Urban crisis and state intervention: A preliminary study about the social meaning of the

Housing Committee of the Municipal Council of Shanghai

Kuo, Chi-jeng∗

Abstract

After the Industrial Revolution, development of most large cities was associated with huge amount of rural-to-urban immigrants. As labor force was essential for industrial production, when the central city grasped cheap labor force from its surrounding rural areas, the demands for labors’ accommodations became severe to the city itself. Contemporary urban studies assumed: housing was not only commodities for services consumption within the city, but also means for recreation for the labor force. Housing absolutely could be seen as commodities for urban residents to obtain living services through consumptions from the housing market. Labor force would all be recreated within them. But historical studies showed that: low-income consumers were always excluded from the housing market for unprofitable reasons to real estate providers. Private sectors could not steadily provide these levels of services. But corresponding to maintaining, producing and reproducing the social relationship, housing for the low-income ones was absolutely essential for cities to well function. As the capitalist mode of production were deep going and city itself attracted millions of immigrants moving in, requirements for infrastructure and facilities regarding collective consumption, including housing, would all appealed to a power state to provide, especially the unprofitable facilities and housings services to the low-income labors.

Shanghai, as well as some other colonial cities in Asia like Bombay, Singapore, and Hong Kong would all had experienced dreadful housing problems even London, where their urban governance know-how originated, had ever confronted before. Insufficient housing supply caused specific part of the cities adjacent to industrial zones overcrowded. Accompanying limited investments corresponded to low living standards, doubts for unsanitary and possible infectious diseases all summoned the state to intervene powerfully. This paper proposed to have a historical review about the establishment of the Housing Committee of SMC (Shanghai Municipal Council) and its agendas in the 1930s. Comparing to experiences of state intervention to housing problems in Bombay, Singapore Hong Kong, London, and New York, the paper try to figure out the correspondence between state intervention and the legitimacy state itself conceived in Shanghai. Political concern for legitimization urged the SMC’s urban policies inclined to capital accumulation rather than legitimized it through housing supply interference. To be identified by middle classes, the SMC’s intervention preferred to grasp justification through some non-efficacious social

∗ Associate Professor, Dept. of Architecture, Tunghai University, Taichung, TAIWAN; e-mail address:

cjkuo@mail.thu.edu.tw

1

control about dwelling form to pacify the established ones and maintained their existing property benefits. The urban crisis regarding housing in Shanghai proved to manifest not only the specific procedures for legitimacy through political interaction between states and designated social groups, but also witnessed the constant contradiction of the capitalist society.

Key words: space commodification, informal sector, state intervention, alleyway houses, the Housing Committee, Shanghai

A. Preface

After industrial revolution, development of major industrial cities was associated with great amount of rural-to-urban immigrants inevitably. As industrial centers grasped cheap labors from surrounding areas, these labors’ housing demands became more and more urgent. Recent urban studies assumed: housing absolutely were commodities, which individuals could consume to obtain dwelling services and have the labors recreated. But low-income labors usually were excluded from housing markets because their housing needs were unprofitable and unattractive to private housing providers. Dwelling services from private sectors were unsteadily. But regarding maintaining, producing and reproducing of the social relationships, housing was indispensable to urban functions. When capitalist mode of production penetrated to affect the divisions of labors between urban center and its rural surroundings profoundly, new demands for infrastructures, collective consumptions for public services all appeals to a powerful state.

Shanghai had become the 5th great metropolis with population estimated up to 3402000, just next to London, New York, Berlin, and Chicago. Statistics compiled by Prof. Charles Richet, its growth rate of population had ever peaked the first in the mean while.1 For the sake of inadequate infrastructures and high thresholds of commuting expenses, a great deal of housing demands about the rural-to-urban immigrants could not be digested by the commercial housing market (the first market). Congested pattern of dwelling in the vicinity of industrial bases formed consequently. Functioned as the second commercial markets for low-income dwellers, informal additions and alterations to existing housing units and the illegal occupancy, which almost assembled to be slums, not only satisfied the unprofitable housing demands, but also relieved the pressure of inadequacy in collective consumption of housing. To solve the problems of congestion and unsanitary conditions caused by inadequate housing supply within specific districts, the so-called “slum areas” by the Municipal Council of Shanghai (the SMC), all depended upon powerful state intervention. The Housing Committee was established by the SMC in 1936. Policies aimed at solving serious inadequacy of housing were proposed to be negotiated within bureaucratic and non-governmental members. But indeed the SMC’s institutional interference towards real estate systems of housing production initialized from end of 1890s. Issues of the governmental interference were accumulated and extended greatly in the latter 40 years. As there had ever been obvious ‘state interventions’ towards housing production, the paper here proposed to analyzed: Why and when did SMC assumed it to be appropriate to deal with housing problems with the institutional form of Housing Committee? What’s its social propose? What are the actual attitude and ideology of the Housing Committee? Did such attitude or ideology sustained to vividly figure out or mask later the actual housing problems?

1 According to http://www.Shanghai-ed.com/tales/t-all04.htm

2

What’s the inclusive social meaning of theirs policies? Furthermore, experiences of the housing reform of New York and installation of the British Royal Commission of Housing of London were also compared collaterally to identify the correspondence between the housing policies and capitalist state’s characteristics.

The paper first reviewed the housing shortage circumstances under serious economic depression at Shanghai about the 1930s. Then, the establishment of the Housing Committee and its viewpoints towards housing problems were be analyzed thoroughly through the SMC’s official documents (the Municipal Archives of SMC), Municipal’s Gazette and its annual report. Reinterpretation about the Committee’s comments on issues of housing played as vital part of this paper. Finally, through dialogues with experiences of London and New York, the paper proposed to view Shanghai as a manifestation witnessed the constant contradiction of capitalist society.

B. Crisis of Urban Governance and state’s selective interference

a. Housing Committee and state’s selective interference

I. Inadequacy of Collective Consumption of Low-income Housing and Crisis for Urban Governance

Long term real estate development absolutely was the major finance source for the colonial state’s governance. The well-established infrastructures and specific investments regarding collective consumption all had the International Settlement and French Concession shaped superior environments for private investments, especially for the real estate sectors. But the real estate investment could flourish in Shanghai only when financial resources were normally provided by external money market. When the money circulation was blocked up globally and indigenous financial network could not be nourished with capitals steadily, the real estate market could do nothing but decline. The state’s revenue system from property tax would also been embroiled and consequently infected state’s functioning.

The Son-Hu Battle in northern Shanghai in 1932 greatly damaged Jian-wan and Zha-bei Districts. Only the real estate values for property had twenty million dollars lost. Economic depression emerged after the financial market was stagnant by this Battle. Amounts of banks and local private banks (the so-called Qian-zhuang in China) reduced with 85% off. 85% of the population losing their jobs. The Battle also caused the vacancy of housing aggravated. The Son-Hu Battle later seemed to be the ending point for Shanghai’s 70 years of real estate flourishing.

1934, five years after the Great Depression happening in New York, real estate markets in Shanghai started to confront with serious decline. June in the same year the Parliament of United States adopted new proposal to collect silver globally, great amounts of China’s silver was exported. The indigenous money market paled to bloodless and caused critical economic depression.2 All the mechanism of the market broke down.

Financial stringency and high rate of unemployment evoked rent repudiating and rent lessening movement. Housing vacancy hastily increased. The stock price of some real estate enterprises depreciated to 20-30% of their originated face value. Foreign businessman banks ceased loan granting and mortgaging to real estate sectors. As most of the economic activities

2 Ibid. p.122

3

regarding real estate suspended by depression, the state’s function for governance was also embroiled.

Property taxation was according to their values appraised by SMC. From 1932, there was immense number of grievances to SMC from different economic units. That caused great political persecution for SMC.3As building tax was levied by their renting price listed on their lease, vacant houses could not be levied thereupon. Revenue from property tax decreased hastily and almost damaged state’s function. How to revitalize the declining real estate economic through state interference became the critical agenda in confronting urban crisis for SMC.

