konvencija o hemijskom oruzju

The Chemical Weapons Conventionand the Role of Engineers and Scientists*

J. MatouekEU Research Centre of Excellence for EnvironmentalChemistry and Ecotoxicology, Faculty of Science,Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic

Chemical weapons, like all military technology, are associated with activities of scientists and en-gineers. However, chemical weapons differ from any other military technology because theywere invented, and their first mass use directly developed by famous chemists. The active contri-bution of engineers and scientists and their organisations in the negotiations on chemical disarma-ment, including drafting the Chemical Weapons Convention, is described. Their present andfuture role in implementing the Convention is analysed, taking into consideration the threats andbenefits of advances in science and technology, and stressing the independent expertise of theOPCW Scientific Advisory Board.

Keywords: Chemical Weapons Convention, engineers, scientists, NGOs, advances in scienceand technology, OPCW Scientific Advisory Board

IntroductionThe Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons andon Their Destruction, referred to briefly as the Conventionon General and Comprehensive Prohibition of ChemicalWeapons, or Chemical Weapons Convention, abbreviatedas CWC, was adopted in 1992 after negotiations at theConference on Disarmament (and previous multilateral ne-gotiating fora in Geneva) which lasted nearly a quarter of acentury. The delays were due not only to the then currentEast-West confrontation and the Cold War but also to theworldwide spread of the chemical industry and the relati-vely easy possibility of clandestine synthesis of chemicalwarfare agents in militarily-relevant quantities. This expe-rience, and also experience with weak points of the pre-viously adopted Convention on the Prohibition of Deve-lopment, Production and Stockpiling Bacteriological (Bio-logical) and Toxin Weapons and of Their Destruction(BTWC),** which lacked any objective verification mecha-nisms, has been reflected in very careful definitions and cri-teria, defining purposes not prohibited by the CWC, and avery complex and effective verification system. This is a verysophisticated and by no doubt also the best elaborated di-sarmament document that totally outlaws one importantand very dangerous kind of weapon of mass destruction(WMD). It commits States Parties (SP) to eliminate theirchemical weapon (CW) stockpiles and production facilities(CWPF). Both Review Conferences (2003 and 2008) repor-

ted generally good acceptance by the international com-munity, showed positive results of implementation of theCWC provisions, and outlined future actions.

Any arms control document, as for any functioning disar-mament agreement, even if it is primarily a document of in-ternational law, is much more than just a legal document; ithas political, military, military technological, military poli-tical, scientific and technological, economic, ethical andsuch like aspects also. It can be adopted and implementedonly as a result of wide consensus of the international com-munity, while it cannot exist without expertise in all theabove-mentioned areas.

The coherent formulation and concise regime of the CWCreflects the extremely valuable and effective contributionsof well informed and concerned engineers and scientistsand their national and international professional organisa-tions. The latter include NGOs mainly in chemistry, chemi-cal technology and allied branches associated with thedevelopment, production, use and protection against CWand other WMD. This paper describes the efforts made bythe scientific and technological community to achieve a ve-rifiable total and comprehensive ban of CW from the startof negotiations about the CWC, discusses activities involvedin implementing the CWC as well as future tasks arisingfrom the impact of scientific and technological develop-ment.

The Route to the Chemical WeaponsConvention and the Contributionof the International Communityof Engineers and ScientistsBeside the positive role of engineers and scientists in anyarms control and disarmament issue, their negative roleshould also be mentioned. Any weaponry must have been

J. MATOUEK: The Chemical Weapons Convention and the Role of Engineers and Scientists, Kem. Ind. 59 (2) 6978 (2010) 69

KUI 4/2010Received January 8, 2009

Accepted November 4, 2009

* Based on J. Matousek's lecture at a NATO Advanced Research Work-shop, 1316 November 2008, Zagreb, Croatia, organised by the Britishand Croatian Pugwash Groups. The text is a chapter of the book resultingfrom the workshop: Assessing the Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction The Role of Independent Scientists, edited by L. Finney and I. laus, IOSPress, Amsterdam 2010. Permission from IOS Press is gratefully acknow-ledged.** Opened for signature in 1972, entered into force in 1975.

designed by scientists and engineers at the relevant stages ofscientific and technological development in their professio-nal service in order to solve concrete demands for develo-ping the technology of warfare. Mass use of chemical wea-pons could emerge only in the era of a chemical industrycapable of delivering enough quantity of toxic chemicals(initially chlorine and phosgene) routinely produced as ba-sic raw materials for syntheses of organic chemicals (origi-nally organic dyestuffs). This prerequisite was most deve-loped in Germany, which produced more than 90 per centof the world production of synthetic dyestuffs in the seconddecade of the 20th century. The possibility of misusing thispotential for weaponry was actually transformed into realityjust shortly after the initial stage of the First World War(WW I) when the movements of big armies were stopped inthe mud of the trenches. This was the impetus for develo-ping new weapons able to overcome field fortifications.Chemical weapons with their widespread effects appearedon battlefields exactly at that time.

It is typical, maybe only for chemical weapons, that theywere not developed by any order of the military, and in thiscase also not following a wish of Emperor Wilhelm II. Rat-her, the first use of pernicious chemicals* had been desi-gned and developed from the original idea of scientists. Theactual Father of Chemical Warfare was Professor Fritz Ha-ber (later Nobel laureate in chemistry for the synthesis ofammonia), then director of the Emperor Wilhelm Instituteof Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry in Berlin-Dah-lem. He put together a staff of excellent scientists (amongthem some well-known Nobel laureates) James Franck,Gustav Hertz, Wilhelm Westphal and Richard Wilsttter for designing scientifically the first use of chemical wea-pons. Industry was also represented Professor Carl Dui-sberg, director of IG-Farben, was also a member of thisgroup under Habers personal leadership. The idea for thefirst use (called Blasangriff in German) was the release on awide front of gaseous chlorine from steel bottles.

