TRANSDUCTIONSBodies and Machines at Speed

A D R I A N M A C K E N Z I E

A continuum• W f L O N D O N • N E W Y O R K

C O N T I N U U M

I iu- lo w e r B u ild ing , I I Y o rk Road, I ondon, Si I 7 N X ->70 I cx ing ton \ \e n u e , New Y o rk , N Y 10017 (iSO iII i i i i . i onnniiunihi>i>k'-.( om

hirst published .^00?

<K> Adrian M ackenzie ?()<P

A ll rights reserved. No part ot I his pub lica tion nt.n be reproduced in a p h o to p rin t, m ic ro lih n , m icrofiche , mechanical record ing , photocopying , o th e r means, kn ow n o r as yet un kn o w n , o r .stored in an in lo rm . it ion n w ith o u t w r itte n perm ission obtained bclorehand Iro n i the publishers.

B r i t i s h L i b r a r y C a t a l o g u i n g - i n - P u b l i c a t i o n D a ta

A catalogue record lo r this hook is .na ilab le Iron ) the B ritish l ib ra ry . ISBN 0 H ? M SHNi 1 (hardback)IS I i S 0 64 iSS4 X (pap* r lu c k )

L i b r a r y o f C o n g r e s s C a l a l o g i n g - i n - P u b l i i a t i o n D a t a

Mackenzie, A d rian , I'-X-PI ransdm tions : bodies and machines at speed / Adrian M acke n /ie

p. ( in .Inc lnd i's b ib liographica l references and index.ISBN 0 8?f>4-SXX* 1 ISBN 0 S 7 M S8S4 X (p b k.)I. I echnolouy Social aspects. ?. Technolog ica l lorecasting. I. l i t

I \ 4 . r> . M i lS >00 > i ( ) i.4 S M d c? l

Ivpcsi't in C entraServc l t d , Sal Iron W a ld en , l.ssex P rin ted and bound in ( ire a t B rita in b\M l ’ ( i Books l t d , B odm in , C o rn w a ll

nv lo rm , b\ p rin t ,

tra n s la tio n , o r anv

. 't r ie va l s vs tcm ,

.?()() I 047 i75

Contents

A cknow ledgem ents vii

Prcface i x

In tro d u c t io n 1

C h a p te r 1. Radical c o n t in g e n c y and ih c m ateria l izations

o f te ch n o lo g y 29

C h a p te r 2. f r o m s to n e to rad iation: the d ep th and speed

o f tech n ica l e m b o d im e n ts 57

C h a p te r 3. T h e te ch n ic i ty o f t im e : 1 . 0 0 o sc i l la t ion / seco n d

to 9 , 1 9 2 , 6 3 1 , 7 7 0 11/ 8 7

C h a p te r 4 . In fra s tru c tu re and individuation: speed and

delay in S t e la r c ’s Pincj Body 1 16

C h a p te r 5. L osing t im e at the P lay Sta t io n : real t im e and

the ‘w h a t e v e r ’ b ody 145

C h a p te r 6 . L ite , co l le c t iv e s and the pre-v ita l tech nic ity

of b io te c h n o lo g y 171

C o n c lu s io n 2 0 5

R eferences 2 1 9

Index 22 9

Acknowledgements

T h is b o o k o w e s a lo t to o th e r p e o p le . C e l ia R o b e r ts e n co u ra g ed m e at

every s tep in its w r i t in g , and m ad e many g e n e ro u s c o n tr ib u t io n s , both

th e o re t ica l and p ract ica l . A gro u p of p eo p le read o r resp o nd ed to

chap ters at various t im e s . A m ir A hm adi read the o p e n in g chapters in

detail and jo k e d that it cou ld b e a good b o o k . Linnell S e c o m b e and

C athy W a ld b y read ch a p te rs ca re fu l ly , and b ro u g h t to light p ro b le m s 1

had n o t re c o g n iz e d . At an early stage , R ich ard B ea rd sw o rth pointed

o u t n ew d irec t io n s . In the b a c k g ro u n d , Paul P a tto n has b e e n a firm

sup p ort for a long t im e . I w o uld like to a c k n o w le d g e the support of

the A ustralian R e s e a r c h C o u n c i l , u n d e r w h o se p o s td o c to ra l fe llow ship

sch e m e I had the o p p o r tu n i ty to w r i te m o s t of the b o o k . Finally, the

series e d i to r , G arv H all , read the b o o k in its e n t i re ty and tactfully

p ro m p te d m e t o im p ro v e it in c o u n t le ss wavs.

Preface

N o w t h e r o c k e t s l i r e . Y o u fee l th e hisj p u sh . Y o u r m o o n

ship g e t s a w a y fast . T H K N . . . .

M a e and Ina F r e e m a n , 1 9 6 2

G e t t in g o f f the g r o u n d , let a lo n e in to space , was re p res e n te d as a

te ch n o lo g ic a l s u b l im e , a c r o w n in g a c h ie v e m e n t of H om o ja b c r , during

the tw e n t ie th c e n tu r y . A 1 9 6 0 s p ic tu re s to r y b o o k lo r beg inn ing readers

called You W ill Go to the M oon (F r e e m a n and F r e e m a n , 1 9 6 2 ) p ro m ised

space travel to A n g lo -A m e r ica n and Australian boys. At the start

o f th e b o o k , a neatly d ressed child sits on a stool at his l iv in g -ro om

w in d o w , o b se rv in g th e m o o n th ro u g h a te le s c o p e . His fa ther and

m o t h e r ( th e o n ly w o m a n to b e seen in the b o o k , and only briefly)

re la x on the c o u ch . A train set and m o d el plane lie on the f loor , the

already ha lf -ab and oned toys o f an ea r l ie r m o d e rn ity . By the end ol the

b o o k , in a surprisingly rapid seq u e n c e of e v en ts , the bov has ro c k e te d

to the m o o n , leaving his n u c le a r family b eh ind . S u ited -u p , he and a

‘ r o c k e t m a n ’ stand on a lunar m o u n ta in lo ok in g to w ard s an o th er

f ro n t ie r , M ars . B e lo w t h e m lies the ‘ m o o n house . . . w h e r e you will

live o n the m o o n ’ (p. 6 1 ) .

T h e literal p ro m is e o f that s to r y b o o k has not b een kep t. I have not

go n e to th e m o o n . T h e sight and sounds o f b last-o ffs , launches , o rb its ,

and sp lash-d ow ns have b e c o m e s to ck fo o ta g e , and space ju nk is piling

up in d ecaying o rb i t s , i f it is n o t d ro p p in g out of the sky a l to g e th e r . In

fact, the only e x p e r ie n c e I have o f space te ch n o lo g y is what I have

seen on te lev ision scre e n s and in m u se u m exh ib i ts . T h e Hall of Space

and Flight at th e P o w e r h o u s e M u s e u m ol T e c h n o lo g y in Svdnev, for

ins tan ce , exh ib i ts a re l ic o f the C o ld W a r space ra ce , a re c re a te d spac e

m o d u le . It stands on a pedestal at o n e end ol the gallery . Steps lead

ix

up to a cylindrical m od ulo lined w ith e q u ip m e n t , e m p ty spacesuits ,

dials and nozzles. A stronauts lived t h e re lo r w e e k s , d rift ing past each

o th e r w ith c lip b o ard s and O m e ^ a w atches . Even on a Saturday

a f te r n o o n , this end o f the m u se u m is n o t t o o c r o w d e d . I t ’s a long way

lr o m the e n tr a n c e , and m o r e u p -to -d a te in te ra c tiv e c o m p u t e r displays

net m o st visitors b e fo re they get this far. A m a n , a b oy and a small

girl e n t e r the- hall and v eer to w a rd s the sp a cecra ft . T h e y c l im b the

s tep s , the boy in f ro n t , the girl lagging b e h in d . T h e b oy rea ch es the

p la tfo rm and runs in to the m o d u le . T h e m an fo l lo w s . Beh ind th e m ,

the girl stam ps h e r fee t on the steps and g r o u c h e s : ‘ B o r in g old s p a c e . ’

In m in ia tu re , that everyday in c id e n t encap su la tes the c o r e p r o b le m

addressed by this b o o k . E v e ry o n e has heard that te c h n o lo g y will m ak e

the fu tu re b e t te r . E v e ry o n e has heard that it co u ld m a k e it a lo t w o rse .

T h e p ro b le m is to figure o u t w hat sco p e o r cap acity th e r e is to

c o l le c t iv e ly m anoeuvre b e tw e e n these tw o s o m e w h a t b lo o d le ss ab stract

possibil it ies . You W ill Co to the M oon was n o t a lo n e in p ro m is in g sp eed ,

new fro n t ie rs , and a h o m o g e n e o u s , c le a n , fr ic t io n less m a sc u l in e c u l tu re

of e n o rm o u s r o c k e ts , w ell-sea led spacesuits and lunar co lo n ie s . T h a t

lu tu re , in w hich m achines will o v e r c o m e all o b sta c les , was and still is

be in g o fte n rehearsed today. High te c h n o lo g y can sym b o l iz e the

ev ap o rat io n ot po lit ica l , re l ig iou s, racial , e th n ic , e c o n o m i c and g e n d e r

d if fe re n ce s . ‘N o w th e re is n o t o n e th in g to hold y o u r m o o n ship b a c k ’

(p. 3 9 ) , the boy is to ld a f te r b last -o ff . In m any areas , such as

b io te c h n o lo g y , in fo rm a tio n and c o m m u n ic a t io n s , that sam e re n d e r in g

of te ch n o lo g y pulls e n o r m o u s c ro w d s .

At the sam e t im e , as a re sp o n se to that kind ot te ch n o lo g ic a l

b o m b a s t , ‘b o r in g old s p a c e ’ has its l im ita tions . A d m it te d ly , spacc

te ch n o lo g y itself has b een s o m e w h a t o f a d is a p p o in tm e n t . It s e e m e d to

lose m o m e n t u m o n c e the C o ld W a r spark w e n t o u t o f it. So ‘b o r in g

old s p a c e ’ is an apposite r e t o r t t o th e m u s e u m ’s v e n e ra t io n o f an

o b so le te te ch n o lo g ica l fetish, of a fu tu re th a t was b ro a d ca s t as i m m i n ­

ent and im p o rta n t . O u ts id e the m u se u m halls , in the hu m a n it ies , the

typical resp o nse to the te ch n o lo g ica l fu tu re has shared the g i r l ’s v iew :

in g e n era l , te ch n o lo g y is i r re le v a n t, b o r in g , subsidiary o r , w o rs e ,

hostile to c u l tu r e , trad it io n , h is tory and m e a n in g . C r it ica l th o u gh t has

learnt to d isco u n t m o n o to n o u s ideo lo g ica l ly loaded talk o f b righ t

tech nolog ica l futures partly b eca u se o f this p e r c e p t io n of ‘t e c h n o l o g y ’

P R E F A C E

as a c o v e r fo r tro u b lin g d if fe re n c e s and con flic ts w ithin hum an

c o l le c t iv e s . W e l l b ev on d h u m a n i ty ’s a n x ie t ie s , a ny o ne w h o has seen

A rno ld S c h w a rz e n e g g e r in T erm inator k n o w s that te ch n o lo g y also can

sy m b o lize a devastated fu tu re . M a ch in es cou ld m ak e us do what we

d o n ’t w a n t to d o . T h e v cou ld fo r e c lo s e the fu tu re . O r m o r e sob er lv ,J

as h is tor ian L eo M a r x w r i te s , te c h n o lo g y is ‘a b lo od less abstraction

that re p res e n ts no p art icu lar p erso n o r th ing , no specific skill , vocation

o r o t h e r in s t i tu t io n ’ ( M a r x , 1 9 9 9 , 1 4 4 - 5 ) .

T h e p o in t h e re is that th e se resp o n ses e i th e r s train ing eagerlv

to w ard s an im p ossib le te ch n o lo g ic a l fantasy, o r res is t ing o r igno r ing it

gloss o v e r that /.one o f o u r c o l le c t iv e w hich is act ively eng aged , o r

as I shall b e suggesting , transduced in tech nica l m ed ia tio n s . F r o m this

angle , the p r o b le m is h o w to engage with a c o l l e c t i v e ’s e m b o d im e n t

o f tech n ica l m ed ia tio n s w i th o u t rep u dia ting , o r o v er - id e n ti fy in g w ith ,

t e ch n o lo g y . T h e c o n c e p t o f transduction is m e a n t to d ev e lo p so m e

th e o re t ica l t ra c t io n in this still s o m e w h a t o b sc u re but rich ly diverse

m id dle d o m a in . It tr ies t o sh o w how te ch n o lo g ie s are b o th difficult to

access in te r m s o f s u b je c ts and so c ie t ie s , yet indissociably folded

throu gh c o l le c t iv e s and c u ltu re s . T h a t m id dle d om ain is lived c o l l e c t ­

ively and it is e v en tfu l . T e c h n o lo g y is w ith in us, w h e th e r w e thought

w e w e r e g e t t in g in to or o u t o f it. T o re m a in w ith the e x a m p le of the

space ra ce : in its w a k e m il i ta r y / sc ie n t i f i c / c o m m e rc ia l satell ites c r is s ­

cross th e sky day and n igh t, and, ev en m o r e to the p o in t , an in tr icate

c o m m u n ic a t io n in fra s tru c tu re is in p lace . W h e n You W ill Go to the

M oon says o n the last page ‘then Y O U will see' (p . 6 3 ) , it was adopting

a slightly m o r e s ituated o u t lo o k on the fu tu re ol high te ch n o lo g y : the

space ra ce was played o u t as a m ed ia s p e c ta c le , and it spun off m edia

events like a c o m e t ’s tail.

M o r e g e n era l ly , habitual d esens it iza tion to the stale and o v e r used

w o rd ‘t e c h n o lo g y ’ d o es n o t s e e m to inhibit the g r o w th and w eb b in g

to g e th e r o f tech n ica l in fra s tru c tu res , ev en i f they d o n o t have the high

profile o f r o c k e ts , space shuttles and space sta tions . N o d o u b t , nu m bed

by the b lo od less a b s tra ct io n ‘t e c h n o lo g y ’ and t ired ol its ideological

baggage, th e re m ay b e s o m e r e lu c ta n c e o r ev en incapacity w ithin the

hu m anities to fiddle arou nd w ith the specific p atterns and events

associated w ith th e m u ltip le in te rs e c t io n of t e ch n o lo g ie s . Y e t , justifi­

ably spurn ing utopian o r d ystopian talk o f ‘t e c h n o lo g y ’ as a universal,

XI

P R E F A C E

critical thinkc'rs arc landed w ith a p r o b le m : on w hat gr o u n d can

anyone engage crit ically w ith specif ic t e ch n o lo g ie s? T h is is a d o u b le

bind. Learn ing to read You W ill i ,o to th e M oon , for in s tan ce , m eans

learning to hear the sub jec ti fy ing vo ice ad dressed to cer ta in gro u p s in

the late tw e n t ie th cen tu ry via the sym b o ls of high te c h n o lo g y , and at

the sam e t im e , d ev e lo p in g a feel for w hat always a c co m p a n ie d it: a

co m p l ic a te d , m essy , f luctuating tang le of te ch n ica l m e d ia tio n s and

c o l le c t iv es involving specific bodies and t im e s . In that sen se , T ransduc­

tions is an a t te m p t at learning to read again.

Introduction

A d o u b le bind applies to c o n te m p o r a r y c o l le c t iv es . Against, through

o r w ith te ch n o lo g ie s , they test th e ir cap acit ies to m ak e sense ol the ir

o w n situation . Y e t they are b u r d e n e d bv an o v er lo a d e d , stale a b s tr a c ­

t io n , ‘t e c h n o lo g y ’ , w hich o v err id e s and a tte n u a te s a m o r e polvp honic

voic ing o f te ch n o lo g ie s . T h is b o o k resp ond s to the con tusion and

a m b iv a le n ce w hich (low s fro m that d o u b le b ind. It is not the first

a t te m p t to deal w ith the to p ic , and it stands in the shad ow , perhaps

t o o m u ch so, o f the d iverse w o r k ot o th e r th ink ers such as G i lb e r t

S im o n d o n , D o n n a I la ra w a v , B ru n o L a to u r , B ern a rd S t ie g le r and

M artin H eid eg g er .

T h e r e are m anv wavs in to this d om ain . Transductions takes a lairlvJ J

th e o re t ica l path, o r ie n t in g its e n g a g e m e n t w ith c o n te m p o ra r y t e c h n o ­

logies by tw o p r o b le m a t ic r e fe re n c e points : co rp o re a l i ty and t e m p o r ­

ality. T h e r e is no a b so lu te justif ication lo r the p riv ilege I am acco rd ing

to bo dies and t im e as po in ts o f re f e r e n c e . T h e s e areas stand out at the

m o m e n t for a lo ose c lu s te r of reasons. Broadly speaking, it is in

re la t ion t o bo dies and t im e that m o d e r n te c h n o lo g y e ffec ts its m ost

in t im ate synthesis w ith cu l tu re s . F o r s o m e t im e n o w , living bodies

have b e e n seen as ‘u n d e r a t t a c k ’ , o r ab o u t to be l iberated ( f ro m

natu re , and u lt im ate ly fro m d eath ) bv c o m m u n ic a t io n , in fo rm a tio n

and b io m e d ica l t e ch n o lo g ie s . S im ilar ly , the p e rc e p t io n has b een that

t im e itself is b e in g c o lo n iz e d by speed . A cc e le ra t io n and instantaneitv

seem t o in to lerab ly c o m p re s s t im e . M o r e ab s tra ct ly , in the general

Held o f r e c e n t p hilosophical thou ght fro m w hich this b o o k takes

som e im p o rta n t c u e s , b ody and t im e m ark l imits tor thou ght. I o

think ‘the b o d v ’ o r to th ink ‘ t i m e ’ is to run up against the lim its ot

thinking. Body and t im e ch a llen g e the p rerog at iv es of thou ght. I hose

tw o l im it cases have u n d o u b ted ly tr igg ered im p o rta n t theo re tica l

r

innovations w hich have n o t b e e n c learly ar t icu la ted to g e t h e r with

te ch n o lo g y . O u r c o l le c t iv es are e x p o s e d t o an on goin g te ch n o lo g ic a l

dynam ism w hich can perhaps b eg in to b e th o u g h t in its n e x u s w ith

bodies and t im e .

T his approach turns aw ay steep ly f ro m any gen era l iz e d a ssert io n o f

the e f fec ts of n ew te ch n o lo g ie s on s o c ie ty . T h a t assert io n coasts a long

on a sep aration b e tw e e n te c h n o lo g y and so c ie ty w hich I seek to

u n d e r m in e , if n o t co l lap se, at a fairly lo w level. It will b e strik ingly

ap p aren t f ro m the o u tse t that m an y specif ic p o lit ica l , c th ic a l , e c o ­

n o m ic , cultural o r social p r o b le m s e f f lo resc in g arou nd te c h n o lo g y are

u n d e r - r e p re se n te d in this b o o k . R e c e n t and o n c o m in g te ch n o lo g ic a l

changes pose g loba lly large p r o b le m s , b u t th e focus h e re is m o r e o n

the con d it io n s o f intell ig ib il ity of te ch n o lo g ic a l p ra c t ice s in th e ir s p e c i ­

f icity, on the in terleav ing of t c c h n o s c ie n c e , capital and cu ltu re s .

In s im p le te r m s , until w e have b e t t e r ways o f a r t icu la tin g the t e c h ­

nical c o n st i tu t io n ot o u r c o l le c t iv e s , any ge n era l e s t im a t io n o f t e c h ­

nologica l im p a ct rem ain s p re m a tu re and perhaps m is ta k e n . T h e

volati le e ss e n c e , the m u ta b le , d iv e rg en t and ev en tfu l c h a ra c te r o f

t e ch n o lo g ie s w ith in o u r c o l le c t iv e s e lud es c lassification as m e r e ly

‘te c h n ic a l ’ o r ‘so c ia l ’ . T h e in terp lay b e t w e e n w h a t c o u n ts as social/

cultural and w hat co u n ts as te ch n ica l is far m o r e c o n v o lu te d than

m o st ex is t in g a cco u n ts ad m it .

T E C H N O L O G I E S , B O D I E S A N D T I M E S

C e rta in anx ie t ie s and e x p e c ta t io n s are ins is tently raised by the flux o f

t ech n o log ica l chang e. T h e y are m e n t io n e d c o n sta n tly in the mass

m ed ia , they figure in many d if fe re n t narra tiv es , and o cc u p y p r o m in e n t

positions in p ublic d eb ates . T h e y re v o lv e arou nd the q u e s t io n o f w hat

possible p o in ts of o r ie n ta t io n w e can have w hen a lm o s t e v ery fo u n d a ­

t ion p lace , t ra d it io n , self , o t h e r , b o d y , life, d ea th , c u l tu r e , na tion ,

history seem s a b o u t to be a l te re d , i f n o t u t te r ly t r a n s fo r m e d , by

te ch n o lo g y . O n e q uestion is h o w such anx ie t ie s arise : w hat drives

them ? I w ant to suspend that q u e s t io n , and s lo w d o w n a l it t le t o ask:

can we think throu gh the c o n d it io n s u n d e r w hich such ap p reh ensio ns

of tech n o log y arise? This m ight s ee m like an o b tu se q u e s t io n . H o w ­

ev er , it is a way ot ho ld ing o n t o th e d o u b le bind m e n t io n e d a b o v e .

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

2

I N T R O D U C T I O N

O n the o n e hand, w e are already d iverse ly te ch n o lo g ic a l . O n the o th e r

hand, ‘t e c h n o lo g y ’ has b e c o m e a p ro b le m -fe t i sh lo r us. T h e c o n ce p t

of t ra n sd u ct io n can help fra m e this q u est io n of the ‘th in k a b il i tv ’ ol

t e ch n o lo g y . It b o th highlights a m argin o f co n t in g e n c y associated with

te ch n o lo g ica l o b je c t s and p ra c t ices w ithin c o l le c t iv e s , and clarifies som e

o f th e difficulties co l le c t iv e s have in m ak in g sense of technica l p ractices .

T h is is n o t to s im ply say that te c h n o lo g ie s can have d if feren t m eanings ,

d if fe re n t uses o r d if fe re n t e f fe c ts w ith in any given social c o n t e x t .

R a th e r , this m argin o f c o n t in g e n c y o r in d ete rm in a cy partic ipates in the

c o n s t i tu t io n o f c o l le c t iv e s . It enta ils o p e n n ess to future and past. T h e

fo l lo w in g chap ters e x p lo r e s o m e c o r p o re a l and te m p o ra l im plications

o f this in d e te rm in a cy and o p en n ess .

As a way o f in tro d u c in g th e c o n c e p t o f t ra n sd u ct io n , I ap p roach it

first o f all f ro m th e p e rs p e c t iv e o f the d e c o n s tru c t iv e q u a s i -co n c e p t of

‘o rig inary t e c h n ic i t y ’ . A d m it te d ly , this is not an easy way to c o m e up

to sp eed on th e to p ic . H o w e v e r , or ig inary te ch n ic i ty d oes help rem in d

us th a t the p r o b le m o f th ink in g a b o u t te ch n o lo g y is also a p r o b le m ot

th ink in g ab o u t t i m e , c o r p o r e a l i ty and, in d eed , th ink in g about thinking.

A t a fairly d eep level , it u n se tt les the c er ta in ty that w e know what

te c h n o lo g y is in p r in c ip le . I a m assum ing that the d e c o n s tru c t iv e logic

o f th e su p p le m e n t , w ith w hich orig inary te ch n ic i ty has s tro n g affinities,

is fam il iar eno ug h to c le a r the path a l it t le h e re . F o r the p urposes of

m y ge n era l a rg u m e n t , th e d iscussion of orig inary te ch n ic i ty is in fact

m ainly a g r o u n d -c le a r in g m o v e . S e c o n d , I ske tch h o w the m argin ot

in d ete rm in a cy ju st m e n t io n e d can b e un d e rs to o d in t e r m s ot the notion

o f ‘t e c h n ic i t y ’ d ev e lo p e d by G i lb e r t S im o n d o n . Finallv, I e x p lo re the

link b e tw e e n te ch n ic i ty and tra n sd u ct io n . W e will see that technica l

o b je c t s e x is t t ra n sd u ct iv c ly . T h e agenda h e r e , and in the chap ters that

fo l lo w , is s tra ig h tfo rw a rd . U ntil w e can think ot tech nica l o b je c t s ,

m a ch in e s , e n s e m b le s in th e ir o w n te r m s , th en th e ir ro le in con sti tu ting

w h o o r w hat w e are rem ains shro u d ed . T h e intell igibil ity ot o u r ow n

a nx ie t ie s a b o u t te ch n o lo g y is e n tw in e d w ith the w ay w e think about

te ch n o lo g y .

5

V

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

O R I G I N A R Y 11 G I l N K T l Y A N D T H E

M E A N I N G O F ‘ T E C H N O L O G Y ’

It is t e m p t in g to use the w o rd ‘ t e c h n o lo g y ’ to m ea n the w h o le to o lk it

ol technical a r te fa c ts , d iverse and in n u m e ra b le as they m ay be.

H o w e v e r , I am not sure it is possib le to do that (and this p ro v ides the

first cue fo r the c o n c e p t of t ra n s d u c t io n ) . T h is difficulty was signalled

s trongly in the w o r k of M art in H e id e g g er (H e id e g g e r , 1 9 5 4 , 1 9 7 7 ) .

W h e n he grafted te ch n o lo g y o n to the q u e s t io n of B ein g , he e x e m p li f ied

perhaps the m o s t e x o r b i ta n t use of the t e r m ‘t e c h n o l o g y ’ in p hilosophy

to date ( the G o r m a n w o rd der Technik d o es n o t m ap d irec t ly o n to

‘t e c h n o lo g y ’ ; H e id e g g e r ’s resp o nse to m o d e r n te ch n o lo g y will be

discussed in C h a p te r 5 ) . R o u gh ly parap hrased , his w o rk o n te ch n o lo g y

asks: how can w e deal w ith the fact that te c h n o lo g y todav displays

itseli e v e r y w h e r e as a con stan tly shifting, o p e n -e n d e d and gro u nd less

o rd e r in g ol ev ery th in g that e x is ts , and yet w e find it a lm o s t im p ossib le

to think ab o u t h o w w e are co l le c t iv e ly involved in that o rd e r in g ,

e x c e p t in te r m s of an increasing ly u n te n a b le a n t h ro p o c e n tr is m w hich

e levates us, as ‘ the h u m a n ’ , t o th e su m m it o f all th ings (H e id e g g e r ,

1 9 7 7 )? Put d if ferent ly , w hen IB M C o r p o r a t io n ’s s u p e r c o m p u t e r Deep

Blue beat the re igning hu m an w o r ld chess c h a m p io n , G ary K asp arov ,

in 1 9 9 7 , w hat was o u r re a c t io n ? T o say that h u m a n ity is still su p e r io r

in the c o n te s t of in te ll ig en ce b eca u se it built the te c h n o lo g y o f

s u p e rco m p u tin g ? H e id e g g e r ’s q u e s t io n in g o f te c h n o lo g y addressed the

p rofou nd in c o h e re n c e of such a re sp o n se . Lie sou gh t to th ink th ro u g h

the e x p e r ie n c e of be in g suspended b e tw e e n g r o w in g o rd e ra b i l i ty and

an as yet ind ec ip herab le h is tor ica lly specific in v o lv e m e n t w ith

te ch n o lo g y .

T h e r e is no s im p le way o ut of that e x p e r ie n c e . It is a n o th e r version

of the d o u b le bind . C o u ld w e th en m o v e up a level and, speaking

m o r e re f lex ive ly , say the te c h n o lo g y is a set o f a r te fa c tu a l , c o rp o re a l

and s e m io t ic rea l it ies , fo lded in to ea ch o t h e r th ro u g h the broadly

d el im ited e x p e r ie n c e o f an h istorical s itu ation ( e .g . p ro g re ss , u topia ,

dystopia , e t c . ) as m o d e rn ? F ro m this m o r e sop hist ica ted p e rs p e c t iv e ,

the w ord ‘t e c h n o lo g y ’ w ould be t re a te d as a h is tor ica lly s ituated

d iscursive e n t i ty , dating f ro m s o m e t im e in the early n in e te e n th

cen tury o r a little ear l ie r ( M itc h a m , 1 9 9 4 , 1 30 3 1 ) . Anv r e f e r e n c e to

4

I N T R O D U C T I O N

te c h n o lo g y w o u ld th e n inescapably f i lter throu gh this c o m p le x h is to r ­

ical siting. T h e unstab le a ffect ive charge that the te r m tech nolog y

ca rr ies today , w h e th e r it b e S il icon V a l le y ’s en thu siasm , W a ll S t re e t 's

panicky g lee , c o n s u m e r res is tance to gen et ica lly m odified ( G M ) foods,

o r the g i r l ’s b o r e d o m w ith space as the final te ch n o lo g ica l fro n tie r ,

w o u ld thus c o n n o t e the f ra g m e n ta t io n ot that h is torical e x p e r ie n c e .

‘T e c h n o lo g y ’ cou ld then be t re a te d as a d iscursive reality g e n era ted bv

the historical p ro c e sse s of m o d e rn i ty .

T h e p r o b le m w ith this m o v e is that , tor b e t t e r o r w o rs e , tech n o log y

is m o r e than a m a n n e r of speaking o r launching new c o m m o d it ie s o r

p olit ica l p r o g r a m m e s . It s trongly resists re d u c t io n to d iscou rse and

signification . R a th e r , it tend s to co n d it io n th e m . T his is not to say that

te c h n o lo g y , o r s o m e asp ect of t e c h n o lo g y , is outs id e d isco u rse . R a th e r

it is to say that w e can th in k , s ignify, m ak e sense and re p r es e n t w ho

w e are in p art only b eca u se of t e ch n o lo g y . O b l iq u e ly d ep art in g from

H e id e g g e r ’s w o r k , re c e n t w o rk in c o n t in e n ta l philosophy has h o m ed

in on this p o in t . D ra w in g p rim ar ily on d e c o n s tru c t iv e ap p roaches , a

c lu s te r o f Fre n ch and British th e o r is ts including Ja c q u e s D e rr id a , Jean-

Franyois L yo ta rd , B er n a rd S t ie g le r , D avid W il l s , G e o ffre y B en n in g to n ,

R ich ard B ea r d sw o rth and S im o n C r itc h le v have re fe rre d to a c o l le c t iv e ,

con st i tu t iv e hu m an e x p o s u r e t o s o m e th in g ten ta t ive ly called ‘originary

t e c h n ic i t y ’ . T h is d ifficult and aw k w ard tech nica l t e r m shies away fro mJ

any s im p le substantive d efin it ion . K e ith Ansell P earson outl ines it in

these te r m s :

C u r re n t co n tin e n ta l p hilosophy co n te n d s that the hu m an is n e c e s ­

sarily boun d up w ith an orig inary te ch n ic i ty : te ch n o lo g y is a c o n ­

stitutive p rosthesis of the h u m an anim al, a d angerou s sup p lem ent

that en jo y s an orig inary status. ( 1 9 9 7 , 1 2 1 )

H e re fe rs to D e r r i d a ’s w o r k , w hich fro m t im e to t im e invokes the

n o t io n o f orig inary te ch n ic i ty . S in ce it d irec t ly links originary technicity

to c o r p o re a l i ty , the fo l lo w in g fro m D e rr id a is re levant:

T h e natural , or ig inary body d oes n o t e x is t : te ch n o lo g y has not

s im ply added i tself , f ro m outs id e o r a l te r the fact, as a foreign bodv.

C e r ta in ly , this fo re ign o r d angero u s su p p le m e n t is ‘o r ig inar i lv ’ at

r

w o rk and in p lace in the supposedly ideal in te r io r i ty o f the ‘body

and s o u l ’ . (D e rr id a , 1 9 9 3 , 15)

O n e tack w e cou ld take on this q u a s i - c o n c e p t o f orig inary te ch n ic i ty is

to say that it c o n c e r n s the status o f th e body as a b o d y . It m ay n o t b e

possib le to th ink of a b ody as such becau se bo dies are already tech n ica l

and t h e r e fo re in s o m e sense n o t se lf - identica l o r s e l f -c o n ta in ed . In

Specters o f M arx, the p o in t is d e v e lo p e d fu r th er :

[ W jh a t e v e r is n o t th e b ody b u t b e lo n gs to it , c o m e s back t o it:

prosthesis and d ele g a t io n , re p e t i t io n , d if fe ra n cc . . . . T o p r o t e c t its

life, to c o n s t i tu te itself as un ique living e g o , to re la te , as th e sa m e,

to i tse lf , it is necessarily led to w e l c o m e the o th e r w ith in (so m an y

figures of death : d if feran ce o f th e tech n ica l apparatus , i terab il i ty ,

n o n -u n iq u e n e s s) (D e rr id a , 1 9 9 4 , 1 4 1 )

If th e re is no n o n -te c h n ic a l b ody as such , w h at w e call a living body

will have and has already had t o a d m it ‘o th e rs w i t h in ’ . A b o d y m igh t

have to be ap p roached u n d e r th e gen era l d e c o n s t r u c t iv e r u b r ic o f

i terab il i ty . D ist inguish ing th e d yn a m ics o f or ig inary te ch n ic i ty f r o m the

dynam ics of te ch n o lo g y as they are usually u n d e rs to o d , G e o ffre y

B en n in g to n o b se rv e s , The d y n a m ic o f te ch n ic i ty will thus b e the

d ynam ic of the p ro s th e t ic and th e re b y the h u m an as n o n - p r o p e r

su p p lem en ta r ity in g en era l (B e n n in g to n , 1 9 9 6 , 1 8 1 ) . ( I t w o u ld b e

possib le to c i te fo rm u la t io n s fro m R ich a rd B e a r d s w o r th and also S im o n

C r itc h le v that m ak e the sam e p o in t ( B e a r d s w o r th , 1 9 9 S , 1 9 9 8 ;

C r itc h le y , 1 9 9 9 ) ) . T h e m u tab il i ty and e v en tfu ln ess o f t e ch n o lo g y

should b e n e i th e r ap p roached as a u to n o m o u s a g e n t n o r found e n t ire ly

w anting in dynam ism c o m p a r e d to the living. M o s t e x p l ic i t ly of all,

B ernard S t ie g le r has exp an siv ely argued in his m u lt i -v o lu m e w o r k , La

techn ique et Ic tem ps (T e c h n o lo g y and t i m e ) , that th e n o t io n o f orig inary

te ch n ic i ty d raw s o u t c er ta in im p lica t io ns o f d e c o n s t ru c t iv e th o u g h t that

have b een m o r e o r less o v ersh a d o w e d in its l i te rary and philosophical

re ce p tio n (S t ie g le r , 1 9 9 4 , 1 9 9 8 ) . R a th e r than tr e a t in g te c h n o lo g y as

te x tu a l , all of these d e c o n s tru c t iv e t r e a tm e n ts suggest th a t te x tu a l i ty ,

d iscou rse , m ean in g and life m o r e g e n e r a l ly , is a lready tech n ica l w ith o u t

being, fo r all that , te ch n o lo g ic a l ly d e te r m in e d . T h e line th ey m a r k

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

6

b e t w e e n the te c h n o lo g y as d iscursive en t i ty and te ch n o lo g y as g lo b a l­

izing o rd e r in g o f c o m m u n ic a t io n and p ro d u c t io n is c o m p lica te d ,

un stab le and divisible.

In te r m s th a t m a rk e d ly strav f ro m this s trongly W e s t e r n E u ro p ea n ,

d e c o n s tru c t iv e a p p roa ch , I th ink that the fem in ist h istorian and theorist

o f s c ie n c e and te c h n o lo g y D o n n a Haravvav points to so m e th in g similar

w h e n she w r i te s , ‘ I define c o r p o re a l iz a t io n as the in tera c tio n s of

hu m a n s and n o n h u m a n s in the d is tr ib u te d , h e te r o g e n e o u s w o rk p r o ­

cesses o f t e c h n o s c i e n c c ’ ( 1 9 9 7 , 1 4 1 ) o r ‘th e body is s im ultaneously a

h is to r ica l , natural , te ch n ica l , d iscursive and m ateria l e n t i t y ’ (p. 2 0 9 ) .

She cou ld b e u n d e rs to o d as saying that w hat w e take to be a body is

n o t only insep arab le fro m te ch n o lo g ie s (o r ‘t e c h n o s c i e n c e ’ ) , but

dynam ica l ly e n g e n d e re d in the in terp lay of disparate actants . T h e

im p o r ta n t p o in t , highlighted in the sec o n d c ita t io n , is that bo dies figure

as sites o f c o m p l ic a t io n , in te rs e c t io n and h e te ro g e n e o u s c o l lec t iv e

p ro c e ss e s . T h e so c io lo g is t o f s c ie n c e and te ch n o lo g y , B ru n o L atou r,

a lso s tr ikes o u t in this d ir e c t io n at t im e s , w h e n he w ri te s , fo r instance ,

th a t ‘t h e r e is no sense in w hich hu m ans may be said to e x is t as humans

w ith o u t e n te r in g in to c o m m e r c e w ith w hat auth orizes and enables

th e m to e x is t ( i .e . t o a c t ) ’ ( L a to u r , 1 9 9 4 a , 4 5 - 6 ) ; o r , ‘even the shape

o f hu m a n s , o u r very b o d y , is c o m p o s e d in large part o l soc io tech n ica l

n e g o tia t io n s and a r te fa c ts ’ (p. 6 4 ) . Again , as in the d ec o n s tru c t iv e

a c co u n ts , stress falls on living bo dies as the d o m a in in w hich w hat it is

t o b e h u m an e n c o u n te r s s o m e th in g o th e r , and finds itself in ‘c o m ­

m e r c e ’ w ith an e n ab lin g o th e r .

It is w o r th n o t in g how m an y of these fo rm u la t io n s d irec t ly and

in e x tr ic a b ly assoc iate living bo d ies w ith tech nica l a c t io n . T h e assoc i­

a t ion is m o r e than an e x te r n a l linkage b e t w e e n bodies and technica l

ar te fa c ts . T h e a d je c t iv e ‘o r ig in a ry ’ , as s o m e of the q u o te s just given

ind ica te , is o n e w ay to d e s c r ib e s o m e th in g m o r e un nerv ing and

u n lo ca ta b le than m e r e ly s trapping o n , im p lanting o r even in ject ing

gadgets in to living bo dies . By n o w , ‘o r ig in a r v ’ has b e c o m e familiar

sho rthan d fo r th e d e c o n s tru c t iv e logic ot the su p p le m e n t . T h e logic ot

th e s u p p le m e n t d escr ib es all tho se s ituations in w hich what was thought

to b e m e r e ly added on to so m e th in g m o r e p r im a ry turns out to be

ir rev ers ib ly and in e x tr ic a b ly p resu p p o sed in the con st i tu t io n ot what it

is said t o be added on to . D e rr id a w ri te s in Spccch an d P henom ena: ‘the

1

strange s tru c tu re ol the su p p le m e n t . . by delayed r e a c t io n , a

possibility p ro d u ces that w hich it is said to be added o n ’ (D e rr id a ,

1 9 7 5 , 8 9 ) . ||, as an ear l ie r q u o te l ro m D e rr id a ind icates , te ch n o lo g y

can be seen as a ‘d angerou s s u p p le m e n t ’ , w e m ay b e justified in saying

that the apparent ‘adding o n ’ of t e ch n o lo g y to living bo d ies has a

c o m p le x te m p o ra l s t ru c tu re . It may be necessary to th ink ab o u t

tech n ic i ty in re la t ion to t im e . This will be the o th e r d ir e c t io n in w hich

originary te ch n ic i ty takes us: to w a rd s an e n g a g e m e n t w ith te ch n o lo g y

as te m p o ra l , o r m o r e c o r r e c t ly , as te m p o ra l iz in g . T o speak of the

in ex tr ica b il i ty of bodies w ith te c h n o lo g y is also and alw ays to speak o f

t im e .

W H A T D O f . S T E C H N O L O G Y S U P P L E M E N T ?

W h a t is su p p le m e n te d bv te ch n ic i tv (a te r m w h o se specific m ean in g

will soon be discussed)? In nearly all the fo rm u la t io n s I have q u o te d , it

is ‘ the hum an a n im a l ’ , ‘h u m a n s ’ , o r ‘the h u m a n ’ . M o r e g e n er a l ly , it is

‘ l i fe ’ o r ‘ the l iv in g . ’ N o w a c co rd in g to the logic o f the s u p p le m e n t , if

tech n ic i ty su p p lem en ts the liv ing, the n o n -te c h n ic a l d o es n o t s im ply

p re c e d e the tech n ica l . C o n v e rs e ly , te ch n o lo g ie s are n o t s im ply added

on to cu l tu re s , fo r instance . So fo r in s tan ce , an essentia l hu m an

capacity to use to o ls c a n n o t p re -e x is t the d e v e lo p m e n t o f tho se to o ls

(see C h a p te r 2 ) . O rig in a ry te ch n ic i ty im plies that the n o n -te c h n ic a l

e n ti ty , the ‘w h o ' o r the h u m a n , also has n eed o f the ‘w h a t ’ , the

technica l su p p le m e n t , in o rd e r to b e c o m e w h o she o r he is. T h e p oint

w ould not be t o posit p rim acy for e i th e r the te ch n ica l o r the n o n ­

tech n ica l , but to .set- h o w the- .secondary p os it ion o f o n e t e r m ( t e c h n i ­

c itv) a llow s the o th e r t e r m to b o th b e th o u g h t and rem ain in s o m e

sense u nthought.

O n e wav in to this difficult te rra in has b e e n o p e n e d up by B ernard

S tieg ler . I he d ee p in ter la c in g of t e ch n o lo g y and t im e fo rm s the

principal focus of his re c e n t w o rk (La tech n iqu e et le tem ps. I . La fa u te

d ’E ptm ethee (T h e fault of E p im e th e u s ) ; I.a tech n iqu e et le temps. 2 . La

d isorien ta tion ( D is o r ie n ta t io n ) ) . A lon g w ith p h i lo so p h er G i lb e r t S im o n -

d o n ’s w o rk ( to w hich w e w ill turn in just a m o m e n t ) , S t ie g le r ’s w o rk

offers o n e ol the m ost e la b o r a te and w id e -ra n g in g a c co u n ts of orig inary

tech nic itv c u rre n t ly available. (T h e m a jo r cr it ica l resp o n ses to S t ie g le r ’s

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

8

I N T R O D U C T I O N

w o r k available to date in English are B en n in g to n 1 9 9 6 ; B ea rd sw o rth ,

1 9 9 5 , 1 9 9 7 , 1 9 9 8 . ) S t ie g le r brings the delayed rea c t io n im plied bv the

log ic of the s u p p le m e n t to the lo re f ro n t . In a s trongly H eidegger ian

vein , he argues that the re la t io n b e tw e e n te ch n o lo g y and c u ltu re is a

kind of h is tor ica lly m ateria l ized ‘ t e m p o ra l iz a t io n ’ . H e w rites :

T e c h n o lo g y evolves m ore qu ickly than c u ltu re . M o r e a ccu ra te ly , the

te m p o ra l re la t io n b e tw e e n the t w o is a ten s io n in w hich th e re is

bo th advance and delay , a ten s io n ch a ra c ter is t ic of the d raw ing-o u t

[E rstreckung ] w hich m ak es up any p ro ce ss ol t e m p o ra l iz a t io n . ( S t ie ­

g le r , 1 9 9 3 , 4 3 )

T h e t e r m ‘t e m p o r a l iz a t io n ’ is H e id e g g e r ’s ( 1 9 6 2 , 386 7 ) . It w ould be

difficult t o e x p lo r e it in detail h e r e . C o n c e p tu a l ly , it could be seen as

a p r e c u r s o r t o the logic ot the su p p le m e n t . The im p o rta n t point is

th a t , fo r H e id e g g er , t im e is not an en t i ty o r substance w hich w ould

sim ply have a past, p r e s e n t and fu tu re as its a t tr ib u te s . N o r d oes it

d es ignate the un stab le ap p earan ces o f an un derly in g reality . R a th e r ,

te m p o r a l i ty is an o p e n n ess o r d is ju n ct io n a f lec t in g every level ot what

ex ists . T e m p o r a l i ty t c m p o ra l iz e s i t s e l f v a r io u s ly , f o r e n t i t i e s w h o th in k

a b o u t it , it p ro v e s particularly t r o u b le s o m e . E xisten t ia l lv , it m ean s that

w e do not e x is t s im ply in o urse lv e s , but hold ourse lves o p en to a

fu tu re that w e c a n n o t fully a p p rop ria te (e .g . 1 will n o t e x p e r ie n c e mv

o w n d ea th ) , and find o u rse lv e s un a cco u n ta b ly affected bv a past that

p re c e d e s us. By analogy , S t ie g le r is arguing that the re la t ion b e tw e e n

c u ltu re and te c h n o lo g y also in s o m e sense te m p o ra l iz e s , o r makes

p ossib le , a re la t io n to fu tu re , past and p re se n t .

T h e r e are m any q u es t io n s that such a brief foray in to te ch n o lo g y as

te m p o ra l iz a t io n c a n n o t a n sw e r . S tra teg ica l ly , S t ie g le r advances the idea

that te ch n o lo g ie s te m p o ra l iz e ra th er than flatten t im e o ut. Apart from

all the c o n ce p tu a l c o m p l ic a t io n s that S t ie g le r ’s w o rk at t im es entails ,

this is a novel a ffirm ative thesis w hich w arrants ser ious con sid era t io n .

F o r the m o m e n t , all 1 w ant t o suggest is that a p p roach ing t im e and

te ch n o lo g y I ro m the angle o f original te ch n ic i ty has a b e t t e r chance ol

n eg otia t in g the d o u b le bind than s o m e o th e r m o r e conventional

resp o n se ap p roaches . F o r instance', te ch n o lo g y is o f te n view ed ap p re­

hensively as an unstoppable- ju ggern aut . F ro m S t ie g le r ’s perspective ,

9

the technica l runs ahead of c u l tu r e , but it is n o t a lo n e . It enlists

hum ans to p o w e r its instantia t ion . As a s u p p le m e n t , it is n o t a u t o n o m ­

ous o r intrinsically d ynam ic . T h is very c o m p l ic a te d p o in t aw aits fu ller

d iscussion (see C h ap ters 4 and 5). T h e m ain idea is that w h e n w e

think a b o u t orig inary te c h n ic i ty , w e can e x p e c t to find a c o m p l ic a te d

in ter lacing o f anticipation and delays. T h e r e is instabil ity and m o v e m e n t

at the jo in t b e tw e e n te c h n o lo g y and c u l tu re , b u t this is n o t becau se

e i th e r is an a u to n o m o u s agent.

I I I M l V I A R Y T E C H N I C I T Y A N D D E E O C A L I Z A T I O N

O rig in a ry te ch n ic i ty brings the d e c o n s t ru c t iv e logic of th e s u p p le m e n t

in to play around te ch n o lo g y . T h a t m ean s that w h e n w e t ry t o d ec id e

w h e th e r hum ans and te ch n o lo g ie s are e n tw in e d c o r p o re a l ly and t e m ­

p ora lly , w e c a n n o t ground o u r ju d g e m e n ts in a radically n o n - te c h n ic a l

d o m a in . C le a r ly , this m u st have c o n s e q u e n c e s fo r th e q u e s t io n w e are

tra ck in g h e re . I asked: can w e th ink th ro u g h the c o n d it io n s u n d e r

w hich ap p reh ensio ns ( fe a r lu l , e a g e r ) o f t e c h n o lo g y arise? A resp o n se

in fo rm e d by the q u a s i -co n c e p t o f or ig inary te ch n ic i ty w o u ld say that

w e can re n d e r tho se co n d it io n s in te ll ig ib le in ways w h ich a r c a lready

m arked by so m e th in g te ch n ica l . T h o u g h t , in o th e r w o r d s , has its

te ch n ic i ty . T h e logic of the s u p p le m e n t takes us a long way fr o m ideas

of te ch n o lo g y as m ateria l a r te fa c t o r id eo lo g ica l a b s tra c t io n . It m ig h t

help to exp la in ho w such ab s tra ct io n s gain t ra c t io n . M e a n w h i le , the

o th e r t e r m , ‘t e c h n ic i ty ’ , has b e e n p u t aside. It can b e b ro u g h t fo rw a rd

to show ho w a m argin of in d e te rm in a cy is assoc iated w ith te c h n o lo g y

that n e i th e r b e lo n gs solely t o h u m an life n o r b e lo n g s to s o m e in tr ins ic

d ynam ism o f t e c h n o lo g y .

As it appears in r e c e n t F r e n c h th o u g h t , the n o t io n o f te ch n ic i ty

perhaps s tem s m o s t d ir ec t ly f r o m the re la t iv e ly l it t le k n o w n yet

startlingly fresh and re lev a n t w o r k o f the p h i lo so p h er G i lb e r t S im o n -

don. W h e re a s orig inary te ch n ic i ty stresses a d e h is c e n ce in c o n c e p ts o f

the (h u m an ) s u b je c t , te ch n ic i ty , as d ev e lo p e d bv S im o n d o n , em phasizes

som eth in g s im ilar in tech n ica l o b je c t s . S im o n d o n was a s tu d en t of

G e o rg e s C a n g u ilh e m , and has published several b o o k s and m any

articles on te ch n ic i ty , te c h n o lo g y , ‘ in d iv id u a tio n ’ , a f fe c t and c o l le c t iv e

(S im o n d o n , 1 9 8 9 a , b, 1 9 9 2 , 1 9 9 5 ; C o m b e s , 1 9 9 9 ; H o tto is , 1 9 9 3 ;

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

i o

I N T R O D U C T I O N

D u m o u c h e l , 1 9 9 5 ) . W h e n c u r r e n t d e c o n s tru c t iv e thou ght invokes the

te r m ‘o rig inary t e c h n ic i t v ’ , it is hard to n o t hear first ot all an ech o of

the c o n c e p t of t e ch n ic i ty S im o n d o n d ev e lo p e d in the 1 9 5 0 s and 1 9 6 0 s ,

i f only becau se the te r m is n o t o fte n found e lse w h e re . S im o n d o n

initiated an im p o rta n t shift in p e rsp e ct iv e on te ch n o lo g y thro u gh the

n o t io n o f te ch n ic i tv . In d rastically su m m a riz ed anticipation ot the

c o n s e q u e n c e s o f his a p p roa ch , w e cou ld sav that the c o n c e p t ot

te ch n ic i tv re fers t o a side of co l le c t iv e s w hich is n o t fully lived,J

re p r e s e n te d o r sy m b o l iz ed , y e t w hich re m a in s fundam ental to the ir

g r o u n d in g , th e ir s itu ation and the c o n st i tu t io n ot th e ir l im its. T e c h n i ­

c ity in te r la ce s g e o g ra p h ic , e co lo g ic a l , e n e r g e t ic , e c o n o m i c and h is to r i ­

cal d im e n sio n s w ith o u t b e in g re d u c ib le to any ot t h e m . 1

In S im o n d o n ’s first b o o k , Du M ode d'existence des ohjets techn iques

( T h e m o d e o f e x i s te n c e of tech n ica l o b je c t s ) ( 1 9 5 8 ) , the te r m ‘tech ni-

c i t e ’ o cc u rs r e p e a te d ly . T h e b o o k seeks to red ress a misguided

o p p o s it io n b e tw e e n cu ltu re and te ch n o lo g y . Such an o p p osit ion may

have lo n g e x is te d , b u t was less h a m p e rin g w hen the tech nica l o b je c ts

in q u e s t io n w e r e m o r e d is cre te and less e x te n s iv e and p o te n t than

r e c e n t o r c u rr e n t te ch n o lo g ie s . B roadly speaking, S im o n d o n argues

that a m isa p p reh en sio n o f the wav in w hich technica l o b je c t s exist

p re v e n ts us f r o m see ing th e ir part in th e c o n st i tu t io n ot hum an

c o l le c t iv e s , o r in ‘th e h u m a n ’ . T h e b o o k also deals w ith the p ro b le m

that la rge-sca le te ch n ica l ensem bles (such as in fo rm a t io n , c o m m u n ic a t io n

o r tr a n s p o r t in fra s tru c tu re s , b io te c h n o lo g ic a l in te rv e n t io n s , e t c . ) pose

for th o u g h t , re p r e s e n ta t io n and c o l le c t iv e lite. T h e s e e n s e m b le s are

difficult to re p r e s e n t as such b eca u se of th e ir sp raw ling , d istributed

and o f te n quasi-invisib le e x i s te n c e . S im o n d o n ’s resp o n se to b o th the

o p p o s it io n b e t w e e n c u l tu re and te c h n o lo g y , and the p ro b le m ol

re p res e n t in g te ch n ica l e n s e m b le s re l ied on the c o n c e p t ot tech nic itv .

T e c h n ic i tv plays a m a jo r ro le in re -ev a lu at in g w hat a tech nica l o b je c t

is, w h e th e r it b e a to o l , a m a ch in e o r m u lti -sy s tem e n s e m b les o r

in fra s tru c tu res , and th e re b y o p en s the possibility ot a con ce iv in g

c o l le c t iv e life s o m e w h a t d if ferent ly .

i i

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

C O N C R H T I Z A T I O N A S G E N E S I S

W h at is this p ro m is ing c o n c e p t of te ch n ic i ty ? U n fo r tu n a te ly , th e re is a

m a jo r o b sta c le to an sw e rin g th e q u e s t io n q u ick ly and neatly , and this

p ro b le m arises f ro m a c o r e difficu lty in re co g n iz in g and figuring

te ch n o lo g y w ithin the life of a c o l le c t iv e . T h e te ch n ic i ty of so m e th in g

like a handtool can b e provisionally isolated f r o m its c o n t e x t . A

handtool is. in S im o n d o n ’s t e r m s , a tech n ica l elem en t. T h e te ch n ic i ty of7 J

‘a tech nica l e l e m e n t ’ m igh t m a te r ia l iz e , fo r in s ta n ce , in the d if fe re n t

zones of hardness and f lex ib il ity c o m b in e d in a b lade that cu ts w ell .

T h a t c o m b in a t io n reflects a th o ro u g h ly localized a ssem b la ge o f p r a c ­

tices . T h e y are so localized as to b e given p r o p e r n a m e s : ‘T o le d o s t e e l ’

o r ‘M u ra n o g lass’ . P arado x ica l ly , such n a m e s r e f le c t the fact that these

lo w -te c h n o lo g y arte fac ts are m o r e d e- lo ca l iz a b le than th e e x te n s iv e

n e tw o rk s of tech n ica l m ed ia tio n that c h a ra c ter iz e c o n t e m p o r a r y t e c h ­

no lo gy . T h e te ch n ic i ty o f a te ch n ica l e l e m e n t is m o r e m o b i le o r

d etachab le than the te ch n ic i ty of an e n s e m b le w hich is a lw ays in situ.

Sf>, iron ica l ly , despite the t e c h n o -h y p e , th e m o s t u p - to -d a te , h igh­

speed tech nica l m ed ia tio ns are in S im o n d o n ’s t e r m s perhaps the least

m o b i le , the m o s t heavily co n stra in e d and w eighed d o w n by th e ir

c o n t e x t . A m o b i le phone o r w ire less appliance cou ld b e u n d e rs to o d

fro m this p e rsp e ct iv e as a massively e n c u m b e r e d o b je c t . Its physical

p ortab il ity and m iniatur ization c o m e s at the co s t o f an increased

ram ification and layering o f c o m m u n ic a t io n in fra s tru c tu re . B eca u se

they can be d eta ch ed and m o b i l iz e d in d if fe re n t c o n t e x t s , S im o n d o n

says that ‘ it is thus in the e le m e n ts that te ch n ic i ty ex is ts in the m o st

pure w a y ’ ( 1 9 8 9 a , 1 1 ) . By c o n tra s t , it is n o t possib le to d ir ec t ly distill

the te ch n ic i ty of a large-sca le tech n ica l e n s e m b le . E ven the t c ch n ic i ty

of a m achine (such as an e n g in e) c a n n o t b e isolated fro m the ‘associated

m i l ie u ’ w hich it inhabits. T h a t m il ieu (w h ich inc lu des f low s of air,

lubricants and fuel , lo r in s ta n ce) c o n d it io n s and is c o n d i t io n e d by the

w o rk in g of the eng ine. In the case of an e n s e m b le , w e w o uld need to

investigate ho w the tech n ic i ty o f s u b -e n s e m b le s e n t e r in to c o m m u t a ­

t ion , and m utually co n d it io n each o th e r .

As its te ch n ic i tv is h e ig h te n ed , an e le m e n t b e c o m e s m o r e s tab le , o r

d etachable fro m its c o n t e x t . It b e c o m e s m o b i le , and its e f fec ts b e c o m e

m o r e i terab le . It is s ignificant that even h e re in the case o f ‘p u r e ’

I 2

r

t c c h n ic i ty , the tc c h n ic i ty of an e le m e n t still d erives fro m an e n s e m b le .

T h e tech n ica l e le m e n t carries w ith it s o m e th in g acquired in a s ituated,

g ro u n d e d e n s e m b le , f o r a long t im e , a steel blade m ad e in T o le d o had

a re p u ta t io n fo r hardness, f lex ib il ity and durability that s te m m e d from

a c o m b in a t io n ot the local c h a rco a l , the c h e m ica l c o m p o s it io n o f the

w a te r , and th e forg ing te ch n iq u e s used. O f t e n the tech n ic i ty o f a

te ch n ica l e le m e n t (s o m e th in g w hich e n te rs into the c o m p o s it io n o f a

tech n ica l o b je c t ) re f lects a c o m p l ic a te d and even globally e x te n d e d

tech n ica l e n s e m b le in its o w n right. S e m ic o n d u c t o r chips exh ib i t that

kind of te ch n ic i ty . A lso , as w e will see in a la ter c h a p te r , the tech nic itv

of a s im p le tech nica l e le m e n t such as a s to n e h an d -axe implies intensive

c o r p o r e a l o rg an izatio n . F o r an isolated tech n ica l e le m e n t , tech nic itv

re fers to the d e g re e o f c o n cr e t i/a lio n w hich the in te rs e c t io n of these

d iverse realit ies e m b o d ie s . N o te that w e are already in the d om ain of

a transd uct iv e p ro ce ss h e re : tech n ica l e le m e n ts possess a d eg re e of

concretiz .a tion b eca u se they encap su la te a singular c o m b in a t io n acquired

in an e n s e m b le . T h e ha l lm ark o f a transd uct iv e p ro cess is the

in te r s e c t io n and k n o tt in g to g e t h e r o f d iverse rea lit ies . ( T h e n e x t

c h a p te r will analyse a b r ick f r o m that p e r s p e c t iv e .)

T e ch n ica l e le m e n t s , such as a spring, a w h e e l , a cu tt in g ed g e , a

sw itc h , a logic gate o r a m o n o c lo n a l a n t ib o d v , e m b o d y a capacity to

p ro d u c e o r u n d e rg o cer ta in specific e f fec ts . T h e te ch n ic i ty of an

e le m e n t is h e igh ten ed o r d im in ished a c co rd in g to the rela t ive in d ep en d ­

e n c e it displays in re la t io n to variations in c o n t e x t . It consis ts in the

‘capacity of an e le m e n t to p ro d u c e o r to u n d erg o an e ffec t in a

d e te r m in e d fa sh io n ’ (S im o n d o n , 1 9 8 9 a , 7 2 3). It is that ‘quality o f an

e le m e n t bv w hich w hat has b e e n acq uired in a tech nica l e n se m b le

e x p re sse s and c o n se rv e s itself in b e in g t ra n sp o rte d to a n ew p e r io d ’

( 7 3 ) . T e ch n ica l o b je c t s actualize o r instantiate the ir tech n ic itv in

various d eg rees o f ab s tra c t io n o r c o n c r e te n e s s .

T H E P R O B L E M O F E N S E M B L E S

How d o es this re la te to th e q u e s t io n o l the intell ig ib il ity ot responses

to te ch n o lo g y ? W e have already g l im p sed the im p lica tions ot the quasi­

no t io n of orig inary te ch n ic i ty . It im plies a c o n ta m in a t io n o f thinking

a b o u t te ch n o lo g y by te ch n ic i ty . 1 am n o w suggesting that S im o n d o n ’s

I N T R O D U C T I O N

1 5

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

pro b lcm a tiz a tio n ot the te ch n ic i tv ol e n s e m b le s p e rm its a m o r e tine-

gra ined analysis ot why it m ight b e difficult to o r ie n t o u rse lv e s in

re la t ion to te ch n o lo g y . T e c h n ic i ty p erta ins to a kind of i terab il i ty

associated w ith the tech n ica l elem ents and d er iv ed fro m a s ingular, s ite-

specific c o n ju n c t io n of d if fe re n t m il ieus. T e c h n ic i ty can b e found

w ithin d if fe re n t c o n te x ts broad ly ranging b e t w e e n small sets of to o ls

to e n s e m b le s c o m p o s e d o f m an y s u b -e n s e m b le s . T h e te ch n ic i ty ot a

hand to o l im plies s o m e th in g d if fe re n t to the t c c h n ic i ty o f a t e l e c o m ­

m u nica t io ns n e tw o r k o r a s e m i-a u to n o m o u s m a c h in e . E ven if, as w e

will see in a la ter c h a p te r , the t c c h n ic i ty of a h a n d -a x e c a n n o t really

be ranked low er than that of a s u p e r c o m p u te r , it is th e te ch n ic i ty o f

the e n s e m b le that is p articularly p ro b le m a t ic .

As a first step in his p ro b lc m a t iz a t io n of te ch n ica l e n s e m b le s ,

S im o n d o n argues that tech n ica l o b je c t s n eed to b e u n d e rs to o d in t e rm s

o f th e ir gen es is , ra th e r than as s table o b je c t s . T h is is n o t a suggestion

that w e should sim ply take an h istorical p e rsp e ct iv e on te ch n o lo g ic a l

d e v e lo p m e n t . R a th e r , he is em p h asiz ing that th e very m o d e o f

e x is te n c e of m ach ines and e n s e m b le s im p lies s o m e t im e s d iv e rg en t

te n d e n c ie s w hich provisionally stabilize in specific te ch n ica l o b je c t s .

T h e essentia lly g e n e t ic e x is te n c e o f tech n ica l o b je c t s springs f r o m the

variable con s is te n cy o r c o n c r e t iz a t io n e m b o d ie d by d if fe re n t specific

tech nica l o b je c t s . A tech n ica l o b je c t lies s o m e w h e r e b e t w e e n a t r a n ­

sient , unstab le e v e n t and a d u ra b le , heavily r e p r o d u c e d s t r u c tu r e . Its

d eg ree o f ‘c o n c r e t iz a t io n ’ , to use S im o n d o n ’s t e r m s , is the te ch n ic i ty

o f a t e c h n o l o g y .7 In these t e r m s , a high te ch n o lo g y can possess a low

tc ch n ic i ty . T h e genesis o f a s table en t i ty is im p lic i t ly a tra n sd u ct iv c

p ro cess . S im o n d o n d escr ib es te ch n ic i ty as ‘a unity of b e c o m in g ’

( 1 9 8 9 a , 2 0 ) , and as a n e t w o r k of re la t io n s :

T c c h n ic i ty is a m o d e o f b e in g only ab le to fully and p e rm a n e n t ly

e x is t as a te m p o r a l , as w ell as spatial, n e t w o r k . T e m p o r a l r e t i c u la ­

t ion consists o f re su m p tio n s o f th e o b je c t in w hich it is rca c tu a liz ed ,

re n o v a te d , rep eated u n d e r the v ery c o n d it io n s of its initial fa b r ica ­

t ion . Spatial re t icu la t io n con sis ts in th e fact that te ch n ic i ty c a n n o t

be c on ta in ed in a single o b je c t . An o b je c t is only te ch n ica l it it

o ccu rs in re lat ion w ith o th e r o b je c t s , in a n e t w o r k w h e r e it takes

on the m ean in g o f a k e y p o in t [p o in t -c le f ] ; in i t se l f and as an o b je c t ,

■4

I N T R O D U C T I O N

it only possesses virtual c h a ra c ters o f tech nic itv w hich actualize

th e m se lv e s in ac tive re la t io n to the e n s e m b le oi a sys tem . ( 1 9 5 8 ,

3 2 5 )

O n c e w e think a b o u t tech n ica l o b je c t s as ex is t in g g en et ica lly , tech nic itv

ex is ts as a n e t w o r k o f re fe r e n c e s o r relays. l iven if a technical e le m e n t

ex is ts d is c re te ly , its te ch n ic i ty is d ep lo y ed in re la t io n to o th e r e le m e n ts

and g e s tu re s , to o th e r p ra c t ices and insti tu tions . P ure tech n ic itv is very

e lu s iv e , b ecau se te ch n ic i ty en d u re s o r persists throu gh d isp ersed , even

d isco n tin u o u s , re p e t i t io n s acro ss c lu sters ot technica l e le m e n ts in

in te ra c t io n .

H aving un d e rs to o d te ch n ic i ty in g e n e t ic t e rm s , the reason whv

e n s e m b le s pose a p r o b le m fo r thou ght b e c o m e s visible. T h e y are

c o m p o s e d ot the te ch n ic i ty ot th e ir tech n ica l e le m e n ts . Technical

e n s e m b le s a ssem b le and o rganize the tc c h n ic i ty ot e le m e n ts , not In­

fo r m in g m a t te r . T o see tech nica l ac t io n as assem b ling tech n ic it ies

involves a specific and nu anced c r i t iq u e of the h y lo m o rp h ic o r m a t tc r -

fo rm sch e m a that has re g u la ted m o s t understandings of tech n ica l act ion

and m an y philosophical n o t io n s of w hat a bodv is s ince P lato . (This

will b e discussed in the n e x t c h a p te r ; see S im o n d o n , 1 9 8 9 a , 7 4 . )

H o w e v e r , it a lso raises the p ro b le m o f ho w to th ink about the

te ch n ic i tv o f the e n s e m b le . If the te ch n ic i ty of a tech n ica l e le m e n t is

a lready te m p o ra l ly and spatially re t icu la te d , w hat ab o u t technica l

o b je c t s such as m ach in es and e n se m b les? T h e r e is an a lm o st b e w i ld e r ­

ing to p o lo g ica l and te m p o ra l c o m p le x i ty h e re : the te ch n ic i ty ot the

e n s e m b le is co n s t i tu te d f ro m the spatially and te m p o ra l ly re t icu la ted

te ch n ic i t ie s of its e le m e n ts .

T R A N S D U C T I O N A N D ( O l I 1 C T 1 Y I I N D I V I D U A T I O N

H and ling this c o m p le x i ty re q u ire s a final shift in the level ot analysis

f ro m the p r o b le m o f the e n s e m b le to the c o n c e p t o f t ran sd u ct io n . It

brings us back in to p r o x im ity w ith c o l le c t iv e life , s o m e th in g w e have

n o t caught sight o f fo r a w hile . T h e c o n c e p t o f t ran sd u ct io n answ ers

d irec t ly the p r o b le m o f th ink in g ab o u t d iverse in te ra c tio n s and r e s o n ­

ances b e t w e e n the e le m e n ta r y te ch n ic i t ie s p resen t in a technical

e n s e m b le . At the sam e t im e , it also e x te n d s to the e m e rg e n c e of

1 £

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

reso n a n ce and cou p lin g b e tw e e n d iverse rea l it ies . It o cc u rs around

singular p o in ts , and it is a p ro c e ss that highlights m etastab ility ra th e r

than stability in a given c o n t e x t . The p r o b le m ol the te ch n ic i ty o l a

technica l e n s e m b le leecls d irec t ly in to the b ro a d e r p ro b le m ol th ink in g

thro u gh the con d it io n s un d er w hich a n x ie t ie s and e x p e c ta t io n s ab o u t

te ch n o lo g y arise.

In his la ter w o rk I .’Individu ct sa g en ese p b y s ic o -b io lo g iq u e (1 he

individual and its physico -b io lo g ica l ge n es is ) , S im o n d o n p ro v ides a kind

ol d efinition ol tra n sd u ct io n :

T h is te rm [ transd uction] d e n o te s a p ro ce ss b e it physical, b io lo g i ­

cal, m en ta l o r social in w hich an activ ity gradually sets itself in

m o t io n , propagating w ithin a given d o m a in , by basing this p ro p a g a ­

t ion on a s tru c tu ra t io n ca rr ie d out in d if fe re n t zo nes o f the d o m a in :

each reg io n o f the c o n st i tu te d s t ru c tu re serves as a c o n st i tu t in g

p rinc ip le fo r the fo l lo w in g o n e , so m u ch so that a m o d if ica t io n

p rogressive ly e x te n d s i tse l f at th e sam e t im e as this s t ru c tu r in g

o p e ra t io n . . . . T h e t ran sd u ct iv e o p e ra t io n is an individuation in

p ro g ress ; it can physically o c c u r m o s t s im ply in the fo r m of

pro g ress ive i tera t io n . H o w e v e r , in m o r e c o m p l e x d o m a in s , such as

the d o m ain s o f vital m e tas tab il i ty o r psychic p ro b le m a t ic s , it can

m o v e fo rw ard with a co n sta n tly variable s tep , and exp an d in a

h e te r o g e n e o u s field. (S im o n d o n , 1 9 9 5 , 30 3 1 )

N o te the co n t in u ity b e tw e e n this d efin it ion and that of te ch n ic i tv . B o thJ J

c o n c e n tr a te on o n to g e n es is ra th e r than o n to lo g y . T h a t is, te ch n ic i ty

and tra n sd u ct io n a c co u n t lo r ho w things b e c o m e w'hat th ey are ra th e r

than w hat they are . T e c h n ic i ty is o n e im p o r ta n t kind ol t ra n sd u c t io n :

that w hich perta ins to tech n ica l o b je c t s . A te ch n ica l e le m e n t such as a

b lade, a spring, a sw itch o r a cult ivated seed reso lv e s a d iv e rg e n t set

ol con stra in ts w ithin a given d o m a in . It r e p r e s e n ts a cer ta in d e g re e of

c om p atib il i ty b e tw e e n th e m . Again, a m a ch in e e m b o d ie s a te ch n ic i ty

that p ertains to a c o l le c t io n of e le m e n ts loca ted at the in te rs e c t io n of

d ifferent m ilieus. F inally, an e n s e m b le possesses an ev en m o r e d is tr ib ­

uted kind ol te ch n ic i tv .*

In l.'Individu ct sa gcn esc p h y s ic o -b io lo g iq u e , first published in 1 9 6 4 ,

S im o n d o n generalized the te r m ‘t r a n s d u c t io n ’ t o n a m e any p ro cess

i 6

I N T R O D U C T I O N

(physica l, b io lo g ica l , soc ia l , psvchic o r te ch n ica l ) in w hich m etastabil i lv

e m e r g e s . His in te re s t in ontogenesis ( that is, on how so m e th in g c o m e s

to b e ) ra th e r than on to logy ( that is, on what so m e th in g is) s tem s from

a m o d e o f th o u gh t focu sed on a unity o f b e c o m in g ra th e r than a unitv

o l substance . T h e s p e c tru m ol tra n sd u ct io n s ranges fro m sim ple

i te r a t io n (as in S im o n d o n ’s parad igm atic e x a m p le ol a physical t ra n s ­

d u c t io n , the g r o w th ot a seed crystal suspended in a liquid) to

co n sta n tly varying rh yth m s o s c i l l a t i n g in a held s tru c tu re d bv d if fe r ­

e n c e s and re p e t i t io n s (as tor in s tan ce , in affect and th o u gh t) . T ra n sd u c­

t ion arises I ro m the n o n -s im u lta n e i ty o r m etastab il i tv o f a d o m a in , that

is, in the tact that it is n o t fully s im u ltan eo u s o r c o in c id e n t with itself.

B o u n d aries , s ingularities and d if fe re n c e s un d erl ie transd uctions .

T h is m ean s that living things can also be un d e rs to o d transductivelv .

( W e should n o te first of all that tra n sd u ct io n has specific m eanings in

r e c e n t b io lo gy . As w e will see in the last c h a p te r , in the 1 9 5 0 s

m o le c u la r b io lo g y began to speak o f ‘t ra n s d u c t io n ’ . C e l l b io logy has

a lso d ev e lo p e d a specific m e a n in g fo r the te r m ‘signal t ra n s d u c t io n ' . In

m o le c u la r b io lo g y , it n a m ed a specific ev en t in w hich a virus carries

n e w g e n e t ic m ateria l o v e r in to the D N A o f b ac ter ia . Viral transd uction

p refigu res th e fo rm s of g e n e t ic m an ip u la t io n c u rr en t ly un d er intense

d e v e lo p m e n t . ) N o n - l iv in g indiv iduation , w hile tran sd u ct iv e , always

o c c u r s on the surfaces o r bo un d ary b e tw e e n the individuating entity

and its m il ieu . T h e planes on w hich the crystal gro w s are always on

th o se surfaces of th e crystal in c o n ta c t w ith a liquid. Lite is t ransd uctive

t o o , b u t involves te m p o ra l and to p o log ica l co m p lic a t io n s . T h e living

e n c o u n te r s in fo rm a t io n , u n d e rs to o d s tr ic t ly as the un p red ic tab il i ty o f

fo rm s o r signals, as a p r o b le m . It reso lv es the p r o b le m through

c o n s ta n t te m p o ra l and spatial r e s tru c tu r in g o f i tse l f and its m ilieus. It

d ev e lo p s and adapts, it r e m e m b e r s and anticipates . U n lik e a crystal,

life can individuate ( that is, d ev e lo p in its specific ity o ut o f a dom ain

of un reso lv ed te n s io n s and p o te n t ia ls ) to a g r e a te r o r lesser e x te n t bv

b e c o m in g in fo rm a t io n fo r i t s e l f . It possesses in te r io r m ilieus. It is as if

a crystal cou ld b e c o m e a m e d iu m fo r its o w n fu r th er grow th.

S im o n d o n calls that p ro ce ss a ‘r e c u r r e n c e o f th e future on the p r e s e n t ’

( 1 9 8 9 a , 1 4 4 ) . T he living gives in fo rm a tio n to i tse l f and, in doing so,

individuates itself on the basis o f a reserv e ot pre-individual singular­

i t ies , o r a Held of in tens it ies n o t vet organized in specific form s and

i 7

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

functions.' ' Finally, th e r e w o uld be fo rm s o f life w h o se c o l le c t iv e

individuations includes te ch n ic i ty .