II. The Provisional form for state interference

i. The establishment of the Housing Committee

Year 1936, The Housing Committee was justified itself to establish by the statement: “ --Whereas the constant growth in the population of this foreign Settlement has been

accompanied by a rapid development of industrialism and many changes in the living conditions of the people:

--and whereas the serious public concern has been manifested over the resultant housing congestion and other unfavorable features therewith:

--and whereas no public steps have been taken toward and examination of the problem with a view to possible measures for preventing its further aggravation :

--and Shanghai Municipal Council is now requested to instruct the Works Committee to investigate the Housing Situation in all its aspects and to publish a full Report thereon with such recommendation as the Works Committee may see fit to make” 4.

The team composed of “…member of the Works Committee, together with additional representatives of the public selected because of their known interest in the housing problem, their general knowledge of local Chinese and foreign public affairs or the suitability of their professional qualification for dealing with building problems. “. June 8th the Housing Investigation Sub-Committee, responsible for general inquiring about housing issues, proposed to sub-divided the committee into three sections:

Sub-committee A handled ‘general survey’, responsible for :

“-Statistics and Charts: -Broad Outlines of the Problem: -Conditions common to the three Administrative Areas: -Overcrowding in the Settlement: -Inspection of typical Premises: -Health Aspects: -Typical Alterations and Additions in Chinese Houses: -Housing Enterprises Conducted by Industries: -Lodging Houses: -Squatters Huts: -Occupied and Unoccupied Premises:

3 The Municipal Archives of SMC: U1-14-0007062, U1-14-0003276, U1-14-0006506 4 The Municipal Archives of SMC: U1-10-153, pp.8-9

4

-Solution not to be Found in Settlement Area alone: -Limitations of the Council’s Power:’

Sub-committee B on ‘administrative powers and building rules survey’, responsible to figure out:

“ -Unauthorized Alteration of Chinese houses: -Abuse of Standard Two-storey Chinese house: -Council’s Power to Prevent Abuses: -Alterations and Additions to be under Permit: -Remedies for Existing Abuses in Chinese Houses: -Regulations to Control Existing Abuses.”

Investigation about “conversion of domestic premises to industrial uses” played significantly for sub-committee B. “Design of proposed new building types” regarding improvement of Chinese dwelling and “introducing/revising existing building rules” were also major tasks for Sub-committee B.

Sub-committee C on ‘economic survey’ especially took charge of Chinese houses’, included:

“ -Investment and Return to the Owner: -Investment and Return to the Sublessor: -The Relation between Rentals and Wages: -The Incidence of Taxation: -Relation of Houses to work Centers: Transportation: -Zoning: -General Conclusion as to Palliatives:” 5

ii. Agendas of the Housing Committee and their standpoint

The missions for the Housing Committee were clarified to requested the Public Works Department and the Industrial Section of the Municipal Service united to avoid deterioration of the congestion condition overwhelming in the Chinese alleyway houses or row houses. Chinese houses were highlighted and justified by the Committee’s statement:

“Whilst the terms of reference did not limit the Committee’s investigation expressly to the housing of the Chinese population alone, it early became apparent that the overwhelming preponderance of the Chinese population and the vastly more pressing nature of their problem justified an exclusive attention to their needs. Moreover, the dissatisfactions as to local housing to which public opinion had given expression, and which was the immediate occasion for the getting up of this enquiry, had reference exclusively to the housing of the Chinese population” 6

Although Mr. Hwauk, member of the Sub-committee C had ever addressed:” I have had with over 30,000 men working in such comparatively modern industries as the railway, iron and steel works, the arsenal, etc., has struck me with their low wages, which are on the average below what is needed to support the worker with three or four dependents.”7 The

5 Ibid. PP.9-10 6 Ibid. p.9 7 The Municipal Archives of SMC: U1-14-0005898

5

Committee still regarded the congestion situation in Shanghai as normal conditions for any industrial metropolis. “It will be generally appreciated that though the problem of housing in the Settlement has its distinctive features, the housing of the poor classes has become a pressing problem in all populous Western countries.” 8

Based on the general ideas experienced in Western Europe industrial great cities, the Housing Committee ascribe the blame of housing problems to poverty：

“……through out the world, the principal difficulties with regard to housing appear to be that the poorer working classes cannot afford to pay any an economical rent for even the minimum of accommodation which will conform to modern standards of decency. “ 9

For low-income housing could not be solved by real estate market, the Housing Committee assumed state intervention were essential. For example: “In many European countries the difficulty presented by the low economic means of the people is to an extent overcome by means of subsidies from the state.” But as the Housing Committee’s investigation and proposal inclined to legitimize state intervention, they still restricted themselves to ‘restricted intervention’. For

“It is now recognized in England that there are limits to drastic interference with the normal play of economic forces and to municipal action on a large and ambitious scale. The tendency now is towards the more effectual application of gradual methods of improvement, and the exercise of prevention in preference to cure.” 10

Congestion and filthy situation within Chinese houses were seemed to be like some kind of chronic disease. ‘Drastic interference ’was metaphorred like surgical operation here and supposed to be no longer necessary. Gentle ‘curing ‘assumed more appropriate. But how to judge, and who could judge the syndrome had been recovered? Of course the congestion situation happening in Chinese dwellings could not be solved easily, but the Committee inclined to have such an idea that it could be adjusted through new standard providing. These standards were thought to be born of real estate markets and theirs social process principally; especially to some society its space had almost commodified.

The Committee identified the problems of housing into two totally different aspects of quantities and qualities generally. ” The defective qualities included unsanitary conditions and bad-ventialization. The defective quality produced high rents and overcrowding.” Under state intervention,” The problem of quantity may be ‘solved’, but that of the quality has no finality; since the effort to provide superior houses still goes on.”11 Regarding housing production and qualities maintaining, state intervention here was assumed not to be the absolute and appropriate mechanism to overtake what the real estate markets afford to do.

State’s restricted intervention then pre-argued to be reasonable.” It is apparent that remedies necessitate the co-operation of every section of the community affected; of legislative and administrative bodies and of philanthropic individuals and societies.”12 8 The Municipal Archives of SMC: U1-10-153, p.10 9 Ibid, p.10 10 Ibid., p.60 11 Ibid., p.10 12 Ibid., p.14

6

Consequently the Housing Committee not only looked forward to cooperate with the congested communities locally, but also motivated the philanthropic individuals and societies.

III. Policies Intervention and Spatial Practice

i. The Ultimate Urban extension-----Correspondence between Wages and Commuting Distance

For London, policies towards evacuation had ever been applied by British’s local authorities to solve overcrowded problems in inner city. Through releasing the land use restriction, the transit commuter line established and suburban expansion emerged.13 In outskirts of the industrial great cities, cheap land cost sometimes also meant cheap living cost. Local authorities or private real estate sectors could provide cheaper or larger accommodation to have someone capable of striding over the threshold of commuting budget to evacuated from the congested inner city. In the meanwhile, if infrastructures regarding commuting line, piped water/gas , and electricity could be expected to provide constantly, speculative bidding up in property price would suppose to be restrained. Then holding property ownership in suburbs would be more attractive than leasing. For real estate developer, selling a house to someone afford to pay commuting expenses were more profitable than leasing to them. Suburban living became prevalent to middle class who afforded commuting to get its house ownership.

But for Shanghai, ‘suburban’ politically had its and physical boundary. In 1920s, after the new Chinese regime, the Kuo-Min-Dang (KMT), established the Chinese special council of Shanghai in Nan-shi district, nationalism emerged to became a critical obstacle of suburb expansion for the SMC. Not only the legally expansions before 1898 were no more possible, but also all the ‘illegal expansion’ admitted by SMC, the so-called extra-Settlement expansion (in Chinese called 「越界築路」), were forced to restrain itself. The evacuative strategy prevalent in most industrial large metropolis, including other colonial large cities within Asia, had complete dissimilar context confronted by SMC.14 Who could be moved? /which part of the city could be equipped with adequate and affordable housing?/ how could the expenses of the infrastructure invested by the SMC could balance with the revenue? These questions all became the most critical concern for the Housing Committee.

Actually the Housing Committee was established primarily on the motifs to avoid the congested situation deteriorated within Chinese alleyway houses or row houses. Of course the major concern would focus on evacuating the poor Chinese from the inner congested area. Consequently the correspondence between low wages and commuting expenses/property price emerged as major concerns for Committee members.