There is another interesting piece of evidence for the perso-nal responsibility of Fritz Haber. Emperor Wilhelm askedHaber whether Germanys international obligations wouldbe breached by such use. It should be noted that the Decla-ration of the Peace Conference in The Hague, signed onJuly 29, 1899, contained an obligation for States Partiesnot to use such projectiles, the only purpose of them is todisseminate asphyxiating or deleterious gases. Furthermo-re, the Appendix of the IV Convention on the Principles ofWar on Land, signed in The Hague in 1907, contained in itsArticle 23 explicit prohibition of use of poison or poisonedweapons.

Haber convinced the Emperor that no munitions would beused; thereby any doubts were diverted and preparationscontinued. Their result was the first mass use of chemicalweapons by the Germans at Ieper (Ypres) in West Flanderson April 22, 1915, with the release of 168 metric tonnes ofgaseous chlorine from steel bottles. The effect of this first actof chemical warfare was horrible: 15,000 casualties, amongthem 5,000 lethal ones, on the side of the British, French

and Belgian Allies. By walking behind the green-greyishtoxic plume, the German infantry penetrated 4 km into thedepth of the enemys defence positions without firing asingle shot. However, the military effect was greater thanexpected, so that chlorine was not utilised to try to breakthrough the full depth of the Ententes defence system. Ha-ving seen a new effective weaponry being used, none of thebelligerents protested against chemical warfare. Quite theopposite: all other major belligerents, mostly SPs to theabove-mentioned agreements (France, Russia, AustriaHungary, Italy, USA), gradually accepted this mode ofwarfare. Only the International Committee of the Red Cross(ICRC) protested in its appeal of 1918 against chemicalweapons that became standard weapons in many othercountries after WW I.

Shortly after constituting its foundation as the first universalinternational organisation, The League of Nations initiatedthe first negotiations for outlawing chemical weapons.

The first modern valid arms control document, the Protocolbanning use in war of asphyxiating and other toxic gasesand bacteriological methods of warfare,** prohibited onlythe use of chemical weapons but not material preparationsfor chemical warfare. This left open the possibility of retalia-tion-in-kind, and has been shown not to be an effective in-strument for prohibiting any CW use. The Protocol wasviolated by some of its SPs several times, starting with theuse in 1935 of CW by Italy (incidentally the first country tohave ratified it) in Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1935, by Japan inChina from 1937, and later by Iraq in the IraqIran War inthe 1980s. This Protocol was generally considered as prohi-biting only the first use of such weapons because about onethird of signatories ratified it with the reservation that theywould not be bound by it in the case of the first use of CWby an adversary or its allies.

In the post-WW II era, the UN General Assembly starteddiscussions on the total and comprehensive ban of chemi-cal and biological weapons as early as 1946. The nego-tiations were commenced at the multilateral negotiatingbody, the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee inGeneva, and continued in its successor bodies until the la-ter Conference on Disarmament (CD). The first efforts ad-dressed both chemical and biological weapons but in thelate 1960s the problem of biological weapons was separa-ted off, as the latter was then (i. e. in the time of the classicalera of biological warfare, when its possible military valuehad been underestimated) considered as more easily sol-ved. This enabled relatively quick adoption of the BTWC in1972, though with all its gaps and weaknesses as mentio-ned above.

The discussions and further negotiations on the main pointsof the future CWC started in the 1970s, while the deepernegotiations on its structure and contents commenced inthe early 1980s. The CD had been precisely mandated bythe UN General Assembly since 1984. The complex nego-tiations then lasted until 1992, after exploring many side-tracks, reflecting not only inherent difficulties of this issuebut also the impact of the final years of the Cold War andEast-West confrontation.

70 J. MATOUEK: The Chemical Weapons Convention and the Role of Engineers and Scientists, Kem. Ind. 59 (2) 6978 (2010)

* Not to speak of the episodic use of irritants that had been started alreadyin August 1914 by the French side, and was responded to several times bythe Germans in 1914. ** Signed in Geneva, June 17, 1925; entered into force 1928.

The input of scientific and technological communities intothe negotiations was undoubtedly crucial. Beside the perso-nal engagement of military, scientific, technological and le-gal experts working in the national delegations who took anactive part in the negotiations, with their backgrounds sup-ported by domestic research institutes, academia, universi-ties, industrial organisations and associations, and state of-fices, several prestigious international professional organisa-tions of concerned scientists and engineers also contributedto the negotiations from their start.

Among the prestigious international and leading national(research) institutes, organisations and programmes makingmajor contributions to discussing the problems of CW andBTW, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute(SIPRI) occupies the prime position. SIPRI was founded tocommemorate 150 years of unbroken peace in Swedenand it is known worldwide for its impressive research andpublication activity. Its Chemical and Biological (CB) War-fare Programme began in the late 1960s and is now one ofSIPRIs longest running programmes. Analyses devoted tovarious actual problems of chemical (CW) and biologicaland toxin weapons (BTW), and progress in BTWC andCWC negotiations and later in their implementation can befound in the respective chapters of all published SIPRI Year-books (since the first 1968/69) as well as in the series of CBWarfare Studies started in 1985, a couple of other previousand parallel books and other non-serial publications on va-rious aspects of CW and BTW. These sources have been wi-dely utilised as serious and fully reliable reference infor-mation by the whole community dealing with CB disarma-ment. The second most important programme relating tothe old chemical and biological weapons (CBW) program-me was obviously the Harvard Sussex Programme, whichedited the quarterly CBW Conventions Bulletin (originallynamed CWC Convention Bulletin), another serious referen-ce source on chronology, news, background informationand comment on CBTW problems. The other instituteworth naming is the United Nations Institute for Disarma-ment Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva.

