kosovo and the challenge of humanitarian intervention.doc

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KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE OF HUMANITARIANINTERVENTION

Selective Indignation, Collective Intervention, andInternational Citizenship

Peace and Governance ProgrammeThe United Nations University

Edited by

Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur

CONTENTS

PREFACE

CONTRIBUTORS

INTRODUCTION - LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Policy Brief: Lessons from the Kosovo Conflict


PART ONE - THE KOSOVO CRISIS

2. Kosovo in the Twentieth Century: A Historical Account

Marie-Janine Calic

3. The Kosovo Conflict: A Perspective From Inside

Agon Demjaha

4. The Closing of the Kosovo Cycle: Victimization Versus Responsibility

Duska Anastasijevic

5. The Kosovo Conflict: The Balkans and the Southern Caucasus

George Khutsishvili and Albrecht Schnabel

PART TWO - THE MAJOR PLAYERS

6. The Costs of Victory: American Power and the Use of Force in the Contemporary OrderG. John Ikenberry

7. Russia: Reassessing National Interests

Vladimir Baranovsky

8. China: Whither World Order After Kosovo?

Zhang Yunling

9. The Major European Allies: France, Germany and the United Kingdom

Simon Duke, Hans-Georg Ehrhart and Matthias Kar?di
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PART THREE - VIEWS FROM NATO ALLIES

10. The N ordic Countries: Whither the Wests Critical Conscience?

Bjrn Mller

11. The Southern Flank: Italy, Greece, Turkey

Georgios Kostakos

12. Kosovo and the Case of the (Not So) Free Riders: Belgium, Canada, Portugal and Spain

David Haglund and Allen Sens

13. The New Entrants: Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic

Pter Tlas and Lszl Valki

PART FOUR - SELECTED INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES

14. The Muslim World: Uneasy Ambivalence

Ibrahim A. Karawan

15. Latin America: The Dilemmas of Intervention

Mnica Serrano

16. South Africa: The Demand for Legitimate Multilateralism

Philip Nel

17. India: An Uneasy PrecedentSatish Nambiar

PART FIVE - CHALLENGES OF THE POST-WAR ORDER

18. NATO: From Collective Defence to Peace Enforcement

Nicola Butler

19. The United Nations System and the Kosovo Crisis

A.J.R. Groom and Paul Taylor

20. The Concept of Humanitarian Intervention Revisited

James Mayall

21. The Concept of Sovereignty Revisited

Alan M. James

PART SIX - OPINION, MEDIA, CIVIL SOCIETY

22. Analogies at War: The United States, the Conflict in Kosovo and the Uses of History

George C. Herring

23. Media Coverage of the War: An Empirical AssessmentSteven Livingston

24. Effective Indignation? Building Global Awareness, NGOs, and the Enforcement of Norms

Felice Gaer
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PART SEVEN - FORCE, DIPLOMACY AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

25. The Inevitability of Selective Response? Principles to Guide Urgent International Action

Lori Fisler Damrosch

26. The Split-Screen War: Kosovo and Changing Concepts of the Use of Force

Lawrence Freedman

27. Military History Overturned: Did Air Power Win the War?

Ray Funnell

28. Force, Diplomacy and Norms

Coral Bell

29. Solidarity Versus Geostrategy: Kosovo and the Dilemmas of International Democratic Culture

Jean-Marc Coicaud

30. The Good International Citizen and the Crisis in Kosovo

Andrew Linklater

PREFACE top

The Kosovo conflict has the potential to redraw the landscape of international politics,

with significant ramifications for the UN, major powers and regional organizations aswell as for the way in which we understand and interpret world politics. Can the UN

Security Council veto now effectively be circumvented to launch selective enforcement

operations? Can the humanitarian imperative be reconciled with the principle of state

sovereignty? What can we learn about the evolving contours of world politics in the wakeof the Kosovo conflict? We hope to be able to offer a meaningful contribution to this

continuing and important debate - a debate that is crucial to our understanding of global

politics at the beginning of this new century.

Within days after the beginning of NATO airstrikes over Kosovo, we proposed to UNU

to undertake a major study on the implications of NATOs involvement in the Kosovo

conflict. Our intent was to draw on some of the best scholarship available to examine the

Kosovo crisis from numerous perspectives - from the conflict-parties and NATO allies,from the immediate region surrounding the conflict and further afield - complemented by

lessons for the longer term normative, operational and structural consequences of the

Kosovo crisis for world politics. The response was positive, and we were given the meansand support to bring together a group of 36 scholars and practitioners to produce a

systematic assessment of the Kosovo conflict and its consequences for the changing

contours of international society. In September 1999 all the authors convened inBudapest, Hungary, to share and discuss their draft contributions. The resulting book will

be available in the summer of 2000 (Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur, eds.Kosovo

and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action

and International Citizenship. Tokyo, United Nations University Press).
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This research brief is comprised of two main sections. The first section (the Introduction)

is a policy brief that has been distributed in similar form to policy makers, analysts, and

UN and Member State officials. As part of this effort, several events - both at the UN andat academic institutions - have been organized by the United Nations University to reach

as large an audience as possible. The second section (Parts One through Seven) of this

publication features brief summaries of all individual contributions to the project. Here,each author has attempted to focus on the main issues, arguments and lessons, and -

insofar as the contribution lends itself to such - on specific recommendations for further

study or action by national and international policy makers. We hope that this researchbrief and the subsequent book will stimulate thought and further discussion within both

the policy-making and academic communities.

We would like to acknowledge a number of individuals who have been instrumental in

making this research brief (and the separately distributed policy brief) possible: Weexpress our deep gratitude to Manfred Boemeke, Senior Dissemination Officer and

Head, United Nations University Press, and his colleague Sumiko Sudo for producing thepolicy and research briefs. We are grateful to William Auckerman for copyediting the

draft manuscript. We thank Yoshie Sawada in the Peace and Governance Programme forher support and assistance, and Jacques Fomerand and Mary-Esther Leung of UNUs

Office in North America for making it possible to share our findings with the wider UN

community at a symposium at UN Headquarters.

Albrecht SchnabelRamesh Thakur

Tokyo, March 2000

CONTRIBUTORS top

Duska Anastasijevic is a staff writer for the independent weekly Vreme, Belgrade,

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Vladimir Baranovsky is Deputy Director at the Institute of World Economy and

International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences, and Professor at theMoscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), Moscow, Russia.

Coral Bell is a visiting fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre of the

Australian National University, Canberra, Australia.

Nicola Butler is a senior analyst for the Acronym Institute, London, United Kingdom.

Marie-Janine Calic is expert advisor to the special Coordinator of the Stability Pact,Brussels, and a historian and political scientist at the German Stiftung Wissenschaft und

Politik (SWP), Ebenhausen, Germany.
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Jean-Marc Coicaud is a Senior Academic Programme Officer in the Peace and

Governance Programme of the United Nations University, Tokyo, Japan.

Lori Fisler Damrosch is the Henry L. Moses Professor of International Law andOrganization at Columbia University, New York, USA.

Agon Demjaha is an adviser (and was the founding director) of the Kosovar Civil

Society Foundation, Pristina, Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Simon Duke is an Associate Professor at the European Institute of Public

Administration, Maastricht, Netherlands.

Hans-Georg Ehrhart is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Peace Research and

Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH), Hamburg, Germany.

Lawrence Freedman is Professor of War Studies at King's College, London, United

Kingdom.

Ray Funnell is retired Air Marshall of the Royal Australian Air Force, Australia.

Felice Gaer is Director of the Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human

Rights at the American Jewish Committee, New York, USA.

A.J.R. Groom is Professor of International Relations and Head of the Department of

Politics and International Relations of the University of Kent at Canterbury, UnitedKingdom.

