that the relation between inflation and CBI is significantlynegative at the 5% significance level.
We can draw some stylized facts from Table 1. First, in OECD countries theaverage t-statistic of the CBI and inflation relation is lower (i.e. more significant)compared to developing and transition countries. In most cases, if we do notdifferentiate between CBI indicators used, these results suggest that the relationbetween inflation and CBI is significant in OECD countries and insignificant indeveloping countries.
Second, in the period 1970–1979 the t-statistic of the CBI indicator becomesmost negative (i.e. significant). This is probably due to the breakup of the BrettonWoods system in 1973. Under the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates,monetary policy in most countries was determined by the fixed exchange rate target.The t-values for most country groups also decline overtime. This is probably dueto the fact that central bank laws have converged over time and have thereforebecome less capable of explaining inflation differentials.9
Finally, the significance level varies not only across time periods and the sampleof countries considered, but also across indicators. The Alesina indicator is highlysignificant in OECD countries in all periods, while for the same country groupthe TOR is never significant; the Bade–Parkin indicator is only significant inthe period 1970–1979. For developing countries, the TOR indicates a significantnegative relation in all periods, while the legal CBI indicators of Cukierman (1992)and Grilli et al. (1991) are insignificant in all periods. To sum up, the significanceof the CBI indicator does not depend only on the time period or country sample,Journal of Economic Surveys (2010) Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 593–621C© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
INFLATION AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE 599
Tabl
e1.
Det
aile
dD
istr
ibut
ion
ofth
et-
Stat
istic
s.
CB
Iin
dica
tor
used
Cuk
ierm
anT
urno
ver
rate
Gri
lliet
al.
(199
1)A
lesi
naB
ade
and
Park
in
OE
CD
LD
Cs
OE
CD
LD
Cs
Tra
nsiti
onO
EC
DL
DC
sT
rans
ition
OE
CD
OE
CD
Peri
od19
60–1
969
−0.7
341.
052
0.73
6−1
.897
−0.5
23−1
.345
0.26
40.
638
−2.2
61−0
.529
Peri
od19
70–1
979
−2.3
91−0
.606
−0.9
21−3
.554
−2.1
81−3
.002
−1.3
93−1
.019
−3.9
18−2
.186
Peri
od19
80–1
989
−1.7
670.
019
−0.2
97−2
.930
−1.5
56−2
.378
−0.7
69−0
.395
−3.2
94−1
.562
Peri
od19
90–1
999
−1.5
520.
234
−0.0
82−2
.715
−1.3
41−2
.163
−0.5
54−0
.180
−3.0
78−1
.347
The
num
bers
inbo
ldre
pres
ent
asi
gnif
ican
tre
latio
nbe
twee
nin
flat
ion
and
CB
Iat
a10
%si
gnif
ican
cele
vel.
Journal of Economic Surveys (2010) Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 593–621C© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
600 KLOMP AND DE HAAN
but also on the indicator used. The significance levels differ much across indicators,when we hold the time period and country group fixed.
However, before we come to any conclusion with regard to the existence of anegative relation between CBI and inflation, we first have to analyse whether thereis a so-called ‘publication bias’ (i.e. journals only publish papers with particularresults).
4. Meta-regression Analysis: Approach
The key research issues are whether there is a publication bias in research on thelink between CBI and inflation, and whether a meaningful CBI effect remains aftera publication bias is filtered out. Drawing heavily on Doucouliagos and Stanley(2009), we can explain a typical meta-regression model as follows:
effecti = β1 + β0SEi +K∑
k=1
αk Z jk + ei (2)
where effecti is the focus of the analysis (in our case, the effect of CBI on inflation),SEi is the standard error of the estimated effect, Zjk is a vector of meta-independentvariables reflecting differences across studies, αk is the meta-regression coefficientwhich reflects the effect of particular study characteristics and ei denotes the meta-regression disturbance term. Without publication bias, the observed effects shouldvary randomly around the ‘true’ value, β1, independently of the standard error. Theterm β0SEi allows for the very common tendency of researchers and reviewers toprefer statistically significant results and for researchers therefore to rerun theiranalysis until they find such significance (Doucouliagos and Stanley, 2009). This isespecially the case for studies with only a small number of observations. To reporta significant relationship, these studies have to find a sufficiently large estimatedeffect, which compensates for the large standard errors associated with the smallnumber of observations. If the number of observations increases indefinitely, thestandard error will approach zero and the reported effects will approach β1, the‘true’ effect (Stanley, 2008; Doucouliagos and Stanley, 2009).
Studies that try to explain the same relationship usually use different sample sizesand model specifications. Hence, the random estimation errors ei in equation (2)are likely to be heteroscedastic. As suggested by Doucouliagos and Stanley (2009),dividing equation (2) by SEi, i.e. a sample estimate of the standard deviation ofthese meta-regression errors, gives the weighted least squares version of equation(2):
ti = β0 + β1
(1
SEi
)+
K∑k=1
αkZ jk
SEi+ ei (3)
where ti represent the reported t-values. The conventional t-test of the intercept ofequation (3), β0, is a test for publication bias.
As follows from Section 2, the variation among the empirical results may beexplained by various study characteristics or model specifications, reflected in Zjk.
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INFLATION AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE 601
The types of design elements that we include in Zjk are as follows:
1. the CBI indicator, sample of countries, and time period used, i.e. aredifferences in results related to the indicators and samples used?
2. the specification of the regression model, i.e. does the inclusion of controlvariables have an effect on the reported significance of the CBI indicator, andif so, which control variables matter?