There are also other programmes contributing to CB wea-pons issues that have been active mainly in the last decade.Among these one cannot overlook the NATO Partnershipfor Peace Programme nor the NATO Programme for Secu-rity through Science that have organised frequent Advan-ced Research Workshops devoted to various aspects of CBdisarmament and have also undertaken relevant educatio-nal activities. Among the national institutes and organisati-ons known for their activities in organising periodic inter-national conferences, congresses and symposia devoted tothe issues of CB warfare, the prime position belongs to theSwedish Defence Research Agency (FOI, but previously theSwedish Defence Research Establishment FOA) which or-ganises the CBW Protection Symposia in Stockholm everythree years. These meetings constitute the biggest worldwi-de gathering of specialists on this topic, the latest having ta-ken place in Gothenburg in 2007. A similar, slightly smallerNBC (nuclear, biological and chemical) event is organisedalso every three years in Finland by the chemical defenceorganisations, the latest being the 7th (NBC2009) in Jyvs-kyl. A related periodic gathering in the Asia/Pacific region,organised since the late 1990s by the defence institutions inSingapore, is known as SISPAT. One cannot overlook the

very active US organisation with links worldwide, AppliedScience and Analysis (ASA) Inc., which organises the annualseries of Chemical and Biological Medical Treatment Sym-posia (CBMTS), the first being in Spiez, Switzerland in 1994and the recent ones dealing with CBR (chemical, biologicaland radiological) terrorism. This organisation also edits theASA Newletter, which has been an important informationsource on various aspects of NBC protection and relatedproblems for two decades. A very important series of sym-posia fully devoted to the destruction of CW, i. e. CW de-militarisation, is organised yearly by the British DefenceScien- ce and Technology Laboratories (Dstl). Another insti-tute worth mentioning is the Illinois Institute of TechnologyResearch Institute (IITRI) which has since 1996 organisedfour workshops on CB Agents Detection and Decontami-nation (three in Chicago, USA, one in Brno, Czech Republicheaded by the author). It is impossible not to mention thevaluable contribution of the International Union of Pureand Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) which in recent years hasworked on destruction technologies. It has also worked onthe actual problems of the impact of scientific and techno-logical development on the CWC, including the deve-lopments in synthetic chemistry, problems of the changingface of chemical industry, developments in analytical che-mistry, and verification issues. This latter issue is deeply stu-died also by the Verification Research, Training and Infor-mation Centre (VERTIC), an organisation that deals with allaspects of verification. It is impossible to name all the orga-nisations and institutes that make positive input but associa-tions of chemical industry should be mentioned also.

Among the prestigious international NGOs representing thecommunity of scientists and engineers with an active inputinto CBW disarmament issues, pride of place belongs to thePugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, fo-unded in 1957. Especially engaged in critical discussionsand open exchange of views and standpoints has been thePugwash Study Group on CB Disarmament, linking inde-pendent experts with negotiators in the CD at meetingsconvened at least once a year since the 1960s, mostly inGeneva, then also latterly in the Netherlands. Several jointSIPRI-Pugwash publications also contributed strongly to theformulation of the CWC. In the mid1990s this forum wasrenamed the Pugwash Study Group on Implementation ofthe Chemical (1993) and Biological (1972) Weapons Con-ventions. Meetings continue normally twice a year, asses-sing all urgent aspects of implementation of the two Con-ventions, including identifying threats of scientific and tech-nological development on the futures of both the CWC andBTWC.

Another worldwide NGO of concerned scientists that mademajor contributions mainly in the time when the CWC wasbeing negotiated is the World Federation of Scientific Wor-kers (WFSW), which then had a very large membership.The WFSW edited the Journal Scientific World, and its Stan-ding Committee on Disarmament published two studies onthe threat of chemical weapons and chemical disarmament(1983, 1986). Each of these studies was published in fourlanguages (English, French, German and Russian), and wereedited in London, Paris, Berlin and Moscow (with the aut-hors contribution). Total and comprehensive prohibition ofCW has also been among the main goals of the Internatio-nal Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Respon-


sibility (INES). This organisation was founded in 1991, withmember organisations in about 60 countries on all conti-nents. It contributes to the CW ban through its WorkingGroup on Chemical Weapons (convened by the author), bydealing with this problem at INES events (for example theWorkshop on CB disarmament at the INES Congress in Am-sterdam, 1996), by the activities of its Council and Executi-ve Committee, and by appealing to Parliaments to acce-lerate the ratification process to achieve the entry into forceof the CWC in 1995. Important also are the links between,and representation of, the above-mentioned NGOs (mainlythe WFSW) in the respective NGO Committees working inthe headquarters of the United Nations (in New York,Vienna, and Geneva) to influence their engagement in theCB issues.

It is impossible to mention all institutions and organisationscontributing to the CW ban (including also, for example,Greenpeace International and Green Cross) but there is nodoubt that without the engaged expertise of concernedprofessionals and their organisations, and state, public andprivate, national and international organisations and foraincluding NGOs, a document as sophisticated as the CWCcould not exist at all.

Chemical Weapons Convention Basic Facts

The Chemical Weapons Convention opened for signaturein Paris, on January 13, 1993 and entered into force onApril 29, 1997. Its complexity is reflected in almost 200 pa-ges of text, containing a Preamble, 24 Articles and three An-nexes: On Chemicals (6 pp), On Implementation and Ve-rification (105 pp), On Protection of Confidential Informa-tion (5 pp).1

The main pillars of the CWC are:

Verified destruction of chemical weapons and CW pro-duction facilities; (CWPF), i. e. disarmament. Verified non-production of CW, i. e. non-proliferation. Assistance and protection. International cooperation.

The spirit of this Convention, significantly influenced byscientific expertise, lies inter alia mainly in the method ofdefining the scope of the prohibition. The CWC is ratherpurpose- than chemical compound-oriented. This meansthat it is nothing like a list of prohibited compounds, assome less informed people might expect. The Conventionsleading principle, which is often reported as the GeneralPurpose Criterion (GPC), is contained in the wording of Ar-ticle II, paragraph 1, defining the purposes of the CWCamong Chemical Weapons:

Article II DEFINITIONS AND CRITERIA

For the purposes of this Convention:

1. Chemical Weapons means the following, together orseparately:

(a) Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where in-tended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention,as long as the types and quantities are consistent with suchpurposes.

