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The haecceity theory andperspectival limitationJonathan L. Kvanvig aa Texas A & M UniversityPublished online: 02 Jun 2006.

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Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 67, No. 3; September 1989

THE HAECCEITY THEORY AND PERSPECTIVAL LIMITATION

Jonathan L. Kvanvig

Impressive work has been done in recent years in attempting to understand how self-awareness is related to other sorts of awareness. One theory of this relation is what I shall call the haecceity theory. In spite of its many accomplishments, I shall argue that the haecceity theory is flawed beyond hope. This defect alone would be cause for alarm, for the haecceity theory has its followers. However, much more than the haecceity theory is at stake; rather an entire (and dominant) way of thinking about awareness and self- awareness must be abandoned. To begin to clarify these cursory remarks, I turn first to the haecceity theory itself.

I. The Haecceity Theory The haecceity theory 1 is a dyadic theory of the intentional attitudes, claiming that any intentional attitude is best analysed as a two-place relation between a person and a proposition. Each such attitude has a de dicto, de re and de se form. The haecceity theory holds that the de dicto form of each attitude is primary and that the other forms can be adequately explained as special cases of the de dicto form. In particular, it claims that these forms can be explained in terms of the de dicto form by positing that (i) each thing has a special property, its haecceity, which is (ii) a perspectivally limited property. A perspectivally limited property is a property some persons cannot grasp, conceive of, or take any other intentional attitude toward. Now, all sorts of perspectivally limited properties can be posited by a variety of theories. For example, an implausible theory, what we might call a theory for paranoids, might posit the existence of propositions which reflect negatively on a particular paranoid which that paranoid cannot discover but which other persons are trying to make true. Such a theory might posit the existence ofperspectivally limited properties in that it may claim that these propositions are undetectable to the paranoid because they involve properties which the paranoid cannot grasp. The haecceity theory posits a more plausible kind of perspectival limitation. It claims that haecceities are perspectivally limited in that (iii) only the individual who has the haecceity in question can grasp that haecceity.

A haecceity is an individual essence; it is the special 'thisness' that is necessarily unique to the thing in question. As such, the haecceity theory is committed to the metaphysical thesis of essentialism -- that at least some

t The classic expression of the haecceity theory is by Roderick Chisholm [4]. Hector Neri- Castaneda defends a similar veiw [2, 3].

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beings have essences. The haecceity theory is more than a metaphysical view, however, for the haecceity theory attempts to put the mataphysical view of essentialism to work in the philosophy of mind and language. It claims that metaphysical essences play a role in accounting for cognitive awareness of certain aspects of reality and for the semantic force of first- person indexicals.

In particular, the haecceity theory puts essences to work in order to explain the special nature of de se intentional attitudes. For example, when Hume believes de se that he is wise, he does so by believing that proposition which would be expressed by his uttering the sentence 'I am wise.' Were he to utter that sentence, the proposition in question would be composed of the property of being wise and Hume's haecceity (which would be expressed by Hume's use of the the first-person pronoun 'I'). Were Heimson to utter the same sentence, he would express a different proposition, one including his haecceity and not Hume's. Further, no proposition which Heimson can believe is identical to the one Hume believes when Hume believes de se that he is wise. If Heimson believes what is expressed by 'Hume is wise' or 'he (Hume) is wise', Heimson does not believe the very same proposition Hume believes when he believes what is expressed for him by the sentence 'I am wise.' Rather, when Heimson believes what is expressed for him by the sentence 'he (Hume) is wise', Heimson believes a proposition composed of the property of being wise and some other entity, perhaps a property, referred to or expressed by 'he' which makes the proposition in question similar (on some grounds which the theory must specify) but not identical to the proposition Hume believes when he believes de se that he is wise.

