kreidie and monroe -- psychological boundaries and ethnic conflict

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Psychological Boundaries and Ethnic Conflict: How Identity Constrained Choice and Workedto Turn Ordinary People into Perpetrators of Ethnic Violence during the Lebanese Civil WarAuthor(s): Lina Haddad Kreidie and Kristen Renwick MonroeSource: International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Fall, 2002), pp.5-36Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20020146.

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2/33


3/33

6

Kreidie and Monroe

my

father.

They

cursed

me

and said. 'Look what

we

are

going

to

do

to

you

in

front

of

your

father.

'

They raped

me,

one

after

the other.

Then

they

shot

me

in

my

left

hand and

left

leg.

I

became

paralyzed.

My

father

then said

to

me,

"May

God be with

you,

"

and he

died. I will

never

forget

this....

Help

me

I

am

desperate,

and

I

am

ready

to

fight.

I

pray

that

war

happens again_If

I

see

them,

I

will kill them with

my

bare hands

Oh,

my

God,

their

voices

are

in

my

ears

I

hate

this.

I

do

not want

to

talk about this

anymore.

I

am

tired

of living

like this.

Saud,

Witness

to

Sharon's

participation

in the Sabra Shatila massacres of 1982

An

important

but

unanswered

question

in

discussions

of

genocide

and

ethnic conflict

concerns

the

psychology

of the combatants and the

perpe

trators.

What is

it

that

has

to

happen

to

ordinary people1?someone

like

Saud?to

turn

them into

individuals

capable

of

committing

atrocities,

often

against people

they

have lived with in

peace

for centuries?

A

vast

literature

exists

on

the sudden

eruption

of

identity-based

conflicts,

and

deciphering

the

causes

precipitating

such

conflicts

has become

a

primary

concern

among

both social

scientists

and

policy

makers. Saud

reminds

us

of the human di

mension

to

our

intellectual

analyses.

She

illustrates

a

point

made

by

Gross

(2000)

in

discussing

the Poles and the Holocaust:

it

was

neighbors

who

did

the

dirty job.

Human

beings

are

not

born into

categories

of

perpetrators,

bystanders

or

victims.

They

are

made that

way

by

events,

and

today's

victim

can

become

tomorrow's

perpetrator

in

a

vicious

cycle

of

retaliation.

Un

derstanding

the

psychological

aspect

of this

problem?why

some

ordinary

people

nonetheless

perform

deeds

we

usually

associate

with madmen

or

sadists?is what

drives

our

research

on

the

ethnic

violence in

Lebanon.2

The

paper

presents

the

results

of

a

narrative

analysis

of

interviews

with

five

ordinary people

who

participated

in

acts

of

ethnic

violence

during

the

Lebanese Civil

War.

Our

results

come

from

a

pilot

project

and,

as

has

been

noted with

oral interviews

concerning

other traumatic

events

(Langer

1991,

Monroe

2001), speakers

are

often

confused

and

ambivalent

in

describing

their

experiences.

Despite

these

limitations,

however,

the

interviews

present

striking

evidence

that

identity

constrains

choice

for

all

individuals,

regardless

of

their

particular

ideological

or

socioeconomic

demographic

background.

This

finding

is

significant,

given

the

hegemonic

influence

of rational choice

theory

in social

science

(Monroe

1991,

1996;

Green

and

Shapiro

1994).

Once

the

importance

of

identity

is

established,

the

next

step

is

for

scholars

to determine how identity exerts its psychological influence. As

a

first step

in this

direction,

we

situate

our

analysis

in

a

social

psychological

framework

and

ask what

insight

the

major

theories

concerning identity

reveal

about the

people

we

interviewed.3

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4/33

Psychological

Boundaries and Ethnic Conflict

7

Part

1

summarizes

the

social

psychological

literature

we

might

expect

to

find

most

relevant for ethnic

conflict. Our

questioning

of

subjects

was

in

formed

by

this

literature,

and

tried

to

address

some

of the

subtle

differences

in

the

approaches

we

found. We

appreciate

the

limitations of

an

examination

constructed

on

the

basis

of

a

few

interviews,

and

hope

future

analysts

can

build

on

our

initial

attempts

as

they

craft

questions

to

analyze

a

wide

range

of

approaches

to

ethnic violence. Part

2

describes

our

research methodol

ogy

and

gives

the

particulars

of

our case

study,

a

narrative

analysis

of

five

perpetrators

of violence

during

the

Lebanese

civil

war

from

1975

to

1989.

Part 3 presents our empirical findings, which suggest the tremendous power

of

identity

and

perceptions

of self

in

relation

to

others

to

determine

political

action.

SOCIAL

PSYCHOLOGICAL

INFLUENCES

ON ETHNIC

VIOLENCE

In

general, analyses

of

ethnic

violence and

genocide

fall

into three

cat

egories.

(1)

Societal

or

structural

analyses,

widely

utilized

by sociologists,

economists

and

political

scientists,

emphasize

the

association

of

particular

behaviors with certain

cultures,

classes

or

ethnic

groups.

Such

analyses

stress

the

importance

of

economic hard

times,

governmental

policies

or

technolog

ical

changes

on

individual

patterns

of behavior.

(2)

Individual level

analysis,

frequently

used

by

clinical

or

personality

psychologists, explain

behavior

in terms

of

a

person's

unique

life

history

and

psychological

characteristics.

Such works

assume

that

personality

traits?such

as

Adorno's authoritarian

personality?explain why

individuals behave

as

they

do.

Highlighting

per

sonality

differences also

helps explain why

two

dissimilar

people

thus would

react

quite differently

to

the

same

situation. The

emphasis

in

this

approach

is

on

individual differences

in

childhood

experiences

and

in

personality

or

psychological adjustment.

(3)

Falling

somewhere between

the

macro

and

the

microlevel

explanations,

social

psychological analysis

is

more

interper

sonal than

societal

or

individual.

It

focuses

more

on

how

immediate

social

influences?other

people

in

the

environment,

their

attitudes

and

behaviors,

and their

relationship

to

the

individual

actor?explain

whether

the

actor

will

engage

in-group

conflict.