T H I N K I N G T R A N S D U C T I V E L Y :

F R O M T E C H N I C I T Y T O C O L L E C T I V E

T h e r e are still u n a n sw ered q u est io n s a b o u t t r a n s d u c t io n , and perhaps

especially ab o u t tra n sd u ct io n as a way to th ink th ro u g h the d o u b le

bind b e tw e e n te ch n o lo g y as o v er lo a d ed signifier and te ch n ica l p ra c t icc s ,

in tim ate ly e m b o d ie d and s ituated . T h e main p o in t is th a t t ra n sd u ct io n

aids in t ra ck in g p ro cesses that c o m e into b e in g at th e in te rs e c t io n o f

d iverse realit ies . T h e s e d iverse rea lit ies inc lu de c o r p o r e a l , g e o g r a p h ­

ical, e c o n o m ic , c o n c e p tu a l , b io p o li t ica l , geo p o li t ica l and a ffect ive

d im ensio ns . T h e y entail a k n o t t in g to g e t h e r of c o m m o d it ie s , signs,

d iagram s, s tor ies , p ra c t ice s , c o n c e p ts , h u m an and n o n -h u m a n b o d ies ,

im ages and places. T h e y entail new cap acit ies , re la t io n s and p ra c t ice s

w hose advent is n o t always easy to re co g n iz e .

A transd uct iv e approach p ro m is e s a m o r e n u a n ced grasp o f h o w

living and n o n-l iv ing p ro cesses d if fe re n t ia te and d ev e lo p . It u nderstand s

the e m e r g e n c e of a m o d e ot unity w ith o u t p re s u m in g un d erly in g

substance o r identity . E very tra n sd u c t io n is an individuation in p ro ce ss .

It is a way so m e th in g c o m e s to b e , an o n to g e n es is . Im p o rta n t ly ,

t ran sd u ct io n re fers not only to a p ro ce ss that o c c u r s in physical,

b io logical o r tech n ica l e n s e m b le s as th ey individuate. It a lso o c c u r s in

and as th o u gh t . T hinking can b e u n d e rs to o d as an individuation o f a

th inking s u b je c t , n o t just s o m e th in g that s o m e o n e w h o th inks d o es . T o

think transd uctiv e ly is to m ed ia te b e tw e e n d if fe re n t o rd e r s , t o p lace

h e te ro g e n e o u s realit ies in c o n ta c t , and to b e c o m e s o m e th in g d if fe re n t .

C o rre la t iv e ly , th o u gh t w hich u n d erta k es to c o m p r e h e n d such p ro cesses

must itself b e transd uct iv e if it is to a c c o m p a n y the co n s t i tu t io n o f

individuated ent i t ies . A t ran sd u ct iv e p ro c e ss calls fo r tran sd u ct iv e

thought.

L o ok in g b a ck , w e can now' at least envisage the p r o b le m o f the

double bind b e tw e e n te ch n o lo g y as a grand s ignifier and the diversity

of technical p ra c t ices a bit d if feren t ly . T h e first s tep w e to o k was to

say that h o w e v e r w e th ink a b o u t te c h n o lo g y , t h e re is no way w e cou ld

purify any o th e r te r m (h u m a n , life, so c ie ty , p o lit ic s , s u b je c t , e th ics ,

i 8

I N T R O D U C T I O N

t ru th ) o f its tc c h n ic i ty . T h is was a very gen era l p o in t , but it means

that anx ie t ie s and hop es c o n c e r n in g te ch n o lo g y can b e read critically ,

e v en d e c o n s tru c t iv e ly . T h e v th e m se lv e s are already tech nica l ly m e d i ­

a ted . O u r second step was to quickly tra v erse a f iner-gra ined acco u n t

o f te ch n ic i tv d raw n fro m S im o n d o n ’s w o r k . T e c h n ic i tv is a c o n ce p t

that diffracts tech n ica l o b je c t s in to a n e tw o r k of te m p o r a l and spatial

re lays . T h e m o d e o f e x is te n c e o f te ch n ica l o b je c t s is g e n e t ic . It involves

delo ca liz ing and localiz ing v e c to rs , and it m o v e s b e tw e e n unstable

ev en ts and d urable s t ru c tu re s . In p art icu lar , te ch n ic i ty flags the p r o b ­

le m o f r e p r e s e n t in g th e m o d e of e x i s te n c e o l c o n te m p o r a r y technical

e n s e m b le s . T h e th ird stage was to say that th ink in g about tech nic ity

o p e n s on to a w id e -ra n g in g style o f th o u g h t focused on individuation,

o r o n th e e m e r g e n c e o f new cap acit ies in the in te rs e c t io n of diverse

do m ains .

T h e q u e s t io n I p o sed was: can w e th ink th ro u gh the con dit ions

u n d e r w h ich te c h n o lo g y b e c o m e s s o m e th in g to b e ap p reh end ed fea r­

fully as an alien o r hopefu lly as a saviour? T h in k in g transductive ly

a b o u t this p r o b le m entails suspending any p r io r , sep arate substantial

unity in e i th e r te c h n o lo g y o r the c o l le c t iv es (s o c ie t ie s , c u ltu res ,

c iv ilizations, e t c . ) , and a tte n d in g t o the p ro ce sse s that sep arate and

b ind th e m . This is easy to say, b u t h o w d oes o n e d o it?

S I N G U L A R E X A M P L E S , G E N E R A L C O N C E P T S ?

Each o f the fo l lo w in g ch ap ters t ra ce s a thread held in tens ion by the

d o u b le b ind. E ach o n e takes s o m e idea, f igure , p e rc e p t io n , e x p e r ie n c e

o r a f fe c t associated w ith c o n te m p o r a r y te c h n o lo g y (sp e ed , p o w e r ,

a u to n o m y , c o m p le x i t y , p lea su re e t c . ) , and show s how that double

bind b e t w e e n te c h n o lo g y as o v er lo a d e d signifier and c o n c r e t e p ractice

applies to it. F r o m a n o th e r ang le , the ch ap ters of this b o o k can be

seen as p lo tt in g a path thro u gh r e c e n t p h i lo so p h em e s . T he chapters

take gen era l c o n c e p ts such as b o d y , m a ter ia l ity , t im e , c o m m u n ity ,

individuality and life , and engage w ith t h e m thro u gh s ingularities or

key p o in ts o f te ch n ic i ty in c o n t e m p o r a r y c o l le c t iv e s . E x a m p le s such as

a b r ic k , a s e v e n te e n th -c e n tu ry p end u lu m c lo c k , a s u p e rc o m p u te r , a

p re -h o m in id h a n d - to o l , a p e r fo r m a n c e by th e artist S te la rc , an online

c o m p u t e r g a m e , a satel l i te navigation system and a g e n o m ic database

■9

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

have been c hosen becau se th e ir s ingularities s tr ik e m e as im p lica ted in

so m e way in the m o re gen era l c o n ce p ts .

T h e h rs t c h a p te r discusses c o r p o re a l i ty and te ch n ic i ty . T h e c o n n e c ­

tions b e tw e e n bodies and te ch n o lo g ie s are c u r r e n t ly u n d e r in tense

the o re t ica l and practical s cru tin y in m any q u a r ter s (ran g ing fro m

critical theory to b io te ch and p h arm aceu tica l c o m p a n ie s ) , n o t least

becau se ol the increasingly d ire c t b io te c h n o lo g ic a l m an ip ula tion ot

what was held to be in s o m e sense im m u ta b le the lim its o f life and

death and inalienable the p ro p r ie ty o r ‘m in e n e s s ’ o t living hum an

bodies . T e ch n ica l p ractices o fte n figure as invading living b o d ies , o r

l iberating su b jec ts fro m the b u rd ens of e m b o d im e n t . R e p r e s e n t in g

th e m in this way risks losing sight of the wavs in w hich o u r c o l le c t iv es

are red is tr ib u t in g and reco n fig u r in g re la t io n s b e t w e e n d i f le rc n t life'

fo rm s and tech nica l apparatuses, hven call ing these p ra c t ice s ‘b i o te c h ­

n o lo g y ’ o b sc u re s the p ro b le m to a c er ta in e x t e n t . T h e te ch n ic i tv of

these new a rr a n g e m en ts resists fo rm u la t io n in t e r m s ot e x is t in g ideas

ol what a te ch n o lo g y is, and it cer ta in ly poses a ch a l le n g e to many

th e o re t ica l a c co u n ts of e m b o d im e n t . D ra w in g on fem in ist th e o r ie s ot

the b ody , the first ch a p te r d ev e lo p s a tra n sd u ct iv e a c c o u n t of’ c o r p o r ­

eality . T h e a rg u m e n t d ev e lo p s o u t o f the m o r e ab s tra ct fo rm u la t io n s

of orig inary tech n ic i ty e n c o u n te r e d a b o v e : w hat w e ta ke to b e a body

is already in s o m e sense te ch n ica l , and th e r e f o r e bo dies and t e c h n o l o ­

gies c ou p le in wavs that are a l itt le m o r e c o m p l ic a te d than any s im ple

version o f te ch n o lo g y as organ e x te n s io n suggests. By tak ing into

a cco u n t s o m e of the ways bo dies are c o n st i tu t iv e ly and in t im ate ly

tech n ica l , it might be possib le to o f fe r an a l te re d a c c o u n t o f the

p ro p r ie ty o f the- living b o d y , o n e w hich begins t o o r ie n t itself with

resp ect to fears of a loss of c o r p o re a l p ro p r ie ty . T h e c o m p le x i t y of

m o d e rn te ch n o lo g y is o f te n co n tra s te d w ith o t h e r so -c a l le d ‘p r im it iv e ’

technica l p ra c t ices . T h in k in g transd u ct iv e ly ab o u t e m b o d im e n t u n d e r ­

cuts the s e l f -e v id e n c e o f that c o n tra s t . Such c o n tra s ts can o b s c u r e the

h is to r ica l-co l le c t iv e e x is te n c e of te ch n o lo g ie s .

T he seco n d ch a p te r c o n tra s ts t w o his tor ica l l im it cases: that o f s ton e

h an d-too ls used by p ro to -h o m in id s and th e s u p e r c o m p u te rs used in

nuclear w eap ons design. These a r te fa c ts are n o t d is in te re s te d e x a m p le s .

H and -too ls figure s trongly in d isco u rses c o n c e r n in g homini/.ation. T h e y

have fun ctioned as a kind o f l im i t - t e r m b e t w e e n n a tu re and c u ltu re in

2 0

I N T R O D U C T I O N

p hilosophical, soc ia l-sc ien t if ic and p op u lar a c co u n ts ol hum an origins.

In t e r m s o f te ch n ic i ty t o o , they e x e m p li fy lim its. T h e hand-too l is a

te ch n ica l e le m e n t radically d e ta ch e d fro m the c o l le c t iv e in w hich it

w as p ro d u c e d . N u c le a r w e a p o n s are a n o th e r l im it , but this t im e bv

v irtue of a m assive te ch n o lo g ic a l e n s e m b le d ev e lo p ed un d er specific

e c o n o m i c and polit ica l co n d it io n s d uring the seco n d halt o f the

tw e n t ie th c e n tu ry . N u c le a r w e a p o n s system s iconi/.e m o d e rn t e c h ­

no lo g y b e c o m in g a u t o n o m o u s , g lo b a l , and o ut o f c o n tro l ( W i n n e r ,

1 9 7 7 ) . W h e n s to n e a xes and t h e r m o n u c le a r w eap o ns are c o m p a re d ,

the c o n tra s t usually loads all p o w e r and c o m p le x i ty on to c o n t e m p o r ­

ary te ch n o lo g y . A tran sd u ct iv e a c co u n t o f te ch n o lo g ie s and bodies

again suggests an a lternat ive to this p ic tu re . O t h e r kinds ol top olog ica l

and te m p o ra l c o m p le x i t y n e e d to be c o n s id ere d . In the case o f the

h a n d -to o l , those c o m p l ic a t io n s c o n c e r n the p ro cess ol co rp o re a l iz a t io n :

the t c ch n ic i ty of a h a n d -a x e , and specificallv its capacity to be m obilized

ap art f r o m the sites o f its p ro d u c t io n , im plies p atterns o f gestures and

p e r c e p t io n s w hich c a n n o t s im ply be reg ard ed as natural . In the case o f

the th e r m o n u c le a r w e a p o n , the c o m p lic a t io n s c o n c e r n the p ractices o f

in scr ip t io n and ca lcu la t io n w hich p artic ip ate in its te ch n ic i ty . T h e force

of th e b o m b as a te ch n ica l m e d ia t io n is d ifficult to signify e x c e p t in

a p o ca ly p tic t e r m s , but this fo r c e is in tr ica te ly in te rw o v e n w ith an

o rg an izatio n o f t ra ce s and inscrip tio ns . Just like the h a n d -a x e , the

b o m b is e m b o d ie d in a c o l le c t iv e . T h e ap p aren tly re len t less historical

e xp a n sio n o f m o d e r n te c h n o lo g y should be re - th o u g h t .

T h e th ird c h a p te r a lso re l ies on a c o n tra s t , but this t im e b e tw e e n a

s e v e n te e n th -c e n tu ry p en d u lu m c lo c k built by the D u tc h scientist

C h rist iann H uygens , and a late tw e n t ie th - c e n tu r y c lo c k sys tem , the

g lobal po s it io n ing sy stem ( G P S ) d ep lo y ed by the U n ited S tates D e p a r t ­

m e n t o f D e fe n s e . Again, the c h o ic e of e x a m p le is n o t a rb itrary . C lo ck -

t im e surfaces in a w id e s tre a m o f historical and th e o re t ica l w o rk on

m o d e r n te ch n o lo g y as resp o n s ib le fo r a kind of loss o f social o r lived

t im e . It figures as the p ro to ty p e o f a global tech n o lo g ica l im p rin ting

and sp eed ing-u p of c o l le c t iv e life. It w o uld be futile to deny these

e f fec ts . Y e t v iew ed tra n sd u ct iv e ly , this way of posing the p ro b le m

m o v es to o quickly to sep arate tech no log y ’ and c o l le c t iv e life. R ather

than sim ply c o lo n iz in g lived t im e , c lo c k - t im e art icu la tes a diverse set

o f rea l it ies on ca ch o th e r . It brings d if fe re n t o rd e rs o r dom ains into

2 I

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

re lat ion in ways that n e i th e r social c o n s t r u c t io n n o r te ch n o lo g ic a l

d e te rm in ism can grasp. T h e te ch n ic i ty o f the p e n d u lu m c lo c k , I will

argue, resides at the in te rs ec t io n o f g e o g ra p h ic , p o lit ica l , m il itary and

e c o n o m ic realit ies . M u tab il ity , m e tas tab il i ty and cv e n tfu ln e ss are a

d irec t c o n s e q u e n c e o f the t ran sd u ct iv e p ro c e sse s assoc iated with

originary te ch n ic i ty . T h e n o t io n of t ra n sd u ct io n has im p o r ta n t im p l ica ­

tions for any e x p e r ie n c e of speed . R e c e n t th e o r ie s of tech n ica l chang c

ten d to a t t r ib u te an ab so lu te value to the speed of c o n te m p o r a r y

te ch n o lo g y . T e ch n o lo g ic a l speed is reg arded as assaulting su b jec tiv ity

and life. P ro m in e n t th eo r ies (e .g . the w o rk o f Paul V ir i l io ) speak of a

radical break o r d is ju n ct io n in o u r e x p e r ie n c e caused by speed ,

particularly the ce le r i ty o f m e d ia te le te c h n o lo g ic s . T h e c o n s e q u e n c e s

are usually p re se n te d as ca ta s tro p h ic , a p o ca ly p tic o r re v o lu t io n a ry .

F ro m th e s tandp oin t o f or ig inary te c h n ic i ty , th e r e is a n eed to be

careful ab o u t how w e evaluate this e x p e r ie n c e of sp eed . As C h a p te r 3

p ro p o se s , d raw ing cr it ica lly o n H e id e g g e r ’ s w o r k on t im e and t e c h ­

n o lo g y , th e r e can be no pure e x p e r ie n c e of s p e ed , o n ly of d if fe re n ce s

o f speed.

T h e fourth ch a p te r co n s id ers a w o r k by th e p e r fo r m a n c e art ist

S te la rc ent i t led Ping B ody and p rovides o n e w ay of m o v in g m o r e

slow ly around the q u est io n o f sp eed . T h a t w o r k , in w hich a living

body transd uces a flow o f data m ea su r in g n e t w o r k re sp o n se t im e s

in to ge s tu re s and im ages , show s that any e x p e r ie n c e o f speed already

d eeply e m b o d ie s a technica l ap p reh e n sio n . T h e r e is no p u re , n o n ­

tech nica l ap p reh ensio n o f sp eed , n o r any n o n -te c h n ic a l access to

t im e .

T h e p ro b le m o f what kinds o f c o l le c t iv e e m e r g e f ro m c o n te m p o r a r y

e n s e m b les o f c o m p u ta t io n and c o m m u n ic a t io n surfaces as an a ltered

p ro b le m fo r th o u gh t in th e n e x t c h a p te r . It takes th e e x a m p le o f an

o n l in e , re a l - t im e c o m p u t e r g a m e . C o m p u t e r gam es o f te n c o u n t as a

debased and th o ro u gh ly c o m m o d if ie d cu ltura l f o r m , at least fo r c r it ica l

th eo r ies o f c u l tu re and so c ie ty . T h e y are seen as im p o v erish in g

sociality, ra th e r than a.s g e n era t in g n e w fo rm s of re p r e s e n ta t io n . T h is

b lanket r e je c t io n w o uld blind us to any c o n st i tu t iv e ro le fo r gam es and

play in the fo rm a tio n o f c o l le c t iv e s . T r e a t e d a l it t le m o r e ser iously ,

these toy arte fac ts also figure in so m e of the w ays in w hich the

e m e rg e n c e o f re a l - t im e c o l le c t iv e s are co u p le d to te ch n ica l in fra s tru c ­

22

I N T R O D U C T I O N

tu res . T h e specif ic t e m p o r a l d ynam ics and d is jun ctions o f real t im e

co m p u ta t io n and c o m m u n ic a t io n cha lleng e polit ical and cultural theo ry

t o inv ent d if feren t w ays o f con ce p tu a liz in g co l le c t iv es .

F inally , ‘ l i f e ’ , a t e r m thread ed into the b a ckgro u n d o f m any d ifferent

a c co u n ts ol te c h n o lo g y , can b e co n s id ere d fro m a transd uctive p e rs ­

p e c t iv e . C o n te m p o r a r y d e v e lo p m e n ts in b io te c h n o lo g y a cce n tu a te the

key ro le and s ignificance o f life in tech n ica l m ed ia tio ns . Life in its

sp ecia ted variety , and in its a c cu m u la te d s ite -sp ecif ic h is tory o f a c c id e n ­

tal m u ta t io n s and variat ions , has b e c o m e a p r im ary r e s o u rc e for

b io p o li t ica l industrialization and c o m m o d if ic a t io n . B io tech n o lo g ica l

p ro c e ss e s , as they have un fo ld ed o v e r th e last several d eca d es , have

e m e r g e d in c lo se re la t io n to in fo rm a t ic and co m p u ta t io n a l t e c h n o l o ­

gies . All of this is fairly w ell k n o w n . But a n u m b e r o f p ro b le m s

re m a in . T his c h a p te r addresses tw o o f th e m . T h e first is how to

fo rm u la te the te ch n ic i ty o f the e n s e m b le o f b io tech n ica l p ract ices . T h e

re la t io n s unfo ld ing w ith in that e n s e m b le a rc n o t easv to re p r ese n t ,

s in ce th ey e n tw in e s trands of h e re d ity , k inship, re p r o d u c t io n , health ,

p ro p e r ty and ra c e , to n a m e a fe w , w ith tech nica l system s. In S im o n ­

d o n ’s te r m s , th e p r o b le m can b e fram ed as o n e o f how t o think

th ro u g h the te ch n ic i ty o f an e n s e m b le w h o se e le m e n ts are assem bled

fro m non -l iv in g and living m il ieu s . As a wav in to this p ro b le m , the

ch a p te r e x a m in e s how g e n o m ic in fo rm a tio n is organized and m a n ip u ­

lated in c o m p u t e r databases. T h e g e n o m ic and p r o t e o m ic databases

that s to r e and r e t r ie v e s e q u e n c e data fo rm a s u b -e n s e m b le o f the

c o m p l c x p ro ce sse s o f rea sse m b ly involved in b io te c h n o lo g y . T h e

organ ization and p ro c e ss in g of s e q u e n c e data th e re can be read as a

s y m p to m ot a sp ecif ic kind o f te ch n ic i ty . T h o s e m an ip ula tions have a

singular t e x t u r e and inscrip tive m a ter ia l ity w hich plays an im p o rta n t

part in b io te c h n o lo g y . T h e seco n d p r o b le m is m o r e th e m a tic , and

c o n c e r n s so m e of th e g en era l im p lica t io n s o f a transd uct iv e approach .

T h e curiously half-l iv ing, h a lf -no n-l iv ing status o f b io techno lo g ica l

m ed ia tio n s h e igh ten s in im p o rta n t w ays the instability o f the b o rd e r l in e

b e tw e e n life and death . F r o m this ang le , b io te c h n o lo g y and what is

happ ening th ro u g h it m igh t be addressed d if feren t ly . R a th e r than

seeing b io te c h n o lo g y as th r e a te n in g the p ro p r ie ty o f life, w e might see

it as m ak in g e x p l ic i t s o m e o f the c o n se q u e n c e s o f the tech nic itv o f

co l lect iv es .

1 3

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

T h e p ro b le m addressed in the b o o k can b e fo rm u la te d as a q u es t io n :

how can w e a c k n o w le d g e the p o w e rfu l g lobal e x te n s io n of m o d e rn

te ch n o lo g y , w ith all its d is locating e f fe c ts of sp e ed , and y e t re m a in

responsive to the specific h is torical layering of co l le c t iv e s c o m p o s e d of

hum ans and n o n -h u m a n s in that ev en t? W h e n M a rt in H e id e g g er ( 1 9 7 7 )

talks ab o u t re f lect ing o n the e ss e n c e o f t e c h n o lo g y as a wav to face

these d ifficulties , he insists on the n ecess ity ot c le a r in g away any

c o n ta m in a t io n o f that e sse n ce by th e m e re ly te ch n ica l . T h a t ins is tence ,

although taken to its l im its in H e id e g g e r ’ s w o r k , typifies an im p o rta n t

strand in ex is t in g resp onses to te ch n o lo g y . W h e n te ch n o lo g ie s and

so c io tc c h n ica l c o l le c t iv es are read in t e r m s o f orig inary t e c h n ic i ty , it

may b e that this c learing away and d e c o n ta m in a t io n of t e c h n o lo g y need

not be pursued so re len t less ly . T h a t cou ld b e im p o r ta n t in a n u m b e r

o f ways. It w o uld m e a n , fo r in s ta n ce , th a t th o u g h t , ev en philosophical

th o u g h t , cou ld begin to affirm its o w n te ch n ic i ty . It w o uld im p ly that

o u r c o l le c t iv es could begin t o ar t icu la te th e ir o w n c o n s t i tu t io n and

l imits m o r e e xp lic i t ly . A re a c t io n that f lattens o u t tech n ica l m ed ia tio n s

risks m o v ing to o q u ick ly . T ransductions e x p lo r e s s o m e g ro u n d s on

w hich w e m igh t m o v e a l it t le m o r e s lo w ly . It b ro a c h e s s o m e ways in

w hich that e x p e r ie n c e o f speed and change indissolubly a ttach ed to

c o n te m p o ra r y te ch n o lo g y can also b e u n d e rs to o d as a c o l le c t iv e

s lo w in g d o w n .

N O T E S

1. A lthough rare ly c i ted e x p l ic i t ly , it cou ld b e arg u ed th at S i m o n d o n ’s w o r k

also lends im p etu s in several ways to th e a c c o u n t s o f h u m an - n o n - h u m a n

ag e nc y d e v e lo p e d by B r u n o L a t o u r , M ich e l G a l lo n and o th e r s u n d e r th e t e r m

‘a c t o r - n c t w o r k ’ th e o r y (se e C h a p te r 3 ) . T h e s e a c co u n t s have b e e n influential

in r e c e n t social s tudies o f s c ie n ce and te c h n o lo g y an d, m o r e b ro a d ly , in

cultu ra l and social th e o r y ( e . g . , Lash, 1 9 9 9 ) . V e r y im p o rta n t ly fo r this b o o k ,

S im o n d o n m ainta ins th at te ch n ic i ty a n d c o l le c t iv e s n e e d to b e t h ough t transductively b e ca u se they are tra n s d u c t iv e p ro c e s se s . Any t h e o r y that

resp ond s to te ch n ic i ty will n eed to i t s e l f he t r a n s d u c t iv e . ( In c id en ta l ly ,

S im o n d o n ’ s n o tio n o f t ransduction as a wav o f u n d e rs ta n d in g th e t e m p o r a l and

co rp o re a l individuation o f living and n o n - l iv in g e n t i t ie s also surfaces in Gil les

O e le u / e ’ s w o r k ( D e l e u z e , 1 9 9 4 ) . ) H e n c e t r a n s d u c t io n d es ign ates b o th a

process that lies at th e h eart o f te ch n ic i ty and a m o d e o f th o u g h t adap ted to

I N T R O D U C T I O N

th in king h o w c o l le c t iv e s are in v o lv ed , as D e le u z c puts it, in th e ‘establish ing

o f c o m m u n ic a t io n b e t w e e n d isp a r a te s ’ ( 1 9 9 4 , 2 4 6 ) , T ra n s d u c t io n n a m e s the

p r o c e s s th a t o c c u r s as an e n ti ty individuates o r p re c ip i ta tes in a field ot

re la t io n s and p o tent ia ls . A lth o u g h w e cou ld ap p ro ach S i m o n d o n ’s u n d e rs ta n d ­

ing o f t r a n s d u c t io n fr o m various d ir e c t io n s ( in clu d in g physical , b io log ica l ,

psychical and c o l l e c t iv e p r o c e s s e s ) , th e m o s t d irec t path in th is c o n t e x t is via

his a c c o u n t o f t e ch n ic i ty .

2 . It should b e c le a r by n o w that ‘t e c h n i c i t y ’ t h e r e fo r e m ean s s o m e th in g

radically d i f fere nt f r o m ‘t e c h n o l o g y ’ , u n d e rs to o d in th e usual English sense

o f th e t e r m as th e lo o se ly defined to o l s , m a ch in e s and system s mainly

assoc ia ted w ith h u m a n , and to a m u c h lesse r e x t e n t , n o n - h u m a n ac t ion s . T h e

t e r m ‘t e c h n o l o g i c ’ d o c s play a s ignificant ro le in S i m o n d o n ’s w o r k , and has

d o n e in F r e n c h and G e r m a n th o u g h t o v e r th e last c e n tu r y o r so , but it re fers

m ain ly to th e s y s te m a t ic study o f th e t r a n s fo r m a t io n s and c o r r e la t io n s that

c h a r a c te r iz e te ch n ica l o b je c t s ( S im o n d o n , 1 9 8 9 a , 4 8 ; M i tc h a m , 1 9 9 4 ; Siguat,

1 9 9 4 ) .

3. E v en i f vvc c a n n o t readily e v a lu ate the te ch n ic i ty o f large-sca le technical

e n s e m b le s , w e ca n say th a t te c h n ic i ty is in p r in c ip le th e t e m p o r a l and spatial

n e t w o r k o f in t e r a c t io n s b e t w e e n tech n ica l e l e m e n t s w h ich to so m e d e g re e

re so lv e s a specif ic d ispar ity o r in co m p a t ib i l i ty w ith in a given d o m a in . T h e

n o t io n o f t r a n s d u c t io n o p en s unusually fa r -re a ch in g c o n n e c t io n s b e t w e e n q u e s t io n s ot te c h n o lo g y , c o r p o r e a l i t y and t i m e . It cou ld a llow b o th th e m o r e

o r less r e c e n t id e olog ica l loading ot th e te r m ‘t e c h n o l o g y ’ and th e widely

varying y e t u n d e n ia b le te ch n ic i ty ot h u m an c o l le c t iv e s to b e h eld in te n s io n .

W e c o u ld also ap p ro a ch t r a n s d u ct io n s tartin g f r o m tech n ica l e le m e n ts

k n o w n as ‘t r a n s d u c e r s ’ . T h e t e r m s ‘t r a n s d u c t io n ’ and ‘t r a n s d u c e r ’ have

te ch n ica l m e a n in g s in b io lo g y and e n g in e e r in g . In e le c tr ica l and e le c t r o n ic

e n g in e e r in g , t r a n s d u c e r s c o n v e r t o n e fo r m ot en e r g y in to a n o th e r . A

m ic r o p h o n e t r a n s d u c e s sp e e ch in to e le c tr ica l c u r r e n ts , l o r th e p ro c e s s of

t r a n s d u c t io n t o o c c u r , t h e r e m u st b e s o m e dispar ity , d isco n tin u ity o r

m is m a tc h w ithin a d o m a in ; t w o d i f fe re n t fo r m s o r p o tent ia ls w h o se dispar ity

can b e m o d u la te d . T r a n s d u c t io n is a p ro c e s s w h e r e b y a disparity o r d i f fere nce

is to p olo g ic a l ly and t e m p o r a l ly r e s t r u c tu r e d across s o m e in te r fa ce . It m ediates

d i f fere n t org an iza t io n s of e n e r g y . T h e m e m b r a n e s o f th e m ic r o p h o n e m o v e

in a m a g n e t ic f ield . A m i c r o p h o n e c o u p le s so u n d w av e s and elec tr ical c u rren ts .

S im o n d o n g e n e ra l iz ed th e special ized e n g in e e r in g usage to give a transduct

ive a c c o u n t o f m a ch in e s . H e r e in t e r p r e t e d c y b e r n e t i c th e o r ie s ot in form ation

and te ch n o lo g y a c c o r d in g to t r a n s d u c t io n , and at the sam e t im e sought to

d e v e lo p a r i c h e r n o t io n o f in f o r m a t io n . U n l ik e th e c y b e r n e t i c m ainstream

r e p r e s e n t e d b y S h a n n o n , W e a v e r , W i e n e r and von N e u m a n n , S im o n d o n does

n o t regard m a ch in e s as producers o r consumers o f in f o rm a t io n , but as transducers

2 *>

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

o f in formation. F'o llowing in f o rm a t io n t h e o r y , he u n d e rs to o d ‘ i n f o r m a t i o n ’ to

re fe r to th e in d e te rm in a cy o r c o n t in g e n c y in a ser ies ot signals. ( T h e basic

idea h e re is th at m o r e in f o rm a t io n is c o m m u n i c a t e d by an u n p r e d ic ta b le

s e q u e n ce of signals than by a p re d ic ta b le s e q u e n c e . In f o r m a t io n th e o r y is a

way o f q u an tify ing the level o f u n p r ed ic ta b i l i ty of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s w ithin a

inven c o n t e x t . ) D e v ice s t r a n s d u c e in f o r m a t io n , u n d e rs to o d as a m arg in ot

u n p red ic tab i l i ty in a s e q u e n ce o f signals , in to d e t e r m in e d fo r m s . A ny d e v ice

th at re ta in s a m argin o f in d e t e r m in a c y can t r a n s d u c e in f o r m a t io n : ‘in f o r m a ­

t ion supplies d e te r m in a t io n to th e m a c h i n e ’ (S im o n d o n , 1 9 8 9 a , 1 4 4 ) . I n f o r ­

m a t io n li teral ly in - fo r m s a m a ch in e , o r im p a r ts a fo r m to it ( o r , a t least , to

th a t aspect o f it w h ich re m a in s o p e n to d e t e r m in a t io n ) . W h e n th a t h ap p en s ,

th e d e v ice t ran s d u ces d i f fere n t fo r m s o r org an iza t ion s of e n e r g y . T h u s in

co n tras t to pervasive and d e ep ly r o o t e d m o d e r n m o d e ls ot m e c h a n is m w h ich

regard m ach in es as d e te r m in i s t i c , S im o n d o n v ie w s th e re la t io n b e t w e e n a

m a ch in e and its milieu as s t ru c tu re d by loca l ized and s in gular in d e t e r m in a c ie s :

T h e e x i s t e n c e o f a m a rg in of in d e t e r m in a t io n in m a c h in e s m u st be

u n d e rs to o d as th e e x i s t e n c e o f a c e r ta in n u m b e r o f cr i t ica l phases in th e ir

fu nct ion ing . T h e m a ch in e w h ic h can re c e iv e in f o r m a t io n te m p o r a l ly l o c a l ­

izes its in d e te rm in a t io n in sen s ib le ins tan ts , r ich in p o ssib i l i t ies . ( 1 9 8 9 a ,

1 44 )

A m a ch in e , f r o m this p e r s p e c t iv e , c o m p o s e s an e n s e m b le o f loca l ized

suspensions o f d e te r m in a t io n , ab le at c e r ta in ‘ s e n s ib le ’ ins tants t o re c e iv e

in fo rm a t io n as a te m p o r a r y and var iable d e te r m in a t io n . It is n o t fully

d e te r m in e d by any part icu lar p re s e n t s in ce it m ain ta in s a m a rg in ot i n d e t e r m ­

ination that a l low s it to c y c le re p e a te d ly th ro u g h th e cr i t ica l phases. T h a t

m argin o p e n s tech n ica l ac t io n to a fu tu re . It p r o je c t s in to w h a t will h appen .

N o d o u b t a n o n - l iv in g te ch n ica l o b j e c t is still m o r e o r less lo ca ted in th e

p re s e n t , s in ce it c a n n o t t r a n s fo rm i t s e l f o u ts id e th o s e cr i t ica l p h ases , ‘r ich in

p o ss ib i l i t ies ’ . It m u st stand in re la t io n to s o m e t h in g o t h e r th an i t s e l f in o r d e r

t o b e c o m e s o m e th in g e lse . Y e t , by vir tu e o f its t e c h n ic i ty , a te ch n ica l o b je c t

(especia lly a m a ch in e , b u t perhap s ev en m o r e so an e n s e m b le o f m a c h in e s )

d oes n o t stand fully in th e p r e s e n t . A d e v ic e can t r a n s d u c e in f o rm a t io n

r e p eate d ly b ecau se it suspends its re la t io n to th e p r e s e n t o r , p u t d i f fe re n t ly ,

b ecau se it re ta in s a m arg in o f in d e t e r m in a c y th ro u g h w h ich it can k e e p

re ce iv in g in fo rm a t io n w i t h o u t b e c o m in g an e n t i r e ly d i f fe r e n t e n t i ty . By

c o n tra s t , a less te ch n ica l , perhap s n o n - l iv in g , o b je c t such as a r o c k te n d s to

i rrevers ib ly a b so rb o r u n d e rg o d e te r m in a t io n b e ca u se it lacks th e suspension

or te m p o r a l local izat ion of in d e t e r m in a c y possessed by a m a ch in e .

4 . T h e te r m ‘ l i fe ’ , especial ly in assoc ia t ion w ith ‘t e c h n o l o g y ’ , is c u r r e n t ly

heavily ov e r lo a d e d . M a k in g use of th e t e r m w i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e to its c o m p le x

2 6

I N T R O D U C T I O N

b io p o l it ica l d im e n s io n s is riskv. S i m o n d o n ’ s w o r k d o c s not at k n o w le d g e this

s i tu ation to any yrea t d e g r e e . H o w e v e r , his t ran s d u ctiv e approach rem ain s

s ign il ican t. L i t e ’ s transd u ctiv i tv is m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d , and less l inear, than the

n o n - l iv in g phvsical individuation ol a crysta l . It is m o r e d i l le r en t ia ted than

th e t r an sd u c tio n s staged in te ch n ica l e n s e m b le s s in ce it enta ils g r o w th ,

re p r o d u c t io n and usually death . N e v e r th e le s s , th e n o t io n ol transduction

destabil izes th e h ie rarch y w h ich assigns in o rg an ic e n ti t ie s to a lo w e r runij,

b e n e a t h o rg a n ism s . The living d o e s n o t c o m e after th e n on - l iv in g , but Jurimj it. F r o m th e s tan d p o in t o f t i m e , th e living can b e seen as a suspension ot the

p r o c e s s e s ot ind iv idu ation that o c c u r in non-livins> e n s e m b le s . S im o n d o n

w r i te s that ‘ vital ind ividu ation w o u ld c o m e t o t i l le r in to physical individuation

bv su spen din g its c o u r s e , bv s lo w in g it d o w n , and by r e n d e r in g it capable ot

prop ag ation in an in c ep t iv e s t a t e ’ ( 1 9 8 9 b , ISO ) . T h e co n tra s t b e t w e e n living

and n on- l iv ing e m e r g e s th ro u g h th e delays, o r d e sy n ch ro n iz in g p ro cesses that

living e n s e m b le s unleash in th e m se lv e s .

27

T

C H A P T E R 1

Radical contingency and the

materializations o f technology

C a n t h e r e b e a t h e o r y o f ‘c o n t i n g e n c y ’ th a t is n o t c o m ­

p e l le d t o r e f u s e o r c o v e r o v e r th a t w h ic h it s e e k s to

e x p la in ?

Butler, 199 3

C an te ch n o lo g ic a l p ro ce sse s th e m se lv e s lie seen as a so u rc e o f c o n t in ­

g e n c y , ra th e r than as s o m e th in g that co v e rs o v e r , l imits o r neutralizes

it? M ich e l Fo u ca u lt in his essay ‘W h a t is E n l ig h te n m e n t? ’ asked: ‘ in

w h a t is g iven to us as un iversal, n ecessa ry , o b l ig a to r y , w hat place is

o ccu p ie d by w h a te v e r is singular, con tin gen t, and the p ro d u c t ot

a rb i tra ry c o n s tra in ts ? ’ ( 1 9 8 4 , 4 5 ) . T h is ch a p te r d raw s o n tw o stream s

o f r e c e n t th o u g h t to s te e r that q u e s t io n to w a rd s e n g a g e m e n t with

te c h n o lo g y : th e o r ie s ot c o r p o r e a l i ty d ev e lo p e d by Judith B u t le r ( 1 9 9 3 ) ,

E lizabeth G r o sz ( 1 9 9 4 ) and o th e rs , and the e x te n d e d c r it iq u e of

h y lo m o r p h ic un ders tand ings o f m a t te r found in the w o r k o f G i lb ert

S im o n d o n . T h e s e t w o s tre a m s r e fe r the cr it ica l q u e s t io n fo rm u la ted by

F o u ca u lt to th e c o n t in g e n c ie s of living bo d ies in th e ir cou p lin g with

te ch n o lo g ie s . S o m e fe m in is t th e o r ie s o f c o r p o re a l i ty such as B u t le r ’s

and G r o s z ’s ta ke F o u c a u l t ’s cr it ica l q u e s t io n and unravel its im p lica ­

t ions fo r universals such as g e n d e r and ra ce associated w ith human

su b je c ts and c o l le c t iv e s . T h e s e universals are given as natural , b io lo ­

gica l, ins t in c t iv e , g e n e t ic o r h e re d ita r y , and the lives ot hum an subjects

and co l le c t iv e s are seen as o b lig ed to b e a r th e ir im p r in t in different

w ays. A cc o rd in g to these th e o r ie s o f c o r p o re a l i ty , a re co n s id e ra t io n ot

the c o n c e p t o f m a t te r cou ld a l low the co n t in g e n c ie s ot living m a tter

to e m e r g e and c o n t e s t the necess ity and universality of that obligation.

29

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

f r o m a quite d if ferent ang le , S im o n d o n ’s f ine-grained a c co u n t o f the

processes ol individuation c o m p le m e n t s b ody th e o ry by sh o w in g how

con cep tu a lly o p p osed te rm s such as fo rm and m a t t e r , l iving and n o n ­

living, hum an and technica l can b e seen as a b s tra c t husks o f the

transd uctive in tera c tio n s fro m w hich they d er iv e .J

If w e want a l ternatives to a te ch n o lo g ica l d e te r m in is m w h ich , in

o n e fo rm o r a n o th e r , and u n d e r o n e n a m e o r a n o th e r (e f f ic ien cy ,

p rofitabil ity , national e c o n o m i c c o m p e t i t iv e n e s s , e t c . ) is ‘given to us

as universal, n e c e ss a ry ’ , t w o p ro b le m s arise. T h e first is to understand

how te ch n o lo g y is in tact g iven to us in this particu larly h e g e m o n ic

way. I he seco n d p ro b le m is to th ink h o w it cou ld b e u n d e rs to o d as

singular and c o n t in g e n t . O n this sec o n d to p ic , I will c o n s id e r what

could be learnt fro m the th e o r ie s o f radical c o n t in g e n c y discussed in

c o r p o re a l th e o ry . W ith in cer ta in trad it ions o f h u m anis t th o u g h t , and

cer ta in strands of pop u lar c u l tu re , m o d e rn te c h n o lo g y , esp ec ia lly in its

in form atic d im e n sio n s , o f te n figures (cu l tu ra l ly , p o lit ica lly , e c o n o m i c ­

ally) as a fo rc e of h o m o g e n iz a t io n , d is loca ting and ab s tra ct in g p ro p e r

s ingularities . C u ltu ra l d if fe re n c e s , in th e ir c th n o -g e o g r a p h ic s itu ation ,

are o ften seen as irrev ers ib ly chang ed by te ch n o lo g ic a l n e tw o r k s o f

c o m m u n ic a t io n and tra n s p o rt ; g e n e t ic m o d if ica t io n and b io te c h n o lo g y

is seen to re co n fig u re universals assoc iated w ith b io logical hered ity .

C o m p u te rs , in fo rm a tio n and m o d e rn c o m m u n ic a t io n s m ed ia have b e e n

f req u en tly re p res e n te d as neu tra liz ing h istorical s ingularit ies in the

n am e of a m o r e universal n o r m : the functional e ff icacy o f te c h n o lo g y

o r , m o r e specif ica lly , in form ation . W h i le I will n o t b e e x a m in in g

specific re p rese n ta t io n s in any detail h e r e , th ey are s ca t te r e d th r o u g h ­

o u t m u ch sc ie n c c - f ic t io n and f i lm , th ey ab o u n d ed o v e r th e 1 9 9 0 s in

talk ol in fo rm a tio n superh ighw ays, and th ey c o n t in u e to o p e r a te in

public d eb a tes a b o u t tech n o lo g ica l chang e. A cross all th e se d if fe rent

d om ains, the focus of this c h a p te r is the w ays in w hich te ch n o lo g iz a t io n

can be seen as co n t in g e n t .

T h e apparent necess ity ol t c ch n o lo g iz a t io n b egins to w a v e r as soon

as w e art icu la te the s ituation of any te c h n o lo g y in deta i l . V ie w in g

tech n o log y as a h o m o g e n iz in g fo rc e is an e x t r e m e ly h o m o g e n iz in g

rep resen ta t ion of te ch n o lo g y . T h e o r ie s of c o r p o r e a l i ty can help to

re w o rk this h o m o g e n iz in g necess ity at a th e o re t ic a l level . T h in k in g

through te ch n o lo g y in assoc iation w ith th e radical c o n t in g e n c ie s o f

3°

R A D I C A L C O N T I N G E N C Y A N D T E C H N O L O G Y

e m b o d im e n t m ig h t e n ab le a d if ferent a rt icu la tion o f technolog ical

m e d ia tio n . T h e p o w e rfu l phanta.smatic allure o f d ise m b o d im e n t o r re-

e m b o d im e n t associated w ith in lo r m a t ics and b io te c h n o lo g y in recen t

d ecad es can b e seen as o n e fetishized g l im p se o f the need tor such a

d if fe re n t ar t icu la tio n of te c h n o lo g ie s and living bodies . Crucial /ones

of in d e te r m in a cy , in c o m m e n s u ra b il i ty and d if fe re n ce s lie along the

to p o lo g ica l ly and te m p o ra l ly fo lded b o u n d ar ies b e tw e e n living bodies

and the no n -l iv in g organ ized m a t t e r w e call ‘ t e c h n o lo g y ’ . W h a t I am

asking h ere is: h o w can w e th ink a b o u t the radical co n t in g e n cy o r

finitude o f e m b o d ie d q ua s i -su b je c ts togeth er with th e ir materialized

q u a s i -o b jec ts , te ch n o lo g ie s?

T E C H N O L O G Y A B S O R B S E V E N T S

T h is p r o b le m ot how' m o d e rn te ch n o lo g y is g iven to us has to be posed

against a b a c k g ro u n d m e ta -n a r ra t iv e . J . - F . Lyotard w r o te that

‘m o d e r n i ty is . . . a way of shaping a seq u e n c e of m o m e n ts in such a

way that it a c ce p ts a high ra te of c o n t in g e n c y ’ ( 1 9 9 1 , 6 8 ) . ' F r o m this

p e rs p e c t iv e , c o n te m p o r a r y te ch n o lo g ica l system s bu ffer and absorb

h igh er rates of e v en ts . E n s e m b le s o f bo dies , th ings, insti tu tions , images

and fo rce s are s u b je c t to p ro g ra m m in g , in an a t te m p t to re n d e r them

ca lcu la b le , p re d ic ta b le and tra c ta b le . M ass m ed ia , t e le c o m m u n ic a t io n s ,

w e a p o n r y , g e n et ic a l ly m od ified ( G M ) food and d rug synthesis are the

sp in -offs o f a p ro c e ss that a c ce le ra te s e v en ts , as so m anv tw e n t ie th -

c e n tu ry w ri te rs have d e s c r ib e d , by aggregating masses and groups o f

living and non -l iv in g bo dies in p ro g r a m m e d , re p e a ta b le seq u ences .

A cc o r d in g to the m e ta -n a r ra t iv e , this p ro g r a m m in g neutra lizes d if fe r ­

e n c e s and s ingularit ies , and a l low s th e m to be m eta b o l iz e d at a g r e a te r

ra te . Such p r o g r a m m in g even thrives on u n ce rta in ty and u n p re d ic ta b il ­

ity as so m e th in g to profit f ro m .

B ehind L y o ta rd ’s sop hist icated fo rm u la t io n lies an im p o rta n t point.

I m p o r ta n t e le m e n ts o f W e s t e r n th o u g h t , w ell re p res e n te d in the

h is to ry o f p hilosophy, have long ju dged tech nica l p ract ices as derivative

c o m p a re d to th o u g h t , re a s o n , su b jec tiv ity o r substance . W e l l before

te ch n o lo g ic a l m o d e rn i ty , te ch n ica l p ra c t ices w e r e regarded as placing

life, th o u gh t , ideas and sub je c tiv ity in to risky p ro x im ity with the

acciden ta l c o n t in g e n c ie s o t lifeless m a t te r . In classical metaphysical

3 1

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

te r m s , unless lifeless m a t te r hears the g o v e rn in g im p r in t o f living

tho u ght, ra n d o m n e ss , chaos and e x t e r io r i t y afflicts th e social-

m etaphysical o rd e r . This is c lear ly a sev e re o v ers im p li f ica t ion of d iverse

co n ce p ts o f life , m a t te r , b ody and th o u g h t lying b eh ind c o n te m p o r a r y

te ch n o sc ie n t if ic th o u gh t , hut fo r the p u rp o ses o f th e m o d e r n m e ta -

narrative , te ch n o lo g y o r ‘the t e c h n ic a l ’ c a n n o t in p r in c ip le be the

s o u rce o f anything radically n e w . T e c h n o lo g ic a l in v en tio n m ay re f le c t

hu m an ingenuity , but its n o v e lty and s ingularity is seco n d a ry in re la t io n

to the p ro p e r ly hum an capacit ies such as living reason w hich c o n c e iv e

it , shape it and regulate its e x i s t e n c e . T h e te ch n ica l su p p o rts o r

su p p le m e n ts hu m an life, b u t w o u ld n e v e r c o n st i tu t io n a l ly a f fe c t w ho

o r w hat the hu m an is. ( I t should g o w ith o u t saying that this p o s it io n is

u n te n a b le , and that a t ran sd u ct iv e un d ers tan d in g o f the te ch n ica l w o u ld

begin by reg arding this sep aration b e t w e e n h u m a n and the te ch n ica l as

the w r o n g s tart in g point . S til l , w e n eed to a c c o u n t fo r th e te n a c ity of

this way o f v iew ing te c h n o lo g y . )

C o n te m p o r a r y te ch n o lo g y c o n t in u e s t o a c c e n tu a te this t h e m e o f an

a cce le ra t in g ab sorp t io n o f e v en ts . T h e a c c e le ra t io n , as L y o ta r d ’s

a c co u n t , a long w ith m o s t t w e n t ie t h - c e n tu r y c r it ica l th e o r ie s of t e c h ­

nology sh o w , is o f ten f igured as c a ta s tro p h ic . W h i le th e c a ta s tro p h e is

usually figured as ten d in g to w a rd s a g r e a te r and g r e a te r loss of h u m a n

c o n tr o l (see b e e n b e rg , 1 9 9 1 , fo r a b ro ad a c c o u n t of c r i t ica l th e o r ie s of

t e c h n o lo g y ) , Lyotard f igured this loss h y p erb o l ica lly in t e r m s of an end

to the co n d it io n s un d er w hich living h u m ans b o d ie s can surv ive , that

is, the th e r m o d y n a m ic heat d eath o f th e sun. L y o ta r d ’ s a p p ro a ch aside,

th e re is also a w idesp read p e rc e p t io n and ev en g lee fu l o p t im is m that

the end o f the hum an as w e k n o w it is associated w ith t e c h n o lo g y . In

this batt le for p rim acy b e t w e e n hu m ans and t e c h n o lo g y , n o th in g is

really at stake becau se b o th sides a c c e p t that th e logic ot t e ch n o lo g ic a l

ev o lu t io n is calcu lab le and law ful. F o r b o th hu m a n ism and a t e c h n o ­

logically d e te rm in is t p o s th u m a n ism , n o th in g n e w e v en tu a te s th ro u gh

te ch n o lo g y becau se its d e v e lo p m e n t is logical and p re d ic ta b le . In

c o n se q u e n c e , th e resp o nse that has d o m in a te d m u ch m o d e rn cr it ica l

thought starts fro m the p os it ion that te c h n o lo g y p art icu lar ly th re a te n s

the passage of t im e by re n d e r in g it su sce p tib le to c a lcu la t io n and

p red ict ion (see C h a p te r 4 ) . As L y o ta rd , fo r in s ta n ce , e xp la in s in his

essay ‘ l i m e T o d a y ' , the te ch n o lo g ic a l p r o c e s s in g o f c o n t in g e n c y

i 2

R A D I C A L C O N T I N G E N C Y A N D T E C H N O L O G Y

neu tra lizes in d e te rm in a cy in the p re s e n t bv p ro g ra m m in g w hat will

hap p en in the fu tu re . It see m s that fo r cr it ica l th e o ry the inevitable

logic ol te ch n o lo g ic a l d e v e lo p m e n t , as w ell as the ca lcu la b le , regular

fu n ct io n in g of t e c h n o lo g y , fo re c lo s e s the fu tu re . O n ly the superficial

n o v e lty o f new' gadgets re m a in s . T h e p re se n t is con stra in e d because

the fu tu re has b e e n at least partly shaped in advance thro u gh in fo rm atic

m o d e ll in g and organizational p r o g r a m m in g of ac t ions and events.

T e c h n o lo g y th re a te n s life and th o u gh t bv w re n ch in g it away fro m self-

p r e s e n t e x p e r ie n c e and ex te rn a liz in g it in a l ifeless o r passive plav o f

patterns .

In resp o n se to this th re a t , t h e re is very o fte n a nosta lg ic ten d en cy

t o im agine th a t in a n o th e r t im e and p lace , ev en ts w ould not be su b je c t

t o c a p tu re , and s ingularities and d if fe re n ce s w o uld n o t be ab sorb ed bv

te ch n ica l m e d ia tio n s . T h is p lace has usually b e e n loca ted s o m e w h e re

b e y o n d te ch n o lo g y , in insti tutions and living trad it ions w hich preserv e

values, m ean in gs and s y m b o lic in te ra c tio n s u n co n ta m in a te d by the

m ateria l p ro ce sse s o f tech n ica l a c t io n . In E u ro p e a n philosophy, c o n t in ­

g e n cy has b e e n lo ca te d in so u rce s d ee p w ith in the su b je c t (K a n t ) , in

th e h is torical d ynam ics o f in te rsu b je c tiv ity and co l le c t iv ity ( H e g e l ) , o r

in the r e m e m b e r i n g o f b e in g (H e id e g g e r ) . In re c e n t philosophy, the

m an ifes ta t io ns o f this ju d g e m e n t have b e e n divided. O n the o n e hand,

t h e r e has b e e n an a t t e m p t t o sep arate the d ead , passive rationality

associated w ith te c h n o lo g y fr o m a n o n -a l ie n a tcd , living reason ( M a r ­

c u s e , H a b e rm a s , ct a l . ) . H a b e r m a s ’ sep aration b e t w e e n ins tru m en ta l-

tech n ica l reaso n and social o r c o m m u n ic a t iv e reason accep ts this

s tart in g p o in t (H a b e rm a s , 1 9 8 7 ) . O n th e o th e r hand, H eid egg er

resp ond s by d ev e lo p in g a n o n -r a t io n a l , n o n -o b je c t i fv in g o r n o n ­

m etaphysica l th o u g h t o f w hat e x is ts , a way ot th ink in g that does not

seek t o p lace te ch n o lo g ic a l reaso n u n d e r the c o n tr o l o f a m o r e p ro p e r

re a so n , but to d isplace the p r im a cy o f reason a l to g e th e r .

D e s p ite d ee p d if fe re n c e s , the p os it ion of te ch n o lo g y itself rem ains

the sam e: t h e r e is n o th in g radically c o n t in g e n t about tech n o log y .

W h e t h e r seen as a ju g g e rn a u t o f p ro g ress , as the incarnation of

d eh u m anized re a so n , o r as th e end o f m etap h ysics , te ch n o lo g y itselt

(w h a te v e r that m igh t b e ) re m a in s in e rt o r passive. H e id e g g e r ’s famous

s ta te m e n t in his essay ‘T h e Q u e s t io n C o n c e r n in g T e c h n o lo g y ’ that ‘the

esse n ce o f te ch n o lo g y is n o th in g te c h n ic a l ’ ( 1 9 7 7 , 1 5 ) seem s to repeat

ii

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

this same sep aration . In any ease , m o s t philosop h y assum es that a

h ierarchica l sep aration b e t w e e n te ch n o lo g ic a l and n o n -te c h n o lo g ica l

c o n t in g e n c y is, in p r in c ip le , possib le . T e c h n o lo g y , in its association

w ith the senseless co n t in g e n c ie s o f m a t t e r , has b e e n pushed o u tw a rd s

and away Iro m the e lev ated in te r io r spaces p r o p e r to life and m ean in g .

In philosophy at large, re a so n , th o u g h t and ind eed life are still seen to

be m o r e p ro p e r to hu m anity than te ch n o lo g y .

L O C A T I O N , D I F F E R E N C E S A N D T E C H N O L O G Y

C an w e grasp te ch n o lo g ie s , in th e ir very m a te r ia l i ty and c o n t in g e n c y ,

as s o m e th in g o th e r than neu tra l in s tru m en ts o f hu m an p ro g re ss o r

im p lacab le co lo n iz ers that e x p lo i t and m a s te r th o se ch a ra c ter is t ic s that

are m o s t p ro p e r ly hu m an ?2 C an w e a p p ro a ch te c h n o lo g y as lo ca t in g

and d if fe rent ia t ing in its o w n way? R e c e n t a t te m p ts by fe m in is t

p hilosop hers to re th in k w hat is at s take in sexually d if feren t ia ted

e m b o d im e n t o f fe r a s tart in g p o in t . A lth ou gh t e c h n o lo g y d o es n o t

always appear at the c e n tr e o f th e o re t ic a l d iscussions of e m b o d im e n t

and m a ter ia l ity , these th e o r is ts have a s im ilar c o n c e r n w ith th e ten s io n

b e tw e e n co n t in g e n c y and nece ss ity , s ingularity and un iversa li ty , and

b e tw e e n m a t te r and fo rm . ( F e m in is t and cu ltura l studies o f s c ie n ce

and te ch n o lo g y have in r e c e n t years taken s o m e o f th e se th e o re t ica l

insights in to detailed h istor ica l and cu ltu ra l studies of s c ie n c e and

te ch n o lo g y . D o n n a H a ra w a y ’s w o rk w o u ld perhaps re p r e s e n t th e m o s t

p ow erfu l and sustained ins tan ce : s ec H araw ay 1 9 9 7 ; B a lsa m o , 1 9 9 6 ;

P lant, 1 9 9 7 . H a ra w a y ’ s w o r k will b e discussed in C h a p te r 6 . ) T h e

p ro b le m w hich lies at the h ea rt o f these th e o r ie s is p rec ise ly h o w to

map co n t in g e n t d if fe re n ce s and loca tions in the c o n s t i tu t io n o f s u b je c t ­

ivity w ith o u t e i th e r essentia liz ing th o se d if fe re n c e s o r re d u c in g th e m

to a p reg iven fo rm w ithin cu l tu re . T h e o r is t s such as B u t le r , G ro sz ,

Spivak and G a te n s have d o n e so, as P h e n g C h eagh argues , by shifting

‘ fro m a m o d e l o f in d ep en d e n t sub je c tiv ity to an a t t e m p t to t ra c k the

con sti tu tiv e m ired n ess o f a u to n o m o u s sub je c tiv ity in th e alw ays-a lready

o cc u r r in g m o m e n t u m of a c ro ss -h a tc h in g of h e t e r o - d e t e r m i n a t io n s ’

( 1 9 9 6 , 1 2 4 ) . T h e y seek to ar t icu la te th e c o n t in g e n c ie s and lo ca t io n o f

sub jec tiv ity , w ith o u t g ro u n d in g t h e m in universals o f n a tu r e , reaso n o r

cu l tu re , by fo llo w ing th e ir p ro p ag atio n acro ss in te rfa ces o r sites of

54

R A D I C A L C O N T I N G E N C Y A N D T E C H N O L O G Y

d ifferen t ia t ion w h e re d if fe re n c e s and in d ete rm in a c ie s e lude solidifica­

t ion and s tabil ization. T h e t r o u b le s o m e ca teg o ry of co rp o re a l i ty and

m ateria l ity a l low s th e m to ask: d oes the apparently m eaningless

n eu tra li ty o f m a t t e r already h a rb o u r u n sp o k en o r sed im e n te d d if fe re n ­

tia t ions? Is m a t t e r , in its very ap p earan ce as m alle a b le , p lastic , fluid,

volati le o r solid , a lready a sed im e n te d re s e rv o ir o f h is torical d e t e r m i ­

nations? Such th e o r ie s m o v e , in sh o r t , f ro m co n t in g e n c y un d e rs to o d as

s o m e th in g in transit ive to c o n t in g e n c y un d e rs to o d as b o rd e r in g , t o u c h ­

ing and c o n ta m in a t in g a r t icu la tio n o f d iverse realit ies w ith each o ther .

C o rp o r e a l m ater ia l ity thus appears n o t as a su b s ta n ce , but as a p r e ­

e m in e n t ly transductive field in w hich psychica l , physical, technica l and

a ffect iv e realit ies p re c ip ita te .

R A D I C A L C O N T I N G E N C Y A N D S I G N I F Y I N G P R O C E S S E S

F e m in is t w o r k on c o r p o re a l i ty has un fo ld ed against a shared b a c k ­

gro u n d ot soc ia l , s e m io t ic and political th e o ry that has approached

qu est io n s of s u b je c t c o n s tr u c t io n in te rm s ot the s t ru c tu re ot the

linguistic sign. Radical c o n t in g e n c y figures largely in t e r m s o f p r o d u c t ­

ive b re a k d o w n s in s ignifying p ro ce sse s . W ith in p o s ts tru ctu ra l ism ,

radical co n t in g e n c y is n o t ju s t an h istorical o r em p ir ica l acc id en t ,

w h e r e in , for in s ta n ce , c er ta in social fo rm a tio n s u n d erg o in g secu lariza­

t ion a c co rd in g to t e c h n o e c o n o m ic im p erat iv es lose all traditional

foundations o r values. In th e fo rm o f b re a k d o w n s o r con sti tu tiv e

failures in signifying p ro c e ss e s , radical c o n t in g e n c y inhabits the foun da­

tions of social fo rm a tio n s . F o r m any p o ststru ctu ra l is t th e o r ie s , c o n t in ­

gen cy e m e r g e s f r o m the v ery Hnitude of s o c io sv m b o l ic o r linguistic

p ro c e ss e s , o r at the lim its o f d is co u rs e , w h e r e signifying p ro cesses

break d o w n . ( E r n e s to L a c la u ’s ( 1 9 9 5 , 1 9 9 6 ) th eo ry o f the em p ty

signifier w o uld b e o n e re levan t specif ic e x a m p le : the p rocess of

signifying the l im its o f a social o r polit ica l to ta li ty sets in m o t io n chains

ot signifiers w hich can n e v e r stand still becau se thev respond to an

im p ossib le in ju n c t io n t o signify the a b sen ce o f any founding u n ity .)

An em phasis on b re a k d o w n s in signification is b o th suggestive and

lim iting in re la t io n to tech n ica l m ed ia tio n s . It usefully suggests that

con t in g en cy need n o t alwavs b e defined in te r m s o f agency located in

e ith er su b jec ts o r in a s t ru c tu re that i tse l f acts as an agent. A system

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

ot m arks can ge n er a te d y n a m ics , o rd e r in g s , l im its and c e n tr in g c t fc c ts

in the a b sen ce o f anv preg iv en g ro u n d o r un ity . W h e n such a system

e n c o u n te rs its o w n lim its , t ra n scen d e n ta l o r e m p ty signifiers p r o l i f e r ­

ate . T h e signifier ‘t e c h n o lo g y ’ , with all its assoc ia ted affects , can be

seen as o n e such l im it t e r m for c o n te m p o r a r y W e s t e r n c o l le c t iv e s . It

re fers to no single signified o r s e m io t ic su b s ta n ce . It w o u ld b e possib le

to m ap out ho w shifts in the signification o f the t e r m ‘t e c h n o l o g y ’

o v e r the last few c en tu r ie s have a l lo w ed it to fu n ct io n as an e m p ty

s ignifier in re lat ion t o c er ta in political and e c o n o m i c fo rm a tio n s .

H o w e v e r , the em phasis on signification and its b re a k d o w n s as the

sole locus o f c o n t in g e n c y usually s tops sh o rt of q u e s t io n in g the

m ateria l ity and te m p o ra l i ty o f te ch n ica l ac ts , o r it v iew s t h e m as

always subord in ate t o the e f fec ts o f s ignification o r the s t r u c tu r e of the

'ksign. T o b r in g c o n te m p o r a r y te c h n o lo g y in to fo cu s , t o b eg in to

art icu la te the ten s io n b e t w e e n te c h n o lo g y as h o m o g e n iz a t io n and

te ch n o lo g y as s ingularity, the ‘l inguistic id e a l is m ’ o f m u ch w o r k in the

hu m anities need s to be re fo cu sed in t e r m s o f m a t t e r and t im e .

M A T E R I A L I T Y , E M B O D I M E N T A N D T E C H N I C I T Y

A nti-essen tia l is t fem in ist th e o ry such as th a t o f Ju d ith B u t le r and

E lizabeth G r o sz has ta k e n such a step by suggesting th a t c o r p o rc a l

d if feren ces t r o u b le su b jec tiv ity w ith radical c o n t in g e n c ie s and s in gular­

ities (B u t le r , 1 9 9 3 ; G ro sz , 1 9 9 4 ) . B odies are m o r e than an acciden ta l

co n t in g e n c y a ffect ing su b jec tiv ity . T h e y have sou gh t to lo ca te radical

in d ete rm in a cy and co n t in g e n c y in e m b o d im e n t , and specifically in the

m ateria lity o f living b o d ies , ra th e r than solely at the level of c u l tu re ,

language o r socially c o n s tr u c te d significations. Ju d ith B u t l e r ’s c o m p l e x

a c co u n t in B odies That M atter ind icates h o w the m etap h ysica l o rd e r in g

w hich posit ions c o n t in g e n c y , m a t t e r and bo d ies as th e lesser t e r m s o f

necess ity , fo r m , reason and language m ig h t b e re c o n f ig u red .

B u t le r c la im s that discursive practices ‘m a te r ia l iz e ’ and ‘d c m a te r ia l iz e ’

sexually d if ferentia ted bo d ies . ‘M a t t e r ’ , and specif ica lly th e m a t t e r o f

living b o d ies , is h e r nam e fo r a p ro d u c t o f p o w e r , in d eed , fo r p o w e r ’s

m o st p ro d uct ive e f fe c t : m a t t e r fo r B u t le r is not s im p ly surface a n d / o r

site on w hich social p ro ce sse s in scr ib e th e m se lv e s , b u t th e p r o d u c t o f

a m aterializ ing p ro cess w hich ‘stabilizes o v e r t im e to p ro d u c e the

R A D I C A L C O N T I N G E N C Y A N D T E C H N O L O G Y

e f fe c t o f b o u n d a ry , fixity and surface w e call m a t t e r ’ ( 1 9 9 3 , 9 ) . In a

d if fe re n t fo rm u la t io n , B u t le r calls m a t te r ‘the s ed im e n tin g effect of a

r e g u la ted i te r a b i l i ty ’ ( 2 5 2 ) . B u t le r shifts the stress fro m m a t te r as inert

g ro u n d to m a t te r as an o n g o in g and variable e f fe c t , suspended in a

w e b of in ter la c in g p ro c e ss e s w h o se general d ynam ics can only be

u n d e rs to o d in t e r m s of i te r a t io n , c ita t io n and p e rfo rm ativ ity .

H ow can m a t t e r b e a p r o d u c t ol p o w e r , stabilizing as corp o rea l

surfaces and boun daries? In c o n tra s t t o the m o r e fam iliar notions of

g e n d e r as a social c o n s t r u c t io n , c o d in g o r in scr ip t io n found thro u gh ou t

the hu m an s c ie n c es , B u t le r is s tro ngly a t ten t iv e to the lim its of

d iscurs ive c o n s t r u c t io n in g e n era l . H e r ap p roach m o v e s away from

e i th e r (a) assum ing, a lo ng w ith h u m a n ism , p reg iven su b je c t positions

w h ich w o u ld e m p lo y th e m se lv e s in m a k in g -o v e r natural bodies into

cu ltu ra l ly s ignificant e n t i t ie s ; o r (b ) assum ing im p erso nal s tru ctu res

such as ‘d is c o u rs e ’ , ‘p o w e r ’ o r ‘c u l t u r e ’ w hich w o uld act as agents in

c o n s tr u c t in g h u m an su b je c ts .

B u t l e r ’s n o t io n ot m a te r ia l iz a t io n as p ro d u c t iv e ol m a t te r takes a

d if fe re n t and unavoidably m o r e c o m p l ic a te d path to w a rd s the lim its o f

signifying p ro c e ss e s . T h e solidity o f s t r u c tu r e , fo rm and sign need to

be a u g m e n te d by re f le c t io n on th e ir highly provisional ground ing .

B u t l e r ’s a c co u n t o f m a te r ia l iz a t io n , s tanding at a singular co n f lu e n ce o f

th e th o u g h t of L u ce Irigaray, M ich e l Fo u cau lt and Jacq u es D e rr id a ,

sh o w s h o w an ap p aren tly passive m a t te r o r natural m ateria l ity is i tse lf

fab rica ted in the heart of a m a ter ia l-so c ia l p ro cess o f re p e t i t io n and

c i ta t io n . W h i le this p ro c e ss alw ays involves language and p o w e r , it is

n o t ju s t that. T h a t is, instead o f e i th e r leaving m a t te r outs id e the scop e

of social c o n s t r u c t io n , o r inc lu ding it w ith in th e social as an o th er

socially c o n s t r u c te d a r te fa c t , B u t le r argues that m a t te r , as an e n se m b le

o f e f fe c ts such as f ix ity , bo un d ary and su rface , is in e x tr ic a b ly boun d up

w ith th e d e te r m in a t io n of the lim its and b oun daries b e tw e e n the social

o r ‘h u m a n ’ , the natural o r ‘n o n - h u m a n ’ , the c o n s t r u c te d and ‘u n ­

c o n s t r u c te d ’ and th e living and the no n-l iv ing . T h e insignificant or

e v e n senseless c o n t in g e n c y associated w ith m a t t e r co n ce a ls the h is to r ­

ically insti tu ted so u rce s ot radical c o n t in g e n c y that reside w ithin the

p ro ce sse s o f m a te r ia l iz a t io n , w ith in p ro c e ss e s that ten d t o stabilize

w h at co u n ts as m a t te r and w hat d oes n o t . !

In o n e o t h e r m o s t im p o r ta n t a rg u m e n ts , B u t le r suggests that the

3 7

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

effects of fixity o r i rred ucib i l ity associated w ith m a t te r m igh t s tem

fro m a d iscursive p ra c t ice w h ich c a n n o t show itself as such w ith o u t

destabilizing itself and its p ro d u c ts : ‘ If it can be sho w n that in its

con st i tu t iv e history this “i r re d u c ib le ” m a te r ia l i ty is c o n s t r u c te d thro u gh

a p r o b le m a t ic g e n d e re d m a tr ix , then th e d iscursive p r a c t ice by w hich

m a tte r is r e n d e re d irre d u c ib le s im u ltaneo u sly o n to lo g iz es and fixes that

g e n d e re d m a tr ix in its p la c e ’ (p. 2 9 ) .

H e r main in te re s t h e re c o n c e r n s how w e should un d ers tand the

e n d e m ic p e rs is te n ce ol g e n d e r c a te g o r ie s . H e r re sp o n se is t o say that

w e can only understand th e ir p e rs is te n c e i f w e ta ke in to a c c o u n t ho w

the foundational te r m m a t te r bears w ith in itself a b are ly le g ib le ,

en c ry p te d version ol those ca teg o r ies w hich serves to ‘o n t o lo g iz e ’

g e n d e r c a teg o r ies that m igh t o th e rw is e display a g r e a t deal m o r e

h e te r o g e n e i ty . Instead ot a c ce p t in g the i r red u c ib i l ity o f m a t te r as the

g round of hum an su b jec tiv ity , o r s tr ic t ly sep aratin g m a t t e r f ro m the

p ro p er ly h u m a n , B u tler d el ica te ly p os it ions m a t t e r as the c o n v o lu te d

bo un dar ies and pleated surfaces h is tor ica lly fo rm e d by p ro c e ss e s of

m ateria l ization and d em a te r ia l iz a t io n g o v e r n e d by reg u la tory

n o rm s . M o r e o v e r , ra th e r than s im ply arguing fo r the inc lu sion o f

w h a te v e r d if fe ren ces have b e e n fo rce fu l ly e x c lu d e d by re g u la to ry

n o rm s , the polit ical task im p lied by this c o n c e p t o f m a ter ia l iz a t io n will

be ‘th e p re se rv a t io n ot the o u ts id e , th e site w h e r e d isco u rse m e e ts its

l im its , w h e re the opacity o f w h at is n o t inc lu ded in a g iven re g im e of

tru th acts as a d isruptive site o f linguistic im p ro p r ie ty and u n r e p re s e n t -

ab i l i ty ’ (p. 5 3).

F r o m this p e rs p e c t iv e , the b o u n d a r ie s and surfaces o f w h a t co u n ts

as m a t te r are n e i th e r p reg iven (as, fo r e x a m p le , h u m a n b io lo g y ) , n o r

irre levan t (as, fo r e x a m p le , the passive su b stra te o f cu l tu ra l c o n s t r u c ­

t ion s) . T h e y unfold in a d o m ain o r re g is te r w h e r e the d is t in ct io ns

b e tw e e n the social and the n atu ra l , the ideal and the m a te r ia l , are

c on st i tu ted and c o n te s ta b le ; w h e r e reg u la tory n o r m s and ideals c leave

and d ivert d if fe re n t possible m a ter ia l iz a t io n s , e v en as th ey re ly o n that

very d iversity o f m ateria l iz ing re p e t i t io n s t o m ainta in th e ir o w n

regulatory fo rc e . By c o u n t in g as m a t te r , an e n c o d e d h is tory of sexual

and racial d if fe re n c e s rem ain s h id den . Y e t the very f ixity and r e c e p t iv ­

ity of m a t te r also asks a q u e s t io n : ‘ How' is it that th e p re s u m p tio n of a

given version of m a t te r in the e f fo r t to d e s c r ib e the m a te r ia l i ty of

i*

R A D I C A L C O N T I N G E N C Y A N D T E C H N O L O G Y

bo dies prefigures in advance w hat will and will not appear as an

in te ll ig ib le b o d y ? ’ (54-).

H e r a n sw e r t o this q u e s t io n is c o m p l ic a te d . Ideal n o rm s , such as

h e te r o s e x u a l i ty , w hich co n st i tu te s o n e im p o rta n t fi lter o f intelligibility

fo r b o d ies , fu n ct io n to d issim ulate the fact that they can only persist as

n e ce ssa ry o r natural thro u gh th e ir o w n perform an ce or rep etition . T h e

p o w e r to m a ter ia l iz e b o d ies a c co rd in g to sex ed su b je c t p osit ions w orks

th ro u g h re p e t i t io n and i te ra t io n . N o rm s are not origins o r substances ,

b u t institutions. F u r t h e r m o r e , as B u t le r insists, ‘ re p e t i t io n is not

p e r fo rm e d by a s u b je c t ; this r e p e t i t io n is w hat enables a su b je c t and

co n st i tu te s the te m p o r a l c o n d it io n for the s u b je c t ’ (p. 9 5 ) . If rep et i t io n

is p r im a r y , and the law is n o t an o r ig in , then w hat appears as the

ir re d u c ib le m a t t e r o f b o d ie s , t o b e k n o w n , shaped and g o v e rn e d , is

i t se l f th e re i te ra t io n of a c o n t in g e n t d e l im ita t io n . T h e f ixing, binding,

b o u n d in g of m a t t e r acq u ires an ap p earan ce o f passivity and recep tiv ity

th ro u g h c o rp o re a l re p e t i t io n s and c ita t io n s that rep ea ted ly and per-

fo rm a tiv e ly e x c lu d e anything that d o es n o t c o m p ly w ith the n o rm in

q u e s t io n . In o th e r w o rd s , the m a t te r of bo dies is ins ti tu ted , in all its

ideal a t tr ib u te s fix ity , b o u n d e d n e ss , e tc . In re c y c l in g o r refusing

w h a te v e r d oes n o t c o n f o r m to the ideal n o rm s ( fo r instance , o f

h e te ro s e x u a l i ty ) , m a t t e r solidifies.