David Haglund is Director of the Centre for International Relations and Professor in theDepartment of Political Studies at Queens University, Kingston, Canada.

George C. Herring is Alumni Professor of History at the University of Kentucky,Lexington, USA.

G. John Ikenberry is Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania

and Non-Resident Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC.

Alan M. James is Emeritus Professor of International Relations at Keele University,

Keele, United Kingdom.

Matthias Z. Kar?di is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Peace Research and SecurityPolicy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH), Hamburg, Germany.

Ibrahim Karawan is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Utah,

Salt Lake City, USA.


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George Khutsishvili is Founding Director of the International Center on Conflict and

Negotiation (ICCN) and Adjunct Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at Tbilisi State

University and Georgian Technical University, Tbilisi, Georgia.

Georgios Kostakos is Academic Adviser at the University of Athens and Research

Fellow at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP).

Andrew Linklater is the Woodrow Wilson Professor of International Politics at the

University of Wales, Aberystwyth, United Kingdom.

Steven Livingston is Associate Professor of Political Communication and InternationalAffairs, Director of the Political Communication Program, and Associate Professor of

International Affairs in the Elliot School of International Affairs at The George

Washington University, Washington, DC, USA.

James B.L. Mayall is Sir Patrick Sheehy Professor of International Relations and

Director of the Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge, Cambridge,United Kingdom.

Bj?rn M?ller is Secretary General of the International Peace Research Association,External Lecturer at the University of Copenhagen and Senior Research Fellow at the

Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI), Copenhagen, Denmark.

Satish Nambiar is a retired Lieutenant General of the Indian Army, was the first Force

Commander and Head of Mission of UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia, and iscurrently Director of the United Service Institution of India.

Philip Nel is Professor of Political Science, Department Chair, and Director of the Centrefor International and Comparative Politics at the University of Stellenbosch,

Stellenbosch, South Africa.

Albrecht Schnabel is an Academic Programme Officer in the Peace and Governance

Programme of the United Nations University, Tokyo, Japan.

Allen Sens is a Sessional Instructor in the Department of Political Science and a

Research Fellow at the Institute for International Relations at the University of BritishColumbia, Vancouver, Canada.

M?nica Serrano is Professor at the Centro de Estudios Internacionales at El Colegio de

M?xico and Research Fellow at the Centre for International Studies, Oxford University,United Kingdom.

P?ter T?las is Senior Research Fellow of the Institute of Strategic and Defence Studies atthe National Defence University in Budapest, Hungary.


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Paul Taylor is Professor of International Relations and Chair of the Department, London

School of Economics and Political Science, London, United Kingdom.

Ramesh Thakur is Head of the Peace and Governance Programme and Vice Rector,United Nations University, Tokyo, Japan.

L?szl?Valki is a Professor of International Law at the E?tv?s Lorand University,Budapest, Hungary.

Zhang Yunling is a Professor of International Economics and Director of the Institute ofAsia-Pacific Studies, the Institute of Japanese Studies, and the APEC Policy Research

Centre at the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS), Beijing, China.

INTRODUCTION - LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS top

1. Policy Brief: Lessons from the Kosovo Conflict top


The Roots of the Conflict: History and Politics

Competing constructions of history have served to perpetuate a climate of hatred

between the ethnic Serb and Albanian communities and triggered the spiral of

conflict. Each side has maintained a perception of history as an oscillating

domination by one or the other side, and each claims exclusive rights andsovereignty over the same piece of land.

The recent conflict mainly resulted from the deliberate and strategic policies of

Serbias ruling elites, which had the short-term goal of securing the continuation

of their own power and shoring up the existing power structure that had beenshowing signs of decay since the mid-1980s.

A Very Slow Response from the International Community

Although an explosion of the Kosovo powder keg was often predicted,

international efforts to contain the conflict were modest and hesitant. Later, facedwith brutal and rapidly escalating hostilities, the international community reacted

in a confused manner.

The international community was reminded that the Dayton Agreement, which

had ended the wars in Bosnia, did not put a lid on instability, ethnic competition,conflicting territorial claims, underdevelopment and poverty in the region.

Moreover, this has taught us about the important roles that need to be played in

the region by non-military organizations - in particular, the European Union, the
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Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United

Nations.

NATOs Decision to Intervene

Action by the UN Security Council would have been blocked by Russian andChinese opposition to military intervention in Kosovo. The Uniting for Peace

Resolution was not invoked to seek authorization from the UN General Assembly.

Rather, NATO unilaterally decided to intervene. The choice of NATO as thevehicle for intervention in Kosovo suggests that this was a European response to a

European problem and would not necessarily presage comparable action

anywhere outside Europe.

What was at stake was not only the fate of the ethnic Albanian population ofKosovo. It was also the standing and reputation of the major democratic countries

involved in the NATO operation, and the credibility of NATO itself. Ultimately,

it was a matter of setting the tone for the years to come, with full understanding ofthe implications that these decisions and actions could have on the future of the

international system.

Fundamental policy differences between the NATO allies led to a "lowest

common denominator" approach to achieving military objectives. Air strikes didnot prevent widespread atrocities against civilians on the ground in Kosovo or the

mass exodus of refugees into neighboring countries.

The war over Kosovo was, in general, an unproblematic conflict for the small

powers among NATOs allies, because its status as a "humanitarian war" made it

easy to justify to political leaders (if not always to their publics). Despite mixedpublic and official responses, the new NATO entrants proved to be loyal, and the

established members showed firm solidarity.

American leadership in the campaign was striking. While Americas constructiveparticipation is indispensable to the international communitys search for

solutions to problems of security, justice, economic growth and political

governance, it can be profoundly worrisome to try to cooperate with a large andpotentially unpredictable superpower that is itself uncertain of how much global

leadership it wants to provide. World order and Pax Americana are roughly the

same thing today. But American hegemony - regardless of how open, benign and

enlightened it might be - is a poor substitute for a more inclusive, institutionalizedand widely agreed upon international order.

Critical Reactions from the International Community

The developments of the Kosovo conflict have distinctly influenced Russias

perception of its relations with the outside world in a more fundamental way than


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most other events during the last decade. Any possible arguments that NATO

might become a stability-provider for Europe have lost validity for Russia.

China worries that what happened in Yugoslavia yesterday may occur in Asia,especially in China, tomorrow. The problem of a strong power (or powers) using

force against a weak one (or ones) based on its (their) own "values" will onlycreate disorder. China supports a multipolar world order; while China does not

want to challenge or compete with US superiority, it rejects US domination orhegemony.

Many of those in Islamic countries who supported the NATO operation because

the Muslims in Kosovo might ultimately benefit from it, now argue that theAlliance committed strategic mistakes in carrying out its military operations.

These mistakes include not intervening earlier, refusing to deploy ground troops

to put a decisive end to the conflict, and not anticipating Milosevics resort to

evicting hundreds of thousands of Muslims from Kosovo.

The South African government, reflecting the positions of the Non-Aligned

Movement (NAM) and Organization of African Unity (OAU) in particular,

wanted to make clear that unilateral intervention, no matter how noble the pretext,

is not acceptable. A broad, non-discriminatory multilateralism (in all issue areas,including security and trade) remains the best safeguard that the developing world

has against unilateral misuse of power by the strong.

Many developing countries fear that the international community runs the dangerof becoming hostage to the machinations of a few privileged and powerful

countries. Moves are already afoot to seek common positions, if not alignments,

and for a restructuring of the United Nations Security Council. Many developingcountries may feel compelled to move towards ensuring greater security forthemselves through acquisition of more weaponry. There is almost total

unanimity in India, for example, that the country needs to strengthen itself

militarily to the extent that there can be no scope for any outside interference inaffairs on the subcontinent.