Explanations

of

genocide

and

ethnic

violence

utilizing

this

approach

tend

to

focus

not

on

the individual

pathology

of

geno

cide

(such

as

a

childhood

of

abuse)

or

the

psychological

dislocation

resulting

from

macropolitical phenomena

(such

as

wars

or

political

disintegration

of

empires). Instead, the social psychologist asks what kinds of interpersonal

situations

might

create

the

feelings

necessary

to

trigger

or

increase violent

behavior

that then

turns

into

genocide

or

ethnic

violence.4 This is

the

ap

proach

followed here.5



5/33

8

Kreidie

and

Monroe

This

study

takes

advantage

of

an

unusual

access

to

Lebanese

fighters

who

deliberately

killed

civilians.

Analysis

of

such individuals

is

usually

con

ducted

through legal

testimony

in

which the

person

who

committed

the

violence is

defending

himself

against

possible

legal

punishment

(Browning

1992,

Goldhagen 1996),

through journalistic

interviews in

which

there is

a

heavy component

of

ideological

and

political ground

to

be

gained,

or

through

biographies

in

which

there is

a

pronounced

stress

on

self-evaluation

and self

justification

(Speer

1970,

Serany

1995).6

Our research

focused

on

two

kinds

of

influences.

The first

concerned

the situational factors the

perpetrators

of ethnic violence felt were critical

in

their

actions. These

included

the

standard

social

psychological

variables,

of

the

kind

found

significant

in

Browning's

work

on

the

ordinary

men

who

engaged

in

killing

Jews

in

Poland

and

reviewed in

the

social

psychological

literature

summarized below

(section

2).

But

we

also

considered

questions

about

basic

identity

factors,

of

the

kind made

central

by

virtue

ethicists

(Kupperman

1991;

Trianosky 1986)

in

an

attempt

to

link

the

social

psycho

logical

to

work

on

moral

psychology (Monroe

2001).

Our

particular

goal

is

to

discover

how

personal identity

becomes

reconceptualized

in

a

manner

that

enables

an

individual

to kill

fellow

citizens

and to

inquire

about

how

these

actions,

in

turn,

feed back

into

and

modify

the

person's

sense

of

self. Our

work thus

focuses

on

the

inter-related

role

of

personal

and

group

identity

as

played

out

in

ethnic

conflict.

This

paper

builds

on

earlier

work

on

the

constraints of

identity

on

choice

(Monroe

1996,

2001)

and

on

work

on

the

importance

of

identity

for

Islamic

political

movements

in

particular

(Euban

1995,

Kreidie

and

Monroe

1997).

The

specific

instance of

ethnic

violence

in which

we

test

our

ideas is

the Lebanese Civil

War.

We

adopt

a

narrative

analysis

(Patterson

and

Monroe

1998)

of

interviews with

men

who killed

civilians in different

villages

and

refugee

camps

between

1975-1982.

Questions

and Controversies Addressed:

The Relevant

Literature

There

is

a

small

but

important body

of work

suggesting identity

con

strains choice

(Monroe

1994,1996;

Ringma 1996),

and

one

of

our concerns

was

to

determine whether the moral

constraints Monroe found

operative

during

the Holocaust

were

also

present

in

other instances of ethnic

violence.

There

is

a

further

body

of

literature

on

the social

psychological

aspect

of

iden

tity;

while this literature

does

not

explicitly

make

the

connection between

identity and choice, we drew heavily from this material in constructing our

interviews.

One

of

our

goals

is

to

encourage

future discussions

to

ask

which

social-psychological

process

most

fully

captures

the

empirical reality

for

our

subjects.



6/33

Psychological

Boundaries

and Ethnic

Conflict

9

Rational

Choice

and Realistic

Conflict Theory

The rational

choice

approach

suggests

there

are

tangible

costs

and ben

efits

to

be

gained

from

conflict and that

participants

act

in

accordance

with

a

rational

calculus.

Realistic

conflict

theory (Campbell

1965,

Insko

et

al

1991)

adopts

the

basic

premises

of rational

choice

theory

in

assuming intergroup

conflict

originates

in the

perceptions

of

group

members with

regard

to

the

real

competition

between

groups

for

scarce resources.

From this

perspec

tive,

it is

rational

for

group

members

to

maximize

their

own

resources

at

the

expense of competing groups. This focus on the rational basis of intergroup

competition

is

important,

especially

when

complemented by

psychological

models that

can

account

for the

generation

of

discriminatory

stereotypes

about

the

out-group,

which

we

argue

is

a

less than

rational

process

as

tradi

tionally

defined

(Monroe

1991;

Green

and

Shapiro

1994).

To

test

for this kind

of

influence,

we

asked

the

perpetrators

about the kind of threat

they

felt

and

the benefit

they expected

from

taking

a

role

in the

battles in Lebanon. As

Saud's remark

illustrates,

concrete

events

do have

important

psychological

effects.

We

tried

in

our

analysis

to

determine

whether these

objective

events

were as

important

as

the shifts

in

social

identity

they

often

precipitated;

we

then

tried

to

calculate the relative

significance

of each.

In

contrast

to

this

approach

is the

view

that

behavior

might

be influenced

less

by

actual realities

and

more

by

cognitive

factors,

e.g.,

the

thoughts,

feel

ings,

beliefs,

or

pieces

of

knowledge

held

by participants

in

conflict.

Lewis

(2002)

has

suggested

the

perceptions

of "the other"

are

particularly

im

portant

in

the Islamic world's

response

to

the West.We thus

focused

on

understanding

how the mental

structures

our

respondents

used

to

organize

knowledge

of

the

socio-political

world

might

influence

the

information

they

noticed

and remembered.

Here,

we

found twelve theories

that focused

on

identity

but which

differed

slightly

in

suggesting

how

identity

worked

to

influence

political

behavior.

Social

Identity Theory

That

part

of

an

individual's

self-concept

which

originates

in

his/her

membership

in

a

social

group(s),

along

with

the

importance

and

the

emo

tional

import

attached

to

that

group

membership,

is

referred

to

as

social

identity.

Associated with the Bristol

school,

social

identity theory suggests

identities are produced from social comparisons. It situates the drive for so

cial

identity

in the

need for social

value and

personal

esteem

in

group

bias.

Because

people

have

cognitive

limitations in

processing

information,

they

develop

sch?mas and

stereotypes

of

social

groups.