3. characteristics of the publication, i.e. does the study focus on the relationshipbetween CBI and inflation? Does the publication form (journal, book orworking paper), outlet (does the journal in which the study is published havea social science citation impact (SSCI) score?) or publication year have anyrelationship with the reported results?
4. the estimation method, i.e. is there any systematic difference between cross-country versus panel studies and does it make a difference if a study controlsfor outliers and/or high-inflation observations?
In our analysis, the unit of observation is not a study, but every regression reported.Many studies contain more than one regression, for instance, when they test forthe sensitivity of the choice of a particular CBI indicator. Since the observationsare not independent, ordinary least squares would lead to biased estimates. Thisis corrected by using a hierarchical linear model, which is a particular regressiontechnique that is designed to take into account the hierarchical structure of the data(Raudenbusch and Bryk, 1986). Equation (3) can be rewritten as
ti j = β00 + β1 j
(1
SEi j
)+
K∑k=1
αkZi jk
SEi j+
K∑k=1
γkV0 jk
SEi j+ ωi + u j (4)
The meta-independent variable is split up in two parts. One part explains thedifferences between studies and estimates Zijk, while the other part explains studydifferences V0j. The ωi and uj are the error terms on estimate and study level,respectively.10
5. Meta-regression Analysis: Results
Table 2 gives our first estimation results. About 60% of the total variance iscontributed to the variance on study level. This implies that there is dependencewithin a study and that a multilevel model is the appropriate model to use. Column 1of Table 2 shows the estimation results of the so-called funnel graph asymmetrytest (Doucouliagos and Stanley, 2009). The parameter of the inverse standard errorsis significant, which indicates that the effect of CBI on inflation is significantlynegative. However, the constant term is also significant at a 5% level, meaningthat the effect found in the CBI–inflation literature is subject to a publicationbias.
To sum up our first results, we find evidence for a genuine effect of CBI oninflation. At the same time, we find evidence that the literature on CBI and inflationsuffers from a publication bias.Journal of Economic Surveys (2010) Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 593–621C© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
602 KLOMP AND DE HAAN
Table 2. MRA Tests for Publication Bias and Genuine Empirical Effect.
t-statistic CBI coefficient
Coefficient z-value
Fixed parametersConstant −1.651∗∗ −5.67Inverse standard errors −0.073∗∗ −2.02
Random parametersVariance estimate level p-value 0.000Variance study level p-value 0.000Intra-class correlation 0.583
Diagnostic statisticsNumber of observations 356Number of studies 58Maximum likelihood ratio p-value 0.000
∗∗, ∗Indicates significance at 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Next, we include variables to control for different specifications used in thevarious studies examined in the MRA. As in any regression model, the estimatedcoefficients in the MRA model can be biased when important explanatory variablesare omitted. Table 3 presents the definition of the control variables used in theMRA. The first set of variables refers to the CBI indicator used in the regression(ALES, GMT, CUK, BP, TOR, OTHER). The next variables focus on countrysample (OECD, LDCs, TRANS, MIXED) and time periods (1960, 1970, 1980,1990).
In bivariate regressions of inflation and CBI, the impact of omitted variableson inflation is attributed to the CBI indicator. Multivariate studies will thereforeprobably report lower absolute t-statistics of the CBI indicator (BIVARIATE). Inorder to examine which control variables reduce the impact of CBI on inflation,we have constructed dummy variables for a number of commonly used controlvariables.
According to Romer (1993), inflation depends on the openness of an economy.Since the real effects of monetary policy are lower in more open economies,governments in these countries have fewer incentives to inflate. We thereforeconstruct a dummy variable reflecting whether a regression takes this controlvariable into account (OPEN).
As pointed out by Franzese (1999), also labour market institutions may changethe real effects of monetary policy and the anti-inflationary impact of CBI,depending on the extent to which a particular wage bargaining system internalizesthe costs associated with excessive wage settlements. We therefore include a dummyvariable that is one if some indicator for the labour market is taken up in a regressionand zero otherwise (LABMARKT). According to various studies, the interactionJournal of Economic Surveys (2010) Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 593–621C© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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Table 3. Variables Used.
ALES A dummy variable equal to 1 if the CBI indicator of Alesina is used,0 otherwise
GMT A dummy variable equal to 1 if the CBI indicator of Grilli et al.(1991) is used, 0 otherwise
CUK A dummy variable equal to 1 if the CBI indicator of Cukierman isused, 0 otherwise
BP A dummy variable equal to 1 if the CBI indicator of Bade–Parkin isused, 0 otherwise
TOR A dummy variable equal to 1 if the TOR indicator is used, 0 otherwiseOTHER A dummy variable equal to 1 if another CBI indicator is used, 0
otherwise
OECD A dummy variable equal to 1 if the analysed countries are all OECDcountries, 0 otherwise
LDCs A dummy variable equal to 1 if the analysed countries are alldeveloping countries, 0 otherwise
TRANS A dummy variable equal to 1 if the analysed countries are alltransition countries, 0 otherwise
MIXED A dummy variable equal to 1 if the analysed countries are mixed, 0otherwise
1960 A dummy variable equal to 1 if data refer to the 1960s, 0 otherwise1970 A dummy variable equal to 1 if data refer to the 1970s, 0 otherwise1980 A dummy variable equal to 1 if data refer to the 1980s, 0 otherwise1990 A dummy variable equal to 1 if data refer to the 1990s, 0 otherwise
BIVARIATE A dummy variable equal to 1 if the inflation and CBI relation isexamined using bivariate regression, 0 otherwise
OPEN A dummy variable equal to 1 if openness of a country is taken intoaccount, 0 otherwise
LABMARKT A dummy variable equal to 1 if some labour market variable is takeninto account, 0 otherwise
ILABMARKT A dummy variable equal to 1 if an interaction of the CBI indicatorwith the labour market is taken into account, 0 otherwise
EXCHANGE A dummy variable equal to 1 if the exchange rate regime is taken intoaccount, 0 otherwise
DEBT A dummy variable equal to 1 if government debt is taken intoaccount, 0 otherwise
POLSTAB A dummy variable equal to 1 if political stability is taken intoaccount, 0 otherwise
GDP A dummy variable equal to 1 if income is taken into account, 0otherwise
INTER A dummy variable equal to 1 if an interaction of the CBI indicatorwith other variables is taken into account, 0 otherwise
LOGINFL A dummy variable equal to 1 if the log of inflation is used as thedependent variable, 0 otherwise
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604 KLOMP AND DE HAAN
Table 3. Continued.