Thus, according to the haecceity theory, haecceities are components of propositions, which are the objects of belief and other intentional attitudes. Since haecceities are perspectivally limited properties and since haecceities are components of propositions, the haecceity theory is committed to the existence of perspectivally limited propositions as well. A perspectivally limited proposition is a proposition which contains a perspectivally limited element, and thus is necessarily such that anyone capable of grasping that proposition is capable of grasping the element in question.

The haecceity theory is a multiple proposition account of first-person propositions. According to any multiple proposition account, when Hume and Heimson both believe what is expressed by the sentence 'I am wise,' they believe numerically distinct propositions. The way in which the haecceity theory is committed to this view of first-person propositions falls out of the account of self-individuation it gives. The haecceity theory holds that we individuate ourselves per se (without relating ourselves to some other object), but not directly (without apprehending some intervening concept of ourselves): we individuate ourselves by apprehending our essence. Other accounts of self-individuation can be maintained which can generate versions of a multiple proposition account different from the haecceity theory. A theory might hold that we individuate ourselves in our de se attitudes both per se and directly. Such a theory would hold that when a de se attitude

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is held, the propositional content of that attitude consists of the person him/herself and an open proposition of the form x is P, where x is a variable which is 'filled' by the person in question and P is some property. 2 This view is a dyadic theory of the intentional attitudes which claims that the de dicto form of each attitude is primary; it is not committed to essentialism or to the haecceity theory. Alternatively, a theory might hold that we do not individuate ourselves per se or directly; rather, we individuate ourselves as the owner of some context of our experience which we individuate per se and directly) Again, such a theory may give a multiple proposition account of first-person propositions; in any case, it is not committed to essentialism or to the haecceity theory.

II. Dyadic Theories and Perspectivally Limited Propositions It has already been pointed out that the haecceity theory is committed to the existence of perspectivally limited propositions. In one sense, this is a virtue of the theory for, as dyadic theories go, the best alternatives for developing a unified account of the intentional attitudes are committed to the existence of perspectivally limited propositions. A dyadic theory can take either the de dicto, de re, or de se form of each intentional attitude as primary; to maintain the dyadic nature of the theory without making the de dicto form of each attitude primary, a theory will have to hold that there are de re or de se propositions (or proposition-like entities) 4 which serve as one term in the dyadic relation which constitutes the form of each intentional attitude. However, any theory which takes either the de re or de se form as primary will inevitably include more in the content of a mere de dicto attitude than is really there. For example, suppose Jim believes de dicto that the tallest spy, whoever he or she might be, is most likely Russian. On a theory which takes de se belief as primary, this belief must turn out to be a variety of de se belief. Yet, clearly it is not; there is no self-awareness of any sort implied by believing that the tallest spy is RussianP

2 Consider Russell [13]. 3 Consider Chisholm [4]. 4 One kind of proposition-like entity is the collection of an individual and a property. Some

views of de re attitudes claim that de re awareness is awareness of an object O and a property P, which we might symbolise as . This entity may not be a proposition, but it is quite propostion-like, for it must include the predication relation between O and P in order to capture the fact that de re awareness is different from a simple awareness of both O and P. Once the predication relation is understood to be included in , the only possible reason for thinking that is not a proposition is that propositions cannot include individual objects. Whether this reason is a good one or not, is, minimally, proposition-like. The same explanation would apply if O were replaced by some special object which constitutes de se awareness. It is this line of thought behind the claim that any dyadic theory must hold that each intentional attitude is best analysed as a relation between an individual and either a proposition or a proposition-like entity.

5 Peter Markie develops a related criticism of Chisholm's Property Theory in [ 10]. Chisholm's Property Theory is developed in [5]. My argument here is a generalisation of Markie's: whereas he directs his criticism only against Chisholm's Property Theory, I claim the same criticism shows that any dyadic theory which takes de se attitudes as primary is doomed to failure.