7/33

10

Kreidie

and

Monroe

Originating

in

Festinger's

work

on

social

comparisons

(1954),

social

identity theory

argues

that individuals have

a

tendency

to

compare

them

selves with others

who

are

similar

to

or

slightly

better

on

relevant dimen

sions. Self-evaluations and

opinions

grow

from such

experiences.

Bruner's

(1957) finding

that

people

overestimate the size

of

objects

they perceive

to

be

valuable,

such

as

a

coin,

was

enlarged

upon

by

Tajfel (1959)

to

theorize

that overestimation is

a

process

whereby

individuals

accentuate

differences

in order

to

make

categorizations.

These theoretical

developments

suggested

that individuals

indeed do

compare

themselves

to

others,

but

usually

do

so

as members of groups.

The

consideration

of the self in relation

to

groups

orients the research

on

social

identity.

Individuals

are

motivated

to

maintain

high

self-esteem,

and identification

with

a

group

will lead

to

social

comparisons

that allow the

individuals

to

continually

evaluate themselves in

a

positive light.

As

individ

uals

identify

themselves with

others

on

the

basis

of

characteristics

such

as

gender,

race

or

socioeconomic

status,

they

also

form

negative feelings

about

the

groups

that

are

excluded

from

their self-definition.

This

leads

to

devalu

ation of

out-groups.

Thus,

social

comparisons

in

intergroup settings

seem

to

attain

a

positively

valued

distinctiveness from other

groups

(Tajfel 1971).

Tajfel's

conclusions

were

derived from

experimental

work.

To

test

these

ideas

in

nonlaboratory

settings,

we

asked

about social

identity

as

a

result of

social

comparisons.

How did

our

subjects

view

the

enemy?

Why

did

they

have

negative

feelings

about

the members

of

the

out-group?

If

they

held

such

feelings,

why

did these

feeling emerge?

What

encouraged

the

growth

of

these

feelings?

Did social

comparisons

with

out-group

members

affect

the

way

the

subjects

felt

about themselves?

Why

did

they

kill these

people?

Was it

because

of

group

memberships?

Group

Identification

and

Self-Esteem

What

motivations

underlie

individual identification

with

groups?

Both

Tajfel

and

Turner

(1979)

and Oakes

and

Turner

(1980) hypothesize

that

the

need for

self-esteem

is

a

prime

motivator

of

intergroup

behavior,

and

therefore

individual

action.

Turner

(1982,

1987)

argues

that since

the need

for

positive

self-esteem

drives

individuals,

group

members will

categorize

themselves

into

groups

and

then

negatively

evaluate

out-groups.

This

pro

cess

frequently

takes

the

form of

negative

stereotyping

or

discrimination.

Successful intergroup discrimination thus enhances social identity and ele

vates

self-esteem.

But

self-esteem

also

can

motivate

a

person

to

overcome

threats

to

self-esteem

by

promoting

intergroup

discrimination

(Abrams

and

Hogg

1990:

33).



8/33

Psychological

Boundaries and Ethnic

Conflict

11

Turner's work has

not

always

been

supported

by empirical

research,

and

some

researchers

conclude

that self-esteem

is

one

of

many

motivating

forces that

surfaces

in

varying

degrees,

depending

on

the

situation.

While

it is

generally

believed

that

self-esteem

does motivate individuals

to

par

ticipate

in

groups,

and

to

discriminate

against

out-group

members,

other

evidence

suggests

the

need

to

modify

this conclusion. Some

groups

do

not

always

negatively

evaluate

out-groups

of

comparable

status,

at

times

evalu

ating

them

more

highly

on

relevant

dimensions,

and

at

other

times

evaluating

them

more

highly

than

some

in-group

members. We

find

one

stark

example

of this in the Middle East conflict. Despite the intensity of the Arab-Israeli

conflict,

Arab-Americans view

Jewish-Americans

living

in

the United

States

as a

more

coherent

and

powerful

group

than

any

Arab-American

organi

zation.

They

even

view

Israeli

leaders

as more

competent

than

the

Arab

leaders

(Kreidie

1988).

On

the other

hand,

a

kind

of "black

sheep"

effect

(Levine

1980)

suggests

consistently

deviant

group

members

are

rejected by

conforming

group

members in order

to

maintain

group

cohesion

and

con

sistency.

We asked

our

respondents

about this

phenomenon

in

a

variety

of

ways.

We

also

asked,

what made

subjects

different from

the other

group?

Why

did

they

choose

to

identify

with

one

certain

group

and

not

the other?

What

happened

that made

them

join

the

group?

The

political/military fight

ing?

Was

group

identity

a

factor

in

their discrimination

against

members of

the

out-group?

How effective did

they

view the

Lebanese leaders of their

own

group?

And

how

do

they

view

them

in

comparison

with

leaders

of

the

other

group(s)?

Do

Cognitive

Limitations Result

in

Reliance

on

Schema and

Stereotypes?

One

reason

people rely

on

group

biases

may

be

cognitive

limitations

in

processing complex

information

(Lakoff

and

Johnson

1999).

Schema

the

ory

offers

an

important

approach

for

understanding

social

identity.

It

argues

(Kihlstrom

and

Cantor

1984)

that the self is

represented mentally

in

a

hierar

chically

ordered series

of

"context-specific

self-concepts,"

each

representing

beliefs

about

the

self

in

various

social

situations.

Thus,

people

have

cate

gories

for

themselves,

just

as

they

have sch?mas for

others.

Having

multiple

sch?mas leads

to

"self-complexity"

which

may

act

as a

buffer

against

threats

to

identity.

To

test

this

view,

we

asked whether

our

interviewees

felt threat

ened

in

one

sphere

and then

cognitively compensated

for

the

attack

on

this

identity by

conceptualizing

of

themselves

as

superior

or

powerful

in other

ar

eas (Linville 1987). Alternatively, a person may have negative self-schemas

that

would

consist of

categories

of

negative

traits

that do

not

characterize

the

individual,

and

may

be

more

easily

accessed than

positive

self-schemas.

To

test

this

position,

we

inquired

about

self-image.

How did

subjects

describe



9/33

12

Kreidie and Monroe

their

self-images?

Where and how did these

images

develop?

How did these

images

shift

over

time,

and

in

response

to

what

situations

or

framing?

Is

self-image

affected

by

participation

in

acts

of

ethnic

violence?

Self-Identity

as an

Outgrowth

of

Role

Theory

Self-categorization

is

not

the

only approach

to

social

identity.