T h e c o n se q u e n c e s of this p e r fo rm a t iv e un ders tand ing of m a t te r are

tw o fo ld . O n the o n e hand, an ap p aren tly neutra l l im it o r co n str a in t on

s u b je c t p os it ions the m a t te r ot a s ex e d bodv is show n at least in

g en era l t e rm s to enfo ld d if fe re n c e s , and to be s tabilized through

histor ica lly ins ti tu ted i te ra t io n ra th e r than d escen d e d fro m an origin or

e sse n ce . O n th e o t h e r hand, that w hich re n d e rs necess ity c o n t in g e n t

i te ra t io n - is i t se l f radically c o n t in g e n t b ecau se it is fundam entally

im p ro p e r , lack ing in se l f - id e n t i ty , m u ta b le and in com p a ra b ly g e n e r ­

ative. I te ra tio n c o n fo r m s to n o rm s and ideal fo rm s only because

d iv e rg en t even ts are c o n sta n tly f i l tered o u t . Radical c o n t in g e n c y ,

instead of b e in g lo ca te d only in b re a k d o w n s in s ignifying p rocesses ,

folds b a ck in to m a t t e r th ro u g h the p osit ive and d isruptive potentia lity

a ttr ib u ted to ‘m a t t e r ’ as b o th l im it p o in t and ‘the site of inscriptional

s p a c e ’ in w hich all r e p e t i t io n s and p e r fo rm a n c e s e v en tu a te (p. 5 2 ) . ' •

T h r o u g h its im p r o p e r c ita t io n o r d iv erg en t p e r fo rm a n c e s o f p ro p er

figures, radical c o n t in g e n c y e v en tu a te s as m a tte r . Stabilized through its

39

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

‘ in s cr ip t io n ’ o f m a tte r as site and surface (and esp ec ia lly the sexually

d ifferentiated m o r p h o lo g y o f hu m an e m b o d im e n t ) , radical c o n t in g e n c y

cov ers its s ed im en ted h istory. Its show of stabil ity re q u ire s the

instituted system o f n o rm s and ideals w h ich o v e r t im e i terative ly

m ateria l ize the lim its and b o u n d a r ie s o f b o d ie s ; b u t at th e sam e t im e it

incessantly e x c e e d s those l im its , sh o w in g th a t th e n o r m s and ideals

only ap p ear to be necessary th ro u g h th e ir d iv e rg en t c i ta t io n o r

re p e t i t io n .

I T E R A T I O N P R O S T H E S I S : N O N - L I V I N G M A T T E R

A N D T E C H N I C A L P R O C E S S E S

B u t l e r ’s specific c o n c e r n is t o d isentang le sexual d i f fe re n c e f r o m the

‘sad n e c e ss i t ie s ’ (p . 5 3) o f s ignif ication and g e n d e r , by re th in k in g

m ateria l ity as radical c o n t in g e n c y . O n c e she has sh o w n h o w m a t t e r

i tse lf is a lways enfo ld ed in a h is tory o f m ate r ia l iz a t io n s , any n o r m s and

pro h ib it io n s that rely on the stability and ne u tra l i ty of m a t t e r should

take on a c o n t in g e n t status. T h e y b e c o m e liable t o d is p la ce m e n t o r

reo rg anizat io n thro u gh the im p ro p r ie t ie s g e n e r a te d in c i ta t io n . H e r

a c c o u n t of i terative p erfo rm a tiv i tv c o n s t i tu te s a c o r p o r e a l a n s w e r to

the critical q u est io n posed by Fo u ca u lt . T h a t q u e s t io n asks a b o u t the

place o f co n t in g e n c y and s ingularity in w h a te v e r c o u n ts as un iversal,

necessary and ob l ig a tory . In B u t l e r ’s analysis, w e are g iven m a t t e r as

‘universal, o b l ig a to ry , n e c e s s a r y ’ o n ly th ro u g h th e s ingular and c o n t in ­

g e n t p e r fo rm a n c e s o f living bo d ies in all th e ir d if fe re n ce s .

H o w e v e r , B u t l e r ’s a c c o u n t re m a in s fo cu sed a lm o s t so le ly o n living

bodies. W h a t d oes such an ap p roach to m ate r ia l i ty m e a n in r e la t io n to

technical pro cesses? D o e s it o p e n a way o f th ink in g , e v en by analogy,

about h o w a tech n ica l chang e c o r r e la te s w ith d if fe re n c e s and m u tat io n s

in co rp o re a l i ty ? It th e re has b e e n a te n d e n c y to n e g a te te c h n o lo g y in

philosophical th o u gh t ( fo r e x a m p le , H e id e g g e r ’s ‘the e ss e n c e of t e c h ­

nology is noth ing t e c h n ic a l ’ ) , it is partly b e ca u se te c h n o lo g y has b e e n

regarded as e x te rn a lly m im in g h u m an (and n o n -h u m a n ) a c t io n ; it has

been associated with the c o n v e rs io n o f living in te r io r i ty in to th e f ixed ,

stable and uneventfu l fo rm s o f m a t te r . As organ ized dead o r n o n ­

human living m a t te r , te c h n o lo g y re c e iv e s the im p r in t o f h u m an

subjectiv ity and p e r fo rm s s eq u e n c es o f ac t ions that f low fr o m hum ans .

4 0

R A D I C A L C O N T I N G E N C Y A N D T E C H N O L O G Y

F r o m this s tand p oin t , i f w e m is ta ke te ch n ica l ac t io n for real a c t io n , we

risk re n d e r in g h u m an life passive, and losing the m ean in g o f thought

and ac t io n . T h e te ch n o lo g ic a l th re a te n s life, b o th in thou ght and

a c t io n , by p e r fo rm in g to o m u ch o r to o w ell . G a d g ets , m ach ines and

a u to m a ta are a p r o b le m b e ca u se th ey cop y life. R e c e n t d ebates about

artificial life (a - l ife ) fo r in s tan ce , o sc i l la te b e t w e e n regarding a-life as a

c o m p u t e r s im u la t io n , and a-l ife as a p ro to ty p ica l l i fe fo rm .

F o l lo w in g B u t l e r ’s s tra te g y , w e cou ld m o v e away fro m this v ie w ­

p o in t . L ike the i tera tiv e m ateria l iza t io ns o f living bo dies , tech n o log ie s

p art ic ip ate in m a ter ia l iz in g and d em a te r ia liz in g the l im its , surfaces and

b o r d e r s o f w hat co u n ts as m a t te r at a g iven t im e . C le a r ly , te ch n o lo g ie s

p art ic ip ate in th e ins ti tu ted n o r m s that B u t l e r ’s th e o ry highlights.

H o w e v e r , te ch n o lo g ie s also in tro d u c e instabil it ies in the h ierarchy o f

c o n t in g e n c y , s o m e t im e s t o the p o in t of b e in g m is ta k e n fo r life (as in

th e long h istory o f l ife l ike artif ices and a u to m a ta ) , but m o r e o ften

incon sp icu o u sly reo rg a n iz in g l iving b o d ies by in flec t ing th e ir b o rd e r in g

and synthesis o f g e s tu re and p e r c e p t io n d if fe ren t ly . T h e tech no log ica l

m im in g o f l i fe , in all its ‘l iv e ’ e f fe c ts , its an im atio ns and artificiality,

o cc u r s thro u gh and as re p e t i t io n . F r o m a s tandp oin t that sees it as

m e r e e x te n s io n o r m im e o f the h u m a n , te ch n o lo g y changes noth ing ; it

fo rm a lly rep eats o r su p p le m e n ts hu m an a c t io n , and it organizes neutral

m a t te r .

A ny m e n t io n of n e u tra l i ty , h o w e v e r , should n o w alert us to the

s ed im e n ta t io n o f d if fe re n c e s w hich it co n ce a ls . B u t l e r ’s a c co u n t en jo ins

us to say that neu tra li ty is an e f fe c t p ro d u c e d by m ean s w hich are

n e v e r s im ply n e u tra l . A t a g en era l level , c o rp o re a l m ateria lization

. transp ires thro u gh his tor ica lly ins ti tu ted n o rm a t iv e i tera t io n s . Bv the

sa m e to k e n , and in te n s io n w ith c o r p o re a l i tera t io n s , the tech n o log ica l

e v en tu a te s as an h is tor ica l o rd e r in g and ch an n ell in g o f iterab il ity in

w hich living and no n -l iv in g m a t t e r appears as cap able o f taking on

fo r m , o f b ear ing an im p rin t o r m a rk . I f i tera t io n shores up a c le a r line

b e tw e e n fo rm and m a t t e r , this i tera tion affects n o t only living bodies

but o rganized m a t t e r , b o th living and n o n-l iv ing . I f i tera t io n has no

orig in , it is n o t so le ly (l iv ing) bo d ies that m a t te r , but the body and its

o rig inary su p p le m e n ts . Living re p e t i t io n s , in th e ir d iv e rg en ce , are ►

always to u c h e d by a no n -l iv in g re p e t i t io n .

4 '

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

T R A N S D U C T f V L C O N T A C T

Such an a u g m e n te d a c co u n t o f m a ter ia l iz a t io n th ro u g h i te r a t io n m ight

allow a d ifferent c o n sid era t io n o f th e c o n te m p o r a r y te ch n o lo g ica l

a c ce le ra t io n of co n t in g e n c y than that w hich L yo tard o ffers . In g e n e ra l ,

he regards tech n o lo g ica l sys tem s as te n d in g t o a b sorb c o n t in g e n c y by

laying d o w n in advance the p a tte rn s w ith in w h ich ev en ts can be

rece iv ed . By c o n tra s t , at least in g en era l t e r m s , a focu s on the m a t e r ­

ialization o f te ch n o lo g y suggests that the neu tra li ty o f the te ch n ica l -

m ateria l substrate already e n c o d e s s ingularities and d if fe re n c e s . W h i le

the idea o f te ch n o lo g y as a neu tra l m ean s o r in s tr u m e n t of hu m an

action has long b een su b je c t to c r i t ic is m ( f o r a h istorical survey , see

M itc h a m , 1 9 9 4 , 2 3 0 1), the neu tra li ty o f its m ater ia l ity in re la t io n to

hum an e m b o d im e n t has re m a in e d largely u n q u e s t io n e d (w ith the

possible e x c e p t io n o f Karl M a r x ; see M a rk u s , 1 9 8 6 ) . B u t l e r ’s analysis

points to the h is tory o f m a t t e r as that o f e x c lu s io n s and a s y m m e tr ie s .

T ech no lo g y partic ipates in those m a ter ia l iz a t io n s , and thus also in the

exc lu s io n s and a s y m m e tr ie s they en a c t .

B u t l e r ’ s w o rk suggests that m a t t e r as a ca teg o ry can b e b e t t e r

u n d ers to o d as s ed im e n te d h istory than as i r re d u c ib le , n e ce ssa ry , o r

ahistorical g round . T h e polit ica l m o tiv a t io n fo r such an a c c o u n t of

bodies in te r m s o f w hat co u n ts as th e ir very su b s ta n cc d raw s on the

‘ im p r o p e r ’ c ita t io ns o f d o m in a n t social n o rm s e n a c te d in d iv erse ways

by fem in ist , q u e e r , and a n ti-ra c is t m o v e m e n t s . T h e d e c o n s tru c t iv e

subtext o f this theory con cern s the instability and u n re a l iz a b le perfo rm -

ativity of w r i t in g and m arks . A lthough B u t l e r ’s a c c o u n t focu ses on

d if ferences and im p ro p r ie t ie s s te m m in g fro m reco g n iz a b ly social c o n ­

te x ts , the so u rc e o f d iv e rg en t re p e t i t io n s is n o t l im ite d t o tho se

c o n te x ts . Indeed , w hat co u n ts as p erta in in g to bodies m ig h t b e very

difficult to l im it. Gayatri C h a k ra v o rty Spivak w r i te s , ‘ i f o n e really

thinks of the b ody as such , th e re is no possib le o u t l in e o f the b o d y as

s u ch ’ (Spivak and R o o n e y , 1 9 9 4 , 1 7 7 ) . A lth ou gh this co u ld b e read in

a n u m b e r o f ways, it p rim ar ily suggests that , e co lo g ic a l ly speaking,

there is no such th ing as a body as such , by i tself , in iso lation . Read

transductively , what w e take to be a b o d v , w ith its l im its , knots

to g e th e r d om ains. Phis can be seen as a d ir e c t c o n s e q u e n c e of B u t l e r ’s

42

R A D I C A L C O N T I N G E N C Y A N D T E C H N O L O G Y

th e o ry ol the c o n st i tu t io n of the b oun daries and surfaces ot differentJ

b o d ies . U nless w e assum e that a body has preg iv en l im its ( to r e x a m p le ,

that a body is a lways fully a l ive) , th e re is a lways a potentia l c o n t a m ­

ination o f the living by the n o n -l iv in g , of the natural In the tech nica l ,

of phvsis by techn e. T h e in h e re n tly unstab le and d iv erg en t advent ot

i tera t iv e ly stabilized bo dies ca n n o t radically e x c lu d e the non-living .

D is t in c t io n s b e t w e e n the c o rp o re a l and the n o n - c o r p o r e a l , b e tw e e n

the tech nica l and the n o n - te c h n ic a l , and b e tw e e n the living and the

n o n -l iv in g , can n o t b e e x e m p t f r o m this logic ot in terac tiv e d estab iliza­

t io n . Instabil it ies in the line b e t w e e n m a t te r and fo rm highlighted bv

B u t l e r ’s th e o ry can and do p rop ag ate th ro u g h the associated n e tw o rk

o f c o n ce p tu a l o p p o sit io n s .

If m a t te r as such is h is tor ica lly se d im e n te d , th e re is c learly no

ju sti f ica tion in l im iting the focus t o living m a t te r . N o n -liv in g m a tte r

should also he involved in the p ro ce ss of establish ing n o rm s and la w s . ’

C o rp o r e a l fe m in is m ’s c o n tr ib u t io n to a m ateria l cu l tu re ol te ch n o lo g ie s

m ay w ell consis t of asking ho w no n -l iv in g m ateria l iza tions partic ipate

in the e x c lu s io n s o r a s y m m e tr ie s thro u gh w hich m a t te r c o m e s to stand

as the neu tra l sub stra te o f socially e la b o r a ted fo rm s and im p rin ts . Just

as the political p r o je c t of these th e o r ie s aim s to re co g n iz e and re p rese n t

p a tte rn s of e x c lu s io n and v io le n c e c o n c e r n in g d if fe re n ce s w ith in the

ap p aren tly neutra l d o m ain o f c o rp o re a l m a ter ia l ity , the political stakes

in a th e o r y o f te ch n o lo g ic a l m ateria l iza t io ns m ight b e c o n ce iv ed as

ar t icu la ting the w ays in w hich a p ers is ten t a n th ro p o m o rp h is m negates

its t r o u b le s o m e d if te re n c e s and no rm a liz e s its o w n p ro d u c t io n throu gh

the ap p aren tly c o n t in g e n t m u tab il i ty o f t e ch n o lo g ie s . T h e v ery th re sh ­

old b e tw e e n w h at d o es and d oes not c o u n t as te ch n o lo g ica l relies on

stabilized m ate r ia l i t ie s , living and n on-l iv ing . At least in o u t l in e , this

ap p roach ske tch es a re sp o n se t o th e cr it ica l q u est io n o f h o w tech n o log y

is given to us as un iversa l, necessary and ob lig atory . In p ractices and

insti tutions (p o lit ica l , e d u ca tio n a l , e c o n o m i c and m il i ta r y ) , what cou nts

as te ch n o lo g y is p art of an in te ra c tiv e stabil ization ot the hu m an. T h e

heavily asym m etrical investment in certain m od es of technology (inform -

atic, b io te c h n o lo g ic a l , b io m e d ic a l , c o m m u n ic a t io n a l ) can be read as

s y m p to m s of the way te c h n o lo g y is c u rr e n t ly given to us as u n iv ersa l.

F ro m this p e rs p e c t iv e , p o lit ics is in te ch n o lo g y just as m u ch as it is in

45

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

the m o r e visible and e n u n cia t iv e d o m a in s of c o l le c t iv e s y m b o lic

in tera c tio n s . T h e crucial polit ical issues turn on h o w th e se d o m ain s are

separated and enfo lded w ith ea ch o th e r .

I N F O R M A T I O N , F O R M A N D R E P E T I T I O N

Fo llo w in g on fro m this still very g en era l th e o ry o l te ch n o lo g ic a l -

c o r p o re a l m a ter ia l iz a t io n , w e can n o w address the seco n d fa c e t ot

F o u c a u lt ’s cr it ica l q u e s t io n : w hat p lace d o es the s ingular and c o n t in g e n t

occup y in re lat ion to the universal g iv enness ot te ch n o lo g y ? T h e fa cet

c o n ce rn s the kind of analyses w e m ig h t m a k e o f specif ic c o n te m p o r a r y

te ch n o lo g ie s . T he obvious e x a m p le s h e re are nearly alw ays ‘h ig h - t e c h ’ .

(T h a t a lo n e should give pause fo r th o u g h t . W h y are so m a n y o th e r

tech nica l p ra c t ices con sis ten t ly re n d e re d invisible o r insignificant?)

O v e r the last several d eca d e s , c o m p u t e r p r o g ra m s , in fo rm a t io n and

n e tw o rk s have b e c o m e th e m o d e l to r th e te ch n o lo g ic a l o rg an izatio n ot

bo th living and non-l iv ing m a t te r . T h e p o in t has b e e n m ad e f re q u en t ly

that e v ery th in g fro m b io te c h n o lo g y t o c o n t e m p o r a r y mass m ed ia re l ies

on the p ro g ra m m e d cita t ion o f m arks , on th e ir analysis as c o m b in a to r y

seq u e n ces o f d iscr e te o p e ra t io n s . T h is is a c o n s e q u e n c e of a c o m p l ic ­

ated p a t te rn o f in te ra c tio n s w h ich are stil l b e in g m a p p e d o u t ( I laravvay,

1 9 9 7 ; H ayles, 1 9 9 9 , for a r e c e n t su rv ey ; E d w a rd s , 1 9 9 6 , fo r a d eta iled

N o r th A m e r ica n p e rs p e c t iv e ) . T h e q u e s t io n th a t B u t l e r ’ s th e o ry

p ro m p ts in re la t io n to the h is tor ica l ins ti tu t io n o f in fo r m a t io n as

the ( c u rre n t ly ) pervasive m o d e ot organiz ing p r o d u c t io n , c o m m u n ­

ica t io n , fo rm and m ean in g w ould b e s o m e th in g like this: h o w d ocs

• in fo rm a tio n stabilize the surfaces and b o u n d a r ie s o f living and n o n ­

living bodies? W h a t kinds o f re g u la to ry ideals fo r w h at co u n ts as

‘the h u m a n ’ c o n t in g e n t ly and h is tor ica lly e m e r g e th ro u g h in fo rm a t ic

m ateria lizations? An a c co u n t o f the in te ra c tiv e c o n ta m in a t io n b e t w e e n

non-l iv ing and living m a ter ia l iza t io ns and the sp ecif ic i terab il i ty of

in fo rm a tio n will b e d ev e lo p ed in the c h a p te rs that fo l lo w . It is n o t

difficult to m ak e the general d e c o n s tr u c t iv e ly inspired c la im th a t living

bodies m u st always be already c o n ta m in a te d by th e ir o w n p ro s th e ses ,

that they can only be w hat th ey are th ro u g h th e i r n o n -h u m a n

e x ten s ion s and su p p lem en ts . It is a l i t t le m o r e difficult to specify ho w

the top olog ica l and te m p o ra l l im its o f b o d ie s , l iving and non -l iv in g ,

44

R A D I C A L C O N T I N G E N C Y A N D T E C H N O L O G Y

arc in te ra c tiv e ly .stabilized and d estab il ized , especially in c o n te m p o ra r y

in lo r m a t ic m ilieus. So far, w e only have a general a c co u n t ot the

n ecess ity ot this in te ra c t io n , ot w hy it should a cco m p a n y any q u e s t io n ­

ing ot th e g iv en-ness o f c o r p o re a l m a t te r . W e still lack a wav ot

a p p roa ch in g th e c o n st i tu t iv e co u p l in g b e t w e e n the living and the n o n ­

liv ing, b e tw e e n the tech n ica l and the non te ch n ica l , in in form ation

te ch n o lo g ie s fo r instance .

R E C O N F I G U R I N G H Y L O M O R P H I S M :

A T R A N S D U C T I V E U N D E R S T A N D I N G O F I N F O R M A T I O N

A ny such ap p roach m u st c i r c u m v e n t o r at least re n d e r p r o b le m a t ic the

f o r m / m a t t e r o r h y lom orp h ic d is t in ct io n , t h e re are several reasons whv

h y lo m o rp h is m should c o n c e r n us. M any w ays o f th ink ing about

su b je c t iv ity , c u l tu re and te ch n o lo g y still ad here to that d is t in ctio n in

o n e guise o r a n o th e r . T h e d is t in ct io n still o f te n o p e ra te s , im plici t ly o r

ex p l ic i t ly , as the paradigm ot a tech n ica l o p e ra t io n . N o t only m a t te r ,

but m an y o th e r su b stances are said to be fo rm e d in a tech nica l act.

F le n c e , social th e o ry o t te n c o n c e iv e s the in te rfa ce b e tw e e n the hum an

and the tech n ica l in h y lo m o r p h ic te r m s : the hum an (c o l le c t iv e ly or

individually) shapes o r is sh ap ed by te c h n o lo g y . T e c h n o lo g y is seen as a

way ot fo r m in g en e rg y o r m a t t e r in the in terests o f hu m an life. This

seco n d a ry status is o t te n m ir r o r e d in c o n te m p o r a r y d eb ates c o n c e rn in g

the digital e m b o d im e n t of in fo rm a t io n . H e re digital in fo rm a tio n is seen

as a to r m in d ep en d e n t o f its m a te r ia l su b stra te (w h e th e r that be optical >

f ibre , a s il icon chip o r a la se r- in scr ib e d plastic d isc) . S im ilarly , g e n et ic

in fo rm a t io n c o d e d in D N A s eq u e n c es has b een t re a te d as ind ep en d en t

of th e c o m p l e x rh y th m s and to p o lo g ie s of organ ism s (H ayles , 1 9 9 9 ,

C h a p te r 1).

T h e w o rk of G i lb e r t S im o n d o n suggests a d if fe re n t no t io n o f

in fo rm a t io n . It s tresses the d iverse re la t io n s m ed ia ting the transp aren t

and in e r t t e r m s o f fo rm and m a tte r .* ’ Th is a lternat ive a cco u n t o f

in fo rm a t io n a llow s us to d ev e lo p the n o t io n o f tra n sd u ct io n discussed

in the p rev ious c h a p te r and , at the sam e t im e , fo rm u la te a resp o nse to

the q u e s t io n o f the p lace of singularity and co n t in g e n c y in re la t ion to

the g lobal universal o f t e ch n o lo g y . T h e a c co u n t unfolds on a n u m b e r

of levels . S im o n d o n resists h y lo m o rp h ic understandings b ecau se the

45

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

notions ot lo rm and m a t te r re m a in t o o ab s tra ct and static t o grasp the

c o n v e r g e n t chains o f tra n s fo rm a tio n s un fo ld ing d uring th e tech nica l

ac t ion o f m o u ld in g in w hich m a t t e r takes fo rm . M a k in g a b r ic k , for

instance , m ight seem trivial , and p ro fo u n d ly d if fe re n t t o in fo rm a tio n

p ro cess ing , b u t S im o n d o n ’s u n ders tand ing o f b r ic k -m a k in g is tvpical of

the way he r e co n ce p tu a liz e s the o p p o s it io n of fo rm and m a t t e r as a

transd uct iv e p ro cess , o r as a p ro ce ss o f in form ation . A c c o rd in g to

S im o n d o n , the e x is te n c e of a b r ick p resu p p o ses a care fu lly m e d ia te d

e n c o u n te r : ‘ In o rd e r that th e r e can be an actually e x is t in g individuated

paralle lpiped [ i .e . a solid b o u n d e d by p ara l le logram s] b r i c k , an e f fec t iv e

technica l op era tion m ust insti tute a m ed ia tio n b e t w e e n a d e te r m in a te

mass of clay and this n o t io n of the p a ra l le lp ip e d ’ ( 1 9 8 9 a , 3 8 ) . M o u ld in g

the clay in to a brick d ep en ds on a p r io r se t of o p e ra t io n s , involving

p rep arat io n o f the m o u ld , and p rep a ra t io n o f th e clay. T h e b r ic k , as a

technica l e le m e n t , is a d om ain in w hich d if fe re n t rea l it ies have b e e n

transd uced o r m ed ia ted :

The m ed ia tio n is p rep ared by t w o chains ot p re l im in a ry o p e ra t io n s

w hich cause m a t te r and fo r m to c o n v e r g e to w a rd s a c o m m o n

o p e ra t io n . T o give a f o r m t o clay is n o t t o im p o se the paral le lp ip ed

fo rm on the raw clay. It is to ta m p d o w n the p re p a re d clay in a

fabricated m o ld . If o n e starts f ro m th e t w o ends o f th e te ch n o lo g ic a l

cha in , the paralle lpiped and the clay in the q u a rry , o n e has the

im p ressio n o f realizing in th e te ch n ica l o p e r a t io n an e n c o u n t e r

b e tw e e n t w o realit ies o f h e te ro g e n e o u s d o m a in s , and of instituting

a m ed ia tio n thro u gh c o m m u n ic a t io n b e t w e e n an in t c r - e le m e n t a r y

m acrop h ysica l o r d e r , la rger than th e indiv iduated , and an intra-

e l c m e n ta l , m icro p hy sica l o r d e r sm a l le r than the individuated , (p. 3 8 )

M aking a b r ick is tran sd u ct iv e . It l inks ‘ rea l it ies o f h e te ro g e n e o u s

d o m a in s ’ . T h e t c ch n ic i ty o f b r ick its d urab il ity , re s is ta n ce to

w ea th er in g , capacity to bear cer ta in kinds of load, the b o n d that

m o r ta r can m a k e to it e m e rg e s f r o m the m e d ia t io n o f d if fe re n t

dom ains. T h e capacity o f the m ater ia l to b e m o u ld e d is i t se l f the

o u tc o m e o f a series o f t ra n s fo rm a tiv e o p e ra t io n s . T h e clay m u st be

prep ared , fo r instance , so that it is h o m o g e n e o u s (large p e b b les will

disrupt d efo rm a t io n in the m o u ld ; S im o n d o n t e r m s th e m ‘parasitic

4 6

R A D I C A L C O N T I N G E N C Y A N D T E C H N O L O G Y

s in gu lar it ies ’ (p. 4 2 ) ) , plastic (that is, it will not shatter like glass w hen

it is pushed d o w n in to the m o u ld , but will sim plv d e fo r m into a

d if fe re n t shape), and yet able to m ainta in con s is ten cy so that it can

take on c o n to u rs w ith o u t spilling like w a te r . All of these p ro p er ties

can be un d e rs to o d as ‘in t r a - e l c m e n t a l ’ , o r ‘m ic ro p h v s ic a l ’ . T h e p r e ­

p aration o f a m o u ld is also tech n ica l ly c o m p l e x , s ince a g e o m e tr ic

fo rm m u st b e s tabil ized, [t need s to re c e iv e and lim it the d efo rm a t io n

of th e clay w ith o u t m ak in g it difficult to re m o v e , it m u st be s trong

e n o u g h to w ithstand the p ressu res o f ta m p in g , vet f lex ib le eno ug h to

a l low b r ic k t o b e ta k e n o ut w ith o u t s t icking . T h e m o u ld p resents an

e n s e m b le o f m o u ld in g g e s tu re s , frozen o r im m o b il iz ed .

W h a t is usually c o n s id er e d as single act of the fo r m in g of m a t te r is

o n ly the last e p iso d e in a ser ies of c o n v e r g e n t tra n s fo rm a tio n s . F.ven in

that last e p iso d e , the m o u ld , as S im o n d o n poin ts o u t , d oes not im p ose

a fo r m fro m the o uts id e on an inert m a t te r : ‘the m o ld l im its and

stabilizes ra th e r than im p o sin g a fo r m : it gives an end to the

d e f o r m a t i o n ’ (p. 4 0 ) . In the ‘c o m m o n o p e r a t io n ’ w h e r e fo rm and

m a t te r e n c o u n t e r each o th e r un d er p re ssu re , the m o u ld solic its a state

o f in ternal re s o n a n c e in the mass o f clay. D u r in g the b r ie f interval o f

m o u ld in g , the m o le c u la r e le m e n ts o f the clay re d is tr ib u te the potentia l

en e rg y they re c e iv e f ro m the ge s tu re s of ta m p in g by filling the m o u ld ,

pushing against its walls and th e n real igning th e m se lv e s . T h e walls of

the m o u ld l im it the m icro p h y sica l o rd e r in g o f the c lay , but only

th ro u g h a p o in t -b y -p o in t ap plication o f o p p o sin g fo rces to the e x p a n d ­

ing surfaces of th e m ass o f clay.

L eaving aside the c o m p l ic a t io n s of variable m o u ld s (a lthough these

c o m p lic a t io n s are p re c ise ly w h at w e will need to c o n s id er in re la t ion

to e le c t r o n ic in fo rm a t io n ; as, fo r in s ta n ce , in the e n c o u n t e r b e tw e e n

g e s tu re s , w o rd -p ro c e ss in g so f tw a r e and display of t e x t o c c u r r in g as I

w r i t e ) , th e m o u ld supplies c o n d it io n s u n d e r w hich a re c ip r o c i ty o f

in te ra c t iv e fo rce s w ith in the clay o c c u r s . F o r only an instant, the

m o m e n t at w hich the in fo rm in g o c c u r s , b o th m o u ld and the w ho le

mass are in d y n a m ic re la t io n . In the system c o m p o s e d o f lim iting

m o u ld and h o m o g e n iz e d clay u n d e r p re ssu re , fo rce s p rop agate r e c ip ­

ro ca lly th ro u g h o u t the mass o f the c lay , n o t just acro ss the in terfaces

b e tw e e n clay and m o u ld . T h is m o m e n ta ry m etas tab il i ty is transductive.J * ;

It is an individuation in p ro ce ss . S im o n d o n w rites:

47

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

[ M ja t te r in the p rocess o f tak ing fo rm is in a s tate o f c o m p le te

in tern al resonance', w hat takes p lace in o n e p o in t re so n a te s w ith all

the o th e rs , the b e c o m in g o f ea ch m o le c u le re so n a te s w ith all o th e rs ,

at all points and in all d ire c t io n s . . . . The m o ld , as l im it , is w hat

p ro v o kes this state o f in ternal re s o n a n c e , b u t the m o ld is n o t that

th ro u g h w hich th e in ternal re s o n a n c e is rea l ized , (p. 4 3 )

The. in te ra c t io n b e tw e e n m o u ld and clay d uring th e instan t th e clay is

p acked in and tam p ed dow n set t les in to e q u i l ib r iu m w h e n th e p ressu re

e x e r t e d by the fixed surfaces o f the m o u ld equals th e in tra -e le m e n ta l

pressures p rop agating b a c k anti fo r th in the c lay. T h e m ateria l ized

fo rm and the p rep ared m ater ia l in te ra c t th ro u g h a se t o f e n e r g e t i c

e xch a n g e s w hich t ra n s fo rm the p o tent ia l e n e rg y o f the clay u n d e r

p ressu re (d ue to tam p in g ) in to a s table , d e te r m in a te e q u i l ib r iu m . T h e

fo rm in g o f the m a t te r d oes n o t o n ly inv olv e surfaces ; it involves the

w ho le mass o f p rep ared m ateria l in a to p o lo g ic a l and e n e r g e t ic

red is tr ib u t io n o f the p o tent ia l e n e rg y co n ta in e d in the c o m p re s se d

c lay. O n ly then can a b r ick b e tu rn e d o u t o f the m o u ld .

I N F O R M A T I O N A S I T F R A T I V F T A K I N G - F O R M

T h e basic p ro b le m with th e h y lo m o rp h ic s c h e m e is th a t it on ly re ta ins

the tw o e x t r e m e start ing points a g e o m e tr ic a l ideal and fo rm le s s raw

m aterial o f a c o n v e r g e n t scr ies of t ra n s fo rm a tio n s , and ig n o res the

c o m p lic a te d m ed ia tions and in te ra c t io n s w h ich c u lm in a te in m a t te r -

ta k in g -fo rm . W i t h o u t taking a c c o u n t of th o se t ra n s fo rm a tio n s and th e ir

e n c o u n te r , th e re is no way o f u n d ers ta n d in g h o w th e m o d u la t io n of

m ateria l by a l im it - fo r m o c c u r s . T h e in te r m e d ia te a r t icu la tio n of tw o

d iv erg en t rea l it ies , the m acro p h ysica l m ateria l ized o r d e r o f th e m o u ld ,

w ith all the g e s tu re s it im m o b il iz e s and p e r p e tu a te s , and th e p re p a re d

m icrop hysica l o rd e r o f the clay w ith its h o m o g e n iz e d d is tr ib u tio n of

co llo idal p a rt ic les , w'hose re la t io n s to ea ch o th e r a l low d e fo r m a t io n ,

rem ains invisible.

H o w e v e r , ev en i f w e re c o g n iz e that th e f o r m - m a t t e r d is t in ctio n

con cea ls a c o m p lic a te d ser ies o f e n e r g e t i c in te ra c t io n s , it has a n o th e r

l im itation . W ith in the d o m ain of tech n ica l p r a c t ic e , m o u ld in g is a

highly specific o p e ra t io n , p e r f o r m e d by c e r a m ic artisans l o r in s ta n ce ,

4 8

R A D I C A L C O N T I N G E N C Y A N D T E C H N O L O G Y

b u t n o t easily generali/able to o th e r tech n ica l o p e ra t io n s . M etallurgica l

w o r k , w hile it d o es m o u ld its p ro d u c ts , subm its alloys to o th e r

t ra n s fo rm a tio n s (q u e n ch in g , annealing , e t c . ) w hich ca n n o t b e readily

u n d e rs to o d as m a t te r - ta k in g - fo r m . W eav ing o r spinning also can n o t be

u n d e rs to o d in th e se t e r m s . W e cou ld in fac t, a cco rd in g to S im o n d o n ,

regard m o u ld in g as a l im it case b eca u se the p ro cess of transd u ct io n

o cc u r s only d uring the instant in w hich m a t te r and fo rm co n st i tu te a

s ingle m e ta s ta b le system o f in te ra c t io n s (p. 5 5 ) . A fter e q u il ib r iu m is

r e a c h e d , the b r ick is ‘ in d iv id u a ted ’ , and th e in te ra c t io n is c o m p le te .

T h e m o u ld and b r ick d iv erge again as the b r ick is re leased fro m the

m o u ld .

T h is leads to the seco n d level o f S im o n d o n ’s a lternat ive to hvlo-

m o r p h ism . H y lo m o rp h is m p rovides no way of a c co u n t in g tor o r even

a c k n o w le d g in g o n g o in g p ro ce sse s o f fo rm a tio n . T h e m o m e n ta r y t ra n s ­

d u ct io n is n o t re p e a te d o r sustained w hen m a t te r - ta k e s - fo r m . If, tor

in s ta n ce , w e w a n te d t o see ho w the i tera tiv e stabil ization o f corp o rea l

surfaces and b o u n d a r ie s in B u t l e r ’s w o rk cou ld b e s u p p le m e n te d bv

this m o r e tran sd u ct iv e u n d ers tand ing o f m a t te r - ta k in g - fo r m , w e w ould

still w an t to ask how the p e r fo rm a t iv e m ateria l iza tio n of living bodies

c o n t in u e s o v e r t im e . A fter a c k n o w le d g in g that m a t te r - ta k in g - fo rm is

m u c h m o r e c o m p l ic a te d than fo rm b e in g given to an inert passive

m a te r ia l , the p r o b le m of u n d ers ta n d in g the itera tiv e s ed im e n ta t io n of

living b o d ies , in th e ir c o r p o re a l - te c h n ic a l specif ic i t ies , rem ain s . In w hat

ways is o n g oin g m a ter ia l iz a t io n driven?

L I V I N G I N F O R M A T I O N

In o r d e r to c o p e w ith this difficulty , the h y lo m o rp h ic sch e m a m u st be

sup p lanted by a n o t io n o f in form ation . H y lo m o rp h is m p re su m e s that

m a t t e r is given fo r m only o n c e o r at o n e t im e . It igno res , m o r e o v e r ,

the v ariety o f in te ra c t io n s involved w h e n m a t t e r is in fo rm a tio n . Bv

c o n tr a s t , in fo rm a t io n , at least as S im o n d o n u nderstand s it , o ccu rs

w h e n e v e r a tra n sd u ct iv e ev en t estab lishes an in te rm e d ia te level at

w hich disparate rea lit ies can be ar t icu la ted t o g e th e r . In fo rm a tio n in

this sense does n o t arr ive f r o m outs id e a system and need not be a

d is cre te ev en t . It e v en tu a te s w h e n e v e r the ‘un reso lv ed incom patib il i ty

o f a system b e c o m e s an organiz ing d im e n sio n in the re so lu t io n ' ot that

49

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

incompatibil ity (1989a , 29 ). This unreso lved state can endure . Infor­mation in this sense (and wc w ill need to com pare this concept w ith technological or informatic understandings of information) implies ongoing transductive processes in the living and the non-liv ing. W i th ­out moving aw ay from the centra l insight that b r ick-m ak ing provides, the suspended resolution ol m atter-tak ing-form allows lo r an ongoing process of individuation.

The relation betw een bricks and living bodies becomes c learer . Since living entit ies individuate continuously , rather than being formed once, they ar e information. T hey are continuous, variable processes of m atter-tak ing-form . The instant in which clay and w ooden mould exchange energy is pro longed in life. Life continual ly reso lves incom ­patibilit ies through recurren t processes of ‘ in ternal resonance ’ resu lt ing from the encounter of d ivergen t o rders or different scales. So for instance, a perception and a gesture partic ipate in a process of i n f o r m a t i o n when they reso lve a problem for an organism in search of food. The association betw een information and ‘ in ternal re sonance ’ stresses that individuation does not occur because an en tity is in relation to something else (to an ex te r io r m il ieu , for instance), but because it is the ‘ theatre or a g en t ’ o f an interact ive com munication betw een different orders (p. 60 ) . In other w ords , information is a transductive process w'hich provis ionally reso lves some incompatib il it ies w ithin an ensem ble . It m ay do so ir revers ib ly , as in the case of the brick, but it may also do so by suspending or de lay ing form ation , by mainta ining or continuing the processes of formation , so that the ensemble remains information, as in the case of life.

It m ight be thought that S im ondon ’s concept of information, and its appearance as a critical a lternative to hy lom orph ism , bears little relevance to contem porary technologies o f information and co m m u n ­ication. Information as m atter-tak ing-fo rm , how ever , d irec t ly confronts the technical concept of information deve loped by cybernetics and the mathematical theory of information dur ing the m idd le of the tw en t ie th cen tu ry .7 Those theories can re inforce certa in hylom orph ic assum p­tions. If information is understood s imply as cod ing, then what is coded appears as m atter to be formed. Information processing techno­logies appear to form or shape what they process. Yet cybernetic information can be v iew ed transduct ive ly . Information in the cybcr-

R A D I C A L C O N T I N G E N C Y A N D T E C H N O L O G Y

netic or informatic sense ‘ is not form, nor an ensemble ol forms, it is the variabil ity of forms, . . . the unpred ictab ility of a variation o( fo rm s’ (S imondon, 1989a, 137). Strictly speaking, information in the cybernetic sense m easures the degree of uncerta in ty associated with . the arrival o f any signal. In flipping a co in , the possible signals are heads and tails. The information associated with a random coin toss is, to use the accepted conventions, expressed as 1 bit (m athem atica l ly , 1 = log^n w here 1 is the quantity of information, n is the num ber of different possible signals, in this case 2 — heads or tails. Katherine N. Hayles provides a very accessible account of cybernetic information: sec Chapter 3 of Hayles , 1999). Once the coding is established ( lor instance, that a coin toss has only tw o possible outcom es, ‘heads’ or ‘t a i ls ’ ) , the num ber of different states in a signal system can be ca lcu lated . This w ay of m easur ing information does perm it calculations com paring different ways of encoding signals, but it does not p ro ­g ram m e the arrival of anv part icu lar signal. It is not so much the much-m aligned d ivorce betw een signal and meaning that Simondon resists, but the confinement o f the concept of information to a re la t ive ly late phase ol its em ergence , the advent of a particu lar form. (The implications o f this very genera l point w ill be developed in later chapters. See for instance, Chapter 5, which discusses a particu lar informatic ensem b le , perform ance artist S te la rc ’s P in g Bod y , Chapter 6 , which discusses a rea l- t im e online com puter gam e and Chapter 7, w h ere genom ic databases are d iscussed .)

BE T W E E N C O R P O R E A L I T Y A N D T E C H N IC IT Y : T O P O L O G Y A N D T E M P O R A L IT Y

Judith B u t le r ’s corporeal theory has d ram atized the radical ly contingent m ater ia l ity o f living bodies. Gilbert S im ondon ’s a lternative account ot information augm ents this scene with a f iner-grained trea tm en t of the tem pora l and topological com plexes in which differences between liv ing and non-liv ing bodies prec ip ita te . Information in S im ondon’s sense has both a genera l and a part icu lar scope. This w ay of understand­ing how m atte r takes form , while it remains genera l , opens a different path into techn ica l-corporea l materia lizat ions and the complicated sites of in terface w here materia lizat ions occur. At a specific level, it

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

responds to the prevalence of information and com m unication techno­logies which have radical ly reorganized human co llect ives over the last 50 years. From this angle, w e can trea t this re -read ing of information as attem pting to slow down the process in which m atte r takes form through information technologies.

In corporeal theory to date , investigation of the norms govern ing what it is to be a recognizably human subject have concentrated on introducing liv ing bodies into accounts of subjectiv ity and cu lture . The interplay with n o n - h u m a n bodies and n o n - l i v i n g ensem bles could be better understood. The exp lanato ry weakness of hy lom orphism stems from its reductive trea tm ent of m atter as l im ited by form. Through a transductive understanding of information, w e can begin to see how limits and boundaries betw een m atter and form are interactive ly stabil ized, f ro m the perspective of this in teraction , technologies are not a domain ex te r io r to human bodies, but are const itu tive ly involved in the ‘bodying-forth ’ of l im its and differences. 'Technical m ater ia l iza ­tions are a lways involved in what w e take to be a liv ing, human body. S im ondon’s account highlights the fact that m ater ia lizat ion is topo log ic ­ally and tem pora lly com plex . T ransductive processes occur at the interface between technical and non-technical, human and non-human, living and non-liv ing. W e saw that dur ing the process of information, as two chains of operations encounter each o ther, m ould and mater ia l cohere in an interna lly resonating ensem b le . If this event is somehow pro longed , or its resolution is suspended, then the process of in form a­tion becomes even m ore topolog ica lly and tem pora l ly com plex . C o n ­tours, surfaces and limits may well be form ed, but only provis ionally , and only as part of an ongoing process of indiv iduation. If w e seek to comprehend what happens betw een humans and the ir non-liv ing prosthetic supplements w ithout presum ing w e know the essence of either prio r to their encounter , and if w c ser ious ly regard human collectives as co-indiv iduating w ith technolog ies , then the topological and tem pora l com plex it ies of information should be taken into account.

At a m ore particu lar level, S im ondon ’s notion of information acts as a counterm easure to the tendency of recent cybernet ic and biotech-J J

nological understandings of information to collapse living and non­living processes together. It takes the specific ity of machines and life seriously. Machines are in the process of in formation. They are open

f 2

R A D I C A L C O N T I N G E N C Y A N D T E C H N O L O G Y

to information to the ex ten t that they can maintain a margin of indeterm inacy , or a capacity to be in-formed. W ith in localized limits, the mechanism of a machine s u s p e n d s final determ ination of its own form. Machines som etim es possess a rich reperto ire of forms. A fully de term ined mechanism wou ld no longer be technological; it would be­an inert object, or junk. A machine must art icu late some degree of openness to a m il ieu in o rder to rem ain technological. Converse ly , a machine, no m atter how sophisticated in its computational arch itec­tu re , is not open to just any event. It is certa in ly not fully exposed to random events (a lthough such a machine wou ld be of great interest !) . A machine w orks w ithin a certa in margin of indeterm inacy maintained at its interfaces. This m arg in , which perm its it to repeated ly be in ­form ed, and to be linked together in ensembles , is a precondition ol ‘ in formation process ing ’ as it is usually understood in contem porary technological processes. In preserv ing a margin of indeterm inacy , technical artefacts, machines or ensem bles allow themselves to act transduct ive ly . That is, they furnish a scene in which repeated energetic interactions betw een liv ing and non-liv ing bodies can occur. (Life too remains in-formation, but w ith the added orders o f com plex ity that flow from its co llect ive en tang lem ents and from the internal milieus it mainta ins.)

W ithou t wanting to pre-em pt the com plex it ies of contem porary information system s, w ord-process ing provides a simple exam p le of this indeterm inacy . Instants of determ inat ion of the state of the machine (as keys are pressed on a keyboard , for instance) occur through the intersect ion betw een gestures and the temporal and topological organization o f e lectr ica l currents . Selection of a form (a keystroke propagates through a hierarchy of coded sub-ensembles until very soon it appears as an arrangem ent of pixels on screen as a font character of specific size and sty le ) occurs when two series ot operations converge , those of a user habituated to keyboard and screen, and the layers o f inscription mobilized by the system. T he openness to determ inat ion of a machine brings all the complexit ies which the account of m atter-tak ing-form has a lerted us to. On the side of the machine, each keystroke entails m atter-tak ing-form . Synchron­ized several hundred mill ion times per second, an energet ic configura­tion of potentials takes shape or actualizes itself as marks visible on

53

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

the screen, held in m em ory or propagated into other technical ensembles.

The question this chapter opened w ith was w hether technology could itself’ be seen a.s the source o f contingencies in its own right, or whether in accord w ith the standpoint that has dom inated most humanist responses to m odern techno logy , it could only be seen as absorbing contingency at an ever increasing rate. From this la tter standpoint, the acce lerat ing effects of speed and change on ly signal that nothing new is happening. How w ould that opening question be answered now? Moving back a little from the details of S im ondon ’ s account o f machines and in formation, it becomes c lear that the notion that machines maintain a margin of indeterm inacy has im portant implications in relation to the above question. There is a m arg in of contingency associated w ith technical practices or m ediat ions. This margin is transductivc. It art icu lates different orders of rea l i ty . Rather than any particu lar technology de te rm in ing the form of human life, it

^ could be seen as suspending the final de term inat ion of form with in localized margins. This is not to cla im that technology is a locus of radical contingency or pure novelty . In this chapter , I have to tr ied to suggest that a different approach is possible. The deconstructive m otif p resent in B utler ’ s theory of iterative m ater ia l ity indicates that what w e take to be the most inert , passive te rm , m a tte r , stabil izes only through processes in which d ivergen t em bod im ents are repeated ly a ligned or norm alized . The sources of radical contingency do not reside in the subject or in the predicates of consciousness, nor in any body as such. Rather, they stem from the lim its of th inkability of bodies, from the ways in which they have no possible outl ine or form.

- The a-signifying status of m atte r , indeed its very ex istence as an isolated te rm , can then be understood as a res idue of historical ly in terwoven institutions, practices and discourses through which inher­ent corporeal d ivergences are rea l igned and held in tension. Subjects — white , b lack , w om an , man, hom osexual, heterosexua l — result .

The m ater ia l ity of technology itself should be exam ined together with that of living bodies. It too m ust be seen as h istorical ly sed i­mented, and as instituted iterat ive ly and through differences. The place of ‘whatever is s ingular, contingent and the product o f arb itrary constraints’ (the focus of Foucau lt ’ s crit ical question) is shared across

£4

R A D I C A L C O N T I N G E N C Y A N D T E C H N O L O G Y

l iv ing and non-liv ing entit ies . Various implications flow from this understanding (and w ill he developed in the fo llowing chapters). The iterative normalization of bodies need not be narrow ly construed as ascrib ing meanings or values to bodies. Value codings gain their significance only in conjunction w ith technical performances which provisionally reso lve compatib il it ies in and betw een liv ing and non­living processes. S im ondon ’s response to hylomorphism offers one wav ot beginning to delineate those perform ances, anil to glimpse some thing other than a re lentless obligation to take up technology or to becom e m ore technological. The stabil ization over t im e of bodily boundaries and surfaces need not be seen as e ither imposed from the outside (as a fo rm ), or as essential to bodies, but as the consequence of a ‘com mon o p era t ion ’ occurr ing betw een the liv ing and the non­liv ing. The connection betw een the tw o approaches is not vet clear. My a rgum ent w ill be that if w e can understand corporealization or materia lizat ion transduct ive ly , then it m ight be possible to ask how corporeality is a lready technical.

N O T E S

1. Th is v iew of tech n o lo gy as an e n sem b le o f a r r a n g em en ts for the p rocess ing

o f co n t in g en cy d iv e rg e s from the m o re usual v iew s o f m o d e rn techn o logy as

e i th e r in s t ru m en ts for the ra t iona l dom ina t io n o f n a tu re and o thers , o r the

v i ew o f t e c h n o lo g y as som e k ind o f ex ten s io n o f the h um an o rgans , as

som eth in g o f h um an m ak in g .

2. In gen e ra l t e r m s , Paul V i r i l io ’ s w o r k s tro n g ly rep re sen ts this pos it ion . See

C h a p te r 3 for fu r th e r co m m e n ts on V ir i l io .

3. For in s tance , one m ust be e i th e r a m an o r a w o m a n , o r r isk exc lu s ion from

soc ia l i ty ( th ro ugh psychos is o r fa i lu re to m ate r ia l i z e as a sub jec t ) . This

im p e ra t iv e is p red ic a ted on m a te r ia l i t y , s ince m a t t e r , and par t icu la r ly the

s exua l m a t t e r of h um an b io logy , is r e g a rd ed as the nece s sa ry , i r red uc ib le ,

p rcd iscu rs ive g ro u n d o f s exed sub jec t iv i ty .

4 . The p lace o r sup po r t o f in scr ip t ion can i t s e l f n ev e r be in scr ibed o r f igured as

such because it is the cond it ion u n d e r w h ich fo rm s and figurat ions m ater ia l ize .OBeyond the oppos it ion b e tw e e n act ive fo rm and passive m a t t e r , it is the

d o m a in w ith in w h ich that idea l oppos it ion m a in ta in s itself . It is a site of

‘ l ingu is t ic im p r o p r i e t y ’ in w h ich the apparen t necess i ty o f the de l im ita t ions

and d e te rm in a t io n s of m a t t e r can he re m app ed as con t ingent vio lence

(B u t le r , 1993 , 53).

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

5. Recen t socia l s tudies o f s c ience and tech n o lo g y have m ad e ser ious efforts to

redress the a s ym m e t r ie s in ana lys is ol hum an and n on -h um an ac to rs . A cto r

n e tw o rk th e o ry , associa ted w ith L atour ( 1 9 9 4 a , 1999 ) and Law and Ca l lon

( 1 9 9 5 ) , is p red ica ted on b a lanc ing the h um an and the n on -h um an . Th is point

w il l be m o re ex ten s iv e ly d iscussed in C h ap te r 2.

6. L a ter chapte rs en gage w ith the d eb a te in var ious fo rm s. S ee C h ap te r 1 in

re la t ion to the e m b o d im e n t o f d ig ita l in fo rm at ion , and see C h ap te r 6 in

re la t ion to bioinl 'orrnatics and its t r e a tm en t o f g e n o m ic in fo rm at ion .

7 . S im o n d o n ’ s response to cyb e rn e t ic s appea rs in a n u m b e r of d if fe ren t w o rk s ,

but e spec ia l ly in S im on d on , 19 89a , Part II, C h ap te r 2.

C H A P T E R 2

From stone to radiation: the depth and speed of technical embodiments

For th e th in g w e a r c lo o k in g lo r is not a h u m a n th in g , nor

is i t an in h u m a n th in g . It o t t e r s , r a t h e r , a co n t in u o u s

p a s s a g e , a c o m m e r c e , an in t e r c h a n g e , b e t w e e n w h a t

h u m a n s in s c r ib e in i t and w h a t it p r e s c r ib e s to h u m a n s . It

t r a n s la t e s th e o n e in to th e o th e r . T h is t h in g is th e n o n h u ­

m an ve r s io n o f p e o p l e , it is th e h u m a n v e r s io n ot th in g s ,

t w i c e d i s p l a c e d . W h a t sh o u ld it b e c a l l e d ? N e i th e r o b je c t

n o r s u b je c t . An in s t i tu t e d o b je c t , q u a s i - o b je c t , q u a s i ­

s u b je c t , a t h in g tha t posse s se s b o d y and sou l in d is so c iab lv .

l.atour, 1996

It w e wanted to ‘e x p e r ien ce ’ contem porary technology differently , the task wou ld be not only to becom e aw are ot how discourses and atfccts (for instance of urgency and necessity) c luster around technology, but to find ways of affirming the historical or genealogical contingency ot technical m ediat ions. The genera l lesson d raw n trom corporeal theorv in Chapter 1 concerns how the limits of discourse are entangled with what w e take to be bodies. Just as corporeal theorv has made it possible to ask w hether living bodies, which vvc often take to be outside or at the very l im its of cu lture , inhabit a necessarily somew hat occluded historical d im ension, it might also be possible to ask how technical mediat ions partic ipate in the historical institution of co llec t­ives. That is the m ajor focus ot this chapter. H ow ever , there may be a limit to our ab il i ty to represent technical mediations. It mav be that we cannot exper ience technology in genera l or a specific technical mediation as such, any m ore than vvc can exper ience the both or our

?7

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

own bodies as such. As w e have a lready seen, the transductive event of a technical mediation w orks along other lines than the established semiotic and value codings available within a social system . It has, in short, a d ifferent mode of historical ex istence to a sign, even when it remains, as is often the case, c lose ly coupled to signifying practices.

The curren tly dominant inscriptive practices of informatics close the distance betw een signifying processes and technical m ediat ions. Because technical mediations such as computation and b iotechnology are so en tw ined with s i g n s , it m ight seem that they could be represented fully. As Bruno Latour w r ite s , ‘program s are w r i t ten , chips are engraved like etchings or photographed like plans. . . . But then is there no longer any difference b e tw een humans and nonhumans? No, but there is no difference betw een the spirit o f machines and their m atter , e i th e r ’ (Latour, 1996 , 223) . Discursive l im its are entang led with technical mediations, just as m uch as w ith corporeal performat- iv ity. D raw ing on theoretical insights deve loped in recen t social studies of science and technology, this chapter e lucidates someth ing of the historical depth of technical m ediat ions. At the same t im e , it draws attention to certa in constitutive l im its in our capacity to represent and exper ience technology. In o rder to w eave the genera l point d raw n from corporeal theory together w ith these insights, it re l ics on a quasi- technical a l legory concerning tw o technological stereo types : stone axes and therm onuc lear bombs. Highly dubious in te rm s of any strict philosophical, historical or social scientific investigation of technology, the a l legory serves to highlight the prob lem of the depth of technical embodiments a long transductive lines.

Ihe story told here resem bles the opening to Stan ley K ubrick ’s film, 2 0 0 1 : A Spa c e Ody ss e y . T here , a bone th row n by a hominid ancestor arcs up into the air in slow' m otion , and becomes a space shuttle carry ing Dr Floyd tow ards an encounter w ith information technology, in the guise of H A L9000, a dom inating supercom puter . The transit ion betw een the proto-technical act of th row ing and the complexit ies of that now-past future occurs almost seam lessly in the film. W hat happens dur ing the m om en t of inflection w hen bone becomes rocket? The slight break in continuity asks us to associate two technical artefacts as different from each other as possible (one signifying slowness and s im plic ity , the o ther , in t im idating com plex ity

5 «

and pow er) w ith the presence of a black monolith , an incomprehens­ibly alien technology that remains stable throughout m illenn ia . ' M y

a l lego ry is only slightly less mythical : it tells how an artefact from the ear liest human non-human co llect ives , the Acheulean hand axes ot 1.5 m illion years ago used by h o m o c r c c t u s , one of the earliest technical artefacts associated w ith our hominid ancestors, becomes s o m e t h i n g

that stands at the limits ot contem porary technical mediations in terms of its d isproport ionate ly lethal efficacy the therm onuclear weapons des igned , stockpiled , detonated and above all , s i m u l a t e d by nation­states after W o r ld W a r II. This is a story of artefacts at the limits ot d iscourse or signification.

These axes, the Acheulean, are located at one limit ot the human. They point to a t im e ot mythical orig ins when w e w ere becoming who we arc socially , l inguistically and co rporea lly . Thev accompany an evo lutionary phase ot humanity associated w ith massive corporeal and presum ably co llect ive reorganization. (For a description, now som e­what dated but still fascinating, of this process, see Leroi-Gourhan, 1993 .) W h ile these stones, found scattered across at least three continents, w il l not speak w ith com plete in te ll ig ib il ity , thev might be readab le in te rm s of orig inary techn ic ity ; that is, as something en tan ­gled w ith any idea or representation of what it is to be human. At another ex trem e , the therm onuc lear weapon constitutes a kind ot d iscursive l im it for certa in collect ives today. Its detonation remains an exceptional event that can only be seen at a distance on the horizon, as a b linding flash of light and, even then, inevitablv as a highly m ediated image draw n from stock film footage taken at a t im e when atmospheric tests w ere stil l being conducted. Most im portantly , because it still m ight have to be detonated even after the end of the Cold W ar , the bomb has becom e the object of intensive simulation. Large research institutions and the most powerfu l supercom puters on the p lanet are devoted to it.

T E C H N IC A L M E D IA T IO N S AND D IS C U R S IV E LIM ITS

The choice o f these tw o artefacts is not innocent. As a technology subject to massive s imulat ion , the nuclear bomb, perhaps more than any other technology excep t com puters them selves , is also a weighty

£9

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

semiotic o b je c t . ’ As Paul Kdwards w r ites , ‘the Cold W a r can be best understood in term s ol d i s c o u r s e s that connect techno logy , s trategy and cu lture : it was quite l itera l ly fought inside a qu intcsscntia lly semiotic space, ex ist ing in models, language, iconography and m etaphor, embodied in technologies that lent to these sem iot ic dimensions their heavy inertial mass ’ (Edwards, 1996 , 120). N uclear weapons w ere and are surrounded by massive simulat ions because no one quite knows what would happen in a conflict fought w ith them . Nuclear weapons stand as a kind of discursive l im it for con tem porary technolog ies, and their polariz ing influence on the Cold W a r still propagates many second o rder effects in the domain of cu ltures , technologies and politics. In their own w ay , hand-axes share many of these properties . They too are objects of s im ulat ion , since w e cannot know w hat their effects m eant. 1 hey too can confirm ccrta in notions as to the l im its of the human, and the distinctions betw een human and an imal life, but also unsett le them .

Consider the fo llowing param eters of the tw o artefacts:Durab i l i t y : the hand-axes w ere made 1.5 mill ions years ago and

apparently w ere ‘used ’ for a period of 1 m ill ion years (Ingold and Gibson, 1993, 3 37). They are found re la t ive ly intact today in large numbers and in stereotypica l form across th ree continents . W h a t they d id , how they w ere used, the difference they m ade , the ir invo lvem ent in human collect ives , has left few traces apart perhaps from some marks on bones. Also found buried across at least th ree continents in bunkers and missile silos, and roving around the oceans, therm onuc lear devices have been made since the 1950s. In them selves , they are not durable. Due to the half-lives of the isotopes they contain , which decompose at around 5% per annum , they have to be continually replenished with fresh reactive m ater ia l . A lthough they a re not stable by comparison, their effects, should they detonate , w ou ld endure over several hundred thousand years . In that sense, as M ichel Serres points out, their performance constitutes ‘the most last ing ’ of technical mediations or quasi-objects available to us (Serres , 1995 , 90 ).

Compl exi t y : a gesture ( th row , blow', e tc . ) propels and guides the hand-axe. Even leaving aside the complications of m issi les, gu idance systems, nuclear weapons laboratories, com m unication and control networks that surround the dev ice , and the j i t te ry polit ics that launch

6 o

T E C H N I C A L E M B O D I M E N T S

them , approx im ate ly 4 0 0 0 components in the thermonuc lear bomb are involved in a contro lled implosion that tr iggers the rapidly fluxing neutrons ot the fission and fusion reactions whose energy release am ounts to an ex p lo s io n . ’ The technical performance oi the two artefacts d iverges corresponding ly betw een that ol the hand-axe whose technical perform ance can be enacted by humans at many different t imes and places (as ev idenced by their d istr ibution), and the bomb whose perform ance is only effective at d ifferent times and places arranged and supported by a vastly m ore e laborate ensem ble , supplied by collect ives on the scale of nation-states. There are far few er bombs than hand-axes. Furtherm ore , the detonation of bombs is now over­shadowed by the simulation of the ir detonation. j

Sp e ed : the flight t im e of the axe is several hundred milliseconds for a path of 5 10 m etres , and less it the axe is not th row n, but held as a hand tool. Detonation t im e lasts a mill ionth of a second for the bomb. After the end of the chain reaction in the deu te r ium , the propagation of e lec trom agnet ic , a tmospheric and heat shockwaves will take slightly longer , but the speed of the chain reaction itself exceeds that ot the fusion reactions occurr ing in the sun.

Flowing from considerations of speed, the w i n d o w o f c o n t r o l is the most important contrast for m y a l legory of discursive limits. A throw depends on t im ing . For the hand-axe, the w indow of control ranges b e tw een one and several tens of m illiseconds depending on the length of its tra jec to ry . That is, assuming that the hand-axe is th row n , it must be re leased at the right m om en t ± 10 ms (m il l iseconds) trom the hand during the th row it the device is to hit a small target five m etres awav (C alv in , 1993). The problem here is that the neurones tw itch . They c an ’t m odulate m ovem ents with anv great accuracy. The tim ing jitter tor sp ine-m otor neurones is approx im ate ly 1 1 ms (C a b in , 1993, 246). On average thev varv that much in their activation time. Neural feedback trom arm to spinal cord and back at its fastest still requires approximately ' 110 ms. A prob lem of control develops because the w'indow ol control is less than the average variation in activation time, let alone the t im e ot neural feedback. T echnical perform ance , if it is to have efficacy, must be much faster than certa in raw tacts ot our own physiology seem to perm it . A kind of r a c e c o n d i t i o n is involved in coping with the brevity of these intervals.' ' The contrast with the

6 i

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

window of control for the nuclear bomb is massive. It only lasts around one hundred millionth ot a second. Unless the unfolding series ot events within the casing ot the bomb is t im ed to w ith in a hundred millionth ot a second, the devices behave unpred ictab ly in the flash ot detonation or, better , the ir detonation fails. To fabricate th e rm o ­nuclear weapons that provide pred ictab le , large and efficient y ie lds of energy (and nation-states want that, as symbolic performances o f their own executive potency), the interaction of those 4 0 0 0 com ponents or so in the first millionth ol a second must be t ightly contro lled . Again, the problem is how to control m ovem ent, given that the crucial interval ol mediation is so brief.

The therm onuclear reaction presents an event of except iona l brevity or high speed compared to the m ovem ent of the hand-axe. The event of detonation occurs w ithin the topology of those 4 0 0 0 components situated in relation to each other. The t im ing ot the hand ’s re lease of the axe stems from hand eye coord ination , whereas the t im ing of the movement of components in the bomb reflects an expanded and m ore complicated field whose coordination requ ires something like the resources ot a large nation-state.

P R O B L E M : T O O M U C H SPEED?

The a llegory should a lready make one thing c lear : the problem ot speed is not new . But how are these contrasts in t im ing and com plex ity and this problem ol handling those excessive speeds to be understood? f low should the story continue? Should the differences b e tw een these two technical mediations be exp la ined in te rm s of the differences between prem odern and m odern techno logy , which wou ld very soon take- us into accounts of modern sub jectiv ity , reason, technoscientific rationality and perhaps even alienation and the like?

fo r the m om ent, let the story continue along these lines (and it should be c lear a lready that this too serves onlv to in troduce a different ending, one that I prefer). The contrasting num bers and times gesture towards the problem of the speed of technical action. The prob lem , stated simply, is this: as a technical perform ance , the nuclear bomb has too much speed. The detonation travels too far and fast, it is too levelling ol differences, it destroys and dehumanizes. O nly madness

62

T E C H N I C A L E M B O D I M E N T S

w ould countenance using it, let alone build ing it. The bomb therefore marks excessive technological speed.

The most read ily available response to the problem ol excessive speed available in the humanities wou ld be to inscribe a line or break betw een the hand-axe and the nuclear device , to break clown technical mediations into tw o categories , the m odern and the prem odern . To take only one exam p le am ong m any, a stark ly d raw n version ol the break runs through the w ork of Paul Viril io : ‘ W ith accelerat ion there is no more here and there , only the m ental contusion of near and far, present and future , real and unreal a mix ol h istory , stories, and the hallucinatory utopia o f com munication techno log ies ’ (V iril io , 1995a, 35). Here the contrast betw een ‘n o w ’ and ‘th en ’ rests on accelerat ion, or changes in speed. In term s ot this break as it is usually understood, the w ay to understand the problem of excessive speed would be to take the two artefacts the hand-axe and the therm onuclear device and say one is p rem odern and the other is m odern.

On this account the difference in speed betw een them marks a radical break and difference in kind. One is c losely tied to the hand, it remains prox im ate to the body, to a small reperto ire ol technical g estures , and to a l im ited set ot relations and signifying processes w ithin a social co llect ive . Its unchanging form over one million years refers to a stabil ity that m ight be understood as involving both low velocities and minimal exper ience of speed. So it is l o c a l and s l ow . Bv contrast, the other is g l o b a l and f a s t , insofar as it is m odern. The staging of a detonation over a few nanoseconds draws on scientific theories , calculations and sophisticated apparatus. The great velocity of the detonation , and hence its potency as a symbol ot sovereign superpow ers , re lies on this tcchnoscientific understanding and manip­ulation. It implies something much m ore ex tended , and much more global in its scope than the hand-axe. The high velocity ol the detonation, the mill ionths of seconds, are carefu lly m odelled and planned through calculation. The unrivalled speed of the chain reaction betw een the hydrogen nuclei is calibrated through the calculations concern ing nuclear and therm odynam ic processes carried out in the nuclear weapons laboratories in Berke ley , Los Alamos, Saclav or A ldermaston.

The great gulf that w e custom arily accept betw een the hand-axe

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

and the bomb, the gap betw een the prem odern and m odern , assumes

that one ot them is valid g lobally , that one ol them is not the w o rk ot local cu lture , but the w ork of a cu lture w ith the capacity to project beyond itself, to cut its ties to local contexts and customs. W e habitually attr ibute speed to subjects whose access to the div idends ot scientific r a t i o n a l i t y a l lows them to take a universa l ly valid ‘w orld v ie w ’ . Any notion of radical break betw een the prem odern and the modern holds as its ax iom that, for bette r or w orse , the modern viewpoint is m ore encompassing, m ore substantia l and translatab le than the prem odern , that its c la ims to universa l ity outdistance and overtake the particu lar forces of local cu ltures . The split be tw een the modern and prem odern then al lows a ro le for the local only in the gaps left by the calculations, only in the zones that have not ye t been

translated into the m ore genera l ized system ot tcchnoscientif ically planned action.

According to this v iewpo in t , anyth ing that is thoroughly m odern , such as the therm onuclear dev ice , can only be m odern to the ex ten t that it is un iversal , or insofar as it em bodies something that spans all localities. Machines go to Jup iter and Mars som etim es — on the strength of that universal ity . N uclear weapons capita lize on the funda­mental energet ic relations of sub atomic partic les . Although its s y m b o l i c

f u n c t i o n s lor collectives are ancient (brandish ing symbols ot sovere ignty is an old practice) , the technical efficacy of the therm onuc lear bomb, its operational capacity m easured in explosive megatons ot TNT , is thoroughly modern because it derives from universal laws, captured and channelled through tcchno.scientific representations back to nature . Trom this standpoint, this technical action is bound to delocalize itse lf , even if its sociosymbolic function remains linked to part icu lar nation­states, because it rests on the prior dislocation enta i led in formulating a physical theory of the universe. The local, inc luding em bodied subjects, must then be figured as a rem ainder , as a res idue of w hatever has not yet been captured and translated into m odern , universal term s. The local falls behind because it clings to the part icu lar , and in particular to the web of signs s ignifying practices, customs, rites and institutions which cover over and conceal the continuum of natural forces. The local is a form of de lay , or retardation that signifies too

6 4

T E C H N I C A L E M B O D I M E N T S

much. The loss of location is a consequence ot radically enhanced mobility .J

In turn , the hand-axe shrinks into a quasi-natural event in this p ic ture . Even if it does constitute a ‘vec to r ’ ol technical progress or an advance in speed, it belongs in preh istory , w here signs, conscious­ness, subjects, cu ltures and meaning are still only germina l, lh e neuronal account of the gestures attached to the hand-axe maintains

continuity with a m odernist account of the therm onuclear weapon to the ex ten t that it describes hand-axes from the standpoint of hominid neuro -m uscu lar param eters . (H ow ever , as w e have seen, there are aporias in that standpoint that we need to discuss further .) If w e accept that the hand-axe can also be understood as the (evo lut ionary) forces _ o f nature at w o rk in hominid corticalizat ion, then it becomes an ev ent described in universal term s. Again, local practices, signs, institutions and histories leave no trace . The hand-axe inscribes a limit to discourse concerning technical mediat ions because it is no longer c lear w hether

anyth ing technical (that is, anyth ing that involves humans) is occurring. Myths ol human origins must soon rush in to fill the gap il tin’ threat to human uniqueness is to be met.

The nuclear weapon poses a limit because its speed and force cause us to ask: what kind of recognizably human individual or collective interest would want this degree of mobilization ol energy? The hand- axe poses an inverted lim it : what kind ol recognizably human subject could not want or be capable ot this? Each lies at the very perim eters

of what we take to be human, indiv idually or co llect ively . Each shades off into the non-human, the inhuman or dehumanized, the monstrous or the an imal. The bomb represents the possibil ity ot excessive force, and d isregard for the consequences for humans and non-humans alike. The hand-axe represents something at the threshold ot human inte l l i­gence. O ther animals make and use tools, but these tools seem to be just on this side of the line betw een prehuman and human. Accepting a r a d i c a l d ifference in speed betw een the bomb and the hand-axe entails accepting a profound continuity in relation to nature. One is the product of scientific manipulat ion of non-liv ing natural forces, the other is s imply liv ing natural forces at w ork on the non-liv ing. The technical mediations belong together because they are both reconfigurations of

K

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

nature. Yet thev lie apart at the opposite ends of history because one is energized by know ledge , subjectiv ity , representat ion and technology , and the other is m ired in the preh istory of the human species.

The ending of this way of te l l ing the story is not happy. From the other side of an irreversib le break betw een the prem odern and the m odern , the prem odern can only appear as what m ust be constantly left behind, or at least neutra lized so that cu ltu re can become as universal as nature. Anything local must bend anti collapse in front of the advancing shoekwave of the m odern . M aking this split entails an attem pt to coordinate a w orld accord ing to one historical t im e , to render every place and idiom translatab le into a universal de-Babelized tongue. I he separation betw een m odern and p rem odern carr ies w ithin it the hierarchical priv i lege of the global econom ica l , po lit ical, epistemological or ontological over the local, of the con tem porary over the obsolete. Not only the past, but anyth ing heterogeneous in the present becomes difficult to account for under this f i l tering reg im e. In the costly accelerat ion tow ards global po w er , s ignifying processes take on a new function: to mourn the loss of any proper p lace, any possibil ity of orientation. The ear l ie r citation from Paul Viril io e x e m ­plifies this outcom e. ‘ Mental confusion’ regard ing locality (tem pora l and spatial), and a collapse of the distinction betw een rea l i ty and fiction are sometimes ce lebrated , and som etim es lam ented by hum an ­ists and posthumanists a like.

T O P O L O G Y , M E D IA TIO N AND M U L T IP L IC IT Y

This w ay of ending the story is dissatisfying only because it promises closure w here there can be none. It dom inated humanist and crit ical theoris ts ’ responses to m odern technologies over the last cen tu ry . It is possible to find versions of it in W e b e r , H eidegger , Adorno, M arcuse and I labermas. It purports to separate signification and technoscientific mediation f r o m each other on the basis of a historical chasm betw een modern and prem odern . D raw ing on recent w o rk in science and technology studies (part icu lar ly the w ork of Bruno Latour) and ph ilo­sophy (especially Michel Serres) , it is possible to roll the narrat ive backwards and look for branching points w here a different kind of ending for the a l legory might be opened.

66

T E C H N I C A L E M B O D I M E N T S

Let us move back to the contrasts be tw een the hand-axe and the bomb. Instead of seeing the differences betw een them as evidence ol a radical historical break betw een prem odcrn and m o d e r n technology which in turn maps back on to an ontologicallv loaded distinction betw een particu lar and universa l , Latour and Serres would see both the hand-axe and the bomb as ways or detours a long which collective life passes in o rder to stabil ize itself. Latour writes :

There is an ex trao rd inary continu ity , which historians and philo­sophers ot technology have increasingly made leg ib le , between nuclear plants, m issi le-guidance systems, com puter-ch ip design, or subwav automation and the ancient m ix tu re ot society, symbols, and m atter that ethnographers have studied for generations in the cu ltures of N ew Guinea, Old England, or s ixteenth century Bur- gundv. (1 99 9 , 195)

At the most genera l level, technologies such as a hand-axe or a therm onuc lear device partic ipate int im ate ly in the articulation ol humans and non-humans together in a c o l l e c t i v e . The two artefacts are not read ily d istinguishable on the basis that one belongs to a culture d istancing itself from nature w h ile the other belongs to a proto-culture m ired in nature . Topo log ica l ly , no such break exists. Rather, both entit ies hybridize human and non-human relations together in com bina­tions that shift the limits of what a co llect ive can do. l atour writes, ‘by m ult ip ly ing the hybrids, half object and hall subject, that we call machines and facts, collect ives have changed their topography ’ (199 5, 1 17). Any technical mediat ion has a s p e c i f i c i t y which can account tor its re lat ive speed, but this specific ity is not to be understood in term s ol the separation betw een modern and p rem odern , or in term s ol d ifferences in kind. The effects of speed refer m ore to the differences in speed within and betw een collect ives than to any absolute break. A w ay of grasping the t o p o l o g i c a l d ifferences betw een collectives is requ ired . In crude te rm s , this approach asks how the hand-axe and the therm onuc lear bomb f o l d bodies, liv ing and non-liv ing, together differently .