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A de re theory does not fare much better. Such a theory will have to find a de re proposition (or proposition-like entity), one which includes an object of which some property is predicated, to which a belief that the tallest spy is Russian can be reduced. 6 Ordinary objects, even the tallest spy should there be one, will not do; for it is possible to have that belief even if the believer is the only object which exists. A de re theorist, then, must find some object which must exist if that belief is held in order to find some de re proposition in terms of which to explain the de dicto belief in question. Besides necessary objects, which obviously are not objects of which Jim believes anything by believing that the tallest spy is Russian, there are only two: Jim himself, and the actual world. Clearly, though, the content of Jim's belief does not include either himself or the actual world. To claim that Jim's belief involves the predication of a property of himself or the actual world is to impute more to the content of the belief than is actually there.

It would seem, then, that if a dyadic theory can give a unified and adequate account of the variety of intentional attitudes, it must do so by taking the de dicto form of each attitude as primary. Initially, there appear two ways to do this, and the difference appears in considering what Hume and Heimson believe when each believes what is expressed by the sentence, 'I am wise'. According to the single proposition theory, both Hume and Heimson believe the same proposition; according to the mulitple proposition theory, Hume and Heimson believe different propositons. 7

However, in fact, only the multiple proposition theory is a dyadic theory. According to the single proposition theory, Hume and Heimson believe the same proposition when each believes de se what is expressed by 'I am wise'. Since each de se attitude implies a corresponding de re attitude, the single proposition theory is committed to the claim that Hume and Heimson each believe the same proposition when Hume believes de re of Hume (and not of Heimson) what is expressed by 'I am wise' and Heimson believes de re of Heimson (and not of Hume) what is expressed by 'I am wise'. Yet, what makes Heimson's de re belief one about him and not about Hume, and what makes Hume's belief one about Hume and not about Heimson? The proposition itself is just as much about each as it is about the other, for it is the very same proposition which is believed by each. Further, there need be no difference in the context of each belief, except that one belief is Hume's and the other is Heimson's. This contextual difference does not explain why Hume's belief is only about Hume and Heimson's is only about Heimson unless it is assumed that every de re belief must be about the person who has the belief, and that assumption is clearly false.

The only available answer, as I see it, is for the single proposition theory to maintain that Hume believes the proposition in question to be true of

Those who accept a de re account of the intentional attitudes include Boer and Lycan [ 1 ] and Davidson [6]. I borrow this terminology, and much of this discussion of the varieties of problems for unified dyadic theories other than the haecceity theory, from Peter Markie [1 l]. Sosa defends the Single Proposition Theory, what he calls the Theory of Perspectives, in [14].

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Hume and Heimson believes the proposition to be true of Heimson. If this is so, however, the single proposition theory is not a dyadic theory, for it now explains some de re beliefs as a relation between a person, a proposition, and an object. 8

Thus, we are left with the multiple proposition theory as the only remaining dyadic theory of the intentional attitudes, and there is a good argument for thinking that any such theory is committed to the existence of perspectivally limited propositions in explaining de se belief. To see this, suppose Hume believes de se what is expressed by 'I am wise', and Heimson believes de re of Hume what is expressed by 'he is wise'. If the multiple proposition theory is not committed to perspectivally limited propositions, it must be possible for Hume and Heimson to be believing the very same proposition in the case at hand. So, let us assume that Hume and Heimson believe the same proposition. This is impossible, though, for if it were true, we would have no explanation why Hume would respond to a solicitation for a wise person to step forward and Heimson would not. If persons are in the same mental states and in the same circumstances, their behaviour will be the same; yet, Heimson and Hume could be in the same circumstances and would be in the same mental state (relevant to the solicitation) without their behaviour being the same, on the hypothesis in question. (Note that it won't do to answer this objection by saying that Heimson not only believes what is expressed by 'he is wise', but also what is expressed by 'I am not him'. If no propositions are perspectivally limited, Hume can believe the same thing by believing what is expressed by 'he is not me'. Further this point is perfectly general: any attempt on the part of a mutiple proposition theorist to distinguish Hume's and Heimson's behaviour on the basis of some additional mental state is bound to fail as long as it is assumed that the content of the state not perspectivally limited.) Hence, contrary to our hypothesis, Heimson cannot believe what Hume believes when Hume believes what is expressed by 'I am wise', and the same argument can be used to show that no one else can believe that proposition, either. If the multiple proposition theory is true, it must be true in virtue of a perspectival limitation on the propositional contents of de se attitudes.