OUTLIER A dummy variable equal to 1 if the author controls for outliers, 0otherwise
NUMOBS Number of observationsPRIMDATA A dummy variable equal to 1 if the author creates his own CBI data,
0 otherwiseSECDATA A dummy variable equal to 1 if the author modified existing CBI data
of others, 0 otherwisePANEL A dummy variable equal to 1 if the author uses panel data, 0
otherwiseFIXEDTIME A dummy variable equal to 1 if the author uses panel data with fixed
time effects, 0 otherwise (if panel data are used)
FIXEDCOUNT A dummy variable equal to 1 if the author uses panel data with fixedcountry effects, 0 otherwise (if panel data are used)
OBJECT A dummy variable equal to 1 if the inflation and CBI regression ofthe study focuses on this issue, 0 otherwise
BOOK A dummy variable equal to 1 if the study is published in a book, 0otherwise
WORKING A dummy variable equal to 1 if the study is a working paper, 0otherwise
PUBYEAR Publication year (1991 = 1, . . . , 2006 = 15)IMPACT SSCI score of a journal
of labour market institutions and CBI affects both the real and nominal effects ofmonetary policymaking and that is why we include a dummy that is one in casethis interaction is included and zero otherwise (ILABMARKT).
Other control variables that various studies have included – generally followingCampillo and Miron (1997) – are the exchange rate regime (EXCHANGE),government debt (DEBT), political instability (POLSTAB) and income (GDP).Stable exchange rate regimes are often argued to reduce inflation; a fixed exchangerate can be considered as an alternative commitment device to counter theinflationary bias of monetary policymaking. A high debt-to-GDP ratio and a highlevel of political instability are determinants of the inflation bias and are thereforeoften argued to lead to higher inflation, while income is often reported to have anegative impact on inflation. We include dummies in our MRA reflecting whetherthese control variables are taken up in regressions. Finally, we take up a dummythat is one if a regression includes an interaction (INTER) of the CBI indicator anda control variable other than the labour market variable, and zero otherwise.
Next we add some variables referring to differences in estimation methods anddata differences. First, we add dummies for regressions using the logarithm ofinflation (LOGINFL) or that delete countries or time periods from the samplebecause they are considered to be outliers (OUTLIER).11 As some countries haveextremely high inflation rates, using inflation instead of the log of inflation causesJournal of Economic Surveys (2010) Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 593–621C© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
INFLATION AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE 605
these high-inflation observations to become very influential. Similarly, correctingfor outliers may affect the significance of the CBI indicator. However, the effect ofcorrecting for outliers may differ across country groups. Temple (1998) finds that inhis sample of OECD countries the CBI indicator of Cukierman et al. (1992) is onlysignificant if high-inflation countries are dropped, while De Haan and Kooi (2000)and Sturm and De Haan (2001) report for their sample of developing countriesthat the inclusion of high-inflation countries renders the coefficient of the TORindicator of CBI significant. We therefore include the interaction of our outlierdummy and our dummies for country groupings.
The next variable we include in our MRA is the number of observationsas more observations are expected to lead to higher significance levels of theCBI indicator (NUMOBS). We also test whether the t-statistic of the CBIindicator is different if the author uses his own CBI measure (PRIMDATA) ormodifies an existing index as there may be bias if an author uses his own CBIindicator (SECDATA). We also distinguish between various estimation methods,differentiating between cross-country and panel models (PANEL). In the lattercategory, we have dummies reflecting whether the author controls for time orcountry fixed effects (FIXEDTIME, FIXEDCOUNT).
Finally, we control for publication and study differences. First, we ask whetherthere are any differences between studies that only estimate the relationship betweenCBI and inflation and those that have a broader perspective. We use dummiesreflecting that a study is published in a book (BOOK) or as a working paper(WORKING) (at the time we did this research) instead of in a journal, respectively.We also test for the effect of the SSCI score of journals as the citation impact of ajournal is often considered as a quality indicator (IMPACT). The final variable weinclude in the MRA is the publication year (PUBYEAR), allowing us to analysedifferences over time in reported t-statistics.
We showed in Table 1 that the significance of the t-value of the CBI coefficientvaries across time and place; therefore in the first regression of Table 4 we controlfor time periods and country sample. All control variables are divided by thestandard error of the CBI coefficient as given in equation (4).
When we include multiple variables, the inverse of the standard error no longerrepresents the genuine effect of CBI on inflation. Rather, it is the combinationof all the coefficients on the variables that reflect the corrected effect of CBI oninflation. We find that the CBI coefficient is insignificant in the 1960s, 1980sand 1990s, while it is significant in the 1970s. We confirm the hypothesis thatthe t-statistic of the CBI coefficient is significantly negative in studies includingonly OECD countries. In the next column we control for the CBI indicatorused. We do not find any significant difference between the results of studiesthat are caused by differences in the indicator used. So even though the variousindicators are constructed in a different way, the significance of the relationshipbetween CBI and inflation is not dependent on the selection of a particular CBIindicator.