Instead of trea t ing the contrasts in speed, com plex ity , durability and t im ing as given by the nature' of the things themselves, the task is to

(l7

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

sift out the interlacing and crossovers which underl ie coarse distinctions between nature and cu lture , p rem odern and the m odern , local and the global. Accounting for the specific ity of any technical mediat ion involves reconfiguring what often appears to be a founding separation or gull betw een these polar regions o f m odern versus p rem odern , or nature versus cu ltu re , as a set of unpred ictab ly w ind ing paths, passing through densely cross-hatched but under-rep resen ted equatoria l contin ­ents of hum an/non-human collect ives . The heavy historical oscillation between modern and prem odern which sends signs and things e ither backwards into the prem odern or forward into the m odern (or postmodern) is deflected by an account of the topological com plex ity which technical mediations in troduce into collect ives .

FO LD IN G OF C O L L E C T IV E R E L A T IO N S T H R O U G H T E C H N IC A L M E D IA T IO N S

I low is technical action involved in the constitution of collect ives? In what sense is topology being used here? I wo com ponents figure centra l ly in Latour’s account. First, he w rites that ‘the essence of a technique is the mediat ion of the relat ions be tw een people on the one hand and things and animals on the o th e r ’ (1 9 9 5 , 272 ) . Note that the mediation concerns ‘ r e l a t i o n s be tw een p eo p le ’ and ‘things and an im als ’ . Technical mediation does not d irec t ly link people and ‘things and an im als ’ . It modulates ‘ relations betw een p eo p le ’ through ‘things and an im als ’ . Second, if a d ivide must be m entioned , it should be the human non-human divide rather than the p rem odern m odern divide. That lat ter divide makes it a lmost impossible to sec how technology as a signifier can promise so much, and yet the en tw in ing ot technologies in collect ive life can remain under-rep resen ted . Technical mediations are inextr icab ly involved in weav ing together social re lations within the collect ive at different rates and rhythms to produce the effects of speed. The topological complication arises because this w eave diverts itsell through things, animals , organisms. The co llect ive and in this context, ‘co l lec t ive ’ is preferable to ‘soc ie ty ’ or ‘ cu l tu re ’ assembles humans and non-humans.

Mediation is only possible because of a margin of indeterm inacy associated with humans. The idea that as a m u l t i p l i c i t y o r c o l l e c t i v e ,

6 8

T E C H N I C A L E M B O D I M E N T S

h u m a n s a r e m o r e u n s t a b l e t h an n o n - h u m a n s ( l i v i n g o r n o n - l i v i m j ) stands at the very centre ol Latour ’ s w ork on technical mediat ions. There are expl ic it formulations scattered throughout his writ ing: 'this is the big lesson of the philosophy of techniques: things are not stable, but people are much less s tab le ’ (1 9 9 5 , 277) . W h ateve r technical m ed i­ations figure in our co llect ives , thev respond to the g rea ter degree of f luctuation, of sensitivity or instability associated w ith ‘p eop le ’ , that is, w ith humans co llect ive ly .

If these instabilities propagated free ly , human collect ives would not survive. A p u r e l y h u m a n co llect ive could eventuate but not endure. In other w ords , for Latour and for Serres , a pure ly human collect ive is unspeakable ; there are only hybrid co llect ives woven together bv perpetua l d isp lacem ent and slippage along various pathways mediated by non-humans. The only virtue attr ibutable to technical mediation is re lat ive stabil ity , or in te rm s of orig inarv technicitv , iterabilitv: technical mediat ions s l o w down the instabilities of collect ives , absorb­ing, buffering, perco lat ing or a ttenuating events, like a delta s lows the flood of a r iver , or s p e e d up instabilities , like lev ees on a r iver bank. At the core , they open different rhythms and rates of contact (faster and s low er) w ithin the m ult ip l ic ity of e lem ents that constitute a human co llect ive . The notion of the speed of technical mediations shifts. Speed loses its absolute status and becomes re lat ive to the fabric of a co llect ive .

C erta in ly , humans often seem to be the most effective actors in a g iven grouping, but their agency and the consistency of the grouping they belong to is highly dependent on the wav thev mediate their relations through non-human entities. In l atour and Serres ’ term s, technical mediations are delegates or translators of the performance of human actors. The consistency of a co llect ive stems from a set of relations. As Serres w r ites : ‘ The “w e ” is not a sum of “I”s, but a novelty produced by legacies , concessions, w ithdraw als , resignations, of the “I”. The “w e ” is less a set of “I”s than the set of the sets of its transm issions’ (1 9 8 2 , 228) . A technical mediat ion is the name of the d isp lacem ent, drift , delegation , delay or dispersal induced bv the inevitable passage ol relations betw een humans through non-humans, or ‘quas i-ob jects ’ , as Latour, fo llowing Serres , term s them.

6 9

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

FO LD IN G TIM E

In the absence of any ontological division betw een the m odern and the p rem odern , an explanatory burden falls m ore heavily on technical mediations. They art icu late d ivergent rea lit ies together because ol the detours , cross-overs and seams they in troduce into the fabric of collect ives. In the genesis o f co llect ives , technical mediat ions channel instabil it ies into netw orks of non-human entit ies . They d ivert vo lati le , fluctuating relations be tw een humans through a lternate pathways , folding the collect ive by binding together different rates and rhythms. These diversions arc not m ere accidents. Thev are vital to the life ofJthe co llect ive . W ithout them , relations w ithin the collect ivc take on lethal instability. Flow can this in terp lay b e tw een stability and instab il­ity that occurs through technical m ediat ion be accessed m ore precise ly? As m entioned above, the break betw een prem odern and m odern is rep laced by a topologica lly d ifferentiated continuum . H ow ever , from Serres and I a tou r ’ s perspect ive , tem pora li ty is enm eshed w ith topo­logy. Latour, fo llowing Serres , says: ‘O ur first step is to look for the folding of t im e ’ (1994b , 45 ) . Folding rep laces radical separation. Every technical mediat ion brings together e lem ents that are not str ictly contem porary or s imultaneous in te rm s of their genesis . As an assemblage or m ult ip l ic ity , a technical mediat ion assembles h e te rogen ­eous e lem ents from different t imes , from the paleo lith ic to the contem porary . ‘Consider a la te-m odel c a r , ’ Serres says. ‘ [I]t is a d isparate aggregate of scientific and technical solutions dating trom different periods. One can date it com ponent by com ponent: this part was invented at the turn of the cen tu ry , another , ten years ago, and C arno t ’ s cyc le is almost tw o hundred years o ld ’ (Serres and Latour, 1995, 4 5 ) . From one perspective , this appears to be a tr ivia l point. Of course the e lem ents of an ensem ble have d ifferently dated orig ins. The therm onuclear bomb still involves technical e lem ents such as bolts or screws; the invention of a bolt lies hundreds of years back in date from the vector processor of the supercom puter which handles the floating­point calculations needed to model what w il l happen to the bolt after d e tona t ion . ’ In that sense, there are c lear ly no pure ly present-day artefacts, only m ix tures which associate e lem ents inherited from different times. Furtherm ore , when we ask what heterochrony w e can

7 0

T E C H N I C A L E M B O D I M E N T S

detec t in the hand-axe, this ‘da t ing ’ ol components runs into a dead end. It does not have any e lem ents . If t im e is folded through the technical mediat ion of a hand-axe, it does not involve differently dated technical e lem ents .

H ow ever , the a rgum ent is m ore complicated than this. The apparent scarc ity of technical e lem ents in a hand-axe can be misleading. Ihe different dates of the e lem ents in a technical ensem ble index the m ult ip le paths and connections that compose the collect ive . Rather than unilinear progress from past to future, ‘t im e flows in a turbulent and chaotic m an n e r ’ (Serres and I.atour, 1995, 45 ) because this mix ing ot technical e lem ents introduces detours or transverse connections in the pathways w ith in the co llect ive . A collect ive or m ult ip lic ity entails ne tw orks of relations betw een the entities or actors that compose it. Technical mediat ions perm it these netw orks o f relations to vary their topology w ithou t a lw ays tail ing apart , or moving too tar. W hen an a lternate path b e tw een tw o points opens, the actors or nodes in those neighbourhoods are exposed to a ltered rhvthms ot contact. As two points in a ne tw ork previously separated by a certa in distance or delav becom e m ore closely l inked , t im e within the co llect ive folds in some w ay . Depending on the scale ol the detour , the mesh of relations composing the collect ive has been augm ented and distorted . W hen a different mediat ion enters the mesh ol relations, different cycles and repetit ion strike up: thus t im e , the form of ‘ irrevers ib le redundancy ’ according to Serres , is folded d ifferently (Serres , 1995, 117). These rhythm s, p roduced by synchronizations and delays , involve repetit ions, cyc les and feedback loops w ork ing against, w ith , through or independ­ent of other repetit ions , cyc les , and beats.

S C A L I N G IS F O L D I N G

How could such a move to rem ed ia te the divide betw een m odern and p rem odern , or betw een nature anti cu ltu re (to be prem odern is to mix these tw o up too m uch, to be m odern is to know the difference betw een them ) account for the obvious differences in speed between the hand-axe and the nuclear bomb?

The variation betw een the prehistoric and the contem porary co llect­ive can be approached in term s of the s c a l i n g or mu l t i p l i c a t i o n in the

7 i

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

num ber ot non-human actors. This scaling up or mobilization enlists a g reater numbers ol actors, and it m ult ip lies the paths that connect them , thus producing ne two rks ot technical action. The specificity of any given technical mediation is to be understood in te rm s ot the relative scale of mobilization it introduces w ithin the set ot relations that compose the collect ive . The centra l a rgum ent of Latour ’ s We Hav e

Never Be e n Mod e r n runs:

The difference betw een an ancient or ‘p r im it iv e ’ co llect ive and a modern or ‘advanced ’ one is not that the form er manifests a rich m ix ture of social and technical cu ltu re while the la t te r exhibits a technology devoid ol ties w ith the social o rder . The d ifference, rather, is that the latter translates , crosses over, enro lls , and mobilizes m ore e lem ents , m ore int im ate ly connected , w ith a m ore finely woven social fabric than the form er does. The relation betw een the scale of collect ives and the num ber of nonhumans enlisted in the ir midst is crucia l . (1 9 9 5 , 109)

Any impression of a radical break betw een ‘o u r ’ co llect ives and prem odern or non-technological collect ives is tac it ly supported by the continuous extension and complication ot our co llect ives through the scaling and mobiliz ing of non-human actors in networks.

The quantitative comparisons betw een the axe and the bomb co r ­roborate this point: the difference be tw een the tw o is essentia lly a m atter of different rates, d ifferent t im ing or synchronization reg im es generated by ‘m ore e lem ents , m ore in t im ate ly co n nec ted ’ . W e can account for the increase in speed betw een the axe and the bomb in term s of the incorporation of a g rea ter num ber of e lem ents into the weave. Hut this accounting must also expla in how the m ore extensive weaving together ol e lem ents is possible w ithout assuming that it rests on an ontological dualism betw een rat ionality and nature , between mind and body. It is one thing to accept that contem porary collectives are intimately connected through large-scale technical ensembles of manv different kinds. It is something else again to refrain from attr ibuting the differences in scale b e tw een the hand-axe and the contem porary ensem bles like the nuclear bomb to a different cognit ive capacity to know and organize the w or ld ot things. The

72

T E C H N I C A L E M B O D I M E N T S

emphasis must therefore rest equal ly on the nu m b e r and i n t ima t e

c o n n e c t i o n (or ‘ fo ld ing ’ ) of the e lem ents involved. The pathways which lead to the detonation of a therm onuc lear weapon are instructive here . The speed of the exp lod ing therm onuc lear bomb derives from its design as a ‘staged radiation implosion d ev ice ’ . A high explosive charge sets off a fission reaction whose energy is then focused on compressing the main hydrogen-deuter ium fuel to crit ical mass. D et­onation involves an energet ica l ly intensive in teraction betw een 4000 or so components . W e cannot account for the speed of the bomb re lat ive to the hand-axe w ithou t considering the scale of interaction betw een different e lem ents dur ing detonation . That .scale of in terac­tion depends on careful coordination ot the stages ol the implosion. How can the m ovem ent of thousands of components in relation to each other be contro lled or planned? In comparison to the people who made the hand-axes, nuc lear weapons designers cannot simplv ‘ shoot’ their w ay to m ore efficient or explosive weapons ( indeed they are even forbidden to do so since the comprehensive test ban trea ty ; MacKenzie , 1998 , 109). Instead, they resort to massive com puter s imulations or ‘codes ’ to stage the interaction of the 4 0 0 0 com pon­ents. T herm onuc lear weapons from the outset w ere bound up with calculation and com putation . The initial p rogram run on EN1AC, the first Am erican e lectron ic digital com puter , ‘was a mathematica l model of a hydrogen bomb for Los Alamos atomic weapons laboratories ’ (Edwards, 1996, 51). The escalation of force entai led in the bomb does not just reside w ith in the 4 0 0 0 components ; it includes an associated m il ieu ol calculation and information processing. The bomb could not be detonated w ithout the simulations which render it w orkab le . The speed of the bomb is l inked to its s imulat ion . In mid- 2000 , IBM announced the com pletion of the ASCI (Advanced S trate­gic C om puting Initiative) W h ite supercom puter . U nder the term s of ASCI, com puter companies build com puters that can s imulate the testing of nuclear weapons. The most powerfu l supercom puter in the w orld has been built specifically lor the US Energy D epartm en t’s Lawrence L ivermore National Laboratory , a nuclear weapons facility (H opper, 2000 , 46 ) .

Leaving aside all the delivery systems, the guided missiles, the naval and a ir arms, the com munication and guidance systems that surround

71

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

the bombs, the moment of detonation entails at least tw o kinds ot m ix ing or interaction. These ‘in t im ate ly co n nec ted ’ m ix tu res are c lear ly legible in the ‘codes ’ or com puter simulat ion that, as Donald MacKenzie points out, model the tw o main phases of detonation (M acKenzie, 1998, 109). The me sh p r o b l e m belongs to the com pressive and expansive phases of the detonation , dur ing which the 4 0 0 0 components are e ither im plod ing in o rder to produce the compressive force necessary to tr igger the fusion reaction, or exp lod ing a lte r the chain reaction has finished. The M on t e Car l o s imulat ion belongs to the spasm of intense fluctuations that occurs in the nuclear chain reactions themselves.

The ‘mesh problem ’

Detonating a bomb is like making clay bricks in a m ould . The mould figures as a set of ‘ frozen ge s tu re s ’ encounter ing the clay as it is tamped down into the mould by the hands ot a w orker . In the case of the bomb, the 40 0 0 components m aking up the casing and p r im ary charges briefly mould a f luctuating burst of h igh-energy radiation so that it can in turn form a com pressive m ould for the d eu te r ium fuel. 1'he difference here is that radiation can only form a compressive mould after a long detour through p repara tory operations. Not only are 4 0 00 components form ing the m ould , but this m ould itself is prepared by the billions o f com puter calculations carr ied out in solv­ing the mesh problem for a part icu lar bomb design. The first main task of the designers is to focus the torce of the exp lod ing prim ary charges (which may themselves be sm a lle r nuc lear detonations) on compressing the deuter ium charge to crit ical densitv . The process of accumulating grea ter density is crucial to the speed of any technical mediation. W ithout the compression produced by the implosive stage, a nuclear chain reaction w o n ’ t take place. W ith it, the chain reaction becomes irrcsistably fast. Compression can on ly occur if the solutions to the mesh problem establish a configuration of components which contain the energy build-up. If too much energy flows out of the system, then the hvdrogen which luels the fusion reaction w il l not reach crit ical mass. This means both genera ting a ‘shockw ave ’ and

retarding outward movem ent of the b o m b ’s components until the

74

T E C H N I C A L E M B O D I M E N T S

main fusion chain reaction gets under wav. The mesh problem ‘ involves m odell ing the evolution through time of a phvsical quantity or a set of in terre la ted quantit ies in a region of spate . [A] numerical solution is attem pted bv superim posing a mesh of subdivisions in the re levant space . . . and ca lcu lating for a series of t im e steps the changing values ol the physical quantities for all the points in the mesh (M acKenzie , 1998 , 110). M ack en z ie 's study of the d eve l­opment of supercom puting indicates that the history of super­com puters can be seen, in part, as attached to the exponentia lly g row ing demands tor m ore precise m odell ing of the dynamics ot the in terpenetrat ing fluid flows in nuclear weapons. In L a tour ’s terms, w e could view the supercom puter as an exam p le ol ‘a slight enhance­ment of the m obil ity , stabil ity and combinabilitv of inscriptions’ (Latour , 1987 , 2 36). The enhancement in mobility of marks stands out c lear ly in the shift trom the ‘human co m pu ters ’ who carr ied out many ot the calculations for ear ly a tomic weapons research and the supercom puters used by weapons designers in the late 1980s. As M a c k en z ie 's comparisons show, the trend tow ard more precise m od­ell ing shifts the scale from a mesh of 2500 cells in the 1960s to a mesh of 125 ,000 cells in the 1990s, and in that sense, represents a d irect scaling up of technical mediat ions (M ack en z ie , 1998, 109). The ne tw ork of calculations in fact prepares in advance and renders stable the interactions that occur during the technical mediations. The simulat ion slows dow n to around 10 hours an interaction that would o therw ise take only a mill ionth ot a second. The speed of the super­com puter and the massive m ult ip licat ion ol e lem ents (m am times 4 0 00 com ponents) acce lerate the m ovem ent of marks in o rder to focus dow n the unstable implosion on to the deuter ium fuel so that it can cross the threshold of crit ical mass.

The effectiveness ot the implosion of parts is structura l ly coupled to an implosion of marks. The strong association betw een supercomputing and nuclear weapons design il lustrates Latour ’s point about number and in tim ate connection. The scaling up ol technical action that we find difficult to account for w ithout a ttr ibuting transcendental powers to the human or the technological in genera l , and to m odernity in particu lar , eventuates as a topolog ica lly and tem pora lly complex art iculat ion of d ivergent realities . The supercom puter and the nuclear

7 5

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

, bomb arc topologica lly l inked in the' sense' that the iterative processes of calculating what happens in each cell ol the mesh over t im e translates or maps an intensive energet ic interaction on to an extensive , albeit com pressed , surface of inscription. The m arks m oving in the supercom puter follow quite different pathways to the m ovem ent ol components dur ing the im ploding stages of the therm onuc lear bomb, but their tra jectories lay clown in advance the paths of the components during detonation.

In a certa in sense, this is all obvious. Unless the bomb is modelled by ca lcu lation , it will misfire. The stronger point here is that the connection betw een the model and the mould is topolog ica l ly continu­ous. The intensity of the bomb as a flash of energy and symbol of sovereign p ow er cannot appear w ithou t the implosive m ould whose shape and strength depend on the ex tended but com pressed c irculation of marks in the registers and m em o ry banks of the supercom puters .

Monte Carlo simulation

Inside the ‘ m o u ld ’ genera ted by implosion, a second computational task takes shape. The brief flash of radiation that comes out of the bomb follows a change of phase in the deu te r ium fuel after crit ical mass is reached. The situation is analogous to the m om ent w hen clay under pressure in a mould begins to red istr ibute itself as a brick . The computational task now concerns how what Simondon w ou ld call a ‘pro-individuated meta-stable s y s tem ’ organizes itse lf w ithin the limits tem porar i ly imposed by the m ould . The reorganization is called a ‘chain reac t ion ’ to emphasize its m ult ip ly ing or scaling effects. U nder the pressure ol implosion, a re la t ive ly small num ber of nuc lear partic les ally themselves to form new e lem ents , th row ing off radiation which tr iggers further all iances. Enabling this reorganization to continue calls for different kinds of computation to the mesh prob lem . The history ol supercom puter arch itectures reflects these difference's. A com puter that performs well on the mesh prob lem may not perform w ell on Monte Carlo s imulations. These simulations map what happens in the fusion reaction ol a therm onuc lear weapon by tracking the histories of a large num ber ol partic les (e .g . neutrons) as a set of branching paths. As J. von Neumann described it,

7^

T E C H N I C A L E M B O D I M E N T S

the history of these neutrons and their progeny is determ ined In deta i led calculations of the motions and collis ions ot these neutrons, random ly chosen variables being in troduced at certain points in such a w ay as to represen t the occurrence of various processes with the co rrec t probabilit ies . (H urd , 1985 , 148)

It the mesh prob lem calls tor an iterated solution of equations and leads to supercom puter com puter arch itectures that acce lerate floating­point calculations, the M onte Car lo method makes much less p red ic t­able dem ands, since ‘ [u]p to 30% ot the instructions in a M onte Carlo program m ay be branches ’ (M acK enzie , 1998, 111). The branches or conditional jumps in the M onte Car lo codes correspond in broad terms to the introduction of the ‘ random ly chosen variab les ’ von Neumann refers to. (Again, as Donald M acK enzie ’ s discussion shows, diverse supercom puter arch itectures responded to these computational dem ands. Speed in floating-point operations does not necessarily imply speed in conditional branch operations. H ow ever , the arch itecture of the C ray supercom puters deve loped dur ing the 1960s and 1970s was able to accom m odate both computational dem ands.) The M onte Carlo s imulat ion draw s up ‘a map of the all iances and changes in a l l iance ’ (Latour , 1995 , 277) that occur dur ing the fusion chain reaction. In other words , if the prob lem of the ext e ns i on of the networks of technical mediat ions is m et w ith a mesh of calculations that prescribe the m ovem ent of technical e lem ents towards a cen tre , the problem ot in tens ity , of what happens at the cen tre , is m et by the simulation of fluctuating interactions with in a zone ot singular in tensity . Just as the preparation ot the m ould and the preparation of the clay converge in the m aking of a b rick , tw o chains of technical mediat ions converge at the ep icen tre of the nuc lear detonation. The transduction inherent to every technical m ediat ion , no m atter on what scale, is just that encounter betw een chains o f different operations.

C O M P R E S S I O N , IN F L E C T IO N AND THE T O P O G R A P H Y OF C O L L E C T IV E S

The shockwave of radiation w e see unfolding from ‘ground zero ’ marks a significantly powerfu l reorganization of m atter . If we look

77

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

only at that flash, its force is b linding. The flash occurs because tw o long and w ind ing chains of operations have prepared the ground tor a specific, localized metastable .state in an ensem ble of e lem ents . The tw o different computational tasks lie on opposite sides ot this encoun­ter , in much the same w ay that the abstract idea ot a torm and untouched raw material stand at the opposite ends of m atter-tak ing- form. W ithout an extensive series ot translations to bring them together, the mediation in which m atte r takes torm cannot occur.

Com pared to the explosion ot the bomb itself, the com puter s imulations seem ontologica lly w eak and insubstantial, even if they have strongly influenced the arch itecture and capabilities of co n tem p o r­ary information technologies. They on ly seem w eak it the ensem ble w ithin which the detonation occurs is den ied recogn it ion . W ith o u t that ensem ble , the few kilograms of hydrogen or helium that feeds the conflagration might as w e ll be w a te r or air . If, as Latour says, ‘ It is in the detours that w e recognize a technological act . . . and it is in the num ber of detours that w e recognize a p ro je c t ’ s degree ot c o m p lex i ty ’ (Latour, 1996 , 215) , then the raw energy of the nuclear blast flows from a com plex set of detours passing through supercom puters . It something happens at the ep icen tre , i f there is in fact an ep icen tre , it can only be reached by passing along the w ind ing paths which traverse num erous technical domains to finally reach the 4 0 0 0 im plod ing components of the bomb, focusing com pressive forces inw ards on the slender .supply o f enriched hydrogen o r helium fuel.

These detours weaving inscriptions, events and things together constitute a collect ive topography which ex ist ing notions o f society find it difficult to grasp. W h a t happens around the bomb I w ou ld argue is typical o f many different technical m ediat ions. The event of detona­tion cannot be separated from that topography. It g rounds the event. The speed and force of the bomb gains traction in that domain. Detours institute shifts in the distr ibution of p o w er and agency w ith in collectives. W hat happens as the bomb detonates typifies technical mediations in their topological effects. They all stage jus t such a cumulative but staggered and detoured m ovem en t inwards tow ards a centre or re lat ive in ter io r ity , whose reorganization tr iggers a move outwards, towards a new ly defined per iphery or outs ide . In the closed world of the Cold W ar , missile system s, com m unication and control

7 8

T E C H N I C A L E M B O D I M E N T S

systems, satell ites and submarines enc ire le the g lobe, suspended in antic ipation of that irrevers ib le m om ent of detonation. But in preparing for it , s o m e t h i n g else happens. The technical ensem ble that surrounds the bomb takes on its own instability. The force ot nuclear weapons poses a l im it to signification.

IS THE P R IM A R Y IN STA BILITY H U M A N ?

Latour and Serres look for c o n t i n u i s t explanations ot technical m ed i­ation. That is, thev try to expla in differences in speed, etticacv and com plex ity in term s of an un in terrup ted gradient running b e tw een the tw o abstract poles o f nature and society , or betw een p rem odern and m odern . Their account cuts across the void that usually separates those poles. The preparation of the bomb shows that the continuum cannot be thought of as an homogeneous ex tension. The com plex ity ot the bomb entails a m ult ip licat ion of actors which do not lack complexit ies , depths and folds. It is topolog ica lly d iverse . M ovem ents ot compression and inflection are m ult ip le since, for instance, the b o m b ’s force requ ires the supercom puter ‘codes ’ . O ur perception of technology can eas i ly pass over these folds w ithout notic ing their depths. Changes in the topography of co llect ives derive from the mediat ion ot social re lat ions byr non-human actors rather than large causes such as the universal p o w er of m odern scientific reason to control nature.

The unbrid led scaling up of contem porary techno logy ’s p ow er is due to ‘o u r ’ almost com plete incapacity to conceive of the depth of the mediat ion or hybridization that takes p lace through quasi-objects. It stems from the difficulty of conceptualiz ing the technicitv ot an ensem ble as the effect of an art iculat ion of diverse realities . Latour w r ite s , ‘ the m ore w e forbid ourselves to conceive of hybrids, the m ore possible their in terbreed ing beco m es ’ (1 9 9 3 , 12). The instability and technological potency of con tem porary collect ives in contrast to the so-called ‘p r im it ives ’ stems from an unwill ingness ot the form er to think through or represent the incessant detours and displacements passing through quasi-objects. As Latour writes :

If . . . our Constitution [the co llect ive schema that separates modernfrom p rem odern , society from nature , and human trom non-human]

79

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

authorizes anyth ing, it is sure ly the acce lerated socialization ot nonhumans, because it never a l lows them to appear as e lem ents ot ‘ real soc ie ty ’ . . . . The s c o p e o f t h e m o b i l i s a t i o n is d i r e c t l y p r o p o r t i o n a l t o t h e imp o s s i b i l i t y o f d i r c c t l y c o n c e i v i n g its r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e s o c i a l o r d e r .

(original au th o r ’s italics) (1 9 9 3 , 42 3)

The real instability or acce lerat ing torce resides in us, in the torm ot an interd iction: ‘do not conceive of m ediat ion or hyb r id s ’ . But because the whole tenor of Latour and Se rre s ’ a rgum en t resists any constitutive divide betw een human and non-human contingencies, and opposes any transposition of such a divide on to history , w e have to be caretul on this point. Is the ‘ m odern ’ interd iction against th inking or represen t ing technical mediation an h istorical ly contingent accident, or does it im ply ‘essen t ia l ’ instability? The form of this question should a lready be familiar. Again, it is the question of w hether the urgency and im portance that technology takes on in con tem porary co llect ives can be deconstructed w ithout d iscounting the o r ig inary techn ic ity ot those collectives.

The case of the hand-axe m ight a l low this connection to be made more d irec t ly . Acheulean hand-axes w e re made for roughly one mill ion years in a stable form (Ingold and Gibson, 1993 , 227 ) . Palaeontology calls them ‘ s te reo types ’ because ot the constancy ot the ir form. By contrast w ith almost any other human technical m ediat ion over the last 4 0 ,0 0 0 years , they constitute an apparently durable and stable form of technical action. If w e hold to the tene t that humans co llect ive ly stabil ize their relations through m ed iat ion , what kinds of instability are being folded, d e legated , s lowed dow n or m ade durable through the hand-axe? According to the archaeologists , innum erab le so-called ‘ Acheulean hand-axes ’ are scattered over the th ree continents ot Africa, Europe and Asia. Hut in terpret ing them in re lat ion to any human collect ive is difficult. First, no one knows for sure what function the axes had or, indeed , w hether they had any function at all. It they w ere technical ly functional, they could be the d iscarded cores Irom which o ther functional quasi-objects flakes w ith sharp edges - w ere rem oved . This would mean thev form a res idue of a technicalJ

operation. Ihey could be cutting tools hence the nam e ‘hand -axe ’ ; they could be missiles like a discus, th row n at a herd ga thered at the

8 o

T E C H N I C A L E M B O D I M E N T S

edge of the w aterho le (m any arc found stuck in the mud around old w aterho lcs ) (C alv in , 1993). Second, although archaeologists have learnt how to make them , no one knows what it means tor h o m o e r c c t m to have m a d e them. Their status as artifice or a.s artificial wavers. This status is precarious because their form, which seems so regu lar and de liberate to us, m ight not have been ‘the intended shape ot a too l ’ (Davidson and Noble, 1993 , 365).

Their fabrication, function, significance and the collect ives they w e re part of remain open questions. The prehistorical remoteness ol the hand-axe constrains any empir ica l sequencing of the networks of associations through which a given technical mediat ion becomes active w ith in a co llect ive . W e only have stones, bones and buried stores ol fragments , to be archaeolog ica lly exhu m ed , sorted , classified and analysed. W e lack the full contex t ot possible u tterances, r ites, myths, g estu res , m ovem ents , perceptions and points ot v iew with which the hand-axe is art icu lated . If w e cannot presum e e ither w h o fabricated or used the hand-axe (if anyone), or wha t the hand-axe is (quite possibly not a hand-axe), w e cannot p lace it in a ne tw ork ot associations and substitutions, whose series would delineate the individuation of a co llect ive . In that case, questions such as these what dynamics ot the co llect ive groupings are channelled through them? Are thev slowing down or speeding up fluctuations in the collect ive , or both? remain open.

Leaving aside all these difficulties ol fabrication and function, but stil l assuming that some technical gesture of a liv ing bodv is involved here , w e can reconsider the basic problem of control ot the hand-axe m entioned at the outset . The figures given then suggested that i f the hand-axe (or the flakes der ived trom the stone) moved at speed, that is, if they w e re th row n or used to strike a b low , then a ‘ race cond it ion ’ ensued. Assuming m ore or less stable t im ing constraints ol hum an neurophysio logy be tw een now and then, a technical gesture involving the hand-axe could perhaps eventuate but not stabil ize or be repeated . That is, its perform ance wou ld not be repeatab le , p red ic t­able, habituated or em bodied . Because of the variation in firing times of neurones (11 ms) anti the t im e of the feedback loops between peripheral muscles and the spinal cord (1 1 0 ms), the problem ot contro ll ing the tra jec to ry of the throw or blow is just as acute anti

8 l

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

difficult as the problem of ensuring that a blast of a mill ionth of a second occurs in a predictable fashion. In both cases, the fluctuations of a single event must somehow be stabil ized.

Like the simulation in advance of detonation through supercom puter calculations, the technicity of the hand-axes implies some form of antic ipation, some planning in advance, some form of compression that precedes the m ovem ent aw ay from the body that so m any technical gestures involve (that is, the history of technology can be understood as the history of exter iorizat ion of human life). The broad solution that human prehistory furnishes to this p rob lem combines an upright posture, the ‘free ing ’ ot the hands from locomotion and, last, the ‘ freeing of the b ra in ’ or the corticalization or hypertrophy of the cerebral cortex of our anthropoid ancestors (Leroi-G ourhan , 1993). The whole organization of the ‘an ter io r field of responsiveness ’ (to use Lero i-G ourhan ’ s te rm ) in humans points tow ards the em bod im ent of a capacity to antic ipate.

Neurophysiological p ictures o f tool use (and associated language use) explain this anticipation in te rm s of netw orks . The race condition involved in th row ing or h itting is overcom e because action is mapped out in a ne tw ork of cortical zones associated w ith hand m ovem ents . Action is repeated both synchronical ly and d iachron ica lly : first, there are m ult ip le circuits of control in paralle l which together average out the activation times, thereby im proving accuracy ; second, the control paths are tra ined and adjusted by ear l ie r repetit ions ; th ird , and most im portant , the sequence of neuronal fir ing is ‘bu ffered ’ or s tored up in advance and then released at one go. W e do not gu ide a technical gesture in ‘ real t im e ’ so to speak, but on ly through an accumulation of previous gestures , and through their repeated perform ance all at once (C alv in , 1993 , 2 3 4 - 5). P ictured in this w ay , it is possible to regard the incorporation of a technical mediat ion as s tructured along the same lines as those w e discussed in re lat ion to the mesh prob lem and Monte Car lo s imulations. Just as there is no possible detonation without a convergent series of detours , our bodies constitu te a site of mediation ske le ta l ly , neurona lly , etc . - for the instabil ity and fluctuating character of technical m ediat ions. A gesture is the outcom e of a living co llect ive organizing itself around the m obil ity of a tool.

8 2

T E C H N I C A L E M B O D I M E N T S

C O R P O R E A L IN STABILITY

If w e take neurophysio logica l p ictures of tool use at face value, they involve another kind of biological essentia lism , this t im e centred on neurones and netw orks . This ending of the a l legory risks becoming just as unsatisfactory as the m odernist one, since now a bio logical or evo lutionary straight line would be d raw n betw een tool use and nuclear weapons. Technical mediations wou ld involve no transductive interaction with in co llect ives , because our capacity to use tools would a lready stem from biological a t tr ibutes. Everything w e do, including planning and build ing bombs, wou ld resu lt from that biological toolkit.

It is necessary to account for the neurological specificity of tool use w ithou t essentializing human tool use. Latour ’ s approach is refreshing on this point. He asks, ‘ what then is a too l? ’ and answers ‘the extension of social skil ls to nonhumans’ (1 9 9 9 , 211) . The hand-axe mater ia lizes through a m ovem ent in which relations betw een p re ­humans shift across from a constantly fluctuating and decaying social o rder on to pliable but durable non-humans. W hat w e regard as a tool is the outcom e of a transductive negotiation betw een the transience and labil ity of social relations and the re lat ive durabil ity ot living and non-liv ing bodies: ‘though composed only of interactions, the social rea lm becomes visible and attains through the enlistment of nonhumans

tools - some m easure of d u rab i l i ty ’ (p. 210) . A tool is a detour taken by social re lations.

Despite their apparen tly inert and static character , tools cannot be understood apart from liv ing bodies associated in a co llect ive . Susan Leigh Star and Karen R uh leder w r ite : ‘A tool is not just a thing with pre-g iven attr ibutes frozen in t im e but a thing becomes a tool in practice, for someone, when connccted to some particular activity. . . . The tool em erges in s i tu ’ (S tar and R uh leder , 1996 , 112). Tools, too, mater ia l ize or corporealize transduct ive ly . It not, a variation ot the old div ision betw een the social and the natural w il l be back in force, now in the guise of a split be tw een social-technical layers and corporeal layers . A transductive event art icu lates d ivergent realities together to p roduce a num ber of different dimensions. During transduction , as we saw in the genera l case o f m atter-tak ing-fo rm , pre- indiv iduated poten­tials in teract. W h a t ex isted prio r to the transduction as separate,

8 }

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

although a convergent series, em erges art icu lated . W e do not have to look for special neurological capacities to expla in human tool use; rather we should look for ways in which neuro log ica l capacities attest to the incorporation of social re lations via a detour called the Acheulean hand-axe (amongst o thers). During that detour , which lasts roughly one million years of preh istory , ‘cort ica l izat ion ’ occurs. This represents the corporeal d imension of the transductive art icu lat ion of social relations with stone. Like intricate links be tw een supercom puters and the detonation of a bomb, w e in our verv bodies com bine the' J

compression and inflection of technical m ediat ions, m obil ity and stabil ity. Corporea lly , we inherit a solution to the prob lem of speed of fluctuations.

SP L L D OF T H O U G H T

This ending of the story of how a hand-axe becomes a nuc lear bomb comprises a different, still mythical account of human orig ins and their relation to technical m ediat ion. It puts speed, u rgency , fluctuations and instability in another light. Technica l m ediat ions take on a com plex tex tu re in their imbrication w ith collect ives . In this a lternative ending, the historical changes be tw een the tw o technical m ediat ions , especia lly in term s of speed, are ne ither transcendenta l , radical nor tr iv ia l . A convoluted , folded continuum lies be tw een them which links bodies, co llect ives , technical ensem bles and discourses. The beginn ing of this chapter suggested that corporeal theory , supp lem ented by science and technology studies, could provide traction on the difficult path aw ay from a m odernist take on technology in te rm s of speed and urgency . Specifically, I suggested that this a lternative path w ou ld mean finding w ays of affirming the genea logica l depth of technical m ediat ions w ith in

our collectives.The w ork of Latour and Serres offers some e lem ents of that

affirmation. In their w ork , the associations of humans and non-humans are vital to co llect ive life, not s imply ex te r io r to it. Association complicates social relations by sending or de tour ing them through relat ively durable ensembles of non-humans. Technical mediat ion is a folding of social relations in o rder to render them durab le . As

8 4

T E C H N I C A L E M B O D I M E N T S

modernists , w e exper ience modern technology in term s ol these

a ttr ibutes: unsurpassed speed, b ew ilder ing com plex ity and excessive pow er. The topological com plex ity ol collect ives cannot be mapped through the historical and ontological dualism of modern versus p rem odern , human versus non-human which that exper ience p ro­motes. Radical divides validate the impression of unaccountable speed

and com plex ity . In contrast, Latour and Serres account for the extension and p o w er of contem porary technical mediations such as the bomb in term s ol scaling (m ultip l ication of actors) a n d topology. There is nothing absolute ly new or surpris ing in the p ow er of technology to change society, only the effects of a co llect ive oversight in relation to its own em bod im ent o f technical mediat ion. Relative to superpow er co llect ives , nuc lear bombs form a l im it case. Relative to prehuman social groupings of hominids, stone axes form a limit.

A problem remains. The theory o f technical mediation as social re lations found durab le answers to the need for a continuist account of

how recent high technology seems to do so much in comparison to o lder or other technologies. But in the w ork I have discussed, the

theory does not fully m eet the challenge ot corporeal theory. The continuist account substantively links social reality and non-humans w ithou t highlighting how social re lations are also corporealized . Bring­ing the ‘dark m a t t e r ’ of technical mediations w ithin our collectives to

light remains inadequate it the co-indiv iduation ot liv ing bodies and technical mediations is still obscure. The case of the hand-axe made this apparent. The art icu lat ion of social re lations through things changes what it is to have a bodv. The m ix ing is so thorough and deep that the tolded surfacc of the cortex em erges as a consequence. Social relations are not only made durab le in things. They are corporealized at the same t im e via the technical m ediat ion. If a stone speeds up, if its flight t im e is reduced , what a body can do has changed; its limits have altered . At a very basic level, every technical mediat ion corporeal izes_ a l iv ing body or bodies. It, to return to the vocabulary of corporeal theory , forms part of the iterative materia lizat ion of the surfaces, limits and m atte r of bodies. The transductive individuation of bodies in technical mediat ion enters into the d ivergent tra jectories of living bodies in our co llect ives . Perhaps these transductive processes would

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

allow us to think ot' ourselves as the ‘weavers of m orph ism s’ or ‘ exchangers of t im e ’ . It w e w eave , it is because w e have been in terwoven .

Converse ly , the attention given to the topological co m plex ity ot our collectives offers something to corporeal theory . Corporeal th eo ry , at least in the version 1 have been d raw ing on, has made strong use ot the deconstruetive notion of iterab ility . The p ow er ol institutional, cultural or political norms to regu late a body rests on the d ivergent iterability ‘p re sen t ’ in and betw een bodies. W ithou t that iterab ility , the norms would have no traction . But in the light ol the to lding together ot humans and non-humans, the d ivergent iterab ility of liv ing bodies can be rendered differently . The radical contingencies ot em bodiment (or in o ther words , the ways in which corporea lity contest the prerogative of consciousness to g ive m ean ing to things) can begin to be art icu lated with technical mediat ions. Radical contingency need not be understood as a consequence of a specific indeterm inacy in the human cortex nor as an essential human freedom . It resides in the ongoing co-indiv iduation ot bodies and things. W ithout this, the historical institution of our co llect ives wou ld be nothing but a p lay on words.

NOTH S

1 . In his hook The Closed W orld: Computers an d the Politics o f Discourse in Cold W ar

Am erica, Paul fid w ards d esc r ib es this scene in m o r e deta i l ( 1 9 9 6 ) .

2. This is the m a jo r p rem ise o f D e r r id a ’ s ana lys is o f n u c lea r s t r a teg y (D e r r id a ,

1984) .5. See M acK enz ie ( 1 9 9 8 ) , C h ap te r 10, for an in t ro d u c to r y a c c o u n t o f t h e r m o ­

nuc lea r reac t ions .4 . A ‘ r a t e co n d i t io n ’ is used in c o m p u te r s c ience to desc r ib e s i tua t ions in wh ich

com pe t i t ion for access to som e re so u rc e by t w o in d ep en d en t ly e x e cu t in g

processes resu lts in un p red ic tab le , n o n -d e te rm in is t ic r e su lts . T h e in te r le av ing

o f the ir ope ra t ion s is re spons ib le for this in d e te rm in a c y .

5. On the ro le o f vec to r p rocesso rs in s u p e r c o m p u te r a r c h i t e c tu r e , see M ac-

Ken/ie ( 1 9 9 8 , 102 3).

86

The technicity of time: 1 .0 0 oscillation/second to 9 ,1 9 2 ,6 3 1 ,7 7 0 Hz

[T ]he s im p le p e n d u lu m d o e s not n a tu r a l l y p ro v id e an

a c c u r a t e an d e q u a l m e a s u r e of t im e s in ce its w id e r m o t io n s

a r e o b s e r v e d to be s l o w e r th an its n a r r o w e r m o t io n s . But

by a g e o m e t r i c a l m e th o d w e have fount) a d i f fe ren t and

p r e v io u s l y u n k n o w n w a y to su sp e n d th e p e n d u lu m ; and w e

have d i s c o v e r e d a l in e w h o s e c u r v a t u r e is m a r v e lo u s l y and

q u i t e r a t io n a l l y su i te d to g iv e the r e q u i r e d e q u a l i t y to the

p e n d u lu m . A f t e r a p p ly in g th is l in e to c lo c k s , w e h ave found

th a t t h e i r m o t io n is so a c c u r a t e and c o n s tan t th a t , a f te r

m a n y e x p e r i m e n t s on bo th lan d and sea , it is n o w o bv iou s

th a t t h e y a r e v e r y u s e fu l fo r in v e s t ig a t io n s in a s t r o n o m y

a n d fo r th e a r t o f n a v ig a t io n . . . . O f i n t e r e s t to us is w h a t

w e h av e c a l l e d th e p o w e r of th is l in e to m e a s u r e t im e ,

w h ic h w e fo u n d n o t b y e x p e c t i n g th is but o n ly by fo l lo w in g

in th e fo o ts tep s o f g e o m e t r y .

Huygens, 1658

T h e s e c o n d is th e d u r a t io n o f 9 , 1 9 2 , 6 3 1 , 7 7 0 p e r io d s o f the

r a d ia t io n c o r r e s p o n d in g to th e t r a n s i t io n b e t w e e n the t w o

h y p e r f in e l e v e l s o f th e g r o u n d s ta te o f th e c a e s i u m - H i

a to m .

B la i r , 19 7 4

Three hundred years separate these tw o technical definitions of the second. The definitions both re ly on oscillations ot some kind that of a pendulum , that of the radiation em itted by caesium atoms. Two

8 7

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

different technological objects a pendulum clock built lor Christiaan Huygens in 1658 and an atom ic clock dating from the 1950s, and forming the basis of currcn t global t im ing standards d irect ly im p lem ent the- definit ions. ’ An infrastructure that now includes sate l­lites stands behind the definit ions. By v irtue of the sheer mult ip licat ion of clocks in many different forms, c lockt im e m ay w e ll be the most ubiquitous of modern technical infrastructures , ff you had to choose a genuine universal associated with technology , c lockt im e w ou ld be a good candidate. Clocks arc- deep ly em bedded in diverse scientif ic, cu ltura l , institutional, econom ic and m il ita ry rea l i t ies , and embodied 1 1 j 1 in various ‘body c locks ’ and ‘clock ch ips’ . C lock-faces are in t im ate ly w o v e n into nearly every possible contex t. Through technological ensembles such as the Global Positioning System , c lock-signals impal- pably criss-cross every point on the ea r th ’s surface.

The contrast betw een these tw o different definitions of a second can be read as a symptom ol the much broader perception concerning tim e and technology that has a lready been broached in the previous chapter: through technology, too much happens too fast. Speaking very broadly , technological .speed can g ive the impression that the future is c losed, and that any exper ience of t im e grounded in duration and m em ory has been lost. Living m em ory appears to be threatened by instantaneous retr ievab il i ty . The com plex rhythms of lived t im e are about to be overridden by the acce lerat ing tem po ol biotechnical interventions. Responding to this p rob lem , there is even a well-pub l ic ized pro ject in California, curren tly running under the nam e of ‘The C lock of the Long N o w ’ , to slow clown cultura l change by bu ild ing a c lock that w ill run for 10 ,000 years and provide at least symbolic stabil ity and longevity amidst the increasing ephem era l i ty of g loba lly resonant communication systems (Brand, 1999). The principal architects and sponsors of the project are com puter engineers and artists, not critics of technology. The contrast be tw een 1.0 osci l lat ion/second and9 ,1 9 2 ,6 3 1 ,7 7 0 If/, can easily be in terpreted as a sym ptom of how human tim e is being lost to an inhuman, g lobaliz ing , technological ‘t im e ’ . This time cannot be lived as such because its rhythms fall beneath the threshold of consciousness perception . Its measure is synchronized around the earth , and because technical performances are so often expressed in time-based term s (k i lom etres/hour , kiloherz,

88

T H E T E C H N I C I T Y O F T I M E .

m egahcrz , g igaherz , mill iseconds, m icroseconds, nanoseconds, ‘teraf- lops ’ , e tc . ) , many con tem porary technical mediations relv on an i'vcr- p resent c lockt im e. C locktim e torms a basic infrastructural e lem ent ol contem porary technology. C locks time- bodies, and machines, and m ed ia te their linkages in diverse ways . The question is: how can the e lem en tary technical mediat ion of c lockt im e becom e the object of a m ore differentiated and reflex ive response? Chapter 2 broached the problem of separation be tw een tw o l im it artefacts (the hand-axe and the therm onuc lear bomb). This chapter focuses on one highly concen­trated domain of technical m ediat ion: c lockt im e over the last 3 50 years . It exp lores one possible response to the multip lication of oscillations by re -read ing c lockt im e in term s of a concept of t e c h n i c i t y

draw n from the w ork of the French philosopher, Gilbert Simondon (S im ondon, 1958/ 1989a, 1 9 6 4 / 1989b, 1995).

The pendulum clock and the a tomic clock are technical objects. M ore specifically, they em body technical mediations concerning the tem pora l and spatial sequencing of events. They stand between other en tit ies , l iv ing and non-liv ing, which together constitute a c o l l e c t i v c . As w e have seen in ea r l ie r chapters , technical mediations knit social re lat ions within human groups to non-liv ing processes. In pre l im inary te rm s , ‘ techn ic i ty ’ refers to a specific v irtual ity or eventfulness associ­ated w'ith this in terw eav ing o f living and non-liv ing strands. At the risk of simplifying, it could be said that technic ity is a term for the historical mode ot ex is tence of technical mediations. Technicity involves an event or inherently unstable genesis occurr ing at the limits ot human- non-human collect ives . As an evolutive or unfolding pow er, technic ity s tructures p art icu la r technical objects, ensembles (such as the pendulum or atom ic clock) and liv ing bodies as provisional solutions to the problem of how an ensem ble of liv ing and non-living processes art iculates its own temporal and topological limits. It precedes and overflows particu lar technological objects or social func­tions. Part icu lar technological objects or technological ensembles are, in S im ondon ’s te rm s, ‘objectivations of techn ic i ty ’ (S imondon, 1958/ 1989a, 163).

To speak of the t e c h n i c i t y of t im e implies an evolutive, genetic process subject to objectivation (for instance, in different clocks) and ‘subjectif ication’ (for instance, in various embodiments of c locktim e),

8 9

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

vet rem ain ing irreducib le to part icu lar technical trea tm ents . C o n ­verse ly , to focus on the technic ity ot c l o c k t im c is to suggest that the social o rder ing ol t im e , the scientif ic m anipulat ion of t im e as a fundamental d imension of physical system s, and the individual e x p e r i ­ence of t im e as imbricated in m em ory and antic ipation , all pass through me t a s t a b l e processes associated with c lockt im e as an ev e n t .2 Such an event may well escape historical dating practices or a technological history of clocks. Those practices and know ledges m ust, in o rder to begin their w ork , re ly on a certa in ensem ble of o ther technical mediations which are neither neutra l nor transparent in relat ion to t ime. Cl o ckt imc t e c h n i c i t y runs through the tw o exem p la ry objectivations of t im e under discussion: H uygen ’ s pendulum clock and the atomic clocks curren tly used, for instance, in the Global Positioning System (GPS) constructed at the orders of the US D epartm ent of Defense. The first main section of this chapter highlights tw o m ore or less conventional accounts of c lockt im e which regard it as a sym ptom of the capture of time by modern social and technoscientific processes ot order ing events. The second section sketches a m ore nuanced approach to c lockt im e, taking into account both the technical specific it ies of t im ing reg im es and the d ivergent realit ies which unfold out of c lo ck ­t im e . The final section develops this approach into an expl ic it account of the technic ity of c lockt im e as an ongoing differentiation or genesis occurr ing at the limits o f .sociotechnical collect ives.

M O D E R N T E C H N O L O G Y AN D TH E L O SS OF TIM E

A symbolic connection runs betw een H uygens ’ pendu lum clock and the dozens of atomic clocks installed in the GPS. On the one hand, the pendulum clock offers an e lem en ta ry symbol of incip ient techno­logical g lobalization, w h ile on the other , the atom ic clock symbolizes the completion of a certa in kind of geotechnical g lobalizat ion. A lready

in H uygens ’ book of 1673 , w here he sets out a geom etr ica l deduction of the isochronism of the p en d u lu m ’s oscillations, the im portance of clocks to sovere ignty , to navigation and astronom y is at the forefront. In dedicating The P e nd u l u m Clock, o r G e om e t r i c a l D em on s t r a t i o n s Co n c e r n i n g

t h e Mot i o n o f Pe ndu la as App l i e d t o Cl o cks , to Louis XIV, Huygens writes :

9 0

T H E T E C H N I C I T Y O F T I M E

[F]or since m y clocks w ere judged w orthy to be placed in the private chambers ot your palace, you are aw are Irom dailv expe r i ­ence how much better they are in displaying equal hours than other such instrum ents . Further you are not unaware of the more specialised uses which I intended for them from the beginning. For exam p le , they are especia lly well suited for celestia l observations and tor m easuring the longitudes ol various locations bv navigators. (1 98 6 , 8)

The pendulum clock links the private chambers of the kina to the peripheries of em p ire and colonies. Otto Mavr writes : ‘ Princes and the ir courts led the w ay . Courts , w ith their com plex ceremonia ls and the ir m any- layered staff hierarchies dem anded punctuality . . . . The clock becam e an attr ibute of nob il i ty ’ (M avr , 1986 , 16 17). It secures the possibil ity ot moving betw een the centre and periphery , bv capturing invariant oscillations to mark the time and providing a technical realization ot a universal , coordinated t im e and length. The pendulum clock m odulates the incipient m ovem ent of globalization bv establishing the possibil ity of a g lobally valid m easurem ent system. The atomic clock, by contrast, affords an image of the completion of g lobalization, at least in relation to navigation, in the guise of the Global Positioning System (GPS) which relies on many atomic clocks

located in orbiting satell ites and in a netw ork of ground stations. As Paul Viril io w ro te :

A new type of watch has been on the m arket tor a while now in the United States. The watch does not tell you the t im e ; it tells you wh e r e you are . Ca l led the GPS an abbreviation for Globa l Po s i t i o n i ng

Sy s t em — this little everyday object probably constitutes the event ot the decade as far as globalization of location goes. (1995a , 155)

It is not c lear w hether GPS did constitute the event of the decade. A recent art ic le on GPS rem arks that ‘the history of GPS is a classic caseJ

ot a technology in search of a m a rk e t ’ ( Tristram, 1999, 70). On the other hand, the Presidentia l D irective on GPS signed into law bv President C linton in 1996 guarantees some ongoing life for GPS.

9 '

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

Nonetheless, GPS, with all the clocks it puts into orb it, aptly symbolizes the ‘globalization of locat ion ’ referred to by V iril io . Its exactitude now reveals unpredictable variations in the revolutions of the earth itself. Many different narratives of progress , technological evolution, a lienation or epochal shilts could form the backdrop to this perception ol the globalization ot c lockt im e , and its suppression of d i l le rent perceptions or exper iences of t im e . In broad te rm s , H e ideg ­g e r ’s v iew expresses a typical objection that the tw en t ie th cen tu ry of critical theory and philosophy had to d o c k t im e :

But t ime cannot be lound anyw here in the watch that indicates t im e , neither on the dial nor in the m echan ism , nor can it be found in modern technological chronom eters . T he assertion forces itself upon us: the more technological the m ore exact and informative

the chronom eter , the less occasion to give thought first of all to t im e ’s peculiar character. (1 9 7 2 , 12)

Consistently through his w o rk , H eidegger insists that clocks provide no insight into t i m e . ’ The reasons for this are com plex and requ ire ex tended discussion. In sum m ary , H e idegger provides an ex trem e ly powerful account ol the ways in which t im e marks a l im it for thought. W h ile the links he makes betw een tem pora l i ty , being, thought and historv shift somewhat in the course of his w ork , it is a lw ays the

J 1 J

exter iorizat ion o r objectification o f tem pora l i ty as t im e that he qu es ­tions. C locktim e figures as a centra l instance of that objectification. It is coupled to modern science and the subject ob ject d istinction. C locktim e glosses over the unstable in terp lay of being. In his te rm s, we cannot speak of t im e itself on the one hand and the modalit ies of consciousness apprehending the flux of t im e on the other w ithou t lapsing back into a metaphysics of subjectiv ity . O nly a single process of temporalization occurs. It is composed of com plex m ovem ents of anticipation and repetit ion through which provisional forms of stabil ity , practice, institution, subjectiv ity , m em ory and historical ex istence unfold. Against this sophisticated fram ew ork , the core objection to clocks is s imple. Through clocks and c lockt im e , attention shifts away from the coalescent and em ergen t character of tem pora l i ty . Not just clocks, but modern technical mediat ions m ore gene ra l ly , deflect

92

T H E T E C H N I C I T Y O F T I M E

attention from the deep and intricate in termesh ing of t im e , bodies and thought. Through m odern technologies of t im ing , profound differences in history, tradition and hence cultural ex istence are lost.

C L O C K T IM E AS S O C IA L IN V E N T IO N ?

As an alternative to this crit ical repudiat ion of the technical mediations of t im e , w e could , for instance, understand c locktim e as a social event or invention. This is the thesis of Norbert Elias, when he w rites:

By the use of a c lock, a group of people , in a sense, transmits a message to each of its individual m em bers . The physical dev ice is so a rranged that it can function as a transm itter of messages and thereby as a means of regu lat ing behaviour within a group. (1993 ,

15)

Clocks from this perspective are ‘s imply mechanical movements of a specific type , em p loyed by people' for their own ends ’ (p. 1 IS). '1 The notion of t im e as a ‘ re la t ive ly m ore unitary hum an-centred concept’ (p. 115) effectively presents c lockt im e as a sociosvmbolic invention concerncd with m ore precise ly regu lat ing and coordinating the repe t i­tion of social phen om en a .4 In Elias’ rich account, the problem of how technology accelerates the exper ience of t im e can onlv be understood in term s of the ‘specific capacity of people for envisaging together and, thus, for connecting to each other what happens “ear l ie r” and what happens “la ter”, what “before” and what “n o w ” in a sequence of events ’ (p. 74 ) . The ‘ sociocentr ic ’ nature of t im e consists of the use of repetit ive , usually inorganic sequences (rang ing from the movement of a shadow during the course o f the dav to the hands or digits of a c lock) for the symbolic representation of non-repeatable social sequences. The very ex istence o f t im e , bv this account, is a social artefact of the num bering or o rder ing ol sequences in synchronized relation to each other, and this in turn relies on physical phenomena that display num erab le repetit ion . l im in g technologies display sequences of m arks through which social groups code sequences ol events. So, accord ing to Elias, looking at a watch:

1

[W ]e read and experience- the changing configuration of these moving units on the lace of a watch in term s such as ‘ five m inutes past seven ’ or ‘ten m inutes and th irty-five seconds’ . In that wav, moving configurations of marks used for t im ing events are trans ­formed by social customs of the beholders into symbols of instances in the flux of incorporeal ‘t im e ’ which , according to a com m on use ol the te rm , appears to run its course independently ot both any physical m ovem ent and any human beholder, (p. 120)

T he ‘social customs ol the beho lders ’ as w e ll as the ‘ specific capac ity ’ of people to envisage sequences o f events are responsib le for the em ergence of autonomous physical t im e . T im e a pp e a r s to have an ex istence independent of social customs, but in rea l i ty it is g rounded on the social acts of t im ing or dating by which phenom ena are semiotically related. The only problem w'ith what Elias suggests here is the nature of the transformation be tw een different social t im ing reg im es. W h ile he says that ‘the significance of this em ergence [of autonomous d o ck t im e ] can hardly be o ve rra ted ’ (p. I I S ) , the specifi­city of the artefact which connects events in a sequence (the clock) does not figure either in the social customs or in the specific capacity to envisage ( i .e . rem em ber) tem pora l orderings. The lines betw een bodies, things, society and nature are secured.

C l O C K T IM E AS T E C H N IC A L . M E D IA TIO N

In such a sum m ary account ol tw o quite different perspectives on d o ck t im e , s tereotypes are hard to avoid. Despite that, H e id egge r ’ s and Elias’ approaches have affinities. Neither have any w ay o f affirming the interval be tw een 1 osci l lat ion/second and 9 bill ion oscillations/ second. Either it must be regarded as destruct ive ly superficial in relation to the real problem of how to think (H e idegger) , or it must be accepted as deriv ing from social a rrangem ents which , so to speak, are ‘more r e a l ’ (Elias). To speak of the technic ity o f c lockt im e is to try to offer some way of com prehend ing the m ult ip licat ion that has occurred betw een 1 osci l lat ion/second and roughly 9 bill ion osci l la­tions/second without repudiat ing the ro le of technical m ediat ions.

In one important respect , a lead on the techn ic ity of d o ck t im e

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

94

comes from recent w ork on the role of technical mediations in the formation of co llect ives . As w e saw in Chapter 2, accounts ot technical mediat ion such as Bruno Latour ’ s We Hav e Ne ve r Be e n Mod e rn argue that the broadlv m odern habit of th inking in term s ot a radical break be tw een the social and the natural (or betw een subject and object, sign and thing, . . .) tac it ly perm its technical mediations to multip ly . Because technical mediat ions cannot be d irec t ly figured as integral to the life of the co llect ive , because they are a lways seen as mere supplements to a core social rea l i ty , the co llect ive work that they represen t constantly recedes from view . W e have so much ‘tech­no lo gy ’ , com parative ly speaking, because the co llect ive is try ing to catch its own tail. From Latour ’s perspective , ‘ it . . . our [modern] constitution authorizes anyth ing, it is sure ly the accelerated socializa­tion of [technical] nonhumans, because it never a llows them to appear as e lem ents of “real socie ty” ’ (1 9 9 3 , 42 ) . C erta in ly the representative positions 1 have sketched around H e idegger ’ s and Elias’ w o rk conform to this judgem ent. In both Fte idegger’ s ‘the m ore exact the clock, the less occasion to g ive thought to t im e ’ , and Elias’ ‘w e read the clock as symbols of instances in the flux of incorporeal t im e ’ , c locktim e always remains secondary to a m ore pr im ary ontological or social reality . It c locktim e is a lw ays seen as a deaden ing ot lived t im e , then all the technical objects and ensem bles which structure themselves around c locktime risk being excluded at the same t ime. Given the pervasive­ness o f c lockt im e, this outcom e constitutes a genera l d isengagement with technology.

Bringing a transductive approach to a specific case such as clocktime entails apprehending clocks as a technical mediat ion which does not measure or adm in ister a pregiven social o r n a t u r a l t im e or space, but which constitutes a reg im e of tim ings and spacings from w hich society and nature , t im e and space unfold. To be sure , clocks are not alone in defining t im e . Every technical m ediat ion , insofar as it folds, deforms and shifts relat ions be tw een living and non-liv ing e lements ot a sociotechnical ensem ble , ‘eventa l izes ’ times and spaces. In this emer- gentist perspect ive , the ‘t im e ’ ot a medieval castle and the ‘t im e ’ ot a high-speed train are not the same because ot the different topological and tem pora l folds they w eave into collect ives (Latour, 1997, 179). The specificity of clocks and c lockt im e consists only in their special

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

status as guarantors ol a certa in reg im e of homogeneous t im e (iso- chrony) and homogeneous space (isotopv). Subsequent bifurcations into objective and subjective times only gain traction through the increm ental synchronization ot m ore and m ore clocks. To quote Latour:

This does not mean that w e are in an isotopic space and an isochronic t im e , but that locally , i n s i d e m etro log ica l chains, there are c j j c c t s ot isochrony and isotopy produced by the carefu lly m onitored and heavily institutionalised c irculation of objects that remain relat ively untransformed through transportat ion . . . rods, hands of clocks, gears and s tructura l isomorphics. (1 99 7 , 185)

In other words , there is no space and t im e apart from the technical mediations through which se lected events oscillations and inscrip­tions, in the case ot c lockt im e are l inked. (The very axes of synchrony and diachrony which have organized w ide domains o f recen t crit ical thought could appear quite different if w e took this perspective seriously enough .) th e specificity ot clocks as ‘metro log ica l chains undergoes reconfiguration here since they now function as w'hat Simondon calls ‘kcy-po in ts ’ [p o i n t - c l e f s ] from which times and spaces unfold.

An exam p le of this analysis in action can be lound in Bovvker (1 99 5 ) . He states the problem succinctly : ‘ It is unprob lem atic to say that societies with differing configurations ot econom ic and techno lo ­gical deve lopm ent have (l ittering ways of understanding and rep re sen t­ing time and space. The problem begins when one tr ies to move out from this s tatement in any d irec t io n ’ (p. 47 ) .

Through his discussion ot n ineteenth-century technological infra­structures such as railways and factories (technical mediat ions that lie within the interval under discussion here ) , B ow ker accounts for the c o n v e r g e n c e of a neutral isotropic space t im e com pounded w ith large- scale patterns of social organization. The crucial implicat ion for our purposes would be that the interval betw een 1 osci l la t ion/second anti 9 bil lion oscillations/second stems Irom the w ay that infrastructural technologies such as ra i lw ays are constantly ‘con juring n a tu re ’ into a

9 6

T H E T E C H N I C I T Y O F 7 I M F

particu lar representational f ram ew ork in which time and spate are universal and neutra l (Bovvker, 1995 , 63).

Nonetheless, there is at least one point at which it mav be necessarv to d iverge from this line of thought. As ye t , it has been difficult lor this fruitful and consequentia l body of w ork to affirm ongoing d y ­namism or instability in sociotechnical collect ives other than as a consequence of our own inability or unwill ingness to expl ic it ly think and represent technical mediations (hence I a to u r ’s semi-ironic p ro­posal f o r a ‘Par l iam ent of T h ings ’ (Latour, 1993, 142 5)). Latour, for instance, says that once w e recognize the constitutive role played bv technical m ediat ions , w e w ill then be able to ‘sort t im es ' (Latour, 1993, 76 ). This suggests that, despite the m utability ot almost every o ther relation or en tity , times could be taken as rem ain ing stable.*’ If times (in the sense ol the o rder ing of series) remain stable, proper representation could put the sociotechnical ensembles in which w e live back on a stable footing. Ultimately ’, instability is e ither stabil ized, or ephemera l.

The crit ical and sociocentric accounts ol c lockt im e view the interval be tw een the pendulum clock and the a tomic clock as stem m ing from e ither (a) a genera l loss of t im e attr ibutable to m odern technology; or (b) a particu lar social habit of overlooking how social relations symbolically o rder events. W h ile Latour ’s approach departs radically from these tw o accounts , it tends to say that the effects of technological speed result from a failure to proper ly represent the role of non­human technical mediations in stabil izing ephemera l events as essences ( i .e . ‘the t im e ’ ) with in sociotechnical collect ives . Despite crucial differences from H eidegger and LTias, the interval betw een 1.0 osci lla­t ion/second and 9 ,1 9 2 ,6 31 ,770 Hz still derives from a failure to think, and instability is a lw ays transient, not ongoing. W h ile l atour mav be compelling in his judgem ent of the m o d e rn i ty ’s inability to represent its own deep ly technical m ediated constitution, it would be somewhat more ‘enab ling ’ if the under representation ot the technical mediation ot time was not so le ly attr ibuted to a failure, and it instability was not always secondary to stabil ity . Som etimes it seems that behind this assessment, there is an implic it promise that stabil ity is the norm and instabil ity the deviation . Perhaps an account that emphasizes structural instabil ity or m etastab ility would also be ot interest.

97

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

T E C H N IC IT Y AND I S O C H R O N IS M : M E C H A N IS M A N D G E O G R A P H Y

Clocktim c hardly seems a promising p lace to envisage ongoing instab il­ity or metastability since it ep itom izes regu lar ity and stab il ity . The growth of this regu lar ity , stabil ity and au tonom y, I w il l a rgue , offers a key instance o f the oscil latory or m odu lat ing aspect o f technical mediations when they are understood as em erg ing from an art iculat ion of diverse realities. Following and ex tend ing Latour ’ s account of a technical mediat ion as an e v e n t m ight bring us c loser to the mult ip lica- tory rhythms of c locktim e as evolutive p ow er of d ivergence . Clock- t im e ’ s mode of ex istence as technic ity is pure ly ne ither social nor technical. In an art ic le entit led ‘T im e and R epresen ta t ion ’ , Isabelle Stengers and Didier Gille expla in how tim e ean appear to be or become autonomous through clocks (S tengers and Gille , 1997). They too speak of the division betw een social and natural/sc ientif ic t imes , but they discuss how the split be tw een social and scientific times eventuates through the specificity o f a part icu lar technical artefact, the pendulum clock. Their com plex account of the relation b e tw een t im e and the technical specificity of clocks in troduces considerations that will be useful in thinking of the evolutive or d ivergent character of the technic ity ol c locktim e. j

M E C H A N IC A L IS O C H R O N IS M

Stengers and Gille describe an historical process out of which the social, scientific, natural and technical phenom ena of t im ing unfold: ‘the concrete object whose in troduction marks the estab lishm ent of an autonomous law of t im e can be m ore prec ise ly identified w ith the pendulum clock that Christiaan Huygens constructed in 1 6 5 8 ’ (S ten ­gers and Gille, 1997, 18 3). Natural t im e and social t im e are only the abstract poles of a zone ol interaction which can be optim al ly read in terms of the technical specificity of the pendu lum clock. H uygens ’ pendulum provides a point of inflection or ‘ intr insic s ingu lar i ty ’ ( l )e leuze , 1993, 1 5) for the technic ity o f c lockt im e. Stengers and Gille write :

98

T H E T E C H N I C I T Y O F T I M E

It is usually c la imed that G alileo 's d iscovery ol the law of pendular motion [the corre lat ion betw een the length of a pendulum and the period ol its oscillation] at last gave a scientific solution to the technical p rob lem of the m easurem ent ol t im e . . . . H owever, Galileo did not produce such a mechanism : the free pendulum is a pure phenomenon; the oscillations need to be counted and the m ovem ent periodica lly restarted . (S tengers and Gilles, 1997 , 185)

The passage cited at the outset from H uygens ’ Pe n d u l u m Clock verifies the last point. H uygens w r ites , ‘ the simple pendulum does not provide an accurate and equal m easure of t im e . . . . (W|e have found a different and previously unknow n w ay to suspend the p en du lum ’ (1986 , 11). W h i le his way of suspending the pendulum is not absolutely singular, the pendulum clock possesses a technical specificity that distinguishes it from previous t im e-m easur ing techniques such as the foliot clock found in medieval c lock tow ers . Huygens points to this when he declares that he has unexpected ly found a different way to s u s p e n d the pendulum. M echanica lly , ‘the foliot c lock . . . appeared as a com plex in which everyth ing partic ipated in the definit ion of the speed of the clock hands, w ithou t it being possible to specifically identify one e lem ent as regu lator ' (S tengers and G ille , 1997 , 184). W ith the pendulum clock, ‘the work of the c lockm akers w il l large ly consist of d isconnecting, as much as possible, the pendu lum -regu la to r from the rest ol the m echan ism ’ (p. 186). The decoup ling of the pendulum from the rest of the c lockw ork takes various forms recoil escapem ent, deadbeat escape­m ent, free escapem ent, constant force escapement vet all these forms head in the d irection of presenting the isochronic osc illations of the pendulum as an em bod im ent o f ‘the t im e ’ . The rem ainder of the mechanism becomes a means of e ither displaying information about the time or co rrecting for the tact that the pendulum itself is never ideal, that it a lways suffers from frict ion, and that, m ore im portant ly , as Huygens points out, the period of a simple pendulum varies according to the driv ing force of the c lockw ork . If the pendulum can be isolated from these variations, then t im e itself can appear to be separate from its technical realization. Through isochronic oscillation, the pendulum can exist as the autonomous em bodiment of natural or physical t im e . '

99

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

G E O G R A P H IC A L IS O T O P IS M

The series of escapements tends to isolate the pendulum from all variations, so that it becomes a pure source of information tor the work carried out by the clock in moving its hands. But this isolation only makes sense if the motions ol the pendulum have m ore than local value. W h ile , as Galileo recogn ized , the motions of the pendu lum are more or less isochronic so that they can help establish proportional relations betw een speeds, they rem ain localized if their period is not standardized. Thus, w r ite Stengers and G ille , ‘the [earlier] pendulum clock developed by Huygens in 1657 had a period ot oscillation ot 0 .7 4 3 seconds. This num ber had no r a i s on d ' e t r e o ther than it co rres ­ponds to a particu lar set of co gw h ee ls ’ (p. 190). The m etro log ica l chain ol c locktim e can only be ex tended it the oscillations of the pendulum can be tied to .something else. H uygens, deve lop ing the relationship betw een pendulum length and the period of the pendu lum , in 1658 constructed a clock that beats once per second. The g e o m e t ­rical (and hence heavily d i a g r a m m a t i c ) proof of the isochronic oscillation of the pendulum ot this clock was published as The P e n du l u m Clock in 1673. Furtherm ore , it includes instructions on how to standardize the hours measured bv the clock to the revo lu tion ot the earth on its a x is .s The oscillations of the pendulum becom e geom etr ica l ly and geograph­ically isochronic; thereafter , m ovem ent ol the cogw hee ls is subordinate to the length of the pendu lum , itself ca librated by the regu lar ity of the ea r th ’ s revolutions. No longer express ing the re lat ive speeds of phenomena, the time o f the pendulum clock becomes autonom ous or, at least, it w ill be rep resen ted as being autonom ous. The constitution of the second as a unit of t im e coupled to the e a r th ’ s revolutions a llows it to claim independence trom all terrestr ia l locality . It is now identified with the e a r th ’ s d iurnal revolution rather than the alternation of day and ni^ht, or the apparent m ovem ent ot the stars, which vary seasonally and from place to place . W hereas the foliot c lock of the medieval clock to w er procla imed variable hours adjusted to fit the varying length ol the solar dav at particu lar p laces, the pendu lum clock measuring the standard second displays constant hours, regard less ot the time of year or the location of the clock. As Stengers and Gille observe, ‘objective, regu lar , normalized t im e , ex ist ing by and for

i oo

itself, is born , uncoupled from what is now no more than the straightjacket of phenom ena ’ (p. 191). The cost ot normalized time is a strengthened relationship betw een the p en d u lu m ’s and the ea r th ’s m ovements .

At the end of The P e n du l u m Clo ck , Huygens goes on to propose that a g lobal standard ot m easurem ent should be deriv ed from the pendu­lum clock. Again the connection betw een tim ing and spacing is unavoidable, and the pendulum clock ends up looking like a precursor ot the global clock system that GPS im plem ents :

A certa in and perm anent m easure of magnitudes, which is not subject to chance modifications and which cannot be abolished, corrupted , or dam aged bv the passage of t im e , is a most useful th ing which many have sought for a long t ime. . . . [Tjhis measure is easily established bv means of our c lock, w ithout which this eitherJ

could not be done or else could be done only with great difficulty. (H uygens, 1986 , 167)

The method that Huygens otters as the basis of a universal, atemporal standard of length involves tuning a simple unregulated pendu lum ’s oscillations to the regu lated oscillations of the pendulum clock bv adjusting its length. The length o f the synchronized simple pendulum will be the universal ‘hour-foot’ , a length that w ill be the same at all places which share the t im e of the pendulum clock. Such a measure would have been valid ev e ryw h ere and ‘ for ages to com e ' as Huygens hoped, if there w ere not variations in gravity at different points on the earth ’s surface.

