kurskbattle

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Following their disastrous defeat at Stalingrad during the winter of 1942-

43, the German armed forces launched an offensive in the East known as

Operation Citadel on 4 July 1943. Operation Citadel, the Battle of Kursk, sought to

give the Wehrmacht the much-needed breathing room on the Eastern Front by

delaying Soviet operations by regaining the initiative in the East before the

British and Americans mounted a Second Front in Europe.1 Hitler and his

generals needed an expedient and decisive victory because "the cracks in the wall

of Axis domination were becoming ever more numerous and more apparent." 2

The Allies were gaining the initiative over the German U-boats in the Atlantic.

Italy's military and political situations were in turmoil. Japan's efforts in Burma

had failed. And the bombing of German industrial centres was disrupting

essential war supplies.3 The Allied pressure was all encompassing and Hitler

could not afford to engage in another attritional battle with Russia.4

The battle of Kursk was essentially a gamble that had failed miserably.

The seemingly endless Russian defenses coupled with the lack of surprise had

given the Panzer formations no chance to work up the necessary momentum to

achieve their objectives. The battle involved as many as 6,000 tanks, 4,000

aircraft, and 2 million fighting men,5 and is remembered as the most

concentrated and least scientific tank battle in the history of armoured warfare.6

Huge losses incurred on both sides. Although Russia could afford these colossal

losses due to Allied assistance, Germany could not. The Battle of Kursk was

1 Charles Messenger, The Blitzkrieg Story (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons) 191.2 Alan Wykes, "Kursk[1943]." Mammoth Book of Battles. Ed. Jon E. Lewis. New York: Carrol &Graf, 1995. 280-93.3 Wykes 280.4 Nipe 26.5 Nipe 27.6 Bryan Perrett, A History of Blitzkrieg (New York: STEIN AND DAY) 159.


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defensive zone running north-south, named the Steppe Front.11 These were

covered by 20,000 guns of various typesover one-third of which were anti-tank

weapons, and blanketed by minefields which were laid to a density of 2,500 anti-

personnel and 2,200 anti-tank mines per mile of front.12

On the other side, Germany's strategic initiative was comprised of two

large Panzer forces that were to make simultaneous assaults on the northern and

southern faces of the Kursk salient and meet in the middle.13 General Model's 9th

Army in the north was made up of seven Panzer, two Panzergrenadier, and nine

infantry divisions. To the south, General Hoth's 4th Army had ten Panzer, one

Panzergrenadier and seven infantry divisions.14 While Russian defense was

impressive, Germany practically matched their opponent's forces with 900,000

men to Russia's 1,337,000 men and 2,700 fighting vehicles against 3,000. Where

the Germans would feel the effects early on was in having only half the guns of

the Red Army.15 While Russia slightly outnumbered Germany in arms, with the

finest divisions ofWehrmacht and Waffen SS armed with the latest tank

technology, Germany was still a formidable force.16

At 1500 on 4 July, the Battle of Kursk began after a short sharp air and

artillery bombardment.17 Compared to other battles with Russia the successes

were mild. Model's 9th Army only managed to penetrate ten miles before they

were stopped. Large numbers of Germany's Porsche Ferdinand assault tanks,

which lacked machine guns, were destroyed by the Russian infantry who dashed

11 Messenger 191.12 Perrett 159.13 Armstrong14 Wykes 282.15 Perrett 159.16 Wykes17 Messenger 192.


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out from the trenches and directed flame-throwers into the engine louvres, thus

setting the fuel systems alight and forcing the crews to either abandon or be

roasted alive. Moreover, the dense breadth of minefields not only slowed the

German tank onslaught, it also forced the unprotected troops, under covering

fire, to clear lanes for the tanks, thereby aiding the Russians further by giving

them easy targets for which their rockets and 76 mm guns proved most

effective.18

To the south, Hoth did better, advancing 25 miles but at a terrible cost.