In column 3 of Table 4 we include variables for commonly used control variablesin studies on CBI and inflation. We find that inclusion of a labour market indicatorJournal of Economic Surveys (2010) Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 593–621C© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
606 KLOMP AND DE HAAN
Table 4. MRA Specification on Time, Country Sample and Control Variables.
t-statistic CBI coefficient
(1) (2) (3)
Coefficient z-value Coefficient z-value Coefficient z-value
Fixed parameterConstant −1.684∗∗ −6.55 −1.604∗∗ −6.11 −1.670∗∗ −6.58Inverse standard
errors0.012 0.30 0.031 0.62 −0.002 −1.35
OECDcountries
−0.517∗∗ −2.21
Less developedcountries(LDCs)
−0.008 −0.19
Transitioncountries
0.001 0.03
Period1960–1969
0.265 1.04 0.225 1.36
Period1970–1979
−0.293∗∗ −4.71 −0.315∗∗ −4.85
Period1980–1989
−0.004 −0.16 0.005 0.16
Period1990–1999
−0.006 −0.15 −0.038 −0.94
Cukiermanindicator ×OECDcountries
0.033 0.93
Cukiermanindicator ×LDCs
0.005 0.17
TOR × OECDcountries
0.061 1.51
TOR × LDCs −0.056 −0.90TOR ×
transitioncountries
−0.009 −0.01
Grilli et al.(1991)indicator ×OECDcountries
−0.002 −0.28
Grilli et al.(1991)indicator ×LDCs
0.006 0.19
Journal of Economic Surveys (2010) Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 593–621C© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
INFLATION AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE 607
Table 4. Continued.
t-statistic CBI coefficient
(1) (2) (3)
Coefficient z-value Coefficient z-value Coefficient z-value
Grilli et al.(1991)indicator ×transitioncountries
0.008 0.49
Bade andParkinindicator
0.004 0.24
Alesinaindicator
−0.007 −0.94
Labour market −0.409∗∗ −2.23Openness −0.004 −0.34Income 0.002 0.16Political
instability−0.007 −0.70
Exchange rateregime
−0.002 −0.23
Debt −0.008 −0.68Labour market
interaction−0.292∗∗ −2.54
Otherinteractions
−0.201 −0.89
Random parametersVariance
estimatelevel p-value
0.000 0.000 0.000
Variance studylevel p-value
0.000 0.000 0.000
Intra-classcorrelation
0.501 0.513 0.509
Diagnostic statisticsNumber of
observations372 372 368
Number ofstudies
57 57 56
Maximumlikelihoodratio p-value
0.000 0.000 0.000
∗∗, ∗Indicates significance at 5% and 10% level, respectively. All control variables are divided by thestandard errors.
Journal of Economic Surveys (2010) Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 593–621C© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
608 KLOMP AND DE HAAN
and an interaction term between the labour market indicator and the CBI indicatorinfluences the t-value of the CBI coefficient and makes the relationship betweeninflation and CBI (more) significant. We do not find that any other variable thatis suggested by Campillo and Miron (1997) influences the significance of theCBI coefficient. This finding therefore does not support Campillo and Miron’sconclusion that the omission of control variables in earlier studies is behind thefact that these older studies found a significant relationship between CBI andinflation.
In Table 5 we add variables to control for the method of estimation and dataissues. Correcting for outliers by deleting countries or time periods from the samplehas only a significant effect in OECD countries, meaning that correcting for outliersin OECD countries makes the relation between CBI and inflation more significant.That the sign of the interaction of outlier correction and country group differsbetween OECD and less developed countries is due to the different impact ofoutliers in these country groups mentioned earlier. The use of the logarithm ofinflation instead of actual inflation as dependent variable has no effect on thesignificance of the CBI coefficient. Not surprisingly, studies that estimate therelation between inflation and CBI using a bivariate regression report a higher levelof significance of the CBI coefficient than studies that take control variables intoaccount. This suggests that bivariate regressions have an omitted variable bias.12
Next we check whether there exists a bias in studies using data that have beenconstructed or collected by the author of the study, or in studies in which the authorhas modified existing data. The estimation results do not support this hypothesis.Also there is no significant difference when panel estimation (with period or countryfixed effects) is used instead of a cross-country estimation.
The final two columns in Table 5 show the results for various publication effects.There is no systematic difference between studies that focus on the relationshipbetween CBI and inflation and those that do not. Likewise, the publication outletdoes not influence differences across studies in a systematic way. There is also nodifference between papers published in journals with different SSCI scores.
Finally, to test the joint significance of the regressors, we performed alikelihood ratio test of a full model, which contains all independent variablesused (except for the fixed effects indicator and the impact factor score becausethese reduce our sample drastically) against a baseline model with only thesignificant variables (i.e. OECD, OECD∗OUTLIER, 1970, LABORMARKT,ILABORMARKT, BIVARIATE). The results indicate that the full model does notperform better than the model that only includes significant variables (p > 0.10).Also we tested the model that only includes significant variables against a modelwith only a constant and the inverse standard errors included. The results show thatthe model with the significant variables included outperforms the model with onlythe constant and the inverse standard error (p < 0.05).
Furthermore the results in Tables 4–6 have been confirmed by estimating theregression using the random sample method. This robust method replicatesthe regression 1000 times by estimating it with a changing sample of about 60% ofthe total sample. The purpose of this procedure is to examine whether the regressionJournal of Economic Surveys (2010) Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 593–621C© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
INFLATION AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE 609
Tabl
e5.