This proposal tor a universal m easure opens a continuous path from the oscillations o f the pendulum clock to the oscillations ot the atomic clocks used in GPS, even il it is convoluted and full of fluctuations. In ‘ the ages to co m e ’ mentioned bv Huvgens, when tor instance the m easurement ol distances is carr ied out through GPS, a local un regu­lated oscil lator in a rece iver (a quartz, c lock) is tuned to the regulated oscillators ot the atom ic clocks in at least three GPS satell ites. Synchronization is now no longer carried out bv hand and eves, but via a set of circuits in the rece iver which m odulate the local oscillator of the GPS rece iver until it coincides with the oscillations being

i o 1

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

transm itted by the GPS satell ites (Kaplan, 1996 , 121). The location ot the rece iver is de term ined by finding the intersection of the distances from those' three satell ites. The oscillations stretch b e tw een the pendulum clock and GPS: the speeding up betw een 1.0 and 9 ,1 9 2 ,6 31 ,770 oscillations/second requ ires that one oscil la tor be tuned to another oscillator of known period in o rder to synchronize the oscillations, to allow them to resonate w ith each other. Perhaps, one important aspect of what w e exper ience as globalization today is the cum ulat ive effect of the synchronization of d ispersed osci l la t ions.9 Heightening the suspension even further, the a tomic clocks orb it ing in the GPS satell ites are themselves synchronized u lt im ate ly to another global t im ing standard: U TC , Universal Coord inated T im e . U TC exists nowhere as such; there is no single m aster c lock. U TC is a ‘paper s tandard ’ , w ith no concrete em bod im ent apart from the statistical procedures used to corre la te and synchronize several dozen atomic clocks scattered around the g lobe (Kaplan, 1996, 55).

In broad term s, the technical specificity of the pendulum clock begins to reveal some singularit ies that the other accounts of m odern technology and time had to vary ing degrees denied it. Stengers and G il les ’ a rgum ent does not present the pendu lum clock as de term in ing what t im e , in the form of c lockt im e, is. Rather , it seeks to show how the em ergence ot autonom ous c lockt im e , or the ‘physical t im e ’ which Elias described as ‘branching o ff ’ from social t im e , requ ires a specific and localized decoupling o f pendulum and c lockw ork together w ith a specific ye t genera l ized coupling of the pendulum with an associated m il ieu , the revolutions of the earth and its gravitational field. Through a p en du lum ’s suspension, and the resu lt ing mechanical isochronism of its oscillations, c locktim e can appear as the em bod im ent of autonomous t im e . Through synchronization of oscillating pendu lum s, the pendu­lu m ’s oscillations geographical ly d istr ibute c lockt im e and serve as a way of establishing spatial re lations betw een distant places.

M ETA ST A B IL IT Y : F R O M IS O C H R O N IS M T O EVEN T

In term s of the three different perspectives on c lockt im e discussed above, we could ask: is this tuning or resonance b e tw een dispersed oscillators best understood as the homogeneous ex tension of the

I 0 2

T H E T E C H N I C I T Y O F T I M E

essence ol m odern technology , as the transmission of a message- regu lat ing behaviour w ithin a social g rouping, or as the institution of an ‘ im m utable m o b i le ’ , an entitv which can maintain some form of constancy as it is translated across different contexts (Latour, 1997, 180)? It m ight be something of all these. All three emphasize stabil ity and hom ogeneity w ith in an expanding co llect ive . Later technical deve lopm ents of the pendulum clock, especia lly dur ing the eighteenth and nineteenth cen tur ies , concentrate on refin ing the isochronism of the pendulum over a w ide r range of m ilieus, taking into account variations in a ir pressure and tem peratu re (H o u se , 1980). W hen the oscil lator becomes p iezo-e lectr ic , as in the case of the quartz crystal oscillator in the ea r ly tw en t ie th cen tu ry , or a tom ic as in the GPS of the late 1980s, this is partly an a t tem pt to maintain isochronism over an ever w ider range of m ilieus. The technical problem remains constant throughout: how can the isochronic constraint necessary for au tonom ­ous tim e be mainta ined over a w id e r range of milieus? From the perspective of the technical history of clocks, it can only be maintained if the clock can stabil ize itself in the face of new sources of variation.

H ow ever , from the perspective of technic itv , and for an understand­ing of the d ivergence symbolized by the interval be tw een 1.0 and9 ,1 9 2 ,6 3 1 ,7 7 0 oscillations per second, m e t a s t a b i l i t y , rather than s t a b i l i t y , is crucia l . So far, this account of the technicitv of clocktime has m ain ly concerned the s t ab i l i z a t i o n of an autonomous tim e through isochronic oscillation. 1 w'ant to focus now on an ongoing me t a s t a b i l i t y

associated w ith c lockt im e . The emphasis that Huygens himself places on the s u s p e n s i o n of the pendulum and, in particu lar , on the precise geom etrica l description of the tw o curved plates which lim it the motion of the pendu lum , can be understood from the perspective of metastability .

Mctastabilitv refers to the provisional equ i l ib r ium established when a system rich in potentia l differences resolves inherent incompatibil ities by restructur ing itse lf topologica lly and tem pora lly (S imondon, 1958/ 1989a, 154 5). In S im ondon ’s p referred exam p le of a physical m eta ­stabil ity, a super-saturated chemical solution begins to crystall ize. As it does, it ‘ ind iv iduates ’ : some s ingular point an im purity , a seed crystal in the solution perm its the solution to restructure itself as a g row ing crysta l. The crystal structures the energet ic potentials of the

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

solution (Simondon, 1 9 64 / 199 5 , 24 ). At the point o f crysta ll ization , the solution is mctastable. The grow th of the crystal represents a provisional resolution of the potential differences that p recede it.

1 here are significant differences betw een a super-saturated solution and a sociotechnical co llect ive . Yet considering the fact that the collect ives w e are ta lk ing about ex tensive ly couple living and non­living processes, there are points of contact here . C lock t im c as it moves betw een 1 oscillation and 9 bill ion oscillations per second can be seen as a temporal and topological o rder ing that continues to unfold from a metastability . I he w ay in which c lockt im e incorporates new sources o f variation, and restructures itself in the process, can be com pared to the provis ional resolution that a crystal represents tor the metastable super-saturated solution. The question is: what mctastability are we ta lking about here? W hat v i r t u a l l y (to u s e L a tour ’s term (Latour, 1997, 190), who draw s it trom the w o rk of Gilles Deleuze (199 3), who in turn perhaps bo rro w ed it from Simondon) inhabits the acce lerat ing tra jectory o f c lockt im e?

By framing metastability in te rm s of our ow n co llect ive invo lvem ent with things, it might be possible to preserve certa in valuable e lem ents of the three approaches rep resen ted by 1 le id egger , Elias and Latour, and to add something w orthw h ile , f ro m H eidegger comes an insistence on tem pora li ty as concomitant of any attem pt to think what is. Tem pora li ty a llows H eidegger to think radical f in itude; that is, as historical ex istence in the absence of absolute loundations. In Elias’ w ork , the social or group character of t im ing finds expression . His work alludes to the historical ly variable constitution of tim ing reg im es, and their d iverse social functions w ith in social groups. Latour provides something different again: the ‘dark m a t te r ’ ot the societies we inhabit consists of the manifold technic al mediat ions that stabil ize the collect ive so that something like history and tim e becom es possible. W e might now be in a position to add something at the intersect ion ot these very different approaches: the metastability of our co llect ive invo lvem ent with c locktim e.

i 0 4

T H E T E C H N I C I T Y O F T I M E

L O C A L IZ A T IO N OF IN D E T E R M IN A C Y IN C R IT IC A L PH A SES

Let us locate this metastability m ore specifically. No m atter how ideal the motion of the pendulum becomes over a range of conditions, it still involves contact in which energy of some kind is converted into information d isp layed on the face of’ the clock. There are always moments ot contact b e tw een the pendulum and the c lockw ork it regu lates . As Stengers and C i l le suggest, the technical deve lopm ent of the pendulum and escapem ent tends to m inim ize the energy converted in this process, and to constrain it as a one-w ay process in which information flows trom the pendulum regu lator to the clock-face, but not the reverse . From the technical perspect ive , contact betw een the pendulum and the c lockw ork represents a deviation avvav from the ideal of the autonomous pendulum . Perfect suspension as an ideal seeks to disguise the technical constitution of c lockt im e. If an irreversible expend iture of ene rgy appears in the constitution of c lockt im e as pure information, then the autonomous character of t im e would be under th re a t .10

From the standpoint of the technic ity of c lockt im e, how ever , this transfer of energy is cr it ica l: the in term itten t m oments of contact constitute the m etastab ility o f the system . In effect, these moments constitute c lockt im c . S imondon describes the technicity of machines in general as a capacity to be repeated ly informed through a carefully staged ensem ble of crit ical phases:

[T]hc ex istence of a margin of indeterm inacy in machines should be understood as the ex istence of a certa in num ber ot critical phases in its functioning; a machine which can receive information tem porally localises its indeterm inat ion in sensible instants, rich in possibilities.. . . Machines which can receive information are those which localise their indeterm inat ion . (1 9 5 8 / 1 9 89 a , 141)

W hat was ear l ie r te rm ed the ‘decoup ling ’ of pendulum and c lockwork can now be described som ewhat differently . In Huvgens’ clock- machine of 1658 , the pendulum repeated ly comes into contact with a rod attached to the c lockw ork escapem ent: ‘ [Tjhe small rod . . .,

1 °5

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

w hich is moved very slightly by the force o f the [c lockwork] wheels , not only follows the pendulum which moves it, but also helps its motion for a short t im e dur ing each sw ing of the p en d u lu m ’ (H uygens , 1986, 16). Contact betw een the rod and the pendu lum localizes indetermination in a very specific w ay . The pendu lum , whose associ­ated energet ic m ilieu is the e a r th ’s gravitational fie ld, encounters the cogwheel gear-tra in of the c lockw ork , whose associated m il ieu en co m ­passes the rituals and protocols of the k ing ’s bed-cham ber , w here H uvgen ’s clock stands. Despite w orn or stick ing cogs, the pendulum ‘ inform s’ the rod of the period of its oscillations. D uring ‘the short t im e ’ , the pendulum enters into a com plicated and highly m ediated exchange with the potentia l energy stored in the weigh ts that drive the clock. The gravity-driven c lockw ork transfers some of its stored energy to the pendulum and, rec ip roca lly , the p en d u lu m ’ s oscillations inflect the rhythm of the c lo ck w o rk ’s m ovem ent. The ‘sensible instants, rich in possibil it ies’ that S imondon refers to occur dur ing the w aver ing , inconstant contact be tw een rod and pendu lum . O ut of the super­saturated , undifferentiated potentia ls of those instants, tw o divergent realities unfold, one facing tow ards a geograph ica l- terrestr ia l m il ieu (the e a r th ’s gravitational field), the other facing tow ards a social m il ieu of symbols , numbers and counting conveyed as ‘the t im e ’ . As Huygens savs, ‘ it w ill a lways measure the co rrec t t im e , or else it w il l m easure nothing at a l l ’ (p. 16). To m easure co rrec t t im e is to mainta in the interaction betw een these tw o m ilieu , and prevent their incompabilit ies trom becoming too great.

The atomic clocks orbiting in the GPS constellat ion could be subjected to a s im ilar analysis , a lthough there w e wou ld have to accept the necessity of fo llow ing a m ore com plicated i t inerary in tracking down the localization of indeterm inacy , and the d ivergent realities that intersect there . The principal point, h ow ever , remains: clocks topologically localize m etastab ility . The reso lution ot metast- abilitv is much more provisional in the case of the c lock than in the case of the crystal. The clock s u s p e n d s any final reso lution of its mctastabilitv by localizing indeterm inat ion at key points. Through these key points, d ivergent realities in teract w ith each other. In suspending resolution, it repeats it. The very stabil ity of t im e as a recurr ing sequence rests on that localized m etastab ility . C locks are not alone in

i 0 6

T H E T E C H N I C I T Y O F T I M E

this; machines and technical ensembles effect localized suspension of indeterm inat ion .

M O D U L A T IO N AS T E M P O R A L M O U I DING

Perhaps regard ing the clock as a machine that resolves meta.stabilitv bv suspending it and m ainta in ing it does not go far enough. The clock on this account is only a step avvav from the physical individuation ol a crystal. It figures as a suspended or pro longed individuation which sustains a relat ion to both an energet ic m ilieu (gravitat ion) and a social m il ieu ordered by repeatab le sequences of marks. Hut if w e regard clocks as carr iers of c lockt im e technic itv , then something more complicated is involved. A progress ive genesis ol c locktim e occurs betw een the p en d u lu m ’s oscillations and the oscillations ol caesium atoms. C locktim e m odulates itself through the genesis of different technical entities. W e can view what takes place during that genesis bv regard ing c lockt im e as a w ay of staging m o d u l a t i o n ol oscillations. ‘ A m o d u la to r , ’ w r ites Simondon, ‘ is a continuous temporal mold. . . . [T]o modulate is to mold in a continuous and perpetua l ly variable m anner ’ (1 9 6 4 / 1 9 9 5 , 45 ) . Through the technicitv of clocktime, modulation occurs at tw o levels.

First, G ali leo ’s s imple pendu lum , whose naturallv resonant osci l la­tions g radually die aw ay after it has been set in motion, undergoes quasi-continuous modulat ion in H uygens ’ clock. The tem poral form of the c lockw ork is m oulded by the oscillations of the pendulum . The temporal ‘m a t te r ’ of the pendulum requ ires the energy stored in the weight-driven c lockw ork . The c lockt im e produced bv the pendulum clock in a sense has no fixed form or m atter , since both the oscillations of the pendulum and the cyclical motions o f c lockw ork are reciprocally interacting and adjusting each other. The pendulum modulates the c lockwork, and the c lockw ork m odulates the pendulum .

Second, the ‘ fo rm ’ and ‘ m a t te r ’ of c lockt im e undergo c o n t i n u ou s

development and variation through modulat ion. ( These term s are taken up by Deleuze when he describes ‘a very m odern conception of the technological o b jec t ’ (1 9 9 3 , 19): such an object involves continuous development of form and continuous variation ol m atte r .) The m odu­lation is legible as w e move from H uvgen ’s clock to the GPS. The

1 0 7

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

i n c r e a s i n g rapidity of oscillation betw een H uygens ’ p endu lum and the atomic clocks of GPS requ ires that what is m odulated , the osci l lat ing m atter , changes. As Simondon says, ‘the viscosity of the support is d iminished as much as possible ’ (1 9 6 4 / 1 9 9 5 , 4 5 ) when modulat ion occurs m ore rapidly . The almost sensible instants in which pendulum and escapement rec iproca lly modulate each other are rep laced by im perceptib ly rapid contacts betw een the oscil lat ing fields of m ic ro ­wave radiation and e lec tr ic potentia l fields of certa in e lectrons be long­ing to caesium atoms. Although the rec iproc ity of m odulat ions essential to c lockt im e remains operative , the localization of indeterm inat ion in the a tomic clock-machine has now' been displaced from oscillations coupled to the ea r th ’s gravitational field and redep loyed in the less palpable , yet stil l localized, interactions of osci l lat ing e lec trom agnet ic fields.

M U L T IP L IC A T IO N AND I N C O R P O R A T I O N O b D IV E RG E N C E

As a tem pora l m ould ing , c lockt im e is ‘continuous and perpetua l ly var iab le ’ . C locktim e could be seen as a kind of event whose ‘harm on­ics ’ or ‘ sub-m ult ip les ’ fold different layers or conjunctions ot oscillation together. (Gilles Deleuze, as if describ ing the m odulat ion that develops betw een the oscillations of a pendulum and the oscil lat ing fields of the resonating caesium atom , speaks of an event as ‘a vibration w ith an infinity of harmonics or submultip les , such as an audible w ave , a luminous w ave , o r even an increasingly sm aller part of space over the course of an increasingly shorter d u ra t io n ’ (D eleuze , 1993 , 7 7 ) . ) The question as to what tr iggers this m ult ip licat ion remains.

S imondon w rites that ‘the individual technical object is not this or that th ing, given here and n o w , but something in genes is ’ (S imondon, 1 9 5 8 / 1989a, 20). Again, if w e wish t o d iverge f r o m the stereotypes surrounding the accelerat ion of c lockt im e , the technical specificity of a part icu lar t im ing reg im e , the GPS system , should be under­standable in term s of this genesis. As a positioning system based on atomic clocks, GPS confirms the inseparability ot t im ing and spacing. More genera l ly , it shows that what counts as t im e and p lace depends heavily on the kinds of technical mediat ions through which a given

l 0 8

co llect ive s tructures itse lf tem pora lly and topologica lly . The ‘t r ig g e r ’ lo r the mult ip licat ion of c lockt im e oscillations is neither ex tr ins ic nor intrinsic to society . Rather, it resides in the recurren t play occasioned by non-coincidence betw een a co l lec t ive ’ s topological and temporal limits.

Because ot the com plex ity of GPS as a technological system , 1 will focus on just one il lustration of this point: the production of the GPS signal structure through m odulat ion of the basic oscillation produced by atom ic clocks. In one form or another, this signal, broadcast from each satell ite in the GPS conste llat ion , contains all the information needed for a local rece iver to de te rm ine its map location. A block diagram showing the modulations that comprise the satell ite signal s tructure conveys the m ult ip licat ion and fil tering of the oscillations derived from the atom ic c lock, now te rm ed ‘the frequency s tandard ’ . This s imple shift in te rm ino logy shows that hearing or seeing a clock has becom e less im portan t than the c lo ck ’s often invisible and silent infrastructural ro le in d irec t ly regu lat ing and synchronizing other technical e lem ents , and ind irect ly coordinating disparate e lem ents of a co llect ive . In technical te rm s, the modulat ing fields of the encoding oscillators superim pose various streams of information on the basic clock signal by shifting the phase of the prim ary oscillator. Several different layers o f m odulat ion are superimposed within the coded and encrypted locational and t im ing signals transm itted by the GPS sate l­lites. T here is not just one zone o f contact betw een the primary oscillator and what para lle ls the c lockw ork , the rest of the GPS system. Here the oscillations of the d o c k are m odulated along divergent paths with in the device. Signals com ing from different sources continuously m ould the p r im ary oscillations (Kaplan, 1996, 2 4 1 - 3 ) . " A diagram of signal s truc ture indicates some of the ‘harm on­ics’ of the oscillations.

This layer ing o f modulat ion corresponds to an incorporation of diverse realit ies not ye t fully rep resen ted or accom modated within the time of H uygens ’ pendulum clock. His plan for a universal standard of length based on the oscillations of a pendulum relied on constant gravity eve ryw h ere on the ea r th ’s surface. The GPS constellation, orbiting the p lanet roughly every 1 1 hours 58 minutes on slightly elliptical orbits, cannot m ake that assumption. Its orbits and the

i 09

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

propagation ot its t im ing signals arc perturbed by non-ideal and difficult to calculate factors such as the sun and m o o n ’s gravitational fields inducing tidal changes in the e a r th ’s gravitation fie ld, solar w inds impinging on the satell ite , orbita l deviations caused by the slow re lease ot atmospheric gases from satell ites made on earth , variations in ionospheric and tropospheric conditions, mult ipath d istort ion of signals and, until recen tly , Selective A va ilab ility (the de libera te m anipulat ion of the satell ite clocks and navigational data by the US D epartm ent ot Defense to ensure that the highest levels ot signal accuracy are only available to authorized users). The m odulat ions present in the clock signal testify to this com plicated in tersect ion . The signal broadcast by a GPS satell ite is not just a clock signal; it also describes the status of the- clock itself, and includes cu rren t and pred ict ive data about the sa te l l i te ’ s location and the a tmospheric conditions re levant to the propagation of the clock signal, as w e ll as the encryp ted signals required by the USA for national security purposes.

The simplest account of the com plex s tructure ot the GPS signal would be to sav that GPS takes the variations of its m il ieu into

J

ac c o u n t . '1 It would be possible to trace how the m ult i- layered modulation of the prim ary oscillations links geograph ica l , m e teo ro lo ­gical, cosmologica l, m il i ta ry , econom ic and legal domains. The in te r ­section of these domains with each o ther through various forms ot feedback and reciprocal modulat ion in GPS constitutes another p ro ­visional structuring of the metastable techn ic ity ot c lockt im e . W hen compared to the pendulum clock, the increase in the rate of pr im ary oscillations does not derive from a de localiz ing or homogenizing dynam ism intrinsic to m odern technology. Rather , it stems from the articulation of different points of contact be tw een human non-human collect ives and their associated milieus. ‘T echn ic i ty ’ , Simondon writes , ‘super saturates itself by incorporating anew the rea l i ty of the world to which it applies ’ (S im ondon, 1958/ 1989a, 158). O ut ot this super­saturated state, particu lar s tructures p recip itate . The rate of oscillation of contem porary c lockt im e indicates the absorption of a field of contingencies that w ere previous ly left open to chance, or that were previously subject to different kinds o f t rea tm ent (tor instance, social, political or cultural representat ion) .

Super-saturated by that incorporation , the techn ic ity ot clocktime

i i o

T H E T E C H N I C I T Y O F T I M E

restructures the l im its ol the collect ives it belongs to. It init iates points ol contact betw een collect ives and what lies outside them and, in doing so, establishes new l im its , new pathways ot action and affect within the co llect ives to which it belongs. The m ult ip ly ing modulation of c lockt im e which underl ies something like GPS (or the com puter clocks whose oscillations are a fundamental component of con tem por­ary digital technolog ies) moves the crit ical phases which in the pendulum clock m ediated betw een the p en d u lu m ’s movements and the c lo ck ’s hands into a m ore com plicated ensem ble of mediations. The quantitative mult ip l icat ion ot oscillations signifies a topological complication in the s tructures of the collectives.

THE IM P R O P R IE T Y OF C E O C K T IM F

An account of the techn ic ity of c lockt im e does not address the integration of clocks w ith in past or contem porary cultures in specific­ally socio logica l, econom ic or semiotic te rm s . Clocks still carry meaning. For instance, O tto M ayr has shown how the clock as a metaphor of o rder , regu la r i ty , authority and the work of creation was particu lar ly significant to natural and political thought for several centuries in m odern Europe (M ayr , 1986). The ‘ Fong Now ’ project shows that, as a m etaphor of o rder , clocks still carry weight.

Rather , the ongoing genesis of c lockt im e can be read as provisional, localized reso lutions of the metastability of a collect ive whose limits are not g iven in advance. C locktim e technic ity , in the term s used here, reters to the w ay in which co llect ives absorb contingency within certain sequences of o rder and synchronization. The absorption remains incomplete because tim ing and spacing includes undifferentiated poten­tials whose ongoing individuation accounts for the interval between 1.0 and 9 ,1 9 2 ,6 3 1 ,7 7 0 osci l lat ions/second. The m ajor point of d ive r­gence from the evaluations of c lockt im e offered by H eidegger , Viril io , Elias and Latour rests on the notion that a co llect ive cannot complete ly define its own lim its because it is not com ple te ly in phase with itself. A kind of s tructura l incom pleteness or virtual itv remains.

At the outset, 1 said that technic ity refers to the historical mode of existence of technical mediat ions. This c laim can now be refined a little. Technical mediat ions are not d irect ly represented in cultural and

r i i

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

language. They only figure ob liquely in the processes w h ereby cultures or societies represent their own ongoing co llect ive life to themselves. ( ‘T echno logy ’ , by contrast, figures huge ly as an object of contem porary d iscourse .) C lear ly , clocks as a technical mediat ion have a history . But c locktim e technicity refers to something different. W h i le still integral to the life ot a co llect ive , it is concerned with the wavs in which1 J

certa in collect ives provisionally structure their be longing-together as an ensemble of living and non-liv ing processes with in tem pora l and topological limits that cannot in advance be fully lived or represen ted . T im ing reg imes the pendulum clock, the atom ic clock represen t changing distr ibutions of those l im its , and d ifferent w ays of art icu lat ing d ivergent realit ies , liv ing and non-liv ing, w ith each other. Som eth ing like c lockt im e is necessary to the ongoing ex istence of our globalized collect ives . But why say anyth ing m ore about c lockt im e technic ity? W h y not trea t the work ot c locks as a s tr ict ly social coding or o rder ing of relations with a group, as Elias does? O nly because the m utability and eventfulness o f c lockt im c would then rem ain inexplicab le . C o n ­verse ly , why not regard c lockt im e as the sym ptom of a genera l ized and pervasive technologiz.ation, as H eidegger docs? Because that wou ld attr ibute an essential dynamism to an abstract en tity , ‘te ch n o lo gy ’ , to which societies would be passively subject. C lock tim e ne ither stands apart from collectives nor is it com ple te ly coded w ith in the ir social functions or purposes. Its m utabi l i ty stems from the s tructura l in com ­pleteness o f collectives themselves.

Attention to the technic ity of c lockt im e po ten tia l ly offers, by contrast with both the g lobaliz ing and sociocentr ic v iews ot m odern technologies, a m ore nuanccd and h istorical ly d eeper t r ea tm en t of why our collect ives are at once durab le and unstable. C lock tim e perm eates tem pora li ty . It inflects the antic ipation of a future and the appropriation of a past. T hrough the localization of specific kinds of indeterm inacy , the ongoing modulation of m atte r and form, and the incorporation of d ivergent rea lit ies in t im ing ensem bles , the techn ic ity ot c locktime figures as one w ay in which co llect ives provis ionally stabil ize their points of contact with what exceeds them , and also open themselves to ongoing differentiation.

I i 2

T H E T E C H N I C I T V O F T I M E

NO TES

1. See A ppend ices 111 & IV ot H o u s e ( 1 9 8 0 ) lo r a brie l ' techn ica l descr ip t ion

of the tw o c locks .

2 . See Jan icaud ( 1 9 9 7 , 189) tor a d iscussion ot the processes ol c o i r rctization

of an event .

3. T he reasons tor this a re c o m p l ic a te d , and w i l l not be d iscussed here . The

c lock as an e x e m p la r y m o d e rn techno log ica l ob ject cannot te l l us any th ing

essen t ia l about t im e , m a in ly becau se it is technical. It lo rn is a co m ponent of

the m o re g e n e ra l f r a m e w o rk ot t e chn o log ies wh ich m a te r ia l ize in response

to the essence ot m o d e rn tech n o lo g y , but wh ich them se lve s a re not essentia l

( see H e id e g g e r , 1 9 7 7 ) . Th is sepa ra t ion b e tw e e n the techn ica l and the

essence ot tech n o lo g y w i l l be d iscussed in C h ap te r 4. For a c le a r and

access ib le account o f H e id eg g e r on t e m p o r a l i t y , see D astur ( 1 9 9 8 ) .

4 . H is to r ica l ly , Elias w r i t e s : ‘ [be to re Gali leo ) t im in g had been h u m an -ce n t re d .

G a l i l e o ’s in no va to r y im ag ina t ion led h im to change the function o f the

an c ien t t im in g d ev ic e [the c lep syd ra ] bv us ing it sys tem a t ic a l ly as a gauge

not tor the f lux of socia l hut o f n a tu ra l ev en ts . In that w a y a new concept

ot “t im e ”, that of “physica l t im e ”, b egan to branch off from the o lder ,

re la t iv e ly m o re un i t a ry h u m a n -ce n t re d co n cep t . . . . T h e sign if icance of this

e m e r g e n c e of the concep t of “physica l t im e" from the m a t r ix ot “socia l t im e ”

can h a rd ly he o v e r r a t e d ’ ( 1 9 9 3 , 1 1.5).

5. T im e w as , p r io r to G a l i leo , t igh t ly w o ven to g e th e r w ith law and espec ia l ly

w ith the state . T h e R om an c a len d a r , the m ed ieva l temporu o r hours , o r the

computus ( the s y s tem o f c a lcu la t ion used in the M id d le Ages in the churc h to

d ec id c on w h a t day im p o r ta n t re l ig iou s feasts w o u ld o ccu r ) had all been

m an ifes ta t ions o f the ‘h u m a n -ce n t r e d c o n c e p t ’ o f t im e . W ith G a li leo ,

‘natu ra l e v e n t s ’ a re b rough t w'ithin the d o m a in of th is t im e .

6. Th is b r ie f a s se ssm en t o f L a to u r ’ s un d er s tan d in g o f the t em p o ra l i ty of

soc io techn ica l co l l e c t ive s r isks m iss ing its main o b jec t iv e : to p resen t socio-

techn ica l t e m p o ra l i t y as a m u lt ip l i c i t y o f t im es d e r iv ed from re lat ions

b e tw e e n d if fe ren t e le m e n t s , r a the r than a lam in a r , i r reve rs ib le How d o m i ­

nated bv a c c e le r a t in g techn o log ica l p rogre ss . It w o u ld r e q u i r e a m uch m ore

d e ta i l ed en g a g e m e n t w ith the ro le that t im e p lays in techn ica l m ed ia t ions to

fu lly establ ish L a to u r ’ s a r g u m e n t . H e re 1 m e r e l y w an t to ind ica te that the

status ot in s tab i l i ty o r m e tas tab i l i tv still r em a in s obscu re and perhaps u n d e r ­

rep re sen ted ,

7 . T o d ay , as the Long Now Foundat ion cons iders des igns for a c lock that could

keep t im e for 1 0 ,0 0 0 yea rs , o r ro ugh ly until the next ice age , w ith onlv

Bronze A ge m a in te n a n ce t e ch n o lo gy , a m echan ica l o sc i l la to r such as a

p en d u lu m or sp r in g , co u p le d to so lar ev en ts , st i ll f igures as the r egu la t ing

i 1 5

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

m echan ism of c h o k e . T h e l o n g N ow c lock d e s ig n e r , D anie l H il l is , suggests :

‘ [s] incc no s ing le [ t im ing] sou rce does the job , use an u n re l iab le t im e r to

adjust an in accura te t im e r , c r ea t in g a phase lo cked loop . M y c u r r e n t favor i te

com binat ion is to use so lar a l ign m en t to ad just a s lo w m echan ica l o s c i l l a to r ’

(H i l l is , 1999 ) . This is the sam e techn ica l p ro je c t that S ten ge r s and G il le

d esc r ib e as const i tu t ive of a u to n o m o u s t im e : the p e n d u lu m c lock m a t e r i a l ­

ized as a w a y to co un t and p e r io d ic a l ly r e s ta r t m echan ica l o sc i l la t ions .

F u r th e rm o re , synch ron iz ing so lar and m echan ica l t im e is the e x p l ic i t o b jec t

o f m uch o f H u yg e n s ’ o w n d iscou rse on the g loba l iza t ion of c lock timc-.s in

The Pendulum Clock (H u y g en s , 1986 ) .

8. For the m etho d of s ynch ron iz ing the c lock w ith the e a r t h ’ s revo lu t io n see

H uygens ( 1 9 8 6 , 2 3 5). F-or an accou n t o f h o w H u ygens c a m e to p re sen t a

g eo m e t r ic a l proof o f the a cc u ra c y o f the c lo ck , see H. J. M . Bos ’ s

in t roduct ion to The Pendulum Clock (H u y g en s , 1986 , 1 2) .

9 . O bv io us ly , it also re q u i r e s the w a v e th e o ry o f e l e c t r o m a g n e t ic rad ia t io n ,

w h ich again under s tands the p h en o m en o n of l igh t as an o sc i l la t ion . In 1678 ,

H uygens p roposed the w ave th e o ry o f light w h ich a l lo w e d the p ropagat ion

o f l ight to be un der s too d and r e n d e red p red ic tab le .

10. In an u n ex p ec te d and h igh ly o r ig in a l m o v e , S ten ge rs and G il le ana lyse these

m o m en ts o f con tac t b e tw e e n the p e n d u lu m and the c lo c k w o r k in s tr i c t ly

t h e rm o d y n a m ic te rm s , as a d iss ipa t ive s y s tem . T h ey u n d er s tan d the m ot ions

o f the p en d u lu m and the m o m en ts o f its co n tac t w i th the e s c a p e m e n t as a

cyc le w h ich converts po ten t ia l e n e r g y to k ine t ic e n e r g y , and e n e r g y to

in fo rm at ion . I w i l l not r e p ro d u c e the ir ana lys is h e r e , bu t m e r e l y in d ica te

that the o u tco m e is a co n cep t io n o f the p e n d u lu m c lock as a d iss ipa t ive

s ys tem . T h a t is, th ey show tha t th e re is o n ly a u to n o m o u s c lo c k t im e , on the

cond it ion that en e rg y constan t ly f lows in to and ou t o f the sy s t em . The

im p l ic a t ion is that the idea l law o f t im e as a l in e a r success ion o f m easu rab le

dura t ions rests on a co m p l ic a ted ser ies of losses o r d is s ip a t ive Hows of

e n e r g y . T h ese losses a re not dev ia t ions from the id e a l , but the ind ispensab le

cond it ion o f the func t ion ing o f the ideal as a n o rm (S te n ge r s and G il le ,

19 97 , 198) .

1 1. The d if fe ren t data sou rces in c lude the sy s tem that g e n e r a te s a u n iq u e code

iden t if y ing the s a te l l i te that is b road cas t in g the s igna l , ‘a lm a n a c ’ and

‘e p h e m e r i s ’ data d esc r ib ing the c u r r e n t sta tus o f the s a t e l l i t e ’ s o rb it

(up lo ad ed from the g ro un d con tro l s ta t ions o p e ra te d by the US D ep a r tm en t

o f D efense ) , and ‘e r r o r s ’ d e l ib e r a t e l y in t ro d u ce d in to the signal by the

D ep a r tm en t o f D efense to d e n y p rec is e locat iona l da ta to un au th o r ized

users. T h e basic osc i l la t ions d e r iv ed from the a to m ic c locks a re d iv ided ,

m od u la ted and sup er im p o sed on each o th e r at a n u m b e r of d if fe ren t ra tes

to p ro d u ce the final signal s t ru c tu r e b roadcast bv each sa te l l i te .

i 14

T H E T E C H N I C I T Y O F T I M E

12. T h e s t ru c tu re ot the s igna l , tor in s tance , bears w ith in it the historv ot late

n in e te c n th -c en tu rv con tes ts b e tw e e n im p er ia l nat ion -sta tes over t im e s tand ­

ards . See C hap ters 5 6 ol How.se ( 1 9 8 0 ) for the debates on the es tab l ish ­

m e n t ot G M T , on w h ich U T C (U n ive rsa l C o ord ina ted T im e ) is based.

C H A P T E R 4

Infrastructure and individuation: speed and delay in Stelarc’s Ping Body

An in f r a s t r u c tu r e o c c u r s w h e n th e te n s io n b e t w e e n lo ca l

and g lo b a l is r e s o lv e d . T h a t is, an in f r a s t r u c tu r e o c c u r s

w h e n loca l p r a c t ic e s a r e a f fo rd e d b y a l a r g e r - s c a l e t e c h ­

n o lo g y , w h ich can th e n be u s e d in a n a t u r a l , r e a d y - t o - h a n d

fash ion . It b e c o m e s t r a n s p a r e n t as lo ca l v a r i a t io n s a r e fo ld ed

in to o rg a n iz a t io n a l ch a n g e s , and b e c o m e s an u n a m b ig u o u s

h o m e lo r s o m e b o d y .

S t a r and R u h l e d e r , 19 9 6

On UNIX com puter systems, a modest d iagnostic program called ping

has long a l low ed users to de te rm ine how fast netw orks are handling information. It measures the propagation de lay b e tw een the host com puter w here the program is running and any o ther accessible netw ork address. To ‘p in g ’ a node on the netw orks is to m easure how long it takes for a data packet to reach a part icu lar address and return. On most days, the de lay here on Syd n ey ’s academ ic netw orks is in the order of tens to hundreds of mill iseconds for onshore sites, and up to ten times that for offshore sites. This de lay fluctuates from second to second, depending on who or what else is present on the networks. On 10 April 1996, and on several la ter dates, the perform ance artist Stelarc, connected to several com puters , m odem s, video m onitors and speakers, oriented his body to an unpred ictab le series of delays ex tracted Irom ping data and transduced as e lectr ica l shocks. In Ping

Body, Stelarc effectively unfolded himself as a living map of technical delays, so that the speed and vo lume of traffic on the Internet regulated the electrical stimulation applied to various points on his sk in . '

l i 6

I N F R A S T R U C T U R E A N D I N D I V I D U A T I O N

In a specific, localized and dated event. Piny Body links together

th ree concerns that have ten tat ive ly c irc led around each other in the previous chapters. H ere , in a w ork staged through communication infrastructure , t im e , technology and living bodies come together. At this juncture , S te la rc ’ s Pincj Body perform ance a llows an important question to he posed: who or what exper iences technology? It gestures towards a kind of co llect ive indiv iduation which, fo llowing Simondon, I w ill te rm tran sin d iv id u a l. W h ile it may be asking too much ot a single w o rk , I suggest that Ping Body can help us see in more detail what the technic ity of t im e and co rporea lity means. For anv subject, ‘mediation betw een perceptions and em otions is conditioned by the domain ot the co l lec t ive ’ (S im ondon, 1989b, 122). As M urie l Combes w r ites , ‘we see here that it is only in the unitv of the collect ive as a m il ieu in j ✓

which perception and em otion can unite that a subject can gather the tw o sides of its psychic activity (perception and affect] and coincide with itself in some w a y ’ (C om bes , 1999, 59). The notion of the

transindividual forms a crucial part ol S im ondon ’s a lternative account of psychosocial exper ience because it links the em ergence of collectives to something that is not fully exper ienced or perceived by individuals. A collect ive is a process ot individuation em erg ing from beings who are not en tire ly themselves since they are transductive . Much of the second half of L'individuation psychiquc et collective (Psychic and collective individualism) (S im ondon, 1989b) concentrates on the idea of the transindividual as a w ay of conceptualiz ing exper ience without either

privileging a pregiven individual subject position or a structural totality at the level of society. The transindividual refers to a relation to others which is not de term ined by a constitu ted subject position, but by p re ­individuated potentials only exper ienced as affect. Speaking transduc- tively, the transindiv idual s tructures itself by resolving certain incompatibil ities through the co llect ive .

This understanding of affect and collect ives could offer a different interpretation of technology in genera l which , when it is noticed at all,

is inevitably felt to be excit ing , boring, in terest ing , riskv, dangerous, ‘cool’ , or ‘n e rd y ’ . W h ile S imondon does not expl ic it ly link the transindividual and an exper ience of technology , an association between technical objects and transindividual resonates throughout his work.

i > 7

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

The notion of the transindividual gathers together the abstract threads of tem pora l i ty , corporeality and techn ic ity and helps ensure that the collect ive historical ex istence of technology does not fall back on pregiven ideas of subjectiv ity , know ledge , po w er , nature or history . It moves the focus aw ay from the split b e tw een devices and bodies tow ard a less visible but vital m idd le g round of m ater ia l practices. Some steps in this d irection have been indicated in the ea r l ie r chapters. The notions of transduction, o rig in ary technicity, iterative m ateria liza tion

and inform ation (in S im ondon ’ s sense) all concentrate on a different understanding of the fabric of human co llect ives . The genera l idea of transduction suggests that a d ivers ity of actors , in terests , institutions and practices are art icu lated together through specific technolog ies. It implies that collect ives indiv iduate themselves techn ica l ly . Bodies, artefacts and ensembles co-indiv iduate at different levels . So, in Chapter 1, living human bodies w e re presented as a lw ays woven together w ith other bodies, non-hum an, l iv ing and non-liv ing. W hat counts as the m atter o f a living body, its capacity to bear the im print of social norms, was here seen to be contingent upon technical patterns o f repetit ion involving non-liv ing m atter-tak ing-fo rm . As w e saw in Chapter 2, collect ives vary in scale and topography. They art icu late diverse realit ies with each other. T ogether , humans and non-humans negotiate what a co llect ive can do and w h ere its l im its l ie . A tool, when it is understood as a m ater ia l pract icc , not only implies an intimate reconfiguration of a living body, but also entails a co llect ivc dynamic. C o llec t ive ly , life suspends its l im its , it staves off stasis not only through growth and reproduction , but through technical m e d i­ations. In Chapter 3, one im portan t consequence o f techn ic ity was exam ined : here the ongoing m utab i l ity and eventfulness of technical mediat ions (part icu lar ly those associated w ith c lockt im e) w as u n d er­stood in term s of the art icu lat ion of co llect ive lim its . H ow ever , w e still need to ask: does a transductive account of technical mediations support a different historical exper ience of technology? And, if so, who or what exper iences it d ifferently? The question of who or what experiences technology w ill be deve loped in the next tw o chapters.

The longitudinal or historical d imension of technical m ediat ions has been ex tensive ly addressed in the w o rk of M art in H eidegger . His affirmative engagem ent w ith technology is often over looked in favour

i i 8

of a m ore familiar and lim ited ‘ ju d gem en t ’ on m odern technology that is also scattered throughout his w o rk . Although H e idegger ’ s account could be shaped into a thoroughly negative evaluation of Stelarc and con tem porary technology in genera l , a m ore in terest ing path might fo llow the linkages betw een tem pora li ty and technology' in his work. A long with S im ondon ’s notion of the transindiv idual , H eidegger 's affirmation of technology in te rm s of tem pora li ty w ill guide m y reading of Ping Body.

VIRILIO AN D s i l l A R C

W hen it comes to questions regard ing the shape of a technological future , S te la rc ’s w ork elic its s trongly sym ptom atic responses, ranging from enthusiasm to abhorrence. They tend to oscillate between technological euphoria and the fair ly b leak assessments of recent technology associated with tw en t ie th -cen tu ry critical theory . Techno­log ica lly l iterate and w e l l- in fo rm ed about curren t developm ents in technology , the w rit ings of Paul V iril io are a good exam p le of the latter. Several years before the Ping Body perform ance took place, Viril io described S te la rc ’s w o rk and views on the relation between technology and living bodies. S te la rc ’ s art is entangled in the deepening nexus of te letechnologica l and biotechnological processes. For Vir il io, he is ‘a w i l l ing v ic t im , as so often the case w ith the servant corrupted by the m as te r ’ , o f con tem porary technology (V ir il io , 1995a, 114). Ste larc ’s w o rk exem plif ies the processes o f ‘endo-co lon ization ’ that are shifting technical perform ances into ever m ore intensive engagements with liv ing bodies. V ir i l io ’s broad thesis is that the conjunction of biotechnology and te le techno logy reflects a crit ical phase or discontinu­ity in the increasing speed of technology (V ir il io , 1993, 1998). At the core of the processes which acce lerate information up to light speed, ‘a final type of cen tra l ity , or m ore exact ly , hypercentra l i ty that o f

time, of some “presen t” if not “rea l” t im e ’ (V ir il io , 1995a, 106) prevails. The crisis or discontinuity centres on the loss of delay in com m uni­cation. In these te rm s , when Ste larc stimulates his own nervous system with rea l- t im e signals arr iv ing from around the netw orked globe, he testifies to and exacerbates the cris is : he contributes to a generalized loss of any sense of location or distinction betw een inside and outside,

i 19

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

‘the essential notion of being and acting, here and now , losing all sense ’ (p. 107). The problem here is an absence of’ de lay , exper ienced as light speed instantanoity. Speed im mobilizes liv ing bodies and o ve r ­stimulates those senses vision in particu lar d irec t ly exposed to tclctechnologies .

Viril io writes that ‘|w]e are w itnessing the beginnings of a type of general a rr iv a l in which everyth ing arrives so quick ly that departu re becomes unnecessary ’ (1 9 9 1 , 8) . In his v iew , speed induces a kind of stasis. Instantaneity , or general arr iva l , obviates real m ovem ent. During the n ineteenth eenturv , industria lization had mechanized labour, sub-

J 7stituting ‘ the technical lor the m uscu lar effort of the w o rk e r ’ (1 99 5a , 119), but under contem porary te letechnologica l conditions, spatial ex ter io r ity and tem poral futurity are under assault from instantaneity . He concludes: ‘ such an end implies forgetting spatial ex te r io r i ty as much as tem pora l ex te r io r ity ( ‘no fu tu re ’ ) and opting exc lus ive ly for the “present” instant, the real instant o f instantaneous te lecom m u n ica ­t ions ’ (1 99 7 , 24 5).

fu r th e rm o re , in compensation for the ir tendency to render m o ve ­ment superfluous (beyond m anipu lat ing contro ls) , te letechnologics resort to massive stimulation: ‘ it is now a m atte r o f amplify ing the sub jec t ’ s vitality through the impulses of information techno log ies ’ (1 99 5a , 126). S te la rc ’ s e lectrost im ulat ion bv de lay t im es renders this compensating amplification exp l ic it : ‘The loss or, m ore prec ise ly , decline of the rea l space of every expanse (physical or geographical) to the exclus ive advantage of no-de lay rea l-tim e te le techno logy , inevitably leads to the in traorganic intrusion of technology an d its m icromachines into

the heart of the liv in g ’ (original au th o r ’s italics) (p. 100).Although it would be difficult to deny a deep and complicated

connection betw een the geographical deterr i to r ia l izat ion and techno- corporeal endo-colonization , this thesis is strongly magnet ized by an absolute notion of speed as instantaneity and absence of de lay . For Viril io , contem porary technologies have ir revers ib ly crossed an abso­lute t im e barr ie r marked by the velocity o f e lec trom agnet ic radiation. He suggests that ‘ today w e are beginning to rea lize that systems of te lecom m unications do not m ere ly confine extension, but that, in the transmission ol messages and images, they also erad icate duration or d e la y ’ (V ir il io , 1993, 3). Beyond the tim e barr ier , the disorienting

I 2 0

I N F R A S T R U C T U R E A N D I N D I V I D U A T I O N

exper ience of speed leads inevitably to a rupture ol the living infer ior ity of the body. Speaking very broadly , implants, endo- corporeal prosthe.ses and perhaps biotechnology more genera lly flow for V iril io from the artific ially induced im m obil ity of living bodies.«' OThey compensate for a loss of t im e composed ol rhythms ot antic i­pation and delay . V ir i l io ’s response seeks to counter uncrit ical techno- ccn tr ism . Faced w ith d isorienting acce lerat ion , a technocentric response embraces incessant upgrading of technical com petence and equ ipm ent, and g leefu lly anticipates the fateful dissolution of existing human orientations and certa in ties into processes ot biotechnical evolution . Stc larc himself often seems to echo these term s; for instance, he states that ‘the body is o b so le te ’ (S tc larc , 1997). Certain aspects of Ping Body and S te la rc ’s o ther w orks otter themselves to this kind of in terpretat ion . H ow ever , both V ir i l io ’ s critical stance, with its vision of the d isp lacem ent ot ‘ natural capacities lor m o vem en t ’ by sedentary te leopera t ive inert ia (V ir i l io , 1997, 16), and uncritical technocentr ism uneasily share a presupposit ion: the thesis that a loss ot distance and de lay ir revers ib ly leads to ‘ intraorganic in trusion ’ not only tends to presuppose an uncontam inated origin or natural interioritv which can be in truded upon, it also attr ibutes a hostile agency to technology in genera l . At the risk of car icaturing V ir i l io ’s work in particu lar , I think that his and the technocentr ic response risk a serious disavowal ot the depth and com plex ity of human technical invo lve­ments. Keith Ansell Pearson has argued in relation to technocentrism that the ‘collapsing of bios and technos into each other is not only politically naive, p roduc ing a com ple te ly reified grand narrative of technology as the true agent and telos of natural and (in)human history, but also restr icts technics to anthropos, binding history to anthropocen- tr ism ’ (Ansell Pearson, 1997, 124). A s im ilar kind of narrative often lies behind accounts which forecast the invasion of living bodies bv machines. To speak ol the posthuman body undergoing autonomous technological evolution amounts to the same thing as reading human subjects as the self-present agents of their own history.

I 2 1

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

SPRIT) AND Dl l AY

is there another way ol understanding Ping Body, which could show how historical ly sed imented and em bodied tem pora l i ty becomes in ex ­tr icable from an ensem ble of technical mediat ions? Despite certa in problems of accessibi lity , translation and polit ical risks, this is w here H e idegger ’ s work is significant and productive . It s trongly links technology and tem pora li ty . No longer does technology just happen within history as just one event am ong m any others. It has its own specificity as an event, and this specificity concerns its re lat ion to t im e . Any exper ience of technology in te rm s of speed, d isem bod im ent or d isorienting collapse o f space t im e differences m ight be seen d iffer­en tly from the perspective of tcmporali/.ation.

The problem of ‘too much speed ’ is the centra l p rob lem here . (W e have a lready encountered it in Chapter 3 in the contrast b e tw een the hand-axe and the therm onuc lear bom b .) Speed lies at the heart of any exper ience of technology. The m obility of d igita l in form ation , so frequently invoked in recent t im es , undoubted ly promises (even if it does not actually p rovide) an exper ience o f accelerat ion for those whose reading and w r it ing habits took shape through books ra ther than screens. Perhaps more profoundly , b io technology, w ith its heavy reliance on an informatic t r ea tm en t o f life, exacerbates biopolit ical tensions (consum er resistance to genet ica l ly modified (G M ) foods; debates over genetic research into cloning) to the ex ten t that it alters co llect ively art icu lated rhythms of g row th and reproduction . The disorientat ion associated w ith the speed of information and w ith the rhythms of technical change m ore gene ra l ly w il l , or perhaps already has, become normal. A chance rem ains , h ow ever , as Ping Body shows, to exper ience this disorientat ion m ore thoughtfu lly . From this angle, w e could ask: do technical m ediat ions also provoke - at least at their inception a deepened exposure to delay?

Speed is a lw ays re lat ive to de lay . O n ly a change in speed is ever felt as such. W e have no exper ience of speed excep t as a difference of speeds. D err ida asks: ‘are w e having, today , another, a different exper ience of speed? Is our relat ion to m otion and t im e qualitat ive ly different? O r must w e speak p rudently of an ex trao rd inary although qualitat ively homogeneous accelerat ion of the same exper ience? ’

i 2 2

I N F R A S T R U C T U R E A N D I N D I V I D U A T I O N

(D err ida , 1984, 20). As he goes on to point out, this form of the question , by opposing the quantity and qual ity of speed, risks moving too qu ick ly : it could be too fast, in that it rushes to see a break or d ifference, ignoring historical continuities or repetit ions. But it also could be too s low in that it m ight miss see ing, hearing or feeling an unforeseen shockwave because it is concerned with uncovering con­tinuities and repetit ions. The genera l point is c lear: there can be no sensation of speed w ithou t a difference in speed, w ithout something moving at a different speed. Rather than opting for one side or other (rad ica l ly different versus the sam e), it m ight be interest ing to ask what the difficulty o f decid ing about the right speed means.

It is no paradox to say that speed actually is coupled to delay , to w hatever remains incom ple te ly synchronized in a g iven context. Delay is a consequence of the re la t iv ity of speeds. W ith in a ccrta in modernist fram ew ork , de lay , as lack o f synchronization, implies a fail ing, fault or breakdown of some kind. In V ir i l io ’s te rm s, cu lture lags catastrophic­ally behind technological processes. H ow ever , if different speeds w ere not co-present in a given situation, even if only as m em ories of a different speed, there could be no exper ience o f accelerat ion or disorientation. To be located en t ire ly in the present, or to have access to com plete instantaneity , if it w e re possible , wou ld be to feel neither delay nor speed. The coupling of speed and de lay can be taken a step further. U nderstand ing who or what exper iences technical mediations as a change in speed can be framed as a question about what kind of transductive individuation is occurr ing . M ore specifically, it means asking w he th e r every th ing changes at the same rate in any process of individuation. Rather than being simply destruct ive of the integrity of lived exper ience (as suggested by Viril io and others), the effects of speed m ay attest to a specific dephasing associated w ith a transductive individuation. From this perspect ive , the exper ience of speed could be more interest ing.

The prob lem of thinking about how to read such constitutive delay is, I th ink, pervasively inscribed in Ping Body. The w ork was performed in order to be archived or ‘up loaded ’ . This means that even its performance in 1996 was heavily m arked by its reception at other times and places. The files can be dow n loaded from Ste la rc ’s W eb site or accessed on the M etabody C D -R O M .2 Ping Body was and still can be

1 2 }

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

viewed trom tour different, even d ivergen t , angles. A schematic technical d iagram of the apparatus which transduced Internet delays into e lectr ica l stimulation of' S te la rc ’s body il lustrates how the perfo rm ­ance functioned technical ly . C om puter graphics showing data gathered from the Internet, and quas i-geom etrica l com puter-genera ted an im a­tions of d ism em bered body parts (also shown to the live aud ience) represent the relat ion betw een the signals f i ltered from Internet traffic and a living body. Video files show the artist in perform ance , capturing on-screen the gestures and m ovem ents that took place on a certa in date , at a particu lar place. The video images w e re d isp layed on a large screen dur ing the event. Finally, a set of tex t files docum ent and date th e p e r fo rm a n c e s .

The fo llowing discussion attem pts to establish some kind of mapping betw een these four different diagrams or inscriptions of the event of Ping Body. It reads the diagrams as traces of heterogeneous realities art iculated in the kinds of individuation staged through information technology. M y principal concern is the prob lem of m apping Ping Body

as an event which unfolds tem poral structures and indeterm inac ies between diverse living, technical , m ediat ic and social bodies. The motivation is to at least com plicate the anthropocentr ic and techno- centr ic tendencies of V ir i l io ’ s and S tc la rc ’ s own in terpretat ions , and to suggest some m ore genera l points of or ientation in re la t ion to the speed of contem porary technology . As Bruno Latour puts it, ‘T echno­logical mechanisms are not anthropomorphs any m ore than humans arc technomorphs. Humans and nonhumans take on form by red is tr ibuting the com petences and performances o f the m u lt i tude of actors that they hold o n to and that hold on to th e m ’ (1 9 9 6 , 225 ) . This a lternate reading of Ping Body aims to show some e lem ents of the process . It draws first of all on a set of Heideggerian motifs concerning t im e and techno logy .

T E C H N IC A L S U P P O R T

T here is every indication that H e idegger wou ld have been no m ore interested in S te la rc ’s w ork than he was in rad io , te lev is ion , c yb e rn e t­ics, satell ites, h im or mechanized agr icu lture and concentrat ion camps. He also places no great stock in technical or scientific know ledge in

i 2 4

I N F R A S T R U C T U R E A N D I N D I V I D U A T I O N

genera l , exp l ic it ly c la im ing that ‘science does not th ink ’ (Heidegger, 1994). A diagram ol the technical apparatus which staged the event w ou ld on many accounts , including H e idegger 's and V ir i l io ’s, be the most inessential and ind irect m ode of access to Ping Body. It merely shows how desktop com puters , m odem s, e lectrodes , video and sound equ ipm en t w ere hooked together to transduce pine/ results into e le c ­tr ical signals ranging b e tw een 0 and 60 volts on S tc la rc ’s arms, legs and torso. W h ile the apparatus attached to and surrounding S te larc ’ s body m ust have been c lear ly visible during the perform ance, the wavs in which the components formed an ensem ble distr ibuted w e ll b e v o n d

the site of the perform ance can be read more d irectlv from the d iagram . The diagram schematica lly figures an infrastructure an information ne tw ork w ithin which the w ork is located.

W hat re levance does a diagram of the apparatus have? It could be read in a num ber of different wavs. If the technical apparatus is itself just the mater ia l support of the perform ance , a d iagram of the support has an especia lly secondary status. W ith respect to broader questions about the event of m odern technology, it would have little significance: ‘ so then, the essence of technological is also not at all techn ica l ’ , w r ites H eidegger on the first page of ‘The Question Concerning Techno logy ’ (H e idegger , 19 54 / 1 97 7 , 13), as if to confirm that the technical details of S te la rc ’s performance are i r r e le v a n t . ! W hy does H eidegger , who consistently says that technology constitutes the most difficult problem for thought today, and who insists that we must reconfigure our approach to technology to go deep underneath instru­mental and anthropological concepts (technology as a means to an end, technology as a product ol human action) apparently repudiate machines themselves? W h y say that the essence ol technology has nothing to do with the technical? Is he saving ‘n o ’ to technology itself as a g row in g c luster of interconnected machines simply because toving with the in tricacies of com plex modern m achinery prevents the em ergence of some broader perspective in which this complexity would m ake m ore sense? H eidegger d irect ly denies this: ‘To sta rt

with , it must be said that 1 am not against technology. 1 have never spoken against techno logy , nor against the so-called demon ol tech­no logy ’ (H eidegger and W isse r , 1988, 25). H e idegger ’s oft-repeated s tatement that the essence ot technology is nothing technical itself

i H

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

needs to he understood as something e lse , something am hivalent and troubled no douht, hut not as a s imple and untenab le negation oi the artefactual complexit ies of technology . There is a definite b lindness to or intolerance of the technical that imbues his questioning ot tech ­nology. This concern has been raised by D errida , am ong o th e rs .4 As Bernard St ieg ler has argued in relat ion to the opposition b e tw een the essence of technology and technolog ies, ‘the whole question is w hether such an evaluative distr ibution according to which technology is only

on one side (of an opposition) not being itse lf constitutive ot individuation is in fact still m etaphys ica l ’ (S t ieg ler , 1993, 4 1 ) .Read generous ly , H e idegger ’s s ta tem ent could mean that the te ch ­

nical support itself, which in Ping Body figures as a contingent set of technical objects for the reproduction (and archiv ing) of Internet delays and video images, obscures something crucial about technology : the radical ly historical and constitutive invo lvem ent o f humans in the

J

diverse unfolding of beings. S imondon makes the same point in a different way when he says, in relat ion to large-scale technical ensembles , w e need to look beyond the machine itself to a m il ieu which a lw ays includes life : ‘there is something ot the living in a technical en sem b le ’ (S imondon, 1989a, 125). The tissue of in te rcon ­nections which the diagram shows includes connections te rm inat ing at a liv ing body, th a t body, accord ing to the d iagram , exists at the same level as machines, components and netw orks . It is not above them , d irect ing them or exerc is ing p ow er through them . Ping Body points to a life amidst the technical in frastructure , w ithou t which the ensem ble could not be what it is. Stelarc does not d irec t this ensem b le , nor is he simply enslaved by it. At most, w e could say that he com plicates it to the ex ten t that he links different parts of the ensem ble to each other. W ithout h im , Ping Body as an ensem ble falls apart.

If, as H eidegger argues in broad te rm s throughout much of his w ork , technology constitutes the p redom inant mode through which whatever exists presents itself today , then the crit ical question is how that predominance is constitu ted . The technical taken bv itself occludcs diflerences, but not because it enervates the hum an, as V iril io argues. Rather, it can make it difficult to see just how thoroughly enmeshed technical ensembles are with a part icu lar kind of life, here represen ted

I N F R A S T R U C T U R E A N D I N D I V I D U A T I O N

sense accidental, even inauthentic , in relation to any comprehension of our own invo lvem ent w ith them . In touching them , hearing them , in com ing into palpable and visual contact with them , vve lose touch with an exposure to them . The technical support is d isorienting, not because it is seductive , banal or terr ifv ing , but because it diverts attention awav from an essential invo lvem ent w ith it.

The schematic d iagram of Ping Body indexes something important concerning ‘the techn ica l ’ . The apparatus composed of computer , m odem s, video and sound equ ipm ent, ‘s t im box ’ (the device that controls voltage applied to Ster lac) and e lectrode patches shows a com plex interface betw een a globally ex tended technical infrastructure (that of the Internet, which lies off the d iagram to the right), and a localized here and now , in which we locate Stelarc as an individual man. The diagram (see www.ste larc .va .com .au/pingbotlv/lavout.htm l) indicates the necessary partic ipation of living bodies in a technical ensem ble : w e see Stelarc outl ined as a body, and w e see video monitor screens, video reco rder , amplifiers and speakers. Their inclusion implies an aud ience , even if this is only Stelarc himself, which pcrccives.

The fact that the technical d iagram leaves out perception , gesture, location or exper ience , and replaces these w ith a s imple outline of a body is significant, but it is not the only thing left out; so are multip le layers of technical s tructure and codes im p lied by the com puters or video equ ipm ent. No technical d iagram , no m atter how much more deta iled than this one (which is very schematic) can dispense with blank surfaces or open boxes in which the marks of other machines or living bodies are inscribed. N either a living body, nor a perception, nor a machine can be fully figured here . The boxes and lines on the diagram suggest that a technical system is not a fully determ ined context.

It m ust preserve a degree o f structura l indeterm inacy in o rder to w ork. It is a technical support only by being both stable and yet not fully de term ined . W e can read the boxes and lines of various components as indicating re lat ive degrees ol c losure and discreteness of the technical ensem ble .

The d iagram , in short, signifies that there is no such thing as the technical-in-itself, the pure ly technical support. The technical always exists in a relational context or m il ieu which enfolds certain specific

1 27

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

degrees of indetermination along with de term inat ion . Hvery machine awaits specific responses in o rder to be the machine that it is. This incompletion structures the machine. W ithou t a margin of in d e te rm ­ination, it would not be technical. A margin of indeterm inat ion or incompletion constitutes the technic ity of a technical ensem ble . The question is how these degrees o f indeterm inacy m ater ia l ize through repetition in relation to adjacent bodies, machines and m ilieus. In the case o f Ping Body, the schematic d iagram suggests that the apparatus opens a num ber of different dimensions or tra jector ies at once: cameras, video monitors, pro jectors and recorders pertain to the visualization and record ing of the gestures and actions of a body; m odems and com puters transduce local information into the globalized Internet; and e lectrodes and S te la rc ’s ‘Third A rm ’ re late to the limits of gesture and touch. The technical ensem ble affords reso lution ot these different tra jectories . They c ircu late around the unfolding of Ping

Body, configuring a mobile set of limits for w hatever body eventuates . If the essence of technology is not technical , this i.s not because any exposure to the technical necessarily d iverts us from the deep issue of how we are involved with technology . Rather the technical in itself does not exist as such.

I III VISIBILITY O F 1)11 I I RI NCI S:A R C II IV b AND A U T O -C O N D I T I O N INC

The reason I le idegger insists on trea t ing the cssence of technology i.s to concentrate on the wav in which technology rem ains what it is. This has a specifically temporal d imension involving ‘d ifferenc ing ’ or ‘d iffer­en ce ’ . The historical mode o f ex istence o f technology is unthinkable without attention to these- differences. For H eidegger , Viril io and many other recent responses to techno logy , con tem porary technolog ies, especially the cybernetic technologies which they all regard as inaug­urating an intensified phase of technical evo lu tion , tend to render differences im perceptib le . W hen H eidegger resisted the co llapse of the essence ol technology into the technical , he did so in the name ol d ifferences, and in the- name ol the d iverse , manifold paths along which things, including bodies which are not just things, em erge . In very compressed term s, in Identity and D ifference he w rites : 'for us, the

i 28

I N F R A S T R U C T U R E A N D I N D I V I D U A T I O N

object /Seiche/ of thought is d ifference as d iffe rence ’ (H e idegger , 1957, 37). The whole question of technology is how to think about what technology is w ithout th inking technolog ica l ly ; that is, without erasing differences. If he is not against technology , H eidegger must offer a way of thinking about the essence of technology in term s of diff erences.

The risk ot ^d ifferen t ia t ions specifically concerns what becomes technolog ica lly visible. In this case, as Viril io argues , S te la rc ’ s living body risks appearing as m ere ly technological. The audience of Piny

Body could see a com puter-genera ted animation of Piny Body. (The archived versions ot the w ork found on S te la rc ’s W eb site and the M etabody CD -R O M centre on this in te r lace .) The animated display has tw o main zones. On the left, a s imple outl ine ol a human body is again recognizable. During run t im e, various points on this body Hash to show the activation ol the- e lectrodes on S te la rc ’s body bv ping

values. On the r ight, s imple three-d im ensional w ire -m esh animations ot a d ism em bered body move in accordance with the signals received back from the Internet. Along the bottom , a data window displays the Internet locations and t im e delays draw n from the ping data.

If w e are to avoid see ing Stelarc as a w il l ing victim of technological colonization, then these simple images of an outl ine o f a body, and of aw k w a rd ly dislocated w ire frame limbs, must be legible as something connected to the essence of technology, das Gc-StcII (or l ln lraming). W h ile insisting that the essence ot contem porary technology is nothing technical , H eidegger called on a quasi-tcchnological te rm to name it. In G erman, das G estcll means a stand, rack, frame, chassis, or, more obscurely , skeleton, as H e idegger expl ic it ly points out (H eidegger, 1977/1954 , 20 /27 ) . This is s im ilar to the sense in which in I'nglish, one can speak of a skeletal s tructure as a ‘ f ram e ’ . W ith the possible exception of the skeleton, all these meanings refer to some aspect ot an apparatus that supports or em places . (Samuel W eb e r suggests the translation ‘em p lacem en t ’ : W eb er , 1990 .)

The w ord das Gestcll is hyphenated by H eidegger as das Gc-stcll.

What would it mean to read Ping Body according to this articulated frame or rack , which names the thinkable essence of technology? for Heidegger the one thing that is to be thought through the essence of technology is the wav in which technology is what it is. It orders everything it touches in historical ly specific wavs. I te ideggcr savs that

i 29

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

the disjointed das G e-stell, the essence of technology, is die Weise des

lintbergens, the foremost way of revea l ing (H e idegger , 1954 , 28 ). The m anner in which almost everyth ing social re lat ions, p lant and animal life, machines, econom ic, ecological and cultura l system s, etc . - displays itself today is specific to this historical con juncture and its permeation by technical processes. To say that the essence of tech ­nology is a wav of reveal ing or disclosing is to affirm that w hatever comes into being today, w hatever stabil izes or mater ia lizes as a contem porary product, body, construct, artefact or phantasm , em erges from processes synthesized through or as das G e-stell.

There are tw o facets to this essential visibility. The first concerns how things persist. W e might say they ex ist arch iva l!/ . Techno log ica l ly configured, things and events are re tr ievab le . They ex is t as Restand or

standing-reserve according to H eidegger : ‘e v e ryw h e re , every th ing is o rdered to stand by, to be im m ed ia te ly at hand, indeed to stand there just so it may be on call for a further order ing . W h a teve r is o rdered about in this way has its own w ay of s tand ing ’ (H e idegger , 1977/ 1954, 17/24 ). The event cA Ping Body includes, as an integra l co m ­ponent, its own retrieval. The apparatus which surrounds Stelarc codes, indexes and lorm ats the event ready for retr ieval and reproduction . The archival facets of Ping Body w e re a lready im p lied on the technical d iagram in the form of various record ing devices, and the figure that w e are discussing is also draw n from an archival system (an Internet W eb site or C D -R O M ). This figure is ex trac ted from a sequence of data produced during the perform ance , exp l ic it ly for the purposes of uploading and storage on the Internet, as well as for the ‘ l iv e ’ audience. It resides on the netw ork as a set of marks (inform ation), ready to be de livered , reproduced or transported e lsew here . Accessing these resources is not difficult because thev ex ist in o rder to be accessed and reproduced . Every level of their organization and inscription is p re ­mised on repeated retr ieval and reproduction . All entit ies touched by

contem porary technics are subject to this archival storage and access through coties and indexes. By im plicat ion, this process o f enclosure anti retr ieval is not just what ‘ life less ’ systems of marks untlergo . On the le lt-hand sitle of the an imated display of Ping Body, a set of body parts, rendered as 31) volumes under tw o-d im ensional p ro jection , are

i 3 0

I N F R A S T R U C T U R E A N D I N D I V I D U A T I O N

configured as addressable resources in an archive. The living body too becom es a resource ot e lem ents to be re tr ieved .

The other facet of the m odern technological reg im e of visibility concerns the paths along which things come to exist. Again, w e might say, they em erge or appear through self-regu lation . The archive unfolds itself or moves into visib ility a long paths that H eidegger describes in

te rm s of a quas i-cybernet ic logic o f feedback cyc les , activating certain sequences ot events repeated ly : ‘the revealing reveals to itsell its own

manito ld in ter lock ing paths, through regu lat ing their course ’ (1977/ 1954 , 16/24 ). This formulation shifts the emphasis aw ay from any notion of a subject represen t ing the w orld to itself towards an in term inable self-regulat ion at w ork in modern technology. In con tem ­porary te rm s, w c m ight say that the mode of em ergence of technical

objects works ‘au toca ta ly t ica l ly ’ by constantly firing off new confirma­tions of the o rderab il i ty o f things (Kauffman, 1993).

in H e idegger 's te rm s , Ja s G e-stell constantly animates itself. It displays quas i-cybernet ic dynamics. It is a mode of em ergence that feeds back on itself. The art icu lat ing or d ism em bering mark typographica lly signals one possible source of m ovem ent when it distends the fram e, das Gestell, into tw o l im b s .5 The instability that H e idegger inscribes in das G e-stell can be understood as a topological transformation w here in fo ld in g , something, the same thing, also opens.

The opening, sett ing in the open or extension can be more or less understood in the term s we have just used to analyse the archive- s imulation interaction in Ping Body. C on tem porary technology sets things out in the open, on visible surfaces, p re -em inen tly today that of the d igita l screen. It m ult ip lies inscriptions, as w e have seen in ear lier chapters, in o rder to compress o ther things, f rom H e idegger ’ s stand­point, the levell ing or homogenization associated with modern tech­

nology flows with the im perceptib i l i ty of this setting in the open.W hat gathers or folds together is m ore difficult to parse. The whole

question of technology for H eidegger is a question of whether and bv what path w e can think of opening out and folding together. The

gathering-sett ing out \Jas Yersammelnde jenes Stellens] of technological existence does not present itselt as such, since it is what regulates disclosure, em ergence or appearing for us in genera l. W e cannot

i i <

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

think it d irect ly because of our invo lvem ent in it, because it affects who or what vvc are. As H eidegger savs, the human ‘ stands w ith in the essentia l sphere of das ( le -s tc lf ( 1 9 7 7 / 1 9 5 4 , 2 4 / 27 ) . Furtherm ore , ‘(the human] cannot take on a relation to it re trospective ly \nachtrag- lich|’ ( ib id .) . This is a crucial point: w e arc not in de lay when it comes to an essentia l involvement with technology. Lastly, vvc arc , tor H eidegger, not too late- when it comes to th inking that invo lvem ent. ‘Above all , the question of w hether and how w e specifically get involved with that in which das Cic-stell presences never comes too la t e ’ (1 9 7 7 / 1 9 5 4 , 24 / 2 8 ) . The relation to the manifold, to m u lt ip l ic ity , to folded differences, can never come too late . At least on this point I le idegger cannot be assimilated to the broad s tream of thought which regards technology as a lienated from cu lture .

G L O B A L IZ A T IO N AND T L M P O R A L IZ A T IO N

W hen Ping Body runs, the display shows someth ing of the inter lac ing of these tw o facets of’ the essence o f technology. The flashing points that appear on the outl ined body on one side of the display m ark the return of ping messages from rem ote nodes of the Internet. The delays in response show that the Bestand does not attain the ideal im m ediacy that some of H e idegger ’ s formulations, and most ot V ir i l io 's , imply. The Hashing points on the outl ine of S te la rc ’ s body signal perceptib le delays. On the other side of the d iagram , the partia lly d ism em bered and prostheticallv stimulated limbs of Stelarc signal another prob lem : people are not autonomous in relation to the essence of technology.

According to I le idegger and many others, the technologica l evening- out of differences is becoming m ore or les.s norm al. N orms arc defined, which tend to globalize themselves and decontex tua l ize d iffer­ences. As Geoffrey B owker w r i te s , ‘one could perhaps describe globalization as an inevitablv ever- incom plete a t tem pt to impose a uniform representational t im e and space on a heterogeneous collection of lived spaces and h istories ’ (B ow ker , 1995 , 5 5). For H eidegger , their normality threatens the singular and constitu tive exposure of humans to an essential metastabilitv concerning their ro le in the em ergence of things. How does ‘the h um an ’ (dcr Mensch] p lay a constitu tive role in the domain of das ( lc -stc ll? H e id egge r ’ s answ er centres on tem porality.

I ?2

I N F R A S T R U C T U R E A N D I N D I V I D U A T I O N

Technology can untold as opening out into yisib ilitv only to the extent that w e expose or suspend ourselves in relat ion to the gathering or folding it entails . W e can be caught up in technical ly staged synchron­ization o r im m ediacy only because w e arc not lu l ly in the present, there all at once, or fully synchronized. The folding or gathering relies on a certa in non-simultane ity or dis junction which w e can call tem poralization . There is not t im e itself in its llux on the one hand, and the modalit ies of consciousness through which it could be appre­hended on the o ther , but a single process of tem poralizat ion , which has no ex istence apart from the folding together of humans and non­humans. H eidegger w r ites :

The human stands so decis ively in the wake of the provocation of das G e-stell that he does not hear it as a c la im , that he tires ot seeing himself as the one spoken to and hence also tails in every wav to hear how far he ek-sists from out of his essence in the region of an exhortation or address (im Bereich eincs Zuspruches], and thus can never m ee t only himself . (1 9 7 7 / 1 9 5 4 , 2 7 / 35)1’

H eidegger is almost alone in touching on this point: it w e did not exist (ek-sist, H e idegger w rites) as a mode of exposure to the non-human, it our exposure to the metastable folding ol being was not associated with tem pora l perturbations (w e will soon return to these), nothing would happen, e ither technica l ly or non-technicallv .

This affirmation of de lay does not mean that people need to be out of date in their th inking about technology , or that cu lture should always follow in the w ake of technological change. R ather, it means that there can be no technology as such without temporalization, deferral, anticipation and de lay . The crit ical core ot the ‘e m ergen cy ’ (understood as both the perception ot an urgcncy and something emergent) of contem porary technology for H eidegger consists of the possibil ity that delay wou ld not ‘a r r iv e ’ or appeal' . In other words, catching up with con tem porary technology being thoroughly up to date w ou ld pose a threat to thought. In contrast to V ir i l io ’s emphasis on setting out the effects ol a genera l ized arrival through technology, for H eidegger the non-arrival of any questioning concerning our specific involvement with technology is a h igh-level risk or a danger.

1 55

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

In itself, speed is not the danger. The danger is that the question of how technology implies de lay will not be broached. How could the question not arrive? O nly if it is not thought in term s ol de lay . The question o f technology, o f how to think about its essence, is never too late unless it arrives w ithout delay .

Unfamiliar as it may be, and still tending tow ards a supra-technical identif ication of the human with th inking, this v iew ot techno logy takes it ser iously as a dis junctive and p lur i-poten t event. It gestures tow ards different ways of thinking about essence, m ore a ttuned to a rad ica l ly contingent implication of bodies and t im e in technical m ediat ions. Seen from this point of v iew , Ping B ody's fixation on de lay takes on a very different com plexion . The perform ance refers to a com plicated h is to r­ical actualization which occurs neither as a s ide-eftcct ot hum an activity nor autonom ously beyond the human. Just as there is no technical support in itself, there is no synchronization or s im ultane ity that does not also im p ly an exposure to something which resists im m ediate re tr ieva l . A constitutional exposure to delay m arks the rea l- t im e s imulat ion , or any other kind of technological synchronization. The question now is how this exposure is art icu la ted or embodied.