(b) Munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause.(c) Any equipment specifically designed for use.

Under purposes non-prohibited by the Convention accor-ding to Article II, paragraph 2 (a) (d) are understood:

industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceuticalor other purposes, protective purposes, namely those di-rectly related to protection against toxic chemicals,

military purposes not connected with the use of CW andnot dependent on the use of toxic properties of chemicalsas a method of warfare as well as law enforcement inclu-ding domestic riot control.

Toxic chemicals are further defined in Article II paragraph 2as meaning:

Any chemical which through its chemical action on lifeprocesses can cause death, temporary incapacitation orpermanent harm to humans and animals. This includes allsuch chemicals, regardless of their origin or of their methodof production and regardless of whether they are producedin facilities, in munitions or elsewhere.

From this explanation quoting relevant articles of the CWC,it is evident, consistent with the above-mentioned GPC,that the Convention is nothing like a list of prohibited com-pounds. It covers any toxic chemical intended to be usedfor chemical warfare (and therefore developed, producedand stockpiled), pursuant to Article II, paragraph 1 (a) andparagraph 2, even those not yet synthesised. This meansthat the CWC is open-ended and the prohibition coversany future scientific and technological development. In ot-her words the Convention is ipso facto protected against theresults of scientific and technological development.

The most important toxic chemicals and their precursorsendangering the CWC are listed within three Schedules,constituted according to the risk the chemicals pose for theConvention. Schedule 1 contains super-toxic lethal chemi-cals and key precursors that have no peaceful uses, Schedu-le 2 contains dual-use dangerous toxic chemicals and pre-cursors produced in small quantities, and Schedule 3 liststoxic industrial chemicals that have been used for chemicalweapons and their precursors and produced on a massscale.

A frequent misunderstanding is to consider the Schedulesas something like lists of prohibited compounds, althoughit is explicitly stated in the CWC that Schedules do notconstitute a definition of CW. However, the open-endedprohibition does not mean that toxic chemicals (includingother than those contained in the Schedules) cannot appearon battlefields being used by non-States Parties, or less pos-sibly by SPs breaching the CWC, or more possibly by terro-rist groups.

That is why scientific and technological development has tobe very carefully watched, international verification measu-res extended, national authorities and operation systemsestablished, and respective legislation adopted in order toenable prevention and an adequate and immediate res-ponse (repression, protection, rescue and recovery) in casesof emergency.


Implementation of the Chemical WeaponsConvention and the Role of the InternationalCommunity of Engineers and Scientists*

Facts about the Implementation of the CWC

At present, there are 188 States Parties to the Convention. Itis important that the Convention includes all P5** membersof UN Security Council and the vast majority of states withdeclarable CWC facilities.

Seven SPs (Russia, USA, India, Albania, South Korea, Libyaand Iraq) declared possession of chemical weapons.

Among SPs, there are 13 possessors of former (post 1946)CW production facilities: Russia, USA, India, South Korea,Libya, France, UK, China, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Bosnia & Her-cegovina and Serbia & Montenegro (the last two SPs decla-red one i. e. the same production facility).

The CWC implementation and verification regime now co-vers over 98 % of the worlds population, but what is moreimportant, 98 % of the worlds chemical industry.

Reviewing the figure for the number of SPs, it is also impor-tant to note that there are 2 signatory states (inter alia Israel)that have not yet ratified the Convention and altogether 5countries that have not even signed it. In addition to less im-portant states it should be noted that to the non-signatoriesgroup belongs the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea,and also that the neighbours of Israel (Egypt and Syria)made their signatures conditional on Israels abandoning itsnuclear weapons programme. Assessing the universality ofthe CWC (which is one of the requirements of the First Re-view Conference), it is interesting to compare the signatorystates with those of other principal agreements on weaponsof mass destruction (WMD) as shown by Table 1.

It seems that one could be satisfied with the relatively highnumber of SPs twelve years after entry into force, in com-parison with other arms-control/disarmament agreements.Nevertheless, for the prevention of any use of CW, it is ne-cessary to attain a higher number of SPs mainly becausesome of the above-mentioned important non-signatoriesconcentrated in the Near and Middle East and on the Ko-rean peninsula are likely possessors of CW (not to speak ofpossession of another WMD in the case of Israel and NorthKorea).

The most important data from the declarations of SPs (seeTable 2) show the worldwide problems arising from thepossession, storage and former production of CW, as wellas from the spread of chemical industry. These problemsaffect not only the destruction of CW at present and in thenear future but also the monitoring of the non-productionof CW in the chemical industry in the future.

Verification of the destruction of CW stockpiles and of CWproduction facilities, as well as verification of non-produc-tion of CW by the peaceful chemical industry, is the con-

cern of the main pillars of the Convention. The total num-ber of sites declared by SPs that must be regularly or ran-domly inspected (over 5800) shows the heavy burden ofnecessary verification activities. At this stage of implementa-tion, the inspections have been obviously concentrated onchecking declarations, inspecting storage sites and destruc-


* If it is not otherwise stated, the data are reported as of November 30,2009.** At the same time the nuclear weapons states recognised under the Nu-clear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

T a b l e 1 Universality: CWC compared with other mainagreements on WMD

T a b l i c a 1 Univerzalnost Konvencije o kemijskom oruju uodnosu na druge konvencije o orujima za ma-sovno unitavanje

TreatyUgovor

Entry intoforce

Stupanjena snagu

SPszemlje--lanice

Othersignatories

Drugipotpisnici

Non--signatories

Nijepotpisalo

NPTUgovor o neirenjunuklearnog oruja

1970 190 0 5

BTWCKonvencijao biolokom oruju

1975 163 13 19

CWCKonvencijao kemijskom oruju

1997 188 2 5

T a b l e 2 Important data from the declarations by the SPs(as of November 30, 2009)

T a b l i c a 2 Vani podaci iz deklaracija Zemalja lanica (do30. studenog 2009.)