MR
ASp
ecif
icat
ion
onD
ata
and
Est
imat
ion
Met
hodo
logy
.
t-st
atis
ticC
BI
coef
fici
ent
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Coe
ffic
ient
z-va
lue
Coe
ffic
ient
z-va
lue
Coe
ffic
ient
z-va
lue
Coe
ffic
ient
z-va
lue
Fixe
dpa
ram
eter
sC
onst
ant
−1.6
40∗∗
−5.7
7−1
.694
∗∗−4
.17
−1.8
54∗∗
−7.2
8−1
.684
∗∗−4
.50
Inve
rse
stan
dard
erro
rs0.
011
0.85
−0.0
10−0
.30
7.93
71.
01−0
.009
−0.6
9B
ivar
iate
regr
essi
on−0
.429
∗∗−2
.73
Num
ber
ofco
untr
ies
−0.0
01−1
.56
Log
infl
atio
nis
depe
nden
tva
riab
le0.
040
0.94
Out
lier
corr
ectio
n×
OE
CD
−5.6
24∗∗
−4.5
2O
utlie
rco
rrec
tion
×L
DC
s0.
005
0.25
Out
lier
corr
ectio
n×
tran
sitio
nco
untr
ies
−0.0
58−0
.42
Dat
aso
urce
prim
ary
0.00
20.
15D
ata
sour
cese
cond
ary
−0.3
95−1
.36
Pane
lre
gres
sion
−0.0
02−0
.16
Journal of Economic Surveys (2010) Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 593–621C© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
610 KLOMP AND DE HAAN
Tabl
e5.
Con
tinu
ed.
t-st
atis
ticC
BI
coef
fici
ent
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Coe
ffic
ient
z-va
lue
Coe
ffic
ient
z-va
lue
Coe
ffic
ient
z-va
lue
Coe
ffic
ient
z-va
lue
Fixe
dtim
eef
fect
0.00
90.
27Fi
xed
coun
try
effe
ct−0
.012
−0.9
5O
bjec
tof
the
stud
y0.
022
0.70
Wor
king
pape
r0.
014
1.35
Boo
kpu
blic
atio
n−0
.076
−1.2
5Pu
blic
atio
nye
ar−0
.004
−1.0
1Im
pact
scor
e0.
003
0.12
Ran
dom
para
met
ers
Var
ianc
ees
timat
ele
vel
p-va
lue
0.00
00.
000
0.00
00.
000
Var
ianc
est
udy
leve
lp-
valu
e0.
000
0.00
00.
000
0.00
0In
tra-
clas
sco
rrel
atio
n0.
520
0.58
00.
500
0.59
0
Dia
gnos
ticst
atis
tics
Num
ber
ofob
serv
atio
ns36
311
336
315
8N
umbe
rof
stud
ies
5522
5527
Max
imum
likel
ihoo
dra
tiop-
valu
e0.
000
0.00
00.
000
0.00
0
∗∗,
∗ Ind
icat
essi
gnif
ican
ceat
5%an
d10
%le
vel,
resp
ectiv
ely.
All
cont
rol
vari
able
sar
edi
vide
dby
the
stan
dard
erro
rs.
Journal of Economic Surveys (2010) Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 593–621C© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
INFLATION AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE 611
Table 6. MRA General to Specific Approach.
t-statistic CBI coefficient
(1)
Coefficient z-value
Fixed parametersConstant −1.412∗∗ −6.51Inverse standard errors −0.043 −1.34Outlier correction × OECD −0.651∗ −1.85OECD −0.401∗∗ −2.76Period 1970–79 −0.351∗∗ −4.65Bivariate −0.287∗∗ −2.01Labour market −0.025∗∗ −2.09Labour market interaction −0.176∗∗ −1.99
Random parametersVariance estimate level p-value 0.000Variance study level p-value 0.000Intra-class correlation 0.512
Diagnostic statisticsNumber of observations 363Number of studies 55Maximum likelihood ratio p-value 0.000
∗∗, ∗Indicates significance at, respectively, 5% and 10% level. All control variables are divided bythe standard errors.
for the total sample is similar to those for only a part of the sample (results areavailable on request).
Finally, we performed a general-to-specific approach on the variables includedin this study. Stepwise we deleted the variable with the highest p-value, untilall variables were significant at a 10% significance level. The results as shown inTable 6 confirm our previous findings. Together, the variables included have a strongeffect, as evidenced by the p-value of the likelihood ratio. So there is a genuineeffect of CBI on inflation. The results in Table 6 offer a clear interpretation of thepresence of this result. There is a negative significant effect of CBI on inflationin OECD countries. This effect is even stronger if the researcher corrects thesample for outliers and includes a labour market indicator and the interaction ofthe labour market indicator and the CBI indicator. Inclusion of the 1970s in thesample strengthens this negative CBI effect further.
6. Conclusions
There are various surveys on the rationale for and the consequences of delegatingmonetary policy to an independent central bank; the most recent ones are fromJournal of Economic Surveys (2010) Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 593–621C© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
612 KLOMP AND DE HAAN
Arnone et al. (2006) and Crow and Meade (2007). However, to the best of ourknowledge, this paper is the first to apply MRA on the vast amount of empiricalstudies examining the impact of CBI on inflation.13 MRA is an effective means toanalyse the influence of, among others, alternative indicators, model specificationand sample selection.