As I claimed earlier, then, the best hope for a unified dyadic theory of the intentional attitudes involves a commitment to perspectivally limited propositions. All other unified dyadic theories face problems which such theories avoid.

I believe that the haecceity theory has advantages which the other multiple proposition theories lack which should lead a mutiple proposition theorist to prefer it to its competitors. If I am right about this, the defect which I shall show in the haecceity theory is especially important. I shall not, however, go into the reasons for perferring the haecceity theory to its alternative multiple proposition theories here, for my intention is to undermine the haecceity theory and the argument against the haecceity theory can

8 Peter Markie elaborates this argument in [11].

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be generalised to these other theories as well. So any reasons for distinguishing among multiple proposition theories will be of minor significance, for, I shall argue, they are al l mistaken. Further, they are mistaken at the core. As we have seen, the plausibility of a dyadic theory of the intentional attitudes involves a commitment to perspectivally limited propositions. It is this feature of the haecceity theory which cannot be sustained, and the generalisation of this argument undercuts any theory which incorporates such perspectival limitation. Let us turn first then to the argument against the haecceity theory.

III. The Haecceity Theory and a Di lemma The di lemma that the haecceity theory faces arises from the fact that it implies that there are perspectivally limited propositions. It is not just that the theory implies that there are such propositions, 9 but rather that haecceities seem to be components of certain propositions implied by the haecceity theory which we are all able to understand. If what seems to be the case is the case, then haecceities are not components of perspectivally limited propositions. If, however, appearances are deceiving and no haecceity is a component of these propositions, the propositions in question are false, and hence so is the haecceity theory since it implies these propositions.

Let us examine how the di lemma arises. The haecceity theory tells us that at least each person 1 has a haecceity which is such that any proposition of which that haecceity is a component is one that one and only one person can grasp. That person is the one who has the haecceity in question. Consider, then, Ronald Reagan. According to the haecceity theory, Reagan has a haecceity, so let us call it 'R'. The theory implies several things about R: that it exists, that only Reagan can grasp any propostition of which R is a component, etc. Let us consider the second of these claims, namely the following proposition:

(1) R has the characteristic of being such that Reagan, and only Reagan, can grasp any proposition of which R is a component.

The di lemma which the haecceity theory faces arises when considering any proposition of the same kind as (1), i.e., any proposition claiming to describe

9 Boer and Lycan argue that the mere fact that the haecceity thoery includes the perspectival propositions it does shows that the haecceity theory is false [1; pp. 441-443]; I give a similar argument in [9; pp. 50-51]. Neither of these arguments decisively refutes any theory committed to perspectivally limited propositions, as Markie shows in [ 11 ].

J0 An interesting question for the haecceity theory is whether everything, or only every cognitive being capable of self-awareness, has a haecceity. If the theory opts for the former, it is positing the existence of propositions which are not even possibly grasped by anyone, for some things are essentially such that they have no self-awareness. If such propositions are posited, there are other objections the haecceity theory must face. In particular, it must face the intuition that propositions are intrinsically things capable of being believed or having some other intentional attitude taken toward them. As far as I can tell, no untoward consequences arise from denying haecceities (in the special sense defined in this paper) to all but beings capable of self-awareness. Perhaps it is a happy metaphysical coincidence that only such beings had haecceities. Or is this happy coincidence a bit of gerrymandering that makes any success by the haecceity theory in explaining self-awareness trivial?