As any Shanghai residents knew:

“One of the factors in Congestion in housing in Settlement is the inability of the wage earner to pay the cost of transport. Workers lived as near as practicable to their work, and whenever possible, within walking distance of it.” 15

Another restricted investigation about employees of the Dept. of Public Utilities also 13 Hall, 1987, pp.49-57,61-6 14 詳 Kuo, 2003，pp.224-30. 15 The Municipal Archives of SMC: U1-14-0005898；Relations between Wages and Cost of Transport

7

show that: most of the employees were unwilling to commute to work place because their wages were not commensurate to commuting expenses. To live near their working meant money saving. To the few commuters, commuting fares were estimated no more than 6% of their monthly wages.16

“…there seem to were no any reasons for anybody to live anywhere far from his working places.…his wage could only buy for him only the shelter of part of a house……The industrial population in Shanghai is entirely a rent paying group, and such a factor as time payment of a future home cannot be conceived” 17

The memorandum addressed by Dr. Chatley also indicated:

“The difference in land values and the extensive overcrowding that occurred in the areas of high values raises the question of the cost of transport. If, of a typical family of five, two members works outside and a difference of rent of $2.00 for the family per month can be secured by traveling a certain distance, then such outside workers might each spend up to nearly $1.00 per month for transport (= 2 cents per trip for say 50 trips per month)……the distance traveled for 2 cents is small.” 18

That meant: the differentiation in property price could not mathematically function with commuting expenses and commuting distance. Not to mention the “time and spiritual lost “. The commuters supposed had their person causes:

“There is a basic reason Where workers in other cities spend either time or money in traveling to and from their work .……that they are attempting to live in.…a more recently constructed house,.……[or ] in the vicinity of other fellow provincials,.…”19

Obviously low wages discounted the Housing Committee’s evacuative strategy. At least, the evacuated were no longer the low-wage labors. The Committee also acknowledged: ” The Committee’s impression is that in all areas the population tends to crowd until the $1.00 per head per month is reached, irrespective of the landlords return. “20 Owing to too much capitals and populations pursued and competed within the restricted territory of the International Settlement, congestion and high rental cost for housing fundamentally cut off any possibilities of state’s evacuative strategies towards affordable housing provided in outskirts of the city.

ii. The Myths between Ownership and Tenancy—low density suburbs and high density inner city

A. State promotion and thresholds for property ownership

Just like one of the Committee member ever addressed: ” Where workers in other cities spend either time or money in traveling to and from their work it has to be assumed that there

16 “In the recent study of the Cost of Living of public utilities workers, out of 147 who lived in ordinary rented

premises, only 28 workers rode to work and only 25 paid regular daily fares for transport.” The Municipal Archives of the SMC, U1-14-0005924; Relations between Wages and Cost of Transport

17 The Municipal Archives of the SMC: U1-14-0005898, p.71 18 Ibid. p.71 19 The Municipal Archives of the SMC: U1-14-0005898, p.3 20 Ibid. p.71

8

is a basic reason: that they are attempting to buy, for example, a small house in a suburb.” 21 Experience from Osaka, through ‘subsides’ their city authority pushed workers entered the real estate market, although the percentage to all population is low to the Housing Committee of Shanghai. They did propose to advocate ownership to the whole city dwellers even though tenancy had ruled in congested areas.22 John Graham, member of the Committee, delivered to J.R. Jones, Secretary of the SMC, on July 7, 1936 and appealed to state guarantee for loaning and mortgaging in order to raise housing ownership ratio to solve housing problems.23

“Another rather discouraging feature in the Shanghai situation is that practically no one below the millionaire class owns his own home.

I supposed no proposition receives more universal agreement than that the best citizenry is in these countries where the greatest proportion of the workers owns their own home, so there is no need to enumerate any of the benefits here.” 24

But evidently, what Graham focused seemed to be mere the middle class with income at least ten times above average labor classes.

“If a man in Shanghai with an income of $100.00 or $150.00 wished to buy a house, the best he could do would be to pay half cash and give a mortgage at 10% to 12% for the other half, which makes such an impossible situation that he does not even think of it. At a very small initial cost and no ultimate cost the Municipal Council inaugurate a system of mortgage insurance that would make it easy for this man to own his own home.

Supposing a man has salary of $150.00 per month, he might easily have saved 300.00 and could afford to pay the sum of $35.00 per month for rent and taxes. He wishes to buy a house, which will cost him $3,000.00. He pays in his own $300.00 and borrows from his bank $2,700.00 which he agrees to pay back at $30.00 per month, which will amortize the loan in ten years and four months at 6.5%, at the end that time he will own his house free and unencumbered and be a very good type of citizen.

Of course the bank will not loan him the money on that basis, but the council can borrow money at 5.5% or less, therefore, if the Council guarantees the loan the bank will be glad to make it at 5.5% and 1% should be added to form a fund for its insurance. There will be little risk of loss, for it is not likely that the house would have deteriorated very little and there would be many ready to take up his contract at the reduced price. After a few years his quality would have grown so that the risk of loss would have entirely disappeared. If this method of finance appealed to the citizens in numbers the insurance funds would soon grow and any money advanced by the Council be returned, then a guarantee fund would soon accumulated. “25

Obviously what Graham insisted was the mechanism to promote housing ownership. But

21 The Municipal Archives of SMC: U1-14-0005898, p.71 22 Kuo，2003，pp.229-30 23 The Municipal Archives of SMC: U1-14-0005898, pp.119-20 24 Ibid., p.45 25 The Municipal Archives of SMC, U1-14-0005898, p.45

9

he obviously again mis-estimated the amount of the Council’s vacant property within or outside state’s own territory.26Actually the Council’s vacant property within its territory was few, even though including the extra-Settlement area. The Council-owned property estimated insufficient to deal neither with the congested problems, nor to mention the ones supposed to be move out from congested areas unmovable for theirs low wages.

But what Graham suggested were not just his own theory, it also represent the fundamental ideology towards collective consumption of housing of any capitalist regime like SMC. The state’s intervention selectively promoting housing ownership because restricted intervention were pre-supposed to be the Housing Committee’s fundamental attitude. For low wages and low expenses-paying abilities for housing of the inhabitants of slums and congested areas, the SMC and the Housing Committee shared the same opinion that it’s impossible to erect any tenant houses on profit basis.27 The tenants now reside in congested estates were not thought to be the appropriate classes. And they presumed it’s unlikely to improve the living condition within the Chinese estate unless raising the rental to have landlords renovated their deteriorated houses. Contradictorily, the Housing Committee favored to assist citizens “with monthly income between 50-150 dollars because to this group obvious upgrading was easy to obtain..……the requirement for housing improvement was urgent.”28 Generally speaking, the state intervention proposed to favor the groups moved around owning a house instead of tenancy. State preferred to promote the middle level fabricated into the real estate market to have revenue raised. Setting effective mechanism for smooth urban governance with financial concern still ruled.

B. State Intervention to Sub-letting and the Redefine for Residential Density

High property price had most of the inner city dwelling units built for tenancy. Overbuilding for sub-letting emerged consequently. But the extra rents usually were collected by sub-landlord and seemed nothing to do with the property owner. Therefore most Chinese residential units continued to deteriorate because their owners got no inclination to maintain their buildings. The whole area would also went deteriorated either. As building tax was levied by each building’s leasing contract, overbuilding and sub-letting not only could not help the owner earn more money, but also unable to have revenue increased. The only way the SMC could raise its revenue was just by raising the assessed value. But that would have the risk to arouse public complaint, especially in the meanwhile of economic depression.29 State’s legitimacy would also been vibrated. Therefore to restrict sub-letting seemed to be a rational and reasonable reaction for the SMC’s intervention.

Were sub-letting both the cause and result for congestion? The Housing Committee argued:

“…over-crowding was the cause of high rents, not high rents the cause of over-crowding. If the rent changes in the situation as regarding sub-letting are examined, it may be that his first contention may be held to be true, though seeing that the wage rates will not permit lower paid workers to live within their income, it

26 Ibid. p.46 27 Ibid. p.45 28 The Municipal Archives of SMC, U1-14-0005898, pp.45-6 29 The Municipal Archives of SMC: U1-14-0007062

10

cannot be said that high rents do not contribute to over-crowding” 30

Motifs for profit-pursuing of the sub-landlords were also another key factor for congestion.