It is widely believed that countries with a more independent central bank will,on average, have lower levels of inflation. Our MRA corroborates the conventionalview by finding a significant ‘true effect’ of CBI on inflation, once we controlfor a significant publication bias. The effect is strongest when a study focuses onOECD countries, the period 1970–1979, considers the labour market, and when therelation is estimated using a bivariate regression. We also find that the literatureon CBI and inflation suffers from a publication bias, i.e. the reported results aresubject to a selection effect. We do not find any significant difference betweenthe results of studies that are caused by differences in the indicator used. Soalthough the CBI indicators are constructed in a different way, the relationshipbetween CBI and inflation is not dependent on the selection of the CBI indicator.Furthermore, we conclude that there is no significant difference between studiesusing regressions in a cross-country setting and those using panel estimation withfixed time and/or country effects. Also there are no significant differences betweenpublications in scientific journals, chapters in books or working papers. Focusingon journal articles, there is no significant difference between high- and low-rankedjournals in terms of their SSCI score.
Acknowledgements
We thank participants at the conference ‘Does Central Bank Independence Still Matter?’(14–15 September 2007) at Bocconi University (Milan, Italy) and the Aarhus Colloquiumfor Meta-Analysis in Economics (27–30 September 2007, Sønderborg, Denmark) and twoanonymous referees for their comments on a previous version of the paper.
Notes
1. One theory underlying this view is the time inconsistency approach to monetarypolicymaking. The basic message of this theory is that government suffers from aninflationary bias and that, as a result, inflation is sub-optimal. Rogoff (1985) hasshown that when monetary policy is delegated to an independent and ‘conservative’central banker, this inflationary bias will be reduced. Conservative means that thecentral banker is more averse to inflation than the government, in the sense that(s)he places a greater weight on price stability than the government does.
2. The only difference between the indicators of Cukierman (1992) and Cukiermanet al. (1992) is the procedure employed to aggregate the various dimensions of CBIinto one measure.
3. Still, this indicator is less than perfect, as it suffers from the limitation that centralbank governors can hold office for quite some time simply by being subservient topolitical leaders (Brumm, 2000).
4. Dreher et al. (2008) have extended the sample of countries and the time period forwhich TORs are available.
Journal of Economic Surveys (2010) Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 593–621C© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
INFLATION AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE 613
5. The empirical evidence that the financial sector is inherently inflation averse isnot compelling. Although Posen (1995) presents supportive evidence, other studiesfind less or no support (De Haan and van’t Hag, 1995; Campillo and Miron, 1997;Temple, 1998).
6. However, they also find that this result is driven by the inclusion of high-inflationcountries in the sample; excluding those countries makes the coefficients of theCBI indicator insignificant. Also De Haan and Kooi (2000) point to the role ofhigh-inflation observations.
7. Examples include Abreu et al. (2005), Doucouliagos (2005), Rose and Stanley(2005) and Nijkamp and Poot (2005).
8. In various studies, especially the older ones, X consists only of some CBI indicator.9. We thank Alex Cukierman for this observation.
10. All regressions have been estimated with STATA using the generalized linear latentand mixed models command with the Newton–Raphson algorithm.
11. Studies focusing on OECD countries often include a dummy for Iceland as thiscountry had a very high rate of inflation in the 1980s and 1990s, but also anindependent central bank.
12. However, as one referee pointed out, this finding could also reflect the fact thatbivariate regressions are older and hence focus on older time periods. In otherwords, there could be a multicollinearity problem between our ‘multivariate’ variableand the sample period dummies. To check for this we calculated the correlationcoefficients between the period dummies and the multivariate indicator. We do notfind any evidence that the period dummies are related to the bivariate regressionindicator. The correlations range between 0.05 and 0.11.
13. Although there is a possibility of reverse causality, most papers have not examinedthis issue. An exception is the study by Dreher et al. (2008) who find that thelikelihood that a central bank governor will be replaced increases with high pastinflation, suggesting that the TOR is indeed endogenous.
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Journal of Economic Surveys (2010) Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 593–621C© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
618 KLOMP AND DE HAAN
Tabl
eA
1.St
udie
son
Infl
atio
nan
dC
BI
Use
din
the
MR
A.
Num
ber
of%
sign
if.
Titl
eA
utho
rs(y
ear
publ
ishe
d)re
gres
sion
sne
gativ
e
Polit
ical
and
mon
etar
yin
stitu
tions
and
publ
icfi
nanc
ial
polic
ies
inth
ein
dust
rial
coun
trie
sG
rilli
etal
.(1
991)
510
0.0
The
case
for
cent
ral
bank
inde
pend
ence
De
Haa
nan
dSt
urm
(199
2)12
58.3
Cen
tral
bank
stra
tegy
,cr
edib
ility
and
inde
pend
ence
:th
eory
and
evid
ence
(Cha
pter
20)
Cuk
ierm
an(1
992)
1010
0.0
Mea
suri
ngth
ein
depe
nden
ceof
cent
ral
bank
san
dits
effe
cton
polic
you
tcom
esC
ukie
rman
etal
.(1
992)
340
.0
Why
cent
ral
bank
inde
pend
ence
does
not
caus
elo
win
flat
ion:
ther
eis
noin
stitu
tiona
lfi
xfo
rpo
litic
sPo
sen
(199
3)2
66.7
How
inde
pend
ent
shou
lda
cent
ral
bank
be?