Sarbin

and

Scheibe

(1983)

suggest

social

identity

emanates

from roles and

that

roles

are

the natural

starting point

for

understanding

social

identity.

Their

model

emphasizes

three factors:

(1)

status

or

position

in

a

social

structure

that conforms

to

a

set

of

expectations

held

by

members

of

a

relevant

society,

a

notion

qualitatively

different from

role;

(2)

involvement,

or

the

intensity

with which

a

role is

enacted;

and

(3)

positive

or

negative

valuation

of

these

two

dimensions.

To

test

this

model,

we

inquired

about

the social

status

of

the

perpetrators

in

their

family

and social

surroundings

and

what role

they

took

in

the

fighting.

Were

subjects

in

roles

or

positions

that led

to

certain

expectations

about

their behavior? If

so,

were

these

expectations

relevant

for

their acts?

If

so,

how?

Categorization

We

next

explored

one

especially

troubling

implication

of

social

identity

theory:

the

suggestion

that

although perceptions

of

competition

for

scarce

re

sources

reinforce

in-group/out-group

distinctions,

genocide

and

racism

may,

in

fact,

simply

be extreme manifestations

of

normal

group

identification and

behavior.

The

social

identity approach

leaves

undefined

the

kinds

of

situ

ational

factors

and

processes

that affect

(1)

which

group

categories

form,

(2)

which

group

identifications

become

most

salient

in

particular

contexts

and

(3)

how these

identifications

escalate

into

violence.

Not

all differences

become

politicized

or

violent;

in

fact,

a

wide

range

of

group

identities

coexists

peacefully

in

most

times and

places.

We

posed

many

questions

for intervie

wees

about

group

categories,

how these

categories

shift

over

time,

and

what

function

these

categories

serve

for

our

perpetrators.

We also considered

several

other literatures that

rely

on

different

psychological

mechanisms

to

understand

ethnic

violence.

These

literatures

include

models

of

symbolic

racism,

social

representations

and

poststructuralist

theories

of conflict.

Models of Symbolic Racism

Models of

symbolic

racism

(Sears

1993, 1988;

Kinder

and

Sears

1981)

argue

that

racism is

based

on

symbolic

dispositions

learned

early

in life.



10/33

Psychological


13

These

dispositions,

though

latent

for the

most

part,

can

be elicited

in

certain

contexts to

produce

racist

attitudes

and behavior. Because of its

ability

to

account

for the

contexts

in

which

symbolic

dispositions

become

"activated,"

the

symbolic

racism

approach

offers

interesting insights

and

methodologies

for

the

analysis

of

the

critical

shift

of

perception

that

occurs

between self

and

other

in

cases

of

genocide

and racism.

To test

this

approach,

we

asked

the

people

in

our

sample

about

symbolic dispositions

toward Muslims/

Maronites/etc. learned

early

in life and how

socialization

by

schools,

par

ents,

media,

and

religious

groups

affected the

subjects

(Kreidie 1988).

Social

Representations

Moscovici

(1988)

and

Doise

(1988)

suggest

collective

meanings

are

gen

erated

through

the

act

of

communication

between

individuals. This

approach

accepts

the

validity

of

realistic

conflict

theory

by

agreeing

that there is often

a

real material

or

political

interest involved

in

intergroup

conflict;

but

it

ar

gues

that the "real"

situation

is less determinative of

how

people

will behave

than what

people

believe

or

perceive

about the

scarcity

of

resources.

We thus

must

consider the

production

of beliefs

in

a

particular

society

through

sym

bols and

systems

of

meaning

since the critical

beliefs

and

social actions of

a

society

may

emanate

not from

objective phenomena

but

rather

from

the

shared

representation

of these

objective

phenomena

(Moscovici

1988).

Social

representations

concern

the

contents

of

everyday

thinking

and

the stock of

ideas that

gives

coherence

to

our

religious

beliefs,

political

ideas

and the

connections

we

create

as

spontaneously

as

we

breathe.

They

make

it

possible

for

us

to

classify

persons

and

objects,

to

compare

and

explain

behaviors,

and

to

objectify

them

as

parts

of

our

social

setting.

While

repre

sentations

are

often

located

in

the minds

of

participants, they

can

just

as

often

be

found

"in

the

world,"

and

as

such

examined

apart

from

any

particular

in

dividuals

(Moscovici 1988:114).

This

suggests

that

when

we

"represent"

the

character

and

relation

of

identity

groups

in

language

and

images,

we

actually

help

construct

beliefs

about

them.

Social

representations

might

be

identi

fied

in

everyday

language,

in

media

images,

in

popular

culture,

or

any

other

place

where

communication

occurs

(Moscovici

1988:115).

Because there

are

so

many

people

talking

and

so

many

images

around

us,

representations

of

identity

groups

will

necessarily

be

multiple,

and

might

not

be shared

by

an

entire

society

(Moscovici

1988:119).

At

the

same

time,

many

representations

become so common in a particular context that they have profound effects

on

popular

perceptions

and

beliefs.7

To test

this

theory,

we

asked

what

factors

made

our

subjects

draw

an

image

of

himself

and

of

the

enemy.

Where

did

the

subject

situate

himself in



11/33

14

Kreidie and

Monroe

society?

What role had

he

attained

during

the war? What

were

his definitions

of

enemies and

what

role did different

agents?such

as

the

family,

school

and

media?play

in

shaping

both

his

self-image

and that of his

enemy?

How did

certain

acts,

such

as

killing

civilians,

affect the

subject's

sense

of

self?

Social Dominance

Theory

Sidanius

(1994;

Sidanius

et

al

1993)

explains

racism in

terms

of socio

biology

and

evolutionary theory, arguing

that

the needs

of

certain

groups

to

maintain the

integrity

of their

gene

pools

causes

racist

attitudes

and

be

havior. This

approach

may

have

particular

relevance

in

the

Mideast,

where

birthrates take

on

political significance,

with

people

often

fearing

that "the

other is

populating

and

taking

over."

To

inquire

about social dominance the

ory,

we

asked about the

kind

of

threat

subjects

felt and how

poignant

these

threats

were

to

their existence. We also asked what alternatives the

perpe

trators

thought

they

had in

dealing

with the

enemy

and how

they

thought

eradicating

the

enemy

would

help

solve the

underlying problem

for them.