“ Sub-letting was formerly a profitable undertaking. With investment of a few hundred dollars in the alteration of a house to turn it into a dovecot, ……the sub-lessor was able in many cases to get a sufficient return to live wither rent free or at reduced rental. The more he subdivided the house and the more congested it became, the higher the rents he was able to charge! And while he did not have a whole house to himself, he exercised control within the house in which he lived.” 31

In consequence the Housing Committee concluded that there seemed to have three major causes that could justify state’s interference. The unbalance correspondence between ownership/tenancy right and tax-payers’ obligation, the incapability of the SMC’s supervision towards un-authorized addition and alteration, and more significantly, the sub-lessor didn’t pay any compensation for the over-crowding situation he brought about. As housing vacancy increased and sub-letting were no longer profitable from early 1930s, the Housing Committee assumed it to be the critical moment to regulate sub-letting through state intervention.

“But recent studies of cost of living indicate that sub-letting is no longer a profitable enterprise.……Interest charges on the investment and a sinking fund to provide against the depreciation of the fixtures and possible loss in value of the investment have to be taken into account. In addition, rent, lighting, repairs, upkeep, municipal tax and payment to alleyway watchman, are regularly monthly charges. When all have been assessed the rent-equivalent for the space the sub-lessor occupies is found to be high.……Now that the practice has ceased to be profitable, many sub-lessors would escape from their ventures if they could.” 32

The Committee proposed to take the time when most sub-lessors abandoned their houses as the most critical moment for state intervention. They proposed to withdrew the rights of exercising control of one’s own houses back to owners themselves. But great part of such houses was deteriorated renovation demanded a great deal of money invested further. Unprofitable as it was, it’s unattractive to most owners. At the mean while, most of the tenants were not the ‘appropriate’ ones that would benefit the owners. To most housing owners’ profit, the state’s intervention designated to concentrate on demolishing and constructing new buildings. All the contracts and the existing social relationship beneath them would thoroughly be wiped off.

Evaluations between low wage and commuting expenses confirmed the impossibilities to move low-income workers away. Directly raising the residential density, and calculating the density with persons per room, instead of per house unit gradually became Housing Committee major concern. The existing building codes regarding Chinese two-storey wooden houses stood in the breach immediately. Dr. H. Chatley, chairman of the Sub-committee C pointed out directly in positions inclined to the owners at July 9, 1936: “unless we raised the height of the houses up to 5 or 6 stories, or it’s impossible for the owners to gain adequate

30 The Municipal Archives of SMC: U1-14-0005898 ,p.4； 31 Ibid., p.4-5 32 Ibid. p.4

11

remuneration.” Although the commissioners of the Public Works opposed these strategy, 33 but Miss Hinder and other members on behalf of the Sanitary Dept. all formally supported these proposal and assumed that “might profitably be more closely examined” .34 According to its resolution, Harriet B. Lacy, another member of the Committee, brought up an investigation about some alleyway houses projects in Yang-shu-pu District at July 20 the same year. In this article he addressed that the building codes were unprofitable to most housing owners actually. He also assumed that’s the cause for real estate depression. 35 What commissioners of Public Works and members of the Housing Committee concerned run in the same groove, they all stand for profit concern and intended to stimulate external capitals push into the redevelopment of the inner congested areas. But these proposals inevitably had its blind spot, especially problems about exclusion brought about by thresholds of rental. 36

Graham, the promoter for ownership also realized the same problems. He disagreed to raise the building height, but admitted the state to interfere the interior standards instead; even though that would also irritated the rental price.

“the Building Regulation had to be modified: all houses should equipped sanitary convenience, piped water and water closet. Each unit should have larger spaces and had restriction to persons inhabited per room.……[would]provide the tenants better living conditions; although that would lift the rental price.” 37

But what Graham insisted did not became common consensus in the Committee. Rational principals, the attitude ‘deferential to market’, not only monitored the Committee to modify the restrictions on building height of the Bye-laws, but also prompted for road widening and block re-subdivision; all appealed to induce more external capitals throw into.38 Further more, regulations of ‘zoning’ were also introduced to have broader influence of state intervention.

iii. Connive about the unauthorized alterations/additions and the squatter district

From 1920s, as more and more unauthorized additions and alterations became prevalent within the Chinese dwellings and went beyond the SMC’s control, the Dept. of Public Works attitudes towards them had shifted from ‘tacitly approve’ to ‘openly connive’. In 1930s, “heir investigation about such unauthorized additions and alterations addressed almost 90% of the Chinese population resided in 82,000 Chinese housing units; each apiece had two unauthorized alterations or additions. 150,000 units of unauthorized articles had been estimated by the SMC”. 39

33 The Municipal Archives of SMC: U1-14-0005898, pp.49-57 34 Ibid., pp.49-57 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. pp.50-3 37 Ibid. p.45 38 The Municipal Archives of SMC:U1-14-0005859, pp.13-9 39 The Municipal Archives of SMC:U1-10-153, p.37

12

Figure 1 sketch of the unauthorized additions and alterations Reference:：《里弄住宅》

Confronted with such situations, instead to enforcing bans or demolishing, the SMC got no alternatives but to approve tacitly. ”The Public Works Department of SMC had actions towards the new unauthorized buildings. Annually more than one thousand dispatches had been issued,” Limited amount of SMC’s staff were thought to be unbalanced with the amount of emerged unauthorized ones. 40 The year 1932, as Son-hu Battle happened in northern part of Shanghai, a great quantity of schools, churches, factories, work shops were forced to move into the International Settlement and French Concession. The two colonial state’s attitude towards unauthorized buildings compelled to be looser. After 1932, Shanghai began to confront financial inadequacy affected by the Great Depression from USA and Europe. As real estate development and constructions of new building almost ceased, the SMC were also compelled to cease all its redressing issuing towards unauthorized and unexpected buildings within its territory.

For example, a letter written by Pawnbrokers’ Association at June 27, 1935 addressed:

”[you]are requested to allow landlords and tenants to repair but to delay rebuilding of old and dilapidated shops and factories. The delay is designed to curtail immediate expenses and thus enable relief to be given to industry and commerce.” 41

The SMC replied immediately. But the former strong attitude inclined to demolish unauthorized buildings was no longer existed. They even stressed:” If a bona fide application to repair were to be submitted to this Department a permit would be issued. “ 42

The ‘Silver Inadequacy Crisis’ not only stagnated the real estate trading, but also decreased the state’s revenue indirectly. The state apparatus no longer could function as infrastructures providers, not to mention the collective consumption of housing. Consequently the SMC was obliged to tacitly approve the existence of the former

40 Ibid. p.37 41 The Municipal Archives of SMC: U1-14-0005859, pp.13-5 42 “This department has no record of any pressure being brought to bear on any owner of dilapidated buildings

to demolish and rebuild unless the structure is on land scheduled for road widening, and such widening is an urgent matter”.1935/7/8, The Municipal Archives of SMC: U1-14-0005859, p.16

13

unauthorized additions and alterations to relieve the pressure of housing inadequacy and revenue shortage. The SMC realized tenants’ rental could be raised only if they insisted demolishing or rehabilitating the unauthorized ones. For the Public Works Dept., they also come to the consensus that:

It is a general request which does not apply to any particular instance or instances. Similar requests haves been made to the Shanghai City Government and the French Municipal Administration. If our Public Works Department thinks that the Council has been lenient in applying the Building Rules and in fact has been meeting such a wish, then we can let the Chamber of Commerce know. If the Department feels the request is not practical, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce may informed to that effect.43

The Sub-committee B who responsible for general investigation reviewed the unauthorized alterations and additions from 1936. December of the same year they took the administration problems about the un authorized buildings up with Shen Yi, Commissioner of the Public Works Department of the Chinese Special Council of Shanghai. How the Chinese government defined ‘unauthorized’ was given special attention. Consequently they came to a temporary conclusion: 44

“It is considered that it would be neither practicable nor defensible to attempt to embark upon any campaign for the immediate and wholesale removal of the existing lofts, partitions, and other alteration and additions which have been un-authorized erected in Chinese houses.……Specific recommendations to effect such remedies were submitted by the Commissioner of Public Works. It is reiterated here that the elimination of building evils that have accumulated over a long period of years can only be by a gradual process. .……and there is no intention on the Committee’s part to recommend that the Council should enter upon any course of action such as would result in any large number of people being deprived of their present dwelling places. It is proposed that the work of improvement should proceed piecemeal and gradually…and that it should be regarded mainly as educative and persuasive rather than coercive, in order that the public may become gradually reconciled to the new requirements. In this connection the proposal of the Commissioner of Public Works was noted that he would deliver to all Chinese houses a notice stating what is not in future to be permitted in respect of alterations and additions in such houses.” 45

What a rational bureaucratic technicians indispensable, the rationale of expediency, was manifested thoroughly so far. But actually it’s because the SMC were unable to do any improvements about housing conditions; that was the authentic reason. Concerning regime’s legitimacy itself, the SMC would rather to keep the status quo and tacitly approved the unauthorized existence.