SubjectPredmet

Declaring SPsDeklarirano

zemalja-lanica

Declared sitesDeklarirano

lokacija

CW storage facilitiesSkladita kem. oruja

7 38

CW destruction facilitiesPostrojenja za unitavanjekem. oruja

6 37

CW production facilitiesPostrojenje za proizvodnjukem. oruja

13 70*

Abandoned CWNaputeno kem. oruje

3 35

Old CWStaro kem. oruje

13 47

Chemical industryKemijska industrijaSchedule 1 chemicalsKemikalije s Popisa 1

22 27

Schedule 2 chemicalsKemikalije s Popisa 2

38 456


35 479

Discrete organic chemicalsDruge organske kemikalije

80 4579

* Of the 65 reported (former) CWPFs, 62 certified as already destroyed(43) or converted for peaceful purposes (19)* Od ukupno (ranije) deklariranih 70 lokacija za proizvodnju kem. oruja,62 su potvrena kao ve unitena (43) ili prenamijenjena u mirne svrhe(19)

tion of CW stockpiles and CW production facilities and, inthe chemical industry, on facilities producing scheduledchemicals.

At present, the most important task is undoubtedly destruc-tion of CW:

Declared chemical agents: 71,194 metric tonnesDestroyed: 39,585 metric tonnes

(i. e. 55.6 %)Declared munitions (containers) 8.67 million items

Destroyed 3.93 million items(i. e. 45.3 %)

As expected, the destruction proceeds asymmetrically, withconstruction of destruction facilities meeting with domesticfinancial and technological difficulties and acceptance pro-blems by local populations.

The scheduled 10 year term set by the CWC for total CWdestruction has not been met, and an allowed exemption toextend the destruction period for another 5 years has alrea-dy been agreed for the Russian Federation and for the US. Itseems now that it will be difficult for the latter SP to meeteven the extended deadline for total destruction. On theother hand, Albania and South Korea had already finisheddestruction of their small stockpiles in 2008, as had India in2009.

Table 3 overviews the inspection activities. If we relate de-clared sites to inspection frequency, it is obvious that themain effort has been concentrated on checking declara-tions submitted by the SPs concerning the closed storageand production facilities, and to ongoing processes of CWdestruction.

Somewhat less attention has been devoted to the industrythat produces scheduled chemicals. In future, when all CWstockpiles have been destroyed, the inspection effort will befocused on industry. For the reasons explained in the chap-ters in this book* dealing with the impact of scientific andtechnological development on the Convention, it seemsthat potential threats stem mainly from the industry pro-ducing discrete organic chemicals. This is because of thechanging face of the chemical industry and new deve-lopments in organic synthesis that are able to deliver newunscheduled toxic chemicals with incredible rapidity, so-mething which was not expected when the Convention wasdrafted. That is why the inspection effort devoted to thispart of industry seems to be low; it is restricted by thelimited numbers of inspection personnel. The high numberof such facilities worldwide (about 5600) as compared withthe number of inspected facilities (up till now somethingover 1600, most of which have been inspected only once)clearly indicates the necessity to increase the focus on thistype of site. The limited personnel capacity of inspectionteams could be enhanced through two means. First, therecould be considerable economising in the (till now con-tinuous on-site) inspections at the destruction of CW stock-piles, which nowadays are regulated also by stringent do-mestic legislation dealing with both security and safety,

namely health and workplace safety, and environmentalprotection. Secondly there could be increased utilisation ofthe capabilities of control and analytical instrumentationand other relevant information technology, includingequipment for continuous checking, remote and off-sitesensing, perimeter watching and observation, data record-ing, data transmission in real time, central data processingetc.

T a b l e 3 Inspection activities (as of November 30, 2009)

T a b l i c a 3 Inspekcijske aktivnosti (do 30. studenog 2009.)

SubjectPredmet

Inspected sitesPregledano

lokacija

Inspections*Broj inspekcija

CW production facilitiesPostrojenja za unitavanjekem. oruja

67 415

CW destruction facilitiesCW destruction facilitiesPostrojenja za unitavanjekem. oruja

37 1221

CW storage facilitiesSkladita kem. oruja

38 413

Abandoned CWNaputeno kem. oruje

35 52

Old CWStaro kem. oruje

47 90

Industry inspectionsInspekcije u industriji


36 202


254 486


234 277

Discrete organic chemicalsDruge organske kemikalije

579 761

* 81 SPs have been inspected* Inspekcije su obuhvatile 81 Zemlju-lanicu

Organisation for the Prohibitionof Chemical Weapons OPCW

Pursuant to the CWC, after its signature, the PreparatoryCommission was founded and after its entry into force, theOrganisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons(OPCW) was established, with its headquarters in The Ha-gue, The Netherlands.2

The Organisation consists of three main elements: Confe-rence of the States Parties, Executive Council and TechnicalSecretariat.

With regard to the topic of this paper, it is necessary to stressthe important role of the main subsidiary body. This is theOPCW Scientific Advisory Board (SAB). Consisting of 25 in-dependent experts (from SPs), it plays a crucial role in advi-sing the Technical Secretariat and the Director-General onissues of scientific and technological development havingactual or potential impact on the CWC and its implementa-


* See the chapters by Clagett, Perry Robinson and Trapp in this volume.See the reference at the footnote on page 1.

tion. The SAB solves important issues by utilising broaderscientific expertise, organising Temporary Working Groups(TWG) and launching some projects in cooperation with,for example, the International Union of Pure and AppliedChemistry. It also takes active part in other workshops andfora organised by the OPCW, and cooperates with specificorgans of the OPCW.

Main Results of Both CWC Review Conferences

The aim and tasks for the First Review Conference (2003)were determined as follows: Review operations of the Convention. Take account of scientific and technological deve-lopment. Lessons learned and recommendation for future imple-mentation.It was not an amendment (revision) conference.

The attendance represented 113 (then) SPs, two signatorystates (Haiti, Israel), two non-signatory states (Libya, Ango-la), five international organisations the European SpaceAgency (ESA), ICRC, the Permanent Court of Arbitration(PCA), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation(CTBTO) and UNIDIR 22 NGOs and six industry associa-tions. Despite a somewhat provocative statement by the USalleging non-compliance by Iran and concerns about theSudan, the Conference did not collapse into disarray andthe CWC has not met the fate of BTWC.* The Conferencedid not result in radical change of direction for the OPCWor make substantive decisions on crucial, still outstanding is-sues (e. g. so called non-lethal agents, riot control agents,law enforcement, nil declarations in respect of OCPFs andother problems).

However, a number of priorities were clearly recognised.These included: Universality of the Convention. National implementation measures. International cooperation and assistance. Verification regime for the chemical industry. Optimisation of verification measures. Scientific and technological development. Functioning of the OPCW.

Detailed explanation of these priorities is beyond the aim ofthis paper. For further information the adopted documentscan be consulted. First there is the political declaration con-taining 23 paragraphs3 and the main written result the re-view document with 134 paragraphs.4 Except for manymostly general statements, the programme did not go toodeeply into the problems of the impact of scientific andtechnological development on the CWC that are obviously

relevant to its future implementation. That issue was howe-ver deeply analysed in the document prepared by theOPCW Scientific Advisory Board and introduced to theConference in the Note by the Director-General.5

For the present status of the CWCs implementation, thedevelopments between the 1st and the 2nd Review Confe-rences were of utmost importance.

Some of recommendations of the OPCW SAB are reflectedin the SABs recent advice, and especially in projects thathave been launched recently. It is generally expected thattheir results will influence the present and future activitiesof the OPCW, considering the crucial importance of the im-pact of scientific and technological development on theCWC, especially after current CW stockpiles have been de-stroyed. Recent advice and recommendations by the SABare related to:

Salts of scheduled chemicals (of the same toxicologicalimportance as free bases). Captive use of (scheduled) chemicals (generally not im-portant for possible misuse). Structure of ricin (A + B chains, connected by disulphidecrosslinking). Role of the Chemical Abstract Service (CAS) figures (onlyan auxiliary tool, with no regulatory power).

The ongoing projects under the aegis of the OPCW SAB in-clude:

Biomedical Sampling and Analysis (in investigating alle-ged use of CW) (TWG). Sampling and Analysis to upgrade objective verificationefforts (TWG). Education and Outreach (a joint OPCW-IUPAC project)on introducing CWC issues in university curricula and oncodes of conduct of chemists and life scientists. Workshopshave been held in Bologna, Oxford and Moscow in 2005,and in Bologna in 2006. The latter workshop was associa-ted with an informal SAB meeting.7

For detailed information on the above-mentioned recentactivities of the SAB.6,7,8 Those reports were utilized by theOpen-ended Group, established within the OPCW Techni-cal Secretariat, in preparing the 2nd Review Conference.These preparations, marked by the 10th anniversary of theOPCW and entry into force of the CWC, also involved interalia:

A joint OPCW-IUPAC Workshop on Advances in Scien-ce and Technology (Zagreb, April, 2007).9

OPCW Academic Forum (The Hague, September,2007).10

OPCW Industry and Assistance Forum (The Hague, No-vember, 2007).11

OPCW NGO Forum (The Hague, November 2007).

The Second Review Conference took place in The Haguefrom April 7 18, 2008. Its character and tasks were defi-ned simply as Review operations of the CWC, consistentwith the requirement of the Convention for the review con-ferences. The attendance represented 114 SPs, two signa-tory states (Guinea-Bissau and Israel), three non-signatories(Angola, Iraq, Lebanon), five international organisations,and 28 NGOs.


* The last two (the 5th and 6th) BTWC Review Conferences were unable toadopt the Additional Protocol on implementation and verification thatcould have enhanced it to the level of the CWC with respect to, for exam-ple, declarations, verification mechanisms, destruction, non-proliferation,organization and national implementation measures. This addition (whichitself was elaborated by prestigious international NGOs with the basic in-put of Federation of American Scientists in 199091) has been negotiatedat four consecutive BTWC Review Conferences since the early 1990s. Itwas finally blocked by the US at the 6th Review Conference in 2006.

Beside general debate, procedural questions and reports ofsubsidiary bodies, especially that of the OPCW ScientificAdvisory Board12 dealing with problems of advances inscience and technology and their impact on the Conven-tion and its implementation, the programme went verydeeply into all problems of reviewing and assessing the ope-rations of the Convention in all its aspects, including espe-cially:

1. The role of the CWC in enhancing international peaceand security and in achieving the objectives as set forth inthe preamble of the CWC.

2. Ensuring the universality of the CWC.

3. Implementation of the CWCs provisions, related to:

(a) General obligations and declarations related thereto.(b) Destruction of CW and destruction/conversion ofCWPFs.(c) Verification activities of the OPCW.(d) Activities not prohibited by the CWC.(e) National implementation measures.(f) Consultations, cooperation, and fact-finding.(g) Assistance and protection against CW.(h) Economic and technological development.(i) Articles XII to XV of the CWC and final clauses.(j) The protection of confidential information.

4. The general functioning of the OPCW.

The Second Review Conference, being very well prepared,and utilising results of a series of activities carried out withinthe framework of, and celebrating the 10th anniversary of,the CWCs entry into force in 2007 (as described above),analysed individual points in a very deep and comprehensi-ve manner. This is clearly reflected in one central docu-ment, adopted at the end of the conference13 that willorient activities in chemical disarmament for the followingfive years. Detailed analysis of this document is beyond theaim of this paper.