Poststructural

Approach

to

Identity

What

we

might

characterize

as

a

post-structural approach

to

identity

overlaps

with each

of the above-mentioned

literatures;

as

such,

it

provides

a

useful

synthesis.

Poststructural

theory

(not

to

be confused with

postmodern

theory)

owes

its intellectual

origin

to

the Marxist tradition insofar

as

it

pre

sumes

that

society

is

structured

into classes

which

are

in

conflict

for

power

and

resources.

But

while Marx

considered

only

a

single

identity

division?

property

ownership?poststructural

theory

incorporates

the

study

of mul

tiple

kinds

of

identities,

such

as

race,

ethnicity,

nation,

and

gender,

or

any

identity

category

in

which there

is either

an

active

contest for

dominance

or

a

history

in which

one

group

has been dominant

over

another. Like

social

identity

theory,

poststructural

theory

presumes

that identities

are

produced

through

social

comparisons,

and that

group

value is

assigned

through

such

comparisons.

Like realistic

conflict

theory,

it

incorporates

the

belief

that

re

sources

are

usually

scarce

and that

people

are

motivated

by

"rational" desires

to

promote

their

interests. And

like the literature

on

social

representations,

it focuses

on

the

ways

that

beliefs

about

identity

groups

are

constructed

through

discourse

and

symbols.

To explain the transformation of mere difference into intergroup con

flict

or

violence,

utilizing

this

approach,

we

tried

to

consider

intergroup

rela

tions

in

highly

contextual

ways.

That

is,

we assume

group

identities

form

in

historically specific

ways.

We

then

asked whether the social

representations



12/33

Psychological


15

which foment

conflict

are

also

specific

to

a

particular society.

In

the

case

of

Lebanon,

we

asked

perpetrators

about

feelings

and views

on

the

political,

economic and social situation

in

Lebanon. We also asked how

the sectarian

political

system

affected their actions either

in

joining

their

party

or

move

ment

or

the

way

they

viewed the

others.

We

asked

the

Druze

(the

Socialist

Progressive

Party

members)

why

they

considered themselves

subordinates

while the

Christians

(specifically

the

Maronites)

were

deemed the

dominant

group.

Why

did the Druze

ally

with the Palestinian

refugees

against

other

Lebanese? At

the

same

time,

we

asked Christian

fighters

about their

views

on

Palestinian refugees and the other Lebanese Muslim fighters. What factors

made the Maronites

join

the

Phalengist

party?

Why

did the

Maronites

ally

with the Israelis

against

other

Lebanese?

Why

would Maronites

resort to

violence when

they

had the

largest

share in

government

representation?

We asked

perpetrators

of

all

groups

about the

importance

of

their reli

gious/ideological

and

political

identification.

What kind of

relationship

did

they

have

with other

groups

before

the

eruption

of

violence? What

caused

the

violence? How

strong

and

certain

was

the threat of the

other

group

to

compel

them

to

commit

violent

acts? Did

they

believe

they

had

any

other

alternative

ways

to

deal

with

the threat?

In some

poststructural

studies of

group

conflict,

the

metaphors

of

rep

resentation

play

an

important

part

in the

psychology

of

violence. For in

stance,

the

popular representation

of

the "dehumanized other"

as

vermin

or

bestial

suggests

that

a

group

does

not

deserve human

rights (Lerner

1992,

Glass

1997). Similarly,

there

might

be

a

drive

to

eradicate the

"morally

bankrupt

others,"

lest

they

infest, defile,

or

pollute

the

healthy

social

body.

This

metaphor

represents

the

in-group

as

organic,

and

the

out-group

as

a source

of

impurity.

Or,

there

is

the

specter

of the

"threatening

others,"

who

will

perhaps

undermine the

economy

if

left

unchecked,

who

will kill

us

if

we

don't

kill

them first.

We

raised

all

these issues in

our

interviews,

since

Monroe

(2001)

found classification and

categorization

critical for

un

derstanding

genocide

during

the

Holocaust.

In

each

of these

situations,

our

underlying hypothesis

was

that

popular

representations

of

the

out-group

would

reinforce the coherence

and

superiority

of

the

in-group

as

well

as

justify

violent

means

to

gain

or

maintain

domination.

LEBANON: A

CASE STUDY OF

IDENTITY

POLITICS

The

Complex Variety

of

the

Lebanese

Identity

All

the

people

we

interviewed

described

themselves

as

Lebanese.

But

being

Lebanese differs

depending

on

whether

one

is

Maronite,

Sunni,

Shiite,



13/33

16

Kreidie

and

Monroe

Druze,

Muslim

fundamentalist,

Lebanese

communist,

or

Lebanese Arab

na

tionalist.

Strong

competing

identities undercut the

Lebanese

national

iden

tity

and,

at

least

in the

case

of

modern

Lebanon,

separate

identities often

produce

inner

psychological

conflicts

concerning

who

one

is and

to

which

groups

that

most

basic

sense

of

identity

can

allow

one

to

belong.

Perhaps

because

of the

political

violence

itself,

group

membership

takes

on

an aura

of

being

necessary

for survival and

group

loyalty

becomes

a

premium

since

other

group

members

are

necessary

for

protection.

Whatever the

causes?

and these

are

the focus of

our

analysis?it

seems

fair

to

say

that

in contem

porary Lebanon, conflicting identities tend to promote mistrust, intolerance

and

intergroup

antipathies,

and

not

the

consociational

democracy

of the

immediate

post-World

War

II

period

lauded

by

many

(Lijphart

1984).

This

has

long

been

true,

as

is

evident

from

even

the

most

cursory

of

historical

backgrounds.

During

various historical

periods,

the

political

struc

ture

in Lebanon

reflected

a

pluralistic political

system

in

which

subordination

among

the

actors

was

conjoined

with

political

supremacy

of

each in his do

main. Even

a

brief historical

survey

lies

beyond

the

scope

of this

manuscript

(see

Kreidie and Monroe

2001 for

a

review);

however,

most

experts

agree

that social

identity

is critical

for

understanding

Lebanese

political

instability

and

Lebanon's

seemingly

unending political

conflicts. Sectarian

and social

cleavages

have

widened

over

time

as

the

apparently

conflict-ridden

political

system

has failed

to

assimilate

diverse

groups

into

one

political

commu

nity.