“In order to deal with the problem of abuses in buildings after they have been erected, an examination was undertaken of the Council’s powers respecting buildings under the Land Regulations and Bye-Laws. Such examination has produced the conviction that it is rather due to the fact that the Council’s powers

43�Ibid.,1935/7/4 44� The Municipal Archives of SMC: U1-14-0005924,pp.64-66, 1936/12/16 45 The Municipal Archives of SMC:U1-10-153, pp.38-9

14

have in the past been allowed to go by default, possibly because of the difficulties attaching to a staff organization sufficient to care for the widespread nature of the abuses, that unauthorized alterations and additions in Chinese houses have been permitted to develop on so large a scale. The Council’s existing powers under the Land Regulations and Bye-Laws are considered adequate to vest it with authority to take action in respect of such abuses, and it is unnecessary to seek further powers for the purpose in hand by means of amendment of the existing Land Regulations and Bye-Laws.” 46

The more expedient way supposed to amend the original By-laws and had the ‘unauthorized’ ones presumed to remain:

“In exercise of its existing powers under the Land Regulations and Bye-Laws, it is considered that the Council can properly, and should, interpret the terms “new buildings” and “building operations,” and the further terms and provisions of the Land Regulations and Bye-Laws to include “any alteration or addition to an existing building…It is further recommended that a permit must always be obtained for any alteration or addition to an existing building. ” 47

These expedient approval manifested in the final recommendations of the Housing Committee. Safety and emergency egress were the only two ultimate insistency for SMC:

“The Sub-Committee considered in detail the specific recommendations submitted by the Commissioner of Public Works for dealing with existing abuses in Chinese dwelling-houses, which recommendations were based upon the assumption, primarily, that the requirements of structural safety must be satisfied in every case; and, secondarily, that reasonable means of egress be available in the event of fire.”48

These insistency were further generalized into some detail demanding afterwards:

“….providing for the conditions only under which existing unauthorized alterations and additions shall be permitted to remain, were accordingly adopted:

Structures on Drying Stages and Over Shops.—That the floor be of reinforced concrete; that the roof be pitched, and that the average internal height shall not exceed 8 feet. That over shops the front wall be set back at least 5 feet from the front of the building, and that the door at the top of the stairs gives direct access to the open air. ….Regarding permissible structures on drying stages and over shops, only walls of non-combustible materials will be permitted. It is considered that in the majority of cases the existing staircases leading to such structures are sufficient, but it is recommended that where special hazards exist double handrails on the staircases be insisted upon.

Roofs over Yards—Roofs over yards shall be permitted, provided they allow suitable lighting and ventilation, but shall not be constructed above the first floor except in back yards containing stairs.

46 Ibid. p.39 47 Ibid. p.40；the word” must” had been highlighted by typed twice in the original archives. 48 The Municipal Archives of SMC: U1-10-153, p.40

15

Sleeping Lofts.—These would only be permitted to remain provided they are structurally safe and there exist reasonable means of egress therefore in the event of fire.

Structures and Gates in Passages.—These will not be permitted to remain, except under gate-houses and where the minimum passage width prescribed is maintained.

Enclosing of Verandahs.—These will not be permitted to remain where constructed over Municipal roads. ….No further enclosing of verandahs anywhere will be permitted.

Stairs in Rear Yards.—As these provide safer egress in the event of fire, they should be permitted.

Openings in Fire Walls.—These to be permitted in external walls, provided they are at least 10 feet away from any other building.

Hollow Ceilings.—These shall not be permitted to remain, in view of the dangers to health consequent upon resulting insanitation due to rats, etc.

Wooden Drying Stages over Roofs.—These to be permitted to remain, subject to reasonable safety provisions.” 49

Besides, the SMC’s attitude to the squatter districts was loosened either. One for the SMC never mind their legitimacy from the low-income groups, and another for improvement about the squatter districts signified inestimable investment. For the sake they never gave attention to slum areas unless most middle class communities’ anxieties were evoked. The former attitude of ‘tacitly approved’ subsequently extended to the administration about those squatter huts. Even more they’d ever set annual quota to restrain:

“During the Committee’s sessions, however, the Council itself gave renewed consideration to the problem, and in October made public a report as to its future policy regarding this type of living accommodation. Briefly, the Council’s aim is to reduce these huts by an annual quota and to prevent their further erection.” 50

Permitted quota signified the SMC agreed to see the squatter huts increased annually by the rate SMC itself willing to approved. That also mentioned the state even ‘appreciated’ the contributions the informal sectors provided for relieving the pressure of housing inadequacy. What concealed behind were a set of logic the state apparatus used to calculate between expenditures and revenue for collective consumption. Through state’s inducing, the SMC still appealed to market to deal with the housing inadequacy constantly.

“The Council however recognized that the enforcement of its policy of systematic reduction carries with it some responsibility to both permit and encourage some alternative form of housing not beyond the means of the average hut dweller, yet offering some attraction to the land-owner, and it is believed this would be found in the type “A” house of the City Government’s model villages.;…A house of this type

49 Ibid. pp.40-1，the first copy of the archive typed with” will”, then a second correction with red underlined

typed” they should be permitted” with “will” be deleted. The two words” to remain” had also been deleted。 50 The Municipal Archives of SMC: U1-10-153, p.33

16

with 200 square feet of living space would cost about $200, and should last as long as the ordinary Chinese house. At a rental of slightly over one cent per square foot per month, which is now being paid in the poorer class huts, it should provide a satisfactory means of obtaining a reasonable return for small capital outlay on much of the land now lying idle in the Eastern District.”51

Figure 2 Spreading of the squatter huts and slum areas outside the territory of International Settlement and French Concession at Shanghai

Consequently, the spreading of the squatter huts never was terminated. Enclosed them outside the territory of International Settlement and French Concession themselves were all along the only strategy for these two colonial states. On condition not to arise anxiety for infectious disease, few and piecemeal spreading of the squatter huts and unauthorized buildings not only could be approved, but also were expected to relieve the pressure for insufficient housing supplying. Whether the state interfered or not thoroughly depended on the surrounded middle class communities feel threatened or not. Outside the territory, excluding replaced state’s public housing accommodating. The interface between the three administrative districts emerged as the best accommodation zone for wanderers and low-wage workers. These attitude and principals towards unauthorized buildings concluded at the conference records of the Housing Committee on March 1, 1937. The informal buildings like squatter huts and unauthorized alterations and additions were officially approved institutionally. Consequently the collective dwelling patterns within Chinese residence in International Settlement of Shanghai could reproduced them through state’s intervention—actually to say state’s conniving.