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the perspectivally limited nature of any haecceity. Either the haecceity is part of the proposition in question, or it is not. If it is part of the proposition, then haecceities are not perspectivally limited, for we are all able to grasp (1).

It would seem, then, that the haecceity theory is committed to the other horn of the dilemma, that is to denying that Reagan's haecceity is a component of (1). On this option, however, (1) is false, as I shall argue. In order to show this, it is first important to note that, however the haecceity theory chooses to construe the reference of 'R', it must not pretend that 'R' is only a description of Reagan's haecceity and not a name of some property. Since, according to the haecceity theory, there is a unique thing which is Reagan's haecceity, we can name that thing, and that is just what 'R' is. As far as I can tell, to insist that 'R' is a description rather than a name assumes an implausible restriction of naming: namely, that you cannot name anything with which you are not acquainted. The notion of acquaintance here is either so loose that anything that we talk about is something with which we are acquainted (in which case the haecceity theorist cannot maintain that we are not acquainted with each other's haecceities), or else the principle is clearly false. We can, for example, name the being in the uterus of a pregnant woman even though we are not acquainted with it; we can even name the earliest born baby or babies of 1995 even though no such entity has yet been conceived.

So, the haecceity theorist cannot maintain his theory by insisting that 'R' is only a description. It would seem that 'R' should be treated as any other linguistic device which expresses a property. When, for example, 'being red' occurs in the predicative position, as in 'roses have the property of being red', 'being red' expresses the property of being red and the proposition expressed includes the property of being red. When 'being red' or 'redness' occurs as a subject of a sentence, things do not change much: 'being red' or 'redness' still expresses or refers to the property of being red, and the property of being red is included in whatever proposition is expressed by the sentence in question. Just so, it would seem that the best way to construe 'R' is to take it to either express or refer to a property, a property which is a component of proposition (1). Since the property in question cannot be, according to the haecceity theory, the very same property Reagan grasps when he takes some de se attitude toward himself, the property must be some property relevantly similar to, but not identical with, the one Reagan grasps in taking a de se attitude toward himself.

Given this understanding of (1), however, it is not difficult to see that (1) is false. For it then implies that there is a property, R, which by hypothesis is not perspectivally limited (because it is not a haecceity), which has the property of being perspectivally limited. Of course, no property which is not perspectivally limited has the property of being perspectivally limited, hence, on this alternative, (1) is false. Since (1) is an implication of the haecceity theory, on this alternative, the haecceity theory is false as well.

The haecceity theorist might resort to factors regarding individuation to

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answer this objection. He might claim that Reagan's haecceity is not individuated per se and directly, and hence that there is some individual concept by which Reagan's haecceity is individuated. This individual concept is expressed by a complex description, perhaps something like 'the property which is unique to Reagan and which is such that grasping that property is necessary and sufficient for self-awareness on the part of Reagan I. If Reagan's haecceity is individuated in this fashion, then the force of R in (1) is to be explained by this individual concept: when we use 'R' to name Reagan's haecceity, the element in the proposition in question which is expressed by 'R' is the individual concept in question. Hence, even though 'R' may be a name and not a definite description, the propositional element is just the sort of element which would have been expressed were it a definite description. Finally, if an individual concept is the propositional element expressed by 'R', no dilemma arises on the basis of (1), for all it implies is that the property which is unique to Reagan and involved in his self- awareness is such that it is perspectivally limited.

There are several reasons for being dissatisfied with this response. The first has to do with the motivation for replacing ordinary names with definite descriptions. By doing so, we are able to explain away our apparent acquaintance with remote objects, such as historical figures, by replacing names such as 'Socrates' with predicative expressions and either variables or perhaps logically proper names. The point of such analyses is that it is assumed that our acquaintance with properties, which are the propositional elements expressed by predicative expressions, is not infected by the same perplexity that infects our apparent acquaintance with now dead or distant individuals. If the same puzzles infect the realm of properties, it is not clear what can be gained by replacing names with definite descriptions. Since haecceities are properties, there would seem to be a general methodological presumption that names for them secure their presence in the propositions expressed.