For H eidegger , language itself answers that question . As Bernard St ieg ler observes, for H eidegger , speech or language bears w ith in itself the orig inary tem pora li ty which opens a historical w or ld for humans (S tieg ler , 1993 , 41 ) . The concentrat ion on language has protound consequences for the th inkability of techno logy as an event. The problem ot th inking technology is basica lly , tor H e idegger , a problem of the inability to hear at a distance, or to detec t echoes. Modern j 1 technology muffles the orig inary tem pora li ty of speech. By render ing time calcu lab le , it creates o ther storage possibil ities which compete with and scramble the m em ory w o rk of language. (Lyotard (1991) develops this po int.) Technical action anaesthetizes sensitivity to the radical futurity em bodied in linguistic heritage . H eidegger w r ites such difficult texts on technology because he a ttempts to re tr ieve the event of that exposure in thorough ly linguistic te rm s . Part of his pro ject is to resist language becom ing m ere ly technical . This com m its his work to a com plicated web of l inguistic resources o verw he lm ing ly drawn from German and classical Greek texts . If we assume that t im e simply becomes calculable in m odern techno logy , then som eth ing like a

' 3 4

I N F R A S T R U C T U R E A N D I N D I V I D U A T I O N

historical ly continuous linguistic heritage such as German poetry and philosophy wou ld appear to be the only source o f radical contingency left. Yet this antipathy to calculation remains far too simple and crude. Not on ly language opens an historical w orld for humans. The historical life ot collect ives embodies itse lf in technical mediations. The tem por­a l i ty ot collect ives is in t im ate ly l inked to their technic ity . W hile the stress that H e idegger places on the technological folding of t ime as temporalization remains crucial (because it does not a llow con tem por­ary technology to figure as a s imple assault on the l iv ing), w e need also to ask it it is possible to preserve this emphasis on tem porality w ithou t g round ing it so le ly within language?

F R O M G E ST U R E S T O C O I L E C T IV F S : IN F O R M A T IO N AND T E M P O R A L IT Y

In the video still ot the perform ance , Stelarc stands frozen, webbed w ith cables and transducers , exposed to a spectrum of visual, tactile and auditory signals channelled by technical media interlaces (computer- contro lled e lectrodes , video screens , com puter-genera ted sound). Behind h im , his own im age steps back m/sc en abyme in a rear video pro jection. S te la rc ’s gestures are p ro jected on-screen by part of the Ping Body apparatus, probably by the top video cam era in this case. (In the an im ated sequence archived at S te la rc ’ s W eb site, the peculiar rhythms and abnormal contortions of S te la rc ’s gestures and movements make m o re sense ot the d ism em bered com puter animations o f body parts.)

Most contem porary machines are arranged so that living bodies perform gestures in contact w ith certa in surfaces of the machine (e .g . the keyboard , the m ouse , the touchscreen , data-g lovc, spoken words). In information technolog ies, these gestures can be parsed as a sequence ot commands that m ake sense w ith in a given context of action. Stelarc’ s gestures are not functional, nor is the ir significance obvious. They do not point tow ards or do anything. Ping Body presents a living body whose quasi- involuntary m ovem ents How trom a sequence ot highly serialized and ne tw o rked m ovem ents of coiled information (the data provided by ping runn ing on the UNIX com puter) as gestures. Stelarc perhaps feels the arrival of the ping data as a shock through the

' ^

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

e lectrodes, but his gestures cannot be read as re lat ing to some other purpose. This reversal of the usual relation be tw een body and machine can be in terpreted as the stimulation of an o therw ise increasingly tranquilized liv ing body. The consequence o f such an in terpretat ion is c lear lv negative'. Q uoting Viril io again:

W hat lies ahead is a d isturbance in the perception of what rea l i ty is; it is a shock, a mental concussion. . . . The specific negative aspect of these information superh ighways is p recise ly this loss of o r ien ta ­tion regard ing alter ity (the o ther) , this d isturbance in the re la t ion ­ship with the other and with the w orld . (V ir il io , 1995a)

H eidegger also often speak.s of the loss of distance and p rox im ity . For both H eidegger and Viril io , S te la rc ’ s gestures can only signal d iso r i­entation, specifically in relation to ‘ the o th e r ’ and ‘ the w o r ld ’ . In V ir i l io ’s te rm s, the reversal staged by Ping Body w ou ld only confirm the endo-colonization of the living by the technolog ica l: Stelarc stimulates himself in o rder to compensate for the passivity and im m obil ity induced by the arrival ot data on the netw orks . Ffis gestures touch nothing and no one. This in terpretat ion ignores the fact that the ping data concern delays. Read in te rm s of delav , the reversal ot the order of interfacing in Ping Body (the in terface accesses Ste larc , rather than Stelarc accessing the interface) introduces a prom ising com plica ­tion. Ping Body does enact instantaneity . Instead ol gesture pertain ing solely to what arrives instantly , to what is im m ed ia te or in contact , gesture opens on to a certa in non-touching touch amidst the speed of te lem atic com munication . Ping Body em bodies speed and de lay as a constantly changing disparity or d ivergence b e tw een touch and non­touch. This is not to say that Ping Body configures a posthuman body. In all their differences, living human and non-human bodies constitute a /one of in teraction and rc lat ionality lo r das G e-stell. They transduce betw een machines, which themselves partic ipate in the individuation of the co llect ive . In the process o f transducing betw een machines, liv ing bodies themselves arc- reconfigured (as w e saw in C hapter 2). Simondon w rites that ‘the living does not com e after , but dur ing the non-liv ing’ (S imondon, 1995 , 149). Insofar as they are l iv in g , bodies onlv suspend com pletion of the physical processes of individuation.

i } 6

I N F R A S T R U C T U R E A N D I N D I V I D U A T I O N

Because they suspend indiv iduation or because thev stage an ongoing transduction of d ivergent rea lit ies , topological and temporal com pli­cations em erge . ‘T im e , ’ S imondon says, ‘ springs from the preindividual just like the other dimensions through individuation effects itse lf ’ (S im ondon , 1995, 32). Topolog ica llv , the transindividual is neither in ter io r nor ex te r io r to a body, but the continually folding and unfolding lim it be tw een inside and outside. Insofar as thev live, bodies transduce . They are a transductive operation in progress.

The objectless flows of the s tand ing-reserve in Pincj Body image, data, w o rd , action stream across the folds and surfaces of bodies, especially around hand, mouth , eye and ear. W hat kind of transduction might occur through the interactions staged there? Not only do such flows support anthropocentr ic il lusions concerning technology as a human construct serv ing human purposes, they also re iterate forgetful­ness of d ivers ity and differences by p lugging liv ing bodies into technical apparatuses, and entail de-d ilfercntia t ion . Their intersection might be­thought of in term s ot how humans and technologies co-indix iduate. The disparit ies in t im ing in the gestures ol Ping Body are essential to that h istorical ly contingent bodving-forth or border ing which co-elefines what it is to have a body and to be s ituated in relation to others within a technosocial co llect ive . W ithou t that lack of synchronization, no body, l iv ing or non-liv ing, could be. Ihe d isorienting event of Ping

Body goes further than placing a living body under the control of te lem atica l ly d ispersed sources ot information. It marks delay and disorientation as the possibil ity of there being an outside, ol there being t im e or others. W e certa in ly recognize the- flows as information in the usual sense. Ihey might also give rise to inform ation in Simondon’ s sense: the signification which springs up when an indiv idu­ation discovers the dimension according to which disparate- realities can be art icu lated w ith each other.

There m ay be something too literal in Ping Body's trea tm ent ot delay: e lectr ica l signals applied d irec t ly to the skin certa in ly signify an experience of de lay w ithout passing through language or signs. Stclarc \s gestures stem from neurom uscu lar stimulation by data concerning the status of a com munication infrastructure . Yet Pimj Body reverses the usual occurrence of a gestu re in relation to technical ensembles. There is here, as Viril io says, ‘a loss of orientation regarding a l t e r i t y ’ , blit

> V I

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

this loss ni'i'd not be negative. Ping Body's gestures antic ipate and respond to delays induced by the anonymous fluctuating vo lume ol other gestures propagating on the netw orks . Despite their quasi- involuntarv character , the gestures are tr iggered at intervals d ictated bv the speed at which information is m oving on the Internet. That speed is significantly affected by the vo lume of information on the networks. In turn , this means that the rhythm of the gestures testifies to a shifting intersection of d ispersed flows, criss-crossing be tw een different e lem ents of con tem porary sociotechnical co llect ives . (Again, contrary to V ir i l io ’s in terpre tat ion , the d isorienting effects of speed bear a relation to others w ithin th em .) It becomes impossible to decide w hether S te la rc ’s gestures are his, or the involuntary products of Ping

Body as a technical ensem ble , itself in ter laced with o ther places and people, l he line betw een the tw o the relat ion to others , as m arked by the dependency of the ping data on what others are do ing on the netw orks; the delay result ing from the cu rren t state of com munication technology shifts constantly and in ways that cannot be fully antic ipated. W e a lready include an antic ipation of a technical delay within our gestures , and this inclusion means that a gesture can never be en t ire ly human or com plete ly meaningful. If that line b e tw een the technical and the other cannot be c lear ly d raw n , does not the who le question of a loss of orientation clue to excessive speed take on a different complexion?

T R A N S IN D IV ID U A L E M B O D IM E N T

The undecidable inclusion of the technical w ith in the non-technical helps deal w ith a certa in l ingering prob lem associated w ith delay. Speed is exper ienced through inert ia and de lay . It is ev idence of temporal complication and differences. In certa in respects , Ping Body

affirms the temporal c omplications of’ the co llect ive . R ather than seeing humans as under assault by techno logy , the notion of transductive individuation lets us see how information implies an em bod im en t of a particu lar kind: the transindiv idual. The most difficult point in H eideg­g e r ’ s account o f technology centres on the prob lem of how to think the essence of technology w ithout lapsing back into notions of essence derived from metaphysics and an onto logy of substance. The first

i 58

I N F R A S T R U C T U R E A N D I N D I V I D U A T I O N

section of the ‘The Question Concern ing T echno logy ’ had analysed why plausible and still com m on instrumenta l and anthropological definitions ol technology (technology is a means to an end for humans, technology is something humans make or do) fail to respond to the event of con tem porary technology. Those definit ions neglected to address the essence of m odern technology as a mode ol em ergence or eventuation . In fact, that neglect , which is no m ere oversight, is the core com plex ity in th inking technology for H eidegger: ‘ technics is that which requires us to think what is usually understood bv “essence” in another sense ’ (H e idegger , 19 54/77 , 30 /34 ) . The event of modern technology implies a different concept of essence: the essence of technics , das G e-stcll, is not a genus or genera l ideal, of which all actual technical m ediat ions, inc lud ing Ping Body would be species or instances. Rather, it pertains to a m ode of eventuation .

The essential complication here is that everyth ing that occurs techn ica l ly tends to de lay the appearance ol its own mode of even tu ­ation. Delay is intrinsic to the technological as a mode of eventuation. The essence of technics is, w ith regard to its th inkabilitv, in delay . T he autocatalysis and archiv ing character ist ic of contem porary technical processes expose things to visibility at the expense ol concealing how that m ode of eventuation and pers istence involves humans in something that they d on ’t m ake or invent, i .e . something radical ly different vet constitutive for them . The hum an -non -hum an constellation ot tech­nology radiates both an energe t ic and a dislocating o rder ing in visibility, accessibility and synchronization while eclipsing a s lender and vet essential invo lvem ent tor humans. The constitutive delay affects anv thinking o f that invo lvem ent in the eventuation of things.

The prob lem is that the delays which Ping Body works with are ‘techn ica l ’ delays , while the constitutive delay that H eidegger refers to when he talks about responding to the event of m odern technology is not technical . The mill isecond delays in Internet response times seem trivial in comparison to the ‘epocha l ’ suspensions and delays Heidegger is interested in . Those delays are defin ite ly located at the level ol thought and history. They concern the interplay betw een anticipation and reco llect ion which constitutes w hatever is presented as real or significant within that co llect ive . Recapitu la ted in term s of Foucau lt’s ‘critical ques t ion ’ (see the discussion which begins Chapter 1), delay is

i 3 9

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

a condition oi possibil ity of crit ical questioning : ‘ what is g iven to us as necessary ’ can appear as rad ical ly contingent only because w e do not live solely in the present.

Delay can function m ere ly as retardation . In V ir i l io ’ s v iew , tech ­nology streams aw ay from cu ltu re , and in doing so, tends to p re -em pt or supplant it. For him, technological speed functions as a kind of absolute anticipation which blocks the arrival of anyth ing other than that which it program m es. W o rse , this speed has no d irect ion or meaning in itself. If, how ever , techn ic ity remains a condition of mean ing or in te ll ig ib il ity , speed might not be fully in te l l ig ib le . As Derrida writes in answ er to a question posed by Bernard St ieg ler , ‘technology is not in te l l ig ib le ’ (D err ida and St ieg ler , 1996 , 121) , since anyth ing that forms part of the conditions of m ean ing or in te ll ig ib il ity cannot be fully intell ig ib le in itself. (T em pora lity and corporea l ity also have this ‘p ro p er ty ’ .) U ninte l l ig ib i l i ty imposes a l im it on thought, but it is not s imply a nihilistic lim it . The ‘m ere ly techn ica l ’ form of delay found in Ping Body becomes im portant because w ithou t this technical delay there can be no sensation of speed. Speed can only be em bodied through technical delays.

W i l l \ W A S PINC, B O D Y P F R F O R M F D ?

A fourth Hie relat ing to Ping Body records the dates on w'hich the w ork was perform ed. Ping Body was perform ed in Sydney , for instance, on 10 April 1996. This date marks a day and a p lace , a lthough perhaps not the day or place H eidegger had in mind for the eventalizat ion of the essence of technology itse lf when he w ro te that ‘ technology installs itself eve ryw h ere until one day , through every th ing techn ica l , the essence of technology comes in the event \Ercignis] of t r u th ’ (1977/ 1954, 35/39). In this formulat ion , and manv others like it, de lay loses its constitutive charge if the ‘one clay’ is understood as a future present, as a dav on which a long-delayed recogn it ion of human involvement with technology w il l finally arr ive . The event of tech ­nology cannot be simply or d irec t ly datab le for H eidegger , w ithout asking under what c ircum stances something like a date becomes meaningful as an inscription of tem pora l processes.

The archived diagrams, com puter images and video clips surround

14 0

I N F R A S T R U C T U R E A N D I N D I V I D U A T I O N

an event that occurred on a part icu lar dav. The event of Ping Body is actualized on that day. Perhaps that particu lar date , 10 April 1996, does not count any m ore than any other particu lar date , such as 31 D ecem ber 1999. W e could ask, how ever : does Ping Body sav something about how an event takes p lace today, about d atab ility under certain m ed ia t ic - in lo rm at ic conditions? W e have a lready seen the reversal of the usual o rder of interfacing and exper ience of speed that occurs through Ping Body. S te la rc ’s gestures are involuntarily inflected bv m easurem ents of the de lay tim e of com munication . Those delay times them selves re late to shifts in the vo lum e of com munication associated w ith a m ult ip l ic ity of d iverse rea lit ies : the alternation of dav and night, the div ision of the w or ld into a set of t ime-zones governed by datelines, the closing and open ing times of geographically scattered financial m arkets , the fluctuating volumes of information tr iggered bv highly contingent polit ical, econom ic , cu ltura l and natural events. All of these shifts take place w ith in a m il ieu of s ignalling and transmission synchron­ized by dating and t im ing protocols . The event of Ping Body articulates those conditions on each other. Dating and tim ing protocols operate in each single facet of Ping Body, from the technical apparatus, through the Internet protocols which passed back the ping data, to the video loop which recorded , m ixed and transm itted Ping Body on local and rem ote video screens as a ‘ l iv e ’ event.

W ho or what is Ping Body? The ephem era l m onstrosity of Ping Body

m ute ly gestures tow ard a m ode of individuation int im ate ly associated w ith technology as event. It lives on re lays and delays within con tem ­porary informatic co llect ives . S imondon w r ites that a ‘collect ive only exists if an individuation institutes i t ’ (S im ondon, 1995, 165). The transindiv idual partic ipates in the individuation of a co llect ive . C lear ly , Ping Body does not a l low us to decide w hether technological change is destructive decontcxtual izat ion or a rad ica l ly novel event. It perhaps allows us to say taht the w'ay in which something comes about today cannot be fully rendered fully in te ll ig ib le in term s which separate what bodies, machines, t im e or human and non-human others are.

At the simplest leve l , as an event, Ping Body art iculates diverse technical, m ediat ic and corporea l-gestura l realities with each other. Perhaps w hat it further brings into question is the wav things happen today. It asks w hether they occur as just such an articulation of diverse

141

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

realities. Their em ergent relation needs to be thought about. Broadly speaking, V ir i l io ’s thesis is that technological ensem bles catastrophically collapse ex ist ing orderings ot space and t im e . They coloni/.e the liv ing, and reduce or erase d if fe re n c e s . It is difficult to see how such a position could reg ister relations betw een different rea lit ies , let alone open up any kind of affirmative possibil ity. Insistence on an idealized sim ultane ity and the natural in ter io r ity of a living body can stand in the w ay of crit ical questioning. Although there are strong grounds to diverge from H eidegger (tor instance, on the basis of his still too m e ta p h y s ic a l re p re s s io n of the techn ica l) , I think that the prob lem ot th inking contem porary technological ensem bles cannot easily c ir cu m ­vent his discussion of the essence of technology and the human in term s of tem pora li ty . Nearly every o ther crit ical account accepts speed as the ‘ substance’ o f m odern techno logy , and then tr ies to find ways of s low ing it down. H eidegger a lone structures a response to techno ­logical speed in term s of constitutive de lay , as a d ivergence at the core of historical processes. But is it possible to imagine an affirmative co llect ive response to the event o f m odern technology em erg ing from a G crm anic-G reek philosophico-poetic l inguistic heritage?

Ping Body can be read as someth ing m ore modest. It gestures tow ards a collect ive individuation associated w ith technology . W e are co llect ive ly incorporating reg im es of s im ulat ion , com m unication and retr ieval o rdered by das G e-stell. Yet the techn ic ity o f these technical mediat ions cannot be rendered fully significant because they in part condition meaning. O nly at tem pora l and corporea l l im its can they be felt , and there perhaps on ly affectively. (In C hapter 5, one such contem porary l im it-exper ience w il l be d iscussed .) For collectives cen tred on signifying processes, this can p resen t com patib i l i ty prob­lems. Ping Body is transindividual to the e x t e n t that it inhabits this incompatib il ity betw een affective and technical processes . It diagrams convoluted pathways or processes for the em ergence of technological objects, and assays the tissue of the ir in terconnection as living. Technica l mediations may lack m ean ing ye t stil l be m utab le and eventful w ithin the life ot the co llect ive .

1 42

I N F R A S T R U C T U R E A N D I N D I V I D U A T I O N

NOTHS

1. V id eo im age up loads , t e x t and techn ica l deta i l s o f p er fo rm ances in A ustra l ia ,

U K , the N e the r lan d s and N ew Z ea lan d , as w e l l as most o f S te la rc 's w r i t in g s ,

a r e a rch iv ed at w w w . s t e l a r c . v a . e o m . a u / , and also in C o o k et id. ( 1 99 7 ) .

2. \v\vw.s t c la r c .v a .c o m .au /

3. I w i l l not a t te m p t to sum m ar i/ e H e id e g g e r ’ s th ink ing on techn o logy . Som e

acqua in tance w ith H e id e g g e r is unavo idab le in the fo l low ing d iscussion . An

o v e rv ie w can be found in D rey fu s ( 1 9 9 5 ) .

4 . D e r r id a fo rm u la ted his uneas iness w ith this assert ion o f separa t ion b e tw een

tech n o lo g y and its es sence as fo l low s :

It m a in ta in s the poss ib i l i ty o f though t that ques t ions , w h ich is a lw ays

though t o f the e s sen ce , p ro te c ted from anv o r ig ina l and essent ia l c o n ta m ­

inat ion by tec h n o lo g y . T he co n ce rn , then , w as to analv/.e this des i re for

r ig o ro us n on -co n tam in a t io n and , f rom that , perhaps , to env isage the

necess i ty , o ne cou ld sav the fatal n ecess i ty o f a co n tam in a t ion and the

w o r d was im p o r tan t to m e of a con tac t o r ig in a r i lv im p ur i fv in g thought

o r speech b y tech n o lo gy . C o n ta m in a t io n , th en , o f the thought o f essence

b y t e ch n o lo gy , and so co n tam in a t ion by techn o logy ot the th inkab le

essence o f tech n o lo g y . (D e r r id a , 19 89 , 10)

5. D is t r a c t ing ly , for o u r pu rp oses , s ince it w o u ld m ean b roach ing ques t ions o f

la n gu a g e , t rans la t ion and h is to ry , this a r t icu la t ion o n ly m akes obvious sense

am id s t the s em an t ic fo lds o f the G erm an t e x t . The usua l English t rans la t ion

o f das G e-stell as ‘e n f r a m in g ’ om its th e hyphen a l to ge the r . T he broken

sy l lab les of das G e-S tc ll re f lec t a d eep a r t icu la t io n in the process w h e reb y

th ings c o m e to stand as techn ic a l ly o rd e r a b le en t i t ie s . H e re 1 w i l l not trace

H e id e g g e r ’s s em an t ic p a th , but w i l l s im p ly sugges t that the a r t icu la t ion o f Jus

G e-stell con jo ins a co n ce r te d fo ld ing o r g a the r in g w ith an o pen in g o r set t ing

ou t (H e id eg g e r , 19 7 7 , 19- 2 1 ; 19 5 4 , 23 5).

6. T h e re a re severa l p rob lem s in u n d er s tand ing w h at is said here . The tex t has been sub jec ted to a co m pre ss io n that p laces ser ious obstac les in the w av o f

its t rans la t ion and c o m p re h e n s io n . W h e n e v e r H e id e g g e r sounds m ost in ac­

cess ib le , w h e n e v e r the a rch iv e o f his though t is most res is tan t to expans ion ,

a k ind o f co n densa t ion o r d en se p a t te rn in g th rough in te r laced philosophical ,

p oe t ic and e t y m o lo g ic a l r eg is te rs is r e sp on s ib le . It is v e ry difficult not to

skip o v e r the p lea ted surface of the t ex t . W h i l e the t ex tua l com press ion

repeats and re-m arks that v e ry m an ifo ld ing ot en t i t ie s w h ich H e id eg ge r is

in te re s ted in th ink ing , it a lso r e in fo rces a c o m m i tm e n t to spoken language

as the p r im a ry m e d iu m o f access to hum an h is to ry . Th is , tor ins tance , is

w h y the h um an ek-s is ts as the one spoken to o r addressed. T h e unfam il ia r i tv

>43

m

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

ol H e id eg g e r ' s w a y ot speaking about c o n te m p o r a r y t e c h n o lo g y d e r iv e s u l t i ­

m a te ly from his project of r ep ea t in g and r e m a r k in g in language the h is tor ica l

com p l ic a t io ns and sed im en ta t ion ol a hum an ex p o s u re to so m eth in g o ther

than itself.

1 4 4

C H A P T E R 5

Losing time at the PlayStation: real time and the ‘whatever’ body

If a n y th in g , th e m o d e r n c o l l e c t i v e is th e o n e in w h ic h the

r e la t io n s of h u m a n s and n o n h u m a n s a r e so in t im a t e , the

t r a n s a c t io n s so m a n y , th e m e d ia t io n s so c o n v o lu t e d , that

t h e r e is no p la u s ib le s en se in w h ich a r t i l a c t , c o r p o r a t e

b o d y , and s u b je c t can he d i s t in g u i sh e d .

l a t o u r , 19 9 9

Technological infrastructure can seem quite rem ote from the affective, perceptual and gestural modalit ies of em bodied individuals. This chapter continues to emphasize the en tw in ing ol infrastructure and corporea lity , but also focuses on the implications for individuals and collect ives . The en tw in ing stems from metastabilit ies that previous chapters have variously' analysed at different levels in term s of m ate r i­alization, information, t im ing and em bodv ing-de lav . II a transductive understanding of technical mediat ions is to be of value, it must also make some sense of how ind ividuals fit w ith individuation. In other words, amidst all of the m ed iated anti suspended indeterm inac ies open to an a lw ays-a lready techn ica l ly m ediated co llect ive , w e need to ask: how does an in d ividualized individuation occur? In part, an answer to that question comes from the notion ot the tran sin d ividu al introduced in Chapter 4. It a l low ed S te la rc ’s Ping Body to be located on the boundary of in frastructure , co llect ive and bodv, anti sketched a general answer to the question of who or what exper iences technology. It should, h ow ever , be possible to say m ore about how ‘ indiv idualization’ arises in a specific technical ly m ediated contex t. This chapter will discuss how gesture anti perception individuate a living both in the context ot an online, rea l- t im e com puter game.

>4 ^

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

Such games have a broad and diffuse significance w ith in co n tem por­ary cultural contexts . They exem p lify certa in historic transformations broadly invoked by Giorgio Agamben:

To appropriate the historic transformations of human nature that capitalism wants to lim it to the spectac le , to link together image and body in a space w here they can no longer be .separated, and thus to forge the w hatever body, whose physis is resem blance — this is the good that humanity must learn to w res t from com m odit ies in their dec line . (Agam ben, 1993a, 50)

W hat m ight this ‘goo d ’ mean in relat ion to the m ovem ents of digital information that support the rapid d isp lacem ents o f m onetary value characterist ic of g lobalization? judged by the value standards of this good, the com puter gam e, w e m ight say, is a technical m ediat ion in the service of the degenera te spectacle of in form ation- im ages . It internalizes cu rren t and archaic phantasms ot p leasure , vio lence and control through simple narrat ives , c rude m oraliz ing filters and forms o f self-identification.

Even so, 1 want to argue that in the w ays that they cu rren t ly link images and bodies, com puter games expose us to something m ore than a form of cultura l dam age , m ore than an infantile em barrassm ent or com m odity in decline. For all the gender-spec if ic , class-bound and racia l ly s tereotyp ica l identifications they read ily e lic it (identifications that support and key into the ongoing commodif ication ot computation and information), there are certa in m etastab le configurations and rhythms associated w ith these toy artefacts. T hey m ay help think through the problem of indiv iduation of a l iv ing en tity in a technical ly m ediated collective.

Return ing to Agamben\s citation , three strands are of in terest :(a) Agamben speaks o f ‘historic transformations of human n a tu re ’ .

W e w ou ld have to ask w hat specific transformations are invo lved , and how is ‘human n a tu re ’ to be understood here . In A gam ben ’s sugges­tion, these transformations concern the aw k w a rd ly te rm ed ‘w h a tev e r ’ body.

(b) W hatever these transformations are , ‘capita lism wants to l im it ’ them ‘to the spectac le ’ . W e m ight ask: how is this l im itat ion - of the

14 6

R E A L T I M E A N D T H E ' W H A T E V E R ' B O D Y

transformations - to the spectacle occurring , and why docs capitalism l im it those transformations? In the spectacle , especially given the ever- increasing ro le of rea l- t im e or ‘s t re am in g ’ m edia , the reduction of de lay to the m om ent of transmission features p re-em inen tly , ln iorma- tion, as a techn ico-econom ic processing ol indeterm inacy , tends to reduce delay to the instant; it stages a co incidence between the occurrence , record ing and reception of events.

(c) Finally, and m ore prob lem atica l ly , how is the linkage between image and body to be thought of w ithin the context of these transformations? W h y is that linkage so important for Agamben (or for us)? In what sense does it constitu te a ‘go o d ’ , something that we might work for, in resisting an a lienating separation betw een bodies and images? This separation is to be resisted prec ise ly becausc it contributes to an uninhabitable commodif ication that even tua lly , as Agamben argues in la ter w o rk (Agam ben , 1998), targets life itself.

This th ird point w il l be a m ajo r focus here . W res t ing the good from a com m odity in dec line , such as the com puter gam e, would involve a form of bricolage that d iverts it from its assigned function within the mediatized spectacle that A gamben, echoing Guy D ebord ’s The Society

o f the Spectacle (1 9 9 5 ) , invokes here . In the case of the com puter gam e, that function involves the d irec t interfacing o f what is stereotvpicallv regarded as a fairly unprom ising kind of indiv idual, the com puter gam e-p layer , into c ircuits o f information. The s tereo type of com puter games regards them as closed w orlds , purged of differences, and mostly involving narrat ives that emphasize ex term ination of differences rather than affirmative engagem ent with them . Those circuits , h o w ­ever, also engender linkages betw een bodies and images which com ­pose the m ediat ized w hatever body.

Agam ben’s concept o f the whatever subtly art icu lates a collective belonging-together, or being in com m on , which does not p resume any substantial who le or un ity . Agamben writes-, ‘decisive here is the idea of an inessential com m ona l i ty , a so lidar ity that in no wav concerns an essence’ (p. 18). It designates a kind of being that em erges as a modal oscillation b e tw een proper and im proper , in the same w ay that the wavering line o f a hand-w rit ten signature runs betw een the proper ideality of ident ity and the im proper contingencies of its particular inscription. For the most part , operat ing at a quasi-ontological level,

1 4 7

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

A gam ben ’s account is not framed in te rm s of technical ly m ediated linkages betw een images and bodies, be tw een audiovisual perceptions and gestures. Yet, w henever he avers to the con tem porary ethos of the spectacle , this linkage comes to the fore. In the contex t of com puter gam es , we may need to renegotiate the passage b e tw een ontology and ethics as a linkage betw een bodies anil images. The space in which I w ill a ttem pt to locate these linkages is t im e : the t im e lost in play and conceived neither objectively nor as a p red icate of human subjects or cu ltures .

The discussion that follows forms a ‘ sub jec t ive ’ coun terpart to the ‘ob jec t ive ’ account of c lockt im e techn ic ity in C hapter 3. W h a t was at stake in that discussion was a w ay of understand ing the dynam ism of a co llect ive w ithout resort to an essence o f technology or society . The tentative conclusions concerned the incom pleteness of the co llect ive in term s of metastable reg im es of t im ing and spacing. The chapter argued that the effects of instability and dynam ism associated w ith co n tem p o r­ary technology result from the incorporation with in a co llect ive ot the fact of its own ex ter io r ity or incom pleteness. The ongoing m etastab ility of certa in collect ives reflects an incom plete structur ing stem m ing from their interiorization of the ex ter io r itv of technical m ediat ions asjtem pora li ty . This interiorization can now be approached trom a different ang le : that o f d iscovering in an em bod ied subject something that is neither individual nor com m on ident ity . In S im ondon ’s te rm s, corporeality designates the pre-ind iv iduated reserves which constantly com ply with and contest social norms.

PLAY, TIM E AND H IS T O R IC A L T R A N S F O R M A T I O N S OF H U M A N N A T U R E

The discussion is d ivided into three m ajo r sections, beginning w'ith a theoretical contcxtualization of the links betw een p lay, t im e and historical transformations associated w ith the in form alic spectacle . The fo llowing section sets out how' a specific rea l- t im e com puter game figures in that spectacle. A final section addresses the question of how- certain complications or ‘k inks ’ in linkages b e tw een images and bodies in com puter games open on to the pecu lia r ly co llect ive s ingu lar ity that Agamben term s ‘ the w h a tev e r ’ . In S im ondon ’s te rm ino logy , this

1 4 8

R E A L T I M E A N D T H E ' W H A T E V E R ' B O D Y

‘w h a tev e r ’ would be te rm ed the ‘trans ind iv idua l ’ , although he used the te rm w ithout any d irect reference to the- role of technical mediations in collect ives. The unstable m ix tu re o f discussing the specificit ies of a part icu lar gam e and broader questions associated not only w ith the informatic spectacle but also with tem porali ty and corporea lity w il l , I hope, be justif ied bv the appearance of some prom ising disjunctions in the tim ing of information. Thev suggest how an information consum er might, tentative ly and inconclusively, succeed in belonging to im proprie ty as such.

THE T E M P O R A L IT Y OF PLAY: BETW EEN S T R U C T U R EAND EVENT

Let m e sketch briefly both why I think that p la y , even in the form of com puter gam es, m ight open a w ay into the prob lem s of the historical transformations of human indiv iduation; how , through plav, we might both discern certa in co llect ive transformations associated with digital technologies and something important but elusive as to how one could belong to an im proper ye t s ingular co llect ive . The argum ent will situate the com puter gam e in relation to the tim e of the spectacle referred to by Agamben. Rather than trea t ing the com puter game as a scmiotic process to be analysed according to its coding of narratives, or v iewpoints , w e m ight need to see it from the angle of temporalitv , and through tem pora l i ty , h istoric ity .

W e could bt'gin by regard ing the com puter game as a toy, something that ‘ch ildren of all ag e s ’ plav w ith. The sheer investment of t im e , m oney and ene rgy that goes into com puter games attests to how much time is g iven or lost to these toys bv certa in people, most prom inently by boys and m en , but c lear ly not just th e m .1 A computer game is a form of p lay, and through it, the com puter becomes a kind of toy. Games figure p rom inent ly in the m arket ing of personal computers for home use. Home com puters are prom oted on the basis of their capacity to stage the m ult im ed ia spectacle associated with contemporary gam es. No m atter how commodified it is, or what economic value it has as merchandise , the com puter game functions also as a form of plav, or as a form of toy.

W hat is specifically at stake for contem porary social collectives in

1 4 9

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

their status as forms of p lay, or as to vs? There is a powerfu l double nexus betw een play and tem pora l i ty , as Agamben himself has pointed out e lsew here :

(a) f i r s t , the history of gam es shows that p lay em erges from ritual,

and ritual is deep ly in terw oven with t im e and history in the social formations it belongs to: sacred ritual maintains the ca lendar by m arking thresholds betw een seasons in m any societies , for instance. Com press ing A gam ben ’s a rgum ent a l it t le , it could be said that rituals absorb events into synchronic structures , such as myths and calendars. Plav and gam es, as desacralized r itua l , enact rites as actions em ptied of mythical content. Agamben w rites : ‘ so in ball gam es w e can disccrn the relics of the ritual represen tat ion of a m yth in which the gods fought for possession of the su n ’ (Agam ben , 1993b, 69 ) . W h ereas the narration of myths ‘ a llows a sequence of events to be placed in a constant fram ew ork in which the beginning and the end of a story form a sort of rhythm or rh y m e ’ (L yotard , 1991 , 6 7 ) , p lay entails a loss of o rdered t ime, or a b reakdow n of the t im e of the sacred. Play transforms structures into events.

(b) Second, at a less abstract level, p lay keeps on subsuming not only sacred behaviours, but anyth ing that once be longed to human practice , w hether it is practical, econom ic or m il ita ry . Play even takes what still belongs to cu rren t practice , and m in iaturizes it in the form of toys. Describing this aspect o f play as transform ation, Agamben writes : ‘the toy is what belonged once, no longer - to the rea lm of the sacred or the practical e co n om ic ’ (1 99 3b , 71 ) or to the m il itary - industrial com plex . Docs this tem pora l d im ension of the toy and play strongly em erge in the com puter gam e? The com puter gam e tem por­ar ily configures the com puter as toy , and p lay ing a com puter game entails interacting w ith the com puter as a toy . Support for this in terpretation is not hard to find. Not on ly was the personal computer itself la rgely the invention of com puter gam e-p laye rs in the late 1960s and ear ly 1970s (in C a l ifo rn ia ) ,2 con tem porary com puters are increas­ingly m iniature in the sense that all toys are m in iatures . Early microcom­puters transformed a cu rren t ob ject - the large m ainfram e computers, belonging to governm ents , corporations , the m il i ta ry and universities

into a toy , a site of bricolage pervaded by te lev isual cu ltu re . (Hence

i ? o

Bolter and Grusin (1 9 9 9 ) can argue that there' are no absolutely new m ed ia , only rem ediat ions of ear l ie r m ed ia .) This ‘to y ’ from C alifornia was sold back into those institutional domains a decade or tw o later in vast num bers, so that we humanities academics have computers on our desks today. The econom ic turned a toy to its own ends and this reappropriation increasingly s tructures the artefact at all levels of its fabrication and m arket ing . On the one hand, sem iconductor manufac ­turers such as Intel design their products w ith the graphics-intensive requ irem ents of com puters gam es foremost in mind (e .g . by ‘hard­w ir in g ’ certa in m athem atica l transformations com m only used by p ro­grams that com pute images represent ing the m ovem ent of objects in 3D space). On the other hand, in March 1999 under their ‘ F reePC ’ scheme, Com paq (the largest personal com puter m anufacturer) began to give com puters to consumers in exchange for full information on consumption habits. These considerations, how ever , should not p re ­vent us from asking w hether the com puter as toy , and the computer game as presentation of the com puter as toy , can stil l share in the specific destructur ing tem pora l i ty of play. In term s of the example I will soon be discussing, this is to ask how rea l tim e, w here the interval between the tr igger ing of an event and its processing/reception falls beneath the threshold of sensible perception ( i .e . faster than conscious thought), partic ipates in this tem pora li ty . Real t im e can be understood as a touchstone ot the ongoing historical transformations in human nature that Agamben refers to.

PLAY AS M A T E R IA L IZ E D H IS T O R IC IT Y

Agamben’s analysis o f the toy leads to a m ore genera l point as to the implication of p lay and t ime:

W hat the toy preserves ol its sacred or econom ic m odel, what survives ot this after its d ism em berm ent or miniaturizat ion, is nothing other than the human tem pora li ty that was contained

therein: its pure historical essence. The toy is a materialization of the historic ity contained in objects, ex trac t ing it bv means of a particular m anipulat ion . (Agam ben, 1993b, 71)

R E A L T I M E A N D T H E ‘ W H A T E V E R ' B O D Y

' f 1

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

This is a c laim strorudv rooted in historical m ater ia l is t accounts oft ' J

subjectivity . If the toy somehow preserves the h istoric ity o l objects , if human tem pora li ty imbues it, and play ex tracts or exposes that tem poralitv through m anipulat ion, then there w ou ld be strong grounds to ask what kind of tem pora l i ty , what m ater ia lizat ion ol h istoric ity , can be d iscerned in com puter gam es . In some w ay that needs clarification, com puter play and along w ith it, the com puter insofar as it functions as a toy w ou ld be a cipher of the tem pora li ty associated with our relation to information. It should enact something about what t im e is for us, in what sense we can be historical through and perhaps despite com putat ion , as the goal ol rea l- t im e transfer ot information is re lentless ly pursued in d iverse .spheres. W hen Again ben argues that historic ity can be seen in play, he does not mean that play represents the way in which human tem pora l i ty unfolds. Rather, he argues that the dynamics of that tem pora li ty untold as play. In other words , play is not der ivative , secondary to tem pora l i ty . In particu lar , p lay would not be foreign to the temporaliz.ing dynamics of humans in their exposure to history, but deep ly em bedded as a series of oscillations convert ing synchronic structures into diachronic events. Play inverts r itual: if ritual (or secular narrat ives o f progress or emancipation which ground the ir leg it im acy in the future ra ther than the past) absorbs events into synchronic s tructures , p lay in all its forms art icu lates and even d ism em bers svnchronic s tructures into events. It

J

doubles , replicates and displaces symbols , gestures and figures outside the codings which organize them with in static s t ru c tu re s . ’

THE ‘ W H A T E V E R ’ BO D Y AN D PLAY

f r o m the’ standpoint o f this perturbation of tem pora l s truc tu re , w e can draw out some links betw een play and the ‘w h a tev e r ’ body, links that pass through the ‘historical transformations of human n a tu re ’ . What Agamben understands bv ‘human n a tu re ’ is adum brated in The Coming

Community. Devoid of any essence, h istorico-sp iritual vocation or destiny, humans are and have to be their ‘own ex istence as possibility

R E A L T I M E A N D T H E ' W H A T E V f c R ' B O D Y

be) matters . The quasi-concept o f ‘w h a tev e r ’ (inures this constitutive im proprie ty as a kind ol constantly oscillating em ergence , alternating be tw een potential and act, be tw een com mon nature and singularity.

The passage from potentia lity to act, from language to the word, from the com mon to the proper , comes about every t ime as a shutt l ing in both d irections along a line ol sparkling alternation on wh ich com m on nature and s ingular ity , potentia lity and act change ro les and in terpenetra te . The being that is engendered on this line is w hatever being, and the m anner in which it passes from the com m on to the proper and from the p roper to the common is called usage or ra ther , ethos, (p. 20)

The kind of en tity in question here is ‘not a final determ inat ion of being, but an unrave ll ing or an indeterm inatum of its limits: a paradoxical individuation by indeterm inatio n ’ (p. 56). In consonance with much recen t theory , this formulation acknow ledges that singularity is not com plete differentiation down to individual specific ity. On the contrary, the s ingu lar ity o f ‘w h a tev e r ’ is yet to be differentiated, vet to be analysed or f i ltered by dom inant codings. Indeterminacy and deep contingency consist in a reserve of pre-indiv iduation , or a constitutional openness that tr iggers becomings, invention and indeed play itself. To refer to ‘historical transformations o f human na tu re ’ would be to point to the process of endur ing through this incom plete­ness, never being s im ultaneous or self-coincident, a lways being in some sense de layed or lacking synchronization with a m ilieu , and always running ahead ot the present e ither through anticipation or perhaps openness to the unthought. History is the site of exposure and

structuring articulation of this domain.Through the notion of ‘w h a tev e r ’ as the ‘m athem e of s ingu lar ity ’ (a

somewhat paradoxical te rm ) , I read a wav of negotiat ing the double bind b e tw een im properness and properness , between a loss ol particu­larity through an apparently irresistib le global c ircu lation of information and a fraught insistence on binding cultura l specificity to historical and geographical contex t, that structures many accounts of the informatic spectacle. Jean-Fran^ois Lyotard avers to this double bind, for instance, by observing that:

1 i 3

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

traditional cu ltu re thus remains profoundly m arked by its local situation on the surface of the earth so that it cannot easily be transplanted or com m unicated . . . . The new technolog ies, on the other hand, in as much as they furnish cu ltura l m odels which are not init ially rooted in the local context but are im m ed ia te ly formed in view of the broadest diffusion across the surface of the g lobe, provide a rem arkab le means of overcom ing the obstacle traditional cu lture opposes to the record ing , transfer and com m unication of information. (Lyotard , 1991 , 65 )

liven if this diffusion is c lear ly incom plete and massively uneven (in term s of who has access), the double bind concerns what kind of cu lture could respond to this cu rren t ly operating model of globalized diffusion.

The notion of the ‘w h a tev e r ’ body offers a w ay to reconfigure this double bind in the context ot the informatic spectacle . Its point ot leverage is an a ltered understand ing of the re lat ion betw een singular individuation and the commonality or generality associated w'ith informa­tion. This understanding a l low s focus to be m ainta ined on the ethos of linkages betw een images and bodies, rather than try ing to locate a new proper essence or identity which could e lude the s tr ic tures of the double bind. On the line of ‘sparkling a lte rna t ion ’ b e tw een p roper and com m on, part icu lar and universal , those linkages compose an ethos

which is neither proper nor im proper , but ‘a s ingular ity w ithou t ident ity , a com mon and absolute ly exposed s ingu la r i ty ’ (Agam ben, 1993a, 65 ).

T R A N S F O R M A T IO N S LIM ITED T O THE S P E C T A C L E ?

How' would such an historical transformation of co llect ives become legible? If p lay materia lizes the h istoric ity incorporated in objects , then it should also be an ex em p la ry site from which to draw some of the e lem ents o f the ethos o f the ‘w h a tev e r ’ body. Play som etim es occurs as just that kind o f modal oscillation betw een structu re and event, universal and part icu lar , which the ‘w h a tev e r ’ entails.

In very broad term s, co llect ives o rder t im e accord ing to the differential relations they establish betw een event and structure . At

' 44

R E A L T I M E A N D T H E ' W H A T E V E R ' B O D Y

one ex trem e , a co llect ive ot plav would be an impossible society ol the pure event; all s tructures wou ld be translated into events, into a loss ol o rdered t ime. Chronological and calendrical time would collapse. At the other ex trem e wou ld lie a society ot the eternal p resent, know ing no difference betw een past and present. In any given society , specific mechanisms ot ritual and plav incessantly transform structures and events into each other. Given the impossibil ity ot ex ist ing at e ither ex trem e ( i .e . a society w ithout s tructure , or a society w ithout event) , historic transformations in human nature have to be seen in these term s as modifications in the rhythms, rates and repetition of m ovem ents betw een structure and event, and event and s tructure .

W h e re wou ld the com puter gam e lie be tw een these tw o ex trem es? In what w ay does it transform structures into events? Turn ing to the specific exam p le I promised at the outset , that of a recent rea l- t im e animation gam e, how does it artifice the m arg in betw een s tructure and event? How does it p reserve , as a toy , the tem pora li ty captured from the sacred/econom ic m odel it d ism em bers? Finally, in the context of the informatic spectac le , how does it l im it the historical transforma­tions in which w e are enmeshed?

R E A L -T IM E SY N T H E SIS AND C O D IN G

A gam e called Avara exemplif ies the cu rren t ly dominant genre of com puter games: rea l- t im e an im ated com bat, a style of game that excites s trongly gender-specif ic in terest and drives the frenetic d ev ­e lopm ent of faster graphics- intensive computation (see wwvv. am brosiasw .com /gam es/avara ) . As a rea l- t im e , ne tw orked action gam e, it tightly binds together considerations of t im e , speed, bodies and information. For p layers , the main gam e scene displays an image of self, an other , an alien (by defin it ion, a hostile o ther) , and a ‘ closed- w o r ld ’ sett ing (Edw'ards, 1996 , 3). As a gam e played over networks, not on ly are there com puter-con tro l led opponents (the aliens), but also other hum an-contro lled p layers in the im age. Actor and spectator are interchangeable in this spectacle whose main theme is surveil lance and secur ity . In Avara , each stage or level of the game introduces a new- scene in which hidden thresholds or traps complicate the su rve i l­lance ac t iv ity , a l low ing other p layers to see w ithout being seen. As

1

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

Bolter and Grusin have recen t ly argued , in certa in ways this type of game shows the influence ol o ther m edia such as te lev is ion , video, cinema and the novel:

Like te lev is ion , these gam es function in real t im e : c ither the p layer tr ies exp l ic it ly to ‘beat the c lo ck ’ or faces some other lim itat ions, such as the am ount of am m unit ion , which defines the rushed pace ol the game, f in a l ly , like te levis ion , these gam es are about m o n ito r ­ing the world . . . . [PJlayers of act ion-sty le gam es are called on to conduct an ongoing surveil lance. (Bo lter and Grusin , 1999 , 63)

In Avara, fu rtherm ore , a p layer usually meets o ther p layers on the networks. The circuit of hand-keys-com puter-screen -eyes is not only mediated by the labyrinthine paths o f the software , but also by the protocols and topology of digital ne tw orks . The t im e and space of the game is enmeshed with the g lobally ex tended but uneven ly d istr ibuted passage of information. W h a teve r im ages are genera ted in the course of this rea l- t im e animated gam e, they are accessible to others , perhaps from different standpoints. The play is not on ly located in the manipulation of certa in image-objects through keyboard contro ls , but in an in teraction with other p layers , whose gestures and bodies are figured as objects on the screen . By contrast w ith other w e l l-know n games like M yst, which are based on a series of l inguistic puzzles en tw ined with photoreal stills of mythical scenes, gam e play in Avara centres around rea l-tim e anim ation. W h ateve r the gam e m ay em body in relation to tem pora li ty passes through the synthesis ol rea l- t im e animated images by the g a m e ’s ‘graphics en g in e ’ . The software acts as a machine to constantly red raw a geom etr ica l ly defined set of entities on the screen within certa in tem pora l or , m ore p rec ise ly , chronom etr ic param eters . That is, the images have to change fast enough to fall beneath the threshold of p laye rs ’ conscious perceptions. The software of the gam e seeks to keep its rate o f red raw in g above the m in im um rate ot around 2 5 frames per second, the same constraint that both cinema and television must m eet in the ir own wavs.

The w ay in which the gam e synthesizes images with in these tem pora l parameters is by coding the scene heavily around a mobile v iew po in t occupied by the player. These gam es are ca lled ‘ 3 I ) - im m ers iv e ’

i ff.

R E A L T I M E A N D T H E ‘ W H A T E V E R ’ B O D Y

because the polygons m apped on to the 21) screen arc generated with in a three-d im ensional buclidean g eo m etry , and then mapped back on to the screen accord ing to ax ioms of l inear perspective developed in Renaissance art. As opposed to ear l ie r gam es such as Space Invaders o r Pacman w here the scene had no depth , A vara and its contemporaries such as Doom, Q uake , Marathon and so on increase p laye rs ’ sense of m obil ity and speed by mapping it according to the rules of linear perspective .

G eom etr ic perspective is crucial to the constitution ol an almost a rb it ra ry vantage point from which the space bevond the screen can be surveyed or contro lled . Perspective al lows much m ore com plex o rde r ­ings of objects, m ore diverse spaces, and m ore complicated and dynam ic tra jector ies through them . M oreover , as Bolter and Grusin observe, such gam es im p lem en t l inear perspective so thoroughly (through the m athem atics of l inear a lgebra anil pro jective geom etry ) that there is no room in the gam e scene for ‘the distortions or de l iberate m anipulat ion of conventions that occur in Renaissance pa in t ing ’ (Bolter and Grusin , 1999 , 26). Indeed, any such manipulation is m ade difficult by the fact the graphics engine can only maintain the frame rate b y com puting all visible entit ies as collections of straight­sided polygons. W hat appears to us as a p layer figures on the screen as the continual rotation and translation of a few dozen polygons held in p rox im ity . The gam e scene, inc luding every th ing that is e ither station­ary or moving, is un iform ly composed ot polygons. There arc no curves here , no variations in tex tu re . (Avara shows its age here, because most cu rren t action gam es re ly on ‘tex tu re -m ap p in g ’ to furnish the gam e scene w ith variations in tex tu re . ) The peculiarly synthetic appearance of A vara ’s w o r ld , and most an im ated computer games, stems from this re liance on polygons as the low-leve l building blocks of images.

Polygons are part icu lar ly appropriate for the construction of per- spectival v iews because the ir l inear g eom etry can be easily transformed to represent the d im inut ion in size associated with depth or distance into the scene. Furtherm ore , the ir well-defined edges permit the figures and shapes that move on the screen to be il luminated direction- ally. They have bright and shadowed sides. This play ol light and shade is no reflection of light touching any body in the world ; light too is

1 57

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

coded into the polygonal geom etry ol the scene. The play of light and shadow gives depth and d irect ion to a visual sett ing which would otherw ise appear very disorienting.

W hat does this brief and perhaps familiar survey of the technical coding of' the com puter game scene indicate? How does this system of codcd marks which composes this visual space (and the audible effects which I’m leaving aside) consisting ol po lygons, perspectival depth and directional light, ex tract any differential margin be tw een structure- and event in contem porary social collectives? In what sense is this kind ol play temporalizing?

In genera l te rm s, we could say that the kinds ol technical considera­tions just referred to increase the capacity ol the system of marks known as digital computation to control and regu late events, to insert them in a frame. As a technoscientific toy , does Avara not conform to Lyo ta rd ’s description of how information is processed based on a model of exchange dedicated to neutra liz ing events? That is, as Lyotard observes:

C om plete information means neutra liz ing m ore events. . . . [l]f one wants to control a process, the best w ay of doing so is to subordinate the present to what is (st i l l) called the ‘ fu tu re ’ , since in these conditions the ‘ fu tu re ’ w ill be com plete ly p rede te rm ined and the- present w ill cease opening onto an uncerta in and contingent ‘a f te rw ard s . ’ (Lyotard , 1991, 65 )

In term s ot the desynchroniz ing indeterm inac ies of play in genera l , as Agamben describes it, events at the in terface betw een p layer and machine arc- more synchronical ly de te rm ined within gam es program s, rather than less synchronic. I'hat is, any event d iachronicallv tr iggered by a p layer can be processed and conveyed to self or another player solely within the 31) perspectival space composed of co loured po ly ­gons. The coding of a scene in that geom etry and as a co llect ion of polygons lorms a highly organized structure that can absorb almost instantaneously almost any event that propagates into it. There is no visible motion within the space of the screen that has not undergone processing in term s of this computational geom etry and the linear translations coded through it. The very exper ience p layers have of

i

R E A L T I M E A N D T H E ' W H A T E V E R ' B O D Y

being in contro l, o f being able to play the gam e, depends on synchronic structures that antic ipate all possible moves in advance, structures that are dynam ica l ly repopulated with new data by each move in the game, but which themselves are not d irect ly exposed to play or randomhricolage.

Rather than convert ing structures into events, the rea l- t im e an im ­ated com puter gam e seems to assimilate events to pre- existing struc­tures, to select amongst the possible e v e n ts only those- that can be processed in term s of translations of polygons around the screen. Rather than rea l- t im e play tr igger ing events, the very systems on which it re lies seem to contain events within a str ict ly controlled perm utat ion ol marks. There would be good grounds to argue that there is no play here , or at anv other ‘p lays ta t ion ’ . I he s tructuring ol information as value governs the field of play in a wav that Fvotard again describes d e a r ly : ‘According to this wav of treating t im e , suc­cess depends on the informational pro cess, which consists in making sure that, at t im e c ' , nothing m ore can happen other than the occurrence p rogram m ed at t im e t ’ (1 99 1 , 66 ). From this perspective, there is no future in com puter games. To plav a com puter game represents a loss of t im e , since nothing happens, except what uus program med.

IN F O R M A T IO N AN D T IIF V A I . lIF OF PI.AY

Furtherm ore, not on ly is this m ovem ent of polygons m odelled on exchange, it is also a race to ex tract value from information. A rough equation betw een m oving m ore polygons per second on screen and the gam e machine as a com m odity form governs profits in the games and expanding online en terta inm ent markets. M ore polygons per second means m ore visual deta il , and a g rea te r sensation of speed. Games such as Q uake and Doom, or machines such as the Sony PlayStation represen ted quantum leaps in capacity to compute polygons per second. W hen consum er advertis ing talks of excitem ent, speed and action, it refers almost solely to the capacity ol a particular game or machine to mobilize polygons on-screen. As a com modity torm, the polygonal scenes of rea l- t im e gam es instance a more general ride which holds that the value of information equates to the time of its

1 59

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

circulation. Oncc information is ev e ryw h e re , fully diffused in the netw orks, it loses value. For that reason, the informatic spectacle m ust constantly inscribe new re lat ive delays in the circu its of information. In relation to the’ te lecom m unicat ion of finance, Gayatri Spivak has com m ented that ‘|e]ven as c irculation t im e attains the apparent instantaneity of thought (and m ore ) , the continuity of production ensured by that atta inm ent of apparent co incidencc m ust be broken up by capital: its means of doing so is to keep the labor reserves in the com prador countries outside of this in s tan tane ity ’ (Spivak, 1996 , 12 3). W h ile the money-form of value m ight attain rea l- t im e instantaneity in certa in priv i leged and highly invested domains (such as the foreign exchange m arkets) , there must still be a speed differential to be explo ited . To have something faster, sooner, now rather than later , is W 'h a t defines the value of information as a com m odity . H ence, the only thing that is of value is a rela tive reduction in transmission t im e of information. Insisting on value, the very princip le (and principal) of capital resides in different delays . A lthough the value of information rests in its speed, this speed only m akes sense as a differentia l . There must be differences in speed for information to have any value.

By promising instantaneity betw een an event and its reception , real time seeks to erad icate de lay . Yet at the same t im e , there m ust be delays som ew here , o therw ise capital wou ld not dep loy itself in real t im e as information or live spectacle . T here m ust be different speeds of access to information or different rates o f m ovem ent o f information if capital is to m arket the spectacle to consum ers as a form of merchandise. T he only solution to this necessity is to continue to speed up, to stage differences in speed by c ircu la t ing information to some places faster, thereby re inscr ib ing re lat ive delays in m ovements of information as the source of value.

Indeed, the most significant transformations that capita lism wants to lim it to the spectacle wou ld be prec ise ly those unstable transformations associated with rea l- t im e m ovem ents of information. Guy D ebord, in The Society of the Spectacle, w ro te that the ‘ time of the spec tac le ’ is the ‘time appropriate1 to the consumption of images, and, . . . the image of the consumption of t im e ’ (D ebord , 1995 , 112). W e w ou ld need to ask in the contex t of the com puter gam e how ‘a t im e appropriate to the consumption of im ages ’ is f igured, and how the gam e is an image

i 6 o

R E A L T I M E A N D T H E ' W H A T E V E R ' B O D Y

ol the consumption of t ime. Lor the sake of calculable delays, the diffusion of information must be manageable as risk rather than as indeterm inate or incalcu lable delav . To resist that managem ent, the question w ou ld be: what kind of incalcu lab le or indeterminable delav can be associated today with rea l- t im e m ovem ents of information?

D IS JU N C T IO N S IN C O M P U T A T IO N A L M \ I III Si V

LIN KAGES B E TW E E N BOD Y AND IMAGE

W h ere , contra Lyotard , such coding and determ inat ion of a flux of images might also increase the reserves of indeterm inacy is precisely in the domain of the linkages betw een bodies and images. The question remains: can a m ore com plex and deep ly contingent temporality inhabit the linkages o f body and informatic images? How would this tem pora li ty w o rk against the l inear coding of images and the extraction of informatic surplus value through re lat ive differences in speed? Given these s tr ictures , how could w e access any kind of historic transforma­tion? Does not the very form of the technical coifing involved in these

J O

games (which is of course patented) through its pcrformativ itv neutra l­ize any possibil ity of th inking through com puter game plav in terms of ‘historic transform ations ’ excep t as a commodif ied spectacle? Do not the patented processes subsume play within a genera lized form of spectacle which re len t less ly and incessantly re-enacts dcsacralized structures captivated by econom ic exchange value more than anything else?

This would be to ask in what sense, if any, these linkages can be thought differently as neither proper nor im proper , but as the ‘w hat­ever ’ body. Such a body is neither ineffably individual nor intell igibly universal . The ‘w h a tev e r ’ body wou ld have to be, as Agamben points out, in effect an inhabitant of limbo, and neutra l with respect to either salvation or damnation, impassible w ith respect to divine justice (or any of its sccular heirs ). The ‘go o d ’ associated w ith the ‘w hatever ’ bodv would not be som ew here e lse , apparent from the linkages between images and bodies. Rather, ‘ it is simplv the point at which thev grasp the taking-p lace proper to them , at which thev touch their own non- transcendent m a t t e r ’ (Agam ben, 1993a, 15).

Let us try again to access this ‘tak ing -p lace ’ in term s of the temporal

1 b I

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

instabil it ies ol rea l- t im e play. The rea l- t im e synthesis o l images entails different forms of anticipation and delay than those found at w ork in cinema and television, or in any other m ed ia that Avara re-m ed iates . There is nothing new in the requ irem en t that an im ated com puter games redraw screen images at least tw en ty times per second. Film and television a lready observe that constraint. C inem a and television re ly on a coincidence betw een the succession ol images synthesized by the apparatus and the flux of perceptions exper ienced by the spectator. H ow ever , rea l- t im e computation seeks to in ter leave gestu re w ith in the circuit . W ithout wanting to naturalize touch as the last vestige of proper corporeal presence amidst technological d is location, as they come into contact with images, gesture and touch do make explic it so m e important disjunctions in the computational synthesis of spaces and times, f rom the perspective o f contro ll ing or s tocking events, the presence o f gesture poses p rob lem s that can be seen from both technical and phenomenological perspectives.

(a) I he technical-corporeal problem. The effect of im m ed iacy genera ted by the te levisual apparatus had, until recen t ly , no real possibil ity of im m edia te ly reconfiguring events on-screen accord ing to v iew er response. By contrast, the rea l- t im e gam e m ust devise some w ay of rem ain ing open to p layers ’ gestures . In the rea l- t im e com puter gam e, a transduction occurs betw een the indeterm inate sequence of gestures p layers might be induced to send across the in ter lace and the suppos­edly stable constraint that visually coherent ( i .e . not f ragm ented or incom plete) images are rem apped at least tw en ty times per second. T he com puter gam e so ltw are configures the com puter as a transducer that art icu lates gestures and images. This capacity of the machine to be repeated ly determ ined or ‘ in fo rm ed ’ at any t im e is called ‘ in terac t iv ­i ty ’ . Certain crucial portions of the program must remain sufficiently indeterm ined to accept a l im ited range of contingent events com ing from the program interfaces. The technical prob lem is to ensure that the transduction of indeterm inat ion into the d e te rm in ed torm of images occurs within an interval m ore or less beneath the threshold of conscious perception.

During each m om ent of plav, gestures m ingle with images. Every gesture in a gam e like- Avara e ither changes a p la y e r ’s location or marks his a ttempts to ‘ touch ’ another p la y e r . ’ But the in term ing ling of

i 62

R E A L T I M E A N D T H E ' W H A T E V E R ' B O D Y

bodies and images docs not take p lace on-screen itself or, at least, no m ore than the w r it ing of a book takes place as its pages are printed. Like reading and w r it in g , it takes place in a space where the lines betw een the part icu lar ity of a gesture and the coding of a mark are difficult to trace . The s ingular ity of this event can be specifically located in the case of A vara in its b inary space partit ioning trees , the patented data s tructures which transduce touch into geometrical form, and w here the set of polygons composing the visual space of the game is dynam ica lly s tructured to p erm it interaction betw een plaver v iew ­points and p layer gestures . If to have a bodv is to be open to technical mediat ions, then having an Avara body involves the particu lar pathways and rhythms of action and perception transduced through these structures .

In constantly m eld ing gestures and im ages, Avara m akes use ot a binary space partit ion ing tree (BSP tree ) to bring together gesture and image. A quasi-technical definit ion of the BSP tree reads:

A Binary Space Part it ioning T ree (o r BSP T ree) is a data structure that is used to organize objects w ith in a space. . . . A BSP tree is a recurs ive sub-division of space that treats each line segment (or po lygon , in 31)) as a cutting plane which is used to categorize ail rem ain ing objects in the space as e ither being in ‘ f ron t’ or in ‘back ’ of that plane. (Fuchs ct a l . , 1 9 8 0 ) ’

The im portant feature of this som ew hat technical definit ion is that every object in a space structured bv BSP trea tm ent is categorized according to its position in relation to a set of arb itrar ily selected partitions or thresholds. Gesture is not d irect ly processed within an homogeneous g eom etr ic continuum , but m arked in relation to thresh­olds or partitions that classify every o ther entity within the scene as cither ‘ in fron t’ or ‘beh ind ’ . Hvery m ovem ent in Avara, and the many other con tem porary games that use the same techniques, takes place through traversal of a b inary t ree-structu re of virtual v iew points rather than through a continuous translation betw een points in a geometrical continuum.

The mechanism of the BSP structures the gam e space in the interests of visually m apping an indeterm inate set ot movements and in tersecting

1 6 3

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

tra jectories , oi tracking dispersions and Iragmentations, and ot p e rm it ­ting shifts betw een different v iewpoints to be represented w ithout discontinuity or comprehensive recalcu lation of the relations betw een entities in the scene. A p la y e r ’s v iew po in t at any g iven t im e is defined by sorting all the polygons in the scene accord ing to w hether they stand in front of or behind that v iewpoint . That these discontinuous traversals of the nodes o f a data s tructure can be m apped back on to a continuous linear and perspectival g eom etry w here objects seem to be separated or co ll id ing, visible or occ luded , should not preven t us from rem ark ing the specificit ies of the locale w here gestu re and im age are linked. In these term s, ‘touch ing ’ means s imply ‘no longer recurs ive ly classifiable’ as e ither ‘ in front o f ’ or ‘beh ind ’ . To see the gam e space as Cartes ian , for instance, wou ld be to go straight past the tak ing-p lace of gesture in Avara.

The BSP tree algorithms trea t gestures a.s an occasion to re-sort relations betw een objects into the categories of ‘ in front o f ’ or ‘beh ind ’ , touching or not touching, in tersect ing or not intersecting betw een objects. The separation betw een body and im age comes into question here . Agamben observes that ‘never has the human body - above all the female body been so m assively m anipu lated as today . . . And yet the process of technologization , instead of m ater ia l ly investing the body, was a im ed at the construction of a separate sphere that had practica lly no point of contact w ith it: what was technologized was not the body but its im age ’ (Agam ben , 1993a, 4 9 - 5 0 ) . If, in this contex t, bodies and images can become the ‘w h a tev e r ’ body, som e­thing whose singularity is ne ither the ineffable part icu lar ity o f a single body nor the universal ity of a technologi/.ed im age , then it should be possible to regard the ‘t r ic k ’ that BSP trees perform w ith gestures and images as possessing a positive, a lbeit d is junctive , aspect. The BSP trees inextr icab ly code gestures and polygons together . W ith in the context of these data s tructures , bodies and images are enm eshed . No doubt this inseparability stems, as m entioned above, trom the tem poral demands of rea l- t im e processing. The BSP trees render tractab le a computational task that wou ld otherw ise requ ire much m ore powerful com puters ; yet they also provide a g l im pse o f an ethos akin to the ‘w h atev e r ’ , w here images and bodies can no longer be separated . An example of the curiously decoupled in tersect ion of touch and sight in

i 6 4

R E A L T I M E A N D T H E W H A T E V E R ' B O D Y

this space is p layed out in Avara w hen , as sometimes happens, a player occupies the one place of total invisibility and non-touching contact in the gam e scene: the ‘h ead ’ of another plaver.

(b) I he phenom enological problem. 1 he linkage betw een bodies anti images that Agamben affirms as heterogeneous to the spectacle involves a physis, a m anner of folding and unfolding of a body in relation to touch, sound and vision, not just image and sound images. In strict te rm s , to speak of the ‘w h a tev e r ’ body as physis implies temporally com plex relations betw een m ovem ent and rest, be tw een change and stabil ity within that body.*’ The com plex it ies in the context of rea l­t im e com putation occur at tw o levels: not only does a gesture som ehow touch the image amidst labyrinthine passage of data, it also encounters the touch or the mark of others within the image. Gestures, as they pass into p lay , are the locus of an indeterm inacy or modal oscillation in the tak ing-p lace ot the ‘w h a tev e r ’ body that exceeds the coding capacity o f Avara as a system of marks. The wavs in which gestures address an other, even a non-human other, constitute a form of openness or an e lem en t of play that is not fully processed bv the synchronizing codes o f the gam e. The event where in my touch marks the im age ot another, and that others m ark m ine is another possible indeterm inat ion or site ot ongoing individuation in an otherw ise highly regu lated or coded contex t. C lea r ly , the m ark ing of gesture in the gam e, such that now the tim ing of touch (exper ienced as tactile contact w ith the keys and in proprioceptive perception ot the hands) must encounter a flux of images, does not im ply anv necessary increase in indeterm inacy . Yet how this indeterm inacy can be re lated to the s ingularity of the ‘ w h a tev e r ’ body remains unclear . Ideally, in real t im e , things are supposed to happen to give the effect of ‘ liveness’ , of im m ediacy , of no delay b e tw een the occurrence ot the event, its transmission and its reception . The occurrence of the gesture and the visual perception of it should be synchronized if the game is in real t ime. There should be no loss of t im e betw een touch, sight and sound, betw een the advent of an event and its reception .

H ow ever , despite the closed settings and lim ited focus, despite all the effort put into coding gestures , localities and images in advance, games like Avara are exposed to the fluctuating delavs endemic to the circulation of information m ore genera l ly . Sometimes Avara brings up

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

the on-screen message 'R ea l i ty fragmentation d e te c ted ’ to w arn p layers that the cross-mapping ol image and gesture in the topology of the BSP is no longer in ag reem ent b e tw een different nodes on the netw ork . Occasionally , the t im ing of touch unexpected ly docs not coincide with the llux of images. This discrepancy in t im ing can be regarded as an artefact o f the ‘ in co m p le te ’ d eve lopm ent of netw ork technology. Although ‘ the tim e of sp ec tac le ’ promises instantaneous de livery of information, that promise itself has not ye t been and possibly w ill not ever be lu l ly de l iv e red , for s tructura l reasons a lready m entioned ( i .e . the constitution of information as value through differential speeds).

Nonetheless, delay also impinges in a m ore com plicated and u n ex ­pected wav in playing Avara , and these com plications are prom ising . A much younger friend of m ine is a lw ays urging m e to p lay com puter games. Agreeing to try this gam e w ith h im , something struck me as he quickly won a succession ot games. He was not only antic ipating most of m y m ovem ents , and my gestures , he was also antic ipating and m anipulat ing in certa in ways the delays in troduced by the ne tw o rk we w ere playing on. fo r a beg inner , these delays are incapacitating, for the scene changes before a gesture makes (or m ore to the point, misses) its mark on the screen. Because gestures have to be passed over the n e tw ork , and then re in tegrated into the BSP tree along w'ith anything another p layer has done in the m ean tim e , there is perceptib le de lay betw een hand and eye . Gestures and images shift in and out ot synchronization as rea l- t im e processing occurs over the ne tw orks . The beginner cannot adequate ly antic ipate the de lay b e tw een the t im e of touch and the time ot the image in o rder to coordinate the two. W o rse , when opponents com e into close quarters , the rate of events (bring and m ovem ent) burdens rea l- t im e processing even m ore , so that the screen images slow dow n just when they should be most responsive.

The technical name for this phenom ena, which is w e ll known in rea l- t im e applications, is latency tolerance. It refers to the deg ree of lag between an event and the com pletion of its com putational processing; betw een , for instance-, a gestu re and what happens on the screen. The rem arkab le thing about latency is that it can be to le rated . Players habituate themselves to the delay in the circuit b e tw een hand and eye

1 6 6

R E A L T I M E A N D T H E ' W H A T E V E R ' B O D Y

and even tua lly , w ith in certa in lim its , do not even regard it as an obstacle. Embodied anticipation can ‘ov e rco m e ’ the de lay , or render it la tent, so that delays in the flux of images are not even obvious to the p layer . O ver t im e , and through repetit ion , an ex te r io r delav is g radua l ly rem apped or in tegrated w ithin an a ltered rhy thm of m ove­m ents , so that gestu re runs in advance of the technologized image it should be m ere ly responding to. Analogous to the indetcrminacies left open by BSP tree a lgorithms w ith respect to ‘ in front of” and ‘beh ind ’ , habituation to de lay entails a re-sort ing of relations betw een ‘before ’ and ‘a f te r ’ .

Latency to lerance also has another facet. Playing over the networks from Austral ia with overseas plavers, the delavs can become so obvious that some players find them in tolerab le . (U S plavers w ill usually , for instance, ask the Australians to leave the game because thev ’ re slowing everyone else d o w n .) H ow ever , it is not only Australians who slow things dow n . Delay unpred ictab ly arises from the gestures of others who are not even p layers , from responses that have not been and could not have been antic ipated . No m atter how tolerant of delav a gesture can become ( i .e . no m atter how much delav it renders calcu lab le through habit), it cannot fullv take into account the changes in synchronization due to the touch of others, especially that of non­players on the im age . Their gestures cannot be segregated from mine, and the ir responses impalpably a lte r the rhythms of mv response. No doubt their presence can be m inim ized (as, for instance, when Australians are asked to leave the gam e) but, in this contex t, other responses a lways m ark the transit of m ine ; the propagation of o thers ’ gestures transforms mine. In that respect, the ‘w h atev e r ’ bodv’s in­corporation of de lay can never be as com plete or seamless as the ideal of rea l- t im e s im ultane ity promises .

T O U C H AND T E C H N IC A L IM P E R F E C T IO N

This re-sorting ol tem pora l re lat ions, w ithout its double-faceted loss of s im ultane ity , touches on something m ore constitutive than a state of technical im perfection . W hat cannot be anticipated as such in any technologization, what cannot be locked into the projective geom etry , is the tim ing of touch. C erta in ly , every touch can be precisely

i 6 7

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

‘t im e- tagged ’ by the com puter , but the system that remains open cannot d irect ly take into account the de lay tim e of its own d istr ibution , or ot the wav in which we co rporea l ly and co llec t ive ly habituate ourselves to the delays involved in the system . The w aver ing inconstant antic ipation is not susceptible to m easurem ent , since it cannot be known in advance what depth o f anticipation has been incorporated into a gesture . CorrelativcTy, w e cannot be fully conscious of or in contro l ot the de lay that haunts all our gestures , since those gestures are them selves complicated forms of anticipation and response. The system of marks which synthesizes contiguity betw een bodies and machines is ineradica- bly open to delay and the effects of anticipations ot delay .

Delay perm its information to accum ula te econom ic value. Massive technical and economic enterprises seek to render this delay ca lcu lab le , by investing in information and com m unication infrastructures w'hich increase the capac ity of the netw orks to accom m odate m ovem ents of information. Real t im e , as the tem pora l horizon ot m ovem ents ot information, seems to entail a loss of tem pora liza t ion . In an im portant sense, the constitutive value of delav as non-presence , as trace , tor t im e and other seems to be lost here . In his deconstructive approach to technology, Bernard S t ieg ler argues that reduction of de lay produced in real t im e specifically challenges the non-co incidence be tw een w r it ing and reading which i.s constitu tive for d iffer ing-deferr ing thought (S t ie ­g le r , 1996, 77 8) . Because no t im e is lost, t im e (as tem pora l i ty and historic ity) is lost. If informatics seeks to render all de lays calcu lab le , it can only do so by investing or m anipulat ing the intervals , the sites of differentiation, or constitutive incom pleteness w ithin sociotechnical collect ives . Real time a ttem pts to collapse the intervals be tw een event and its reception , so that the event is s tructured by its processing. Those s tructures util ize a technica l ly m anaged circu lation ot infor­mation to introduce speed differentia ls which can then be rap id ly and briefly capitalized. U nder the ‘ race cond it ion ’ production of exchange value, destabil iz ing events are constantly captured and consum ed as spectacle.

It remains to be thought, how ever , what m anner of s ingular ity can inhabit this staging of co incidences be tw een events and structures . If there is play (in the sense that Agamben describes as the manipulat ion of the human tem pora li ty m ater ia l ized in objects) in com puter games,

l 6 8

R E A L T I M E A N D T H E ' W H A T E V E R ' B O D Y

then it is p lay that somehow must d iverge from the economic transformation of events into s tructures . Presum ing that com puter gam es figure in that spectacle as ex em p la ry experiences of rea l- t im e capture ol de lay , I have been asking what scope there is for plav to m anipulate s tructures that are a lready set up to absorb a high rate of contingency. The question is thus, how can there be plav when the s tructures involved are a lready exp l ic it ly organized as butters for indeterm inacy?