Each tended

to

impose

its

own mores

on

all

segments

of

the

society.

This

process

created

domineering

and subordinate

groups,

or

"us

versus

them"

communities,

which

were

exacerbated

by

the

fact that communal

differences

correspond

with

politico-economic

inequities

and

a

have-and

have-not

group

mentality.8

Prior

to

the 1975-1990

civil

war,

there

was

widespread

discontent

among

Lebanese

Muslims,

especially

the

Shiites,

who

blamed

official

authorities

for

the

negligence

in their

areas

and for

not

preventing

the

Israeli

attacks

on

southern

Lebanon.

The

Shiites

thus

formed

the movement

of

the under

privileged

in

Lebanon

(AMAL)

headed

by

Moussa

El

Sadr.9

The Sunnis

never

relinquished

hope

of

drawing

Lebanon

closer

to

the Arab

world and

achieving

more

equitable

shares

in

the

government.

But

because

they

are

scattered

geographically,

the Sunnis

were

unable

to

cohere

politically.

The

general

Muslim

discontent

and

feeling

of

deprivation

were

countered

by

an

equal

if

not

stronger

Christian

paranoia

and

fear

of

being

lost

in the

sea

of

Muslim

Arabs.

This

fear

was

institutionalized in

the

Phalengist

party,

founded by the Maronite Pierre Gemayel.10 At the

same

time, the

Druze

had the

same

feelings

as

the

Christians

and also

struggled

to

keep

their

land

and

unity.

The

Popular

Socialist

party

was

founded

by

Kamal Junbulat

to

fulfill

the

Druze's dream

of survival.



14/33

Psychological


17

Since

independence,

Lebanon

has been the

scene

of

two

nationalis

tic

trends that exacerbate

identity

differences:

Arab

nationalism

(majority

Muslim)

with Lebanon

part

of

a

united Arab

world,

and

(2)

Lebanese

na

tionalism in

an

independent

Christian

state.

As Arab

nationalism

prospered

in

the

early

fifties under

Nasser,

the Lebanese Maronite

president

rushed

to

sign

the Eisenhower doctrine

(1957),

which

pledged

the United State

to

use

its

armed forces when asked

to

do

so

by

any

state

threatened

by

direct

or

indirect communist

aggression.

This

governmental

decision intensified

Muslim

discontent,

which climaxed

in

the

1958

crisis.

However, Arab nationalists were divided among themselves in their

perception

of Arab nationalism.

In

the

sixties,

the Arab

nationalist

move

ment

gave

rise

to

many

prosocialist organizations.11

Most Muslim

Sunnis who

wanted

an

independent

Lebanon with

an

Arab face

were

not

comfortable

with the socialist character of the nationalists. On the other

hand,

the Shiites

split

into the fundamentalist Hizbullah

or more

moderate

AMAL

move

ment.

At the

same

time,

Christians divided

to

form different

parties,

each

with

a

different

perspective

on

Lebanon. Sectarian

differences

in

Lebanon

supercede

parochial loyalties.

Parochial,

sectarian,

ideological

differences,

exacerbated

by

the

internal and

external

factors,

were

evident in

the

out

bursts

of

1840,

1860, 1918,

1958,

and 1975-1990. Violence

ended after the

Syrian

government

and Lebanon's

warring

factions reached

an

agreement

under the

premiership

of Rafik El Hariria and

at

the directive of

King

Fahd.

Thanks

to

superpower

and

regional

endorsement,

the 1989

signing

of the

Ta'if

Agreement

ended?at least

technically?the

Lebanese civil

war.

The

Ta'if

agreement

set

new

rules

for

more

equitable

representation

between the

different

sects

and for the

preservation

of Lebanon

as an

independent

and

sovereign

nation. The

Ta'if

is

not

yet

fully

implemented,

however,

and

one

of the most

pressing

issues is

the

Syrian

withdrawal

from

Lebanon,

an

issue

that exacerbates

already-polarized

sectarian

identifications within

Lebanon.

Profiles:

Sample

and

Methodology

For

our

pilot project,

we

chose

subjects

from

each of

the most

impor

tant

fighting

factions: 2 Christian

Phalengists;

1Muslim

Murabetoun;

and

2

Druze

Progressive

Socialist

Party

members. Because of the

sensitive

as

pect

of

the

interviews,

subjects

were

reached

through

personal

contacts,

in

part

to

assure

anonymity.

Interviews

were

conducted in

Arabic

during

the

summers

of

2000-1,

at

places

in

Lebanon chosen

by

the

interviewee.12

Inter

views ranged from 90 minutes to five hours and were taped, transcribed and

integrated

with

notes

taken

during

the

interview. Several

other

interviews

were

scheduled but

dropped,

because the

subject

seemed

skittish and

ner

vous

about

anonymity,

or

because

we

felt the

demands

made

on

us

would



15/33

18

Kreidie and Monroe

have

jeopardized

our own

safety.

(We

were

asked

to

ride

in

several

cars

blind

folded for several

hours and

change

cars

frequently.)

We

use

only

first

names

and identities

have been modified

slightly

to

protect

subjects'

anonymity.

All

subjects

admitted

they

had

engaged

in

ethnic violence and

killing.

To

have

a

check

on

the

veracity

of

facts

described,

we

also interviewed

some

vic

tims

and

victims'

families. But since

our

interest

here

is in the

perceptions

of

perpetrators,

in

understanding

how

they

process

information

and

how

their

cognitive

frameworks

affect their

behavior,

we

focus less

on

historical

details

and

more

on

capturing

the mindset that leads

to

violence.

Dealing

with memories involved interesting methodological problems, not the least

of

which is the distinction

between

post

hoc

justifications

for

decisions

as

opposed

to

the actual

decision

making

process

itself.

For

our

purposes,

how

ever,

it is

important

to

understand what

particular

post

hoc

justifications

are

given,

since that

yields

insight

into the mindset of the

speaker.

All

subjects

were

between

36 and 50

when

interviewed. At the

time of

their

involvement

in

the

war,

they

were

between 15 and

22.13

Assa'd,

Abdo,

Talal and

Toni

were

involved

in

the

war

at

all

stages,

until its

closing

around

1989.

Marwan

was

involved between 1975-76

and

again

from 1981-1984.

