labor 02 - 03 (aug 24 sept 7) pnb - equiasia

7/21/2019 Labor 02 - 03 (Aug 24 Sept 7) PNB - Equiasia

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PNB vs. Cabansag GRJune 21, 2005J. Panganiban

Facts:

Florence Cabansag went to Singapore as a tourist. While she was

there, she looked for a job and eventually applied with the Singapore

Branch of the Philippine National Bank. PNB is a private bankingcorporation organized and existing under Philippine laws. She was

eventually employed and was issued an employment pass. In her job

offer, it was stated, among others, that she was to be put on probation

for 3 months and termination of her employment may be made by

either party after 1 day notice while on probation, and 1 month notice

or 1 month pay in lieu of notice upon confirmation. She accepted the

terms and was issued an OEC by the POEA. She was commended

for her good work. However, she was informed by Ruben Tobias, the

bank president, that she would have to resign in line with some cost

cutting and realignment measures of the company. She refused but

was informed by Tobias that if she does not resign, he will terminate

her instead.

Issues:

1. W/N the arbitration branch of the NLRC has jurisdiction

2. W/N the arbitration of the NLRC in the NCR is the proper

venue

3. W/N Cabansag was illegally dismissed

Ruling:

1. Labor arbiters have original and exclusive jurisdiction over

claims arising from employer-employee relations including termination

disputes involving all workers, including OFWs. Here, Cabansag

applied for and secured an OEC from the POEA through the

Philippine Embassy. The OEC authorized her working status in a

foreign country and entitled her to all benefits and processes under

our statutes. Although she may been a direct hire at the

commencement of her employment, she became an OFW who was

covered by Philippine labor laws and policies upon certification by the

POEA. When she was illegally terminated, she already possessed the

POEA employment certificate.

2. A migr ant worker “refers to a person who is to be engaged, is

engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a state of

which he or she is not a legal resident; to be used interchangeably

with overseas Filipino worker.” Here, Cabansag was a Filipino, not a

legal resident of Singapore, and employed by petitioner in its branch

office in Singapore. She is clearly an OFW/migrant worker. Thus, she

has the option where to file her Complaint for illegal dismissal. She

can either file at the Regional Arbitration Branch where she resides or

the RAB where the employer is situated. Thus, in filing her Complaintbefore the RAB office in Quezon City, she has made a valid choice of

proper venue.

3. The appellate court was correct in holding that respondent was

already a regular employee at the time of her dismissal, because her

three-month probationary period of employment had already ended.

This ruling is in accordance with Article 281 of the Labor Code: “An

employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall beconsidered a regular employee.” Indeed, petitioner recognized

respondent as such at the time it dismissed her, by giving her one

month’s salary in lieu of a one-month notice, consistent with provision

No. 6 of her employment Contract.



OSM SHIPPING PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. NLRC1 (Panganiban, 2003) GR No 138193 March 2, 2003Petition for review on certiorari of the decisions of the CA

Facts:

A complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of salaries,overtime pay and vacation pay was filed by Fermin Guerreroagainst OSM Shipping Phils. Guerrero was hired by petitioner, inbehalf of its principal Phil. Carrier Shipping Agency (PS-SLC) toboard its vessel MV Princess Hoa as Master Mariner for a contractof 10 months.

He boarded the ship on July 21, 1994. Almost 7 months later, hewas forced to disembark the ship because he was never paid anycompensation for his work since he boarded the ship and as such,he could not even buy his basic necessities.

OSM story: ! Concorde Pacific, the American company which owns the

MV Princess Hoa, appointed Phil. Carrier Shipping AgencyServices Co. (PC-SASCO) as ship manager, one of whoseresponsibilities was the selection or determination ofqualifications of Filipino Seamen.

! On the same date, OSM entered into a Crew Agreement withPC -SASCO for the purpose of processing the documents ofcrew members of the vessel.

! The initial plan was to use the vessel for overseas trade. ButConcorde changed its plans for the vessel and decided to useit instead for coastwide trade, thus the vessel never left thePhilippines. It had the vessel converted to Philippine registryby way of bareboat chartering it out to another entity namedPS-SLC.

! To do this, Concorde, through its representative had toterminate is crew agreement with PS-SASCO. Consequently,the latter terminated its crew agreement with OSM.

! PS-SLC, the bareboat charterer, is now the disponentowner/employer of the crew and is thus responsible for thepayment of the complainant’s wages.