Present Role of Engineers and Scientistsin Implementing the Convention

Engineers and scientists and their organisations made majorcontributions to negotiating and drafting the CWC and to itsdifficult ratification process, thereby enabling its entry intoforce. They again are now playing an important role in itsimplementation.

The complicated and extensive text of the CWC body andannexes, many of them connected with implementationand verification, need precise study, explanation and ac-ceptance by all segments of society committed to act pur-suant to its provisions. The experience with implementingthe CWC through national legislative systems has shownhow difficult it is for initially less well-informed people tounderstand its provisions, however committed they may beto taking part in the implementation of those provisions.The first approach of, for example, those in industry with le-gal obligations under the treaty, was their frequently ex-pressed thesis: What do we have to do with prohibition ofany weapons that is purely a military issue? It was and stillis necessary to do much work in education and outreach onnational as well as international levels, starting with educa-

ting officials of national authorities and the preparation ofnational implementation measures with respect to their le-gal and technical aspects.

The practice of implementation, especially in countriespossessing CW (and in countries where old CW are found),deals at present with very dangerous operations of CW de-struction and disposal. The CWC leaves full responsibility inthe choice of effective technology to the SPs but does notallow such environmentally barbaric methods of destruc-tion/disposal, routinely used still in the 1970s, such as seadumping, earth burial, open-pit burning or blasting. Deve-lopment of cost-effective and safe technologies for thewhole process of destruction (starting from storage sites upto the disposal of metal scrap and non toxic end-products)under domestic legal workplace safety and environmentalstandards are amongst the important international coopera-tive tasks of the scientific and technological communities.

Development of verification technologies utilising the mostsophisticated instrumental analytical techniques for detec-tion, identification and determination of trace amounts orconcentrations of toxic chemicals, their metabolites, break-down products and excess impurities in other industrialchemicals, or under environmental conditions and in biolo-gical samples, is another serious task necessary for verifyingimplementation of all provisions of the CWC.

Assistance and Protection are also amongst the main pillarsof the CWC. These terms imply providing both equipmentand know-how in detection and monitoring, decontamina-tion, protection of personnel and medical treatments tothose SPs that are experienced in this domain, and also toSPs with less or even zero experience with armed forcesand the protection of the population. This area is gaining in-creased importance, not only because of possible militaryuse of CW by non-SPs but also because of the increasingpeacetime threats that modern industrialised society poses,including possible chemical, biological, radiological andnuclear terrorist attacks.

Impact of Scientific and TechnologicalDevelopment on the Conventionand the Future Role of Engineersand Scientists

Both Review Conferences, and especially the reports pre-pared by the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board, identifiedpositive and negative aspects of the impact of scientific andtechnological development on the CWC and its implemen-tation.

Consistent with these views it is possible to formulate therole of engineers and scientists and their organisations inthe future implementation of the CWC. In the first instancethere is their engagement in finishing the complete and safedestruction of CW stockpiles, and the destruction or con-version of the CWPFs. Then there is their involvement in as-suring the non-proliferation of CW, i. e. verifying non-pro-duction by the peaceful chemical industry of potential CW,taking into account threats and benefits posed by scientificand technological development.


Potential threats arise from scientific and technological de-velopments because of the accelerated pace of productionof new toxic chemicals, from new synthetic methods andfrom the changing face of the chemical industry.

One present threat lies already in the inconsistency of theCWC with regard to riot-control agents. Even though lawenforcement and domestic riot control are explicitly men-tioned among the purposes not prohibited, the particularCWC wording (Article I, paragraph 5) prohibiting use ofriot-control agents as a method of warfare is generally un-derstood as ipso facto exempting these agents from the de-finition of toxic chemicals (for the purposes of the CWC);this has consequences for the current verification regime even these known agents are unscheduled. This is a signifi-cant loophole in the CWC, allowing its possible circumven-tion because R&D and production of such chemicals areoutside routine verification regimes. One can imagine legi-timate search for new effective and safe (how safe?) irritantsand various kinds of incapacitants based on a wide spec-trum of toxicological action (calmatives, algogens, variousbioregulators either isolated or of synthetic origin, influen-cing some biogenic processes associated with the nervoussystem) for policing purposes, but there are also tempta-tions in the direction of the uncontrolled development andproduction of means that sometime might be used on bat-tlefields.

This problem of so-called non-lethal agents is a real, currentand very serious problem. Every toxicologist knows that thetoxic effect on, or response of, an organism is dose- (expo-sure-) dependent. This means that so-called non-lethalagents do not exist at all. The safety index of irritants andother harassing agents depends on the difference betweenthe statistically determined dose (involving both concentra-tion and exposure time) that has intolerable effects and thedose that causes death. This index of safety should be as bigas possible, but it cannot by its very nature be unlimited.That is why the concept of non-lethality is inevitably im-precise.

Future threats arise mainly from the changing face of synt-hetic and manufacturing methods for production of bothscheduled and new (unscheduled) toxic compounds. Thesenew threats come primarily from the rapid pace of deve-lopment in bio-molecular science (e.g. genomics and pro-teomics) and in chemical synthesis (i. e. combinatorialchemistry) that can produce toxic chemicals for potentialmisuse. These methods enable the very rapid syntheses ofextensive series of compounds with tailored structures,the effects of which are predicted theoretically on the basisof molecular engineering or architecture. Thus, what tookmonths or years to produce in the classical era of organicsynthesis in the middle of the 20th century can today beachieved within days or weeks.

We are now faced also with the changed character of thechemical industry. Many parts of the chemical industryoperate with multipurpose batch facilities whose produc-tion can readily be switched from one product to another.The potential of producing toxic chemicals is also consi-derably enhanced by the use of microreactors producinglarge volumes in small plants. Globalisation of this industrytherefore necessitates reviewing the verification regime ofother chemical production facilities producing discrete

organic chemicals. The number of such facilities (see Table2) that are currently almost without international supervi-sion shows the importance of this issue.