J

Occasionally , com puter games manipulate the mater ia lized tem p o r­a lity of information as econom ic value. It wou ld be possible to in terpre t the s tructures of play w ith in a m ore deta iled set of technical, econom ic and social prob lem s concern ing m ovem ent, delav , thresh­o lds, fragmentat ion and exclus ion. H ere , the focus has been on something m ore e lem en ta ry , y e t e lusive. The discussion has sought to identify certa in kinds ot indeterm inacy in rea l- t im e animated games, both in the v irtual s tructur ing ot images as coded spaces open to gesture (exem plif ied in the BSP tree ) and in the incalculabilitv of delays s tem m ing from the antic ipatory e lem en t of any gesture . Understanding this mater ia lizat ion as the ‘ w h a tev e r ’ body entails the step o f app re ­hending the linkages betw een bodies and images in the game as the incipient ethos of an informatic whatever.

These are perhaps s lender supports on which to rest a response to the injunction presented by the notion of the ‘w h a tev e r ’ bodv, an injunction to think how to belong to im propr ie ty , or how to singularly inhabit indifference. ‘ W h ateve r is the thing with a l l its properties, none of which, how ever , constitutes difference, ln-differcncc with respect to properties is what individuates and d isseminates s ingu lar it ies ’ , writes Agamben (1993b , 19). How would such a notion of in -difference, in w'hich p roper/singu lar and un iversa l/com m on change roles and in te r­penetrate , bring us into contact w ith an ethos or taking-p lace associated with information? The in terp lay betw een contingency-absorbing s truc­tures and the unpred ictab i l ity o f de lays is neither com plete ly proper to com puter games (or by extension, information m ore genera lly) nor simply im proper to them . Rather , from tim e to tim e plav occurs, not under the m astery of any subject, and the line betw een the incorpora­tion ot de lay into the informational process and an unanticipated delav wavers. These unpred ictab le occasions are neither s imply technical nor

i 6 9

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

properly non-technical. l ime is lost, and the passage of the ‘w h a tev e r ’body betw een common and proper becomes visib le.

NOT I s

1. During 1998, according to newspaper reports , one-quarter ot the overall revenue received by Sony Corporation came from sales ol its PlayStation com puter Janies console. ( S y d n e y M o r n i n g He r a l d , no. 84, 20 March 1999,

p. 10.)2. For a history of the personal com puter (PC) see Campbell-Kellv and Aspray,

1996.3. In general terms, moving further into the detail o f Agamben\s aeeeount, play

renders tangible the differential margin between the ‘o nce ’ and the ‘no longer ’ . These two terms, the ‘o nce ’ and the ‘no longer ’ can be taken to refer respectively to the synchronic anil d iachronic dimensions ot social formations. ‘At once ’ refers to the synchronic nature ot structures , the ‘once upon a t im e ’ of myths, present all at once; ‘no lon ger ’ refers to the diachronic pole when every present m oment falls away into the past w ithout being retained or stored. Play, as the margin between them , can be understood in a mechanical sense too, as the amplitude of the movement between them.

4 . Again, more recent and complicated games than Avara seek to display every gesture that has an effect on the game scene, increasingly , every object in the scene bears the marks of previous contacts. All objects in the scene are susceptible to damage, not just the bodies of other p layers or the enemy- others.

5. For the first academic publication describing the BSP tree , see Fuchs c l a l . ,

1980. The patent for the technique is US patent 5274718 : Image representa­tion using tree like structures and can be viewed at w w w .de lph ion .com /clcta ils?pn=US05740280_.

6. This is Aris tot le ’ s definition of p hy s i s (cl . Aristotle , 1996, 3 3).

I 70

C H A P T E R 6

Life, collectives and the pre-vital technicity o f biotechnology

Gene m ap p in g is a par t icu la r k ind o f spaUali/.aUon oi' the

body . . . . Hov\ does it get m istaken for a non-trop ic thing-

in -itse ll?

Haravvav, 1997

Life as information im p lies com p l ic i ty w ith re a l t im e .

S t ick le r , 1996

W c know that technical mediat ions can saturate life. Chapter 2 show ed that something as ostensibly simple as a stone axe presupposes deep and in t im ate transformations in a 1 i \ i n b o d y . A tool implies a corporealization for someone or something. Recent ly ‘ l ife ’ , from the superm arket tomato , through genet ica l ly a ltered rabbit viruses, to cloned sheep and attem pts at human somatic gene therapy, has undergone a fairly l iteral technological render ing . Life, as we are told constantly , is now being exp l ic i t ly designed or eng ineered . No longer individual human bodies, but life as a d iverse and intricate ly overlap­ping m il ieu has become an open and disperse engineering site, the object of mapping program s, financial speculation, voracious property claims, and massive state and corporate funding. Numerous warnings about new biomedical and biotechnological practices and the effect they could have on our norms (natu re , kinship, family and health) are now taking place. Life has becom e intensely technological, or at least new ly susceptib le to an association w ith the potent but almost empty abstraction, ‘techno logy ’ . How could such a connection unfold between technology and life? In the term s that I have been developing,

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

what kind of transduction or co llect ive indiv iduation is occurr ing as life becomes expl ic it ly technological? Som eth ing should be becom ing c learer . As a universal, the notion of ‘techno logy ’ (and, by association, of ‘b io techno logy ’ ) has very poor traction in the domain of co llect ive life. It appears m ore or less as an em pty signifier, capable of sliding across different signilieds such as ‘p rogress ’ , ‘exp lo i ta t ion ’ , ‘ f reed o m ’ or ‘ co n tro l . ’ The genera l problem threaded through much of this book has been how to negotiate a path be tw een an over ly genera l notion of technology and the localized under-rep resen ted m ilieus of technical practices. The localized practices I have focused on have been large ly informatic. W hy? First, it is hard not to be affected by the hype that has surrounded these technologies for the past few decades. T h e h y p e .should not be dismissed w ithou t consideration . These devices are fascinating because they have a l low ed the webb ing together of practices. Thus, even if certa in isolated devices have been fetishized (desktop com puters , for instance), it is strongly arguable that in formatic-materia l practices are large ly responsib le for the ex istence (if large-scale com m unication ensembles such as the Internet.

Far l ier discussions of t im ing reg im es and ne tw o rk devices showed that technologies are not unified, d iscre te , meaningful or m eaningless in them selves . Although they often figured as d iscrete dev ices , they are deep ly en tw ined w ith co llect ive practices. S im ilar ly , even if b iotechnology is curren tly a fetishized dom ain , conceptualiz ing the ex istence of a technical ensem ble en tw ined w ith co llect ive life remains a prob lem . That problem of the en sem b le , of how to think about something that is neither a s tructure nor an individual substance has motivated my recourse to the notion of transduction , w ith its focus on individuation as the art icu lat ion of d iverse realit ies . Talk o f technic ity , and in this chapter, of the technic ity of b io techno logy, stems from the need to highlight a formative and rad ica l ly contingent collective en tw in ­ing betw een liv ing bodies and information, rather than an in terfacing ot individual bodies with machines.

Foreshadowing the discussion in this chapter , the im m ed ia te p rob­lem is how to formulate what is co llect ive ly at stake in biotechnology. W e do not yet know what life becom ing technical means for collective life, but it is c lear that we need ways o f ta lk ing about it as an event.

1 7 2

Fart ol the problem i.s the uncomfortable te rm , ‘b io technology’ . It does not sit easily am ong all the other artefacts and practices we usually understand by technology. In this respect , b iotechnology is not just one exam p le among many others. Nor, in term s of the linked series of ‘ex am p le s ’ I have discussed in previous chapters, is it an isolated exam p le . It brings the prob lem of the living bodv (posed in the contex t o f Judith B u t le r ’s theory of corporeal materia lizat ion) back to the fore. At the same t im e , it represents a significant, historically analysable encounter b e tw een living bodies and the material practices of information in which w e arc all im p licated , know ing ly or not. Fven if it m ight not be possible to say what biotechnology is (and this will be the first prob lem addressed in this chapter) , we can see how prob lem s in defining it flow from something w orth thinking about, something which 1 w il l conceptualize in te rm s of the notion of the ‘p re -v i ta l i ty ’ of co llect ive life. The aim of this chapter to analyse why biotechnology is difficult to think about sounds prim a facie

negative . It is not, insofar as an incapacity to fully represent something means that something can happen.

T R A N S D U C T I O N A N D P R F -V IT A L IT Y

The te rm ‘co llect ive l ife ’ has often surfaced in this discussion. It has operated in the contex t of an exp l ic it d istinction betw een liv ing and non-liv ing entities. From the standpoint of transduction , the basic distinction betw een the liv ing and non-liv ing can be framed both topologica lly and tem pora lly . Topolog ica l ly , the transductive individu­ation of a non-liv ing thing takes place at a surface or boundary. The surface of a crystal g row s in its so lution, but the in ter io r lavers of the crysta l, which have a lready structured them selves , remain stable and are not a ltered by further g row th . Transduction occurs between the potentials ot the solution and in ter a tom ic forces in the crystal. By contrast, in l iv ing processes , both the in ter ior and the ex ter io r of the enti ty g ro w (through regenera t ion ) , and the entity itself, bv virtue of its m em bersh ip of a group of some kind (co lony, community or species), can partic ipate in reproduction . The very ex istence of interior changes is significant. l ife prolongs anti complicates its in d iv id u a tio n

through sexual reproduction , hered ity , m obility and communication.

L I F E . C O L L E C T I V E S A N D B I O T E C H N O L O G Y

1 7 }

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

It constantly resolves problems for itself through perception , m ove­m ent, nutr it ion , excret ion , com m unication , even by dying . In doing so, the line betw een inside and outside divides and shifts constantly . The non-liv ing has no true in ter io r , because it does not mainta in a

disparity or desynchronization within itself. The liv ing, because it effectively has both an in ter io r m il ieu and an ex te r io r m il ieu , dephases itself. This can be understood as a topological com plication . Gilbert Simondon cla ims that in the living, ‘ in ter io r i ty and ex te r io r i ty are e v e ry w h e re ’ and they are in contact with each other (S im ondon, 1995,1 59). Considered from the standpoint of this tem pora l complication of topology, life or a living body does not map on to any single surface, and transductive processes are not located solely on a single surface. Manifold and differentiated ex te r io r m ilieus percep tua l , a l im en tary , semiotic , energet ic , symbiotic continuously fold into an in ter ior , which folds itself outwards through reproduction , and g row th . Life is transductive because it is not individual.

In te rm s of this abstract contrast, technologies occupy a curious position. Although machines, devices, tools and infrastructures are identifiably non-liv ing, they belong to living co llect ives . They lie within the topology of co llect ive life, yet them selves lack in ter io r ity . This borderline position is w e ll expressed by the m ean ing of transduction in con tem porary m olecu lar b io logy: ‘ In addition to their ow n DNA, phages can acquire cell DNA from the bacter ia they infect and transfer that new ly acquired DNA into other bacter ia in the course of subsequent infection. This phenomenon is called transduction ’ (Berg and Singer, 1992 , 84 ).

A phage a virus that infects bacter ia - serves as a c a rr ie r or vector of genes from one cell to another. W h en a bacter ia cell is infected by the quasi-vital phage, fragments of the bac te r ia ’ s DNA are incorporated into the phage DNA. W hen the a lte red phage infects o ther bacterial cells , the fragments rep lace corresponding DNA segm ents in the rec ip ient cells. The transfer of genet ic m ater ia l is ca lled transduction,

and it provides a genera l m odel for b iotechnological manipulat ions of

hercditv.J

Transduction in this sense was also one of the ear l iest break­throughs in m olecu lar b io logy. Understand ing and m an ipulat ing bacte­rial transduction was pivotal in the deve lopm ent of recom binant DNA

>74

L I F E , C O L L E C T I V E S A N D B I O T E C H N O L O G V

technologies (Judson, 1992 , 55 ). The phage itself, as a kind of virus, is not str ict ly a live. W e could sav that it is p rc -v ita l. It wavers a long a line betw een the liv ing and the non-liv ing.

W h ile I am not argu ing that technology acts as a virus that infects co llect ives , 1 do think that this technical meaning ot transduction touches on something im portant about b io techno logy . W e cannot ignore the fact that b iotechnology gains traction in living processes only by unravell ing them in m ilieus w here not everyth ing is alive, and w here processes ot transfer and mutation proceed on carefully inscribed and c ircum scr ibed surfaces (m icroarravs , ge ls , blots, chro­m atogram s, e tc . ) rather than in convoluted , hidden, d iverse pathways. Biotechnology actually heightens the exper ience ol com plex insepar­ability be tw een the living and the non-liv ing because of the topological transformations it in troduces. Broadly speaking, it brings ‘ l ife ’ , whose m ean ing was a lready the object of co llect ive historical contestation, into exp l ic i t contact w ith ‘techno logy ’ . Michel l-oucault ’ s notion of ‘b iopo lit ics ’ can be seen as furnishing the background for this point (Foucault , 1978 ; ct. Agamben, 1998). Sum m ariz ing Foucault, Paul Rabinow (1 992 , 2 36) argues:

H istorica l ly , practices and discourses of b iopow er have clustered around tw o distinct poles: the ‘anatomopolit ics ot the human b o dy ’ , the anchor point and target ot d isc ip linary technologies on the one hand, and a regu la tory pole cen tered on populat ion, with a panoply ot strategies concentrat ing on know ledge , control and welfare , on the other.

Today , that c luster ing is be ing red istr ibuted into a distr ibuted ensemble of living and non-liv ing actors. Sequencing robots, databases, immortal cell- l ines , stem cells , hybridom as, hybrid ized mice and radioisotopes are just some of the d iverse technical e lem ents of the ensemble . Most accounts of subjectiv ity , co rporea l ity , h istory , society, culture and technology assume that something living animates technology. Biotech­nology complicates that assumption. It involves a kind ot design, and a kind o f eng ineer ing , but a designing that in t im ate ly associates living and non-liv ing e lem ents .

This significant red istr ibution and gathering of diverse actors in

>75

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

ensemble's whose outlines are not yet e lear has consequences for the rcprcsentah ility ol b iotechnology. In stock-m arket speculation on b io ­tech companies, in Frequently published new spaper , te lev is ion and journal announcements ol the next breakthrough in disease diagnosis and trea tm ent, in genet ic modification of crops and farm animals , or in pharm acogenom ic product launches, there is something m ore than unbounded hubris concerning life and its profitable technological manipulat ion, bike the1 affect surrounding com puters , it flows from a significant reorganization of practices. C onverse ly , when ecological argum ents against the dep loym ent o f genet ica l ly modified organisms insist on the in terconnectedness of life and, in part icu la r , on the unpredictable in teractions that occur betw een different species or com m unit ies of living things, they point to someth ing other than a com peting scientific discourse (eco logy) on life and its com plex ity . Both the ecological responses to biotechnology and the bioteehnophilia of agribusiness and drug companies cannot say w'hv the l iv ing and non-liv ing are en tw ined to such a deg ree that someth ing called ‘b io techno logy ’ could become an object o f contention . In other words , w ithout an account of the wavs in which the technica l and

’ J

the liv ing are en tw ined , the duress which biotechnology imposes on living bodies can only be m is-recogn ized as ‘p ro gre ss ’ or ‘exp lo i ta ­t io n ’ . The w ide ly d ivergent responses to b io technology m ight be understood as flowing in part from the indeterm inate status of this complication of the liv ing and the non-liv ing, which cannot ye t be thought, represented or com m unicated as a coherent or com plete phenomenon.

In this chapter , those dificulties in representat ion w il l be analysed in term s of th ree problems. The first is the troubled connection between b iotechnology and the notion of life as information. Second, the em ergence of a new sub-discipline called ‘b io inform atics ’ concerned with the o rder ing of massive amounts of b iological information w il l be discussed. Finally, the problem of life as a ‘h istory of e r r o r ’ w ill be exam ined .

i 7ft

L I F E , C O L L E C T I V E S A N D B I O T E C H N O L O G Y

B IO IN F O R M A T IC S : TTIL C O I I A IM OF M A T E R IA L IT Y AND M E T A P H O R

Informatic life and its errors

The first problem has been recognized and thoroughly developed in histories of m odern b io lo gy : even before the double helix structure of DNA was made visib le, life had started to become informatic. Georges Canguilhem writes :

Insofar as the fundamental concepts of the b iochemistry ot amino acids and m acrom olecu les are concepts borrow ed from information theory , such as code or m essage; and insofar as the structures of the m atte r of life are l inear s tructures , the negative of o rder is inversion, the negative ot sequence is confusion, and the substitution of one arrangem ent for another i.s erro r . (1 9 9 1 , 276)

Donna H arawav sum m ar izes : ‘much has been w rit ten about how the reconstitu tion of b iological explanations and objects of know ledge in te rm s ot code, p rogram , and information since the 1950s has fundamental ly recast the organism as a h istorica l ly specific kind of technological s y s tem ’ (1 9 9 7 , 97 ) . Error, as C an gu i lhem ’s observation indicates, is inherent to life and h ered ity , and this is something that the informatic conception of life as the transmission of hereditary messages renders m anageable . The m utation of biology as a research practice is well recognized by con tem porary biologists too: information technologies such as the CeneBank database ‘have revolutionized biology, provid ing researchers with powerful tools to hunt for new genes, com pare the w ay genes have evolved in manv different organ­isms and figure out the functions of new ly d iscovered genes ’ (Pcnnisi, 1999, 4 4 7 ) . A lmost Irom the outset , the presence o f information in biology as m etaphor, as technical practice has been at the same time erroneous and pow erfu l ly enabling.

W hen hered ity is understood as a transfer o f information, grow th and reproduction are driven by perm utations and combinations. To quote Jam es W atson and Erancis Crick from the 195? announcement of the structure of DNA: ‘ In a long m olecu le , m ain different

77

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

permutations are possible, and it therefore seems likelv that the precise sequence ot the bases is the code which carr ies the genet ica l in form a­t ion ’ (W atson and Crick , 195 3, 9 6 7 ) . It was thought that sequences ot nucleic acids carried instructions coded in perm utat ions of bases. The notion ol the genom e as a p rogram , and ce l lu lar life as a com puter that execu ted the program , gained precedence in the late 1950s and ear ly 1960s. Confusions betw een life and information w e re present from the outset. As F.velyn Fox Keller w rites :

W ith W atson and C r ic k ’ s invocation of ‘genet ica l in form ation ’ res id ing in the nucleic acid sequences of DNA, some notion of information (how ever m etaphorica l) assumed a cen tra l ity to m o lecu ­lar b iology that almost r ivalled that of the m ore technical definition of information in cybernetics . (Fox Keller, 1995, 94)

In the contex t of m o lecu lar b iology beginning in the 1950s, the notion of genetical information was understood as a p rogram which issued commands to the living cell in the form of prote ins. This understanding of genet ic information regarded IJNA as the contro ll ing script for life, anti m etaphorica lly carr ied over Erwin Schroed inger ’ s notion of the genet ic ‘codescr ip t ’ as formulated in his 1943 lectures ‘W h a t is L ite?’ (see Fox Keller , 1995, 3 - 4 2 ) . By contrast, the concept of information presented by Shannon’s m athematica l theory o f com m unication in 1949 defined information differently : information m easures the degree of uncerta in ty contained in a signal. Genetic inform ation , as Fox Keller points out, was thus som ew hat at odds w ith the cybcrnet ic concept of information. In life, coding errors m ake all the d ifference b e tw een life anti death; coding errors can be fatal. M oreover , gene t ic information acts as both a legis lative code and execu tive p o w er (p. 95 ) . Information in the genet ic cotie was thought to contain all the instructions for the deve lopm ent of a living organism over t im e , whereas information as understood by com munication theory m easured how m any possible different messages could be transm itted betw een a g iven transm itter anti receiver .

Confusion betw een genet ic information and cybernet ic information persisted despite its manifest problems: For exam p le , ‘ as ear ly as 1952, genetic ists recognized that the technical definition of information

i 78

L I F E , C O L L E C T I V E S A N D B I O T E C H N O L O G Y

s imply could not serve for bio logical in lormation (because it would assign the same amount ol information to the DNA ol a functioning organism as to a m utant lo rm ) ’ (p. 19). Perhaps m ore im portantly , it a l located no active ro le to any other part ot the cell or organism , no organizational com plex ity or dynam ism beyond that program m ed bv inherited genet ic instructions. Today, the notion ot gene as program continues to attract cr it ic ism tor the same reasons. M olecu lar biologist R ichard Lewontin crit ic izes the notion of DNA as program . His crit ic ism ot the ‘ vu lgar b io logy ’ ot genetic determ in ism (prom inent in much of the debate around the Human Genome Project) during the early 1990s argued that DNA has no p ow er to reproduce itself, no activ ity apart trom inherited ce l lu la r s tructures : ‘w e inherit not only genes made ot DNA but an intricate s tructure of ce l lu lar machinery made up ot p ro te in s ’ (L ew ont in , 1992 , 3 3). In manv respects, these crit ic isms are d irec ted main ly against the popular conviction that inherited genes impose a kind ot b iological tatc over lite.

W hateve r the lim itat ions ot the conventional so-called ‘Central D ogm a’ v iew ot DNA, which said that in lormation flowed irreversib ly from genes to prote ins, there is no question of contem porary biology, even in its repudiat ion of the irrevers ib le flow of information moving from the DNA to prote ins , d ispensing w ith informatic metaphors. The Centra l Dogma has been rep laced by a m ore thorough-go ing informatic v iew of life. O ver the last few decades, the view that DNA is vitally act ive, and the rest of the organism is passively organized has been rep laced by a much m ore com plicated rapprochem ent betw een DNA and ex tra -nuc lear processes. (A single gene can be read out in different ways or in portions that are spliced d if fe ren t ly . Protein synthesis is also m ore com plicated than s imple encod ing .) The curren t position, especia lly as rep resen ted by the resurgen t in terest in developmental dynam ics , ce l l differentiation and ‘n e tw o rk s ’ of gene regulat ion im bric­ates m o lecu lar b io logy m ore deep ly w ith distr ibuted processes of communication and exchange. M any exam ples could be cited here. First o f a ll , the above quote from l ew ontin shows that ce llu lar s tructures are to be understood as ‘ intr icate m ach in ery ’ . Although there is nothing new here , since intricate mechanism has been a guid ing m odel for life since at least the seventeenth cen tury , today the precise character of the mechanism becomes increasingly informatic.

i 79

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

W hereas 40 years ago only the genet ic mater ia l was informatic , today the whole cell is a d istr ibuted com putat ion : ‘ [A]n a lternative m etaphor ol I)NA is data to a parallel com puting ne tw ork em bedded in the global geom etrica l and biochemical s tructure of the c e l l ’ (Atlan and Keppcl, 1990, 3 35).

Again, it is not at all difficult to find words to this effect:

Genomes of m ammals contain a large am ount of information . . . which the organism uses during its deve lopm ent and continuing ex istence. 1'he information stored in this base sequence encodes not onlv the machinery that each cell requ ires to carry out tasks like genera ting and using energy , but also the information for construct­ing this m ach inery , the codes used in the construction , as w e l l as the information contro ll ing the se lective information readout. (Leh- rach et a ! . , 1994 , 19)

O r, m ore recen tly ,

W e ’ re entit led to think of the, l e t ’ s say, 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 genes in a cell as some kincl of parallel processing chemical com puter in which genes are continuously tu rn ing one another on and off in some vastly com plex netw ork of interaction. (Kauffman, 20 0 0 , 50)

Although the figures have changed (there are now said to be only 30 ,000 genes in the human genom e), the informatic m etaphor, rather than fall ing aw ay , has now d e a r l y ex tended w e ll beyond the genet ic materia l to include the who le ce l l , if not the w ho le organism . Just as imagining computation as a p rogram execu ted by a com puter now' falls far short of the com plex d istr ibution ol com putat ion in con tem porary collect ives , understanding life as an information system entails tak ing a tar m ore complicated view' of information.

Productive confusion o f metaphor and m ateriality

At the level of descriptive metaphors at least, cross-contamination of cybernetic notions of information and the genetic information strongly pervades contem porary biological understandings of life. In these

i 8 o

L I F E , C O L L E C T I V E S A N D B I O T E C H N O L O G Y

te rm s, ‘ life is constitu ted and connected bv recursive , repeating streams of in fo rm ation ’ (H araw av , 1997, 1 34). W e can now ask what is at stake in the appearance of this contusion of metaphors and reality . H arawav takes an im portant step in this direction bv regarding the confusion as productive rather than m ere ly erroneous:

Not only does m etaphor become a research program , but also, m ore fundam ental ly , the organism is for us an information system and an econom ic system of a part icu lar kind, l or us, that is, those in terpe l la ted into this m ateria lized story , the biological world is an accumulation stra tegy in the fruitful collapse of metaphor and m ater ia l ity that an imates technoscience. . . . The collapse of m eta­phor and m ater ia l ity is a question not of ideology but ol modes of practice among humans and nonhumans that configure the world m ate r ia l ly and scmioticallv in term s ot some objects and bound­aries and not others. (1 9 9 7 , 97)

The existence of com peting understandings of information (as com ­mand versus m easure ot uncerta in ty in a sequence of signals) does not s imply indicate irrat ionality or a failure to think clear ly about the wavs in which gene action differs from the execution of a computer program . The ‘co llapse ’ comes about, and the organism is an informa­tion system , because of ‘ modes of p rac t ice ’ that link humans and non­humans through objects and boundaries that ‘mater ia l ly and sem io t ica l ly ’ perform as and through information systems. In other words , it may be bette r to say that the ‘e r r o r ’ that mistakes the m etaphor of inform ation , program s and com putation for the materia lity of life m ay enable something like biotechnology to become a viable object o f co llect ive investment. The e r ro r that collapses metaphor and practice is an enabling e r ro r , in the same w ay that an erro r in heredity can be an enabling m uta tion . Rather than regard ing information as an erroneous take on life (as Fox K eller tends to), Harawav argues that the very tissue of the biotechnological hybrid is informatic . Information is not just a m etaphor that reduces the com plex ity of life as an object of biological know ledge , it is also a set of techn ica l-economic practices which trace certa in paths and not others.

i 8 i

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

Bioinformatics and databases as obligatory passage points

For instance, the accumulation of know ledge of living systems has come to re ly heavily on com puter databases. Genomic: and protein database's are not just repositories of biological data from projects such as the Human Genome Project (H G P), they have becom e part of the infrastructure of b iotechnology. Through several decades of sequenc­ing, these databases have become crucial to con tem porary and future biotechnologies. In what ways do databases such as GeneBank enable the organism to become informatic? In the databases, Haravvay sug ­gests, ‘embodied information with a com plex tim e structure is reduced to a linear code in an archive outside t im e ’ (1 9 9 7 , 245 ) . The topological transformation certa in ly a l lows different reading and w r i t ­ing practices from those carr ied out in the folds of nuc lear DNA, mRNA and protein synthesis in vivo, but those reading and w r it ing practices need to be approached carefu lly .

I he em ergence ot b ioinformatics as a science stems from the problems of sorting and com paring bill ions ot sequences of DNA base pairs. Constant reread ing and rew r it in g of archived linear sequences also focuses on mapping the relation b e tw een DNA sequence and the topological structure of proteins. The m o lecu lar b iologist W a l te r Gilbert, w rit ing in 1991 about the Human Genome- Project , co rrobor­

ates the point from one angle:

The prob lem of w orking out the human genom e can be broken up into three phases requ ir ing inputs that differ by orders of m agnitude. First the DNA itself two m eters in length m ust be broken into o rdered smaller fragments, a process called physical m apping. The

best estimates of how long the mapping process should take are on the o rder o f a hundred person-years. The second phase actually d e term in ing the sequence of all the base pairs of all the ch rom o­somes w ill take three thousand to ten thousand person-years . The third phase understanding all the genes w ill be the prob lem ot

biology throughout the next cen tury : about a mill ion person-years, a hundred years ol research for the w or ld . (G ilbert , 1991, 85)

182

L I F E . C O L L E C T I V E S A N D B I O T E C H N O L O G Y

The ‘ in p u t ’ ot two metres ol DNA presupposes an unravell ing ot the folded com plex ity ol the cell nucleas into a l inear sequence of base pairs. H ow ever , can w e regard this unravell ing as the reduction ol information with a com plex tim e structure to ‘a linear code in an

archive outside tim e ? U nfortunate ly , it mav pre-em pt effective un d er ­standing of this transformation to s imply say that ‘embodied informa­t io n ’ (the 6 bill ion base pairs of human DNA folded into the nuclear of a cell 0 .005 m il l im etres in d iam eter ) is retlucal to a l inear code. The information in the databases is neither simply linear nor the archive outside t ime. C lea r ly , the organization of sequence data, and its reading and w r it ing , is very much the object ol intensive technical investigation. It constitutes the principal technical problem of bioinformatics. It wou ld perhaps be 1 1 0 m ore or 1 1 0 less correct to sav that the l inear w r it ing ot a book reduces com plex temporal structures ol language to l inear marks outside t ime. The transmissions ol marks is inevitab ly accompanied by h istorically instituted practices of reading and w r it ing which complicate any apparent l inearity . On this point, H araw ay ’s account, which provides a sophisticated reading of the informatic materia lizat ion ol life in contem porary co llect ives , engages less p roductive ly with the topology and tem poralitv of technical mediat ion. Rather than being outside t im e , the archive is \erv much in tim e in a num ber ol ways . The analysis ol genomes has a complex

tim e s tructure , as indicated by the language ot industrial t ime m anage­ment trom thousands to a m illion ‘person-vears ’ scattered through G ilber t ’ s sum m ary . It genom ics was ‘outside t im e ’ , then it would not be necessary to re late the mapping to pro jected completion times and research m anagem ent plans. C erta in ly , the recent announcements of the re lease ot the first drafts of a com plete map ol the human genome have been strongly framed in term s of an historical progression of

scientific breakthroughs (C opern icus, Galileo, N ewton , Darwin, liin- stein). I Iowevcr, the breakthrough involved in com pleting the sequenc­ing of the human genom e is main ly concerned with the large-scale organization ol fragments ot sequence data in a single database, such as the US National Institute ol H ealth ’ s GeneBank which in Julv 2000 held ‘ the sequence data on m ore than seven billion units ol DNA'

(H ow ard , 2000 , 47 ) . In m id -1998, com pletion of the sequence was

i 8<

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

projected for the end of 2003 (Collins et a l . , 1998 , 6 8 3 ) . It was roughly com pleted at least th ree years ear ly . There is a reduct ion in t im e , but not outside t ime.

Furtherm ore , regarded topolog ica l ly , the reduction is not l inear. W hile the u lt im ate goal of the genom e pro ject is to dete rm ine the sequence ol base pairs that make up the human genom e, this goal can only be achieved by creating an overlapp ing scries of maps of increasing reso lution , as G ilbert ’ s com m ents indicate. Each successive phase of unravell ing produces a different kind of map. Each phase also requ ires an acce lerat ing analysis of the genom ic mater ia l since the informatic content of the sequence becomes increasingly com plex . The process of physical mapping, which breaks down the genom e into overlapp ing fragments , y ie lds only a re la t ive ly coarse indication ot w here genes are located in relation to each other.

Converse ly , even having obtained a roughly com plete sequence of nucleic acids for a part icu lar organ ism , it needs to be read and annotated accord ing to com plex protocols which are them selves the object of intensive research in the field of b ioinformatics. It becomes useful through being linked to the other large-scale databases containing the details of when and w here various genes are act ive , of prote in s tructure and folding, and prote in prote in interactions. A sequence becomes m ore significant when it can be com pared to the sequence data of o ther organisms, ranging from yeast to m ice . This w ork is what W a l te r G ilbert calls ‘the prob lem of bio logy throughout the next cen tu ry ’ . A simple l inear sequence w il l not produce information about the topological structure or deve lopm ent dynamics of any organism. Highly intensive searching, comparison and sorting of sequences is requ ired before the databases can y ie ld information needed for the sequence-based biology to ‘have unpreceden ted impact and long-lasting value for basic biology, b iomedical research , b io technology, and health c a re ’ (Coll ins , 1998, 6 8 2 ) . The l inear codc w ill on ly m ake sense if read against the codes of o ther organisms, and against o ther kinds of maps which p erm it analysis o f the variations in the sequence. The burgeoning field of bioinformatics focuses d irec t ly on this prob lem : how to read the topological and tem pora l com plex ity encoded in a linear sequence. A w ide and still undeterm ined array o f factors will affect the developm ent of ways of reading genet ic information.

i 84

L I F E , C O L L E C T I V E S A N D B I O T E C H N O L O G Y

The genom e and protein databases, a long with the computer program s which allow' biological research to m utate into database searching and sequence- matching, are at the centre of the biotechno­logical ensem ble . M ore than m ere repositories of biological data, thev constitute a site of art icu lat ion of the liv ing and the non-living. Biologists now say that ‘the databases themselves genera te new know ­ledge. The new know ledge is providing a rem arkab le p icture not only of how living systems evo lved , but also how they op era te ’ (Doolittle , 1990 , 21 2) . In genera l te rm s (as w e w ill see in a m om en t) , that technical know ledge of ‘how' liv ing systems . . . o p e ra te ’ flows from the sorting and comparison of sequence data. The archival aspects of biotechnology are highlighted in the genom e mapping projects:

[T]he global Human Genome Project is a m ult inational, long-term , com putative and cooperative , m ult ib i l l ion-dol lar (yen , franc, mark, e tc . ) effort to represen t exhaust ively in genet ic , physical, and DNA sequence maps the tota lity of information in the species genom e. The data are all en tered into com puter ized databases, from which information is made available around the w orld on terms still very much being w o rked out. C om puter ized database design is at the leading edge of genomics research. (H araw ay , 1997 , 246)

The convergence of informatics and b iology meshes the techniques used to organize and re tr ieve scientific know ledge with the concepts used to understand the organism . The practical consequences of conceptualiz ing DNA as information have tu rned out to be closelv bound to the prob lem of how to organize and make technical use of that information.

Gene-mapping, as undertaken in the HGP, produces various kinds of maps (genetic l inkage maps, cosmid scale physical maps and, u lt im ate ly , a sequence of base acids) large ly res iding on computer databases. There are at least ten different types of genom ic maps that must be organized in relat ion to each other (C an to r , 1994, 2). The different kinds of maps involved in sequencing the human genome overlay each other , producing m ult i layered inscriptions ol the topology of the organ ism ’s nuc lear DNA. The trop ing of sequence data as maps

plays an im portant part in seeing m olecu lar b iology as racing to claim

1 85

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

biopolitical terr i to ry ( l l a r a w a y , 1997, 162 5). The d iverse technical mediations involved in its mapping pro jects need to somehow encoun ­ter each other on common ground. Again, m aking that com mon ground accessible is a central problem tor informatics. Through the deve lopm ent ol search and comparison techn iques, it otters ways to superimpose different maps on each, and to detect homologies and similarit ies that can be capita lized upon.

( l iven the locus of this chapter on the problem ol saying what biotechnology means for co llect ive life, focusing on databases seems a litte abstruse. But one justification for it comes from H araw ay ’s notion of corporcali/.ation providing one account of how diverse technical and social realities intersect. That notion forms part of her m ore general a ttem pt to render visible the technologies that a l low semiotics and m atter to revers ib ly transmogrify into each other: ‘ [i]n art , l iterature and science, m y subject is the technology that turns body into story, and v ice versa, producing both what can count as real and the witnesse.s

to that r e a l i ty ’ (H arawav , 1997 , 197). A lthough she does not settle on any single artefact, the collection she discusses (R obert B o y le ’ s vacuum pum p, com puter chips, foetuses, laboratory m ice , the human brain, seeds, e tc . ) include genome databases as part icu lar ly condensed sites ot interconnection ol ‘know ledge-m ak ing practices, industry and co m ­m erce , popular cu ltu re , social s trugg les, psychoanalyt ic formations, bodily histories . . . and m o re ’ (1 9 9 7 , 129).

Could it be argued that, together with the protocols for read ing and

transcrib ing genetic information betw een diHercnt living and non-living supports, the genom ic and protein databases partic ipate in a corporeal- ization? How can something like a genom e database be involved in corporealization? Interestingly , Harawav presents corporealizat ion as the mark ol the collect ive in a body:

1 am defining corporealizat ion as the interactions of humans and nonhumans in the d is tr ibu ted , heterogeneous w ork processes ot technoscience. . . . T he w ork processes result in matcr ia l-sem iotic bodies or natural technical objects ol know ledge and practice - such as cells , m olecu les , genes, organisms, viruses, ecosystems, and the like. . . . The bodies are perlect lv ‘ r e a l ’ and nothing about

8 6

L I F E . C O L L E C T I V E S A N D B I O T E C H N O L O G Y

corporealizat ion is ‘ m e r e ly ’ fiction. But corporealization is tropic and h istorically specific at every layer of its tissues, (pp. 141 2)

Corporealization occurs , Harawav argues ( i n v o k i n g Bruno la to u r ) when an ‘obligatory passage po in t ’ (p. 164) interacts with and inflects what passes through it. It becomes an inter lace which diffracts and scatters. It shifts the boundaries , the in te ll ig ib il ity , leg ib il i ty , visibility, activity and palpabili ty of a body understood as 's imultaneously a

h istorical, natural, technical , d iscurs ive, and materia l en t i ty ’ (p. 209). Genomic databases are becom ing obligatory passage points for a whole range o f biomedical and biopolitical projects. They are ‘material technologies through which many must pass and in which many visible and invisible actors and agencies co h ere ’ (p. 270) , both human and non-human. H arawav w r ite s , ‘ something peculiar happened to the stable, fam ily- liv ing, M endelian gene when it passed into a database, where it has m ore in com mon with LANDSAT photographs’ (pp. 244 5). This is a str ik ing point whose implications are worth developing. The molecular biologist W a lte r Gilbert describes the ‘lamilv- living g e n e ’ when he writes : ‘The information carr ied on the DNA, that genet ic information passed down from our parents, is the most fundamental p roperty of the bodv ’ (199 2 , 8 3). His com ment marks the genom e as the ‘substance ’ of a body. H araw av ’s point, bv contrast, highlights the fact that ‘DNA as in form ation ’ can only become ‘ the

most fundamental p roperty of the b o d y ’ through mediations that perm it DNA to be configured and com m unicated as information. DNA’s status as in form ation , and its status as a ‘ fundamental property of the b o dy ’ , comes to light only through the reading, copying, comparing and sorting of genet ic sequences carried out by a host of technical mediat ions cu rren t ly c ircu lating through com puter databases. The in lorm ation transm itted by genes only becomes ‘ fundamental’ in the contex t of genom ic corporealizat ion which renders it visible.

A specific and w e ll-know n corporealizat ion passing through genomic databases occurred when a patent was granted to the US National Institute of Health over a cell line derived from a Papua New Guinean man (Beardsley , 1996). W h ile considerably m ore could be said about this case, the part icu lar cell line became commodifiable because its

1 8 7

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

traits w ere seen as defining different norms of health (in this case, in relation to heart d isease). The isolation and appropriation of this s ingularity is typical. On a global scale, genom ic corporealizat ion means managing roughly three m illion differences per individual human. Charles Cantor, chief scientist of the US D epartm ent of Energy's genom e pro ject, w rites :

I would like to imagine that our technology w il l become good enough to enable us to sequence everybody . W hen you are born you are sequenced, and if w e are c lever and compress the data dow n , so that w e have a database of differences betw een people and throw away all the stuff that is the sam e, and take the ex trem e ly conservative estimate that we differ from each other at the level of 0 .1 % , that means 3 m illion differences per indiv idual. If we assume an (underest im ated ) earth population of 4 bill ion indiv iduals, the result ing database will be requ ired to hold ( ju s t handling the differences betw een humans) information about 1 0 16 base pairs. (C antor , 1994 , 17)

By concentrat ing on genet ic information contained in nuclear DNA, the HGP was able, sooner than or ig inally p ro jected , to map and sequence one idealized human genom e. A lready , SNP (S ingle N ucleo­tide Po lymorphism) databases are supp lem enting this ideal genome by mapping some of the t iny genet ic variations b e tw een indiv id­uals. B ioinformatic corporealizat ion focuses on these d ifferences, on yvhat Cantor predicts w ill be im p lem en ted as ‘a database of dif­ferences ’ .

Corporealization as a distributed process

Every technical mediation entails some kind of corporealizat ion . The problem is how to de lineate that corporealizat ion in the con tex t of technological ensembles. Their techn ic ity , and the w ay they are interlaced with collect ives , is not easy to grasp. The techn ic ity of an ensemble refers to the transductive process of indiv iduation that em erges from interaction betw een its technical e lem ents . Chapters 2, 4 and 5 have made that point main ly in the context of information

i 8 8

L I F E , C O L L E C T I V E S A N D B I O T E C H N O L O G Y

netw orks . Biotechnology targets bodies in the biopolitical domains of health and nutr it ion . In genera l te rm s, what Harawav understands as ‘the d is tr ibuted , heterogeneous w ork processes ’ supporting biopolitical corporealizat ion can also be expla ined in term s of the practices involved in con tem porary b io technology. Databases are one place where a specific technic ity which links together different informatic and living processes becomes m ore legible .

For instance, in genera l te rm s, the practices associated with the sequences stored in the databases can be grouped under:

(a) H ybrid isation : hered ity information can be induced to move betw een different organisms and, today , chemical substrates. (This is the w'ay that m o lecu lar b iology uses the term ‘transduct ion ’ .) This process of hybrid isation is fundamental to b io technology, contemporary and past. It has a both m ore genera l and specific meaning. In general terms, hybridization means the process of producing new organisms from the combination of ex ist ing organisms. For instance, the dom est­ication of grain crops in paleo lith ic agr icu ltu re is thought to have occurred via the accidental transfer of genes betw een different species of grass. Human cu ltu re has long relied on the results of accidental transgenic m ovem ents or hybridizat ion in food plants ( 'C hrom osom es show that m odern w heat began when tw o species of grass hybr id ized ’ (Jones, 1994, 26 9 ) ) , or betw een animals (donkey + horse = mule).

Hybridization is also a basic technique used to analyse genetic materia l . A num ber of kinds of hybridization are vital to the processes of m apping genes and m anipulat ing their expression . As we saw earlier , a specific kind of hybridization called ‘transduct ion ’ carried out by viruses betw een bacter ia a l low ed genetic ists in the 1950s to move small selected portions of genet ic materia l into bacteria (Judson, 1992, 55). The laboratory capture ol transduction as a technical process enabled genct ic modification ot o ther organisms. In its general sense, hybridization perm its the production of somatic cell hybrids (e .g. mouse- human cell hybrids) which have been very important in the industrial-scientific mapping of human genes. In its specific sense used by m o lecu lar b iologists , ‘ DNA hybridization means the process of “annealing” [a te rm from m etal lurg ica l craft] strands of DNA or RNA with each other. The technologies of “hybridization micro-arravs” or “gene chips” for instance are cu rren t ly inducing a quantum leap in the

i 89

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

speed ol analysis ot genetic in lormation since they open the in teraction ot gene com plexes within a liv ing cell to ana lys is ’ (M arshal l , 1999 , 444 ) .

(b) Selective replication of genetic m ateria l: the pr im ary hered itary substance or genom e can be m anipulated as a l inear sequence of coded in lormation onlv if it can be isolated in sufficient quantit ies. Genomics relies on techniques lor ex trac t ing , copying and sorting genes as sequences ot nucleic acids, and lor reading and w r it ing proteins as sequences ot amino acids. Beginning in the ear ly 1970s, a s tream ot technical innovations based on the specific cata lytic activit ies ot certa in enzymes (po lym erases , transcriptases, restriction enzyme's) a l lowed sequences ot nucleic acids (DNA and RNA) and amino acids (com pos­ing proteins) to be se lect ive ly copied and ed ited . The reading and w r it ing ol selected portions of hered itary information have tended to confirm the' status of the inheritance as an archiv al system or individual lite as the transmission e)l informatiem. The most prom inent exam ple ol such a technique is probably PCR (Po lym erase Chain R eaction). In the late- 1980s, the now heavily used PCR was eleveloped at Cetus Corporation (Rab inem , 1997). It a l lows large num bers of copies ot any give'n sequence- ot DNA to be read ily synthesized in vitro . Once arb itrary amounts ot genetic materia l can be copied independently ot their conta inment in the nucleus of a living ce l l , genetic information has be'e'n e l lect ive lv detached trenn its em bod im ent in species or indiv iduals .

The combination e>l the tw o previous modes of practice hybr id ­ization and selective replication genera tes the huge volumes ot genetic and protein sequence information curren t ly rep roduced , sorted and transm itted in and betvvee-n many elitlerent com puter databases. These databases then serve- as the substrate e)f new drug research (Haselt ine, 1997). T he important pe>int here is not to say exac t ly what role the databases play in contem porary biotechnological research (a lthough this definitely needs a lot me>re concrete analysis). Rather, I am suggesting that w hatever shape biotechnology is taking stems in part trom the wav in which information is organized in the databases. Biotechnology as it moves out of laboratories into fields, clinics and factories is linked ensem ble-w ise to the databases. This linking is complex and highly m ediated . As mentioned above, a whe)le series of

i 9 0

L I F E , C O L L E C T I V E S A N D B I O T E C H N O L O G Y

maps and translations moves across living and non-living substrates before something as refined as sequence data can In' stored in a database. C ontem porary biotechnology is absolutely reliant on the' s torage, processing and retr ieval of large quantities of genetic infor­mation in com puter databases. Standing at the confluence of techniques ot hybridization and rep licat ion , the computational sorting, comparison and matching sequence data is central it the genet ic differences between bodies are to become visible and manipulab le within the life ot the collect ive.

The m eta sta bility o f a n on-living—living ensem ble

The databases, a long w ith the other ‘obligatory passage-points ’ I fara­way refers to, such as foetus, chip, brain and virus, can be understood as m arkers of d isparity . 1'hev partia lly art icu late or join diverse realities. They constitute e lem ents of a technological ensemble at which the potentia ls tor d ivergence and further restructuring are supersaturated and metastable. Topolog ica l ly , they stand at points w here an individuation of the collect ive is most likelv to be tr iggered. They attest to a co llect ive indiv iduation . Gilles Deleuze, echoing S imondon, w r ites , ‘ individuation presupposes a prior metastable state— in other w ords , the ex istence of a “d isparateness” such as at least two orders ol m agnitude or tw o scales ol heterogeneous reality betw een which potentia ls are d is tr ibu ted ’ (D eleuze , 1994, 246) . While' the notion of corporealizat ion points to the ensem ble ot connections betw een living and non-liv ing entit ies which envelops biotechnology, the notion of transductive individuation shifts the emphasis on to the metastability from which corporealizat ion stems. W hat kind of singu­larities ex ist in this metastablc state, and how are thev brought into communication through the art icu lat ing processes ol transduction?

To understand what kind ot individuation and what kind of metasta- bilitv a con tem porary co llect ive m ight be art icu lat ing through biotech­nology, the technicity ot this ensem ble needs to be considered. Again, as discussed in ear l ie r chapters , the technicitv of an ensemble is not an isolated p roperty , or a hvpostatized rea l i ty . On the contrary , it is that aspect of a technical mediat ion which in t im ately links diflerent milieus together. It structures and sets in plav a constellation ot forces.

i 9 i

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

W hatever technological objects compose the biotechnological ensem ble database's, gene banks, c lone libraries, m icroarrays , s tem cells ,

transgenic organisms, etc. the tcchnicitv of the ensem ble is not contained in anv particu lar object. It incorporates d ivergent realities into a structure which exists in a provisional equ i l ib r ium . ‘T echn ic i tv , ’ Simondon w rites , ‘ is not an hierarchical rea l i tv ; it exists whollv in the1 J ' J

e lem ents , and propagates itself transductivelv in the technological individual and the ensem b les ’ (1 98 9a , 81 ). The techn ic ity of the ensemble stems from its e lem ents , but an e lem en t of the ensem ble , such as a genom ic database, does not contain the technic ity of the ensem ble to which it belongs.

An obligatory passage-point: the technicity o f the sequence databases

Specific liv ing and non liv ing ‘m a te r ia l-sem io t ic ’ bodies em erge from genom ic biotechnology: transgenic organisms (plants, bactcr ia , an ­imals), b io-drugs, and d iagnostic or screening tests which can be highly significant in individual lives ( lo r instance, the techn ique of p re-gcnet ic diagnosis coupled with IVF (in-v itro fert i l izat ion)) . Biotechnological objects in their current forms, w hether ‘ ra t ionally des igned d rugs ’ (Flaseltine, 1997 , 82 ), genet ica l ly modified bacter ia , goats or cows used for ‘pharm ing ’ custom -des igned drugs, genet ica l ly modified crops and food products, prospective somatic or g e rm - l in e therapies for disease, or genet ica l ly modified bacter ia for breaking down crude oil, d raw on an ensem ble of technical e lem ents , both living and non-liv ing. These include e lectrophoresis gels, im m orta l ce l l- l ines , stem cells, sequencing robots, PCR assays, DNA m icroarrays , etc. B iotechnology as an ensem ble consists of liv ing and non-liv ing e lem ents . The ensemble transduces, rep licates and sorts certa in e lem ents of selected living things via practices which themselves are not fully a live: assays, reactions and, the exam ple I w ill focus on, a lgorithms. If w e want to understand something ol what is at stake in b io technology for collectivc life, we need to account first of all for the ways in which biotechnology renders at least these d ivergent realit ies com patib le . W h y is something like a database, or a sorting a lgor ithm , an obligatory passage-point for biotechnology?

>92

L I F E , C O L L E C T I V E S A N D B I O T E C H N O L O G Y

The bioinformatic ensem ble arises in the tensions and complications betw een living and non-liv ing entit ies . W h ile living entities define the genera l horizon of b iomedical and biotechnological knowledges and exper im enta l p ractices, the genera l tendencv in recent biotechnologv, as Paul Rabinow rem arks in his account ot the technique ol PC'R, has been to reduce the dependency ol exper im enta l w ork on living svstems (Rab inow , 1997 , 1). PC R , tor instance, makes selected DNA sequences abundant w ithou t re ly ing on liv ing svstems to reproduce them . So, too, the hybridizat ion , reading and sorting ol genetic materia l in b iotechnological practice relies m ore and more on non­living substrates and techniques such as radioactive labell ing, gel e lectrophoresis , radiographs, DNA array chips, genom ic and protein sequence databases, sequence analysis, comparison algorithms and so on. No doubt certa in processes, such as cell hybridization, target living cells (bacter ia , yeasts , mouse cells) or in the case ot ‘pharm ing ’ , complex m ult ice l lu la r organisms such as sheep, pigs or goats, but in general the reduced dependency ot biotechnologv 0 1 1 l iv ing svstems is significant. B iotechnologv is viable onlv in or as this complicated tension betw een living and non-liv ing processes. It should not be seen as a s imple reduction ot the liv ing to the non-liv ing, but as a specific co-implicat ion ot the living and the non-liv ing, tiverv techno­logical ensem ble brings together liv ing and non-liv ing bodies, there is no pure ly non-liv ing technological system . H ow ever , the bio­technology is d istinctive in the w ay that it configures living bodies as reservoirs ot technical e lem ents . The technic ity ol biotechnologv resides with in the linkages established betw een the non-living and the living.

Protein and gene sequence databases occupy a domain that seems rem ote trom the ostensible ta rge t of b io technology, life itself in all its various ecosystems. The database infrastructure is an attempt to cope with the sheer m agnitude and variety of interactions occurring within living processes. Because the database contains nothing living, and exists as a set ot com puter program s and stored data, accessed principally through com puter netw orks , it might seem a strange place to look for the technic ity of biotechnologv as an ensemble. Databases do not apparently im pinge d irect ly 0 1 1 l iving bodies, in the wav that, tor instance, a synthetic growth hormone does. The databases (and

1 9 }

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

there are many of them , mostly publicallv accessible online: GeneBank, the European M olecu lar Biology Laboratory; DNA Database of Japan, and m ore recen t ly , the’ PubMeel Project ot the US National Institute ot Health) arc not technical e lem ents in the ensem b le ; they arc rea l ly sub-ensembles in their own right. N evertheless , their rem oteness from living bodies belies their im portance. The organization of genetic information in the database's implies a specific topological and temporal s tructuring ol the- living non-liv ing ensem ble of biotechnology. In other words , the sub-ensemble can il lustrate the genera l point about the transductive- articulation of the living and the non-liv ing in b io­technology.

I he genom ic and protein databases, rapidly g row ing and incom plete as thev are , contain a transcription ol the hered itary in lormation transm itted and expressed by life in various forms (hum an, m ouse, rat, dog, zebrafish, wheat, r ice , e tc . ) . G enomic databases are con ­cerned main ly with the information transm itted when organisms reproduce , and protein databases are- concerned w ith the w ay in which proteins are s tructured and function in organisms. W ith in the o rgan­ism, genet ic in lormation is character ized by repeated , overlapping operations on linear sequences, whereas prote in s tructure , a lthough it is composed of long sequences of amino acids, is characterized topolog ica l ly , in term s of folds. T he topology of a protein determ ines its specific structural or enzymatic ( i .e . cata ly t ic ) function in the organism. In short, the specificitv of genes is the ir sequence , whereas the specific ity of proteins is their topological folding. Although there is a corre lat ion betw een the linear sequence of genet ic information and the topological structure ol proteins (s ince genes ‘co d e ’ proteins), defining this corre lat ion is part ot ‘the w ork of the next [this] c en tu ry ’ (G ilbert, 1 9 9 ] ) . Both kinds of sequence information (genom ic or protein) display hered itary variation. Isolating, sorting and classifying these variations is of crucial biotechnological im portance.

In a deep sense', both major kinds of database are in effect concerned with l ife ’s h istory, with the wav in which it involves both conservation and innovation. The databases respond to a basic prob lem whose dimensions are only becoming m ore apparent now that complete genom e maps are becoming available'.

The problem is that life, when it ‘ transm its m essages ’ as sequences

i 9 4

L I F E . C O L L E C T I V E S A N D B I O T E C H N O L O G Y

which arc then expressed in topologica lly and tem pora lly complicated liv ing systems, observes no genera l rules. Heredity refers to both the transmission ol characters and the expression ol characters in an organism (Judson, 1992 , 38). As Canguilhem w rites , ‘heredity is the modern name ol substance ’ (C angu ilhem , 1991, 280) . W hen thev are m ater ia l ly configured as informatic processes, these two aspects of hered ity transmission and expression suggest that life can be handled as a set of archiving and reading practices. Quoting C angu il­hem again , ‘ life has a lw ays done without w rit ing , long before writ ing even ex isted what humans have sought to do with engraving, writ ing and printing , nam ely , to transmit m essages ’ (C angu ilhem , 1994, 317). The first protein sequence elic ited (insulin in the late 1940s) showed that ‘the sequence ot amino acids is entirely and uniquely specified. No genera l law , no physical or chemical sequence, governs their assem bly ’ ( judson , 1992 , 5.3). At the same t im e , heredity also demonstrates s trongly conservative or cum ulat ive tendencies. If it is possible, for instance, to use rats and mice to model the metabolic processes associated w ith obesity in humans ( O ’ Brien and Menotti- Raymond, 1999, 4 5 9 ) , it is because many gene sequences between mammalian species are homologous or conserved across species. S im ilar ly , there are ‘unexpected levels ol conservation of gem - content and gene orders oyer mill ions ot years of evolution within grasses, crucifers, legum es, some t r e e s ’ (C a lc and Devos, 1998, 656) . The implications of this combination of a lack ol generality , regularity or lawfulness in protein and DNA sequences w ith evolutionary or heredity conservation of sequences are manifold and central to the very possibil ity of biotechnology. Heredity is an accumulation of accidents, errors and mutations genera ted in the context of continual rereading. Accident, d ivergence and er ro r constitute the history of life because life continues to indiv iduate. The variety of life from the standpoint of comparative genetics stems from the spectrum of those accumulated , reproduced erro rs . In tu rn , the databases exist as a wav ot coping with the dimensions of those errors .

■94

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

IN SERTIO N P O IN T BY P O IN T

Ihc impetus to ‘m ap ’ the en tire human genom e Hows from this lack ol regu lar ity . Indeed, genom ic maps depend, as w e ll as capitalize, on i r regu lar i ty . As Judson w r ites , ‘ from the start the genet ic map of any species-molds, (lies, maize or humans-has pr im ar i ly been the map ol d e lec ts ’ (Judson, 1992, 47 ) . If genes, w hatever the ir function (s t ruc ­tural or regu la tory ) operated accord ing to consistent, predictable mechanisms, and w ere a lw ays conserved faithfully, then it wou ld not be possible to analyse their function. O nly variations or disruptions in gene action a llow biologists to identify them as units of hered ity . In any case, if genom ic sequences fo llowed genera l laws, the mapping effort would be obviated. It would be possible to w ork w ith general formulae and models to design interventions into organisms.

There are a num ber of different ways to i l lustrate the contingencies of hered ity , and how it prom otes the trea tm en t o f life as an in form a­tion system . Eirst, the concept ol the gene as a constant unit of hered ity is under serious threat . W i l l iam Gelbart w r ites that ‘the realities of genom e organization are much m ore com plex than can be accom modated in the classical gene concept. Genes res ide with in one another, share some of their DNA sequences, are transcribed and spliced in com plex patterns, and can overlap in function w ith other genes of the same sequence fam il ies ’ (G elbart , 1998 , 66 0 ) . This means that even the notion of genes as the com ponents of hered ity , as coding for inherited traits , must now' be replaced by specific spatial and temporal patterns of interaction betw een RNA and prote in . Philip Kitcher concludes that ‘ it is hard to see what wou ld be lost by dropping talk of genes from m o lecu la r b iology and s im ply discussing the properties of various in terest ing regions of nucle ic ac id ’ (Kitcher, 1992 , 130). In effect, this happens in bio informatics, w here sequences are trea ted w ithout reference to units of hered ity , and solely in comparison with other sequences.

Second, specific variations in sequences o f nuc le ic acids in the DNA of individuals need to be taken into account if disease is to be understood and treated genom ica l ly . Biologist Eric Lander w r ite s that ‘the human genom e wil l need to be sequenced only once, but it w ill be re-sequenced thousands ot t imes in o rder , for ex am p le , to unravel

i 96

L I F E , C O L L E C T I V E S A N D B I O T E C H N O L O G Y

the po lygenic factors under ly ing human susceptibilit ies and predisposi­t ions ’ (Lander, 1996 , 5 37). Insertions, delet ions and ‘point mutations’ or substitutions of nucle ic acids com m only occur, and continue to occur throughout the life ol an organism , even simply through exposure to cosmic radiation. The u lt im ate promise- of complete sequencing ol every individual is in fact justified bv the individually varying sequences o f proteins and genes in liv ing organisms. The very idea that it wou ld be desirable to sequence an individual and establish a database of differences from a normal genom e shows that life is being ta rgeted in te rm s of individual specificity. As mentioned already, resequencing of se lected portions of the human genom e to deal with individual variations is a lready under w ay : ‘sequencing selected regions of the genom e in a large num ber of individuals to identify po lym orph­isms, which should enable identification of genetic traits associated with human disease, is seen as an important derivative of the human genom e sequencing p ro jec t ’ (R ogers , 1999, 4 2 9 ) . T he goal of the SNP (Single N ucleotide Po lymorphisms) Consortium is to describe vari­ations of single nucle ic acids with in se lected genes which alter the activity of the encoded prote in . Such variations can affect the wav individuals respond to m edicat ions, tor instance (see Lvans and Relling, 1999).

Third , even if an accurate sequence for a particu lar gene or protein is available, no authoritat ive exegesis of its function can be guaranteed on the basis of homology with o ther genes or proteins. The function crucial ly depends on the folded topology of the protein coded bv the gene (and even that topology shifts according to context) . This observation is repeated ly made in assessments of the contemporary state of gene technologies. Autom ated sequencing has flooded databases with sequence information, but the w ork of understanding the function of the genes described by these sequences has scarcely begun. There are fundamental problems in linking gene sequence and gene function, for exam ple ‘one of these is the fact that a single protein mav have multip le forms and functions that are contex t-dependent and that can never be fully understood bv sequence analysis a lo n e ’ (Boguski, 1999, 454) . That is, organisms are ‘m ult ifo rm , intricate and elaborate physical systems w ith their operational and regu latory parts assembled by a series of evo lu tionary contingenc ies ’ (p. 45 5). W hen they code

197

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

proteins, tin- combinatoria l possibil ities ol a linear sequence of DNA has to be transposed into the topological com plex it ies ol a protein .

f in a l ly , only in a lew cases do genes act s ingly to cause disease. M onogenetic disorders or defects are the except ion . The t im ing of gene action is paramount, faced w ith a com plex ne tw ork of in te rac ­tions betw een genes, in which tr igger ing , coupling and t im ing signals are centra l , there is again no simple wav to predict what course ot events will unlold within an organism w ithout tracing the com plex interactions through every specific step. As Lander suggests , ‘the greatest challenge will be to dec ipher the logical c ircu itry contro ll ing entire developmental or response p a th w ays ’ (Lander, 1996 , 5 38). Since the early 1990s, DNA m icroarrav technology has begun to provide a way of mapping these in teractions cn masse. It a l lows the temporal patterns of gene expression to be e lic i ted . For instance, a c luster of genes that may be inactive ear ly in the deve lopm ent ot a s traw berry may be re lat ive ly active when the fruit is ripe (M arshall , 1999, 4 4 5 ) . Drawing on sequence data held in genom e databases, an array of synthetica lly produced DNA sequences ( ‘p robes ’ ) is laid on a wafer or glass s lide. H ow ever , even m icroarray snapshots of clusters ol gene activ ity only sketch an outl ine of the tem pora l dynam ics of the organism.

In each ol these lour respects , there can be no abstract rep resen ta­tion of the variability of hered ity ( le t alone the differences and changes induced by environm ental and deve lopm enta l conditions) or the func­tioning ot the genom e. There can only be point by point m apping of the variations in sequences, the variations in linkages b e tw een DNA sequence and protein function, and the deve lopm enta l dynamics o f the organism which appear as topological contact be tw een in ter ioritv and ex ter io r ity . I he possibil ity ol bringing various living processes into the biotechnological ensemble relies on a point by point in ter lac ing of the ensemble with the living systems.

D A TABASES AND THE T O P O L O G Y O f TH E LIVING

I he databases owe' their ex istence to a m ix tu re of pattern and irregu lar i ty . The point by point insertion ol liv ing organisms into a technological ensemble must pass through databases because of this

i 9 8

L I F E , C O L L E C T I V E S A N D I I O T E C H N O L O G Y

drastica lly contingent o rder ing of li l’c- as information. As W ill iam Gelbart acknow ledges , ‘ w e re we to be- able- to re-ad the genomic instruction manual in the same way we- can read a book writ ten in a language we understand , w e might not need a huge support system of scientific databases’ (199 8 , 659 ) . W hat prevents us trom reading genom es like a book is the fact that life turns out to involve a process of perpetual m isread ing. Error, misprint, m istranslation, unacknow ­ledged citation, transcription actually constitute the text of life in its reproductive and evo lu tionary viability.

The databases address this constant m isreading bv sorting and com paring sequences. In Lerov H ood ’s words:

W e must be able to ex tract from a sequence . . . a variety of information, including the boundaries of genes, the- presence of regu latory e lem ents , and the presence ol sequences that may relate to specialized chromosomal functions such as rep licat ion, com pac­t ion, and segregation . I he key te> ex trac t ing this information is the ability to com pare this sequence against all preexist ing sequences to test for s im ilarit ies . (1 9 9 2 , 147)

The most e lem en tary problem lor bioinformatics is how to compare- two sequences, and in part icu lar , how to find out whether one- sequence is contained in, or could be derived from the other: ‘sequence comparison is the- most important prim it ive operation in computational b io logy, serving as a basis lor m ain other, metre- com plex m anipu lat ions ’ (Setubal and Meidanis , 1997, 47 ) . The- so- called ‘ed it d is tance ’ specifies how many insertions, deletions and substitutions of base- acids are needed te> transform erne sequence- into another designated sequence. Such comparison has manifold uses, ranging from com paring the- genomes e>! different specie-s in order to construct an evo lu tionary t ree , to deducing the folded topology of proteins, to the forensic identification of DNA. l o r instance, in order to com pare tw o DNA sequences, GATTACGA ITAGC and AATTAC- GATAGC, they can be aligneel as follows

G ATT A C G ATTA G C AATTACGAT-AGC

9 9

1

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

by in s e rtin g a spate into the second secjucnce. The only d ifference is in the first base (G versus A). The comparison can be carr ied out on paper by hand and eye while the sequences are short, but it qu ickly becomes impossible for sequences ot biological in terest because the num ber ot different possible a lignm ents increases exponen tia l ly . This is a case w here reading the l inear DNA sequences stored in the databases themselves entails tem pora l com plex it ies which must be addressed by a lgorithmic trea tm en t. It the databases, or the software which accesses them , trea ted sequences s imply as sequences, then the problem ot matching sequences wou ld be intractable because of the exponentia l g row th in the num ber of different possible a l ignments . I he combinatoria l s low -dow n can only be avoided by using an

algorithm which speeds up the comparison. It re-m aps the l inear sequences on to a different data s tructu re , a tw o-d im ensional array , and breaks down the act ol com paring the sequences into com paring first the smallest, and then gradually longer prefixes of the sequences, a lways using the results of previous comparisons to shorten the w ork ol comparing the longer sequence's. To obtain the' accelerat ion in comparison, the- o rder in which the prefixes of the sequences are compared is critical.

O nly by such detours and careful o rder ing o f comparison can

b io in lormatics, and biotechnology m ore gene ra l ly , effectively carry out the point by point insertion of living organisms into a technical ensem ble . The contingencies and irregu lar i t ie s of hered ity mean that life can only become technical via a point by point m apping and comparison of life as a set ol transm itted messages. The motivation tor the various genom e sequencing pro jects derives Irom this. Biologists such as Lric Lander and W a l te r Gelbart wou ld not need to speak of sequencing every person if genet ic inheritances w e re not variable. Genomic databases, and the associated a lgorithm s for sorting , com par­ing and matching sequences, torm onlv one e lem en t or sub-ensemble in the com plex , constantly shifting field of con tem porary b io techno­logy. But they are an e lem ent concerned w ith linking various life forms in d i l le ren t configurations by trea t ing them as a set of transm itted messages to be re -read , sorted , c ited and com bined . They are obliga­tory passage-points for b io technology, albeit highly com plex and laby­

200

L I F E , C O L L E C T I V E S A N D B I O T E C H N O L O G Y

rinthine o n e s , as it reconfigures co llect ive life through recourse to non-human life.

In their cu rren t incom pleteness , the genom ic databases remain somewhat ‘abstrac t ’ . The technic ity o f a technical ensemble can be understood in S im ondon ’s term s as the degree of concrcti/.ation attained in the relations betw een e lem ents of which it is composed: ‘technicitv

is the degree o f concretizat ion of the o b jec t ’ (S imondon, 1989a, 72). The process of concretization melds and grafts different elements together. Elements become difficult to d isentangle , because thev begin to overlap. Boundaries b lur betw een one part of the ensemble and others, and milieus become associated w ith the ensem ble . 1 his process is occurr ing in the biotechnological ensem ble in manv different wavs. Not on ly is the w o rk of sequencing ongoing (especially given the goal of sequencing individual variations), but the protocols tor reading useful information from the databases are , as some ol the earlier com m ents suggest, still i l l-defined. Despite their sophistication and

reliance on the latest and most powerful information technologies (e .g . Celera Genomics, the company' that sequenced the human genom e in competit ion w ith the EfGP, used supercom puters to order and sort genet ic sequences) , the technicity ol these databases is relat ively low compared to what it might becom e. The t ra n s d u c tiv e processes at work in biotechnology have begun to inter lace databases with diverse life forms via a panoply ol techniques of hybridization and analysis. Point by point, a technological ensem ble enmeshes itself with ‘ta rge t ’ organisms. W h ile life becomes technological only in a fine-grained assembly of e lem ents , genom ic DNA forms a priv i leged core around which, or through which , the technic ity of biotechnology incorporates or corporealizes the living.

W h y is it so difficult to co llect ive ly represent what is at stake in biotechnology? A short answ er w ou ld be that w henever the limits of a collective are contested , s lippages and failures in signification are tr iggered . A m ore involved answ er focuses on why it is hard to think through the in ter leaving of specific technical processes within collective life. Collect ive life is not fully alive. Canguilhem wrote that ‘ in order to understand liv ing things one needs a non-m etric theory ol space, a science of o rder , a topo logy ; one needs a non-numerical calculus, a

2 0 I

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

combinatorics , a statistical m ach inery ’ (1 9 9 4 , 317). In o rder to manipulate' l iv ing things on the basis ol such an understand ing , one needs a machinery ot o rder ing and comparison. The genom ic and protein databases re-present a non-m etr ic , statistical topology of the liv ing. They must be statistical because there is no genera l set o f laws lor life o ther than those- containeel in the hered ity and environmental processes ot re-combination and mutation through which biological variations arise. They are topological because they address the problem ot he>w a l inear sequence can be mapped on to a com plicated tem pora l and topological organization. The com plex ity ot the databases is, perhaps, a good inelex of the- depth at which life is being reorganized . Again, laced with a lack ot universal o rder , the b io informatic solution is to use sequence- s im ilar it ies te> pred ict s tructura l or topological similarit ies in liv ing organisms.

V iew ing biotechnology as a sympte>m ot co llect ive individuation responds to that difficulty by showing that the individuation occurs as a temporal and topological folding ol many d i i le ren t e lem ents , liv ing and non-liv ing. In relation to b io technology, the- m ajor point that I have be-e-n developing is this: to acce lerate liv ing processes is alse> to suspe-nd them at some- points anel, at those points, to detour into the non-liv ing. Debates ove-r the significance ol b io technology genera l ly overlook the- implications ot this point, and range betw een tw o poles. At one- peilc-, bie>technology is said to change nothing, since humans have- a lways cultivated and scle-ctiveTv bred living organisms. It is often argued that ‘ lor m illennia , humans have successfully modified the genet ic makeup ol organisms through se lective b reed in g ’ (Berg and Singe-r, 1992, 221 ). Counter ing this argum en t, biotc'chnology is said to change- everyth ing because now , for the first t im e , a cu ltu re begins to bree-d anel select life forms (human and non-human) w ithou t regard tor the web of ecological, cu ltura l and econom ic connections that links living things together. The speed of this selection ignores its co m ­plications. One side of the de bate sees biotechnology as understandable anel controllable- along the same linc-s that human societies have tollovved le>r m illennia. The other side- argues that l ife ’ s interactions or properties cannot be- fully understood o r contro lled in advance, and therefore sees biotechnology as intrinsica lly r isky in terference . One side- tends to place- the technical in control o f the liv ing, the other

2 0 2

L I F E . C O L L E C T I V E S A N D B I O T E C H N O L O G V

tends to see life as e lud ing technical contro l. Ecological arguments against b iotechnology deep ly oppose the idea (usually promoted bv b iotechnology corporations or researchers w ork ing on patentable research) ot lim ited or precise ly contro lled interventions in a target organism , fo r the ecological standpoint (also tor dissenting voices within m olecu lar b io logy itse lf) , unintended in teractions between the eng ineered organisms and the ecosystems thev are part ot (through g row th , reproduction and hybridization) pose a serious risk to living d ivers ity . Ethical, political and moral questions about biotechnologv stem partly from ecological understandings of the relational complexity ot liv ing organisms. W ithout wanting to pre judge this debate (which 1 have risked car icaturing in discussing so briefly) , I think both poles share a sym m etr ica l com m itm ent to occluding the role of technical mediations in co llect ive life.

The terms of the debate shilt in a transductive perspective. The constitu ted technical objects of biotechnologv the databases, the genet ica l ly modified organisms, rationally designed drugs, statistical screening and forensic test-kits attest to a different folding of living bodies and collect ives . As an ensem ble , w e have seen that it links the living and the non-liv ing point bv point through informatic modes of order ing . Information is not m ere ly a mistaken metaphor. It is an ongoing enabling e r ro r . As a consequence, certa in rhythms and patterns o f reproduction , growth and death of selected life forms are suspended. C lear ly the web ot connections be tw een and within living things is in terrupted and reorganized . The interruptions and suspen­sions are localized and specific. But so too are the l im its , the topology and tem pora li ty of our co llect ives ; that is, w hat or who we mean bv ‘hum ans ’ transmutes. The argum ent that biotechnologv is nothing new ignores the metastability of a co llect ive that lives in part through the non-liv ing. The s ingular ity of biotechnology crystall izes at least in part from the informatic linkages betw een living and non-liv ing entities.I hese linkages are historical ly instituted within and In a collective.

Everything is indeed connected , as the ecological standpoint argues. Yet b iotechnology would be a m ere abstraction il those connections w ere not metastable . Arguments about the commodification ot seed stocks, and explo itat ive acquisition ol property rights over various e lem ents of liv ing things, as set out in much recent crit ical work on

2 o j

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

biotechnology (Shiva, 1995 ; Fow ler , 1995), cannot be ignored. How- ever , what cruc ia l ly distinguishes biotechnological processes trom other l iv ing processes is the historical ly specific suspension of life, g row th , reproduction and death with in the con tex t of a hitman non-human collect ive. Biotechnology is not a s imple in terference in living p ro ­cesses. it occurs as a s ingular conjunction ot processes that conjoin the l iv ing and the non-liv ing. A ttend ing to how the liv ing and the non ­liv ing are grafted on to each other may prove to be a m ore flexible and adaptive response than s imply co llapsing the biotechnological on to the domain of the living.

204

Conclusion

In the last pages ol fren ch D,\/l: I rouble in Purgatory, in a formulation rem in iscent ol Foucau lt ’ s concept of ‘eventa l izat ion ’ (Foucault , 1991), the anthropologist Paul Rabinow w rites : ‘ from time to t ime, and always in t im e , new forms em erge that catalyze previously existing actors, things, tem pora li t ies , or spatialities into a new mode ot ex istence, a new assem blage, one that makes things work in a different m anner and produces and instantiates new capac it ies ’ (Rabinow , 1999, 180). The concept ot transduction can be understood as one way ol art icu lat ing such singular occurrences. In the context ot recent tech­nical m ediat ions, it does so by pointing to the productive tension that couples human collect ives and non-human forces, curren tly those of silicon and ‘genet ic com ponen ts ’ . It focuses on the folding of difierent forces and e lem ents together as collect ives individuate. As a wav of thinking about an encounter betw een d ivergent realit ies , transduction helps resist the tem ptation to explain contem porary technology via one of tw o m ajor rival principles: that of ‘techno logy ’ as an empty, m etaphysical- ideological abstraction disguising social processes, and that of technology as an ahistorical hand colonizing human cultures with its materia l structures and logic. T echnical practices neither form culture nor are they formed bv cu lture . The transductions discussed inJ j

this book can be seen in the barest term s as eventful articulations between realities on different tem pora l and corporeal scales.