Interviews

were

analyzed using

a

narrative

technique

commonly

utilized in

political

science

(Patterson

andMonroe

1998)

and were

analyzed by

separate

coders.

Each of

our

five

perpetrators

was

involved in

an

ethnic

massacre.

Each

admitted

killing

members

of the other

ethnic

groups.

The

particular

incidents

range

from

fighting

on

a

one-to-one

basis,

bombing

civilian

areas,

and/or

killing

with

the

purpose

of

cleansing/eradicating

certain

areas

from the

en

emies.

These included

(1)

the

1975

Tall

Za'atar,

(2)

Nabaa

and Karantina

massacre,

(3)

the

Sabra

and

Shatila

massacres

of 15-18

September

1982,

massacres

in which

Ariel

Sharon

played

a

role,

(4)

the Salima

village

in

cident

and

Bmaryem

village

massacres

of

1975-6,

and

(5)

the

Green

Line

kidnappings

of

1975-1976.

We

were

careful

to

choose

incidents which

in

volved

perpetrators

from

different sectarian

groups

since

ethnic

violence is

not

limited

to

one

group.14

ANALYSIS

Although

interviews

are on

going,

even

this

preliminary

analysis

sug

gests

the

tremendous

power

of

identity

and,

more

particularly,

our

view

of ourselves

in relation

to

others.

These

two

psychological

factors

seem

to

constrain choice for

all

these

individuals.

Beyond

this

finding,

the results

summarized

in Table

1

focus

on

the

critical

psychological

factor(s)

that

turns

ordinary

citizens

into

perpetrators

of ethnic

violence,

and

on

the

psycholog

ical

steps

in

this

transformational

process.



16/33

Psychological

Boundaries

and Ethnic

Conflict

19

Table

1.

Major

Social

Psychological Approaches

to

Ethnic Conflict

Theoretical

explanations

Mentioned:

Yes

Mentioned: No

Social

identity

Group

identification

Social

comparison

Self-esteem

Schema and

stereotypes

Self

identity

as

roles

Cognitive representations,

socio/cultural effects

Models

of

symbolic

racism

Realistic

conflict

theory

Social

representation

Social dominance

Post-structural

approach

All

subjects

All

subjects

All but

more as

background

All

subjects

All

subjects

All

subjects

All

subjects

All

but

more as

background

Yes

but

secondary.

Toni,

Assa'd, Talal,

and Marwan

All

Marwan,

Talal,

Assa'd

All

All

but Talal and

Assa'd broke

with

parental

models

Abdo

Toni and

Abdol-secondary

Identity

Constrains Choice

We

were

struck

by

the

extent to

which

identity

constrained

choice for

all these

people.

Regardless

of

their

political

and

ideological position,

and

irrespective

of their

particular

social/group

identities,

no

one

felt

they

had

a

choice.

Each insisted

they

were

pushed

into action

by

"the

other."

No

one

seemed

to want

the

conflict

to

continue;

yet

all seemed

pulled

toward

its

continuation

by

a

feeling

that

they

would be

destroyed

if

they

did

not

turn

to

violence.

Moreover,

even

the

few

narratives

we

have

collected

so

far

suggest

the

important

role

of

social

comparisons

in

forming

group

boundaries and

social

identities.

We also

can see

the

fighters'

motivations that

made

perpe

trators

biased

against

other

groups;

we

can

form

a

picture

of

the

factors that

might

have

produced

certain

cognitive

sch?mas

of

the

"others."

Stereotypes

shaped

the

inter-group

relationships.

Many

researchers

suggest

the

location

and

historical

role

of

Lebanon

as a

refuge

of

different

ethnic and

religious

groups

have

shaped

its

destiny

as a

divided multiethnic

country.

Our

findings

do

not

support

theories

of

consociational

democracy

(Lijphart 1975)

which

argue

that the

institutional

recognition

of

multiethnic

groupings

can

provide

political

stability.

Instead,

our

analysis

reinforces

the

conclusions of

scholars

who

claim

ethnic divi

sions

deepened

because the

Lebanese

constitution

entrenched

ethnicity

in

a

sectarian-based

political

system

(Hitti

1957;

Kirk

1964;

Salibi

1965;

Barakat

1977). At least for the people in our sample, sectarian arrangements ag

gravated

disparities

between

the "haves

and

the

have-nots" in

Lebanon.

Further,

we

find

that

although

this structural

explanation

provides

fertile

intellectual

ground

for

explaining

how

ethnic

divisions and

differences led



17/33

20

Kreidie and Monroe

to

violence,

this structural

explanation

alone

cannot

fully clarify

why

the

Lebanese

resorted

to

political

violence.

For

a

fuller

explanation,

we

need

the

psychological

component.

Social

Comparisons

The

members of the Lebanese National

Movement?Talal,

Assa'd and

Marwan?were

very

dissatisfied with

the

unequal

distribution of

political

power and its effect on their group's accessibility to better employment.

This

social,

economic and

political

dissatisfaction,

which

rationalists

might

focus

on as a

major

cause

of frustration and

eruption

of

violence,

was

set

in

a

historical

background

of mistrust

that

was

entrenched

in

the

fighters'

minds

through

socialization.

The

distrust

from

past

injustices

seemed

to

place

a

lens

on

people's

abilities

to

view the

present

situation,

and

spread

a

cloud

of

suspicion

over

current

interactions with

people

of

the

other

group

that

was

more

important

than

existing political

realities

in

determining

re

sponses

and

future

behavior.

All

subjects

depicted

the role

of their

family,

school and

media in

accentuating

their

status

in

Lebanon

as

either

being

Sunnite,

Shiite,

Druze

or

Maronite.

Each views his

group

and himself

as

different

from others in

terms

of

status

in

society,

rights

in

government

and

employment

privileges.

This

social

comparison

was

clear

in

the

stories of

all

subjects.

According

to

Marwan,

his

parents

often talked about their disadvan

tages

and

how

unfair their

situation

has

been

over

years,

but

they

never

thought

that

war

would

help.

Even when

the

war

erupted

and their lives

were

endangered,

Marwan's

parents

chose

not

to

get

involved

and discour

aged

their

son

from

taking

part.

Unlike

his

parents,

however,

Marwan could

not

take

a

passive

role. "How

can

I

see

this

happening

to

my

people?