This point can be pressed home a bit more forcefully. There are distinctions within the realm of properties concerning the mode of access we have to properties,just as there are distinctions within the realm of objects concerning the mode of access we have to them. Some objects are objects of direct awareness and some are not; some properties are objects of direct awareness and some are not. If we impose the project of reductive analysis on all sentences involving terms which refer to anything but objects of direct awareness, the complications which will result will be immense for we will have to replace all terms expressing anything of which we are not directly aware with terms expressing things of which we are directly aware. Further, these complications are intrinsically problematic because the project of reductive analysis is to show what we are really thinking about when we think about things with which we are not directly aware. The more complicated the analysis becomes, the less plausible such an account is of the contents of our thoughts.

There is a worse problem, however. Even if haecceities are not individuated

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per se or directly, it does not follow that they are not components of the propositions in question. When it is granted that some individual concept is employed in individuating any object, all that follows about the proposition in question is that it contains the individual concept in question; nothing at all follows about whether the object is a component of the proposition as well. Further, in the present case of the haecceity theory, there are plausible grounds for thinking that replacing the heacceity with the individual concept cannot succeed. For it is an informative proposition, for any individual concept that might be employed to individuate Reagan's haecceity, that Reagan's haecceity is characterized by that individual concept. Yet, if the individual concept replaces Reagan's haecceity in the proposition expressed by this claim, we generate the uninformative claim that a certain individual concept is characterized by that same individual concept. Hence, replacement of haecceities by individual concepts not only does not follow from facts about individuation, but also generates paradoxes which show that such replacement cannot be an accurate description of what occurs.

If one must hold a dyadic theory of the intentional attitudes, a more plausible account of the relation between individuation and the components of propositions is the following. When an object or property is not individuated per se or directly, some individual concept which accounts for the means of individuation is a component of the proposition in question. The rest of the account of the components of propositions remains unaffected: if objects are components of some propositions, then the fact that an object is individuated v/a an individual concept does not prevent the object from being a propositional component; if a property is a component of some propositions, then the mere fact that such a property is individuated via an individual concept does not prevent that property from being a part of the proposition in question. (I shall argue in a moment that one should not accept a dyadic theory, and thus I do not believe this account to be the correct account of the relation between individuation and propositional content; all I mean to imply is that it is a better account than the one which I put in the mouth of the haecceity theorist above.)

We can see, then, that facts about individuation do not enable the haecceity theory to defend the view that Reagan's haecceity is not a component of (1) or that there is not some property referred to or expressed by 'R' which is a component of (1). However such a property is individuated, it still must be part of (1). Yet, if such a property is a component of (1), then, whether some individual concept should also be thought of as part of (1), the dilemma remains for the haecceity theory. The haecceity theory implies a proposition about each person, to the effect that that person has a perspectivally limited haecceity, and all such propositions are false. As is obvious, if a theory implies a false proposition, the theory is false as well.

It should be pointed out that a natural way to account for the facts about individuation cited above takes us away from a dyadic theory. These facts about individuation concern a distinction which can be put in a variety of ways. The distinction may be between: conceiving of versus thinking about

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a property, directly grasping a property be referring to it versus indirectly grasping a property through some description, knowledge by direct acquaintance versus knowledge by discription. Which of these ways of drawing the distinction is best, or whether there is one or more than one distinction here, is not important. What is important is that these distinctions suggest that it is one thing to have a certain propositional content to some intentional attitude, and it is quite another thing to have come to, or accessed, that propositional content in a certain fashion. We might come to the content in question by employing some name which functions as a purely referential device, or perhaps by some description; we might believe something about Hume, using his name, which he would believe about himself only using an indexical. We might come to believe a proposition by individuating a property employing some individual concept where someone else may come to believe that same propositional content by individuating that property in some other way, either by a different individual concept by individuating theproperty per se and directly. These points, as noted above, cannot help the haecceity theory; instead, they lead us toward a triadic theory of belief which holds that each intentional attitude is best analysed as a relation between a person, a proposition, and some third thing, perhaps a route of empistemic access to the proposition. ~