The Russians fought for every yard of ground, and when they voluntarily

surrendered an area it was simply to lead the Panzers onto what was a pre-

planned artillery killing ground.19 But by the morning of 12 July, the German

troops, even with all their losses, managed to battle through the defensive zone

and land at the village of Prokhorovka, just south of Kursk. The ensuing battle

was to be forever etched in stone and known as the "greatest tank battle in

history."20

In a fantastic blaze of gunfire, both German and Russian forces,

numbering 500 tanks, literally drove into each other. The fighting was so close

and chaotic that tanks on both sides, in desperation, rammed each other and

fought at a near standstill until, after several hours, the thunderous clamor of

guns diminished.21 During the chaos on the ground, aircraft on both sides fought

for mastery of the air. In the end, neither side gained any ground and more than

18 Wykes 285.19 Perrett 159.20 Mulligan 237.21 Perrett 159.


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300 tanks were lost.22 It now became increasingly clear to Hitler that reaching

Kursk was less attainable than it had ten days before. Once the dust settled the

massive waste of men and arms on both sides was evident. Nothing positive was

to come of it. The quick and decisive battle plan of Operation Citadel transformed

into everything Hitler feared. The Battle of Kursk became the battle of attrition.

But, this should not have come as a surprise. After two years of continuous

warfare, the Wehrmacht and the Red Army were familiar antagonists. They knew

their opponents' strengths and weaknesses; they had learned to recognize the

signs that indicated enemy activities and intentions. Each had studied and

borrowed from the other in terms of tactics, equipment, organization and

intelligence.23 The result of the battle at Prokhorovka is quite fitting for these two

opponents. However, what separated the two was that Russia, with its large

population and Allied support, could afford these losses, while Germany could

not.

By 12 July Hitler was completely aware of the failure of Operation Citadel.

It was even more apparent that he had put in far more armour than he could

afford to lose.24 To make matters worse, the Allies landed in Sicily on the same

day as the devastating tank battle at Prokhorovka. The Second Front had begun

and much of Germany's efforts were exhausted on Russia. Even though Hitler

had cancelled Operation Citadel, knowing full well that Germany could not

manage both situations simultaneously, the fighting continued anyway; theRussians did not stop there, but continued to push the reconstituted 4 th and 9th

Army divisions back even further than where they had begun. Kursk was the

22 Wykes 292.23 Mulligan 244.


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battle that finally tilted the scales against Germany on the Eastern Front. "The

once proud Panzer divisions had been bled until they were white," and they were

never again strong enough to become the weapon of decision they had formerly

been.25 Germany was now put on the defensive and it would stay this way until

the end of the war.

In summary, Operation Citadel was one last attempt by the Germans to

ease the threatening pressure in the East before the British and Americans

mounted a Second Front. To be sufficiently prepared for this threat, Hitler knew

the campaign had to avoid another battle of attrition with Russia. However, the

German delays, caused by the conflicting interpretations Hitler received, gave

Russia plenty of time to adequately prepare for the offensive. Moreover, after

two years of continuous warfare with Germany, Russia had become very familiar

with their opponent's tactics and this was evident in the way the battle played

out. Germany had to fight for every inch of ground they covered and this proved

incredibly costly to both. While the Russians could afford these incredible losses,

Germany could not, and, as a result, they had been effectively exhausted to the

point where they would never regain the momentum they previously had. The

Battle of Kursk was a gamble that had failed miserably; a gamble that ultimately

changed the roles of power.

24 Wykes 290.25 Perrett 162.


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Bibliography

Armstrong, Richard N. "Prokhorovka: The Great Tank Battle." Military Review

73.7 (1993): 64-67.

Messenger, Charles. The Blitzkrieg Story. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,

1976.

Mulligan, Timothy P. "Spies, Ciphers and 'Zitadelle': Intelligence and the Battle

of Kursk, 1943." Journal of Contemporary History 22 (1987): 235-6

Nipe, George M. "Germany's Lost Victory?" World War II 12.6 (1998): 26-34.

Perrett, Bryan. A History of Blitzkrieg. New York: STEIN AND DAY, 1983.

Wykes, Alan. "Kursk." Mammoth Book of Battles. Ed. Jon E. Lewis. New York:

Carrol & Graf, 1995.

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