1 "#$%&# '#()#*+$

Labor Arbiter rendered its decision in favor of Guerrero, orderingOSM and PS-SASCO to jointly and severally pay Guerrero’sclaims. NLRC affirmed with modification.

OSM filed with the CA a petition to set aside the NLRC judgment.This was dismissed because petitioner did not comply with therequirements of Sec. 3 Rule 46 of the ROC by failing to attach aduplicate original or certified true copy of the LA’s decision. Theyonly attached a mere machine copy.

Hence this petition.

Issue:

1) Procedural – WON CA was correct in dismissing thepetition for failure to comply with the said requirement? – NO

2) Substantive – WON OSM is jointly liable with PC-SASCO,as its agent. - YES

Held:

1) Sec. 3 rule 46 of the ROC requires that a duplicate original orcertified true copy of only the questioned decision should beattached to the petition and not all supporting papers. Sincethe LA’s decision was not questioned ruling, a machine copyof it would suffice. The duplicate original of the questioneddecision of the NLRC should be attached, and this wascomplied with. However, even if petitioner’s proceduralcontention was correct, this Court still ruled for Guerrero onthe merits. To remand this case to the CA would further delaythe recovery of wages.

2) On behalf of its principal, OSM does not deny hiring Guerreroas master mariner. Petitioner was the legitimate manningagent of PS-SASCO and it was allowed to recruit, hire anddeploy seamen on board the vessel.

a. It argues that since Guerrero was never deployedoverseas, his employment contract became ineffectivebecause its object was allegedly absent. – Employmentcontract like any contract is perfected upon the



concurrence of essential elements such as consent ofthe parties, object certain (subject matter of thecontract) and the cause of the obligation. Contrary topetitioner’s contention, the object of the contractwas the rendition of service by Guerrero on boardthe vessel. The non-deployment overseas of theship did not affect the validity of the perfectedemployment contract.

b. OSM also contends that there was a novation of thecontract when Concorde decided to use the ship forcoastwide trade. – A contract cannot be novated solelyby the will of one party.

3) Joint and solidary liability is meant to assure aggrievedworkers of immediate and sufficient payment of what is duethem.

Decision of NLRC affirmed.



JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, INC., and KARY

INTERNATIONAL INC., petitioner, v. HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, HON. MA. NIEVES CONFESSOR, then Secretary of the

Department of Labor and Employment, HON. JOSE BRILLANTES,

in his capacity as acting Secretary of the Department of Labor

and Employment and HON. FELICISIMO JOSON, in his capacity

as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment

Administration, respondents.

G.R. No. 120095. Auust 5, 1996

KAPUNAN, J.

FACTS:

The Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the Philippines

(FETMOP for brevity) filed a class suit on January 27, 1995 assailing

that the Department Order No. 3 which establishes various

procedures and requirements for screening performing artists under a

new system of training, testing, certification and deployment of the

former and other related issuance, principally contending that the said

orders, 1.)violated the constitutional right to travel; 2.) abridged

existing contracts for employment; and 3.) deprived individual artists

of their licenses without due process of law. FETMOP also averred

that the issuance of the Artist Record Book (ARB) was discriminatory

and illegal and in gross violation of the constitutional right to life liberty

and property. FETMOP prayed for the issuance of the writ of

preliminary injunction against the orders.

JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. (JMM for brevity) and Kary

International, Inc. (Kary for brevity) filed a motion for intervention in

the civil case which was granted by the trial court on February 15,

1995. However, on February 21, 1995, the trial court issued an order

denying petitioner's prayer for writ of preliminary injunction and

dismissed the compliant. An appeal was made to the trial court

regarding its decision but it was also however, dismissed. As a

consequences, ARB requirement was issed. The Court of Appeals

upheld the trial court's decision and concluded that the said issuance

constituted a valid exercise of Police power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the the said issuance is a valid exercise

of Police Power.

RULING:

Yes, the ARB requirement and questioned Department Order related

to its issuance were issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to a

valid exercise of Police Power by the State. The proper regulation of aprofession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as a

legitimate subject of a valid exercise of police power by the state

particularly when their conduct afffects either the execution of a

legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the

public health and welfare and public morals. According to the maxim

sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use your property in such a

fashion so as to not disturb others) it must of course be within the

legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in

which every one may so use his own property so as not to pose injury

to himself or others.