This book has tr ied to inhabit the tension betw een ‘techno logy ’ as a signifier w ithin cultura l formations, and technologies when they almost unintellig ibly in terw eave signs and things, liv ing anil non-living bodies. The small gir l in the m useum (see the Pre lace) , as she encounters ‘boring old space’ , apprehends something important about technology. It concerns a g lobal-scale ideological production of high technology as

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

a svmbol of masculine subjectiv ity anil superpow er nation-states. Modern m il itary technology character ist ica lly symbolizes the sovereign p ow er of states. Its missiles, ships and satell ites aes thet ica lly frame masculine execu tive authority . Technolog ies , espec ia l ly weapon sys­tem s, obviously act as grand symbols of sovere ign ty (N ancy, 1993, 4 3 ) . M ore gene ra l ly , technologies such as m obile phones, com puters and transgenic organisms have m ean ing w ithin symbolic systems. They partic ipate in the signification of m any things including gender , class and ethnicity . H ow ever , technologies also art icu late non-liv ing and liv ing potentials together , as w e have seen a num ber of t im es , in diffuse ways that are not a lways w e ll represen ted with in ex ist ing semiotic systems. F lexible and surpris ingly contingent co llect ive s tru c ­tures are involved, as w e saw , for instance, in the case ol Avara or Ping Body. Above all , technologies overflow the ir ro le as signifiers.

BODIES AND TIM E AS C O L L E C T IV E LIM ITS

W hv theorize this tension betw een technology as m ean ing and tech ­nology as event in term s of bodies anti t ime? Previous chapters have answered this question at d ifferent levels. T here is first of all a genera l deconstructive motivation which is linked to the notion of radical contingency anti the absence of u lt im ate foundations for thought. T im e anti body have been im portant in recent European thought precise ly because they contest the prerogat ive of consciousness, language and cu lture to give meaning to things. Although they are not usually mentioned in the same breath , corporea l ity and tem pora l i ty share something as concepts: thev are difficult, perhaps impossib le , to think of as such. Both have often been understood in the history o f W estern philosophy as inimical to thought and m ean ing. Bodies, in the incon­stancy of their perceptions and their ineluctable m orta l i ty , contaminate thought w ith deceptive appearances, e r ro r and finitude.

By contrast, a deconstructive response to corporea l ity says, for instance, that ‘ if one rea lly thinks of the body as such, there is no possible outl ine of the body as such ’ (Spivak and R ooney , 1994 , 177). (W e saw some of the reasons for this in C hapter 1.) From this position, the body can only be thought of as a contested l im it te rm , anti cannot be com prehended d irect ly in itself. The ‘ex trem e ecological

206

C O N C L U S I O N

posit ion ’ Spivak adopts on this question highlights the impossibil ity ot topo log ica lly m apping or delineat ing bodily surfaces in themselves. Constant differentiations, exchanges, involutions and projections p re ­vent any such outl ine trom stabilizing except as a particular corporea l­ization or m ateria lizat ion . The concepts of corporeality developed in anti-esscntia list feminism (Grosz, Harawav, Butler) have worked against any idea of bodies as natura l, ahistorical or even anthropolo­g ica lly constant. The prototypical unth inkability of the body has been crafted into a methodological sieve which a llows the historical contin­gencies of liv ing bodies to be g leaned w ithout imm ediate reduction to any universal substrate , bio logical or social. S im ilar ly , t ime, with its refusal to stabil ize as an entity or re lat ion , has long vexed reason w ith paradoxes of change and non-change. Largely following Heidegger, deconstructive thought has capitalized on just this resistance to meaning to deve lop a mode ot thought that affirms, rather than questions, its own lim its . In a deconstructive light, neither t im e nor bodies can be thought as such. They do not ex ist as s imple entities or substances of which w e are conscious or which w e d irec t ly exper ience . There is no flux of t im e of which w e could be conscious, only processes ot tcmporalization. T here is no body whose outl ine , substance or form we can be certa in of, only processes ot corporealizat ion or m ater ia l i­zation. Transductions borrows from deconstruction (and in particular, from feminist deconstructive theory) an affirmation of the corporeal and tem pora l finitude of thought.

Aside from this deconstructive ly m otivated attention to radical contingency, there is another d irect motivation to develop an account of technology in te rm s of tem pora l i ty and corporea lity . Our bodies and lives are m arked by tensions be tw een different stories, and practices, between different tem pora li t ie s and topologies. From a transductive standpoint, ‘ the h um an ’ and ‘ the non-hum an ’ are the provisional outcomes of a co llect ive individuation in progress. If ‘the human form is as unknown to us as the n o n hu m an ,’ as Bruno Latour writes (1996 , 227), it is because both forms em erge and recede constantly as facets of the same ongoing process of individuation. In Latour’s words, ‘humans and nonhumans take on form by redistr ibuting the competences and performances of the m u lt itude ot actors that thev hold on to and that hold on to th e m ’ (p. 225) . The examples discussed in this book

207

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

have- sought to emphasize the difference betw een the human and the non-human as an h istorically contingent and shitting e l lec t ot their interlacing. A prob lem atic tension betw een the human and the non­human, the liv ing and the- non-liv ing, flows through these exam ples . In regard to technology, this tension is heightened because large swathes ol philosophical, historical, anthropologica l, psychological, econom ic , sociological, governm enta l , corporate and popular discourse insist that ‘the hum an ’ is a last instance, something whose stable value and meaning must ground all explanations and judgem ents concerning technical practices. I his means that there is a strong conflict be tw een how ‘techno logy ’ is figured and how it is em bodied in mater ia l practices. It we insist, for instance, on v iew ing technologies as instrum ents ot societies, cu ltures or civilizations, we lose any possibil ity of see ing how the capacities and labric ol our co llect ives are constitu ted .

t i i i ; d o u b i t b i n d a g a i n

What is the point ol being mindful ol that tension or metastability between technology as a grand signifier and a p lura l ity of m ater ia l- technical practices? The reasons are manifold. As I have said, a g row ing ensemble ot institutions, discourses and know ledges springs from that tension. 1 he fluctuating fortunes ol various technologies on the stock markets in recent years, and the' unrem itt ing pace of innovation in

certain technical domains (such as b iotechnologv and information technology) foster an intense sense of urgency associated with techno­logical innovations. 1 hat sense of urgency pervades stories told about technology. It strongly drives m any responses to technological speed. At the same t im e , new forms ol commodif ication (tor ex am p le , the proliferation ol com munication serv ices), d iverse fashions and styles (gadget-based lifestyles), music, visual and l i te rary tex ts , and techno- scientific practices pro liferate localized m icro-pract ices indissociably linked with technical ensembles . It is possible, and m ore re levant than ever , to analyse these astonishingly d iverse phenom ena from sociolo­gical, historical or anthropological standpoints. They need to be historically and cu ltura l ly s ituated. Amidst all this, how ever , as Donna Harawav (1 99 7 , 59) w r ites , ‘the point is to learn to rem em ber that we might have been o therw ise and might yet be, as a m atter ot

2 o 8

em bodied I ac t ’ . ‘T echno logy ’ hasn ’t a lways been nor always will be exper ienced as it is today. It is possible, a lthough only barely at the m om ent , to imagine a t im e after ‘techno logy ’ , a time when it no longer functions as a grand signifier. All the aflects ol nrgenev, speed and relentless dynam ism concern ing new technologies may well sub­side, as in the past they have subsided in the w ake ol technologies such as clocks, ra i lw ays, e lec tr ic light, film, televis ion and telephones as they becam e part of an almost invisible co llect ive infrastructure.

O ur curren t susceptib il ity to exc i tem ent or anx iety about new technologies cannot be com ple te ly dismissed as ephem era l , or as the ideological effect of product advertis ing and commodification, l.ven if we become m ore cr it ica l ly aw are of the wav in which stories told about technology are at odds with technical practices, something more is at stake. O ur collect ives have been informed bv technical mediations in ways that w e can scarcely signify. If, like H arawav , we want to learn to rem em ber that we could have been and might vet be different, we need to develop a feel tor the peculiar mode ot existence of technologies in our co llect ives . A m iddle ground between grand narratives ol capital ‘T ’ technology and innum erab le micro-practices (for instance, the sub-culture ol tex t-m essag ing on mobile phones) usually regarded as ‘ cu l tu ra l ’ should be m apped. In this m iddle ground, technical mediations are not the subject, agent or ‘ m o to r ’ of history (Basalla, 1988). This has been an important them e throughout this book. If technology is trea ted as the subject of history, if it is seen as an agent which forms and shapes cu ltures , then rea lly there can be no point in try ing to understand how w e collect ive ly might have been different. W e could not have been, except by destroying everything that counts as technology , as the inhabitants of Samuel B utler ’ s lircwhon

did when they destroyed all machines (Butler , 1921). On the other hand, the frequently voiced feelings of disorientat ion and inability to keep up w ith technoscientific change means that w e cannot comfortably assert that cu lture is in control of technology.

The concept of technic ity offers a wav of thinking about how technical practices are grounded in d iverse milieus. It tends to underm ine the familiar impasse betw een technological and human agency because it involves thinking rclat ionallv about technical action. It focuses (see Chapter 1) on the concretization of technical elements

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

and, more importantly tor contem porary purposes, on the coneretiza- tion of technical ensembles composed of such e lem ents . As ear l ie r chapters have shown, concrctizat ion is a com plicated transductive process in which diverse milieus converge in singular zones of intense interaction. M aking a brick, it seems trivial to say, is a transductive event. The event in which clay and mould exchange propert ies is a point of inflexion, not simply a point of intersect ion or collis ion. W hat counts as the form of a brick and what counts as its m atte r arc effects of this interaction. They are not its p re-ex is t ing constituents . O nly because the habits o f th inking ot m atte r and form as separate is so strong can such an occurrence appear tr iv ia l . M oreover , as I have suggested throughout this book, it does not a lw ays occur so trans ient ly as it does when clay and m ould are brought together . The point of inflexion, or the m om ent when actors exchange propert ies , can have an ex tended duration. It can involve ongoing in teract ion , stabil ization and destabilization betw een different realities. As S te la rc ’ s Ping Body, the genom ic databases, or the com puter gam e Avara show, part ot the problem resides in how to delineate and de lim it the ex ten t of these events when it comes to large, d istr ibuted netw orks of technical e lem ents . The technical ensem bles discussed in this book have been selected because they m ark persistent troublcspots for classiHcatory schemas fo rm /m atter , hum an/non-human or social/technical .

READIN G T E C H N O L O G I C A L O B JE C T S

At the start of this book, a suggestion was m ade about reading technological practices and objects. It was, 1 said, necessary to learn to read again because many responses to con tem porary technical en ­sembles sw ing betw een repudiat ion and over-identif ication . That oscil­lation prevents us from looking for the em ergence of new capacities, or rem em ber ing how w e m ight have been and could be different. The broad question I started with was: ‘how can w e acknow ledge the powerful global extension of m odern technology , w ith all its d is locat­ing effects of speed, and yet remain responsive to the specific material practices and situations in which collect ives of humans and non-humans are involved?’ Now w e can ask: ‘ in what ways does the concept of transduction imply a way ot reading technology outside the oscillation

2 i o

C O N C L U S I O N

betw een repudiat ion and over-identif ication? f low could that opening question now be read d if fe ren t ly ’ ? Bruno l a tour (1996 , 207) enjoins us to read technological mechanisms d irect ly :

Beyond our infinite respect for the dec iphering ot Sc r ip ture , we need to have infinite respect for the dec iphering ot inscriptions. To propose the description of a technological mechanism is to ex tract trom it p rec ise ly the script th a t the engineers h ad transcribed in the mechanisms

and autom atism s o f humans and nonhum ans. (O rig inal au thor ’s italics)

Such a reading is possible because various traces and sem iolic svstems- d iagram s, system descriptions, codes and standards, displays, man­uals, instructions, w arn ings, indicators and controls c luster around technical artefacts and ensembles . Reading and w r it ing form a large part of the operation of con tem porary machines. Different codes, protocols and conventions compose much of the infrastructure involved in com putation , for instance. These layers of inscription mark the diverse negotiations which a technical object embodies.

The quasi-a llegorical reading of the nuclear bomb and Acheulian hand-axe (C hapter 2) was in effect a de-scription of tw o limit cases, or tw o practices. The point of this a l legory can be put simplv: sometimes it is hard to identity the engineers . Both artefacts mark a kind ot discursive l im it . The hand-axe figures as a threshold for human collectives. W ithout something like hand-held im plem ents , it is hard to imagine that a co llect ive is human. The nuclear bomb is also troublesome to represent . Toying with such a mater ia l-sem iotic actor, a political co llect ive w ie lds excessive force. In both cases, the limits of human collect ives are in question. One w ay to read such limits is to follow' the lead of ex ist ing w ork in science and technology studies. As we saw', an extensive and rich set of exceptions to the dominant oppositions betw een the technical and the social have been mapped out in recen t studies.

O ver the last tw o decades , science and technology studies (STS) have w rough t a sea change in humanities and social science approaches to technology. Its accounts of the en tw in ing o f human and non-human agency deep ly affect much of this book. From amid its case studies of particular technical system s, a genera l pattern em erges in which human

2 I I

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

anti non-human actors, and social and technical factors are linked together inextr icab ly . The vital insight on which I have been d raw ing concerns the constitution o f human co llect ives as combinations of the liv ing and non-liv ing. I:or science and technology studies , there is nothing pure ly human, only m ix tures of human and non-human e lem ents joint'd together bv netw orks of association. As the case of the hand-axe showed, this synthesis through ‘m ix in g ’ is ex trem e ly in t im ­ate. It reaches at least as far as the level o f neurom uscu lar organization. H ow ever , this book has d iverged from that bodv of w o rk in not re ly ing solely on the idea ol mixing to account for technical practice .

T F C IIN IC IT Y AND M HANING

To see the question of technical practices as something m ore than a m ix ing of humans and non-humans, w e could reconsider the signific­ance of some of the other cases discussed in ear l ie r chapters. In every ease, starting from the crude exam ples of a brick or hand-axe , moving on to clocks, com munication netw orks or com puter gam es , and ranging out to the technical ensembles d istr ibuted arountl the nuclear bomb or the genomics databases, technical practices im pinge upon representation anti thought in surpris ing ways . For instance, the case of the brick seems to provide a paradigmatic instance of the distinction betw een m atter and form. It appears to be clay m oulded into a regu lar geom etr ica l shape. T hat d istinction b e tw een form anti m atter not only perm eates accounts o f em bod im ent (see Chapter 1), it turns up in different guises in many conceptual fram ew orks . If, as I have argued , the informing of m atter anti form can be understood as a transductive event, we are also offered a way of th inking against the gra in of most ex ist ing accounts of em bod im ent. In other wrords, th inking through technical practices affects the w ay that w e think about o ther problems, such as em bodim ent, which are usually taken to be distinct from the technical. It is possible to go one step further and, or ien ted by the quasi-concept of orig inary techn ic ity , argue that technical practices a lways touch on the conditions of signification in some w ay . As the Introduction suggested , or ig inary technic ity is the idea that there is no way we can conceptualize or signify the human w ithou t a lready re ly ing on a notion of the technical . Although I have not exp lored the

2 I 2

implications ot this idea, it m ight also mean vvc that cannot think

w ithout being in some wav technical.The broad v iew that w'ithin our collect ives , technical mediations are

subordinate to ex ist ing m ean ing s tructures there lore needs reappraisal trom the transductive standpoint I am advocating. The emphasis on subordinating technology to signification, especially to linguistic signifi­cat ion, and the goal ot symboliz ing technology w ithin cu lture does not take into account the ways in which technical mediations might resist signification. Technica l mediat ions can be thoroughly ‘m etabo lized ’ in co llect ive life, to the ex ten t that they becom e an invisible infrastructure, or they can ex ist at the very limits ot the collect ive . Both possibilities mean that technology cannot be simply represen ted as such. S te larc ’s Ping Body , for instance, s lows down and renders perceptib le the temporal and spatial disjuctions associated with netw orked information. Bv render ing visible habituated patterns of anticipation and delav, Ping Body

shows how something that is norm ally seen as m ere ly technical (the ex istence of delays) is also en tw ined with em bodim ent. S im ilar ly , an exam p le of how the technical is involved at the limits of signification was introduced in the contex t ot the discussion of a r ea l- t im e networked com puter gam e (in Chapter 5). I suggested there that the kind of co llect ive information, even only f lectinglv, during certain kinds of m ediated interaction was difficult to signify using ex ist ing notions of com m unity , cu ltu re or society. That singular organization of spatial and tem pora l patterns could not be understood apart from the technical artifacing involved. The difficulty ot signifying these kinds of collective tormation stems from the fact that they occur at a level of embodied, temporaliz ing technical action which is usually regarded as prior to, or outside of, signifying processes. Importantly , then, the task of r e a d in g

technology d ifferently entails read ing across technical and cultural domains. It requires different mappings of how embodied practices are tem pora lly anti topolog ica lly organized.

A w ide spectrum of w ork in the humanities addresses technology through cultural representations in isolation from technical practices. From the transductive standpoint, the risk is that the cultural and historical studies of technology , with their concentration on semiotic and narrat ive analyses ot technologies as tex ts , might overlook the orig inary technicitv of cu lture . In this area, Donna Haravvav’s work is

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

one of the most concerted attem pts to go beyond sem iot ic analyses with its efforts to understand how ‘technology . . . turns body into .storv and vice versa ’ (H arawav , 1997 , 179). If this book has not accessed technical mediations at the level of the ir cu ltura l representat ion in l ite rature , film or other m edia , this does not mean that narrat ive , textual and semiotic analyses of technologies arc not c ruc ia l ly im portant, f o r instance, the many com m ents about speed to be found scattered throughout the book are responses to a part icu lar ly prevalent narrat ive about m odern technology. H ow ever , I have tr ied to suspend the assumption that ex ist ing languages, narrat ives and sign systems fully capture all the exchanges, mutations and events w ith in a co llect ive .

P O IN T S OF S IN G U L A R IT Y

How then, can we read technology differently? The gu id ing princip le here has been to focus on the points of inflection or s ingular it ies w ithin technical ensembles . At these points, actors bodies, machines, signs, m ilieus are catalysed, to echo Rab inow , into new assemblages. In any technical m ediat ion , there are points at which humans and things exchange propert ies , or at which body becomes story and vicc versa. Such points are crucial because thev delineate a border b e tw een what counts as human and what counts as non-hum an, betw een what functions technical ly and what presents itself as social; they decide finally betw een what lives and what does not live. These points take d ifferent forms. Often they involve a topological tw ist or a tem pora l disjunction. Again, we have seen exam ples which include the escape­ment of the pendulum clock, the binary split partit ion ing trees o f the rea l- t im e an imated com puter gam e, the folding o f gcnom ic or p roteom ic sequence data ready for searching and comparison , and the anticipation and delay involved in a gesture w ith a hand tool or S te la rc ’s Third Arm . These sites of art iculat ion are not a lw ays highly visib le, on the surface, or at the interface betw een technical and non-technical. But on e ither side of them , m ore recognizable human and technical figures appear. In looking for these points of art icu lat ion am id the complicated ensembles of signs and things presented by con tem porary technology, I am not saying that technical mediations are the under ly ing rea l i ty that social conventions over-code for their own purposes. The points of

2 1 4

C O N C L U S I O N

inflection show that technical operations can be analysed as the art icu­lation ot diverse realities on each other. Another name tor what occurs around these points process m ight be cvcntali/.ation (Foucault , 1991).

As a consequence of this genera l approach to technical practices, the problem of the speed of technological change takes on a different com plex ion . Stories about the acce lerat ing pace ot technological innovation and the increasing speed ot technical ensembles have abounded for at least a 150 years. These stories contribute to the oscillation betw een over-identif ication and repudiat ion that I have been analysing. They narrate technology as irrevers ib le , monolith ic , autono­mous and acce lerat ing . Ol course , the exper ience ot speed cannot be den ied . But concepts of self-present subjectiv ity usually associated with m odern ity (e .g . the Cartes ian subject) cannot account for the ex pe r i ­ence ot speed associated w ith technologi/.ation except as a loss of orientation (S t ieg ler , 1996). Bv contrast, the read ing of speed under deve lopm ent in e a r l ie r chapters has suggested that the exper ience ot speed is an el feet of differences. The point is obvious at one level: there can be no exper ience of speed except as a change of speed. H ere , I am argu ing something m ore . The transductions w e have discussed occur at the l im its of the co llect ive , at points of inflection w here in ter io r becomes ex te r io r , and vice versa. Differences in speed are the consequences of an ongoing process ot folding inwardlv and ou tw ard ly . The efficacy and speed of the Acheulian hand-axe as a pro jection of human gestures is accom panied , at least approxim ately , by an intricate neuronal folding. The annihilating energies released by a nuclear detonation ride on a dense (lux ot calculation enclosed in supercom puter s imulations. Transductions, as I have said, are not necessarily instantaneous or spatially encapsu lated . W e can expect a lack of synchronization betw een what is d isembodied and what is em bodied , be tw een what runs ahead and what remains in delav. In terms of both corporealizat ion and tem poralizat ion , these dynamics ot anticipation and de lay mean that technical mediations are not simply present. Each t im e that a transductive process comes into plav, the em bodiments and tem pora li t ies available within that collective shift, bringing them into tension with ex ist ing codings of bodies, places and time. W e saw' these tensions at w o rk around c locktim c, information networks, rea l- t im e com munication and bioinlbrmatics.

2 ' f

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

Constant technological innovation makes it difficult to decide w hether a particu lar innovation is significant or new . (C u r ren t ly , lor instance, people are debating w hether b iotechnological transgenic organisms are tota l ly new or nothing new at a l l . ) For tw o reasons, 1 am not sure how important it is to say w hether some technical phenomenon is rea lly new or not. First, even it w e do tind something new or novel, the significance ot that judgem en t could a lready be somewhat underm ined by what Jean-Fran^'ois Lyotard formulates as techno logy ’s absorption of an ever- increasing rate of contingency the idea that technological systems act as increasingly com plex buffers, processing social, econom ic, ecological or natural events (see Chapter 1). There is the possibil ity that paroxysm al change can be regarded impassively or with indifference, th is is a magnified version of the ‘ scroll b l indness’ familiar to com puter w orkers who spend a long time scrolling through screens of tex t . Second, h ighlighting a single innova­tion usually avoids the m ore significant p rob lem of how to recognize the technicity of the ensembles in which our co llect ives are en tw ined . As a way of th inking around this impasse, I see m ore promise in the idea that the exper ience of disorientat ion or impossib il ity ol decid ing w hether something is new or not is also an opportun ity to render in tell ig ib le something about a co llect ive indiv iduation. Read ing tech ­nical practices in term s of their production of speed again involves mapping how the effects of speed are produced across an ensem ble . It is possible to do this through works that figure this ensem ble , such as S te la rc ’s Ping Body, o r by trac ing how a com m on technical practice like clockt im e is propagated through technical ensem bles . The emphasis on the ensemble in this book is significant. Both the flash of nuclear detonation and the potentia lly ‘acce lerated evo lu t ion ’ attr ibuted to b iotechnologies relv on largely invisible infrastructures (e .g . supercom ­puters, databases, e tc .) whose technic ity i.s difficult to represen t because it is composed of manv different technical e lem ents .

T F C I 1NOLOGIF.S A RF C O L L L C T I V F IN D IV ID U A T IO N S

In the transductive reading of technical p ractices, technologies are collective individuations. The implications of this point are not easy to grasp. W h y do some technical ensem bles provoke a strong cultural

2 l 6

C O N C L U S I O N

reaction while others remain largely invisible? W hy are some objects (gadgets , machines, systems) marked as exp l ic it ly technical and others are not? In te rm s of orig inary technic itv , there is no practice, no signification, no affect for that m atte r , that does not have something technical about it. Eating, praying , dressing and ta lking can be seen as having technical facets. W o u ld w e want to sav, then, that all these practices are also co llect ive individuations? M ore often than not, such questions have been an sw ered in term s of science and modernity . Technological practices are understood as f lowing from scientific know ledge , and as possessing a rational foundation and a potentially colonizing universal ity that o ther cultural practices do not. I have d raw n on some different theoretica l approaches to realign this percep­tion. The w ork of H eidegger , I faraway and Latour all question the prim acy ot reason as the foundation ot technology. By quite different paths, all of them attr ibute a deeper temporalitv and a less homogen­eous ex tension to technology than this perception suggests. 1 Ieidegger (see Chapters 3 and 4 ) understands technology as an event in the history ot Being which inscribes how things come to be or appear as they are. That understanding keeps alive the question of who ‘w e ’ , co llect ive ly , are. Latour (d raw ing on Michel Serres) espouses some­thing s im ilar when he refigures the split b e tw een m odern and p rem od­ern cu ltu res with an account of how collect ives are stabil ized through translations (inscriptions, delegations, detours) into networks of things. Finally, Harawav , as she maps how troublesom e boundary objects such as databases, foetuses or stem cells perm it bodies to become storv and vice versa , indicates how what counts as technology is a highly site- specific nexus ot stories, investments, know ledges and inscriptions, not an a priori category .

The supercom puter , S te la rc ’ s Piny Body, the GPS, the computer game and the genom ic databases are not random ly chosen examples. They are eventali/.ations in the sense that Rabinow sketches. C locktime oscillations, the commodified rea l- t im e im age, and bioinformatics all materia lize at specific junctures w here temporal and topological reo r­ganizations of co llect ive life occur. Important dimensions of these eventalizations are inform atic. Today, we find it difficult to broach the question of technology apart from its informatic dimensions. W hat does a transductive reading sav about information? Viewed

2 1 7

T R A N S D U C T I O N S

transduct ive lv , information has close links to corporealizat ion and lem poralizat ion . Rather than apprehending information as foreign to l iv ing bodies, it suggests that w e should attend to the materia l interfaces and technologies that m ake d isem bod im ent such a powerful il lusion (H ayles , 1999, 47 ) . A paralle l approach could be taken to tem pora li ty and information: the exper ience of a loss of t im e can be m et by attention to the processes ol t im ing and synchronization that render real t im e and accelerat ion persuasive and encompassing. W h ile ‘ in form ation ’ is often understood as a kind ol abstract foundation of contem porary technologies ( includ ing , as w e have seen, b io techno l­ogy) , it can also be read as a com plex of in tersect ing norms, institutions and scripts p lied through technical mediat ions. The abstract concept of information in rea l i ty only has value as a concrete , point by point interlac ing of different realit ies . S im ondon ’s understand ing of information as in-formation (see Chapter 1) m akes this point d irect ly . Concepts o f radical contingency or fin itude have magnet ized social and political theory for some tim e now . Radical contingency is an abstract w ay of saying that collect ives cannot expec t to find u lt im ate founda­tions for their own mode of ex istence . Judith B u t le r ’ s theory of citational m ater ia l ity , Michel Foucau lt ’s explorations o f the p lace of the arb itrary , contingent and singular w ithin w hat is g iven as universal and necessary , and the them e of or ig inary techn ic ity found in D err id a ’ s w ork are broad symptoms of this turn to radical contingency. H o w ­ever , technology has not been affirmed in the con tex t o f radical contingency. In general te rm s, it has figured as a de localiz ing and homogeniz ing force, absorbing and neutra liz ing contingency . It tends to be seen as something that can only veil the abyssal absence of foundation. Consequently , technology is often framed as neutra liz ing contingency by increasing technical m ediat ion . W e think, sometimes hopefully , sometim es anx iously , that machines w ill obviate the u n ex ­pected and that, through them , even at the cost of constant innovation, we can am ortize ourselves against the future. This d imension of technical practices cannot be lightly d ismissed. Yet, nor can another possibil ity be dismissed: that technical practices do m ore than confirm or corrode ex ist ing limits o f human cu ltu re , subjectiv ity and exper ience .

2 i 8

References

A gam b en , G iorg io (1 9 9 3 a ) The C o m i n g C o m m u n i t y , tr . bv M ichael Hardt

(M inneso ta U n iver s i ty Press, M inneapo l is ) .

A gam b en , G iorg io (1 9 9 3 b ) I n f a n c y a n d Hi s t o r y : 1 h e De s t r u c t i o n o f Expe r i e n c e ,

t r . by Li/ Heron (V erso , London).

A gam b en , G iorgio (1 9 9 8 ) H o m o S a c e r : S o v e r e i g n P o w e r a n d Rar e Li f e , tr . bv

David H e l le r -R oazcn (Stanford U n ivers i ty Press , S tan lord ) .

Ansell Pearson , Keith (1 9 9 7 ) Viroid Li f e : P e r s p e c t i v e s o n t h e l r a n s h u m a n C ond i t i o n

(R o u t le d ge , London).

A r is to t le 1996 P h y s i c s , t r . bv Robin W a te r i i e ld (O xfo rd U n ivers i tv Press,

O xfo rd ) .

Atlan , H enr i and Keppe l , Moshe ( 1 9 9 0 ) The c e l lu la r co m p u te r DNA:

p ro gram or data . B u l l e t i n o f M a t h e m a t i c a l B i o l o g y , 52 (3 ) : 3 35 48 .

Balsamo, Anne (1 9 9 6 ) 7 e c h n o l o g i e s o f t h e ( t e n d e r e d B o d y : R e a d i n g C vb o r g l l ’omcn

(D uke U n iver s i ty Press , D urham ).

Basalla , G eorge ( 1 9 8 8 ) T he E v o l u t i o n o f T e c h n o l o g y ' (C am b r id g e Universitv

Press , C am b r id ge ) .

B eards ley , T im (1 9 9 6 ) Vital data . S c i e n t i f i c A m e r i c a n , 2 7 4 (3 ) : 76 81.

Beardsw orth , R ichard ( 1 9 9 5 ) From a gen ea lo gy o f m a t te r to a politics of

m e m o ry : S t i e g le r ’ s th ink ing of technics . T e k h n e m a : J o u r n a l o j P h i l o s o p h y a n d

T e c h n o l o g y , 1 (22 ) : 85 114.

B eardsw orth , R ichard ( 1 9 9 8 ) Thinking techn ic itv . C u l t u r a l Values, 2 (1):

70 86 .

Bennington , Geoffrey ( 1 9 9 6 ) E m ergenc ies . Oxf o r d Li t e r a r y R e v i e w , 6 (1 ) :

76 216 .

Berg, Paul and S inger , M ax in e ( 1 9 9 2 ) D e a l i n g w i t h Ce n e s : The l a n g u a g e o f

H e r e d i t y (U n ive rs i ty Sc ience Books, Mil l V a l ley , CA).

2 i 9

R E F E R E N C E S

Boguski, M ark S. ( 1 9 9 9 ) B ioscquence exeges is . S c i e n c e , 286 (1 5 O c to b er ) ,

453 5.

Bo lter , ja y David and Grusin , R ichard (1 9 9 9 ) R e m e d i a t i o n : U n d e r s t a n d i n g N e w

M e d i a (MI I Press, C am b r id ge , M A ).

Borst, Arno (1 9 9 5) I h e O r d e r i n g o f T i me : Tr om t h e Anc i e n t C o m p u t u s t o t h e

M o d e r n C o m p u t e r (Pol i ty Press, C am b r id ge ) .

Bo w ker , Geoffrey (1 9 9 5 ) Second n atu re once rem o ved , l im e , space and

representa t ions . Ti me S o c i e t y , 4 ( 1 ) : 4 7 66 .

Brand, S tew art (1 9 9 9 ) The Cl o ck o f t h e Lon g Now : T i m e a n d R e s p o n s i b i l i t y (Basie

Books, Ni ‘W York).

Bu tle r , Judith (19 9 3) Bod i e s That .Mat t e r : On t h e D i s c u r s i v e Limi t s o f Sex

(R o u d ed g c , I .ondon).

Bu tle r , Samuel ( 1 9 2 1 ) L r c w h o n (Jonathan C ape , London).

Ca lv in , W i l l iam (1 99 3) The un i ta ry hypothes is : a co m m o n neura l c ir cu it ry

lor novel man ipu la t ions , language , p lan-ahead and thovving? In Loots ,

L a n g u a g e a n d C o g n i t i o n in H u m a n E v o l u t i o n , ed . by K .R . Gibson and 7 .

Ingold (C am b r id g e U n ivers i ty Press , C am b r id ge ) .

C am p be l l-K e l lv , Martin and Aspray , W i l l ia m (1 9 9 6 ) C o m p u t e r : A H i s t o r y o f

t h e I n f o r m a t i o n M a c h i n e (Basie Books, N ew York) .

C angu i lhem , G eorges ( 1 9 9 4 ) The concept o f life. In A Vital R a t i o n a l i s t :

S e l e c t e d Wr i t i n g s f r o m G e o r g e s C a n g u i l h e m , ed . by Francois D e lapo rte , tr . by

Arthur G o ld ham m er (/ o n e Books, N ew Y ork ) , 301 20 .

C angu i lhem , G eorges (1 9 9 1 ) The N o r m a l a n d t h e P a t h o l o g i c a l , tr . by C aro lyn

R. Fawcett and Robert S. Cohen (Zone Books, N ew Y ork ) .

C an to r C har les (1 9 9 4 ) Can com puta t iona l sc ience keep up w ith evolv ing

techno logy for genom e m app ing and sequenc ing? In C o m p u t a t i o n a l M e t h o d s

i n G e n o m e R e s e a r c h , ed. by Sandor Suhai (P len um Press , N ew Y ork ) , 1 18.

Cheagh, P h e n g ( l 9 9 6 ) M at te r ing , d i a c r i t i c s , 2 6 (1 ) : 124.

C ol l in s , Francis S . , Patrinos, A r i , Jo rdan , Elke, C hakravar t i , Aravinda,

G este land , R aym o nd and W a l t e r s , I .eRoy (1 9 8 8 ) N ew goals for the U .S .

H uman G enom e Pro jec t : 1998 2 0 0 3 . S c i e n c c , 2 8 2 : 682 9.

C om bes , M urie l ( 1 9 9 9 ) S i m o n d o n I n d i v i d u e e t C o l l e c t i v i t e (PU F , Paris) .

C ook , Jeffrey , Xeb ington , Garv anti De Silva, Sam (1 9 9 7 ) M e t a b o d y : Erom

C y b o r g t o S y m b o r g (C D -R O M , M er l in In tegrated M ed ia , Sydn ey) .

C r i tch lev , S imon (1 9 9 9 ) Ethi c s , Po l i t i c s , S u b j e c t i v i t y : Essays o n De r r i d a , Lev ina s

a n d C o n t e m p o r a r y I r e n c h 1 b o u g h t (V erso Books, London).

2 2 o

R E F E R E N C E S

Davidson, Ian and N ob le , W i l l i a m (1 9 9 3) Tools and lan<uiasH' in human

evo lu t ion . In l o o k , L a n g u a g e a n d C o g n i t i o n in H u m a n h v o l u t i o n , ed. In K..R.

Gibson and T . Info ld (C am b r id g e U n ivers i ty Press, C am bridge ) .

D ebord , Guv (1 9 9 5 ) I h e S o c i e t y o f t h e S p e c t a c l e , tr . bv Donald Nicholson

Smith (Zone Books, N ew York) .

Deleu/.e, Gilles ( 1 9 9 3 ) The h o l d : Le i bn i z an i l t h e B a r o q u e , tr . In lorn Conlcv

(U n ive rs i ty of M inneso ta Press , M inneapo l is ) .

D e leuze , Gilles ( 1 9 9 4 ) D i f f e r e n c e a n d R e p e t i t i o n , tr . bv Paul Patton (Colum bia

U n ivers i ty Press, New York) .

D e rr id a , Jacques ( 1 9 7 3 ) S p e e c h a n d P h e n o m e n a a n d O t h e r Lssavs o n Husse r l ' s

T h e o r y o f S i g n s , tr . bv David B. All ison (N o rthw es te rn Univers i ty Press,

Evanston).

D err ida , Jacques (1 9 8 4 ) No apoca lyp se , not now (lu l l speed ahead, seven

m iss i les , seven m iss ives) , d i a c r i t i c s , tr . In C a th e r ine Porter (sum m er,

1 9 8 4 ) , 20 31.

D err ida , Jacques 1989 Of Sp i r i t : H e i d e g g e r a n d t h e Qi i e s t i o n , tr . In Geotlrev

Bennington and Rachel Bovvlbv (U n ive rs i ty ol Ch icago Press, Chicago).

D err id a , Jacques (1 9 9 3 ) The rhe to r ic ot d rugs . An in te rv iew , tr. In Michael

Israel. Di f f e r e n c e s : A J o u r n a l O f h e m i n i s t C u l t u r a l S t ud i e s , 5 .1 : 1 10.

D err id a , Jacques (1 9 9 4 ) Sp e c t e r s o f Marx: Th e S t a t e o f t h e Debt , t h e l lo r i of

M o u r n i n g a n d t h e N e w I n t e r n a t i o n a l , tr . by Pes>sjv Kamul (Routledsje , New

York) .

D err ida , Jacques and S t ick le r , Bernard ( 1 9 9 6 ) L c h o g r a p h i e s d e hi t e l e v i s i on

(G al i lee-IN A , Paris) .

D oo li t t le , Russe ll F. ( 1 9 9 0 ) W h a t w e have learned and wil l learn irom

sequen ce databases. C o m p u t e r s a n d DNA. S a m a h e I n s t i t u t e S t ud i e s in t h e

S c i e n c e o f C o mp l ex i t y , vol 7 , ed . by G eorge I. Bell and Thoman G. Mari'

(A d d iso n -W e s le y , New Y ork ) , 21 31.

Dreyfus, Hubert (1 9 9 5 ) H e idegge r on ga in ing a tree re lat ion to technology.

In l e c h n o l o g y a n d t h e Po l i t i c s o f K n o w l e d g e , ed . by A ndrew 1 eenberg and

Alasta ir Hannay (Indiana U n ivers i ty Press, B loom ing ton) , 97 107.

D um ouche l , Paul ( 1 9 9 5 ) G ilbert S im o n d o n ’ s p lea tor a philosophy ol

tech no lo gy . In T e c h n o l o g y a n d t h e Po l i t i c s o f K n o w l e d g e , ed. In Andrew

Feenberg and A lasta ir Hannav (Indiana U n ivers i ty Press, B loomington).

Edwards, Paul N. (1 9 9 6 ) Lhe C l o s e d Wor l d : C o m p u t e r s a n d t h e Po l i t i c s o f Di s c our s e

in C o l d War Ame r i c a (M IT Press, C am b r id ge , M A ).

2 2 1

R E F E R E N C E S

I i i . i '. N orbert (1 9 9 3) l i m e : An Essay (B la ckw e l l , O xfo rd ) .

Fvans, W i l l i a m ] . and Roll ing , Marv V. (1 9 9 9 ) P harm acogenom ics : t r an s la t ­

ing functional genom ics into ra t ional the rapeu t ic s . S c i e n c e , 286 (1 5

O c to b er ) , 4 8 7 91 .

Fecnberg , Andrew (1 9 9 1 ) Cr i t i c a l T h e o r y o f T e c hn o l o g y ' (O xfo rd U n ivers i ty

Press, O x lo rd ) .

Foucau lt , M iche l ( 1 9 7 8 ) Hi s t o r y o f S e xua l i t y , Vo lume I: An I n t r o d u c t i o n , t r . by

Robert H urley (R andom H ouse , N ew York) .

Foucault , M iche l ( 1 9 8 4 ) W ha t is en l igh ten m en t? In The F o u c a u l t R e a d e r , ed .

by Faul Rab inow (Penguin Hooks, H am m o n d sw o r th ) .

Foucault , M iche l ( 1 9 9 1 ) Q uest ions of m ethod . In The h ' o u c au l t Ef f e c t : S t u d i e s

in C i o v e r n m e n t a l i t y , ed. by G. Burchc l l , C . Gordon and P. M i l le r ( U n iv e r ­

sity ot Chicago Press , C h icago ) , 73 104.

Fow le r , C ary (1 9 9 5 ) B io technology , patents and the Th ird W o r ld . In

B i o p o l i t i c s : A f e m i n i s t a n d e c o l o g i c a l r e a d e r o n b i o t e c h n o l o g y (Zed Books Ltd/

Third W o r ld N e tw o rk , London) , 214 25.

Fox K e l le r , F.velyn (1 9 9 2 ) S e c r e t s o f Li fe, S e c r e t s o f D e a t h : Essays o n L a n g u a g e ,

G e n d e r a n d S c i e n c e (R o u t lcd ge , New York) .

Fox K e l le r , F.velyn (1 9 9 5 ) R e f i g u r i n g Li f e : M e t a p h o r s o f T w e n t i e t h - C e n t u r y B i o l o g y

(C o lum b ia U n ivers i tv Press , N ew Y ork ) .

F reem an , M ae and F reem an , Ira (1 9 6 2 ) You Wi l l Go t o t h e M o o n (R ando m

H ouse, N ew York) .

Fuchs, H en ry , K edem , Z. and N ay lo r , Brian (1 9 8 0 ) On visible surface

genera t ion by a pr ior i f ree s t ruc tu res . C o n f e r e n c e P r o c e e d i n g s o f SIGGRAPH

‘8 0 14 (3 ) : 124 3 3.

Gale, M ike and Devos, Katrien (1 9 9 8 ) Plant com para t ive genet ics after 10

years . S c i e n c e , 282 (2 3 O c to b er ) , 6 5 6 .

G e lbart , W i l l i a m M . (1 9 9 8 ) Databases in g en o m ic research . S c i e n c e , 282 (23

O c to b er ) , 659 61 .

G ilbert , W a l t e r (1 9 9 2 ) A vision o f the Holy Grail . In The C o d e o f Code s :

S c i e n t i f i c a n d S o c i a l Is sue s in t h e H u m a n G e n o m e P r o j e c t , ed . by Daniel ].

Kevles and Leroy Hood (H arvard U n ivers i ty Press , C am b r id ge , M A ).

Grosz, Flizabeth (1 9 9 4 ) Volat i l e Bod i e s : T o w a r d s a C o r p o r e a l F e m i n i sm (Indiana

Univers i tv Press, B loom ington) .

2 2 2

R E F E R E N C E S

H aberm as , Ju rgen (1 9 8 7 ) T echno logy and sc ience as ‘ Ideo logy ’ . In Towa r d s a

R a t i o n a l S o c i e t y (Po l i ty Press , C am b r id ge ) .

H a raw a y , Donna J . ( 1 9 9 7 ) Modest_Witness(fOSecond_Millennium. F c m a l c M a n © _

M e e t s _ O n c o M o u s e ™ F e m i n i sm a n d T e c h n o s c i e n c c (R o u t led ge , New York).

H ase lt ine , W i l l i a m A. (1 9 9 7 ) D iscoyer ing gen es for new medic ines . S c i e n t i f i c

A m e r i c a n , 276 (M arch ) , 78 8 3.

H ay les , Kather ine N. ( 1 9 9 9 ) H o w We B e c a m e P o s t hu n i an : Virtual Bod i e s in

C yb e r n e t i c s , Li t e r a t u r e , a n d I n f o r m a t i c s (U n ive rs i ty o l Chicago Press,

C h ic a g o ) .

H e id egg e r , M art in (1 9 5 4 ) Vor t r dg c u n d Au f s d t y c (V er lage G unther Neske,

S tu ttga rt ) .

H e id egg e r , M art in (1 9 5 7 ) I d e n t i t d t u n d D i f f e r e n t (V er lag G unther Neske,

Pfu l l ingen) .

H e id e g g e r , M art in (1 9 6 2 ) B e i n g a n d T i m e , t r . bv John M acquarr ie and Edward

R obinson (Basil B lackw e l l , O xfo rd ) .

H e id egg e r , M art in (1 9 7 2 ) On Time a n d B e i n g (H arp e r & R o w , N ew York).

H e id egg e r , M art in (1 9 7 7 ) The Qi i c s t i o n C o n c e r n i n g T e c h n o l o g y a n d O t h e r Essay*,

t r . by W il l i a m Lovitt (H arp e r Torchbooks , N ew York) .

H e id egge r , Martin ( 1 9 9 4 ) Einblick in das was ist. In B r e m e r a n d F r c i b u r g c r

Vor t r ag e ( 1 9 4 9 ) G e s a m t a u s g a b e Band 7 9 , ed . bv P etra Jaege r (Vittorio

K lostcrm ann , Frankfurt am M a in ) , 3 77 .

F le ideggcr , M art in and W is se r , R ichard ( 1 9 8 8 ) M art in H e idegger im Ges-

prach m it R ichard W is s e r . In A n t u o r t : M a r t i n H e i d e g g e r im Ge sp r i i c h , ed. bv

G unther Neske and Emil K e t te r ing (V er lag G unther Neske , Pfull ingen).

Hil l is , Daniel ( 1 9 9 9 ) C lock Ideas, w w w . lo n g n o w .o r g / 1 O kclock/clock.htm

H ood , L e roy (1 9 9 2 ) B io logy and m ed ic in e in the tw en tv -h rs t cen tury . In The

C o d e o f Cod e s : S c i e n t i f i c a n d S o c i a l Is sue s in t h e H u m a n G e n o m e Pr o j e c t , ed. bv

Daniel J . Kevles and Leroy Flood (H arvard U n ivers i ty Press, Cam bridge ,

M A ) , 1 37 63.

H opper , Ian (2 0 0 0 ) IBM rockets past 10 teraflops. [ 'he Aus t r a l i an 11, 4 Ju lv,

4 6 .

Hottois , G ilbert ( 1 9 9 3 ) S i m o n d o n e t l a p h i l o s o p h i c d c l a c u l t u r e t e c h n i q u e (De

Boeck U n ivers i te , Brussels) .

H ow ard , Ken (2 0 0 0 ) The b io informatics go ldrush . ' Sc i e n t i f i c Ame r i c an , 28 3( 1 ):

46 - 5 1 .

H ow se , D erek (1 9 8 0 ) (i r e e n w i c h a n d t h e D i s c o v e r y o f L o n g i t u d e (O xford

U n iver s i ty Press, O xfo rd ) .

223

R E F E R E N C E S

H u n l , Cuthln-rt ( 1 9 8 5 ) A note on e a r ly M o n te C ar lo com pu ta t ions and

scientif ic m eetings . Annal s o f t h e H i s t o r y o f C o m p u t i n g , 7 ( 2 ) : 141 55.

l lu v g e n s , Chris t iaan (1 9 8 6 ) Chr i s t i a a n H u y g e n s ’ t h e P e n d u l u m Cl ock, or , G e o m e t ­

r i c a l D e m o n s t r a t i o n s ( o n c e r n i n c j t h e M o t i o n o f P e n d u l a a s A p p l i e d t o Cl o cks (Iowa

State U n ivers i ty Press , A m es) .

Ingold, T im and Gibson, Kathleen R. (1 9 9 5) Too l s , L a n g u a g e a n d C o g n i t i o n m

H u m a n Ev o l u t i on (C am b r id g e U n ivers i ty Press , C am b r id ge ) .

Jan icaud , D om in ique (1 9 9 8 ) Ch r on o s : P ou r T i n t e l l i g e n c e d u p o r t a g e t e m p o r e l

(B ernard G rasse l , P a r is ) .

Jones , Steve (1 9 9 4 ) Che L a n g u a g e o f t h e Ge ne s : B i o l o g y , H i s t o r y a n d t h e

E v o l u t i o n a r y Eutur e (F lam ingo , London).

Judson, H orace Free land (1 9 9 2 ) A h is tory ot the sc ience and techno logy

behind gene m app ing and sequenc ing . In T he C o d e o f C od e s : S c i e n t i f i c a n d

S o c i a l Is sue s in t h e H u m a n G e n o m e P r o j e c t , ed . by Daniel J . Kevles , and Leroy

Hood (H arvard U n ivers i ty Press , C am b r id ge , M A ) , 57 80 .

Kaplan, Fl liott 1). ( 1 9 9 6 ) U n d e r s t a n d i n g GPS: P r i n c i p l e s a n d A p p l i c a t i o n s (Artech

House Publishers , Boston).

Kauffman, Stuart A. (20 00 ) Forget in -v i t ro now i t ’s ‘ in s i l ico ’ . S c i e n t i f i c

Am er i c an , 28 5( 1 ): 50 5 1.

Kauftman, Stuart A. (1 99 5) The O r i g i n s o f O rd e r : S e l f - o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d S e l e c t i o n

in Ev o l u t i o n (O xfo rd U n ivers i ty Press , O xfo rd ) .

Kevles , Daniel ]. and Hood, Lerov ( 1 9 9 2 ) T he C o d e o f Cod e s : S c i e n t i f i c a n d

S o c i a l I s sue s in t h e H u m a n G e n o m e Pr o j e c t (H arvard U n ivers i ty Press,

C am b r id ge , MA).

Kitcher, Philip ( 1 9 9 2 ) Gene: cu rren t us ages . In K e y w o r d s i n E v o l u t i o n a r y

R i o l o g y , ed . bv Lvelvn Fox K e l le r and Hlizabeth A. Lloyd (Harvard

University Press, Cambridge-, M A ).

K itt ler , Friedrich (1 9 9 6 ) Farben u n d / o d e r M asch inen denken . In S y n t h e t i s c h c

W'clten. Kun s t , K i i n s t l i c hke i t a n d K o m m u n i k a t i o n s m e d i e n , ed . by Eckhard

H am m el (V er lag Die Hlaue Fule , Fssen) , 119 52.

Faclau, Frnesto (1 9 9 5 ) Subject ol po l i t ics , po lit ics of the sub ject . Di f f e r e n c e s :

a J o u r n a l o f l e m i n i s t C u l t u r a l S t u d i e s , 7 (1 ) : 146 64 .

Laclau, Frnesto (1 9 9 6 ) W h y do e m p ty signifiers m a t t e r to politics? In

E. ma mi pa t i o n s (V erso Books, London).

2 2 4

R E F E R E N C E S

Lander , t r i e S. ( 1 9 9 6 ) The n ew gen o m ics : global v iew s o f b iology. Sc i e n c e ,

27 4 (25 O c to b er ) , 5 36 9.

Lash, Scott ( 1 9 9 9 ) A n o t h e r M o d e r n i t y : A D i f f e r e n t R a t i o n a l i t y (B lackw ell Pub­

l ishers , O xfo rd ) .

Latour , Bruno (1 9 8 8 ) I rreduct ions . In The P a s t e u r i z a t i o n o f P r a n c e (Harvard

U n iver s i ty Press, C am b r id ge , M A ).

L atour , Bruno ( 1 9 8 7 ) S c i e n c e in Ac t i on : H o w t o h o l l o w S c i e n t i s t s a n d Eng in e e r s

T h r o u g h S o c i e t y (H arvard U n ivers i ty Press, C am b r id ge , MA).

L atour , Bruno (1 9 9 3) We H a v e Ne v e r B e e n M o d e r n , tr . bv C ather ine Porter

(H arv es te r W heatsheaf Press , London).

Latour , B runo ( 1 9 9 4 a ) P ragm ato go n ie s : a mvth ica l account of how humans

and nonhum ans sw ap p ropert ie s . A me r i c a n B e h a v i o u r a l S c i e n t i s t , 37(6):

791 808 .

L atour , Bruno (1 9 9 4 b ) On technical m ed ia t ion philosophy, socio logy,

g en eao lo g y . C o m m o n K n o w l e d g e , 3(2): 29 64 .

L atour , Bruno (1 9 9 5 ) A door m ust be e i th er open o r shut: a l itt le philosophy

ot techn iques . In T e c h n o l o g y a n d t h e P o l i t i c s o f K n o w l e d g e , ed . bv Andrew

Feenberg and A lis ta ir Hannav (Indiana U n ivers i ty Press: B loom ington).

Latour , Bruno (1 9 9 6 ) Arami s , o r t h e Lov e o f I e c h n o l o q y , tr . bv C ather ine Porter

(H arvard U n ivers i ty Press , C am b r id ge , M A ).

Latour , Bruno (1 9 9 7 ) T ra in s o f thought: P iage t , fo rm a l ism and the fif th

D im ension . C o m m o n K n o w l e d g e , 6 (3 ) : 170 91 .

Latour , Bruno ( 1 9 9 9 ) P a n d o r a ' s H o p e : Essays o n t h e R e a l i t y o f S c i e n c e S t ud i e s

(H arvard U n ivers i ty Press , C am b r id g e , M A ).

Law, John and C a l lo n , M iche l (1 9 9 5 ) A gency and the hybrid co llec tive . Sou t h

.At lant i c Qi i a r t e r l y , 9 4 (2 ) (Sp r ing) , 4 81 .

Lehrach, Hans, M o tt , R ichard and Z ehe tne r , G uen ther ( 1 9 9 4 ) Informatics

and exp e r im en ts for the H uman G enom e b x p e r im cn t . In C o m p u t a t i o n a l

M e t h o d s i n G e n o m e R e s e a r c h , ed . bv Sandor Suhai (P lenum Press, New

Y ork ) , 19 24.

Lcro i-G ourhan , A ndre (1 9 9 3 ) Ge s tu r e a n d S p e e c h (M IT Press , Cambridge ,

M A ).

L ew ont in , R ichard (1 9 9 2 ) The d re a m ot the hum an genom e. .Yen York Re v i ew

o f Books , 28 M ay , 31 4 0 .

Lyotard , Jean-l'rane^ois (1 9 9 1 ) l ime today . In The I n h u m a n : Re f l e c t i o n s on

Ti m e , t r . by Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bow lin (Stanford University

Press , S tanford), 58 77.

l i t ,

R E F E R E N C E S

M acK enzie , Donald (1 9 9 8 ) K n o w i n g M a c h i n e s : Essays o n T e c h n i c a l C h a n g e (MIT

Press , C am b r id ge , MA).

M arkus , G yorgy ( 1 9 8 6 ) M arx and the p ro b lem o l tech no lo gy . L a n g u a g e Sc

P r o d u c t i o n , Append ix II (R e id e l , D o rd rech t) , 146 87 .

Marsha ll , f l i o t ( 1 9 9 9 ) Do-it-yourscII gene w a tch in g . Science, 286 (15

O c to b er ) , 4 4 4 7.

M arx , Leo (1 9 9 9 ) Information techno logy in h is torica l per sp ec t ive . In H i g h

T e c h n o l o g y a n d l . o w - l n c o m e C o m m u n i t i e s : P r o s p e c t s f o r t h e P o s i t i v e Use o f

A d v a n c e d I n f o r m a l i o n t e c h n o l o g y , ed . by Daniel A. Schon, Bish Sanyal and

W il l iam Mitche ll (MIT Press , C am b r id ge , M A ) , 13 3 -48 .

M ay r , O tto (1 9 8 6 ) A u t h o r i t y , Li be r t y a n d A u t o m a t i c M a c h i n e r y i n Ea r l y M o d e r n

Eur op e (Johns Hopkins U n ivers i ty Press , Ba l t im ore ) .

M itcham , Carl ( 1 9 9 4 ) t h i n k i n g T h r o u g h T e c h n o l o g y : T h e Pa t h B e t w e e n E n g i n e e r ­

i n g a n d P h i l o s o p h y (U n ivers ity o f Ch icago Press , C h icago ).

N ancy, Je an - l .u e (1 99 5) W a r , l aw , so vere ign ty T e c h n e . In R e t h i n k i n g

T e c h n o l o g i e s , ed. by V erena A n d e rm a t t C on ley (M inn eso ta U n ivers i ty

Press , M inneapo l is ) , 28 58.

O ’ Brien , S tephen J. and M en o t t i -R a y m o n d , M ar i lyn (1 9 9 9 ) The p ro m ise ol

comparative- genom ics in m am m a ls . S c i e n c e , 286 (15 O c to b e r ) , 4 5 9 .

Pennisi , Elizabeth (1 9 9 9 ) Keep ing g en o m e databases c lean and up to date.

S c i e n c e , 286 (15 O c to b er ) , 4 4 7 50.

P icker ing , A n d rew (1 9 9 5 ) T he M a n g l e o f P r a c t i c e : T ime , Ag e n c y , a n d S c i e n c e

(U n ive rs i ty o f Chicago Press , C h icago ).

Plant, Sadie ( 1 9 9 7 ) Ze r o s + One s : D i g i t a l W o m en + T h e N e w T e c h n o c u l t u r e

( l )oub lc-day, N ew York).

R ab inow , Paul ( 1 9 9 2 ) Artif ic ia l i ty and en l igh ten m en t : f rom soc iob io logy to

b iosoc ia l i ty . In I n c o r p o r a t i o n s , ed . bv Jonathan C ra rv and Sanford Kw inter

(Zone Books, N ew York) .

Rab inow , Paul ( 1 9 9 9 ) Erench DNA: T r o u b l e in P u r g a t o r y (U n ive rs i t y ot Chicago

Press, Ch icago ).

Resistance is use less. New S c i e n t i s t , 19 F ebruary 2 0 0 0 , 2 2 2 6 : 21 .

R ogers , Jane ( 1 9 9 9 ) Gels and gen o m es . S c i e n c e , 286 (15 O c to b e r ) , 4 2 9 .

2 26

R E F E R E N C E S

Ser re s , M iche l ( 1 9 8 2 ) I h e Pa r a s i t e (Johns Hopkins Univers i ty Press ,

B a lt im ore) .

S erre s , M ichel ( 1 9 9 5 ) Gene s i s (U n ive rs i tv ol M ichigan Press, Ann Arbor).

Serre s , M iche l and Latour , Bruno (1 9 9 5 ) C o n v e r s a t i o n s o n S c i e n c e . Cu l tu r e an d

T i me (U n ive rs i tv of M ichigan Press , Ann Arbor) .

S etuba l , Joao C ar los and M eidan is , Joao (1 9 9 7 ) I n t r o d u c t i o n t o ( o m p u t a t i o n a l

M o l e c u l a r B i o l o g y ( P W S Publishing C om panv , Boston).

Shiva, Vandana ( 1 9 9 5 ) B io technologica l deve lo pm en t and the conservation ol

d iv e r s i ty . In Bi o p o l i t i c s : ,1 Femin i s t a m i E c o l o g i c a l R e a d e r on Biotechnology, ed.

by Vandana Shiva and Ingunn M o ser (Zed Books Ltd/Third W or ld

N e tw o rk , London) , 193 - 2 H .

S igaut Francois, ( 1 9 9 4 ) t e c h n o lo g y , C o m p a n i o n E n c y c l o p a e d i a o f An t h r o po l o g y ,

ed. by T im Ingold (R o u t le d ge , N ew York) 4 2 0 59.

S im ondon , G ilbert ( 1 9 5 8 ) Psvcho-soc io log ique de la t ech n ic i t c ’ . Bu l l e t i n d e

1’Ec o l e P r a t i qu e d e P s y c h o l o g i c c t d e P e d a g o g i c d e Ly on , 319 50.

S im ondon , G ilbert ( 1 9 8 9 a ) Du m o d e J ' e . x i s t e n c e d e s o h j e t s t e c h n i q u e s (Editions

A u b ie r -M o n ta igne , Paris) .

S im ondon , G ilbert (1 9 8 9 b ) L ’i n d i v i d u a t i o n p s y c h i q u e c t c o l l c c t i v c ( Editions

A ub ie r -M o n ta ig n e , Paris) .

S im ondon , G ilbert ( 1 9 9 2 ) L ' l n d i v i d u c t s o g e n e s e p h y s i c o - h i o l o g i q u e I n c o r p o r a t i o n s

(eds . Jonathon C ra rv and Sanford K w in te r ) (Zone Books, New York).

S im ondon, G ilbert ( 1 9 9 5 ) l ' l n d i v i d u e t s o g e n e s e p h y s i c o - b i o l o g i q u c (Editions

J e ro m e M il lon , G renob le ) .

Spivak, G ayatr i C hak ravo r ty (1 9 9 6 ) Sca t te red specu la t ions on the question ol

va lue . In The S p i v ak R e a d e r : S e l e c t e d Works o f ( i a y a t r i C h a k r a v o r t y Sp i vak, ed.

by Donna Landry and Gera ld M acLean (R o u t le d ge , N ew Y ork ) , 107 40.

Spivak, Gayatri C hakravor tv and R o on ey , Ellen ( 1 9 9 4 ) In a w ord . In The

Ess en t i a l D i f f e r e n c e , ed . bv Naomi Schor and Elizabeth W ee d (Indiana

Un ivers i tv Press , B lo om in g to n ) , 151 84 .

Star , Susan Eeigh and R uh lede r , Karen ( 1 9 9 6 ) Steps tow ard an ecologv ol

in fras truc tu re : design and access tor large information spaces. I n f o r ma t i on

S y s t e m s R e s e a r c h , M arch , 7 (1 ) : 111 34.

S tc larc ( 1 9 9 7 ) M e t a b o d y : Fr om C y b o r g t o S y m h o r g , C D -R O M (eds. Jelfrev

C ook , Gary Zeb ington and Sam De S ilva) (M er l in Integrated Media,

Sydn ey) .

S te larc , w w w . s te la r c .v a .c o m .au /

Stengers , Isabel le and G i l le , D id ier (1 9 9 7 ) T im e and representat ion . In Powe r

2 2 7

a n d I n v e n t i o n : S i t u a t i n g S c i e n c e , tr . bv Paul Bains (U n iv e rs i t y ot M inneso ta ,

M inneapo l is ) .

S t ieg le r , Bernard (1 9 9 3 ) Q u es t io n in g tech no lo gy and t im e , t r . by Richard

Beardsvvorth. T c k h n e m a j o u r n a l o f P h i l o s o p h y a n d t e c h n o l o g y (Fall 1993) ,

31 44 .

S t ieg le r , Bernard (1 9 9 4 ) La t e c h n i q u e c l l e t emp s . I . La f a u t e d ' E p i m e t h e c

(G a l i le e , Bar is).

S t ieg le r , Bernard (1 9 9 6 ) La t e c h n i q u e e t l e t emp s . 2. La d i s o r i e n t a t i o n (G a l i le e ,

Paris) .

S t ieg le r , Bernard (1 9 9 8 ) T e c h n i c s a n d T ime : The Fau l t o f E p i m e t h e u s , tr . by

Richard Beardsvvorth and G eorge C o l l in s (S tanford U n iver s i ty Press,

Stanford).

Suzuki, David and D resse l , H olly (2 0 0 0 ) from Naked Ape t o S u p e r S p e c i e s

(A l len & U n w in , S ydney) .

T r is t r am , C la i r e (1 9 9 9 ) Has GPS lost its w a y ? T e c h n o l o g y R e v i e w , 1 02 (4 ) :

70 74 .

V ir i l io , Paul ( 199 3) The th ird interva l : a cr i t ica l t ran s it ion . In R e t h i n k i n g

T e c h n o l o g i e s , ed . bv V eren a A n de rm a t t C o n ley (M inn eso ta U n ivers i ty

Press, M inneapo l is ) , 3 12.

V ir i l io , Paul ( 1 9 9 5 a ) The Art o f t h e M o t o r , tr . by Ju lie Rose (U n ive rs i t y of

M inneso ta Press, M inneapo l is ) .

V ir i l io , Paul (1 9 9 5 b ) Speed and inform at ion : cyberspace a la rm ! C T h e o r y , tr .

bv Patr ice R iem en s . w w w .c th e o r y . c o m / d e f a u l t . a s p .

V ir i l io , Paul ( 1 9 9 7 ) O p en Sky , tr . by Ju lie Rose (V erso Books, London).

V ir i l io , Paul (1 9 9 8 ) The Viril io R e a d e r , ed . by l ) e r D erian (B lackw e l l

Publishi T S , O xford ) .W atson , J. and C r ick , F. ( 1 9 5 3 ) A s t ru c tu re for D eo xyr ibo sc N ucle ic Acid.

Na tu r e , 171, 2 Apri l , 75 3.

W e b e r , Sam ue l ( 1 9 9 0 ) The vau lted e ye : r em ark s on kn o w led g e and p rofes­

s ionalism . Yale Lr en c h S t u d i e s , 7 7 : 4 4 60 .

W in n e r , I .angdon (1 9 7 7 ) A u t o n o m o u s T e c h n o l o g y : I e c h n i c s - o u t - o f - C o n t r o l as a

I h e m e in P o l i t i c a l I b o u g h t ( M i l Press , C am b r id ge , M A ).

R E F E R E N C E S

228

Index

ac c e l e r a t ion 1, 32, 80 , I I 9

affect 1 1 7

A g a m b e n , Ci iorgio 146 54, 164

Anse l l Pea r son , Kei th 5, 121

a tomic c l ock 88 9

biopo l i t i ca l 175

b i o i n f orma t i c s 183 4 , 192 3, 196,

199

b i o t ec h no l og v 2 3, 172 6 , 191 3,

198 , 201 2

bo dy 20 , 29 , 42 3, 1 37, 17 3, 206

bio log i ca l 83

c o l on i z a t ion bv t e c h n o l og v 2

c o rp or ea l i z a t ion 7 , 186 7

d i s e m b o d i m e n t 31

i ma ge s and 147 , 1 61 , 163 4

o r i g i na r v t echni c i t v o f 5 6

r ad i ca l c on t i ng e n cy ot 30, 8 6 , 206

soc iotechnic al hy b r i d 7

t echn i c i tv o f 51 2, 84 , 85

w h a t e v e r body 1 52, 1 54, 165,

169 7 0

Bu t l e r , Jud i th 29 , 36 4 5 , 17 3, 2 07

C a n g u i l h e m , Ge o rg es 10, 177 , 195 ,

201 2

c l ock , see a t om ic c l o ck ; p e n d u l u m

c l o ck ; t ime

c o l l e c t i v e 22 , 57, 6 7 , 6 8 , 1 35, 141,

148 , 154 5, 2 09

l i v ing and non l iving 1 12, 201 ,

2 0 3 4

m i x e d cons t i t u t i on 69 , 71 , 212

t opolog i c a l c o mp l e x i t y 84 5, 173

\\ ha te v e r 147

c o m p u ta t i o n 180

c on t i ng en cy 2*0 H , $9, 54, I $4,

2 0 6 7, 2 1 cS

c o rp or ea l i t y , see body

co rp or ea l i / a l i o n , m.y bod\

cu l t u r e

re l a t i on to t e c hno l og y 9 10

l imi t s ol 57

dat a s t ruc t ur es I M

da tabases , g em ' and pro te in s equence

i 82 , 185 , 18 5, 187, 190, 19? 4,

198 9 , 201

d e l av , see speed

D e l e uz e , ( l i l i e s 108, 1 9 j

D er r i d a , J acques 5 S, 122 140

Mias , N or b e r l 9 $ 4 , 104

even t s 31 2

fo ld ing 7 0 1, 7 H 1

l o r m

i n l orn i a t i on 45

m od u l a t i o n o f 10 7

1 oucau l t , Mi che l 29, 175, 215

box Ke l l e r , Lvclvn I 78

229

I N D E X

gamesc o m p u t e r 22 , 146 , 149

S'L’L’ til.so plav

g es t u r e 135 8, 16 2 , 167 8

( i l oha l Pos i t i on ing Sy s t em 88 , 91 ,109 1 1

Grosz , 1 l i/abeth 29

hand tool s 20 , 59 62 , 8 0 3

I l aravvav, Donna 7 , 34, 177 , 181,

182 , 186 7 , 208

1 l e i de gg er , Ma r t i n 4 , 24, 5 3,

t i me and t e mp o r a l i t y 92 3, 104

es s e nce ol t e c h no l o g y 124 35 h e r e d i t y 195 , 198

h i s tory 24 , 39 4 0 , 118 19, 1 35,

152 , 153

I l uvgens , Chr i s t i a an 88, 9 9

h uma n 4 3 , 2 0 7 8

hi s tor i ca l na t ur e 146

vs p r e h u m a n 65

vs n o nh u ma n 6 8 , 207

hybr id i za t i on 189

h y l om o rp h i s m 1 5 , 4 5 9

i mage

a n i ma t ed 1 56

pe r spec t i va l I 57

i nd i v idua t i on 18, 4 9 50, 85 , 145 ,

153 , 191

i n l o r ma t io n 30, 158 , 172, 2 1 7 18

c o m m o d i t y va l ue 1 59 6 0

c y b e r n e t i c 50 1 g e ne t i c 178 9 , 187 , 20 3

i n l o r ma t io n t he orv 178

l i l e 4 4 , 177 9

S i m o n d o n ’s not ion 4 9 52, I 37

t em po r a l i t y 1 52

i n l r a s t ruc tu r e , see t echnica l e n s em b l e s

i t e rabi l i t y 38 9 , 41

l anguage 1 34

l a t ency to l e r a nc e 166 7

I a tou r , Br un o 7, 6 7 , 7 0 , 7 8 80 , 95 ,

124 , 2 0 7 , 21 I

1 e r o i - Go u r h an , A n d r e 82

l i fe 2 3, 4 9 50, 17 3

as i n l o r ma t i o n 181

m e c h a n i s m 179

t echni c a l m ed i a t i o n o f 171 , 2 0 0

l i v i ng /no n- l i v i ng 4 1 , 4 3 , 52 3, 126,

I 36, 17 3 6

log i c o f t he s u p p l e m e n t 3, 7 8

I vo t a rd , Jean-1 r anco i s 31 2, 154 ,

I 58, 1 59

mac h in e 52 3, 105 6

M a c k en z i e , Dona ld

ma t e r i a l i t y 34 5 , 4 2 , 5 3 4

m a t t e r 37 4 0 , 161

and f o rm 1 5 , 4 5 6 , 2 1 2

m ed i a t i o n 4 6

m o d e r n i t y 31

br eak w i t h p r e - m o d e r n 6 3 4 , 66 ,

71

mu l t i p l i c i t y , see co l l ec t i ve

n u c l e a r w e a p on s 2 1, 5 9 62

d e t o na t i on 7 4 5

p e n d u l u m c l ock 87 , 9 0 1, 9 7 101

p l ay 1 50, 151 , 154 , 168 9

pol i t i cs 4 3 - 4

P o l y m e r a s e Cha in Reac t i on ( P C R )

190 , 193

pr ac t i ce

di s cu r s i ve 36 7

o r i g ina r y t e ch n i c i t y , see technic i tv

( j uas i -obj ec t s 31, 6 9

Rabinovv, Paul 1 7 5 , 2 0 5

rea l t i m e , see t i me

r e p r es en t a t i o n

l imi t s o f 112 13

2 3 0

I N D E X

s a U ' l l i U ' nav i ga t i on 2 1

Se r r e s , Miehe l 6 9 7 0

s i gn i f y ing pr of e s s e s 35 6 , 38, 59

d i s eu r s i ve l imi t s 6 5 , 142 , 211

S i m on d on , Gi lbe r t 10 I I , 16 18,

104 , 117 , 126 , 141, 174, 192

■icc t eehn i e i tv , t r ansduc t ion

s i mu l a t i o n 59

nu c l e a r w e a p on s 7 4 7

spec t ac l e 146 7 , 160

s p eed 1 , 2 1 2, 62 3, 6 9 , 84 , 122,

1 34, 2 08 , 215

and co l l e c t i ve t o p og ra p h y 78

d e l a y 1 22 3, 1 32, 1 34, I 36, 1 38,

1 39, 160 1, 166 7

Vi r i l i o 120 1

Sp i vak , ( i a va t r i Ch a k r a vo r t v 4 2 , 160 ,

206

S t c l a r c 116 42

S t en ge r s , I sabel l e 9 8 9, 105

S t i eg l e r , Be rna rd 6 , 8 9 , 126 , 134,

140

s u p e r c o m p u t i n g 75 7

t echn i c a l e l e m en t s 12 1 3, 7 0 1, 192

t echni c a l m ed i a t i on 4 6 , 6 7 8, 6 9 , 79 ,

2 1 4

corp or ea l i z a t ion 188

i nc o r po r a t io n o f 82 , 142

mob i l i z a t i on o f r e l a t i ons 7 2 , 82

m od u l a t i on 98

t echni c a l ob j ec t s 11, 109

t echni c a l e n s emb l e s 11, 14, 71 , 1-15,

172 , 188, 192 , 2 01 , 216

t ec hn i c i t y II I 3, 89 , 191 , 201

c o nc r e t i z a t ion 12 13, 201

g ene s i s 108

i t e r abi l i t v 14,

l i fe 8, 174

m ar g i n o f i n d e t e r mi n a c y 10 11,5 3 4 , 68 9 , 105 6, 128

o r i g ina r y 3, 5, 8 9, 212 , 2 17

re l a t i ona l i t v 14 15

t h i nk i ng 1 0, 80 , 2 I 3

t cchnolog\

abs t r ac t i on \i , I, 4 , 172, 205

c u l t ur e 10 , 4 0 1

d e t e r m i n i s m 30

d i s cu r s i xe c ons t ruc t i on 4 5,

inte l l i g i b i l i t y ol 3, 112, 140, 213

as s i gni i i c r 68 , 205 6, 209

techni t itx ol 18 1 9

t i me

ca l cu l abi l i tx 32

c lock t i me 21 2 , 7 5 98 , 1 1 I

da t ing 140

exent 141

real t i me 1 5 1 , 1 60 , 1 68

l emp or a l i l x 161

t cmpo r a l i z a t i o n 9 , 9 3, 13 3, 168,

2 07

t im i ng 72

t r ansduc t ion \i , 15 18, 25 n . l ,

4 5 8 , 1 18, 174 5, 2 05 , 2 10 , 215

a r t i cu l a t i on ol d i ve r s e rea l i t i es 77,

8 3 4 , 95 6 , 1 18

event 96 , 2 05 , 210

ind i v idua t i on 17, 12 3, 137, |9|,

2 1 6 17

i n l o n n a t i o n 45 6

l i v i ng/no n- l i v i ng 18, 23 , 173

mct a s t ab i l i t v 17, 76 , 10 3 4 , 107,

1 I I

on t ogen es i s 17, 18

t h i nk i ng 18

t r ans ind i x idua l 117 18, 1 37, I 38,

141 , 145

Vi r i l i o , Paul 91 , 1 I 9 20 , I 26, 1 36,

140

xvhatexer , my body

23 ■