51 The Municipal Archives of SMC: U1-10-153, p.33

17

iv. Structural expediently policies interference

In October 7, 1936, after synthesizing each sub-committee’s investigation and review, the Housing Committee proposed a temporary recommendation. Restricted to the exercising powers that had been reviewed, specific recommendation was addressed in two major aspects.52 One pointed to the ‘executable’ strategies, another went around economic aspects of housing from Sub-committee C’s through review. ‘Means for reduction of rent’ and ‘means for improvement of hygiene’ suggested to be two principal appeals.53

For ‘Means for reduction of rent’, the Committee took one step ahead proposed another ten strategies (section A).:

1. Public Subsidy of housing Schemes； 2. Reduced assessment of cheap house property； 3. Permission to build more stories of less individual height； 4. Cooperation with industrial undertakings in housing workpeople； 5. Improved cheap tram transportation； 6. Cooperation with Extra Settlement Authorities in housing； 7. Increase of wages； 8. Cheap lodging houses for single men and women； 9. Reduced pawn broking and money lending rate； 10. Reduced mortgage rate ;54

For ‘Means for improvement of hygiene’, there were ten further strategies (section B).:

1. additional sanitary accommodation； 2. Ejection of excess occupants； 3. Increased aeration by road widening, wider alleyways, parks and tree planting； 4. Smoke reduction； 5. Cleansing or piping of waterways ; 6. cheaper public water supply； 7. Zoning and decentralization of god owns and factories； 8. Condemnation of unfit structure； 9. Birth Control Clinics； 10. Discouragement of excessive immigration；55

Generally speaking, the executable recommendation what Housing Committee proposed was full of expediency to housing inadequacy actually. The unauthorized additions and alterations build beyond state’s original by-laws here was suggested ‘permitting to remain’ on conditions. The reasons had the state justified its interference to private estates, emergency fleeing and sanitary, were again the ‘reasonable’ excuse for those unauthorized ones to be permitted by the SMC to remain ironically. Even though state proposed to redefine ‘new building’ and ‘building operations’ to had more opportunities to interfere private additions/alteration after completion. Although the unregistered building behavior supposed to be brought into state’s supervision, but evidently the state were unwilling to do thorough improvement within the Chinese alleyway houses structurally. Accurate calculation, what the

52 The municipal Gazette, 1937/3/30, p.114 53 The Municipal Archives of SMC: U1-14-0005898, p.73 54 Ibid., p.73 55 The Municipal Archives of SMC: U1-14-0005898

18

state’s rational bureaucratical technicians ever in pride of, had here restricted just to supervise buildings’ storey height. No more criteria were established for demolishing towards congestion. Base on the last two minimum conditions of emergency fleeing and sanitary, the fragmented approval to alterations/additions, and even to ‘industrial premises’ were merely justified the state apparatus’s paralyzed governance towards dwelling congestion.

Analyzing the recommendations concerning economic aspects in section B, it’s obvious that what the Housing Committee recommended still proposed to exercise public anxiety about sanitary to justify state’s intervention and consequently extended to other interference towards Chinese deteriorated and congested estates. Therefore most proposals in section B appeals to state’s conventional infrastructures projects which could be exercised directly by Council’s Sanitary Department. Nevertheless congested were the structural outcomes to most industrial great cities including Shanghai, conventional prescription about infrastructure constructions were unable to push the tenants evacuated from the congested areas actually. Even the proposal 2 and 8 of section B ----ban on the unauthorized alterations/additions, were indeed useless to deal with overcrowding problems but only reduced the capacity of the existing communities. Even more that would bring about more vagrants and homeless further evoke prevalent anxiety within middle class communities. It was what the SMC vigorously avoided.

There still demanded state intervention for low-income accommodation through cooperation with the real-estate sectors and philanthropic enterprise. Proposals in section A therefore could be viewed as state’s action strategies need to be negotiated with different agents and administration systems. Basically the proposals in reducing rent could further been divided into two categories. The first proposed ‘to relieve the pressure of housing inadequacy by evacuating residence out’; “Cooperation with industrial undertakings in housing workpeople” and ”Cooperation with Extra Settlement Authorities in housing” both belonged to this category. The second category ‘appeal to the market mechanism’ with state power induced besides;” Reduced pawn broking and money lending rate”, “Public Subsidy of housing Schemes”, and “Reduced assessment of cheap house property” all signified possible financial aids from the state.

However it was evidently that the SMC continued to keep its stance to have housing problems been dealt with through normal market instead of state itself. What the Housing Committee’s general investigation and recommendation never shifted the SMC's ground. In the first two proposals in section A, the SMC definitely knew the low-income tenants groups that deserved to be paid maximum attention were also the ones incapable of shifting to any other place beside the vicinity of their working place. There were also none rental houses that were cheaper than lived in their existing congested building when added commuting expenses. But the Housing Committee still scheduled to push them shifted to working residence in industrial areas or into the Chinese boundary that far away. Intentionally they did ignore the sober truth: residence for low-income tenants absolutely should be adjacent to their working places. Therefore, the proposal “ Improved cheap tram transportation” even looked like SMC’s grace to the poor, on the contradictory, including another two proposals—“Reduced assessment of cheap house property” and ” Permission to build more stories of less individual height”, they actually were supposed to provide profitable conditions for real estate markets. There still lacked detail procedures about “Public Subsidy of housing Schemes“ and “Reduced pawn broking and money lending rate” and how could they assisted potential tenants enter the rental market. But to low-income tenants or vagrants, continuous loaning from informal economic for surviving had became

19

normality. The Housing Committee’s recommendation in section A was more appropriate for relieving economic pressure of the state itself than adequate and affordable accommodation.

What the SMC confronted were typical predicament prevalent in most industrial cities. Especially the collective consumption requirement regarded housing inadequacy for low-income labors. Overcrowded and hybrid usage of the urban spaces had emerged as a huge counter conditions against capitalist mode of accumulation. As accumulation ceased or suspended, state apparatus could not well function, its legitimacy were also been embroiled. The financial embarrassment caused by ‘Silver Inadequacy Crisis’ merely incandesced the state’s legitimacy crisis and compelled the state to interfere. Insufficient investment towards collective consumption of housing conditioned state’s capability to deal with the great and long-term urban debts. Openly conniving to informal sectors with their buildings and economic procedures ironically were more concrete than any blurred economic prescription, furthermore more positive to relieve pressure of housing inadequacy.

No latter than the SMC executed Housing Committee’s recommendation, another battle ceased all the struggles. July 1937, half year after the Housing Committee disbanded, the East and the Zha-bei districts once again turned into major battlefield. All the inhabitants with churches, schools and any other institutions moved into the International Settlement and French Concession collectively. The great deal of refugee had the population rising drastically again. Each inches of the International Settlement were compelled to increase its capacity for refugees right on the spot. The openly conniving attitude recommended by the Housing Committee ironically proved to be a expedient but foreseeing strategy.

C. Conclusion

Housing absolutely could be seen as commodities for urban residents to obtain living services through consumptions from the housing market. Labor force would all be recreated within them. Nevertheless according to what the paper had presented, historical studies show that: low-income consumers were always excluded from the housing market for unprofitable reasons to real estate providers. Private sectors could not steadily provide these levels of services. But corresponding to maintaining, producing and reproducing the social relationship, housing for the low-income ones was absolutely essential for cities to function well. As the capitalist mode of production were deep going and city itself attracted millions of immigrants moving in, requirements for infrastructure and facilities regarding collective consumption, including housing, would all appealed to a power state to provide especially the unprofitable facilities and housings services to the low-income labors.

Shanghai shared the same experience with industrial great cities after the industrialization and urbanization from mid 19th century. The year 1885 the British Royal Commission was established at London to deal with arduous housing problems happening in some large cities like London and Manchester. New York also had exercised housing reform from mid-19th century. But:

“like that of the cities of the old world, is that the avarice of capitalists renders governmental interference for the protection of the poor and unfortunate an absolute necessity” 56

56 March 28, 1856, New York City’s Daily Times, from Richard E. Foglesong：Planning the Capitalist

20

The American ‘welfare state’ emerged with serious housing reform efforts to improve housing conditions in American cities. Housing deterioration was excused to speculative housing production and lack of zoning.57 Exploitation and low wages supposed to worsen housing condition. Housing reform were all advocated by educated professionals and sponsored by business groups and merchant-dominated organization. Through their exertions, as public opinion and the educated wealthy closed up, the state was summoned to play more active role in housing supplying. State intervention to urban housing commenced.

Such intervention always initiated by sanitary concerning. The first Tenement House Law issued in 1867 at New York appointed towards two different aspects----first, the load of social cost brought about by slums, and second, the actual social effect for recreation of labors of the slum areas. In deed,

“The housing ordinance of the late 1800s and early 1900s were less a response to the needs of the poor than to the perceived threat—political, sanitary, and social—to the larger community to following those needs to go unmet. …Guided by the philosophy of physical environmental determinism, reformers of the period asserted the right of the community to guard against the multiple threats of the slum over the rights of the private builder and tenement house holder. .”58

The upper/middle classes were motivated. Housing reform then was deprive of their essential upholder----the workers, and came to the emphasis about the threat of slums. Searching for “the right of community to be free from diseases” gradually transformed into the interest about social control. Segregation and exclusion emerged in the name of “controlling the spread of diseases”, but actually concerned to keep the property value steadily.