Deb
elle
and
Fisc
her
(199
4)4
66.7
Inst
itutio
nsan
dm
acro
econ
omic
outc
omes
–th
eem
piri
cal
evid
ence
Jons
son
(199
5)10
0.0
The
anti-
infl
atio
nary
infl
uenc
eof
corp
orat
ist
stru
ctur
esan
dce
ntra
lba
nkin
depe
nden
ce:
the
impo
rtan
ceof
the
hum
psh
aped
hypo
thes
isA
l-M
arhu
bian
dW
illet
t(1
995)
466
.7
Polit
ical
infl
uenc
eon
the
cent
ral
bank
:in
tern
atio
nal
evid
ence
Cuk
ierm
anan
dW
ebb
(199
5)4
80.0
Dec
lara
tions
are
not
enou
gh:
fina
ncia
lse
ctor
sour
ces
ofce
ntra
lba
nkin
depe
nden
cePo
sen
(199
5)10
0.0
Cen
tral
bank
inde
pend
ence
inan
othe
rel
even
coun
trie
sE
ijffi
nger
and
van
Keu
len
(199
5)4
25.0
Cen
tral
bank
inde
pend
ence
:cr
iteri
aan
din
dice
sE
ijffi
nger
and
Scha
ling
(199
5)12
100.
0T
hest
atis
tical
asso
ciat
ion
betw
een
cent
ral
bank
inde
pend
ence
and
infl
atio
nC
argi
ll(1
995)
950
.0
Cen
tral
bank
inde
pend
ence
inde
xes
inec
onom
ican
alys
is:
are
appr
aisa
lFu
jiki
(199
6)12
100.
0
Cen
tral
bank
inde
pend
ence
,w
age
barg
ain
stru
ctur
ean
dm
acro
econ
omic
perf
orm
ance
inO
EC
Dco
untr
ies
Ble
any
(199
6)7
17.2
Journal of Economic Surveys (2010) Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 593–621C© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
INFLATION AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE 619
Cen
tral
bank
inde
pend
ence
,in
flat
ion
and
polit
ical
inst
abili
tyD
eH
aan
and
Sier
man
n(1
996)
1830
.0C
entr
alba
nkin
depe
nden
cean
din
flat
ion
perf
orm
ance
:pa
nace
aor
plac
ebo
Jenk
ins
(199
6)6
100.
0
Cen
tral
bank
inde
pend
ence
:on
lypa
rtof
the
infl
atio
nst
ory
Hey
len
and
Van
Poec
k(1
996)
1063
.6C
omm
ent
on‘C
entr
alba
nkin
depe
nden
ce:
only
part
ofth
ein
flat
ion
stor
y’E
ijffi
nger
and
De
Haa
n(1
996b
)8
50.0
Cen
tral
bank
inde
pend
ence
,in
flat
ion
and
grow
thin
tran
sitio
nec
onom
ics
Lou
ngan
ian
dSh
eets
(199
7)3
0.0
Why
does
infl
atio
ndi
ffer
acro
ssco
untr
ies?
Cam
pillo
and
Mir
on(1
997)
29W
hat
real
lym
atte
rs:
cons
erva
tiven
ess
orin
depe
nden
ceD
eH
aan
and
Koo
i(1
997)
833
.3C
entr
alba
nkin
depe
nden
cean
din
flat
ion
targ
etin
g:m
onet
ary
polic
ypa
radi
gms
for
the
next
mill
enni
um?
Fuhr
er(1
997)
1275
.0
Mea
suri
ngce
ntra
lba
nkin
depe
nden
ce:
ata
leof
subj
ectiv
ityan
dof
itsco
nseq
uenc
eM
anga
no(1
998)
566
.7
Mix
edsi
gnal
s:ce
ntra
lba
nkin
depe
nden
ce,
coor
dina
ted
wag
e-ba
rgai
ning
and
Eur
opea
nM
onet
ary
Uni
onH
all
and
Fran
zese
(199
8)3
75.0
Rec
onsi
deri
ngth
epr
inci
pal
com
pone
nts
ofce
ntra
lba
nkin
depe
nden
ce:
the
mor
eth
em
erri
er?
Ban
aian
etal
.(1
998)
138
.9
Cen
tral
bank
inde
pend
ence
:a
sens
itivi
tyan
alys
isE
ijffi
nger
etal
.(1
998)
2410
0.0
Cen
tral
bank
inde
pend
ence
and
infl
atio
n:go
odne
ws
and
bad
new
sTe
mpl
e(1
998)
410
0.0
Part
ially
inde
pend
ent
cent
ral
bank
s,po
litic
ally
resp
onsi
vego
vern
men
tsan
din
flat
ion
Fran
zese
(199
9)3
100.
0
Cen
tral
bank
inde
pend
ence
and
infl
atio
n:co
rpor
atis
m,
part
isan
ship
,an
dal
tern
ativ
ein
dice
sof
cent
ral
bank
inde
pend
ence
Oat
ley
(199
9)4
60.0
The
polit
ical
econ
omy
ofin
flat
ion:
barg
aini
ngst
ruct
ure
orce
ntra
lba
nkin
depe
nden
ce?
Iver
sen
(199
9)8
75.0
Journal of Economic Surveys (2010) Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 593–621C© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
620 KLOMP AND DE HAAN
Tabl
eA
1.C
onti
nued
.
Num
ber
of%
sign
if.
Titl
eA
utho
rs(y
ear
publ
ishe
d)re
gres
sion
sne
gativ
e
Cen
tral
bank
inde
pend
ence
and
wag
eba
rgai
ning
stru
ctur
e–
empi
rica
lev
iden
ceK
ilpon
en(1
999)
310
0.0
The
case
for
anin
depe
nden
tE
urop
ean
cent
ral
bank
:a
com
men
tD
eH
aan
(199
9)2
0.0
Inst
itutio
nal
dim
ensi
ons
ofco
ordi
natin
gw
age-
barg
aini
ngan
dm
onet
ary
polic
yFr
anze
sean
dH
all
(200
0)1
83.3
Infl
atio
nan
dce
ntra
lba
nkin
depe
nden
ce:
conv
entio
nal
wis
dom
redu
xB
rum
m(2
000)
30.