Sanctions Dont Work

Whatever the justification in other contexts, if the objective is the relief of

suffering in - and the democratization of - the targeted society, sanctions are a

grotesquely inappropriate instrument of policy.

Precluding the Use of Ground Forces was Ill-advised

In the Kosovo context, excluding the deployment of ground forces from the

beginning was a serious mistake. Uncertainty about the possible use of ground

forces should have been preserved, and in future interventions a principle ofambiguity should be respected.


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Media Coverage Bolstered Public Support

Pictures of refugees tended to bolster US and European public support for the

military action, while pictures of collateral damage - the death of civilians byerrant NATO bombs - undermined support for the bombing. However, concern

for "mistakes" was balanced by concern for the plight of ethnic Albanianrefugees. More than any other factor, the constant stream of refugees and reports

of Serbian atrocities tended to bolster support for the war.

NGOs Were Torn Between Humanitarianism and the Use of Force

By and large, calls for use of force came from relatively few NGOs, with the most

public appeals coming from NGOs located outside the region. NGO positions on

the use of force reflected the legal and moral norms they devote themselves toupholding and enforcing globally, and an aversion to the use of violence in

settling international disputes. Far from being "selective indignation," their

actions reflected efforts to implement global norms universally, with an impactthat could instead be termed "effective indignation."

The Prospects for Stability in Kosovo Are Grim

If the age-old divide between the two communities in Kosovo was widened by the

imposition of absolute Serbian rule in 1990, the atrocities committed by the

Serbian regime during the NATO campaign appear to have broken all bondsbeyond repair.

The Albanian political leadership and a major part of Kosovos population

continue to insist on independence. The historical dream of creating a unified pan-Albanian state is still persistent.

There is a worrying lack of a long-term plan for implementing a settlement in

Kosovo. The application of a double standard for ethnic Albanians ("all victims")

and Serbs ("all perpetrators") has made it almost impossible to implementResolution 1244, whose aim was to respect the territorial integrity of the FRY

(with Kosovo as a constituent element).

Neither the Rambouillet Accords nor UN Security Council Resolution 1244

clarify the future status of Kosovo. The lack of agreement on the future territorial

status of Kosovo makes the task of the UNMIK more difficult, further confusesboth Serbs and Albanians and leaves space for self-serving misinterpretations and

propaganda.

Peace support operations in Kosovo, along with Bosnia-Herzegovina, now lookset to continue indefinitely. NATO expended huge military and political resources

on a relatively small region, and yet the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia are

still far from resolved. Military power alone has not been sufficient, and other


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skills and expertise will be needed if reconciliation and reconstruction are to

proceed in the Balkans.

The current situation in Kosovo can only be an interim solution - in the form of anopen-ended protectorate. It is clear that the only lasting solution is a political

settlement that reconciles legitimate ethnic Albanian interests about the future ofthe province and long-term peace with Serbia.

Unless Serbian Society Embraces Democracy

If the cycle of self-victimization is ever to be broken, t he grassroots democracythat has again begun to emerge throughout Serbia needs to adopt a more

responsible perception of Serbias history and national identity. For this to

happen, Serbs must start building truly democratic institutions which will beprepared to examine not only the effects of Milosevics rule, but also the reason

for his continued political success. Only then will Serbia create the conditions for

its return to the society of states and re-establish friendly relations with itsneighbors, Kosovo included.

NATOs War Has Brought Southeastern Europe Back into the Spotlight

NATOs war in and over Kosovo and the subsequently increased international

presence in the region have brought much needed attention to the Southeast

European region. The new momentum for peace, security and stability in theBalkans should embrace as well the Southern Caucasus.

It is time that Southeast European countries address their problems as a

community and as a region, and deal with conflicts and state misbehaviour andfailure (as in the case of Serbia) by themselves, particularly if they want to avoidcontinued great power intervention. Regional integration, confidence building,

early warning, conflict prevention and development should be main foreign policy

goals throughout Southeastern Europe, both within the Balkans and the SouthernCaucasus as well as between those two regions.

Military Power Was Used Poorly

In the Kosovo conflict, military power was not used well. This, in turn, was the

result of the fact that, in the main, senior politicians and those who advise them

have not studied the military and the power they deploy; they neither understandmilitary power nor appreciate the difficulties associated with its use, and

consequently err in using it. This situation must be corrected. Too many precious

resources are wasted, too much devastation occurs and, most importantly of all,too many lives are lost because those entrusted with making decisions on using

military power have neither the knowledge nor the skill to do so wisely.

NATO Acting Without the UN Sets a Dangerous Precedent


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A dangerous precedent has been set in the Balkans, whereby NATO takes action

with UN backing when possible, but without it if Alliance members think it

necessary.

Or Does It?

Although comparable circumstance may not be lacking, for political and strategic

reasons operations along the lines of those in Kosovo may not often be embarked

upon in the immediate future. This will further delay the widespreadacknowledgment of a reshaped norm. The Kosovo crisis has undoubtedly

introduced some change into the wider world, but not much.

Principled Responses? Most Likely Not

A code of rules governing intervention would be likely in the early 21st century to

limit rather than help effective and responsible action on the part of the

international community. The charge of double standards is inevitable.Nevertheless, the creation and strengthening of humanitarian norms in the

medium and long term is a practical goal.

Any attempt to get general agreements among governments about the principles

which should govern intervention through Security Council Resolutions would be

counter-productive at this time. Intervention in present circumstances has to

depend upon a conjunction of the various overlapping interests of states and acommon perception of the relevance in particular instances of moral principles.

Agreement in advance on general rules governing when intervention could take

place would be very difficult to achieve, unless on the basis of a minimum

common denominator that would make it more difficult even in cases of grossviolations of basic standards.

It may not be feasible to expect to achieve anything like principled responses at

the international level in the foreseeable future, at least where the issue concernsmilitary intervention to enforce international law. It may be inevitable, possibly

even preferable, for responses to international crises to unfold selectively, when

those who have the capability to respond also have motivations for undertakingthe burdens of intervention. Scarce resources may need to be allocated in

accordance with the preferences and values of those who are committing the

resources. Such interventions could well prove more effective than unrealistically

altruistic ones.

A Dilemma for the International Citizen

The good international citizen faces a painful dilemma. To respect sovereignty is

to be complicit in human rights violations; to rely on economic sanctions and

diplomatic pressure - and to argue that the UN Security Council must give itsconsent to humanitarian war - risks accusations of failing to act decisively against


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violent regimes. Yet to use force unilaterally risks accusations of violating

international law and of setting unfortunate precedents.

Perhaps the dilemma can be overcome by trying to promote an internationalconsensus about the point at which a state forfeits its sovereignty, and by efforts

to remove the Great Power veto in exceptional circumstances so that the supportof a majority of the Great Powers is all that is required to permit states to engage

in humanitarian war. Without such international agreements, good internationalcitizens may be tempted - and may come under pressure from their domestic

populations - to go it alone. While it is hard to condemn them if they do, it is also

hard to support their efforts other than in the most extreme of circumstances andwith the assumption that the use of force will not cause more problems than it

solves.

PART ONE - THE KOSOVO CRISIS top

2. Kosovo in the Twentieth Century: A Historical Account top

Marie-Janine Calic

Although an explosion of the Kosovo powder keg had often been predicted, international

efforts to contain the conflict were modest. It was not until the emergence of the first

violent clashes in late 1997 that major international actors put the issue high on their

political agenda. Faced with a brutal and quickly escalating war, the internationalcommunity was unable to cope. Although countless international organizations, national

governments and special envoys attempted to mediate between the parties, this was done

mainly on a half-hearted and contradictory basis.