The ever-growing range of toxic chemicals and new proces-ses of small-scale syntheses increase also the threat of che-mical terrorism.

The main benefits of scientific and technological develop-ment can be expected in the development of progressiveanalytical methods and relevant high technology instru-mentation. Many modern separation techniques (such asgas chromatography and high performance liquid chroma-tography) coupled with identification techniques (such asmass spectrometry) and other spectrophotometric methods(such as Fourier transform infra-red spectroscopy), and lin-ked with computerised data-libraries accessible on-line,have been introduced into the OPCW-designated laborato-ries; some of these techniques are used routinely in port-able or mobile equipment for on-site inspections. Theproblems are to keep up with the rapid development of po-tential (mainly unscheduled) toxic chemicals, technical up-grading of equipment, analysis of toxins and biologicalsamples, conservation and transportation of samples foroff-site analysis and the like. It is also desirable to introduceutilisation of automated analytical techniques. This includesremote (off-site) methods with automatic data transmissionin real time to reduce the burden of continuous on-site pre-sence of inspectors verifying destruction of CW. Verifica-tion efforts also need to shift to counter the much greaterfuture threat by ensuring the non-production of CW by theincreasing and spreading peaceful chemical industry faciliti-es that manufacture discrete organic chemicals (see the bot-tom line of Table 2). The multifaceted technical issue ofverification and its many practical applications is beyondthe scope of this article, but it can be concluded that, if thepower of modern analytical science were to be used to itsfull extent, all analytical requirements of the CWC could beachieved.

Another very significant contribution of scientific and tech-nological development that should be widely utilised in fu-ture implementation of Article X (relating to Assistance andProtection), includes the delivery of means and of know--how in the continuously developing areas of:

Detection, identification and monitoring (point and stand--off detection, i. e. simple means, automatic alarms, re-connaissance vehicles, stand-off sensors, data transmission,field-portable and mobile laboratories and sets). Decontamination (means and methods for decontamina-tion of personnel, decontamination of equipment and ma-teriel, decontamination of stationary objects, decontamina-tion and treatment of water). Protection of personnel (protective masks, suits, accesso-ries and other means for armies, civil and population pro-tection, for general and specialist use, shelters, filtration,ventilation and special equipment, filter-ventilated combatand transport vehicles. Treatment of intoxication (first aid methods and means,such as antidotes, syringes, auto injectors and other equip-ment, medical treatment methods and means, therapeuticprocedures, equipment, evacuation and rescue systems,rescue and evacuation vehicles).


Other challenges of scientific and technological develop-ment are associated with the work of the OPCW, its Tech-nical Secretariat and with education and outreach. Thoseissues also should be matters of interest to concernedengineers and scientists and their organisations.

Conclusions

The international community of engineers and scientists, in-cluding individual experts directly engaged in the negotia-tions as well as professional organisations, institutions andNGOs of concerned scientists, has played a positive rolefrom the early stages of negotiations on the CW ban,through advanced negotiations of the CWC, preparationsfor its entry into force and during the first period of imple-menting the CWC.14

Operations of the Chemical Weapons Convention thatmost probably would not exist without valuable input of ex-pertise by the scientific and technological communities areproceeding generally satisfactorily,* judged according to thestatus of its implementation by the 188 States Parties andthrough verification by the Organisation for Prohibition ofthe Chemical Weapons in The Hague. The First ReviewConference stressed the importance of achieving worldwi-de universality in order to totally eliminate the dark legacyof past chemical arsenals once and forever, to preventthreats and to utilise the benefits of scientific and technolo-gical development for the implementation of the CWC inthe foreseeable future. These positive trends were confir-med by the outcome of the Second Review Conference in2008. The future implementation of the CWC involves anessential active role for scientific and technological experti-se, including the engagement of NGOs of concerned engi-neers and scientists.

ReferencesLiteratura

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4. Review document, OPCW, The Hague, 2003. Available atwww.opcw.org/html/global/wgrc/2k3/ rc1revdoc.html.

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7. Report of the Informal Meeting of the SAB, Bologna, Septem-ber 2006.

8. Report of the 9th Session of the SAB. OPCW, The Hague, Feb-ruary 2007.

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10. R. Trapp (Ed.), Academic Forum. Proceedings, OPCW, TheHague, 2007.

11. Industry and Protection Forum. Proceedings, OPCW, TheHague, 2007.

12. Note by the Director General: Report of the SAB on Deve-lopments in Science and Technology (RC2/DG.1), OPCW,The Hague, 28 February 2008.

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* Except for the delayed schedule of destruction by the main CW posses-sors.

SAETAK

Konvencija o zabrani kemijskoj oruja i uloga inenjera i znanstvenikaJ. Matouek

Kemijsko oruje, kao i cijela vojna tehnologija, povezana je s aktivnostima inenjera i znanstveni-ka. Meutim, kemijsko oruje se razlikuje u odnosu na druge vojne tehnologije po tome, to jeono nastalo i prvi puta masovno upotrijebljeno izravnim sudjelovanjem znamenitih kemiara.Opisan je znatan doprinos inenjera i znanstvenika te njihovih organizacija pregovorima o kemi-jskom razoruanju, ukljuujui i stvaranje (pisanje) Konvencije o zabrani kemijskog oruja.Razmatra se njihova sadanja i budua uloga u provedbi Konvencije uzimajui u obzir ugroze idobrobit koje donose napredak znanosti i tehnologije, naglaavajui neovisnu ekspertizu Znan-stvenog savjeta Organizacije za zabranu kemijskog oruja.

Masaryk University Faculty of Science Prispjelo 8. sijenja 2009.EU Research Centre of Excellence for Environmental Prihvaeno 4. studenog 2009.Chemistry and EcotoxicologyBrno, Czech Republic

konvencija o hemijskom oruzju

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