In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the right of

property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is certainly

much wider. To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements

violates due process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the

mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to the practice of

various trades or profession. Professional leaving for abroad are

required to pass rigid written and practical exams before they are

deemed fit to practice their trade. It is not claimed that these

requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a property rightunder the due process clause. So long as professionals and other

workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no such deprivation

exists.



Eastern Mediterranean v. Agemar Manning

G.R. No. 154213 : August 23, 2012

EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN MARITIME LTD. AND AGEMARMANNING AGENCY, INC., Petitioners, v. ESTANISLAO SURIO,FREDDIE PALGUIRAN, GRACIANO MORALES, HENRYCASTILLO, ARISTOTLE ARREOLA, ALEXANDER YGOT,

ANRIQUE BATTUNG, GREGORIO ALDOVINO, NARCISO FRIAS,VICTOR FLORES, SAMUEL MARCIAL, CARLITO PALGUIRAN,DUQUE VINLUAN, JESUS MENDEGORIN, NEIL FLORES, ROMEOMANGALIAG, JOE GARFIN and SALESTINO SUSA,Respondents.

BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS:

Respondents Estanislao Surio, et al. were former crewmembers of

MT Seadance, a vessel owned by petitioner Eastern MediterraneanMaritime Ltd. (Eastern). On December 23, 1993, Eastern filed againstSurio, et al. a complaint for disciplinary action based on breach ofdiscipline and for the reimbursement of the wage increases in theWorkers Assistance and Adjudication Office of the POEA.

During the pendency of the administrative complaint in the POEA,R.A. No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995)took effect on July 15, 1995. Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 vestedoriginal and exclusive jurisdiction over all money claims arising out ofemployer-employee relationships involving overseas Filipino workers

in the Labor Arbiters. The jurisdiction over such claims was previouslyexercised by the POEA under the POEA Rules and Regulations of1991 (1991 POEA Rules).

The POEA dismissed the complaint for disciplinary action. Easternelevated the matter to the NLRC. The NLRC also dismissed theappeal for lack of jurisdiction. Likewise, the CA also denied theEasterns petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction to review onappeal cases decided by the POEA on matters pertaining to

disciplinary actions?

HELD: The petition for review lacks merit.

LABOR LAW: jurisdiction of appeal from POEAs decisionpertaining to disciplinary actions

Although Republic Act No. 8042, through its Section 10, transferredthe original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide moneyclaims involving overseas Filipino workers from the POEA to theLabor Arbiters, the law did not remove from the POEA the original andexclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all disciplinary action casesand other special cases administrative in character involving suchworkers.

When Republic Act No. 8042 withheld the appellate jurisdiction of theNLRC in respect of cases decided by the POEA, the appellate

jurisdiction was vested in the Secretary of Labor in accordance withhis power of supervision and control under Section 38(1), Chapter 7,Title II, Book III of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987.

In conclusion, we hold that petitioners should have appealed theadverse decision of the POEA to the Secretary of Labor instead of tothe NLRC.

Court of Appeals decision AFFIRMED.



ANTONIO M. SERRANO VS. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES,INC.GR No. 167614 March 24, 2009

FACTS:Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant MaritimeServices, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12 months, as Chief Officer, withthe basic monthly salary of US$1,400, plus $700/month overtime pay,and 7 days paid vacation leave per month.

On the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept adowngraded employment contract upon the assurance andrepresentation of respondents that he would be Chief Officer by theend of April 1998.

Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano ChiefOfficer.

Hence, Serrano refused to stay on as second Officer and wasrepatriated to the Philippines, serving only two months and 7 days,leaving an unexpired portion of nine months and twenty-three days.Upon complaint filed by Serrano before the Labor Arbiter (LA), thedismissal was declared illegal.

On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision based on the provisionof RA 8042.

Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time hequestioned the constitutionality of the last clause in the 5th paragraphof Section 10 of RA 8042.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III ofthe Constitution on non-impairment of contracts;2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of theConstitution, and Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII onlabor as a protected sector.

HELD:On the first issue.The answer is in the negative. Petitioner’s claim that the subjectclause unduly interferes with the stipulations in his contract on theterm of his employment and the fixed salary package he will receive isnot tenable.The subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on theground that it impinges on the impairment clause, for the law wasenacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate abusiness, profession or calling, particularly the recruitment anddeployment of OFWs, with the noble end in view of ensuring respectfor the dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever they may beemployed.