On 24 September 1997, the International Contact Group for the first time voiced theirconcern over tensions in Kosovo and issued an appeal for negotiations. They established

a new working group on this issue and sent a delegation to the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia (FRY). This delegation urged Belgrade to (i) initiate a "peaceful dialogue"with Pristina, (ii) allow an OSCE-led observer mission to Kosovo, Sandshak and

Vojvodina, (iii) accept international mediation, and (iv) grant a "special status" to

Kosovo. Belgrade, however, declared that Kosovo was an internal affair and nobodyelses business, and rejected these proposals. In its Moscow declaration of 25 February

1998, the Contact Group declared that any solution on special status would be acceptable,

as long as both sides were in agreement.

In response to the escalation of violence in March 1998, the UN Security Councilimposed an arms embargo as well as economic and diplomatic sanctions against the FRY,

calling for a "real dialogue" between the conflicting parties. As the fighting continued,

displacing several tens of thousands of people, NATO in June 1998 stepped up itsmilitary presence in neighboring Macedonia and Albania and started to threaten Belgrade


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with air strikes. It was not until September, however, that NATO issued an Activation

Warning (ACTWARN) for an air campaign in the FRY.

In its resolution 1199 of 23 September 1998, the UN Security Council called for animmediate cease-fire, withdrawal of military and paramilitary forces, complete access for

humanitarian organizations, and cooperation on the investigation of war crimes inKosovo. Although the resolution did not explicitly threaten the use of "all necessary

means," NATO interpreted this as a legitimization for the use of military force against theFRY. By this time, the UNHCR estimated that there were about 200,000 refugees.

After an ultimatum issued by NATO, Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic and US

special envoy Richard Holbrooke agreed on 12 October 1998 on a partial withdrawal ofthe Serbian military forces and deployment of an OSCE verification mission of 2,000

unarmed personnel. Although the situation calmed down in view of the approaching

winter, a number of serious clashes between Yugoslav forces and Kosovo Liberation

Army (KLA) fighters were reported before the informal cease fire broke down around

Christmas.

In view of the new escalatory spiral, on 6 February 1999 the Contact Group pressured the

conflicting parties into negotiations on the legal status of Kosovo. In the Rambouillet

meetings, the Contact Group presented a proposal for an interim agreement based on itsdecisions of 29 January 1999, providing for a large degree of self-government and an

international implementation force. Whereas the Albanian delegation could finally be

convinced to approve the proposal, Belgrade continued to reject the agreement for fear offoreign interference in its internal affairs.

On 24 March 1999, NATO started an air campaign against the FRY. The campaign

aimed to force the Serbian side to accept the Rambouillet agreement and, thus, to preventan imminent humanitarian catastrophe. NATO expected that it would take only a fewdays to bring the Belgrade government to the fold. Instead, the military operation

continued for 11 weeks before the war came to an end. Serbian military and paramilitary

forces reacted with extreme violence against KLA fighters and the ethnic Albaniancivilian population. Altogether, more than 800,000 people were displaced and thousands

killed.

After the G-8 states had agreed on the text for a UN Security Council Resolution that was

also acceptable to the FRY, on 9 June 1999 representatives of the Yugoslav military andNATO concluded a military-technical agreement on the withdrawal of Yugoslav troops

from Kosovo. This ended the war. On the basis of Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999 and

the report of the Secretary General of 12 June (S/1999/672), the NATO-led Kosovo Force(KFOR) established its presence in the war-torn province. The UN, in cooperation with

numerous international organizations, began to build up a civil administration.

From the beginning, the United Nations Mission In Kosovo (UNMIK) was confronted

with a number of serious problems. Many lessons from the Bosnia peace operation wereneglected, such as a unified civil-military and integrated command structure. In addition,


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KFOR was unable to prevent the expulsion of more than 250,000 non-Albanians, mainly

Serbs and Roma, by the KLA. UNMIK is suffering from a severe financial crisis caused

by Member State governments who, as often before, were willing to fund a war, but notthe necessary reconstruction and peace-building efforts. Last but not least, the

constitutional political status of Kosovo, which formally remains an integral part of the

FRY, is de facto still undefined. The Albanian political leadership and a major part ofKosovos population continue to insist on independence. The historical dream of creating

a unified pan-Albanian state is still persistent.

3. The Kosovo Conflict: A Perspective From Inside top

Agon Demjaha

The roots of the Kosovo conflict date to the beginning of the 20th century. During this

century-long period, two realities - an Albanian reality and a Serbian reality - have been

created, based more or less on different and contradictory interpretations of history.

The dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and the abolition of the autonomy of Kosovo in1989 escalated the conflict to a new level: Kosovo became a de facto Serbian colony

where ethnic Albanians (representing 90 per cent of Kosovos population) were ruled by

the Serbs, who represented less than 10 per cent of the provinces population. Albanians

created parallel state institutions that, in reality, had the objective of establishing localand sovereign authority. The Kosovo Albanians hoped that the international community

would support their cause and reward their peaceful resistance to Serb oppression.

Despite many warnings that the conflict in Kosovo would escalate to an open armedconflict, the international community failed to implement a workable conflict prevention

strategy and instead focused much more on the management and containment of the

escalating conflict rather than on a sustainable solution.

While the Dayton Agreement retroactively rewarded the armed struggle of the BosnianMuslims and Serbs (each getting their own territory and political structures), the hopes of

Kosovo Albanians receded into an indefinite future, thus triggering the emergence of the

Kosovo Liberation Army. The appearance of the KLA and the actions of Serbian policeand military forces caused the first human catastrophe in the summer of 1998. When, on

15 January 1999, 45 ethnic Albanians were massacred in Racak, the international

community decided that it was finally time to act.

A peace conference in Rambouillet, France, was organized for February, and both theAlbanian and the Yugoslav delegations agreed to participate. The Albanian delegation

insisted on a referendum on independence after an interim period, while the Serbian

delegation resisted the prospects of a NATO presence in the province and eventualindependence for Kosovo. After the Albanian delegation unilaterally signed the peace

deal, NATO decided to move forward with air strikes against Yugoslavia. Although

without the mandate of the Security Council, at least in the opinion of the AlbaniansNATO was conducting a just war, a war that was the only credible response by the

international community to address the crisis in Kosovo. On the other hand, for Serbs the

NATO strikes were illegal and an act of aggression against their sovereign country.


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Whatever the truth, it should be remembered that even if NATOs real aims were not of a

humanitarian nature, it was Milosevic who gave them a good excuse for such an action.

After almost three months of bombing, a military-technical agreement between NATOand Yugoslavia was signed, and on 12 June 1999 KFOR, the international security forces

with NATO at its core, were deployed throughout Kosovo. After finding many of theirfriends and relatives murdered and their houses burned, numerous returning ethnic

Albanian refugees began to take revenge on the remaining Serb population, promptingthem to flee Kosovo. While these acts of revenge on behalf of Albanians should not come

as a surprise, the reprisals against innocent Serbian and Roma civilians are in no way

justifiable. Moreover, they are very damaging to the reputation and the cause of theAlbanians themselves.

The many remaining problems make present day Kosovo rather chaotic. The province

experiences constant armed incidents because of the possession of considerable amounts

of weaponry on both sides, the political landscape is fragmented, the number of

international and local police forces is insufficient, and much of the infrastructure hasbeen heavily destroyed. Towns like Prizren and Peja have been practically deserted by

the Serbs, and the towns of Mitrovica and Rahovec are divided along ethnic lines.Moreover, it is clear that it will take a long time for Kosovo to rebuild its democratic

institutions.

The current situation in Kosovo can only be an interim solution - in the form of an open-

ended protectorate. Due to the high level of animosity between the ethnic Albanian andSerb communities, long-term solutions are simply unrealistic at this point. Neither the

Rambouillet Accords nor UN Security Council Resolution 1244 clarify the future status

of Kosovo. While offering some comfort in not having to deal with the hot issue of the

future territorial status immediately, this makes the task of the UNMIK more difficult,further confuses both Serbs and Albanians, and leaves space for self-serving

misinterpretations and propaganda. Various options about the future status of Kosovoneed to be considered, although it is clear that the only lasting solution is a political

settlement that reconciles legitimate ethnic Albanian interests about the future of the

province and long-term peace with Serbia.

4. The Closing of the Kosovo Cycle: Victimization Versus Responsibility topDuska Anastasijevic

The origin of the ethnic rivalry in Kosovo is a contentious issue. The lines of division do

not only follow the Albanian-Serbian polarity; they are also apparent within each

community. For example, Serbs and Albanians both identify the same territory as their"historic homeland." Radicals on both sides tend to locate the roots of their enmity even

before the Ottoman rule. As Ernest Renan so appropriately notes, "getting its history

wrong is part of being a nation."

In the Kosovo case, erroneous perceptions of history have served to perpetuate hatredbetween the two communities and indeed triggered the spiral of conflict. Kosovo, of


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course, is not Bosnia, where cordial inter-ethnic relations thrived for centuries before the

bonds were broken by brutal violence and ethnic cleansing. Nonetheless, while co-

existence in Kosovo was a reality long before it was transformed into total confrontation,the forces behind the creation of historical perceptions were so divergent that each side

began to see itself as a victim of the other.

The conflict resulted from the deliberate and strategic policies of Serbias ruling elites,

which had the short-term goal of securing the continuation of their own power andshoring up the existing power structure that had been showing signs of decay since the

mid-1980s. Nationalism served as the vehicle for achieving this goal and, moreover, was

used to justify political interests and tactics. It was a deliberate strategy by the Serbianleadership to create the conflict, as the Kosovo issue was essential to the successful

emergence of populism in Serbia and the rule of Slobodan Milosevic - a rule that has

gone virtually unchallenged for more than ten years. The role of Serbian intellectuals andthe media in generating a security dilemma and hatred between the two communities also

deserves particular mention.

If the age-old divide between the two communities in Kosovo was widened by the

imposition of absolute Serbian rule in 1990, the atrocities committed by the Serbianregime during the NATO campaign appear to have broken all bonds beyond repair. The

Serbian regime has emerged bloodied but unbowed. The military defeat was not total,

allowing Milosevic to use his uncanny skill at turning defeat into personal victory. Hecould, moreover, now boast that his tiny nation had stood up against the worlds most

powerful military alliance. He also had new examples to demonstrate the victimization of

Serbs. The ethnic Albanians, too, have gained additional exemplification of their status as

victims, as that same powerful military alliance came to their rescue on moral andhumanitarian grounds.

The process of self-victimization was developed and consolidated by nationalist myth-

making and propaganda. Because of the traditional lack of contact between the twocommunities, this propaganda was very effective, playing, as it did, on the

misconceptions of both Serb and Albanian publics. The different languages and cultures

of the two peoples certainly played an important role in the fact that ethnic Albanians and

Serbs shared little, other than the territory they occupied. If this was true in the early daysof their cohabitation, little was done to improve mutual understanding. Each side insisted

on a perception of history as an oscillating domination by one or the other side, and each

claimed exclusive rights and sovereignty over the same piece of land. When theseinterests came into conflict, the Kosovo knot began to tighten to the point where the only

possible solution seemed to be to cut through it; the time had passed when it could be

unraveled. This is not to say, however, that the conflict resulted from the clash of twonationalisms: this would obscure the differences in their activities.

For almost a decade, the Serbian nationalist movement held power over the territory and,

more importantly, showed its readiness to inflict death and human suffering in

demonstrating that power. The Serbian national consciousness still has problems inlinking cause to effect in the wars in Croatia and Bosnia. It will therefore not be


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surprising if some time is needed before it is reconciled to the fact that Serbian

sovereignty over Kosovo no longer exists. It can be reclaimed only by the use of force,

but - given the current economic and military power of Serbia on the one hand and thestrength of the KFOR ground troops in the province on the other - this scenario is the

least likely.

Thus, the grassroots democracy which has again begun to emerge throughout Serbia

since the latest military adventures of the Milosevic regime ended in defeat needs toadopt a more responsible perception of Serbia's history and national identity if the cycle

of self-victimization is ever to be broken. For this to happen, Serbs must start building

truly democratic institutions which are prepared to examine not only the effects ofMilosevics rule, but also the reason for his continued political success. Only then will

Serbia create the conditions for its return to the society of states and re-establish friendly

relations with its neighbors, Kosovo included.

5. The Kosovo Conflict: The Balkans and the Southern Caucasus top

George Khutsishvili and Albrecht Schnabel

The conflicts between Serbia and Kosovo, and between NATO and the Federal Republic

of Yugoslavia, have caused mixed reactions among countries and peoples throughout

Southeastern Europe. While the Balkan countries were directly affected by the conflict,the Southern Caucasian countries of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan seem at first to be

too removed from the Balkans to be affected by the conflict in Kosovo. However, they do

consider themselves part of Europe, part of the greater Southeast European subregion andfuture members of Europes regional organizations and greater security community.

Throughout the region, reactions have ranged from strong support for either NATO or

Serb actions to equally strong opposition. The reasons for such varied responses can befound in every countrys and societys ethnic, religious or political proximity to theconflicting parties and, in particular, in these countries aspirations to join NATO and/or

other Western political and economic organizations.

While Orthodox states close to Yugoslavia were less enthusiastic about NATOs reaction,

those close to the Kosovo Albanians were supportive. However, Muslim communitieswith close affinity to the Kosovo Albanians (such as Turkey and Azerbaijan), but with

separatist minority struggles of their own, had a different issue to worry about: Would

support of NATO action not undermine their own efforts to keep separatist minoritygroups at bay?

While there was disagreement over the means and ends of NATO action, the Alliance

was generally supported, as most states are desperately seeking NATO membership. The

EU, OSCE and the UN were perceived to be subordinate regional and international

organizations vis-?-vis NATO. NATOs actions have been a mixed blessing to the region

as a whole. The Balkans has been further destabilized by refugee movements, a

devastated and unstable Kosovo with strong international security presence, and a


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politically and economically much weakened Yugoslavia (whose GDP has slipped below

that of Albania).

In the Southern Caucasus, various minority separatist groups, most prominently inNagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia, have been encouraged by the international (NATO)

communitys apparent willingness to support the cause of independence against aperceived oppressive regime (although Karabakh and Armenia were careful not to

contradict Russias position too loudly). For the titular nations in the Southern Caucasus,this has not been without problems: Loyalty to NATO (either as an existing or aspiring

member) clearly conflicts with the Alliances perceived new role as the protector of

separatist minorities rights and interests. Once politicians and the public realized thatNATO was in fact assisting a separatist movement, enthusiasm for NATO actions

subsided. However, that was never expressed in open complaints or disagreements over

NATO actions, but rather in more subdued calls than usual for NATOs physical andpolitical presence in the region.

However, NATOs war in and over Kosovo and the subsequently increased internationalpresence in the region have brought much needed attention to the Southeast European

region. The international community was reminded that the Dayton Agreement, whichhad ended the wars in Bosnia, has not put a lid on instability, ethnic competition,

conflicting territorial claims, underdevelopment and poverty in the region. Moreover, it

has also reminded us of the important roles that need to be played in the region by non-military organizations - in particular, the European Union, the OSCE and the United

Nations. The EUs subsequent attempt to reinvigorate its plans for a Southeast European

Stability Pact, symbolized with a summit in Sarajevo, are indications of this possible

attempt to re-commit the European Union to the region.

There are other positive developments for the region that have come out of the NATOwar in Yugoslavia. The anti-Serb stance of the international community has reinforced

the message that the West does not necessarily limit itself to the protection and defense ofnon-Muslim communities. The FRY has been weakened to a point where it is no longer a

major player in the region; Bosnian integration may benefit from that. Particularly, the

aftermath of the war and Kosovo Albanian atrocities against Serbs have shown that there

are no "good guys" and "bad guys" in the Balkans; both Serbs and Albanians can bevictims or perpetrators.

The war and the unstable aftermath of NATOs actions in Kosovo have shown (again)

that the Balkans is more often than not at the mercy of great power interests. It is time

that Southeast European countries address their problems as a community, as a region,and deal with conflicts and state misbehaviour and failure (as in the case of Serbia) by

themselves, particularly if they want to avoid great power intervention. The region has to

be careful in engaging NATO or other military and non-military organizations in theregion. Once response mechanisms/dynamics/expectations are triggered in these

organizations, external involvement may take on its own dynamic - one that may easily

turn out to be counterproductive for the peace and security needs of the region.


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What may have been useful for the Kosovo Albanians may not at all apply in the

Southern Caucasian context. It remains to be seen if any of the renewed attention directed

at the Balkans will be extended to address the latent and protracted conflicts in theSouthern Caucasus (and the Caucasus as a whole), or if that region will continue its

existence at the margins of interest by the European and international communities.

A number of policy recommendations arise from this discussion: Under a new

government, Serbia should be encouraged to rejoin the Southeast European and Europeancommunities of states and regional and subregional organizations. An alienated Serbia

should be avoided. The demonization of the Serbs also should be avoided. However, the

current Serb leadership should be discredited and internationally sanctioned. Only a newleadership committed to democracy, cultural tolerance, and regional integration and

power sharing should be supported by the outside world.

The new momentum for peace, security and stability in the Balkans should embrace as

well the Southern Caucasus. The Southern Caucasus must be included in a Southeast

European Stability Pact. Community building between Christian and Muslimcommunities should be a high priority (and could set standards worldwide). Regional

integration, confidence building, early warning and conflict prevention, and developmentshould be main foreign policy goals throughout Southeastern Europe, both within the

Balkans and the Southern Caucasus, and between those two regions.

PART TWO - THE MAJOR PLAYERS top

6. The Costs of Victory: American Power and the Use of Force in the Contemporary

Order topG. John Ikenberry

The end of the Cold War did not provide the sort of historical break - as occurred in

1815, 1919, and 1945 - to gather world leaders together to discuss first principles and

new institutions. The current system is a patchwork, and it is clearly at risk. On thespecific issue of humanitarian intervention, the two extreme alternatives - either

American unilateral intervention or a UN Security Council-sanctioned intervention -

seem increasingly difficult to sustain on a consistent basis. The alternative is either aseries of regionally-based security forces that have the local legitimacy and capacity to

act in various contingencies, or some sort ofad hoc coalition of the willing. Kosovo

makes it clear that the world community needs to find a way to raise basic questions andfind ways to reorganize the mix of international norms, international institutions, great

power interests and American power.

Three trends of the post-Cold War international order are most important. The first is the

rise of humanitarian and human rights standards. These are norms of democracy andhuman rights that the United States and other states have invoked in seeking to legitimate

the current liberal world order.


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The second is the transformation of NATO. The NATO governments have articulated a

new identity for the alliance after the Cold War: it is to be a grouping of like-minded

democratic states with an interest in the wider stability of the region. This ties NATOpower and purpose to states on the periphery of Europe and to actions and contingencies

unrelated to the territorial defense of member states. This shift in NATO probably helped

facilitate the end of the Cold War and allowed its members to preserve the alliance, but italso unsettles the wider Eurasian neighborhood.

Finally, the international distribution of power has become radically unipolar. The United

States has become the only serious world military power. This unprecedented asymmetry

in power as a mere fact of international life is increasingly quite provocative. The war inKosovo did more than anything else in recent years to underscore this new reality,

revealing even Europes inferiority in military capacity. If history is a guide, other states

have reason to fear concentrated and unrestrained power. It invites resentment andultimately a balance-of-power reaction.

Two dilemmas emerge from these trends. First, American constructive participation isindispensable to the international communitys search for solutions to problems of

security, justice, economic growth and political governance, but it is profoundlyworrisome to try to cooperate with a large and potentially unpredictable superpower that

is itself uncertain of how much global leadership it wants to provide.

Second, the absence of new institutional agreements after the Cold War to guide the

international community in upholding standards of human rights and humanitarian justicehas meant that informal governance mechanisms have been followed. Most of these

involve working with and through American power and diplomacy; world order and Pax

Americana are roughly the same thing today. But American hegemony - regardless of

how open, benign and enlightened it might be - is a poor substitute for a more inclusive,institutionalized, and agreed-upon international order.

The post-Cold War international order is a mix of contradictory shifts and unsettled roles

and expectations. American power is both a useful tool and a provocative obstacle to thestable and legitimate functioning of the system. It sits on top of a fragile foundation.

American power is vital if the international community is to act - whether in Europe

through NATO or elsewhere in the world through the UN Security Council.

While the rest of the world worries about the potential aggressiveness and unilateralismof American power, the American people are more inclined to question whether that

power should be used at all. The result is a situation in which a political chain runs from a

humanitarian disaster in a remote part of the world through Washington, D.C., and out toa farm in Iowa, where the American president is forced to go and make the case that it is

worth American casualties to uphold abstract principles and world weary obligations.

7. Russia: Reassessing National Interests top

Vladimir Baranovsky


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The developments of the Kosovo conflict have distinctly influenced Russias perception

of its relations with the outside world in a more fundamental way than most other events

during the last decade. The ongoing re-assessment of Russias national interests in lightof the Kosovo crisis may have a considerable impact on Russias evolving foreign and

security policy.

The concrete regional aspects of Russias interests associated with the Kosovo crisis have

a relatively low profile. The "ethno-religious solidarity" with the Serbs had a certainemotional impact on Russias political scene, but this factor does not play a crucial role

and is deliberately downplayed by the official authorities. More significant are the moral

grounds of Russias sympathy towards Yugoslavia, which is regarded as the victim ofaggression and pressure from powerful nations. The issue of establishing a "union" with

Yugoslavia, although widely debated in the country, has little prospect of being translated

into practical policy. However, Russia considers that its political presence in the region isan important goal and has realistic chances to be achieved.

Russia is deeply concerned with a possibility that "the Kosovo pattern" might be appliedto Russia itself or to its immediate environment. This alarmism reflects the widely spread

uncertainty with respect to the territorial integrity of the country, with Chechnya being ofspecial relevance to Russias perceptions of the developments in and around Kosovo. An

eventual external involvement into the conflict zones in Russias post-Soviet environment

is another matter of concern.

The developments around Kosovo, as viewed by Russia, point to the evolution of a"NATO-centred" Europe. The "Kosovo phenomenon" has contributed to the

consolidation of Russias anti-NATO stand more than the three-year long campaign

against the enlargement of NATO. Any possible arguments that NATO might become a

stability-provider for Europe have lost validity for Russia. It seems in the interest ofRussia to reduce considerably its relations with NATO, without however breaking them

irreversibly. At the same time, Russia hopes that the Kosovo crisis will promote the self-identification among Europeans, their alienation from the USA and their interest towards

"extra-NATO" patterns (such as the OSCE).

The global implications of the developments around Kosovo represent the most serious

concern for Russia. Russia feels that the international law and UN-based internationalorder is collapsing, while its substitute might relegate Russia to the sidelines of global

developments. Preventing this collapse becomes Russias major interest in the

international arena. Also, Russia may become tempted to look for partners outside the

"Euro-Atlantic" zone (and eventually among the anti-Western regimes). A seriousreassessment of the use of force (becoming "less unjustifiable") and increased attention to

military preparations may also follow the Kosovo phenomenon.

There were considerable domestic aspects in Russias assessment of, and reaction to, thecrisis of Kosovo. The military operation of NATO in Yugoslavia is broadly perceived as

discrediting democratic values (to the extent that they are associated with Western

countries). Furthermore, the developments in and around Kosovo have provoked a real


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identity crisis among domestic pro-Western groups, while society at large is becoming

increasingly sceptical about arguments in favour of cooperative relations with the West.

At the same time, the consolidating effect of the Kosovo crisis on the Russian domesticscene should not be exaggerated; the prospect of building an anti-Western coalition based

on the broad condemnation of NATOs actions, and advocated by national-patriotic

forces, does not seem realistic.

All these factors have shaped the practical policy of Russia's government, which seems tofollow three basic guidelines: First, to articulate a strong negative attitude towards

NATO's policy with respect to Kosovo and to manifest Russia's readiness to oppose its

consequences; in particular, Russia has announced its intention to reconsider a number ofkey elements in its military security policy. Second, to prevent a dramatic collapse of

relations with the West, in particular by avoiding direct confrontation (which could be

caused, for instance, by military assistance to Belgrade). Third, to capitalize on the role ofmediator, on promoting peaceful solutions to the crisis and on making Russia's

involvement indispensable to all involved parties. Indeed, the Kosovo crisis has

unexpectedly added weight to Russia's international role.

Comments in Russia about the performance of NATO-led conflict settlement in Kosovoare becoming increasingly sceptical. In particular, they point to a failure to provide

effective security protection for the Serb minority in Kosovo. There is a growing belief

that this greatly undermines NATOs claim that the intervention had been motivated byhuman rights considerations. Russias other grievances are focused on inadequate

implementation of various provisions of UN Security Council resolution 1244. This

would endanger Russias efforts to re-channel the settlement to the UN.

8. China: Whither World Order After Kosovo? top

Zhang Yunling

The NATO bombing campaign in Serbia, and especially the bombing of the Chinese

embassy in Belgrade, shocked the Chinese. It was the first time that a regional

organization attacked a sovereign state without the authorization of the United Nations,making - among many others - an embassy a military target. If this so-called collective

intervention in a sovereign state becomes legitimate, it provides a carte blanche to

powerful countries to use force, or threaten to use force, to make other countries changetheir domestic policies, governments or political systems. China worries that what

happened in Yugoslavia yesterday may occur in Asia, especially in China, tomorrow.

NATOs action against Yugoslavia raises many questions, including the legitimacy of

waging war on a sovereign state, the core principles of international relations and thecredibility of the United Nations. Peace for the new century will rest on maintaining

international rules and laws passed by the UN members, while respecting state

sovereignty and equality. The danger of a "new interventionism" based on power maylead to more violence and a new arms race, and thus an even more unstable and

dangerous world.


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The end of the Cold War left the US as the only world superpower. The danger of this

unipolar world order is that it enables the US to impose its will on other countries. In

launching air strikes on Yugoslavia, US-led NATO acted without the authority of theUN, setting a dangerous precedent in interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign

state. The problem of this "preemption" of using force by a strong power (or powers)

against a weak one (or ones) based on its (their) own "values" will only create disorder.China supports a multipolar world order. China does not want to challenge or compete

with US superiority, but rejects a US domination or hegemony.

NATOs action in Kosovo is supported by a doctrine of "new interventionism," which is

based on a seemingly "new justice." However, who judges on "the cost of violence," whoconducts the intervention - and in what kind of way? With a military intervention in a

sovereign state, US-led NATO attempted to rewrite international law based on its own

rules. This enforced order does not ensure the peace in the region.

It is clear that China, as a rising power, worries about US domination or hegemony As a

socialist country, furthermore, it is anxious about possibly imposed Western valuesbacked by "collective intervention." However, what worries China most is the situation in

the Asia-Pacific region. China is mostly worried about a US-led coalition in Asia againstChina. The US-led NATO action in the Balkans re-alarmed China that there is a real

danger for its security. China suspects an American regional strategy. In addition to its

military presence and a strengthened US-Japan alliance, the US has increasinglyexpanded or strengthened its bilateral military ties with many countries surrounding

China.

Of course, this does not mean that China will take an overall hostile or confrontational

policy to the US and its allies. China needs a long-term peaceful environment to develop

itself. It remembers well the lesson of the collapse of the former Soviet Union, whichcould not compete with the military superiority of the US. But China believes that it can

play a positive role in checking American hegemony and in moving towards a fairinternational order.

China has proposed a "new security concept" based on the above principles. In the Asia-

Pacific security cooperation, China supports a positive role of the ASEAN Regional

Forum (ARF). Security cooperation with Russia and Central Asian countries also reflectsChinas efforts to offer a different model from that of the Western allies. However, it

seems that the US and Japan do not trust such a "soft approach."

As for the role of the UN, it has expanded and strengthened since the end of the Cold

War in peacekeeping and intervention in internal conflicts. But its credibility wasquestioned when NATO launched the air strike on Yugoslavia. China made great efforts

to hand the issue back to the UN. China does not reject all kinds of intervention.

However, China insists that an intervention must be based on rules and authorized by theUN Security Council. Any new rule-making must be done by the international

community with fair participation (or support) of all community members, not just a few


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countries. The "new interventionism doctrine" cannot be permitted to condition evolving

principles of international relations.

The Kosovo crisis reflects a new danger threatening world stability and security. Thefundamental reason why China so strongly opposed NATOs bombing is to insist on the

principles for a fair and stable world order.

9. The Major European Allies: France, Germany and the United Kingdom top

Simon Duke, Hans-Georg Ehrhart and Matthias Kar?di

The basic issue raised in this and other chapters concerns the recourse to military means

as a way of addressing political, economic and social problems, and the effects on

regional and international security and stability.

For the three major European allies, the Kosovo crisis raised more questions thananswers. Hans-Georg Ehrhart observes that there was initial French disappointment with

the failure of its various conflict prevention efforts, chiefly revolving around diplomaticintercession. Matthias Kar?dis section on Germany points to the remarkable indeed,historic role it played during and after the crisis. Simon Duke, discussing the United

Kingdom, observes that the vigorous leadership role played by the Blair government had

the more general aim of securing Britains leadership role in Europe on questions ofsecurity and defence.

The internal political significance of their respective roles lies in the groundswell of

support for (a still ill-defined) autonomous European crisis management capability. As

such, the relevance of Kosovo may lie primarily in its role as a catalyst towards thedesign and implementation of a Common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

The military significance of their roles in Operation Allied Force was overshadowed bythe U.S. role which, in turn, had the twofold effect of masking many of the differences

between the European allies and putting into stark relief the practical manifestations ofwhat it will mean to implement ESDP.

The policy-relevant lessons and suggestions that arise from the study may be split into

two sets: those that arise for regional security and those that pertain to more generalissues of international security.

Regional security

The need for a seamless web: The three cases highlighted reflect a more generalproblem that exists at the regional level. In this case the difficulty of linking the

EUs efforts at preventive diplomacy with economic leverage (targeted sanctions)and the threat or actual use of military force (through the WEU or NATO) was

apparent. In short, the inability of the three main European powers to link these

aspects into a credible conflict prevention/management strategy was a majorshortcoming that, arguably, has spurred on efforts to create a genuine ESDI and,

in the EU context, ESDP;


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Conflict Prevention: The "Kosovo effect" has seen an increasing emphasis being

placed upon crisis prevention by senior EU officials. Crisis prevention, however,

is not officially a Petersburg task, although it could be argued that it is implicitlyincluded in the Treaty on European Union. Explicit mention of it in the treatys

revision and further plans for how it might be implemented in practice are

necessary;

Implementing Europes desire for autonomous capacities: A number of significantdevelopments during and after NATOs military operations in Kosovo sharpened

general awareness of the urgent need for regional crisis response capacities.

France, Germany and the United Kingdom led the call for a Common EuropeanSecurity and Defence Policy (ESDP). It is with regard to the response to that call

and how to implement ESDP that opinions diverge amongst the European allies as

well as with Washington;

Future relations with the U.S.: In spite of the contributions made by France,

Germany and the United Kingdom, all pale in comparison to those of the UnitedStates. The stakes in Kosovo would have been very high for the Europeans in case

of autonomous intervention in terms of the individual contributions that wouldhave been required - this would have meant an additional 1,000-plus aircraft and

5,000 to 6,000 additional military personnel. Two questions arise from this

observation: First, political rhetoric aside, are the European allies willing to makesuch an investment? And second, what happens if the U.S. chooses not be

involved the next time?

Intra-regional congestion: The overarching U.S. role was matched in institutional

terms by that of NATO. The role of the Alliance raises the important issue of

what relations will emerge between the EU-WEU (and the ESDP) and NATO, aswell as with the OSCE and the Council of Europe. The risk of institutional turf

battles must be avoided.

General international issues

Relations between the UN and regional security bodies: The Kosovo crisis andindeed the crises in Europe of the last five years in Europe, Africa and Asia have

illustrated the profound limitations of the regulatory system built up around the

UN and a number of regional organizations (OAS, OAU, OSCE, NATO, etc.).The general paucity of any means of intervention other than those made available

to the various organizations by Member States, and the frequent absence of

appropriate command and control structures, has meant that more often than notsuch crises are addressed by means of unilateral action (or "coalitions of the

willing," as they are commonly referred to). The power structures in the region

eventually showed a concerted response in Kosovo, a barely perceptible one inAfrica, a hesitant one in Asia (Indonesia and East Timor) and a muddled response

to Chechnya;


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Watering-down of principles of international law: Legal principles were used in

Kosovo (and elsewhere) to suit the circumstances and were used as "political

weapons." This can only weaken their effectiveness and will make anysubsequent appeal to them, especially by Western countries, suspect;

Knock-on effects for crisis management: The "Kosovo effect" is already being feltin the Russian Federation in connection with Chechnya. No UN agency has been

authorized to move into the area resulting, once again, to underline the peripheralrole that the UN is increasingly playing in international disputes. On the one hand,

the UN is faced with chronic resource problems where there is a demand for UN

assistance and, on the other, being sidelined when a regional power chooses tounilaterally or bilaterally apply pressure or force;

Territorial Integrity: France, Germany and the United Kingdom, along with the

other NATO allies, showed a worrying lack of a long-term plan for implementing

a settlement in Kosovo. The application of a double-standard for ethnic Albanians

("all victims") and Serbs ("all perpetrators") has made it almost impossible toimplement Resolution 1244, whose aim was to respect the territorial integrity of

the FRY (with Kosovo as a constituent element). Since the principle of territorialintegrity is at the centre of the international system, political solutions may be

extremely hard to arrive at, and the interim might demand a sustained military

presence with ad hoc political structures.

PART THREE - VIEWS FROM NATO ALLIES top

10. The Nordic Countries: Whither the Wests Critical Conscience? top

Bj?rn M?ller

The Nordic countries have a number of features in common, such as a fairly high

standard of living, a "welfare state" form of capitalism, and stable democracy. All of

them score high on a scale of "internationalism," in the sense that they pay their dues to

the United Nations, contribute significantly to UN peacekeeping and similar operations,and allocate a high percentage of their wealth to development aid. On all these counts

they score much higher than, for instance, the United States, which leads only in terms of

military expenditures.

This shared orientation notwithstanding, the five Nordic countries differed throughout the

Cold War in terms of alignment. Denmark, Norway and Iceland have been members ofNATO since its foundation, whereas Sweden and Finland have been neutral and/or non-

aligned. The end of the Cold War has both caused and coincided with rather profoundchanges in this pattern:

While there are no immediate prospects of Sweden or Finland joining NATO,

both are cooperating quite closely with it under the auspices of the Partnership for

Peace Program as well as in other contexts;


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Both have joined the European Union, and even done so without the reluctance

and reservations of the old member, Denmark. Both are thus closer to the Western

European Union (without actually being members) than is Denmark;

While remaining outside the EU, even Norway has closer ties to the WEU than

has Denmark;

Denmark has abandoned its political dissent and become a totally "loyal" member

of NATO, thereby resembling Norway.

Paradoxically, the declining need for US security guarantees after the collapse of theSoviet Union has been accompanied by growing support for US policies by Denmark and

Norway, even when this has entailed breaches of international law. The turning point

became the February 1998 Iraqi crisis, where both countries pledged support for an attackagainst Iraq that was not authorized by any UN mandate. Having thus lost their

"virginity" in thought, if not in deed, the step to real action in the case of the FRY

(Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) seemed less significant. The relatively unified positionof the Nordic countries in the United Nations was thereby shattered. This disagreement

notwithstanding, Nordic cooperation has continued, both in terms of joint statements and

in terms of military cooperation, e.g., in SFOR (Stabilization Force) in Bosnia.

During the entire period of the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, all three NordicNATO members were unanimous in their support of NATO policy. Until 1998, however,

they were able to do so without abandoning their traditional adherence to UN rules.

Perhaps as a consequence thereof, the nineties saw an almost unprecedented domesticconsensus on these policies, as well as on security politics in general. The "centre" simply

grew to encompass almost the entire political spectrum, leaving only the rather

insignificant right and left wings in dissenting positions. As far as Yugoslavia wasconcerned, it also helped that the problems calling for action were immediately appealingto Denmark, with its long-standing emphasis on human rights policies.

When the focus of attention during 1998 shifted from Bosnia to Kosovo, Denmark

adopted a "follow the leader" position, and showed no hesitation when it came to issuing

threats against the FRY. On 8 October 1998 a decision was passed by Parliament tocontribute to "a NATO deployment in the western Balkans" with four F-16 aircraft plus

reserves and 115 personnel. As a consequence of this decision, the aircraft were

dispatched to Italy and the authority to use them was transferred to the NATO commandchain - as yet another contribution to the NATOs "diplomacy of threat."

After this decision had been taken, the entire matter was almost completely de-

politicized. No real political decision was thus ever taken to launch the attack, even

though this constituted a complete departure from long-standing policies. The Danishmilitary contribution to NATOs war mainly consisted of four F-16 aircraft plus one

reserve, to which were added, from April onwards, an additional four aircraft, and 150

troops for AFOR (Albania Force) from April.


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Throughout the war, most of Denmarks military contribution was for support functions

rather than actual combat. However, on 26 May 1999 Danish pilots dropped their first-

ever bombs on a sovereign state. Even though the bombing campaign was so obviouslynot achieving its aims, there was little parliamentary debate on the alternatives, such as

the use of ground troops. Perhaps surprisingly, 70 per cent of the otherwise peaceful

Danish population supported the war - even to the point of favoring the use of groundforces.

Throughout the war there was massive sympathy with the victims, which was also

reflected in the substantial humanitarian aid granted, both through government and NGO

channels. In addition to the security political debate, there was a heated debate onwhether or not to accept Kosovar refugees (and perhaps Serbian deserters) and, if so, how

many a

kosovo and the challenge of humanitarian intervention.doc

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