IV. Conclusion So, the haecceity theory must be abandoned. Its theoretical commitments include claims which imply propositions like (1). Yet, no propositions like (1) is compatible with the haecceity theory, hence that theory must be false. Further, if my arguments are correct, all other versions of a unified dyadic theory of the intentional attitudes, other than the mulitple propositions theory, are problematic as well. So, the failure of the haecceity theory signals the end of any hope for a successful unified dyadic theory of the intentional attitudes unless some other multiple proposition theory can be successful.

That no multiple proposition theory can be successful can be seen by noting that a more general conclusion can also be generated from our discussion. Any theory which claims that any proposition is limited in such a way that not all those who are able to understand the theory are able to grasp such propositions is subject to the same dilemma. For, presumably, any theory making such a claim will tell us the nature of these propositions (otherwise it is hard to imagine what role such propositions could play in the theory). As soon as the nature of such perspectivally limited propositions is described, some component of such propositions will be isolable which is responsible for the perspectival limitation of the propositions in question. When the responsible component is isolated, however, some proposition will be implied which can be grasped by all and which contains this component and of which perspectival limitation is predicated. As soon as such a

11 For more in a triadic theory of intentional attitudes, see John Perry [12] and David Kaplan [7, 8].

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proposition is implied, however, the above dilemma arises which shows that the theory in question must be false.

The general conclusion, then, is that no philosophical theory can employ perspectivally limited propositions as part of an account of some data which calls for explanation. Since theories which imply such propositions are the last best hope for a unified dyadic theory, the lesson to be learned is that we turn our attention to other theories of the intentional attitudes.~2

Texas A & M University Received October 1987

REFERENCES l. Boer, S.E.,andLycan, W.G.'Who, Me?',ThePhilosophicalReview89(1980),pp. 427-466. 2. Castaneda, Hector-Neri. 'On the Penonmeno-Logic of the I', Proceedings of the XIV

lnternationalen Congress of Philosophy, 3 (1968), pp. 260-266. 3. - - - - - - - - . 'Philosophical Method and Direct Awareness of the Self', in E. Sosa, ed., Essays

on the Philosophy of Roderick Chisholm, Humanities Press, 1980. 4. Chisholm, Roderick. Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study, London, 1976. 5. - - - - - - - - . The First Person, Minneapolis, 1981. 6. Davidson, B. L. 'Belief De Re and De Se', The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63

(1985), pp. 389-406. 7. Kaplan, David. 'On the Logic of Demonstratives', Journal of Philosphical Logic g (1981),

pp. 81-98. 8. - - - - - - - - . Demonstratives, 1976, unpublished. 9. Kvanvig, Jonathan. The Possibility of an All-Knowing God, Chapter Two, 'Knowledge

and Its Objects'. London, 1986. 10. Markie, Peter, "De Dicto and De Se', Philosophical Studies 45 (1984), pp. 231-237. l l. - - - - - - - - . 'Multiple Propositions and De Se Attitudes', forthcoming in Philosophy and

Phenomenological Research. 12. Perry, John. 'The Problem of the Essential Indexical', Nous 13 (1979), pp. 3-21. 13. Russell, Bertrand. 'Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description', in

Mysticism and Logic, London, 1917. 14. Sosa, Ernest. 'Consciousness of the Self and the Present', in J. E, Tomerlin (ed.) Agent,

Language and the Structure of the WorM, Indianapolis, 1983, pp. 131 - 143.

12 1 wish to express my appreciation to several persons who read and commented on previous drafts of this paper. They are: Robert Burch, Andrew Cling, Peter Markie, Hugh McCann, and Christopher Menzel.

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