They

[Christian

Lebanese

Forces]

allied with the

enemy

[Israel]

and

they

were

implementing

their

plan

of

eradicating

not

only

the Palestinians

but also

us

Lebanese

Muslims."

What turned

Marwan,

Toni,

Abdo,

Assa'd

and Talal toward violence

was

perceptions,

especially

the

perceived

threat

to

their

group's identity.

The

social

representations

with which

they

had been socialized

made each

of

these

men

see

themselves

as

part

of their ethnic and

religious

group

and

view

the other

group

members

as

traitors

or as

a

direct threat

to

their

group's

identity.

The Lebanese Forces members (Toni and Abdo) felt theMuslims

were

traitors

because

the

Muslims

supported

the

Palestinians

who

are

planning

to

have their

own

state

within

the state of

Lebanon.

Social

representations

worked

as a

background

variable

on

social

identity.



18/33

Psychological

Boundaries and

Ethnic

Conflict

21

Abdo: "The

Muslims,

whom

we

lived and worked

with

[for]

years,

dared

to

support

the

Palestinians,

who

were

becoming

too

strong

and

were

planning

on

taking

over

our

country

How

can we

accept

that?"

When asked

if

there

was

any

alternative

to

force

in

order

to

stop

this

in

cursion

on

Lebanese

sovereignty,

both Abdo and

Toni

said

no.

Both

men

felt

the

Muslims and

all Arab

countries

were

planning

on

having

the

Palestinian

plan

implemented

in

Lebanon.

Toni: "No. No other

way

[than

force].

We had

to

act

swiftly,

or we

would

have

been thrown

in

the sea."

Abdo

seconded this sentiment.

"All

Arab countries saw what was happening and they did not do anything to

stop

it.

We

had

to

do

it,

and

by

force.

They

[Palestinians]

were

moving

into

our

[Christian] villages."

The

perception

of this threat became

more

imminent when

members

of another sectarian

group

were

approaching

the

Christian

villages,

the

Christian

refuge.

Abdo

said,

"I

was

born in this

village.

My

school,

my

her

itage,

my

people...

[He

fell

silent.]

I had

no

other

option

[than

fighting]."

Talal and

Assa'd,

members of the Lebanese National

movement,

felt the

same

way.

"It is

my

home.

My

family

lived here for

many

generations.

I

had

to

protect

our

honor." Talal

explained,

"If

they

take

over,

where

would

we

go?

This is our home. As

Druze,

we can't let

anyone

step

on our

honor,

and

only

by

blood and

soul

we can

protect

it."

Marwan continued

in

this

vein,

capturing

what

was a

feeling

of

being

encircled.

"We

Sunnis

cannot

continue

to

be

passive

and let

them

take

over.

They

[Christians]

have

done

it

over

and

over

through

out

history."

Q.

Done

what?

Marwan:

They

took

the

biggest

share.

They

allied

with Israel

and France

and

did

their

best to

put

us

down.

Assa'd

also

saw

himself

as

a

liberator.

Q.

Was

itLiberation

war

from

the

other Lebanese militias?

And where

would

they

go?

Assa'd: Which

Lebanon?

They

claim that

they

are

Lebanese.

They

are

traitors. If

they really

want

a

Lebanon

for

all,

then

they

would

give

us

rights.

[Let

us]

have

more

representation

in

politics,

government,

employment.

They

allied with Israel

to

keep

Lebanon for them. If

this

is

what

they

want,

we

will

protect

our

homes,

fight

till the

last

drop

of

blood and

not

give

up

our

right.

We will

not

submit

to

their

conspiracy

and

we

will

not

let

our

children be the

victims of

oppression

Abdo felt the

same

way,

justifying

his

party's

alliance with

Israel.

Q:

Do

you

think

that

your

freedom

and

equality

can

be achieved

through

violence?

Abdo:

I

said

many

times;

we

had

no

option.

Anyone

would

do

what

we

did

with

these

people

who lost their

conscience

and allied with

the

worst

enemy....

They

claim

they

are

Lebanese

They

have

nothing

to

do

with this Our

alliance with

Israel

was

a

de

facto

situation. We had

no

choice.



19/33

22

Kreidie

and Monroe

Self-Esteem

as

a

Background

for

Social

Identity

We asked about the need

for

social value and

personal

esteem

as a

motive

toward

in-group

bias. We found that the

subjects

associated with

their

own

sectarian

group,

even

if

they

had

to

ignore

some

of their

long

held values

or

deviate

from

family

standards.

Consider

Assa'd,

who

fought

in battles

defending

his

own

Druze dominant

village.

Assa'd

explains

his

shift from

being

a

member

of the

Communist

Party

to

being

a

member

of the Socialist

Progressive

Party

by

reference

to

the need

to

help

pro

mote his sect's status and, more specifically, his family's honor. Even though

Assa'd claims

to

be

ideologically

closer

to

the

Communists,

he felt his iden

tity

as a

Druze

was more

important.

His

fighting

as a

Druze

was con

nected

in his mind with his self-esteem.

"If

my

family

is

in

direct

threat,

I would

kill them

[my

family]

myself

before

I

let

them

be touched

by

the

bastards."15

Social

esteem

was

evident

as

a

background

factor

for

all

our

subjects.

While

Marwan decided

to

join

the Sunni

Murabetoun

movement,

disre

garding

his

parent's

requests

to

stay

out

of

any

political

involvement,

he

reported:

"I

joined

the Murabetoun

wholeheartedly hoping

that

we

would

fight

to have more

rights

and better status." When asked

why they supported

the Palestinians

against

other

Lebanese, Marwan,

Assa'd

and Talal said that

they

had

to

defend

the

Palestinians

from "those

Israeli

puppets

who

are

im

plementing

the Israeli

plan

of

weakening

if

not

eradicating

the Palestinian

Liberation

movement. We

can

not

stop

there

and

watch

them

being

per

secuted

again."

Assa'd

added:

"We

Arabs

have

to

put

our

hands

together

to

stop

any

Israeli

aggression,

whether

directly

or

through

their

agents

[the

Lebanese

Forces]."

Talal

repeatedly

told

us

how his

party

works

to

improve

the

general

welfare,

social

equality

and social

status

of

the

Druze,

Talal: Our leader's main goal is improving and spreading education. As parliamen

tarian,

he

always

worked

on

bringing

better education

kreidie and monroe -- psychological boundaries and ethnic conflict

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