It is not unique just in New York, state intervention summoned by housing shortcomings also emerged in colonial period Shanghai, especially when great deal of immigrants move into and huge amount of capitals gathered to compete within restricted SMC’s territory after early 1910s. Housing was produced by commerce market; the logic of commodifcation inevitably penetrated both the production and consumption of housing. Profit-oriented notions not only usually dominated decision makings about the locations and form of housing, but also excluded the low-income immigrants from the market by economic thresholds directly. The unsatisfied housing requirement resorted to unauthorized constructions by informal sectors--sub-letting, re-partitioned, squatter huts spreading and vacant urban space illegally occupancy emerged. With density raised, exterior appearance degenerated, and disease spreading, unskilled low-income labors’ housing humiliated itself gradually.

Plague first justified state’s sanitary interference to riverfront Chinese alleyway houses cross Su-zhou Creek. Although new building codes regarding rat-resist was introduced, but as unauthorized alterations and additions extended limitlessly when more and more tenants and workshops move in, cooked or produced anywhere caused not only possible fire emergencies, but also offensive noise and odors. Fragmentary accusing always summoned state’s ban and demolishing. Actually there was discrimination about racial and geopolitics from middle class position. They shared somehow the similar experience with New York in the resembling

City—the colonial era to the 1920s, 1986, p.56 57 Hall, 1987, pp.57-61 58 Foglesong, 1986, p. 75

21

intentions to guard the middle class’s property.

Therefore, the two great cities both issued restrictive legislation and had ever proposed model tenement.59 Minimum standards for ventilation and lightening were introduced and new housing plan, besides the notorious dumbbell plan, were trying out.60 Sub-letting both existed.61 The two cities also condemned capitalist mode of production and greediness of the sub-landlords. Infectious disease both help to suggested the vivid negative image of their slums in early days. As communities were advocated to have the right against disease spreading, scientific prescription was applied as state’s apparatus. Consequently state intervention were also been justified.

No matter housing reform in New York or Housing Committee of Shanghai, they both represented economic appeals and political benefits. That both enabled the restricted reform possible. Historical review also verified: if capital itself sensed its political and ideological benefits and were willing to support improvement about the housing condition, labors participated or not would became marginal and not indispensable; social control became most vital appeals instead. Ironically, it’s just like what Castells had ever stated: state intervention seemed to respond to the recreation requirement of labors. But actually it was based on the demanding of capital which proposed to keep dominant leadership of the ruling classes and convinced the labors to accustomed capitalist mode of production.62

In consequence, the two city authority were both unwilling to build tenements houses for low-income labors. On the contrary, they would rather appeal to private sectors to build model housing still with tiny profit.63 Real estate markets and philanthropic societies were all resorted to decide the location, production, distribution and administration of tenement houses. The authorities chose to stand outside the play and did nothing but issuing of the building regulations in order to have the market function smoothly. Criteria in both quantity and quality of such tenement houses were all supposed to set through profit calculating and adjustments between providing and demanding.

In the long run the two cities both failed to provide any public tenement housing. Further more, they’d ever handled the unauthorized buildings by ‘condemnation’. But there still were not any legislation of accommodation for residents of the unauthorized buildings. The congested areas compelled to be overcrowded even more and came to its vicious circle.64 Finally the state could rather to connive the unauthorized building spread over the possible vacant spaces of the entire city painstakingly.

Claus Offe had ever had incisive interpretation about capitalist state. He argues that “the state in capitalist socialistic society is confronted with two potentially contradictory objectives: facilitating capital accumulation, the sine qua non of the capitalist system, and maintaining democratic legitimacy, necessitated by the formally democratic character of the state. On the one hand, any state of the capitalist society has to maintain or initiate profitable environment good for capital to accumulate and eliminate or monitor situations

59 Kuo, the Social Production of the Alleyway Houses of Shanghai, 1842-1943, thesis paper, pp. 219,241-2,

2003。 60 Foglesong, 1986, pp.57-61 pp. 71-2. 61 Ibid. p. 64 62 Castells, 1972, pp.460-1 63 Foglesong, 1986, pp. 69-70 64 Ibid., p. 80；Hall, 1987, p.34-44.

22

that would delay capital accumulation. On the other hand, state itself also has to maintain or initiate conditions harmonious to each groups of the whole society. These two objectives were always conflicted. If state exercised its power to facilitate capital accumulating at the expense of other social groups’ benefits, it would no longer legitimate itself and lost most of the necessary loyalties of supporting. But if the state hesitate to provide conditions good for accumulation. The state apparatus would not start and collapse. In Offe’s view, however, “there exists no method of policy formulation that would enable the state to satisfactory carry out these objectives in the long run.”65

Collective consumption about housing are most capitalist cities in developing always confronted, especially they greatly rely upon cheap but unskilled immigrant labors. But the state intervention summoned from housing inadequacy differs from different legitimacy concern itself. What had been exercised consequently would be dissimilar. In comparison to housing administration of other cities under nation-state’s governance like British, Belgium, and Deutsch, city state of New York, part of the federal system of the united states, and SMC somehow shared the same natures differed from other systems under nation-state governance. No matter New York or Shanghai, hesitation in housing reform would rather ascribe to consequential characters of the state than insufficiency of their power. Reviews of urban histories of some capitalist cities also verified: there was a gravitation towards state intervention ”base on the theory that facilitating capital accumulation takes priority over maintaining democratic legitimacy in the definition of ‘good’ public policy.”66 But state intervention could never be successful in stimulating capital accumulation and maintaining democratic legitimacy. To the International Settlement of Shanghai, unauthorized alterations/additions and prevailing squatter huts played vital parts in governance because they provide the possibilities to release inadequacy and un-affordability pressure of low-income housing under state’s openly conniving. In consequence the political appeals called for “democratic legitimacy” were also slackened. Among the great deal of social movements emerged after 1920s at Shanghai, there existed even no movements resorted to housing inadequacy from the low-income groups. Therefore the state inclined to exercise ineffectual social control to maintain a ‘good’ environment could facilitate capital accumulation and ultimately justify itself. The ‘native’-the Chinese congested areas constantly were labeled ‘negative’ through state’s interference corresponding to upper/middle communities’ identity.

From the analysis about the social process of the Housing Committee, capitalism again manifested itself in the urban crisis of Shanghai.

65 Ibid. p.14 66 Ibid. p. 18

23

References

□ Books and Journals:

上海住宅建設志編纂委員會 編 1998 《上海住宅建設志》，上海專志系列叢刊，上海：社會科學院出版社。

上海城市規劃志編纂委員會 編 1999 《上海城市規劃志》，上海專志系列叢刊，上海：社會科學院出版社。

上海房地產志編纂委員會 編 1999 《上海房地產志》，上海專志系列叢刊，上海：社會科學院出版社。

上海租界志編纂委員會 編 2001 《上海租界志》，上海專志系列叢刊，上海：社會科學院出版社。

上海文史資料委員會 編 1990 《舊上海的房地產經營》，上海文史資料選輯 第六十四輯，上海：人民出版社。

上海圖書館（張傳 等編） 2001 《老上海地圖》，上海畫報出版社。

上海社會科學院經濟所城市經濟組（編） 1962 《上海棚戶區的變遷》上海文史資料選輯 no.34，上海人民出版社年出版

王紹周 1989 《上海近代城市建築》，江蘇科學技術出版社。 1987 《里弄建築》，上海：科學技術文獻出版社。

史梅定（主編） 1996 《追憶近代上海圖史》上海：上海古籍出版社。

伍江 1995 《上海百年建築史, 1840-1949》，上海：同濟大學出版社。

池子華 1996 《近代中國流民》，杭州：浙江人民出版社。

朱邦興、胡林閣、徐聲（合編） 1984 《上海產業與上海職工》,（1939 原版，1984 年再版）上海：上海人民出版社。

吳圳義 1978 《清末上海租界社會》，臺北：文史哲出版社。 1981 《上海租界問題》，臺北 : 正中書局

岑德彰 1931 《上海租界略史》，上海：大東書局。 1980 《上海公共租界史稿》，上海：人民出版社。

忻平 1996 《從上海發現歷史--現代化進程中的上海人及其社會生活,1927-1937》，上海：上

海人民出版社。

何重建

24

1991 〈上海近代營造業的形成及特徵〉，《第三次中國近代建築史研究討論會論文集》，北京：中國建築工業出版社。

何重建、胡本榮 1990 〈對借鑒歷史經驗加強城市建設行業管理的思考〉，《建築業改革與發展研討會論

文集》，北京：中國建築工業出版社。 沈華 主編

1991 《上海里弄民居》，北京：中國建築工業出版社。 柯象峰

1935 《中國貧窮問題》，上海：正中書局

胡祥翰 1930 《上海小志》，上海：上海古籍出版社（1989 年重新出版）。

胡煥庸（編） 1987 � 《中國人口-上海分冊》，北京：中國財政經濟出版社

徐公肅、丘瑾璋 1923 《上海公共租界制度》，民國叢書第四輯，臺北：上海書局出版。

徐雪筠 等（編） 1985 《上海近代社會經濟發展概況（1882-1931）----海關十年報告譯編》，上海：

上海社會科學院出版社。

孫毓棠（主編） 1957 《中國近代工業史資料》第一輯，中國科學院經濟研究所主編，北京市：科學出

版社

馬長林 1989 〈上海公共租界的開闢與早期工部局職能考察〉，《上海研究論叢》第七輯，頁

221~233，上海：上海社會科學院出版社出版。

袁燮銘 1989 〈工部局與上海路政〉，《上海研究論叢》第二輯，頁 169~205，上海：上海社會

科學院出版社出版。

高承恕 1988 《理性化與資本主義》，臺北：聯經出版社。

郭奇正( Kuo, Chi-jeng) 2001 〈泡沫化了的國族召喚—大上海計畫與 1927-1937 年間上海的都市政治〉，《台

大地理學報》vol. 29, 頁 27-66 2003 〈上海里弄-集居型式的社會生產與表意的流變〉，《睹物思人論文集》頁

211-270，臺北：麥田出版社。 2003 �《上海租界時期里弄住宅的社會生產》，臺灣大學建築與城鄉研究所博士論文。

陳正書 1988 〈租界與近代上海經濟結構的變化〉，《史林》 (4):89

陳炎林 編 1933 《上海地產大全》，民國叢書第三編第三十二輯，臺北：上海書局。

黃宗智

25

1990 《長江三角洲小農家庭與鄉村發展，1350-1988》，香港：牛津大學出版社。

張仲禮 (主編) 1990 《近代上海城市研究》，上海：人民出版社。

張輝 1935 《上海市地價研究》，上海：正中書局。

張濟順 1993 〈論上海里弄〉，《上海研究論叢》第九輯，頁 59~77，上海：上海社會科學院出版

社出版。 1999 〈上海里弄--論街道基層的生態演變〉，《上海百年風華》,頁 291-332，臺北：躍

升文化出版社。

費正清 1992 《中國：傳統與變革》〈中譯本〉南京：江蘇人民出版社

蒯世勳 編 1980 《上海公共租界史稿》，上海：人民出版社。

[美]裴宜理 2000 《上海罷工-上海工人政治研究》，江蘇人民出版社。

鄒依仁 1984 《上海人口變遷的研究》，上海：人民出版社。

熊月之 1991 〈論近代上海特殊的市政格局〉，《上海研究論叢》 第九輯，頁 324~334，上海：

上海社會科學院出版社出版。

熊月之（主編） 1999 《上海通史》（晚清文化、晚清社會、晚清經濟、民國經濟、民國社會等篇）；上海：

上海社會科學院出版社。

鄭祖安 1997 《百年上海城》，上海：學林出版社。

賴德霖 1992 《中國近代建築史研究》，北京清華大學建築系博士論文。 1993a 〈從上海公共租界看中國近代建築制度之形成（上）〉《空間》雜誌，三月號。 1993b 〈從上海公共租界看中國近代建築制度之形成（中）〉《空間》雜誌，四月號。 1993c 〈從上海公共租界看中國近代建築制度之形成（下）〉《空間》雜誌，五月號。 1995 〈「科學性」與「民族性」--近代中國的建築價值觀〉；[大陸]《建築師》雜誌

羅蘇文 1991 《石庫門：尋常人家》，上海：人民出版社。 1995 〈路、裏、樓與近代上海商業空間之拓展〉，《史林》1997(2):71 雜誌，上海：上

海社會科學院出版社。

Bergere, Marie-Claire（著），張富強、許世芬 譯 1994� 《中國資產階級的黃金時代,1911-1937》上海：上海人民出版社。

i. Johnson, R. J. Gregory D. & Smith D. M., Eds. 1994 The Dictionary of Human Geography, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. ( 王志弘 譯， 1995,

26

《人文地理學辭典》選譯，譯者臺北自印)

Murphy, Rhoads 1953 Shanghai, Key to Modern China， 上海：人民出版社。

Kings mill, 1890 Social Shanghai，轉引自：〈開埠初期的上海建築〉，《史林》42:89

Castells, Manuel 1983 The cities and the Grassroots-A Cross-cultural Theory of Urban Social Movements,

Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1972 Urban Question, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

Chang, Chung-lie (張仲禮) 1955 The Chinese Gentry, Studies on their Role in Nineteenth Century Chinese Society,

Seattle : University of Washington Press

Girouard, Mark 1987 Cities and People-a social and architectural history, Yale Uni. Press.

ii. Foglesong, Richard E. 1986 Planning the Capitalist City—the Colonial Era to the 1920s, New Jersey: Princeton

University Press

Hall, Peter 1987 Cities of Tomorrow-an Intellectual History of Urban Planning and Design in the 20th

Century, London: Basil Blackwell Ltd.

Harvey, David 1981 The Limits to Capital, Oxford: Blackwell

Sheppard, E. & Barnes, T. 2003 The Capitalist Space Economy: Geographical Analysis after Ricardo, Marx and

Sraffa, London: Unwin Hyman

iii. Skinner, G. William 1964 Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China, JAS 4.1 (Nov. 1964) pp. 363-399.

Stone, Clarence Nathan 1985 The Politics of Urban Development, University Press of Kansas

Wasserstrom, Jeffrey, N. 1997 Locating Old Shanghai-hiving fits about where it fits, from Remaking the Chinese City,

Wright, Arnolds 1908 〝Twentieth Century Impressions of Hong Kong, Shanghai, and other Treaty Ports of

China〞，London

�Maps:

葛福田（編） 1949 《上海行號路圖錄》上、下冊，（1949 再版）上海：福利營業股份有限公司出版。

27

張傳、黃國榮、侯錦權 等主編） 2001 《老上海地圖》，上海：畫報出版社。

�Archives:

《費唐法官研究上海公共租界情形報告書》，上海：上海公共租界工部局（收藏於 上海檔案館）

S.M.C. Annual Report （《工部局年報》；收藏於 上海檔案館)： 1876,1877, 1878, 1880-90, 1894, 1895, 1897,1900, 1903, 1904, 1905, 1906, 1904, 1907, 1908, 1909, 1911, 1912, 1913; 1915, 1919, 1921, 1930, 1931, 1937;

The Municipal Gazette（《工部局公報》；收藏於 上海檔案館）： 1922/6/8 :207; 1916/5/18; 1916/7/20---Engineer’s Report; 1921/7/21, p.262 ; 1937/3/30

The Shanghai Municipal Council Archive（《上海工部局檔案》；收藏於 上海檔案館） U1-14(8 上)-101;U1-14(8 下)- 2338, 2473, 2512, 2520, 2538, 2554, 2624, 2704; U1-14(8)251; U1-14-0003276; U1-14-0003488 ; U1-14-0005724 ; U1-14-0005863; U1-14-0005898; U1-14-0005924; U1-14-0006010; U1-14-6032; ,U1-14-6090(1)&(2); U1-14-0006506; U1-14-0007062, U1-10-153;

《申報》 光緒三年十一月初八；光緒三年十一月初二；1914/2/15; 1927/3/2; 1931/8/17; 1940/7/16;

《普益地產贈刊號》6(40):1-2, 6(42):10-13, 6(43):11-13, 6 (44):3（收藏於 上海圖書館）

Rules with Respect of New Chinese Buildings, North China Herald Office or Kelly & Walsh Ltd. 1900 (收藏於 上海檔案館，圖書編號：W1-0-875~877)