0In
equa
lity,
infl
atio
nan
dce
ntra
lba
nkin
depe
nden
ceD
olm
aset
al.
(200
0)10
0.0
Doe
sce
ntra
lba
nkin
depe
nden
cere
ally
mat
ter?
De
Haa
nan
dK
ooi
(200
0)11
20.0
Dec
entr
aliz
atio
nan
din
flat
ion:
com
mitm
ent,
colle
ctiv
eac
tion
orco
ntin
uity
Tre
ism
an(2
000)
270
.0
Bur
eauc
ratic
dele
gatio
nan
dpo
litic
alin
stitu
tions
:w
hen
are
inde
pend
ent
cent
ral
bank
sir
rele
vant
?K
eefe
ran
dSt
asav
age
(200
0)6
0.0
Cen
tral
bank
inde
pend
ence
intr
ansi
tion
coun
trie
sM
alis
zew
ski
(200
0)10
33.3
Inst
itutio
nal
and
sect
oral
inte
ract
ions
inm
onet
ary
polic
yan
dw
age–
pric
eba
rgai
ning
Fran
zese
(200
1)1
0.0
Fisc
alde
cent
raliz
atio
n,ce
ntra
lba
nkin
depe
nden
ce,
and
infl
atio
nK
ing
and
Ma
(200
1)3
0.0
Infl
atio
nin
deve
lopi
ngco
untr
ies:
does
cent
ral
bank
inde
pend
ence
mat
ter?
New
evid
ence
base
don
ane
wda
tase
tSt
urm
and
De
Haa
n(2
001)
60.
0
The
impa
ctof
cent
ral
bank
inde
pend
ence
and
unio
nco
ncen
trat
ion
onm
acro
econ
omic
perf
orm
ance
inth
epr
esen
ceof
aggr
egat
esu
pply
shoc
ks:
evid
ence
from
10O
EC
Dco
untr
ies
(197
1–19
85)
Cho
u(2
001)
1010
0.0
Cen
tral
bank
inde
pend
ence
,ec
onom
icfr
eedo
man
din
flat
ion
rate
sB
anai
anan
dL
ukse
tich
(200
1)1
0.0
Polit
ical
syst
emtr
ansp
aren
cyan
dm
onet
ary
com
mitm
ent
regi
mes
Bro
z(2
002)
80.
0C
entr
alba
nkst
ruct
ure,
effi
cien
cypo
licy
and
mac
roec
onom
icpe
rfor
man
ceC
ecch
etti
and
Kra
use
(200
2)1
60.0
Journal of Economic Surveys (2010) Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 593–621C© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
INFLATION AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE 621
Mea
suri
ngce
ntra
lba
nkin
depe
nden
ce:
ala
tent
vari
able
sap
proa
chD
eH
aan
etal
.(2
003)
1275
.0C
apita
lism
,no
tgl
obal
ism
capi
tal
mob
ility
,ce
ntra
lba
nkin
depe
nden
ce,
and
the
polit
ical
cont
rol
ofth
eec
onom
yC
lark
(200
3)1
0.0
Infl
atio
npe
rfor
man
cean
dco
nstit
utio
nal
cent
ral
bank
inde
pend
ence
:ev
iden
cefr
omL
atin
Am
eric
aan
dth
eC
arib
bean
Gut
ierr
ez(2
003)
275
.0
The
limits
ofde
lega
tion:
veto
play
ers,
cent
ral
bank
inde
pend
ence
and
the
cred
ibili
tyof
mon
etar
ypo
licy
Stas
avag
ean
dK
eefe
r(2
003)
4
Soci
alde
moc
ratic
corp
orat
ism
,ce
ntra
lba
nkin
depe
nden
ce,
and
econ
omic
perf
orm
ance
:an
empi
rica
lan
alys
isof
17in
dust
rial
ized
econ
omie
s,19
61–1
998
Saka
mot
o(2
003)
166
.7
Mul
tiple
hand
son
the
whe
el:
empi
rica
lm
odel
ling
part
ial
dele
gatio
nan
dsh
ared
cont
rol
ofm
onet
ary
polic
yin
the
open
Fran
zese
(200
3)1
88.9
The
uses
ofau
tono
my:
cent
ral
bank
ers’
care
ers,
inst
itutio
nal
cont
ext
and
econ
omic
perf
orm
ance
Ado
lph
(200
4)2
16.7
Cen
tral
bank
inde
pend
ence
and
infl
atio
npe
rfor
man
cein
tran
sitio
nec
onom
ies:
new
evid
ence
from
apr
imar
yda
taap
proa
chIl
ieva
and
Gre
gori
ou(2
004)
110
0.0
Any
link
betw
een
cent
ral
bank
inde
pend
ence
and
infl
atio
n?E
vide
nce
from
Lat
inA
mer
ica
and
the
Car
ibbe
anJa
com
ean
dV
azqu
ez(2
008)
1890
.0
On
the
rela
tions
hip
betw
een
cent
ral
bank
inde
pend
ence
and
infl
atio
n:so
me
mor
eba
dne
ws
Bou
wm
anet
al.
(200
5)1
50.0
Infl
atio
n,ce
ntra
lba
nkin
depe
nden
cean
dth
ele
gal
syst
emH
ayo
and
Voi
gt(2
005)
610
0.0
Goa
l-in
depe
nden
tce
ntra
lba
nks:
why
polit
icia
nsde
cide
tode
lega
teC
row
e(2
008)
366
.7
Journal of Economic Surveys (2010) Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 593–621C© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd