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RESEARCH PAPER 99/4829 APRIL 1999

Kosovo: Operation"Allied Force"

On 24 March 1999 NATO initiated a campaign of airstrikes, codenamed Operation "Allied Force", againstthe military capability of the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia (FRY). This paper provides achronological overview of the main events in thecampaign between 24 March and 28 April and detailsthe major developments both in the region andinternationally. It looks at the humanitarian and legalissues that have arisen from the conflict beforeconcluding with a consideration of potential futuredevelopments.

The historical background to the conflict anddevelopments during 1998 are covered by LibraryResearch Papers 98/73, Kosovo, and 98/93, Kosovo:the Diplomatic and Military Options. The build-up tothe NATO action is covered in Library Research Paper99/34, Kosovo: NATO and Military Action, of 24March 1999.

Mick Hillyard

ECONOMIC POLICY & STATISTICS SECTION

HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY

Tim Youngs, Mark Oakes and Paul Bowers

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS & DEFENCE SECTION

Library Research Papers are compiled for the benefit of Members of Parliament and theirpersonal staff. Authors are available to discuss the contents of these papers with Members andtheir staff but cannot advise members of the general public.

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99/33 The Access to Justice Bill [HL]: Legal aid [Bill 67 of 1998-99] 22.03.99

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99/35 The Control of High Hedges 25.03.99

99/36 The Right to Buy 30.03.99

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Summary of main points

The NATO campaign of air strikes against the military capability of the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia (FRY), known as Operation “Allied Force”, entered its sixth week on 28 April1999. NATO has substantially increased its forces in the region since the operationcommenced on 24 March, with over 1,000 combat aircraft now involved. The Alliance hasspecified the conditions that Belgrade has to meet before the air campaign will be halted.These are: an end to all Serb military actions; a withdrawal of all police and paramilitaryforces; agreement on the deployment of an international military force to Kosovo; theunconditional return of all displaced people; unhindered access for relief organisations; and acommitment to work towards a political framework, based on the accords agreed atRambouillet.

In Kosovo itself, the offensive by Yugoslav Army and Serbian interior ministry police unitscontinues, as reports emerge of increased activity by the rebel Kosova Liberation Army(KLA). Ethnic Albanian refugees continue to cross into Albania, FYR Macedonia andMontenegro, but in smaller numbers than at the start of the crisis. Many refugees have madeallegations of widespread brutality on the part of Serbian and Yugoslav troops, includingmass executions, gang rape and the systematic forced detention of men of fighting age.NATO claims there are currently around 100,000 men unaccounted for, but warns the figurecould in fact be much higher. As of 28 April the UNHCR estimated that a total of 603,200had fled the province, with an unspecified number displaced within Kosovo itself.

Tension continues to mount between the pro-Western Montenegrin Government in Podgoricaand the pro-Milosevic Serbian and Federal Yugoslav authorities in Belgrade. Montenegrohas sought to avoid involvement in the conflict with NATO, prompting allegations byBelgrade of treachery on the part of the Montenegrin leadership, and raising fears thatPresident Milosevic may seek to remove Montenegrin President Djukanovic, a move thatcould provoke civil war. The Western leaders have declared their support for Mr Djukanovicand warned Belgrade of unspecified consequences if it tries to destabilise Montenegro.

Russia has strongly criticised the NATO air strikes, but has not provided military assistanceto Belgrade. Instead, Moscow has taken a leading role in attempts to find a diplomaticsolution to the conflict, although the imposition by NATO of an oil embargo against the FRYcould provoke tension if NATO forces attempt to stop and search Russian vessels.Commentators also believe the deployment of NATO troops into Kosovo without Belgrade’sapproval could prompt the Russian military to break the arms embargo on the FRY.

At present NATO has made no firm decision on sending troops into Kosovo in an offensivecapacity, perhaps aware that such a move could endanger the unity of the Alliance. However,the military options for a ground offensive are currently being updated, and some Westernleaders have indicated that troops be could used in a "permissive" or "semi-permissive"environment without President Milosevic’s approval, once air strikes have inflicted sufficientdamage on Belgrade’s military machine. NATO insists, though, that air power alone iscapable of achieving its declared objectives.

CONTENTS

I The Build-up to NATO Action 8

A. Talks Adjourned at Rambouillet 8

B. The Start of the Yugoslav Offensive in Kosovo 8

C. Final Diplomatic Efforts 8

II The Start of Operation "Allied Force" 10

A. International Reaction 10

III Chronology of Developments (24 March – 28 April 1999) 12

A. Week One of NATO Air Strikes (24 - 30 March) 12

B. Week Two of NATO Air Strikes (31 March - 6 April) 16

C. Week Three of NATO Air Strikes (7 - 13 April) 19

D. Week Four of NATO Air Strikes (14 - 20 April) 21

E. Week Five of NATO Air Strikes (21 - 28 April) 24

IV The Humanitarian Situation 31

A. The Situation in the Region 31

B. Definition of emergency aid 32

C. Level of UK total emergency aid 34

D. The UK Response to the Kosovo Crisis 37

1. DFID's Objectives 37

2. Organisation of aid effort 38

3. The form of UK assistance 38

E. Level of EC aid 41

V War Crimes 42

A. Geneva Conventions 42

B. Genocide Convention 47

C. International Tribunal 50

D. Allegations of War Crimes 51

VI Opinion within the United Kingdom 54

VII Current Developments and Future Prospects 56

A. The Campaign So Far 56

B. Criticisms of NATO 57

C. Attitudes within NATO 58

D. The Oil Embargo 59

E. Main NATO Deployments and the British Contribution 61

1. Operation "Allied Force" 61

2. Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) 62

3. NATO Kosovo Enforcement Force (KFOR) 62

4. Operation Allied Harbour/AFOR 63

5. "Task Force Hawk" 64

F. Possible Outcomes to the Crisis 65

Appendix 1: Summary of NATO forces 69

Appendix 2: Summary of Yugoslav Forces 73

Appendix 3 - UK Ground Forces in FYR Macedonia 77

Appendix 4 - RAF Strike Missions 78

Appendix 5: Airlifts funded by DFID 80

RESEARCH PAPER 99/48

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I The Build-up to NATO Action

A. Talks Adjourned at Rambouillet

On 19 March 1999 the co-chairmen at the Contact Group-sponsored negotiations atRambouillet, Foreign Ministers Hubert Védrine of France and Robin Cook, announcedthe adjournment of the talks without agreement from Belgrade. Although internationalmediators succeeded in persuading the ethnic Albanian delegation to sign up to the draftaccords, the Yugoslav delegation continued to object to key aspects, including theproposed deployment of a NATO-led peacekeeping force to ensure the implementation ofthe accords. NATO had threatened Belgrade with military action if it blockednegotiations.

The failure of the talks led the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe(OSCE) to withdraw the unarmed monitoring force, the Kosovo Verification Mission(KVM), from Kosovo over fears for the safety of its personnel.

B. The Start of the Yugoslav Offensive in Kosovo

On 20 March, as the monitors withdrew from Kosovo, Belgrade launched a majoroffensive with Serbian Interior Ministry police (Ministarstva unutrašnjih poslova orMUP) and Yugoslav Army (VJ) forces. During the first four days of the offensive in theMitrovica region and along the Prizren-Djakovica-Pec axis an estimated 20,000 peoplewere forced to flee their homes.1

Under the terms of the October agreement between President Milosevic and US envoyRichard Holbrooke Belgrade had agreed to reduce its forces in the province to the pre-conflict levels of 12,000 VJ troops and 10,000 MUP troops. However, by 23 MarchNATO estimated that Belgrade had massed approximately 16,000 MUP troops and20,000 VJ troops in Kosovo itself with a further 8,000 VJ reinforcements available on theprovincial border.

C. Final Diplomatic Efforts

In a final attempt to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis, Mr Holbrooke travelled toBelgrade for talks with President Milosevic on 22 and 23 March. It became clear, though,after several hours of negotiations that Mr Holbrooke had been unable to persuadePresident Milosevic to comply with NATO’s demands.

After briefing Alliance members on the failed negotiations in Belgrade, Mr Holbrookeannounced on 23 March that he was handing over the process to NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana. Mr Solana then announced that he had delegated responsibility to

1 For a map of the region see Library Research Paper 98/73, Kosovo


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the Alliance's Supreme Commander, General Wesley Clark, to initiate air strikes againstthe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), although he gave no indication as to when theaction would begin.

It was also reported that Secretary-General Solana had written to the leaders of Albania,Bulgaria, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYR Macedonia), Romania, andSlovenia to assure them of support from the Alliance in the event of a threat to theirsecurity from the Yugoslav military. He stressed that their countries' security was of"direct and material concern" to the Alliance and emphasised that NATO would find itunacceptable if the FRY were "to threaten the territorial integrity and independence" ofits neighbours.2

In Belgrade the Yugoslav Prime Minister, Momir Bulatovic, declared a state ofemergency, calling for the mass mobilisation of reserves and placing the Yugoslav armedforces on a high state of alert.

2 Times, 25 March 1999


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II The Start of Operation "Allied Force"

Shortly after 20:00 GMT on 24 March 1999 the first air strikes by NATO forces werereported against targets around Pristina, the provincial capital of Kosovo. NATOSecretary-General Javier Solana declared:

Clear responsibility for the air strikes lies with President Milosevic who hasrefused to stop his violent action in Kosovo and has refused to negotiate in goodfaith. 3

In a televised address to the American public on 25 March President Clinton warned that:"If President Milosevic will not make peace, we will limit his ability to make war."4 Hecited three objectives for the NATO action:

First, to demonstrate the seriousness of Nato's opposition to aggression and itssupport for peace. Second, to deter President Milosevic from continuing andescalating his attacks on helpless civilians by imposing a price for those attacks.And third, if necessary, to damage Serbia's capacity to wage war against Kosovoby diminishing its military capability.5

Mr Clinton also warned that a failure to act now could lead to a wider war throughout theBalkans, potentially involving Greece and Turkey, although this view was disputed by theGreek government.

A. International Reaction

The international reaction to the NATO air strikes was mixed. The UN Security Councilmet in emergency session, with two of the permanent members, Russia and China, callingfor an end to what they termed the “illegal military action".6 The Chinese President, JiangZemin, said that violence "does not resolve problems. Indeed it makes them morecomplex."7 In apparent deference to domestic political pressure, the Russian President,Boris Yeltsin, issued a stark warning of the potential consequences of the NATO action:

This means war in Europe, possibly even more. It is an extremely serious stepand to take such a step without the United Nations Security Council is more thanincomprehensible. Of course we are doing all that we can, but we cannot doeverything. We could, but conscience does not allow it.8

3 Financial Times, 25 March 19994 Independent, 25 March 19995 ibid.6 "Russia condemns Nato at UN", BBC News web site at http://news.bbc.co.uk , 25 March 19997 Guardian, 25 March 19998 ibid.


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Mr Yeltsin also ordered a freeze in Russia's relations with NATO and deputies in theRussian lower house of parliament, the Duma, called for military assistance to beprovided to Belgrade. In response to the domestic pressure the Foreign Minister, IgorIvanov, claimed that the NATO action had rendered the UN arms embargo on Yugoslavianull and void, although the Russian Government gave no indication that it was intendingto supply military equipment to the FRY.9

On 26 March Russia put forward a draft resolution in the UN Security Council, co-sponsored by non-Council members Belarus and India, calling for an immediate halt toNATO attacks and an urgent resumption of negotiations. The motion was supported bytwo permanent members, Russia and China, and also by Namibia. However, the otherthree permanent members (France, the United Kingdom and the United States) all votedagainst, as did the remaining members of the Council: Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil,Canada, Gabon, Gambia, Malaysia, Netherlands and Slovenia. Therefore, as the motionfailed to win the minimum nine votes required for a majority, the votes against of France,United Kingdom and United States did not count as vetoes.10 NATO leaders expressedsatisfaction with what they perceived to be extensive support for their position within theCouncil. Secretary of State for Defence, George Robertson, declared on 31 March:

It was the UN Security Council that, last week, considered a resolution from theRussians condemning the NATO action. That resolution was defeated by 12 votesto three, the biggest defeat of a resolution since 1993.11

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, made the following statementon the NATO action:

It is indeed tragic that diplomacy has failed, but there are times when the use offorce may be legitimate in the pursuit of peace…As Secretary-General I havemany times pointed out, not just in relation to Kosovo, that under the [UN]charter the Security Council has primary responsibility for maintaininginternational peace and security - and this is explicitly acknowledged in the NorthAtlantic Treaty. Therefore, the council should be involved in any decision toresort to the use of force.12

9 Guardian, 25 March 199910 MoD web site at http://www.mod.uk/news/kosovo/unsc260399.htm11 HC Deb 31 March 1999, c121712 Guardian, 25 March 1999. For a detailed examination of the legal issues surrounding the NATO action,

see Kosovo: NATO and Military Action, Library Research Paper 99/34, 24 March 1999


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III Chronology of Developments (24 March – 28 April 1999)

A. Week One of NATO Air Strikes (24 - 30 March)

The Military Campaign

The initial wave of attacks on 24 March involved eighty allied aircraft and US and Britishships in the Adriatic. Details of the initial attack were provided in a press briefing bySecretary of State for Defence, George Robertson, and Chief of the Defence Staff,General Sir Charles Guthrie, on 25 March. Sir Charles said:

The first targets, which were mainly facilities associated with the Yugoslavian airdefence system, were hit just after 7 o'clock. Assets used included air-launchedcruise missiles, fired by US B-52 aircraft, which had taken off from RAF Fairfordin Gloucestershire earlier in the day, and Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles firedby USN ships and, for the first time, by HMS SPLENDID. Follow-on attackswere conducted by manned tactical aircraft, including RAF Harrier GR-7s, basedin southern Italy, using Paveway 2 Laser Guided Bombs. Other targets includedfacilities associated with military units directly involved in aggression withinKosovo. 13

NATO's Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General Wesley Clark, stated at a pressconference at NATO headquarters on 25 March that:

We're going to systematically and progressively attack, disrupt, degrade,devastate and ultimately, unless President Milosevic complies with the demandsof the international community, we're going to destroy his forces and theirfacilities and support.

On the first night of operations three Yugoslav MiG 29s were shot down - two by USpilots, one by a Dutch pilot. The first night represented the debut of the B-1 Stealthbomber in combat. On the night of 26 March two more MiG 29s were shot down by USF15s over eastern Bosnia. On 27 March a US F-117 Stealth fighter went down outsideBelgrade. The pilot was rescued several hours after the crash. On the same day NATOSecretary-General Solana announced that the Alliance was moving into phase two of itsmilitary campaign:

A few moments ago, I directed SACEUR to initiate a broader range of airoperations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

I have taken this decision with the support of all Allied governments which aredetermined to bring a halt to violence in Kosovo and to prevent furtherhumanitarian catastrophe.14

13 MOD web site at http://www.mod.uk14 Press statement by Javier Solana, NATO web site at http://www.nato.int


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NATO spokesman Jamie Shea said the intention was to target tanks and artillery thatwere being used against civilians in Kosovo.

During the week targets were hit around the whole of the FRY, including sites aroundBelgrade, Novi Sad, Pristina in Kosovo, and Podgorica in Montenegro. Bad weathersignificantly hampered many operations. On 29 March all six RAF Harrier GR7s takingpart in bombing raids on Pristina were forced to return without dropping their bombs dueto poor weather. Similar problems affected Harrier operations on 31 March, 1 and 2April. In response to such problems, the US Department of Defense announced on 29March, the deployment of five B-1B Lancer bombers (along with approximately fifteenadditional aircraft) which have an all weather capability.

The Situation in the Region

Reports from Kosovo indicated that thousands of civilians were being forced to flee theirhomes. NATO claimed it had evidence that Serbian and Yugoslav forces were drivingpeople out of Pristina and the town of Orahovac, and it was reported that the town of Pecwas virtually empty after VJ and MUP units started shelling and burning buildings on 26March.

Ethnic Albanian refugees alleged that Yugoslav forces were torching villages andthreatening the civilian population with death if they did not leave immediately. Therewere also reports of several alleged massacres by Federal units. By 30 March the UNHigh Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) announced that an estimated 94,000 ethnicAlbanians had been forced out of Kosovo since the start of NATO military action on 24March.15 A UNHCR representative said:

The pattern that emerges is paramilitary forces arriving, rounding people up andtelling them at gunpoint to go. So we are seeing officially sanctioned ethniccleansing of the Albanian population.16

On 29 March NATO claimed it had “convincing proof” that Fehmi Agani, a prominentfigure in Dr Rugova's LDK party and one of the negotiators at Rambouillet, had beenexecuted by Yugoslav forces, although the report remains uncorroborated.17 Furtherreports claimed that a number of other leading ethnic Albanians had been killed byFederal forces, including Bajram Kelmendi, a human rights lawyer, and Baton Haxhiu,editor-in-chief of the Albanian language newspaper, Koha Ditore.18

15 Financial Times, 31 March 199916 Guardian, 30 March 199917 Financial Times, 1 April 199918 Guardian, 30 March 1999


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Resistance from the KLA appeared to be patchy, but Albanian TV reported on 30 Marchthat the KLA had ordered a general mobilisation, calling on all men aged between 18 and50 to "fulfil their military duty to liberate Kosovo." Reports from the province claimedthat KLA fighters were stopping ethnic Albanian men from fleeing.19

In neighbouring FYR Macedonia hundreds of ethnic Serbs rioted on 25 March in thecapital, Skopje, in protest at the NATO air strikes. The crowd damaged vehicles outside ahotel housing monitors from the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission that was withdrawnon 20 March. Firebombs were thrown at the US embassy and vehicles set alight. FYRMacedonia has an ethnic Serb population of approximately 40,000, comprising roughlytwo per cent of the country's total population of 1.9 million.

In Greece, which has strong historical and religious ties to Serbia, several demonstrationswere held against the NATO action.

On 29 March the Albanian Parliament called the Yugoslav actions in Kosovo “a crimeagainst humanity in the heart of Europe” and appealed to NATO to send ground troopsinto Kosovo to halt the conflict.20

Diplomatic Moves

On 29 March the British Ministry of Defence published a list of people believed to beaccountable for war crimes, including President Milosevic, the head of state security,Lieutenant-General Radomar Markovic, and other top commanders believed to beinvolved in the campaign in Kosovo. Mr Robertson said attempts were being made tosplit the military hierarchy in Belgrade, declaring:

There are decent people inside that structure who do want to hold on to Kosovobut who do not want to go down in history as successors to the Nazis. They arethe group of people that the message has to get through to…I don’t believe for aminute that there is unity of purpose within the whole regime.21

Responding to claims that the refugee crisis had been precipitated by NATO militaryaction, Prime Minister Tony Blair told the House of Commons on 29 March:

Let us be clear where the responsibility for the refugee crisis lies. It is not NATObombing that has caused the refugee crisis; it is the policy of brutality andrepression against innocent Kosovar Albanian people.22

He added:

19 Financial Times, 1 April 199920 ibid. 30 March 199921 Independent, 30 March 199922 HC Deb 29 March 1999, c739


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For every act of barbarity, every slaughter of the innocent, Milosevic must bemade to pay a higher and higher price.23

On 30 March the Russian Prime Minister, Yevgeny Primakov, held six hours of talks inBelgrade with President Milosevic in an attempt to find a negotiated settlement to theconflict. At the conclusion of the talks Mr Milosevic said that, if NATO halted its airstrikes, he would reduce his forces in Kosovo and allow all peaceful refugees to return tothe province “if they are Yugoslav citizens.” However, many Kosovar Albanians do nothold Yugoslav passports. Mr Primakov also said later that Belgrade would insist thatNATO end its support for the KLA. There were some unsubstantiated reports thatBelgrade was willing to accept a peacekeeping observer force comprising neutral nationsand also Russia.24

However, NATO leaders swiftly rejected President Milosevic's proposal. The GermanChancellor, Gerhard Schröder, speaking on behalf of the EU, said: “This is no basis for apolitical solution”,25 and the US State Department spokesman, James Rubin, declared thatthe proposal fell "far short of what is necessary in order for NATO to stop its aircampaign."26 Mr Rubin went on to say:

Our position is clear. Milosevic must halt the offensive against the KosovarAlbanians, withdraw his forces and embrace a settlement based on theRambouillet framework.27

Defence Secretary George Robertson dismissed calls for a break in NATO’s bombingcampaign, saying: “Any pause by us would lead to a multiplication of the ethniccleansing.”28

In Italy the governing coalition came under increasing strain as the former Communistswithin the government warned that they were considering withdrawing their ministers ifthe NATO action continued.29

On 30 March President Yeltsin reiterated his opposition to the NATO action, but saidRussia would not become involved in the conflict:

Russia has made her choice, and will not allow herself to be drawn into armedconflict. I will do everything for a speedy cessation of military action.30

23 HC Deb 29 March 1999, c73924 Independent, 31 March 199925 Financial Times, 31 March 199926 ibid.27 ibid.28 Guardian, 31 March 199929 Financial Times, 30 March 199930 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 30 March 1999


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B. Week Two of NATO Air Strikes (31 March - 6 April)


During the second week of operations Yugoslav units, ammunition dumps and other sites,primarily in Kosovo, were targeted. NATO also expanded the operation’s scope toinclude communication lines and major transportation routes, in order to isolate Yugoslavforces operating in Kosovo. The Ministry of Interior and other buildings in the centre ofBelgrade were hit by NATO cruise missiles. On 1 April a bridge over the Danube in thenorthern city of Novi Sad was destroyed.

On 31 March, three US soldiers from "Task Force Able Sentry" (formerly part of the UNPreventative Deployment Force in FYR Macedonia) were captured by Serbian forcesclose to the Macedonia/Kosovo border.

US forces and equipment continued to deploy to the region. On 1 April the deployment of12 additional F-117A Nighthawk stealth fighter/bombers was approved by US Secretaryof Defence, William S. Cohen. On 4 April the US announced the deployment of 24Apache AH-64 helicopters and 18 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) to Albaniaunder the designation "Task Force Hawk". According to the Department of Defense,"Task Force Hawk" will, “enhance NATO’s ability to conduct tactical operations againstspecific Federal Republic of Yugoslavia units in Kosovo, especially during periods oflimited visibility and poor weather.”31

On 3 April Mr Cohen announced that the USS Theodore Roosevelt battle group wouldremain in the Mediterranean to support Operation "Allied Force". The battle group wasscheduled for deployment to the Persian Gulf. The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, USSTheodore Roosevelt, is one of the most modern in the US fleet. On 6 April aircraft fromthe carrier became involved in air operations for the first time. On the same day the USNavy announced that the USS Nassau Amphibious Ready Group would remain on stationin the Adriatic past its scheduled 13 May return-home date.32

Russia dispatched an intelligence-gathering vessel to the Adriatic to monitor the situation.


On 31 March several thousand ethnic Albanian refugees arrived at the Macedonian borderfrom Pristina after reportedly being forced onto trains at gunpoint by Serbian forces.Large numbers of Serb civilians were also believed to have fled Kosovo due to the

31 US Department of Defense web site at http://www.defense.mil For further details on "Task ForceHawk" see section VIIc

32 ibid.


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conflict. By 2 April an estimated 634,000 people had been displaced from their homes inKosovo, representing one third of the pre-war population.33 FYR Macedonia and Albaniaappealed to the international community for more assistance to copy with the increasingnumbers of refugees seeking sanctuary on their territory.

NATO accused the authorities in Belgrade of trying to erase the identities of thousands ofethnic Albanians by destroying their property deeds, birth and marriage certificates, andother records. In the House of Commons the Defence Secretary said that the actions ofBelgrade's forces in Kosovo were "not just murder but premeditated murder."34

In early April the French newspaper, Le Monde, reported that the German Governmenthad obtained a detailed plan drawn up by Belgrade for the mass deportation of the ethnicAlbanian population from Kosovo. The document for the operation, known as Operation“Horseshoe”, could, if proven authentic, provide important evidence for any futureattempts to prosecute the leadership in Belgrade for war crimes. According to theGerman Defence Minister, Rudolf Scharping:

Operation Horseshoe began in Kosovo in November 1998… It shows that theYugoslav Army and police had planned, and then started, to drive people out ofcertain parts of Kosovo, from November until the Rambouillet negotiationsbegan.35

The worsening humanitarian situation in the region led the OSCE to announce that someof its resources would be transferred to the UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies inAlbania and FYR Macedonia.36 The UN High Commissioner for Refugees, SadakoOgata, warned on 4 April:

Kosovo's neighbours are swamped and they are no longer able to cope with theinflux. All nations must now help to save lives.37

Albania confirmed on the same day that it would accept 100,000 refugees from FYRMacedonia after the Government in Skopje expressed fears that the influx of largenumbers of ethnic Albanians could destabilise the country's ethnic balance.

The Macedonian Prime Minister, Lupco Georgievski, criticised the West for failing toprovide adequate assistance for the refugee crisis:

The people in Brussels (NATO headquarters) started the war and left for Easterholidays. They left the problem for Macedonia.38

33 Financial Times, 3 April 199934 Guardian, 1 April 199935 Times, 9 April 199936 UNHCR Kosovo Crisis Update, 1 April 1999 from UNHCR web site at http://www.unhcr.ch/news/37 Financial Times, 5 April 1999


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On 7 April 30,000 refugees were moved overnight from FYR Macedonia to Albania bythe Macedonian authorities. The Yugoslav authorities temporarily closed the bordercrossings to Albania and FYR Macedonia. NATO accused Belgrade of using ethnicAlbanians as "human shields" against the air strikes.

In Montenegro, the second republic alongside Serbia in the Yugoslav federation,President Milosevic replaced the top military commander, General Milorad Martinovic,with a close ally, General Milorad Obradovic, raising fears that Belgrade was preparing tomove against the pro-western government of Montenegrin President Djukanovic. Themove prompted a swift reaction from NATO leaders, with Foreign Secretary Robin Cookwarning President Milosevic on 2 April against exploiting the crisis in the region toundermine his political opponents in Montenegro:

Milosevic should know now not to create trouble in Montenegro. He already is inenough trouble himself. He does not have the resources or the time to fight onanother front. Do not think of trying to open up another front in Montenegro.39

Diplomatic Moves

NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana called on Yugoslavia to "stop all repressive andcombat activity and withdraw its forces from Kosovo, and accept arrangements in whichall refugees can return safely to Kosovo under protection of an international securityforce."40 This appeared to indicate that NATO would be willing to send some form ofescort force to protect returning refugees, perhaps even prior to the signing of a peacedeal.

In Belgrade the Russian ambassador to Yugoslavia held talks on 4 April with IbrahimRugova, the self-declared president of Kosovo. The ambassador contradicted NATOclaims that Mr Rugova was under house arrest by saying that the ethnic Albanian leaderwas safe and free to move.41

On 6 April Belgrade declared a unilateral cease-fire as a "good-will gesture" over theOrthodox Easter weekend.42 NATO dismissed the move as a diplomatic ploy and said itwould continue the air campaign until its objectives were met. Belgrade also reportedthat President Milosevic had held talks with the ethnic Albanian leader, Dr Rugova, insearch of an agreement that would enable refugees to return home. NATO claimed DrRugova was acting under duress.

Criticism of the NATO action by Russian ministers and officials continued, with ForeignMinister Igor Ivanov stating on 31 March that: 38 CNN web site at http://www.cnn.com , 7 April 199939 Financial Times, 3 April 199940 ibid. 5 April 199941 ibid. 6 April 199942 Independent, 7 April 1999


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The real goals of those who masterminded, imposed, and are now expanding theNATO aggression against Yugoslavia is to establish NATO's unquestionablediktat in the Balkans. Yugoslavia was a weak spot in these plans. Therefore it hadto be hit in order to undermine its military and economic potential. Washington isalready working out options of Kosovo's separation from Yugoslavia ordismemberment of the province in practical terms. The implementation of suchplans presupposes not only the strengthening of Albanian guerrilla units, but alsothe commencement of a ground operation.

In an attempt to ensure continued Russian involvement in the diplomatic process thechairman of the OSCE, Norwegian Foreign Minister Knut Vollenbaek, travelled toMoscow for talks with Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov. Mr Vollenbaek declared:

It is important that Russia should continue to be involved and we will see if thereis any way that they can assist in finding a solution.43

C. Week Three of NATO Air Str ikes (7 - 13 April)

The M ilitary Campaign

Week three witnessed a further escalation of NATO’s air campaign, particularly withinKosovo. On 7 April General Wesley Clark described the operation as having two clearfronts, with NATO forces conducting strategic strikes against Yugoslav army and specialpolice force headquarters and infrastructure in and around Belgrade, whilstsimultaneously increasing tactical strikes against Yugoslav ground forces in Kosovo.44

The NATO tactics in Kosovo were outlined on 12 April by US Defence Secretary,Will iam Cohen:

We are systematically choking off the Yugoslav army and security forces inKosovo by cutting their supply lines. As we isolate and weaken the Serb forces inKosovo, we are launching aggressive attacks against troops on the ground byhitting staging areas, headquarters and forces in the field.45

On 8 April NATO decided to send 8,000 troops to Albania to help with the humanitarianeffort. An important development for the deployment of future NATO forces was theannouncement on 11 April by Albania that it was placing its mil itary infrastructure,including installations, ports and airspace, at NATO’s disposal. On the same day MrCook confirmed that the aircraft carrier HMS Invincible was being diverted from the Gulfto the Adriatic. On 12 April a passenger train in south-eastern Serbia was hit by twomissiles from a NATO fighter, reportedly kill ing ten people.

43 Financial Times, 7 April 199944 Department of Defense web site at http://www.defenselink.mil45 ibid.


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On 13 April General Wesley Clark requested 300 more aircraft from the US and acomparable increase from other NATO members for use in Operation "Allied Force". Theadditional aircraft fell into three main categories – ground attack, air suppression, andtankers. General Clark said that the additional planes would allow him to strengthen andintensify the air campaign. On the same day the UK announced that an additional 1,800troops, supported by 14 Challenger tanks and 40 Warrior armoured vehicles, were beingdeployed to FYR Macedonia, bringing the total of UK military personnel in Greece,Albania and FYR Macedonia to 6,300.


On 13 April the Montenegrin Foreign Minister, Branko Perovic, rejected the vote in theFederal Yugoslav Parliament of 12 April to join with Belarus and the Russian Federation,claiming that the vote was not legitimate. He also warned that the relationship betweenSerbia and Montenegro was coming under increasing pressure:

With every day that passes there is less and less likelihood that we can remain inthis federation.46

The Government of FYR Macedonia ruled out the use of its territory for an "aggressive"NATO ground intervention into Kosovo, but repeated it would permit NATO to use thecountry as a staging post for a peace-keeping force to police a negotiated settlement.47

Diplomatic Moves

On 7 April the NATO spokesman spelt out the Alliance's conditions for an end to the airstrikes:

• a verifiable end to all Serb military actions and the immediate end of violenceand repression;

• the withdrawal of all Milosevic’s military police and paramilitary forces;• the stationing in Kosovo of an international military force;• the unconditional and safe return of refugees and internally-displaced

persons;• unhindered access for the humanitarian relief organisations;• and finally, the credible assurance of a willingness to work towards a political

framework based on the Rambouillet Agreement.48

On 9 April President Yeltsin warned that Russia would step in if NATO launched aground offensive against the FRY:

46 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 April 199947 Independent, 10 April 199948 NATO Press Conference 14 April 1999, NATO web site at http://www.nato.int


21

I have already told Nato, Americans and the Germans: Don't push us to militaryaction, since that will certainly lead to a European war or even a world war,which is inadmissible. Nato wants to launch ground operations, it wants tosimply seize Yugoslavia and make it their protectorate. We cannot permit that.Russia is not going to get involved in the conflict unless the Americans push us toit.49

The speaker of the Russian Duma, Gennady Seleznyov, claimed that President Yeltsinhad ordered Russian strategic missiles to be targeted at NATO nations involved inOperation "Allied Force", although this was later dismissed by the Kremlin as incorrect.50

It was reported on 11 April that NATO officials were considering a major reconstructionproject for the Balkans similar to the Marshall Plan for Europe in the aftermath of WorldWar II.51 US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called for an integration strategy with"an explicit goal to transform the Balkans from Europe's primary source of instability intoan important part of its mainstream."52

D. Week Four of NATO Air Strikes (14 - 20 April)


On 14 April Operation "Allied Harbour" was announced by NATO. The ACE MobileForce (land) was earmarked for deployment to Tirana to help in stabilising thehumanitarian crisis.

On 14 April Yugoslav sources reported that NATO aircraft had attacked several convoysof ethnic Albanian refugees near the town of Djakovica killing approximately 64 people.Pictures on Yugoslav TV purported to show civilian vehicles destroyed in the attack, butthe Pentagon initially insisted that NATO fighters had only struck a military convoy nearDjakovica, and suggested that perhaps Yugoslav forces were to blame for the civiliancasualties. On 16 April NATO admitted responsibility for the attack, but said that thecivilian deaths were a tragic accident and vowed to continue the campaign.

NATO said satellite intelligence showed an additional 8,000 Yugoslav forces had beensent to Kosovo, raising the total number of MUP and VJ troops in the province to around43,000.53

200 VJ troops crossed briefly into Albania on 20 April but withdrew after a shortconfrontation with Albanian forces. The UN reported that 250-300 VJ soldiers had also

49 Guardian, 10 April 199950 New York Times, 9 April 199951 Sunday Times, 11 April 199952 Financial Times, 13 April 199953 New York Times, 20 April 1999


22

entered the UN demilitarised zone on the strategically important Prevlaka peninsulabetween Croatia and Montenegro. The Prevlaka peninsular forms the northern part of theentrance to the major Yugoslav naval port of Kotor and is seen as vital by both Zagreband Belgrade. The Croatian Ambassador to the UN lodged an official protest with theSecurity Council, demanding an immediate withdrawal of Yugoslav forces.

On the same day NATO forces struck several bridges and radar sites, and destroyed theheadquarters of President Milosevic's ruling Socialist Party in Belgrade. NATO claimedthe building housed "vital elements in the control apparatus of President Milosevic'sregime."54 The attack indicated an increasing willingness on the part of NATO to strike atelements of the Yugoslav President's power structure.


Further tens of thousands of Kosovar refugees were reported to be crossing into Albaniaand FYR Macedonia with an additional 200,000 believed to be on the move withinKosovo itself. NATO estimated that at least 3,200 people had died during the fighting ofthe previous few weeks.55

On 15 April US Defence Secretary Bill Cohen told the Senate that the KLA had not beendefeated by the Yugoslav offensive:

The bombing campaign will shift the military balance decisively in favour of theKLA. Milosevic would then face a choice between either a Nato-backed peaceagreement, or confronting a situation in which the KLA is resurgent.56

On 16 April a Yugoslav army lieutenant, captured by the KLA two days earlier, washanded over to the US Army in Tirana. The Yugoslav foreign ministry claimed this wasclear evidence of "cooperation and coordination between the terrorists and the US-ledNATO forces."57

NATO alleged that Yugoslav forces were organising "grave digging chain gangs", andthe US ambassador-at-large for war crimes said that the scale of atrocities in Kosovocould be considerably higher than originally believed, with over 100,000 ethnic Albanianmen missing.58

The KLA claimed on 20 April that it was massing thousands of troops west of the town ofMitrovica to defend around 250,000 civilians trapped by the fighting. A KLA spokesman

54 NATO Press Conference 21 April 1999, NATO web site at http://www.nato.int55 BBC News web site at http://news.bbc.co.uk, 17 April 199956 Guardian, 16 April 199957 Agence France Presse, 21 April 199958 BBC News web site at http://news.bbc.co.uk, 18 April 1999


23

expressed the fear that Belgrade may try to depopulate the entire northern and easternregions of the province with the aim of establishing a partition.

The UNHCR claimed that as of 19 April 1999 there were 359,000 refugees in Albaniaand 132,700 in FYR Macedonia. An additional 73,000 ethnic Albanians were believed tohave been displaced to Montenegro.

On 16 April the Montenegrin Government came under increasing pressure from the Serbminority in the republic to provide more support for Belgrade, prompting a call fromPresident Djukanovic for the NATO air strikes to end, and for Belgrade to halt its part inthe conflict. Mr Djukanovic said the NATO action was damaging his country's movestowards democracy.59

The newly appointed commander of the VJ in Montenegro, General Milorad Obradovic,wrote to the government in Podgorica on 19 April insisting that the Montenegrin Ministryof the Interior be placed under direct control of the VJ. President Djukanovic refused,stating that the idea was "unacceptable".60

On 20 April VJ units deployed to Montenegro's only border crossing with Croatia anddemanded that the Montenegrin police units hand over control. Again Mr Djukanovicrefused to back down, declaring:

Our policy is that the border between Montenegro and Croatia should becontrolled by ourselves and the forces of the Ministry of the Interior. This willremain so.61

It was also reported that VJ forces had cleared a number of Muslim villages inMontenegro close to the border with Kosovo.

Diplomatic Moves

On 15 April 1999 a peace proposal from the German government was leaked, calling for:

• A suspension of air strikes if President Milosevic begins withdrawing his forces fromKosovo

• An outright halt once withdrawal is complete• UN authorisation of an international military force• A transitional administration for the territory• Relief agencies start work in Kosovo as soon as possible after a plan is agreed• Return of refugees and reconstruction

59 BBC News web site at http://news.bbc.co.uk, 18 April 199960 Financial Times, 22 April 199961 ibid.


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Chancellor Schröder said the proposal was in line with NATO's objectives and was notintended to water them down. Washington described the plan as "constructive", butinsisted that there would be no cease-fire until Belgrade complied with NATO's demands.

On 18 April President Clinton warned that the Balkans would not be secure untilPresident Milosevic left power, saying Serbia needed a democratic transition, "for theregion cannot be secure with a belligerent tyrant in its midst."62

On the same day Belgrade announced it was breaking off diplomatic relations withAlbania and accused the Government in Tirana of complicity in NATO's campaign and oflaunching attacks across its border.63

E. Week Five of NATO Air Strikes (21 - 28 April)


On 21 April Alliance planes hit the official residence of President Milosevic on theoutskirts of Belgrade. A Yugoslav Minister accused NATO of attempting to "assassinatethe president of a sovereign country."64 NATO, however, maintained the residence was alegitimate military target and denied that it was trying to hit the President himself.Pentagon spokesman, Ken Bacon, declared:

We are not targeting President Milosevic or the Serb people. We are targeting themilitary and the military infrastructure that supports the instruments of oppressionin Kosovo… Much of the military and security forces are run out of a variety ofresidences and office buildings throughout the country, particularly in theBelgrade area. They are all interconnected.65

On 22 April NATO hit the Serbian state television station in Belgrade, killing at least 10people. NATO defended the strike, claiming the station was a legitimate target and a"ministry of lies". A NATO spokesman declared that the attack "must be seen as anintensification of our attacks at the very brains of Milosevic's military apparatus andleadership."66 The Government in Belgrade said the attack was a "monstrous crimewithout precedent in history."67 The International Federation of Journalists protested toNATO, saying the Alliance had pledged to avoid hitting civilian targets.68 The Italian

62 BBC News web site at http://news.bbc.co.uk, 18 April 199963 ibid.64 Financial Times, 23 April 199965 BBC News web site at http://news.bbc.co.uk, 22 April 199966 ibid.67 ibid.68 BBC Ceefax, 23 April 1999


25

Foreign Minister, Lamberto Dini, also questioned the attack, declaring: "I disapprove.The question of television wasn't, I believe, part of the plan."69

The first Apache helicopters arrived in Albania on 21 April, and two days later the USDefence Secretary, Bill Cohen, announced that an additional 2,000 troops, 15 AbramsMBTs, 14 Bradley IFVs, and a howitzer battery would be sent to Albania to support theApaches. The move brought the number of US troops in Albania to around 5,000.70

William Cohen also announced the deployment of a further 30 KC-135 equivalent tankeraircraft, air crews and support personnel to the Balkans. This represented the first trancheof the additional 300 aircraft requested by SACEUR. On 26 April a fully armed Apachehelicopter crashed during a training exercise in Albania.

On the same day the last remaining bridge over the Danube in Novi Sad was destroyed.The 27 April NATO operations concentrated on targeting assembly areas, Serb Army andSpecial Police Infrastructure and key petrol, oil and lubricants facilities. NATO alsoattacked facilities at Podgorica airfield in Montenegro, a radio relay site and a munitionsstorage area. A television transmitter on top of the Socialist party HQ building inBelgrade was also attacked. President Clinton signed the Presidential Select Reserve Call-up, which gives Secretary Cohen the authority to call up as many as 33,100 reservists.According to the DOD, the call-up will be sequential with the first group likely to numberaround 2000 involved in air refuelling and logistical backup. The Hungarian defenceminister, Dr Janos Szabó, announced that NATO tanker aircraft are to be stationed nearBudapest.

On 27 April General Sir Charles Guthrie provided the following summary of the effectNATO attacks have had on Yugoslav forces since the conflict began:

Overall, Nato has now conducted 474 attacks, covering 227 individual sites. Weestimate that we have destroyed over 70 combat aircraft out of a total of 450,including 23 out of 83 of the critical aircraft types – MiG29s and MiG21s. As aresult of this success the Serb Air Force has not had the will to face Nato in theair.

We have also destroyed 9 of the strategic surface to air missile radar systems. Wejudge that remaining SAM systems are now reluctant to operate, fearing furtherlosses. We have damaged 9 of Serbia’s 17 military airfields, 4 of them severely.40 aircraft hangars have been destroyed and a further 31 have been damaged.

The Serbian integrated air defence system is not yet inoperable, but we know thatSerbian commanders are seriously worried about the impunity and accuracy withwhich Nato aircraft are able to strike at Milosevic’s forces on the ground. In

69 Times, 24 April 199970 BBC News web site at http://news.bbc.co.uk, 23 April 1999


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addition, we know that the infrastructure supporting the Serb military is nowcreaking under the weight of regular and carefully targeted operations.

The damage we have inflicted on Serbian oil refining and distribution operationsis particularly heavy, with both of their oil refineries put out of action, and 16storage depots attacked. Serbia is dependent now on reserve stocks and imports.

We have also succeeded in causing severe disruption to Serb militarycommunications systems. 31 fixed communications sites have been attacked,including 19 key sites between Belgrade and the southern former Republic ofYugoslavia.

A further example of the way in which the Serb infrastructure is being takenapart, piece by piece, is the damage so far inflicted on lines of communication. Inall, more than 20 road and rail bridges have been damaged or destroyed. Ofparticular strategic significance is the River Danube which cuts the country inhalf. Of the 9 major bridges over the Danube, 5 have been destroyed, 1 has beendamaged and 3 are still fully serviceable. With actions such as these we aim torestrict as far as we reasonably can the movement of Serb forces within thecountry, and also the movement of supplies.

We have also made a particular and direct impact on Serbian ability to conductoperations in Kosovo. All railway lines serving Kosovo have been cut, togetherwith 3 of the 8 roads. In addition, one-fifth out of all major ammunition storagedepots have been significantly damaged, and almost one-fifth of all armybarracks have been attacked.

On 23 April NATO leaders at the 50th anniversary summit in Washington issued astatement on Kosovo, in which they declared the Alliance's commitment to the security ofthe countries in the Balkan region:

13. We will not tolerate threats by Belgrade regime to the security of itsneighbours. We will respond to such challenges by Belgrade to its neighboursresulting from the presence of NATO forces or their activities on their territoryduring this crisis.71

On 25 April Romania and Slovenia granted NATO forces access to their airspace foroperations. FYR Macedonia also agreed to the stationing of additional British andGerman forces on its territory, which, once deployed, would take the number of NATOpersonnel in FYR Macedonia to around 16,000.72

As of 28 April Bulgaria had yet to grant access to its airspace, although approval ofNATO's request was believed to be imminent. In the event that approval is granted,additional Alliance planes could be sent to Turkey for attacks through Bulgarian airspace.

71 Statement on Kosovo, NATO PR, 23 April 199972 NATO Press Conference 25 April 1999, NATO web site at http://www.nato.int


27


In Kosovo KLA forces continued to mount hit and run raids against Serbian forces in thefield. NATO reported that VJ units were continuing their operations in the Rogovamountain region west of Pec with the intention of creating a "cordon sanitaire" aroundKLA supply and reinforcement routes.73 NATO claimed that 35,000 buildings had beendamaged in 550 settlement areas in Kosovo since March 1998.74

In an interview on US television on 21 April President Milosevic denied his Governmentwas operating a policy of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo:

There was never a policy of this country and my policy to expel any citizen ofYugoslavia from any part of this country… I believe that when aggression stops,when bombing stops, then it will be very easy to continue (the) political process.75

He also blamed NATO for the refugee crisis that had developed:

When they started their damn bombing and they started their dirty aggressionagainst this country, there was not one single refugee. When they startedbombing, refugees appeared, of course, as a result of bombing, and everybodyknows it.76

However, on 25 April the first sign of open dissent emerged within the leadership inBelgrade when the Serbian Deputy Prime Minister and former opposition leader, VukDraskovic, called for the country's leadership to stop deceiving the population:

The men running this country must tell the people clearly where we stand andwith whom we stand, tell them... what will remain of Serbia in 20 days if thisdreadful bombing goes on… We should tell them: 'Don't expect anything fromworld opinion, nor from the collapse of Nato, nor from Russia.'77

Mr Draskovic, who is not a member of President Milosevic's inner circle, warned thatRussia was likely to seek a compromise with NATO over Kosovo, rather than risk aconfrontation. In a further interview with the BBC on 26 April Mr Draskovic indicatedhis support for a UN peacekeeping force with Russian involvement to be deployed to theprovince:

73 NATO Press Conference 21 April 1999, NATO web site at http://www.nato.int74 ibid.75 BBC News web site at http://news.bbc.co.uk, 22 April 199976 ibid.77 BBC News web site at http://news.bbc.co.uk, 26 April 1999


28

I would like to have UN forces without forces from Nato countries - we mustapproach a settlement and a settlement must be based on the resolution of theSecurity Council of the United Nations.78

On 27 April it was reported that the privately-run TV station that had carried MrDraskovic's comments had been taken off the air by the Yugoslav Army. Mr Draskovicdenounced the move, saying:

In the case Mr Milosevic supports this, I am ready to stand up against MrMilosevic. We will enter the streets and demonstrate against this anti-democraticdecision. 79

However, on 28 April it was announced that Mr Draskovic had been dismissed for"jeopardising respect for the federal government."80

The day before, another senior Yugoslav official, Goran Matic, a minister from theYugoslav United Left party of Mr Milosevic's wife Mirjana Markovic, indicated that adiplomatic resolution to the conflict could be imminent. Mr Matic, who is closer than MrDraskovic to Mr Milosevic's inner circle, said he believed that "this will be the week inwhich the basic outline of an agreement on Kosovo can be firmed up." He went on to saythat the conflict could be resolved as quickly as "both sides can bring elements ofrationality to the problem," although he insisted that the Belgrade's official positionremained one of opposition to an armed international presence in the province.81

On 22 April several thousand people demonstrated in the Montenegrin capital, Podgorica,against the NATO air strikes. However, the demonstration, organised by the oppositionSocialist People's Party, failed to attract as much support as the organisers had hoped.

On 25 April 161 ethnic Albanian refugees arrived in the United Kingdom and weregranted exceptional leave to remain for twelve months. On 27 April the flow of refugeesout of Kosovo resumed as over 5,000 ethnic Albanians crossed into FYR Macedonia.

Diplomatic Moves

On 22 April the Russian special envoy to Yugoslavia, former Prime Minister ViktorChernomyrdin, announced that talks with President Milosevic had yielded agreementfrom Belgrade for an "international presence" under the control of the UN. MrChernomyrdin gave no clarification on whether the force would be armed, leadingPresident Clinton to declare:

78 BBC News web site at http://news.bbc.co.uk, 27 April 199979 ibid.80 BBC Ceefax, 28 April 199981 International Herald Tribune, 28 April 1999


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If there is an offer for a genuine security force, that's the first time Mr Milosevichas done that, and that represents I suppose some sort of step forward.82

However, Belgrade subsequently denied that it had agreed to a military force, statinginstead that it had proposed an unarmed UN observer force.83

NATO air strikes were reported to have done considerable damage to Yugoslavia'spetroleum supply system, including the two refineries at Novi Sad and Pancevo.However, the Financial Times reported on 23 April that crude supplies had continued toarrive after 24 March from countries such as Italy, Greece and also the United Kingdom,although the damage to the refineries apparently was preventing Belgrade from producingrefined gasoline, diesel or jet fuel. To halt any further supply of oil the EuropeanCommission agreed on 23 April to prohibit the supply and sale of petroleum andpetroleum products to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. To ensure that Belgrade couldnot replenish its supplies from other sources, NATO indicated its intention to impose anoil embargo on the FRY.84

Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov declared his country would not be party to anenforced oil embargo, raising fears that Russian vessels might try to break the blockade.However, on 25 April Defence Secretary George Robertson said he did not anticipate anyRussian move, stating that: “The refuelling of the Serb machine is not on Russia’sagenda.”85

The US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbot, held talks on 27 April with RussianForeign Minister Igor Ivanov and special envoy Victor Chernomyrdin to co-ordinateefforts towards finding a diplomatic solution to the conflict. Mr Talbot described thetalks as "intense and constructive",86 but cautioned that the task was extremelycomplicated.87

Mr Cook also declared his desire for Russia to be "part of the solution to the Kosovocrisis", and indicated that Russia's previous opposition to a international military presencein Kosovo appeared to be changing:

[The Russians] are now willing to recognise that that international presence, to becredible, had to be a military presence. That is welcome. Of course to becredible, it would have to be a military presence that really did reassure theKosovar Albanians.88

82 Financial Times, 23 April 199983 Guardian, 24 April 199984 For further information on the oil embargo see Section VII D85 BBC Ceefax, 25 April 199986 BBC News web site at http://news.bbc.co.uk, 27 April 199987 International Herald Tribune, 28 April 199988 "Interview by the Foreign Secretary", Robin Cook, BBC World Service, London, 27 April 1999, from

FCO web site at http://www.fco.gov.uk


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It was expected that UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan would travel to Moscow for talkson 29 or 30 April and there were signs that another diplomatic initiative by the Russianspecial envoy was imminent.


31

IV The Humanitarian Situation

A. The Situation in the Region

The fighting in Kosovo has provoked a humanitarian crisis of immense proportions. Asof 28 April the UNHCR estimated that there were 367,200 refugees in Albania, 142,650in FYR Macedonia, 15,000 in Bosnia and more than 63,000 displaced Kosovars inMontenegro. The US State Department reported on 22 April that "at least an additional650,000 Kosovars appear to be internally displaced persons." That would meanapproximately 1.5 million ethnic Albanians, or three-quarters of the estimated 1998population, have been forcibly expelled from their homes.89

The international community has responded to the humanitarian crisis by setting upcamps in the region and flying some refugees out for temporary residency in thirdcountries. Table 1 below details the numbers of refugees evacuated to third countries:

Table 1: Humanitarian evacuations of Kosovar refugees from FYR of Macedonia from 5April through 28 April 1999 (figures subject to daily verification)90

ArrivalsReceiving Country28 April Total

Austria - 811Belgium - 676Croatia * - 188

Czech Republic 115 115Finland 147 481France 592 1,777

Germany - 9,974Iceland - 23Israel - 106

Netherlands 157 1,011Norway 162 1,732Poland - 635Spain - 103

Sweden 157 444Switzerland - 33Turkey ** 263 5,407

United Kingdom - 161TOTAL *** 1,593 23,677

89 Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo, Fact Sheet based on information from U.S. Government sources, 22 April1999, from the US State Department web site at http://www.state.gov

90 UNHCR Kosovo Crisis Update, 28 April 1999 from UNHCR web site at http://www.unhcr.ch


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* Croatia: of whom 88 bilaterally without UNHCR/IOM involvement** Turkey: of whom 1,980 without UNHCR/IOM involvement (source: Turkish

government)*** Total: of whom 2,068 without UNHCR/IOM involvement

The following section looks at the British and EU response to the crisis, after an initialdescription of how such aid fits in with the UK's overall approach to internationaldevelopment.

B. Definition of emergency aid

In recent years, humanitarian aid or assistance has become a rigorously defined category ofUK assistance called emergency aid. Emergency aid combines food aid, disaster relief,refugee relief and disaster preparedness, and generally involves the provision of material aid(including food, medical care and personnel), finance and advice to:

-save and preserve lives during emergency situations and in the immediate post-emergency rehabilitation phase

-cope with short and longer term population displacements arising out ofemergencies91

The Department for International Development's (DFID's) objectives for emergency aidwere set out in its White Paper (Eliminating World Poverty)92. The relevant extract isreproduced below.

Disasters and Emergencies

Disasters, both natural and man-made, and often recurrent, are a significantburden on poor societies. The root causes of poverty tend to leave poor peoplenot only more exposed to hazards, but also less able to cope in the event of adisaster. Our objectives in assisting countries to deal with disaster are not only tosave lives through emergency relief, but also to protect and rebuild livelihoodsand communities, and reduce vulnerability to future disasters. In responding todisasters, we aim to provide swift, appropriate and cost-effective financial,material and technical assistance, based on analysis of actual need. We shallendeavour to do this in ways that encourages [sic] the participation of allstakeholders in decisions that affect their lives, builds [sic] local capacity and laysa solid foundation for rehabilitation and recovery. The UK’s capacity to respondto disasters overseas will be strengthened through tapping the vast reservoir ofavailable skills and building partnerships within the public and private sectors toensure that all players are used to their best comparative advantage. In alldisaster work, our responsibility must be first and foremost to those affected.

91 British Overseas Aid 1992/93-1996/9792 Eliminating World Poverty: A challenge for the 21st century, Cm 3789


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Disaster preparedness and prevention will be an integral part of our developmentco-operation programme. We shall work with disaster-prone partner countries todevelop systems for the better management of man-made hazards and, wherefeasible, natural hazards, so as to reduce their human impact. The multitude ofactors involved in humanitarian work underlines the importance of internationalco-operation based on sound principles. Hence we shall encourage system-wideagreement on common performance standards and a code of ethical conduct fororganisations involved in humanitarian work, and will seek to implementguidelines already agreed within the OECD. We shall work for, and co-operatewith, a more effective and efficient multilateral humanitarian system, building onthe capabilities of UN institutions, the Red Cross Movement, other internationalorganisations and NGOs. Within the EU, we shall also work closely with othermember states and the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) toensure more consistent joint policies and approaches.93

In April 1998, DFID published Principles of a New Humanitarianism as a guide to itshumanitarian assistance operations. According to DFID, the benefit of this approach isthat its humanitarian relief is provided in a "principled and accountable manner, while atthe same time addressing the underlying causes for the crises."94 The values andstandards underpinning DFID's humanitarian work are outlined below.

Principles of a New Humanitarianism

• we will seek always to uphold international humanitarian and human rights laws andconventions;

• we will seek to promote a more universal approach in addressing humanitarian needswherever they arise. People in need - wherever they are - should have equal statusand rights to assistance;

• our humanitarian policy will seek to work with other efforts aimed at tackling theunderlying causes of a crisis and building peace and stability;

• we will seek to work with other committed members of the international community,and in particular seek collaboration across the North/South divide to secure betterinternational systems and mechanisms for timely joint humanitarian action;

• we will agree 'ground rules' that prevent diversion of humanitarian goods andcollusion with unconstitutional armed groups;

• we will be impartial: our help will seek to relieve the suffering of non-combatantswithout discrimination on political or other grounds with priority given to the mosturgent cases of distress;

• we will seek the best possible assessment of needs, and a clear framework ofstandards and accountability from those who work to deliver our assistance;

• we will encourage the participation of people and communities affected by crises tohelp them find durable solutions which respect their rights and dignity;

• we will, where possible, seek to rebuild livelihoods and communities, and buildcapacity to reduce vulnerability to future crises;

93 Source: DFID's White Paper94 DFID Annual Report 1999, page 94, Cm 4210


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• we recognise that humanitarian intervention in conflict situations often poses genuinemoral dilemmas. We will base our decisions on explicit analyses of the choices opento us and the ethical considerations involved and communicate our conclusionsopenly to those with whom we work.95

C. Level of UK total emergency aid

The outturn for the UK's total development budget in 1997/98 was £2,059 million, of whichsome £196 million (9½%) was provided in the form of emergency aid. Of this £196 million,£90 million was provided as UK bilateral emergency aid with the remaining £106 millionbeing provided through the UN and EC. In short, the UK provided 46% of emergency aidthrough bilateral channels, 44% through the EC and 10% through the UN.

Table 2 below shows the total level of UK spending on emergency aid for the five mostrecent years. In 1997/98 UK bilateral emergency aid was divided up between disaster relief(£65 million or 72%), refugee relief (£10 million or 11%), food aid (£9 million or 10%) anddisaster preparedness (£6 million or 7%).96 The amount (£9.8 million) spent on refugeerelief in 1997/98, was the lowest figure for some years.

The ten largest recipients of UK bilateral emergency aid are set out in table 3 below. Inaddition to UK bilateral emergency aid, DFID also funds emergency programmes throughthe UN and the EC. These figures are also set out in table 2.

95 DFID Annual Report 1999, page 95, Cm 421096 See DFID Departmental Annual Report 1999 page 93

Table 2

Emergency Aid1

£ thousand

1993/94 1994/95 1996/96 1996/97 1997/98

BILATERAL

Food Aid2 46,206 37,603 26,149 14,779 9,027

Disaster Relief3 114,308 146 353 93,803 88,344 65,127Refugee Relief 17,331 22 383 19,348 12,704 9,808Disaster Preparedness 1,755 2,998 2,740 4,449 5,872

Total Bilateral Emergency Aid 179,601 209,346 142,041 120,278 89,832

MULTILATERAL

UNITED NATIONS

UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs 101 1,600 207 243 173UN High Commission for Refugees 18,847 15,055 16,046 5,036 10,000UN Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) 9,000 6,000 6,666 8,140 10,067

TOTAL UN EMERGENCY AID 27,948 22,655 22,919 13,419 20,240

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

EC Food Aid (Emergency Provision) 35,960 28,466 32,301 25,265 20,455

EC Disaster Relief5 45,800 45,821 50,949 67,944 61,181

EC Refugee Relief5 11,200 6,650 12,030 9,553 2,665EDF - Emergency and Refugee Allocation 8 500 24,916 15,446 4,159 1,842

TOTAL EC EMERGENCY AID 101,460 10,590 110,726 106,921 86,143

Total Multilateral Emergency Aid 129,408 128,508 133,645 120,340 106,383

Total Emergency Aid4 309,009 337,848 275,686 240,618 196,215

Notes 1. Emergency aid includes disaster relief, emergency food aid, short term refugee relief and disaster preparedness. 2. DFID channels assistance through the World Food Programme and NGOs as a means of providing emergency food aid. These amounts are recorded as bilateral food aid as DFID has control over the decisionto provide such food aid to a particular destination.Regular non-emergency provisions of food are notincluded in this table.3. DFID provides funding to certain UN Agencies for their humanitarian assistance programmes inindividual countries. These amounts are recorded as bilateral disaster relief as DFID has influence over thebilateral disaster relief as DFID has influence over the use and destination of the funds.4. DFID programme and GPEX expenditure are the same.5. From 1995/96 EC Refugee Relief is included in the EC Disaster Relief totals shown in Table 8, but isshown separately here.Source Internaitonal Development Statistics 1993/94 to 1997/98

Table 3

Top Ten Recipients of UK Bilateral Emergency Aid

1995/96 1996/97 1997/98

Country £m Country £m Country £m

States of ex-Yugoslavia (1) 38 States of ex-Yugoslavia (1) 42 States of ex-Yugoslavia (1) 20Angola 11 Rwanda 8 Monsterrat 12Rwanda 9 Afghanistan 7 Sudan 5Iraq (2) 7 Iraq (2) 6 Iraq (2) 3Malawi 6 Angola 6 Ethiopia 3Zambia 5 Monsterrat 6 Rwanda 3Ethiopia 5 Republic of Tajikistan 4 Afghanistan 3Afghanistan 5 Kenya 3 Malawi 2Sudan 4 Sudan 3 Burindi 2Liberia 3 Liberia 3 Angola 2

(1) Includes emergency aid to all the successor states of ex-Yugoslavia

(2) There is no Uk aid to the government of Iraq. The amounts recorded as flows to Iraq are emergency aid provided through UN agencies and NGOs for Irqi citizens.

Source: Statistics on International Development 1993/94 to 1997/98


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D. The UK Response to the Kosovo Crisis97

1. DFID's Objectives

DFID is responsible for the British Government's humanitarian effort arising from theKosovo crisis. DFID's objectives are to:

• provide speedy assistance to refugees to relieve suffering and save lives;• promote the protection of the dignity and rights of refugees including the

provision of reliable information to them, and the reunification of families;• encourage a climate of opinion in refugee hosting countries in the region that

is tolerant towards refugees, and supportive of the international presence thatseeks to assist them;

• prepare adequately for new contingencies such as further refugee exodus, orsignificant movements between refugee hosting countries; and for theprovision of humanitarian assistance within Kosovo as soon as access ispossible;

• plan for the return of refugees to Kosovo and the transition from emergencyhumanitarian relief to rehabilitation and reconstruction.

In practical terms, DFID's programme of assistance is currently engaged in:

• bolstering the role of UNHCR as the lead agency for refugee protection andassistance;

• strengthening the in-country operating capacity of UNHCR, WFP, other UNagencies, Red Cross and NGOs which have the principal mandates to providehumanitarian assistance;

• working with host governments to strengthen their capacity to plan and co-ordinate international and national assistance efforts;

• advising and co-operating with the humanitarian assistance efforts of theNATO forces in the region;

• providing logistical and other practical support (through airlifts, cargohandling equipment, transport assets, and logistic experts) to overcomepractical constraints in assistance delivery;

• providing material inputs (e.g. medical supplies, food, tents and blankets,water, sanitation and other requirements for refugee camps) for the use ofbeneficiaries, focusing particularly on the most vulnerable);

• providing financial and other technical inputs to resource, expand and sustainhumanitarian programmes that have been started;

• directly managing humanitarian assistance projects where implementingpartners are not available, and there is no alternative to direct DFIDoperations.

97 Many of the details of the UK effort have been taken directly from the Update Briefing from DFID of19 April 1999.


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2. Organisation of aid effort

As part of a multinational aid effort, the UK’s humanitarian programme needs to be partof a well co-ordinated system. The UK assistance to the Kosovo crisis is managed by theConflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department (CHAD) of DFID. CHAD has established“Humanitarian Field Support Offices” in Albania and FYR Macedonia to work alongsidethe respective British embassies to ensure effective communication with hostgovernments, NATO, UNHCR and other agencies, and other donors.98 The Field Officesare also responsible for the initial and rapid appraisal of further proposals for DFIDassistance, supervising direct DFID-managed projects, and facilitating the work of thepartners.

There is also an emphasis on working with local partners, not least in an effort to mobilisethe refugees' own efforts. Although DFID supports the procurement of locally producedgoods, it is also mindful of the need to mitigate, as far as possible, any adverse effects on thelocal economy and the local host population.

3. The form of UK assistance99

On 3 April 1999 the UK government announced that it had made a further £10 millionavailable to boost the humanitarian relief effort for Kosovo refugees, bringing the totalUK Government (bilateral) commitment to £20 million.100

The second £10 million tranche would come from the Treasury’s contingency reserve,which although within the Government's spending total, is outside DFID's budget.

An outline of the types of assistance provided by UK aid was given by Baroness Amos on14 April. Her written answer is reproduced below.

Baroness Amos: Since 24 March, the Department for International Developmenthas already spent or committed about £8 million assistance to the Kosovorefugees, including over £1.5 million for air transportation and cargo, £16,000 foran airport handling package for Tirana and £400,000 for a truck convoy forAlbania. We have to date agreed cash grants of £0.82 million to UN agenciesand £3.274 million to NGOs and the Red Cross. Further expenditure anddisbursements are currently being considered.

An additional £3 million was made available for humanitarian assistance to thepeople of Kosovo between April 1998 and March 1999: of this, £1.5 million wasallocated to the UN and £1.5 million to UK-based NGOs.101

98 In terms of working with non-governmental organisations, there is, for obvious reasons, a preference forworking with NGOs with previous experience of working in the region.

99 During the 12 months prior to the NATO air strikes DFID channelled over £3 million through variousNGOs.

100 "Clare Short to visit Macedonia and Albania, UK gives an additional £10 million for Kosovo Refugees",DFID PR, 20/99, 3 April 1999


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Since then further details of specific forms of assistance have been made available. Thefollowing section outlines some specific examples of the humanitarian assistance that hasbeen provided by DFID.

Funding airlifts

• DFID has enabled United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), WorldHealth Organisation (WHO), World Food Programme (WFP) and other operationalagencies to deploy quickly personnel and immediate relief supplies to the refugees.

• Since 30 March there have been some 30 flights carrying over 1,000 tons of tents,

blankets, food, medical kits and other emergency supplies for Albania and FYRMacedonia.102 Further flights are planned to transport emergency relief items includingblankets, tents, cooking utensils, water and sanitation equipment.

Providing logistics support

• An airport logistic cell has been set up by DFID at Tirana airport to speed up the flowof aid into Albania: operations staff, 4 forklift trucks and other aircraft handlingequipment have been flown in. DFID is providing a similar aircraft-handling package,including a team of 12 operators, for Skopje airport in FYR Macedonia.

• DFID is providing a convoy of five trucks and drivers to support UNHCR’s relief

operations in Albania: the trucks arrived in Tirana on 16 April. Setting up Refugee Camps and providing Humanitarian Supplies

• DFID has assisted NATO in the establishment of two camps with a current totalcapacity of 40,000 refugees at Brazhde/Stankowic in FYR Macedonia. DFID, in co-operation with UNHCR, has overseen the “civilianisation” of these camps and thetake-over of service provision by NGOs.

• DFID is setting up a camp for 5,000 refugees in co-operation with UNHCR and NATO

near Elbasan in southern Albania, and has offered to establish and run two new refugeecentres in Tirana on behalf of the Albanian Government.

• DFID has funded the purchase and transportation of 14 World Health Organisation

(WHO) emergency health kits to FYR Macedonia, and seven kits for Albania - thesewill cover the needs of 210,000 people for 3 months.

• DFID is helping to establish contingency stockpiles of food, tents and blankets in the

region to enable the rapid provision of assistance to the internally displaced in Kosovoas soon as access to them can be obtained.

101 HL Deb 14 April 1999, c123-4w102 Details are given in the table at Appendix 5


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Personnel Providing Specialist to Albania and FYR Macedonia.

• A team of 12 people has been provided to run the truck convoy in Albania. 2 airoperations and aircraft handling experts in Tirana. 7 professional staff to manageDFID programme in Albania, including logistics, health, water and sanitation, andcamp planning specialists.

• 5 professional staff to run DFID programme in FYR Macedonia, including logistics,health and water and sanitation specialists. 12 air operations staff under recruitment forSkopje.

Cash grants to International Agencies

• £500,000 to World Food Programme (WFP) to transport food supplies to the refugees.

• £250,000 to UNICEF for programmes in Montenegro.

• £1 million for the International Organisation for Migration for regional programmes,including refugee registration, public information and training and capacity building.

• £2.5 million to the British Red Cross for immediate relief supplies and to help

establish a refugee family tracing system to help those who have been separated to getin contact with their relations and be reunited with them. This is to be implementedthrough the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)/International Federationof the Red Cross (IFRC).

• £72,000 to IFRC for relief logisticians

Resourcing NGOs’ humanitarian operations

• Oxfam (£300,000 for relief programmes in Albania)• Save the Children Fund (£300,000 for regional relief programmes)• Children’s Aid Direct (£102,000 for relief programmes in Albania)• Action Against Hunger (£99,600 for a feeding programme in FYR Macedonia)• Finnish Red Cross (£27,500 for lighting for refugee camps in FYR Macedonia)• International Centre for Humanitarian Reporting (£78,800 for radio programmes

and distribution of radios)• Merlin (£140,000 for health care programmes in Albania)• Christian Aid (£600,000 for relief programmes in Montenegro and Albania)• Project Hope (£100,000 for a regional medical aid programme)• Salvation Army (£145,000 for mobile canteens in Albania)• ADRA (£200,000 for food distribution in Albania)• CAFOD (£100,000 for relief programmes in Albania)• War Child (£350,000 for a mobile bakery programme in Albania)

New NGO projects are now being approved on a daily basis by the DFID offices inSkopje and Tirana, using their delegated authority from DFID HQ.


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E. Level of EC aid

The EU General Council agreed on 8 April 1999 to provide ��PLOOLRQ��£167 million);comprising �� million (£100 million) for direct assistance to Kosovo refugees and�� million (£67 million) for budgetary aid to the governments of FYR Macedonia,Albania and Montenegro.

The EU's direct assistance to the refugees is channelled through NGOs and the UNHCR.The budgetary assistance is provided to the governments of the three neighbouringcountries. In addition, the EU will be working with the International FinancialInstitutions (IFI), such as the International Monetary Fund. Planning for a programme ofreconstruction and development once the conflict is over remains at an early stage.


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V War Crimes

There are various issues relating to war crimes which may have been or may yet becommitted in the course of the conflict. Many would claim that Mr Milosevic and otherpolitical, military and paramilitary figures in the FRY have committed war crimes in thecourse of their actions concerning Kosovo. NATO has been at pains to stress its efforts toavoid transgressing the laws of war in its attacks on the military capability of the FRY. Inparticular, the treatment of civilians is relevant to the actions of both the FRY and NATO.There is already an International Tribunal, set up in reaction to the Bosnia conflict, whichcan try those accused of war crimes in Kosovo.

Two of the most relevant texts are the Geneva Conventions and the GenocideConvention, although a range of others could also be of interest.

A. Geneva Conventions

General Outline

The four treaties adopted in Geneva in August 1949, known as the Geneva Conventionsor the Red Cross Conventions (they were sponsored by the Red Cross movement), are themost widely respected basic undertakings in the humanitarian field of the laws of war.They build on previous conventions in this field, and set out provisions for the protectionof various types of victims of armed conflicts. The First Convention covers wounded andsick in armed forces in the field, the Second covers wounded, sick and ship-wrecked inarmed forces at sea, the Third covers prisoners-of-war, and the Fourth covers civilians.Two Additional Protocols were adopted in 1977. These develop and widen the scope ofapplication of the Conventions beyond armed conflicts solely involving states. Protocol Idoes this in relation to international conflicts, and also supplements the provisions of theConventions in other ways, Protocol II does it in relation to civil wars.

The Geneva Conventions and Protocols have a wide measure of support and, inparticular, the common articles which are shared by each of the Conventions are regardedas declaratory of customary international law. Violations defined in the Conventions as‘grave breaches’ constitute war crimes and are subject to universal jurisdiction, meaningthat any state may try any suspect regardless of their nationality and of where the allegedoffence took place. Grave breaches include wilful killing, torture, inhuman treatment,wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury, biological experiments, extensivewanton destruction of property not justified by military necessity, and, in relation tocivilians, unlawful deportation, transfer or confinement and taking of hostages.103

Protocol I adds to the list attacks on civilians and various other attacks (such as

103 First Geneva Convention, Articles 49 and 50; Second Geneva Convention, Articles 50 and 51; ThirdGeneva Convention, Articles 129 and 130; Fourth Geneva Convention, Articles 146 and 147. The Firstand Second Conventions set out the same grave breaches, the Third and Fourth repeat these withadditions.


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indiscriminate ones) likely to cause excessive loss of life or injury to civilians or damageto civilian objects.104

UK and FRY Are Parties

The UK signed the Geneva Conventions on 8 December 1949 and ratified them on 23September 1957. War crimes were made an exception to the rule of territorial jurisdictionby the Geneva Conventions Act 1957, so that war crimes committed abroad by foreignersmay be dealt with by British courts. The UK signed the Additional Protocols on 12December 1977, but did not ratify immediately, as it had concerns over many aspects oftheir application. These included the definition of those groups to be covered (successiveGovernments sought to exclude terrorist groups) and the question of whether Britishpolicy on nuclear weapons would be in conflict with the provisions in the Protocols onindiscriminate attacks. Eventually these obstacles were considered to have beenovercome, and the UK ratified the Additional Protocols on 28 January 1998.

Yugoslavia signed the Conventions on 10 February 1950 and ratified them on 21 April1950; it signed the Additional Protocols on 12 December 1977 and ratified them on 11June 1979. In general the British Government regards the FRY as being bound by theobligations entered into by Yugoslavia, and this applies to the Geneva Conventions andProtocols.105 On its establishment the FRY made clear its intention to ‘strictly abide by allthe commitments that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [ie formerYugoslavia] assumed internationally.'106 It thus accepted the treaty obligations of theformer Yugoslavia, which in the field of human rights were quite extensive. Normally,this kind of succession to treaty obligations would require a formal notification to theother States Parties to each treaty, as has been given by other former Yugoslav republics.However, in the course of its ongoing consideration of a case brought against the FRY byBosnia and Herzegovina concerning the application of the Genocide Convention, theInternational Court of Justice has judged that the FRY’s general statement of intention tobe bound, together with the fact that other States Parties have not contested that it shouldbe considered party to the Genocide Convention, are enough to entail that it is bound byit.107 This principle would be likely to apply to the Geneva Conventions as well.

104 Article 85.105 This applies to treaties which do not have a special procedure for joining. The FRY was not considered

automatically to be party to the UN Charter, as the General Assembly and Security Council refused toallow the FRY to take over the Yugoslav seat in the General Assembly. Where the obligations of theformer Yugoslavia can be divided (a UN seat obviously cannot), each successor state may inherit theobligations pertaining to its territory.

106 Formal declaration on behalf of the FRY, 27 April 1992, confirmed in official Note of same date fromPermanent Mission of Yugoslavia at the UN to the Secretary-General, cited in ICJ Judgement on CaseConcerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,11 July 1996, section 17.

107 ICJ Judgement on Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment ofthe Crime of Genocide, 11 July 1996, section 17.


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Some Relevant Provisions of the Conventions

NATO and the FRY would be expected to adhere to the Geneva Conventions regardlessof whether their conflict is held to be a war. Article 2, one of the common articles whichappears in all four of the Conventions, begins:

In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, thepresent Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armedconflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties,even if the state of war is not recognised by one of them.

The reference to ‘declared war’ is of limited relevance today, as war is seldom if everdeclared any more. It is probably not a sound interpretation to suggest that if all partiesfailed to recognise the state of war (rather than just one of them as stated in Article 2)then the Conventions would not apply. 108

The Fourth Geneva Convention relates to the protection of civilians in time of war.However, it tends to envisage the situation of an occupying armed force acting in anotherstate’s territory and concerns the treatment of civilians in that context. It might not bewholly relevant to the current situation concerning the FRY, but Part II does includeimportant humanitarian provisions, such as the provision and protection of civilianhospitals and the special protection of children.

Additional Protocol I makes further provisions for the protection of the victims ofinternational armed conflicts. In its Article 1 it draws into the definition of aninternational armed conflict

armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination andalien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination.

Part IV relates to civilians. Within this Part, Article 48 states that

in order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilianobjects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between thecivilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and militaryobjectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against militaryobjectives.

108 The Law of War, I Detter de Lupis, 1987, p12. De Lupis states that ‘most admit there was a draftingerror,’ and cites various authorities to suggest that the intended effect of the phrase is simply to deny theright of states to refuse to apply the Conventions on the subjective basis that they do not recognise that astate of war exists.


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Protection is thus extended both to civilians themselves and to civilian objects. Thedefinitions of civilian objects and military objectives are given in Article 52, discussedbelow.

Article 51 sets out detailed provisions for the protection of the civilian population. Thisincludes that ‘the civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not bethe object of attack.’

It also includes a prohibition on indiscriminate attacks, being those not directed at aspecific military objective, or those which employ methods or means which cannot be sodirected or which cannot be limited, and which therefore ‘are of a nature to strike militaryobjectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.’ These include

(a) an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a singlemilitary objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectiveslocated in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration ofcivilians or civilian objects; and

(b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life,injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, whichwould be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantageanticipated.

The Article also prohibits the use of civilians to render any areas immune from attack orto shield military objectives or operations, and holds that

the Parties to the conflict shall not direct the movement of the civilian populationor individual civilians in order to attempt to shield military objectives fromattacks or to shield military operations.

However, the Article holds that the other parties to the conflict are not released from theirobligations to those civilians simply because they are being used as shields.

Article 52 goes into detail on the protection of civilian objects, which may not be theobject of an attack. Civilian objects are all those which are not military objectives, asdefined in paragraph 2 of the Article. Paragraph 2 is as follows:

attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects areconcerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature,location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action andwhose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstancesruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.

In cases of doubt as to whether an object normally used for civilian purposes is beingused temporarily for military purposes, the Article holds that it shall be presumed that it isnot being used for military purposes (ie it will enjoy protection as a civilian object).


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Article 53 prohibits attacks on places of worship, historic monuments or works or art.Article 54 prohibits attacks on, destruction of, or removal or rendering useless of ‘objectsindispensable to the survival of the civilian population,’ such as foodstuffs, agriculturalareas, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies, and irrigation works. Aderogation is allowed in this regard within territory under a state’s own control ‘whererequired by imperative military necessity.’ Article 55 provides for the protection of thenatural environment. Article 56 prohibits attacks on dams, dykes or nuclear powerstations, even if those objects are military objectives, if the attack ‘may cause the releaseof dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.’ Article57 sets out precautions which must be taken to spare the civilian population and civilianobjects.

Additional Protocol II sets out provisions for the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts. The regime here is a little looser than in the case ofinternational armed conflicts, but there are still important provisions.

Article 1 of the Protocol states that it applies to all armed conflicts not of an internationalcharacter and which take place within the territory of a High Contracting Party

between its forces and dissident armed forces or other organised armed groupswhich, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of itsterritory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted militaryoperations and to implement this Protocol.

It does not apply

to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated andsporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature.

Article 3 holds that

nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked as a justification for intervening, directlyor indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the armed conflict or in the internal orexternal affairs of the High Contracting Party in the territory of which thatconflict occurs.

Part IV of the Protocol relates specifically to the civilian population, and repeats inslightly modified form many of the provisions of Part IV of Protocol I. Article 13 makesthe general provision that civilians shall enjoy protection from military operations. Itholds that civilians shall not be the object of an attack, and that

acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror amongthe civilian population are prohibited.

Article 14 prohibits attacks on, destruction of or removal or rendering useless of objectsindispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs and agriculturalareas for their production, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies, and


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irrigation works. Article 15 prohibits attacks on dams, dykes and nuclear power stations,and Article 16 prohibits attacks on places of worship, historic monuments or works of art.

Article 17 concerns the forced movement of civilians and reads as follows:

1. The displacement of the civilian population shall not be ordered for reasonsrelated to the conflict unless the security of the civilians involved or imperativemilitary reasons so demand. Should such displacements have to be carried out,all possible measures shall be taken in order that the civilian population may bereceived under satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety andnutrition.

2. Civilians shall not be compelled to leave their own territory for reasonsconnected with the conflict.

Between them these articles embody the most relevant of the Geneva provisions in thecurrent situation, although others might become relevant in the light of circumstances.NATO’s actions might be considered usefully in the light of the provisions of AdditionalProtocol I, while the FRY’s actions might be considered usefully in relation to both theAdditional Protocols.

B. Genocide Convention

General Outline

The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was adoptedby the UN General Assembly on 9 December 1948. International legal action againstgenocide grew out of the work of Dr Raphael Lemkin, who coined the term in 1944 andpressed for its recognition as a specific crime. This recognition was reflected in theCharter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, and the General Assemblydeclared genocide a crime under international law in its Resolution 96 (I) of 11 December1946. The prohibition on genocide is thus not restricted to the Convention: it predates itby at least two years, and is often cited as an example of jus cogens, that is, a peremptorynorm of international law, binding on all states regardless of treaty provisions.109 Nor isthe Convention solely concerned with upholding the prohibition: it is concerned withsetting out provisions for the punishment of the crime.

109 Peremptory norms are ones which are accepted by the international community as a whole, from whichthere may be no derogation and which may be modified only by the emergence of a subsequent norm ofthe same character. They take precedence over other obligations. See, eg, International Law, 4th ed, MShaw, 1997, pp96-8.


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UK and FRY Are Parties

The UK did not sign the Genocide Convention, as a result of concerns over itsimplications for British asylum law.110 In 1965 the Government’s view of theseimplications changed111 and the UK enacted the necessary provisions in British law underthe Genocide Act 1969. At this point 73 states were party to the Convention. TheConvention had entered into force on 12 January 1951 for those states which were partyto it, having gained the required number of ratifications and accessions (20) under itsArticle XIII. Once the Genocide Act 1969 was passed the UK moved to accede to theConvention. The instrument of accession was deposited on 30 January 1970 and, againunder the terms of Article XIII, became effective on 30 April 1970.

Yugoslavia signed the Convention on 11 December 1948 and ratified it on 29 August1950. As mentioned above, the ICJ has ruled that the FRY is bound by the Convention,having declared itself bound (in respect to its jurisdiction) by the obligations which wereentered into by the former Yugoslavia. As also noted above, this is not necessary as ameans of prohibiting the FRY from committing genocide, which is an international crimeregardless, but it does oblige the FRY to prevent and to punish the crime.

Some Provisions of the Convention

Article I of the Convention confirms that genocide, whether committed in time of peaceor of war, is a crime under international law. States Parties undertake to prevent and topunish it.

Article II defines genocide. It reads as follows:

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committedwith intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religiousgroup, as such:

(a) Killing members of the group;(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring aboutits physical destruction in whole or in part;(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

110 Article VII states that genocide shall not be considered a poli tical crime for the purposes of extradition(politi cal crimes are not normally subject to extradition proceedings). The British Government wasconcerned that spurious allegations of genocide could be used to gain extradition of genuine politi calrefugees.

111 HC Deb 15 November 1965, cc680-1.


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Article III provides that the following acts shall be punishable

(a) Genocide;(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;(d) Attempt to commit genocide;(e) Complicity in genocide.

Article IV provides that anyone committing any of the acts listed in Article III shall bepunished, ‘whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or privateindividuals.’

Article VI provides for trial

by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act wascommitted, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction withrespect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.

The Genocide Act 1969 modified the application of the ‘double criminality’ rule inextradition cases involving alleged genocide. Normally extradition cannot take placeunless the alleged crime was a crime in both this country and the country seekingextradition at the time when it was committed. Section 2(3) of the Genocide Act 1969removes the requirement that at the time it was committed the alleged crime must havebeen a crime in the country in which it was committed. This was in recognition of thefact that when genocide occurs it tends to be the responsibility of the government inwhose territory it occurs, and may be supported by legislation enacted by thatgovernment. It was considered contrary to the spirit of the Convention to allow such actsto go unpunished, even though the Convention itself is silent on the matter.

The definition of genocide can be read in a restrictive way, and there are cases ofnotorious mass killings which might not be regarded as falling within the definition. Thelist of groups the destruction of which constitutes genocide does not include politicalgroups, so that the actions of many dictatorships in the second half of the 20th centurywould be excluded, while the ‘intent to destroy’ a group, ‘in whole or in part,’ and ‘assuch’ may be difficult to prove. The Holocaust was of course the definitive example ofgenocide in modern times, and the killings in Rwanda in 1994 also generally have beenregarded as such.112 The terms of the definition of genocide in the Convention woulddoubtless be read carefully by lawyers acting for any defendant charged with such crimesin relation to Kosovo.

112 The Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, annexed to Security Council Resolution 955,allows for prosecution of persons responsible for genocide in Rwanda. An interesting, if polemical,discussion of examples of mass killings which might or might not be considered to constitute genocideis given in Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century, A Destexhe, 1995.


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C. International Tribunal

The International Tribunal for former Yugoslavia was established by Security CouncilResolution 827 of 25 May 1993, on the basis of proposals contained in a report of theSecretary-General. The Resolution adopted the Statute of the Tribunal also contained in thatreport.113 The full designation is the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of PersonsResponsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in theFormer Yugoslavia since 1991. It sits at the Hague, and since October 1996 the ChiefProsecutor has been Justice Louise Arbour from Canada. The Tribunal has over 600 stafffrom 57 countries. Its budget has climbed steadily each year, and is $94,103,800 for 1999.114

The Tribunal is not confined to conflicts between states, but merely to violations committed‘in the territory of the former Yugoslavia’ between 1991 and a date to be set by the SecurityCouncil once peace has been restored. This was intended to avoid disputes about the statusof the combatants in the Bosnia conflict, but also means that the Tribunal enjoys jurisdictionover the current conflict in the FRY. The Tribunal is responsible for prosecuting war crimes(grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and of the laws or customs of war), genocideand crimes against humanity. It is not responsible for prosecuting crimes against peace, ieplanning, preparation and initiation of war. This means that defendants could be broughtbefore the Tribunal on charges of genocide, or of ordering or condoning grave breaches ofthe Geneva Conventions, but not of initiating the conflict in the first place. In the firstannual report of the Tribunal the President commented that ‘the underlying reason isprobably that the Security Council preferred to reserve to itself competence in the field ofaggression and similar crimes against peace.’115

The Tribunal takes primacy over national jurisdiction, so that suspects should normally behanded over to the Tribunal, rather than being tried in national courts.

As at 31 March 1999 the Tribunal had indicted 84 individuals in 25 indictments. Onlyone person had been convicted and was serving his sentence and one had been acquitted.Five others had been convicted but were appealing, one had pleaded guilty to 31 crimesagainst humanity and violations of the laws of war but was still being tried for genocide,and the trials of 10 others were ongoing. Six accused had died and charges against 18 hadbeen dropped. A total of 26 people were in custody, including those still being tried orappealing and those awaiting trial.116

113 S/25704, 3 May 1993.114 Fact Sheet, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 31 March 1999, from

http://www.un.org/icty/glance/fact.htm.115Annual Report of the International Tribunal…, A/49/342, 29 August 1994, p13.116 Fact Sheet, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 31 March 1999, from

http://www.un.org/icty/glance/fact.htm.


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UK Support for the Tribunal

On 22 April Mr Lloyd listed the financial contributions made by the Government to thework of the Tribunal:

The Government have already contributed £290,000 this year to support variousaspects of the work of the International War Crimes Tribunal for the formerYugoslavia, in addition to the UK's assessed contribution for 1999 of US$5.08m.The Tribunal has not so far sought further financial contributions for its work onKosovo. We will give careful consideration to any such requests should they bemade. We are also considering certain requests for assistance in kind, in additionto the assistance with information on atrocities that we are already providing tothe Tribunal.117

D. Allegations of War Crimes

Since the Yugoslav offensive began in Kosovo in mid-March 1999 numerous allegationshave been made of atrocities in Kosovo, with widespread reports of massacres, rapes,forced expulsions, and the destruction of civilian housing. However, independentcorroboration of the claims will be difficult to obtain until international observers are ableto return to the province.

The US State Department has compiled weekly summaries of alleged instances of ethniccleansing, based on information from US Government sources. The following is anextract from the summary of 22 April 1999:

Kosovar Albanian refugees continue to report mass executions in at least 60towns and villages throughout the province, and they have reported mass gravesin Drenica, Izbica, Kaaniku, Malisevo, Pusto Selo, Rezalla and the Pagarusavalley. We have confirmed the presence of a mass burial site at Pusto Selo andanother in Izbica. Numerous refugee reports indicate a new pattern of Serbexecution in which Serb forces order ethnic Albanian men to run for about 1,500meters, and then shoot them. This creates forensic evidence that would allow theSerbs to claim the victims were collateral casualties of military operations.Kosovar Albanian refugees continue to report both mass and individual summaryexecutions throughout the province. Refugee reports of Serbian mass executionstotal over 3,800 ethnic Albanian deaths. The number would be far higher if wetook into account the countless tales of individual murder. The organized andindividual rape of ethnic Albanian women by Serb security forces andparamilitaries are being reported in increasing numbers by Kosovar refugees.According to refugees, Serb forces have conducted systematic rapes in Dakovica

117 HC Deb 22 April 1999, c613w


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and at the Hotel Karagac in Pec… Disturbingly, some 150,000 to 500,000military-age men remain missing in Kosovo.118

The United Kingdom and other NATO countries have indicated a willingness to passrelevant intelligence information to the Tribunal to assist with its investigations. ForeignOffice Minister Tony Lloyd stated on 22 April:

A senior FCO official, David Gowan, has been appointed to be Kosovo WarCrimes Coordinator. He will be responsible for ensuring that the Governmentpass as much information as possible, including intelligence, to the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia that might be relevant to theTribunal's investigations.119

During the war in Bosnia, the leadership in Belgrade managed to avoid being directlyimplicated by the International Tribunal for the war crimes that took place. It may proveeasier, though, for the Tribunal to prove complicity on the part of President Milosevic andhis inner circle in the atrocities that are reportedly occurring in Kosovo, as SACEUR,General Wesley Clark, indicated in a recent interview:

I think it is very clear that the leadership knows precisely who these people areand what they're doing. There's no question that this is part of a granderdesign.120

The question then arises as to whether the leadership in Belgrade would be willing toconclude a settlement with NATO that does not grant them some form of immunity fromprosecution, although Mr Cook has insisted that amnesties for indicted war criminals arenot an option:

I don't believe that the major powers would offer an amnesty to anyone theyindict and indeed that would not be the policy of Britain.121

Nonetheless, Mr Cook acknowledged that the need for a resolution to the conflict couldforce NATO into some form of accommodation with President Milosevic:

I will deal with anybody who enables us to return the refugees to Kosovo underinternational protection. If that involves dealing with those who have effectivepower in Belgrade, then we owe it to the refugees to do that. The question of theindictment of Mr Milosevic is one where we are very happy to provide all the

118 Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo, Fact Sheet based on information from U.S. Government sources, 22 April1999, from the US State Department web site at http://www.state.gov

119 HC Deb 22 April 1999, c613w120 BBC Panorama Special, 28 April 1999121 BBC Panorama Special, 28 April 1999


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information to Judge Arbour. She must then make up her mind as to whether ornot he is legally culpable.122

The chief prosecutor, Louise Arbour, has indicated that she intends to act quickly inissuing indictments to ensure that "amnesty never becomes an option".123

122 BBC Panorama Special, 28 April 1999123 BBC Panorama Special, 28 April 1999


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VI Opinion withi n the United Kingdom

The United Kingdom has played a prominent role in the NATO campaign and theGovernment remains committed to ensuring that the objectives set out by the Alliance areattained.

During the debate on Kosovo on 19 April the Shadow Foreign Secretary, MichaelHoward, expressed his party's continued support for the Government:

We continue to support the Government. We continue to believe that it was rightto take action against the regime that has inflicted so much terror on those whomit regards as its own citizens.124

However, he questioned whether NATO's original objective of averting a humanitariandisaster had been achieved:

Although I have no doubt that much damage has been done to Mil osevic'smil itary machine…we must nevertheless face facts, and one of those deeplyunpalatable facts is that NATO's primary objective - to prevent a humanitariandisaster - has not been achieved. That must be the starting point for any honestexamination as to how we should now proceed.125

For the Liberal Democrats, Menzies Campbell also indicated his party's support for theGovernment's position, but expressed doubts as to whether air strikes alone would becapable of achieving NATO's declared objectives:

Liberal Democrats have contended that an air campaign alone would not suff iceand that mil itary presence on the ground would be essential for the return of therefugees … I believe that it was wrong for NATO to rule out the option ofground forces in such an apparently unequivocal way… Milosevic should havebeen left in confusion and doubt about NATO's intentions.

However, other Members have questioned the decision to use mil itary force. In a partypolitical broadcast on 29 March, the leader of the Scottish National Party, Alex Salmond,said that the Government was mistaken to use air power against Belgrade, arguing that airstrikes typically served to “steel the resolve of the civil ian population” and cited Londonduring the Blitz as an example.126 Alan Clark called the war "clumsy, wasteful andshambolic" and claimed the operation had "neither clearly defined objectives nor anymeasurable progress in attaining them."127 Tony Benn argued that NATO wascontravening its own constitution by attacking a sovereign state without the explicit

124 HC Deb 19 April 1999, c583125 ibid. c584126 Financial Times, 30 March 1999127 HC Deb 19 April 1999, c597


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authorisation of the UN Security Council, although the Government maintained thatNATO has sufficient legal authority to act to prevent a humanitarian disaster in theprovince.


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VII Current Developments and Future Prospects

A. The Campaign So Far

As of 27 April 1999 around 11,000 sorties (4,400 strike sorties) have been flown incombination with Tomahawk cruise missile attacks from B-52 bombers and naval vesselsin the Adriatic.128 The air campaign has widened quickly from initial attacks upon anarrow selection of targets, such as air defences and communication sites, to a broadrange of targets, including those involving infrastructure and logistics, such as bridges,railways and refineries. The escalation of NATO operations was starkly illustrated by thebombing of military-related government buildings in the centre of Belgrade on 3 April.

Since the campaign began on 24 March there has been a steady build-up of NATO forcesin theatre. The number of aircraft directly involved in the operation has more thandoubled from an initial total of around 400 aircraft (250 planes from the US) to over 1000(800 US). There has also been a move to 24-hour bombing. There are approximately7,300 US troops and 6,000 other NATO troops directly supporting air operations at theAviano Air Base in Italy and other European bases.129

The US Congress has also approved the call up of as many as 30,000 reservists, probablyas pilots and aircrew. In addition to the planned deployment of some 16,000 land troopsto form part of the proposed Kosovo peace implementation force (KFOR), around 8,000NATO ground troops are being deployed to Albania, mainly to assist in the humanitarianeffort. The increase in naval strength is best illustrated by the fact that there are currentlythree aircraft carriers (USS Theodore Roosevelt, HMS Invincible and the French carrierFoch) in the region.

It remains difficult to assess accurately the effectiveness of NATO bombing in weakeningYugoslavia’s military capabilities. NATO claims to have seriously degraded Yugoslavia’sair defences and overall military capability, although NATO aircraft are still encounteringsome anti-aircraft fire and missile attacks when on sorties.

The NATO air campaign has been slowed by unfavourable and unpredictable weatherconditions. The problems that cloud cover can pose for laser-guided weapons, and thestrict rules of engagement being placed on allied pilots in order to reduce the risk ofcivilian casualties (collateral damage) have slowed for the operation and have led to aheavy reliance on cruise missile attacks in the early part of the operation. The mostcrucial impact of this, both politically and militarily, has been the delay in hampering theoperations of Yugoslav units in Kosovo and therefore NATO’s ability to slow or halt theethnic cleansing. The deployment of Apache helicopters and MLRS rocket system to

128 NATO Press Conference 14 April 1999, NATO web site at http://www.nato.int129 Department of Defense web site at http://www.defenselink.mil


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Albania is evidence of NATO’s desire to have a greater impact upon Yugoslav groundforces in Kosovo.

B. Criticisms of NATO

NATO has encountered some criticism over its handling of the campaign, with somecommentators suggesting that the ever-increasing level of military hardware andpersonnel is evidence that initially NATO seriously underestimated and miscalculated themilitary task which it faced.

Another criticism levelled at Western leaders is the claim that they failed to foresee andmake adequate provision for the scale of the humanitarian crisis that developed in theregion, as argued by The Times of 4 April:

There seems little doubt that Milosevic was planning ethnic cleansing of Kosovo,but it defies common sense that he intended to send hundreds of thousands overthe borders in a matter of days. NATO did not expect this, even though it hadbeen warned, and it did not prepare humanitarian aid on the frontiers.130

Some commentators allege that warnings were given by the Pentagon, the Director of theCIA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, rather than back down after theinitial wave of air strikes, Belgrade would in fact increase its campaign of ethniccleansing in Kosovo.131 SACEUR, General Wesley Clark, later acknowledged:

We knew there were going to be some horrendous atrocities. We knew it wasgoing to be fast and violent. We know it might lead to the expulsion of Kosovarsfrom certain regions of Kosovo. That it would lead to the wholesale expulsion ofthe Kosovar Albanian population, no, we had no indication of that.132

Critics also believe it was a mistake to rule out explicitly the use of ground forces in anoffensive role at the beginning of the operation. Instead, it is claimed that Allianceleaders should have kept President Milosevic in the dark as to their intentions, instead ofinsisting that air power alone would be sufficient. Others maintain that NATO shouldhave assembled a large ground force in the region prior to the start of NATO air strikes,although such a move could have undermined the credibility of the diplomatic efforts atthe Rambouillet talks. On the other hand, other observers, such as Lord Owen, believethat a military build-up prior to Rambouillet would have served as a demonstration ofNATO's resolve:

130 Times, 4 April 1999131 See for example Guardian, 6 April 1999, Washington Post, 7 April 1999, International Herald Tribune,

6 April 1999132 BBC Panorama Special, 28 April 1999


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Had such a build-up been started before and during the Rambouill et negotiations,then President Mi losevic would have negotiated more seriously and very likelyneither Nato bombs nor missiles would have been used.133

However, as Lord Owen acknowledges, it could be argued that the decision to rule outground troops simply recognised the political reality that NATO was operating in. Arefusal to rule out the use of ground forces could have made it diff icult for the Clintonadministration to win support from Congress for the NATO action and undermined theunity of the Alliance.

The FRY authorities have made much of civil ian casualties caused by NATO, some ofwhich NATO has admitted, and there has been concern in some quarters over the way inwhich NATO has presented its reaction to such events. Critics have argued thatunnecessary news management techniques have been used in a way which has reducedpublic confidence in the Alliance. NATO has stressed the precautions which it takes toreduce the likelihood of civilian casualties, and contrasts this with the actions of the FRYauthorities.

C. Attitudes within NATO

Indeed, the air strikes continue to pose political problems for some Al liance MemberStates. In Germany, the NATO air strikes have led to tension within the ruling coalitionof Social Democrats (SPD) and Greens, with some commentators warning that, in thelonger term, continued mil itary action could lead to the collapse of the government.134 TheForeign Minister and head of the Green Party, Joschka Fischer, has argued that violencein some circumstances is justified, but other party members have criticised him forbetraying the Green's pacif ist tradition. One Green junior minister, Gisela Altman, haspublicly criticised the Government for its support of the NATO action, and there havealso been signs of dissent from within the SPD.

In Italy the governing coalition has come under strain after warnings from the formerCommunists that they were considering withdrawing their ministers if the NATO actioncontinued. In Greece there is strong sympathy among opposition politicians and thegeneral population for the Serbian position. Although Greece has not contributed forcesto the mil itary campaign, the Government of Prime Minister Costas Simitis has sought toindicate its support for a diplomatic resolution to the crisis, without undermining the unityof the Alliance.

None of the three new member states (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) havecontributed aircraft to Operation "All ied Force" and both the Czech Republic andHungary have explicitly ruled out sending ground troops to Kosovo, although Hungarian

133 Independent, 23 April 1999134 See for example Financial Times, 23 April 1999


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army medical teams are operating in Albania. The current Hungarian Government alsoremains concerned over the position of the sizeable Hungarian minority of 340,000 in thenorthern Serbian region of Vojvodina and has criticised NATO for striking targets inSubotica, a town with a large ethnic Hungarian population.135

D. The Oil Embargo

On 23 April 1999 the EU agreed that ‘the supply and sale of petroleum and petroleumproducts to the FRY shall be prohibited.’136 This is politically binding on EU states;hitherto, crude oil was still being shipped to the FRY from several Member States,including the UK, Italy and Greece. Croatia, Hungary and Romania have also agreed totake measures to stop the flow of oil, and other states outside Europe, including the USA,have indicated that they intend to pursue similar prohibitions of their own. However,shipments of oil from countries such as Russia, have continued to arrive in theMontenegrin port of Bar, leading NATO to propose the establishment of a "visit-and-search" regime to prevent such shipments from occurring in the future.

Apart from the practical difficulties of upholding an oil embargo, there has been somediscussion as to the legality of one in the absence of a Security Council Resolution. Inpractice this raises two questions: is a Security Council Resolution necessary for an oilembargo in itself, and does NATO have authority to police it?

Economic sanctions in general raise difficulties in relation to the rules of the World TradeOrganisation (WTO). The British Government has cited a possible conflict with itsobligations under the WTO rules as an impediment to the imposition by the EU ofeconomic sanctions against Burma in the absence of a Security Council Resolution.137

Furthermore, effective sanctions on the supply of fuel would need cooperation from awider group of states than is the case with NATO’s military action: effectively all theneighbouring states and all states which might supply fuel would have to be involved.The Security Council could compel this wider range of states to cooperate, at least in lawif not in practice. It would need to adopt a Resolution under Chapter VII, and use thelanguage of a ‘decision’ that all states shall refrain from the supply of petroleum andpetroleum related products. This would constitute a mandatory embargo. The power toimpose sanctions is derived from Article 41 of the UN Charter, while Article 25 sets outthe undertaking that all Members of the UN agree to ‘accept and carry out the decisionsof the Security Council.’

If the sanctions were to be supported by a blockade, it would be necessary to put militaryforces in place to uphold it. This would raise all the usual questions about the legal basis

135 Financial Times, 23 April 1999136 Common Position 1999/273/CFSP, OJL 108, 27 April 1999, p1.137 HC Deb 27 April 1998, cc4-5w.


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for the threat or use of force. One approach might be for NATO to argue that a blockadeof its own could be considered an extension of its existing military operations, designedfurther to hamper the military capacity of the FRY, and that the same legal basis which itasserted for the bombing would apply. It is possible that it would gain the co-operation ofneighbouring states in any case for a blockade of land or riverine supplies. A moredifficult position would apply at sea, and this might be a reason for pursuing a SecurityCouncil Resolution.

Forces policing a blockade at sea would have to deal with ships from states which areneither combatants nor members of NATO and in waters which are not the territorial seaof a NATO state. This would raise its own difficulties, and intercepting and boardingships without consent in these circumstances would need a clear legal basis. Anunequivocal way to secure this would be a Security Council Resolution which explicitlyauthorised NATO to police an embargo, as for instance Resolution 1132 authorisedECOWAS to halt and inspect inward shipping in order to verify compliance with the armsand oil embargoes on Sierra Leone (although it did not authorise the use of force in orderto do so). It would obviously be a sensitive matter if NATO forces were to intercept orboard, say, a Russian ship. The consensus of the Russian Government in an embargo andin NATO’s role in policing it might be crucial in allowing this to pass off withoutincident. If the Security Council merely imposed an embargo without authorising NATOto uphold it, it is possible that NATO might still argue that actions disruptive of shippingcould be taken in support of such a Resolution.

On 29 April 1999 Baroness Symons made the following points in reply to a question fromLord Glentoran concerning the effects of an oil embargo on Montenegro and on Russianattitudes, and the question of consent from states whose territorial waters might need tobe used:

the law in this area is of course complex. There is customary law, treaties andinternational conventions. I assure the noble Lord that all of these areas will beconsidered not only by NATO but also by legal advisers here. We have to makeany embargo as effective as we can. NATO is working out military options. Weshall take into account any rules of engagement as well as international law. Thenoble Lord referred specifically to Montenegro. He also mentioned Russia whichis not the only supplier, and nor indeed is the sea the only route. We shall seek tomake any embargo as effective as possible and as consistent as possible.However, we shall of course take into account the needs of Montenegro in theway the noble Lord suggests.138

138 HL Deb 29 April 1999, c436.


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E. Main NATO Deployments and the British Contri bution

1. Operation "Al lied Force"

The overall UK contribution to Operation All ied Force was outlined by Chief of JointOperations, Admiral Sir Ian Garnett on 23 April:

However, the air campaign is but one element of this operation. The UK is alsoproviding significant land and maritime forces and this morning I wil l brieflyremind you about our overall contribution. In the Ionian Sea HMS Invincible,with her embarked air group of Sea Harriers and helicopters, is accompanied byHMS Newcastle and Royal Fleet Auxiliary Fort Austin. In the Adriatic thesubmarine HMS Splendid, armed with her highly effective Tomahawk LandAttack Missiles, remains on station. Also in the area, frigates HMS Iron Duke andHMS Somerset are operating respectively with NATO’s standing Naval ForceMediterranean and the French Carrier group.

Ashore in Macedonia elements of Fourth Armoured Brigade have been deployedsince the middle of February. These include The Kings Royal Hussars withChallenger tanks, the Irish Guards and The Kings Own Royal Border Regimentwith Warrior armoured fighting vehicles, and 4 Regiment Royal Artillery with155mm guns.

Equally important are the combat support and combat service support units suchas logisticians, signallers, electrical and mechanical engineers, field ambulance,pioneers and an RAF helicopter detachment.

These UK troops are under the NATO command of Lt General Mike Jackson,Commander Ace Rapid Reaction Corps, in whose headquarters the majority ofstaff are from the UK because we are its framework nation. In all we plan todeploy around 6,800 UK troops in Macedonia, ready to implement a settlementand escort the refugees home. About 100 other UK troops are also deployed inAlbania to support the ACE Mobile Force (Land).

Returning to our air contribution, you will be very familiar with the excellentwork being done by the Royal Air Force Harriers based at Gioia del Colle inItaly, and the Tornadoes flying from RAF Bruggen in Germany. However,equally essential to NATO’s air operations are the Tristar and VC10 air to airrefuelling aircraft, based at Ancona in Italy and Brize Norton in UK, the E3Dairborne early warning aircraft operating out of Aviano in Italy, and the Nimrodreconnaissance aircraft. 139

According to Sir Charles Guthrie, the UK had carried out around 350 attack sorties by 26April, constituting about 10% of the overall attack effort by that stage.

139 MOD Press Briefing 23 April 1999 from MOD web site at http://www.mod.uk


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On 15 April 1999, George Robertson provided this estimate of the cost of the UKcontribution to NATO action relating to the situation in Kosovo:

The total cost of mili tary operations relating to Kosovo is impossible to estimateat this stage, given we do not know what Milosevic's next moves will be, andhow we wil l need to respond. The costs will, however, be substantial. Ourassessment of costs incurred as of 8 April is some £17 millio n; this does notinclude the costs of replenishing stock of ordnance expended. 140

For further details on the UK contribution to mil itary operations under Operation Al liedForce, see Appendices 3 and 4.

2. Al lied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC)

The ARRC, commanded by British General Mike Jackson, form a NATO command andcontrol element to take command of all NATO forces in FYR Macedonia.141 These forcesinclude the extraction forces and the elements which had been pre-positioned toimplement a peace agreement. According to NATO the force will:

Provide a single NATO Commander for coordination and control of national landforces deploying in FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia).Additionally, this organisation establishes a single commander to allocateinfrastructure, coordinate training facil ities, and assist liaison with the FYROMGovernment.142

3. NATO Kosovo Enforcement Force (KFOR)

KFOR is the name given to the NATO ground forces in FYR Macedonia originallyestablished to police a peace agreement. NATO has estimated that around 26,000 troopswould be required to fulfi l such a task - KFOR currently numbers around 12,000,principally from the UK, France and Germany. 'Operation Agricola' is the UKcontribution to KFOR.

The initial deployment of the planned 6,800-strong British contingent to KFOR wasannounced on 11 February 1999 by the Secretary of State for Defence, George Robertson:

140 HC Deb 15 April 1999 c323-4w141 The ARRC is the land component of NATO’s Rapid Reaction Forces under the permanent operational

command of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). It is multinational and comprisesstaff, assigned military formations and representatives from 14 contributing nations. It is trained,prepared and ready to deploy within days anywhere as directed by SACEUR to undertake combinedjoint mili tary operations ranging from Peace Support Operations (PSO) to High Intensity Warfare. Asthe Framework Nation, the UK provides the infrastructure, administrative support, communications and60% of the staff.

142 Atlantic News, 10 March 1999


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…the Government have decided today to send to the region at the beginning ofnext week the vehicles and other heavy equipment of the units that would formthe leading elements of any deployment. They will include Challenger tanks andWarrior armoured vehicles and artillery. The units principally involved are theKings Royal Hussars, the Irish Guards and 4 Regiment Royal Artillery, with atactical headquarters drawn from 4 Armoured Brigade. Other units will also beproviding equipment. Loading of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships Sea Centurionand Sea Crusader will begin on Monday.143

The detailed inventory of the equipment shipped on the Sea Centurion and Sea Crusadercomprised fourteen Challenger main battle tanks, six AS90 self-propelled guns, 27Warrior armoured infantry vehicles, eight Scimitars, 30 light armoured and supportvehicles, nearly 30 Royal Engineer and REME specialist vehicles and four armouredambulances.144

On 13 April the Prime Minister announced the dispatch of reinforcements to the Britishcontribution. The additional forces were detailed by Air Marshal Sir John Day, on 14April:

The British Army’s initial deployment in February and March comprised theheadquarters of Fourth Armoured Brigade and The King’s Royal Hussars BattleGroup. These were in addition to the British troops serving with the headquartersof the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps, the ARRC, and wecurrently have some 4,500 troops in Macedonia. The deployment of a secondBritish Battle Group, which is the Irish Guards Battle Group, will add aboutanother 2,000 troops to those numbers.

The two British Battle Groups are of similar composition, comprising Challengermain battle tanks, Scimitar reconnaissance vehicles, Warrior armoured infantryfighting vehicles, AS90 heavy artillery and armoured engineer vehicles. We havealso deployed air defence assets to theatre, including high velocity missilesmounted on Stormer armoured vehicles.

4. Operation Allied Harbour/AFOR

Allied Harbour is the NATO/UNHCR operation being set up to assist in the provision ofhumanitarian relief to refugees in Albania. The NATO side of the operation is nowknown as AFOR, NATO's Albanian Force. AFOR is commanded by Lieutenant GeneralJohn Reith and at its centre is the headquarters of the Allied Command Europe MobileForce (Land) - AMF(L). AFOR's mission and composition has been outlined by GeorgeRobertson:

143 HC Deb 11 February 1999, c565144 Soldier, March 1999


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Its mission is to assist the humanitarian effort in Albania. NATO has directedGeneral Reith that his main task is to establish a sustainable capacity to meet thehumanitarian need, working in support of, and in close coordination with, theAlbanian civil authorities and the International Aid Agencies, led by UNHCR,assisting them in the provision of humanitarian aid to the refugees.

AFOR will be a highly mobile reaction force. When fully deployed, it willnumber around 8,000 lightly equipped ground troops, comprising significantengineer and medical expertise. NATO is currently finalising plans for thecomposition of this force.145

Sixteen NATO countries are to be involved in AFOR with additional assistance beingoffered by five Partner nations. Key functions of the operation will include building tentcamps, carrying out distribution of supplies and preserving the security of the camps. Theplanning of the operation is being co-ordinated with the UNHCR.146 During an MODpress conference on 19 April, Lt General Sir John Reith described his main priorities asfollows:

I have really two primary tasks: one is the distribution of the stores and aid for theUNHCR and within that I need to take control of the airport at Tirana Rinus, andthe upgrade of the road system, and we are looking at upgrading 50 kilometres ofroad, and provide the transport to move, topping up on UNHCR’s own resources;my other task is very clearly to help build the camps so that we can give theshelter to the refugees. For that task I will have some 8 Engineer Companies incountry and for the distribution 2 Transport Companies and utilising whatresources are available from the Albanian Army.147

Around 1,500 UK personnel will be deployed to AFOR as part of AMF(L). The UKcontribution includes an Infantry Battalion Group, a Logistics Battalion and a SignalsSquadron.148

5. "Task Force Hawk"

Task Force Hawk currently comprises 24 AH-64A Apache attack helicopters drawn fromthe US Army Europe and 18 Multiple-Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) supported by2600 personnel. The Apaches have been drawn from two battalions of the 11th AviationBrigade in Illesheim, Germany. The task force will enable NATO to intensify attacksagainst Serbian army and police units operating in Kosovo especially during periods oflimited visibility and poor weather.

145 MOD Press Conference 21 April 1999, MOD web site at http://www.army.mod.uk146 NATO Press Conference 14 April 1999, NATO web site at http://www.nato.int147 MOD Press Conference 19 April 1999, MOD web site at http://www.army.mod.uk148 MOD web site at http://www.mod.uk/news


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The Apache can carry either up to 16 Hellfire laser guided missiles or 38 76mm rockets,in addition to 1,200 rounds for its 30mm cannon. The highly mobile MLRS, nicknamed"steel rain" comes in two versions. The original MLRS M77 has two six-pod launchersfiring 12 rockets, each containing 644 bomblets and has a range of 20 miles. The morerecent version of the MLRS can fire two Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMSs).These dispense 950 M74 bomblets to a maximum range of 110 miles and can devastatean area the twice the size of a football pitch. The nature of the system and the fact that thebomblets do not have self-destruct fuses, and therefore could remain unexploded on theground posing a danger to civilians, will raise the possibility of greater collateral damage.Such unexploded bomblets could also be a threat to allied forces should they enterKosovo in the future. Due to the greater range of the more modern system it seems likelythat this system will be used. If deployed near the Kosovo border the ATACMS wouldhelp to weaken Serb defence before an Apache attack.

The A-10 close air-support aircraft would also probably be used alongside the Apaches toattack armoured vehicles. The Apache, while a very effective ground attack aircraft, isvulnerable to surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) such as the 600 Russian-made Strela-2s heldby Yugoslav forces and therefore requires substantial military support. Task Force Hawkcurrently includes a mechanised battalion equipped with 14 M2 Bradley infantry fightingvehicles (IFVs) and M1A1 MBTs for force protection and a 580 strong logistics unit.149

On 23 April, Secretary Cohen authorised the deployment of additional forces to augmentthe operation. The additional forces comprise: 9 MLRSs, 14 Bradley IFVs, 8 BradleyStinger Fighting Vehicles (short-range air defence), 15 Abrams MBTs, 8 155mmHowitzers, and 19 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV). Oncethese units are in theatre the total number of US forces in "Task Force Hawk" will beapproximately 5,350.

F. Possible Outcomes to the Crisis

NATO leaders continue to hold to the belief that air strikes can achieve the Alliance'sdeclared objectives, although contingency planning, albeit in its early stages, is nowunderway to look at possible scenarios for the deployment of ground forces.

Despite some early setbacks, NATO insists that the air campaign is having an increasingimpact on Belgrade's forces in Kosovo. The main lines of communication into theprovince have been cut or damaged, and there are reports that Yugoslav forces aresuffering increasingly from fuel shortages. Communications between forces in the fieldand the high command have also been disrupted. SACEUR, General Wesley Clark,appears confident that the arrival of the Apache force, operating in tandem with A-10aircraft and the MLRS rocket system, will enable the Alliance to carry out its threatsystematically to cut off and destroy the Yugoslav units in the province.

149 Jane's Defence Weekly, 14 April 1999


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As a result, the possibility in the near future of NATO ground forces fighting their wayinto Kosovo remains remote, not least because it would take several months to amasssufficient forces in the region for such an operation. There would also be considerablelogistical obstacles to be overcome. During the Gulf Crisis of 1990-91 the Allies wereable to make use of an elaborate military infrastructure in Saudi Arabia to prepare forOperation "Desert Storm", whereas the infrastructure in both Albania and FYRMacedonia is poorly developed. Albania has only one large airport, in Tirana, and themovement of heavy equipment by sea would be hampered by the lack of adequate portfacilities.

Even if such problems could be overcome, FYR Macedonia has said it would refuse anyNATO request to mount an invasion of Kosovo from its territory, and the mountainousterrain in the region would pose difficulties for forces crossing from Albania.

In addition to the practical considerations, there are also doubts within the Alliance oversuch a course of action. The United States remains cautious of involvement in anoperation that could lead to considerable casualties among Alliance forces, and otherMember States have expressed concern over the legal basis for such an operation and thepossible Russian reaction.

On the other hand, Alliance leaders are aware that Belgrade may continue to refuse toagree to an international peacekeeping force, leaving NATO with the option of continuingto bomb indefinitely or deploying a ground force. As a result, discussion has centred onthe possibility of deploying ground forces into Kosovo without Belgrade's consent, oncethe Yugoslav forces in the province have been sufficiently weakened by the air campaign.NATO leaders have referred to this as a "permissive" or "semi-permissive" environment,a scenario that would require fewer troops than a large-scale invasion against a full-strength enemy. If such an option is chosen, the Pentagon has hinted that a ground forcecould be massed on the border between Serbia and Hungary to help tie down Yugoslavforces.

In the search for a diplomatic solution to the conflict, NATO leaders believe that Russianinvolvement could prove crucial in convincing Belgrade to accept an internationalpeacekeeping force in Kosovo. However, attempts to secure Russia's co-operation couldbe hampered by the unstable political situation in Moscow, as rumours of tension betweenPresident Boris Yeltsin and Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov intensify. Theappointment by Mr Yeltsin of former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin to the post ofspecial envoy to Yugoslavia was welcomed in the West as a sign that Russia was willingto take a more pragmatic stance over Kosovo. The move was seen in other quarters as anattempt by Mr Yeltsin to undermine the authority of Mr Primakov, who has played aleading role in diplomatic efforts to find a solution to the Kosovo conflict.

Some commentators believe that the NATO action may have a longer-term impact on thepolitical situation in Russia, and there have been suggestions that the Russian militarymight, at some point, be unprepared to remain aloof from the conflict. Pro-reform


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politicians in Moscow warn that the strong anti-western sentiment generated by theNATO action may lead to increased support for nationalist and communist parties in theNovember parliamentary elections, despite the fact that there appears to be little supportamong the population for a more interventionist stance. Although polls show that up to96 per cent of Russians are opposed to the NATO air strikes, there is also a strong beliefthat Russia should not become involved in the conflict.

In the Balkans, earlier concern that the NATO action could ignite a wider conflict has sofar proved unfounded, although commentators continue to warn of the danger of civil warin Montenegro.

The KLA leadership, whose requests to the West for training and equipment have beenrefused, believes Belgrade intends to partition Kosovo and is concerned that NATO mayacquiesce, seeing the effective division of Bosnia as a precedent. One possible line ofpartition proposed by Serbian academics runs from Pec in the north-west to the region ofKrajimorav in the south-east, thereby granting Belgrade control of key economic,historical and religious assets in the north and leaving the ethnic Albanians in control ofthe south-west.150 To counteract this possibility, the KLA has reportedly massed largenumbers of troops in the north of the province.

NATO leaders maintain that neither partition nor independence is an option, althoughthere appears to be a growing recognition in the West that the framework agreed atRambouillet may have to undergo some amendments, such as removing the provision thatwould allow some Yugoslav forces to remain in Kosovo. On 28 March PresidentClinton's National Security Advisor, Sandy Berger, hinted that the current conflict couldultimately threaten Serbia's control over the province:

…the only way that Kosovo can remain a part of Serbia is for Mr Milosevic toaccept the peace settlement which gets the Serbian forces out of Kosovo, butkeeps Kosovo Serbian. But the longer this goes on, obviously, that balance ofpower shifts.151

Furthermore, the EU envoy to the Rambouillet talks, Wolfgang Petritsch, declared on 29March:

…everything is now moving in this direction of independence for Kosovobecause it is difficult to imagine that the Albanians will be willing to remain ina state with the Serbs after the massacres.152

In recognition of the changing circumstances Foreign Secretary Robin Cook and hisFrench counterpart, Hubert Védrine, indicated on 20 April that Kosovo could be turned

150 See for example Independent, 21 April 1999151 Financial Times, 29 March 1999152 Financial Times, 30 March 1999


68

into an protectorate under some form of international authority. However, they bothstressed that such a move would not be a precursor to independence for Kosovo.153

There is also growing international recognition that, once the conflict is resolved, therewill be an urgent need for some form of regional economic reconstruction programme,potentially through the European Union, although planning for such a programmeremains at an embryonic stage.

153 Financial Times, 20 April 1999


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Appendix 1: Summary of NATO forces

United States of America

Personnel Land Equipment Naval Vessels Aircraft

350 - in FYRMacedoniaconductingreconnaissance forthe 12,000 NATOforce.

5350 - US troops arebeing sent to operateand maintain theApache attackhelicopters andMultiple-LaunchRocket System(MLRS) ordered toAlbania.

2,200 Marines in theAdriatic.

27 Multiple-LaunchRocket Systems(MLRS)

36 Bradley InfantryFighting Vehicles

M1A1 Main BattleTanks

18 High MobilityMultipurposeWheeled Vehicle(HMMWV)

Surface Action GroupPhilippine Sea (Cruiser)

Gonzales (Destroyer)

Nicholson (Destroyer)

Thorn (Destroyer)

Detroit (Escort)

Carrier Battle GroupTheodore Roosevelt(Aircraft Carrier - 5,500personnel and 80 aircraft)

Leyte Gulf (Cruiser)

Vella Gulf (Cruiser)

Halyburton (Frigate)

Ross (Frigate)

Albuquerque (Submarine)

Artic (Combat Support)

Amphibious ReadyGroupNassau (Cruiser)

Nashville (Cruiser)

Pensacola (Frigate)

Submarine SquadronNorfolk (Attack Sub)

Miami (Attack Sub)

2 B2 Spirit StealthBombers14 B-52 Stratofortress(Bomber/air launched cruisemissile - operate out of UK)

5 B-1B Lancer(Bomber)

15 F-18 Hornet(Bomber/air superiorityfighter)

60 F-15 Strike Eagle(Bomber/air superiorityfighter)

64 F16 FightingFalcon(Ground attack/interceptor)

24 F-117 Nighthawk(Stealth fighter/bomber)

14 A-10 Thunderbolt(Tankbuster)

5 U2 /TR1 (intelligencegathering)

2 E-6 JSTARS(Strategic surveillance/battlemanagement)

2-E-3 Sentry AWACS20 KC 135R(Reconnaissance)

19 EA-6B Prowler(Electronic Warfare)

8 AV-8B Prowler(Electronic Warfare)

5 C-130 Hercules(Electronic Warfare)

12 C-130 HerculesPredator(Unmanned surveillancedrone)

4 P-3 Orion(Maritime Patrol)

78 KC-135/10(Inflight refuelling)


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24 AH-64 Apache(Attack Helicopter)

26 UH-60 Black Hawk/CH-47D(Utility/heavy dutyhelicopter)

United Kingdom

Personnel Land Equipment Naval Vessels Aircraft

6,300 in Macedonia Allof these forces, and thoseof other allies, are nowunder the operationalcontrol of General SirMike Jackson.

Medical Force inFYR MacedoniaAround 250 personnel of2 Armed FieldAmbulance Group aredeployed as an element of4 Brigade to FYRMacedonia. It has beendeployed in support ofthe brigade, but has beenclosely involved in thehumanitarian supportprovided by Britishforces.

28 Challenger Tank12 AS-90 (Howitzer)

86 Warrior ArmouredFighting Vehicles

20 Scimitar ArmouredFighting Vehicles

4 Striker ArmouredRecce Vehicles

1 Aircraft CarrierInvincible

2 SubmarinesEnterprise - Nuclearsubmarine

Splendid - AttackSubmarine with cruisemissiles

2 FrigatesSomersetIron DukeGrafton (with FrenchCarrier Group)

1 DestroyerNewcastle

2 Fleet AuxiliaryFort AustinFort GrangeBailey

10 L-1011 (TristarTanker)

3 E-3 Sentry12 GR-7 Harrier(Ground attack jump jets)

7 FA2 Sea Harrier8 Tornado GR1(Bomber – operatingfrom Bruggen Germany)

1 PR-9 Canberra(Maritime patrol)

5 Chinook Helicopters

2 Puma Helicopters

3 VC10 (Tankers-operating from BrizeNorton)

1 Nimrod R


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Other NATO Contributors:

Country Equipment/PersonnelBelgium 10 F-16Canada Aircraft:

12 F-18 (40 pilots- over 100 sorties flown)

Ground Forces:

800 Troops and 280 vehicles will be deploying to FYRMacedonia in preparation for their employment in Kosovo.They do not have a mandate to operate in a combat role.The main component of the Canadian force will be areconnaissance squadron equipped with 8 helicopters.

Denmark 6 F-16France Aircraft:

6 Jaguar(Ground Attack Fighter)

7 Mirage 2000C(Fighter)

10 Mirage 2000D(Bomber)

2 Mirage F1CR2 Mirage IV P1 Transall C160 Gabriel4 Etendard IV P(Air defence - naval)

14 Super Etendard(Strike-attack - naval)

Navy:

French Carrier Group - FochOrage - Ouragan-class Landing Ship Dock with 100personnel from the 1st Airborne Hussar Regiment and anunspecified number of troops from the 17th AirborneEngineering Regiment. Deployed in support of AFOR.

Ground Forces:

2600 Troops - French contribution to KFOR. Includesarmoured personnel carriers and reconnaissance vehicles.


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Germany Aircraft:

14 Tornado(8 anti-radar, 6 reconnaissance)

1 C-160 Transall (Cargo)CL-289 UAV

Ground Forces:

4000 troops (approx) - in support of KFOR. Equipmentincludes:32 Leopard Tanks32 Marder Infantry Combat Vehicles30 Fuchs Armoured Personnel Carriers24 Luchs Reconnaissance Vehicles1 Bridgelayer10 Helicopters

Italy Aircraft:

6 Tornado2 Alena AMX(Ground attack fighter)

Ground Forces:

2000 troops - Italian contribution to Operation AlliedHarbour in Albania

Netherlands 16 F-164 F-60 (Transport)

2 KC-10 (Inflight refuelling)

2 F-50 (Transport)

1 Gulfstream (Transport)

2 C130H Hercules2 CH-47 Chinook helicopter

Norway 6 F-161 C-130

Portugal 6 F-16Spain 4 F-18

1 KC-1301 CASA 212

Turkey Aircraft:11 F-16

Ground ForceTurkey has allocated a mechanised infantry battalion toNATO should the alliance send ground forces into Kosovo.


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Appendix 2: Summary of Yugoslav Forces

Overall Numbers

Army strength: 90,000 (37,000 conscripts) and possibly 150,000 reservists.Naval strength: 15,000Air Force strength: 15,000.

Main Bases

1st Army: Belgrade, Novi Sad, Sombor, Kraljevo, Pancevo, Pozarevac, Kragujevac,Sremska Mitrovica, Sabac, Valjevo.

2nd Army: Podgorica, Uzice, Niksic, Danilovgrad, Raska, Novi Pazar, Cacak, Kremna.

3rd Army: Nis, Pristina, Krusevac, Prokuplje, Kursumlija, Leskovac, Vranje, Pirot.

Yugoslav Forces in Kosovo

Total Strength: NATO intelligence estimates that there are approximately 43,000Yugoslav troops and paramilitary police now operating in Kosovo. They are reportedlyequipped with around 300 tanks and 150 artillery pieces There are also between 15,000 to21,000 Serb troops on the perimeter of Kosovo. These forces are equipped with tanks andAPCs. Serb forces around the Kosovo border are divided into deployed forces, garrisonforces, and reserve forces. The deployed forces have about 96 tanks, and the garrisonforces have around 30 tanks in garrison. There is a concentration of Yugoslav troopsalong the border between Kosovo and FYR Macedonia. These forces have been buildingup for several weeks.

52 (Pristina) Corps. HQ Pristina. Subordinate to the VJ 3rd Army.

Role: Protect the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; protect keyinstallations, force protection of deployed troops and equipment and keeping the internallines of communication open.

Locations: Pristina, Pec, Prizren, Kosovska Mitrovica, Urosevac, Djakovica, Gnjilane.Currently deployed on operations in Kosovo.

Ministry of Interior Police (MUP) in Kosovo

Role: Internal security as well as all the other police related tasks. The MUP has two sub-organisations, the SAJ (specialist anti-terrorist police) and the PJP (combat police forces).


74

Locations: Largely co-located with the VJ in their barracks. They man all thecheckpoints on the main roads.

Numbers: Vary according to operational need. Peaked at approximately 13,000, fallen toabout 9,000 now. Peacetime strength approximately 6,000.

Key Equipment

Yugoslav Army: Mechanised Forces

1,270 tanks, including T-72s, T-34s, T-55s and M-84s and 805 armoured fightingvehicles.

Main Battle TanksType Number

M-84 239T-72 65T-55 785T-34 181

M-84 tank. An updated copy of the Russian T-72. An effective vehicle but rarely seen inKosovo in any numbers.

T-55 tank. An old Russian tank that is the mainstay of the VJ armoured forces. Late 1940's design but still reliable.

Armoured Vehicles

Type NumberM-80 568M-60P 169BOV VP M-86 68

M-80 Armoured Fighting Vehicle (AFV). A copy of the Russian BMP-1 AFV.

BOV-M APC. A wheeled reconnaissance vehicle.

Anti-Aircraft Guns: 1,850

BOV-3. Self-propelled Anti-Aircraft Gun (SPAAG). A BOV-M chassis with atriple mounted 20mm cannon in a turret. Used in the ground role to good effect.


75

PRAGA. An armoured truck with a twin-mounted 30mm cannon. A SPAAG that hasbeen used to great effect against houses and infantry.

Air Force:

240 combat aircraft, including MiG-21s and MiG-29s, and 48 attack helicopters.

Type NumberMiG-29 Less than 10 remainingMiG-21 70J-22 Orao 30Galeb 50G4 Super Galeb 10Armed Helicopters -Gazelle

48

MiG-29 Fulcrum. A relatively modern Russian fighter. Multi-role tactical fighter forcontrol of upper air space and ground attack. The most modern aircraft in the Yugoslavinventory.

MiG-21 Fishbed. A 1960s designed air defence fighter. Old, but still capable. The AirForce has about 70 of these aircraft.

J-22 Orao. An indigenously designed fighter, ground attack aircraft. Slow and relativelyunmanoeuvrable.

G-4 Super Galeb. Advanced trainer, similar to the British Aerospace Hawk.

Anti-Aircraft Forces:

100 surface-to-air missiles: a mix of SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, SA-7, SA-9, SA-13, SA-14 andSA-16. All of these pose a significant threat to NATO airpower. Yugoslavia also has1,850 air defence artillery pieces. Although not as effective as the missiles, these aredangerous to NATO planes.

Type NumberSA-2 24SA-3 16SA-6 60

Strategic Systems. SA-2, 3 and SA-6 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). The first two areold, but have a high ceiling. The latter is a very effective medium level missile. It hasalready been used in anger in Bosnia and was the weapon responsible for shooting downUSAF Capt Scott O'Grady's F-16 in 1995.


76

Tactical Systems. SA-9 and 13. Essentially the same missile; the first is mounted on awheeled chassis, the second on a tracked chassis. Both capable.

Man portable systems. SA-7, 16 and 18. These are single shot shoulder launchedmissiles similar to the US Stinger and the UK Blowpipe/Javelin. The SA-16s and 18s arethe latest and most capable.

Navy

Vessel NumberSubmarines 4

Frigates 4Patrol Craft 34

Mine Warfare 16Amphibious 20

Command and Control

Command is exercised by the President (Milosevic) who is the chairman of the SupremeDefence Council. Command is delegated to Lt Col Gen Ojdanic who is the Chief of theVJ General Staff. All forces are subordinate to him. Orders are then cascaded to theArmy Commanders, the Navy and the Air/Air Defence forces and then down to the Corpsand the Brigade Commanders.

The MUP is commanded by the Interior Minister which also controls the State SecurityDirectorates, which have their own specialists. In Kosovo the work of the Army and theMUP is co-ordinated. A clear chain of command goes from Pristina via Nis to Belgrade.

Command, Control and Communications links are modern and have built in redundancy.They are protected and have multiple alternative communications nodes.

Sources: MOD web site at http://www.mod.uk Department of Defense web site athttp://www.defenselink.mil/specials/kosovo/ , International Institute for Strategic Studies,The Military Balance 1997-98.


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Appendix 3 - UK Ground Forces in FYR Macedonia

Key British Armoured Units in/being deployed to FYR MacedoniaUnit Peacetime Location Equipment4 Armoured Brigade MainHQ

Osnabruck

Kings Royal Hussars BattleGroup HQ and A Sqn

Munster 14 Challenger 1 Tanks

No 1 Company Irish Guards Munster 14 Warrior ArmouredInfantry Fighting Vehicles

Burma Company Kings OwnRoyal Border Regiment

Catterick 14 Warrior ArmouredInfantry Fighting Vehicles

HQ 4 Regiment RoyalArtillery and 88 Battery

Osnabruck 6 AS90 155mm SelfPropelled Guns

Also under commandsoldiers from 5 RegimentRoyal Artillery & 47Regiment Royal Artillery

Topcliffe & Thorney Island High Velocity Missile

Army Air Corps Wattisham 3 x Lynx

The following units are in the process of being deployed1 Irish Guards Battle GroupHQ and 1 Rifle Company,Support and HQ Companies

Munster 8 Scimitar ArmouredReconnaissance Vehicles

44 Warrior ArmouredInfantry Fighting Vehicles

Squadron from the KingsRoyal Hussars

Munster 14 Challenger 1 Tanks

Company from the GreenHowards Regiment

Osnabruck 14 Warrior ArmouredInfantry Fighting Vehicles

52 Battery 4 Regiment RoyalArtillery

Osnabruck 6 AS90 155mm SelfPropelled Guns

26 Armoured EngineerSquadron

Hohne Various Armoured EngineerVehicles including ArmouredVehicle Launched Bridges

Squadron from theHousehold Cavalry Regiment

Windsor 12 Scimitar ArmouredReconnaissance Vehicles 4Striker Armoured RecceVehicles with SwingfireAnti-Tank Missiles

Source: MOD at http://www.army.mod.uk/army


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Appendix 4 - RAF Strike Missions

Operation Allied Force - RAF Strike MissionsDate Aircraft Involved Target Weapon Used24/5 March 6 Harrier GR7 Ammunition storage facility Paveway II25/6 March 6 Harrier GR7 Ammunition storage facility at

LeskovacPaveway II

27 March No bombing missions due to poor weather28/9 March 4 Harrier GR7 Ammunition storage facility near

PristinaPaveway II

30 March – 3April

No bombing missions due to poor weather

4 April Harriers 'Seek-and-destroy' over westernKosovo

No targetsallocated

4/5 April 6 Tornados Main supply routes between Serbiaand Kosovo

-

5 April Harriers 'Seek-and-destroy' over southernKosovo

No targetsallocated

5/6 April Tornados &Harriers

Fuel storage facility near Pristina

6 April Harriers Military convoy, tanks BL-755 clustermunitions

6/7 April Tornados HQ and storage complex nearPristina

7 April Harriers Military vehicle compound inKosovo

BL-755

8 April Harriers Military vehicle compound andparked military vehicles in westernKosovo

BL-755

10 April Harriers Military storage area and militaryrelay station in Kosovo

11 April Harriers SAM battery and military vehicles 1,000lb bombs11/12 April Harriers Petrol storage facility in Kosovo12 April Harriers Mobile Serbian military targets 1,000lb bombs12/13 April Tornados Obrva airfield and ammunition

depot near Pristina13 April Harriers Fuel dump near Pristina and

military relay station and radar sitein Kosovo

RBL-755munitions and1,000lb bombs

14 April Harriers Ammunition dump in Kosovo 1,000lb bombs14/15 April Tornados Army barracks and airfield Paveway II15 April Harriers Command and Control facilities in

Pristina, artillery/ anti-aircraft sites


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16 April Harriers Pristina Army Corps tactical HQ RBL-75517 April Harriers Serbian Army APCs and vehicles RBL-75517/18 April Tornados Military radar relay site in Serbia -19 April Harriers Serbian Army unit near Urosevac

airfield, mobile Command Post andPOL facility at Pristina

-

20 April Harriers Serbian Army Command Post inKosovo

1,000lb bombs

21 April 4 Harrier GR7 Serbian Army Command Post inKosovo

1,000lb bombs

22 April No bombing missions due to poor weather23 April Harrier Military command posts BL-75524 April No bombing missions due to poor weather25 April Harrier – 20

sortiesRoad bridge, Army Command Post,airfield in Kosovo

RBL-7551,000Ib bombs

26 April No bombing missions due to poor weather27 April 15 Harrier sorties Besinje ammunition storage depot RBL-755


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Appendix 5: Airlifts funded by DFID

Date Journey Cargo Load31March

Manston to Tirana Tents + blankets* 24 MT

31March

RAF Lyneham-Prestwick-Thessalonica

Tents and blankets* 13 MT

01 April Amsterdam-Geneva-Tirana Trucks and health kits 17 MT02 April Copenhagen-Tirana UNHCR blankets*; Oxfam

equip19 MT

03 April Copenhagen-Manston-Tirana Aircraft Handling Package 36 MT03 April Copenhagen-Skopje Blankets* 36 MT04 April RAF Lyneham-Tirana medical supplies (WHO) 11 MT04 April Pisa-Skopje WFP Rations** 35 MT04 April Manston-Tirana-Skopje Forklifts; 4x4s, tents 38MT05 April Stansted-Tirana Tents + blankets* 40MT06 April Dubai-Tirana Tents* 38MT07 April Dubai-Tirana Tents* 40MT07 April RAF Lyneham-Tirana-Skopje DFID Vehicle, Sleeping bags 12MT08 April Bergen-Skopje tinned fish and biscuits (WFP) 41MT08 April RAF Lyneham-Tirana Oxfam equipment, Sleeping

bags12MT

09 April Manston - Tirana Vehicles, handling equipment,bedding

26MT

09 April Bergen - Tirana Tinned fish and biscuits 38MT

10 April Manston - Skopje Vehicles, handling equipment,bedding

40MT

10 April Malaga - Skopje Vehicles 25MT10 April Dubai - Tirana Tents 40MT11 April Cairo - Skopje Kitchen sets 26MT11 April Billund - Tirana Blankets and plastic sheeting 40MT13 April RAF Lyneham - Tirana Sleeping bags 12MT13 April Copenhagen-Tirana Water kits, health kits and

blankets40MT

13 April Billund - Tirana blankets and plastic sheeting 40MT13 April Cairo - Tirana Kitchen sets 40MT14 April Stanstead -Thessalonika DFID convoy 90MT15 April Malaga-Tirana Vehicles and wheat flour 40 MT16 April Malaga-Tirana vehicles and wheat flour 40MT16 April Manston- Tirana DFID convoy 48 MT18 April Billund - Tirana Blankets and plastic sheeting 40MT

* Cargo funded by UNHCR ** Cargo funded by WFP

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