On the second issue.The answer is in the affirmative.To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoingconstitutional provisions translate to economic security and parity.Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, forit applies to all OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that thesubject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidiousimpact on, OFWs at two levels:

First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis-à-visOFWs with employment contracts of one year or more;

Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than oneyear; and

Third, OFWs vis-à-vis local workers with fixed-period employment;The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs andburdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.

Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A.No. 8042 is violative of the right of petitioner and other OFWs to equalprotection.

The subject clause “or for three months for every year of theunexpired term, whichever is less” in the 5th paragraph of Section 10of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Second Officer



SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., Petitioner, vs. JOY C. CABILES, Respondent. G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2014 PONENTE: LeonenTOPIC: Section 10 of RA 8042 vis-a-vis Section 7 of RA 10022

FACTS: Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., isa recruitment andplacement agency.

Respondent Joy Cabiles was hired thus signed a one-yearemployment contract for a monthly salary of NT$15,360.00. Joy wasdeployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26,1997. She alleged that in her employment contract, she agreed towork as quality control for one year. In Taiwan, she was asked to workas a cutter.

Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang fromWacoal informed Joy, without prior notice, that she was terminatedand that “she should immediately report to their office to get her salary

and passport.” She was asked to “prepare for immediate repatriation.”Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, sheonly earned a total of NT$9,000.15 According to her, Wacoaldeducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila.

On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal withthe NLRC against petitioner and Wacoal. LA dismissed the complaint.NLRC reversed LA’s decision. CA affirmed the ruling of the NationalLabor Relations Commission finding respondent illegally dismissedand awarding her three months’ worth of salary, the reimbursement ofthe cost of her repatriation, and attorney’s fees

ISSUE: Whether or not Cabiles was entitled to the unexpired portionof her salary due to illegal dismissal.

HELD: YES. The Court held that the award of the three-monthequivalent of respondent’s salary should be increased to the amountequivalent to the unexpired term of the employment contract.

In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow NavigationCo., Inc., this court ruled that the clause “or for three (3) months forevery year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” is unconstitutional

for violating the equal protection clause and substantive due process.

A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not alaw. It “confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection;it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.”

The Cour t said that they are aware that the clause “or for three (3)months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” wasreinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon promulgation of Republic

Act No. 10022 in 2010.

Ruling on the constitutional issue

In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch oroffice of the government may exercise its powers in any mannerinconsistent with the Constitution, regardless of the existence of anylaw that supports such exercise. The Constitution cannot be trumpedby any other law. All laws must be read in light of the Constitution.

Any law that is inconsistent with it is a nullity.

Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it isinconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured byreincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law orprovision . A law or provision of law that was already declaredunconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have sochanged as to warrant a reverse conclusion.

The Court observed that the reinstated clause, this time as provided inRepublic Act. No. 10022, violates the constitutional rights to equalprotection and due process.96 Petitioner as well as the SolicitorGeneral have failed to show any compelling change in the

circumstances that would warrant us to revisit the precedent.

The Court declared, once again, the clause, “or for three (3) monthsfor every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” in Section 7 ofRepublic Act No. 10022 amending Section 10 of Republic Act No.8042 is declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.



SUNACE INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. v.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION et al.480 SCRA 146 (Jan 25, 2006) GR No 161757

FACTS: Respondent Divina Montehermozo is a domestic helperdeployed to Taiwan by Sunace International Management Services(Sunace) under a 12-month contract. Such employment was made withthe assistance of Taiwanese broker Edmund Wang. After the expiration

of the contract, Montehermozo continued her employment with herTaiwanese employer for another 2 years.

When Montehermozo returned to the Philippines, she filed a complaintagainst Sunace, Wang, and her Taiwanese employer before the NationalLabor Relations Commission (NLRC). She alleges that she wasunderpaid and was jailed for three months in Taiwan. She further allegesthat the 2-year extension of her employment contract was with theconsent and knowledge of Sunace. Sunace, on the other hand, denied allthe allegations.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Montehermozo and found Sunaceliable thereof. The National Labor Relations Commission and Court of

Appeals affirmed the labor arbiter’s decision. Hence, the filing of thisappeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 2-year extension of Montehermozo’semployment was made with the knowledge and consent of Sunace

HELD: There is an implied revocation of an agency relationship whenafter the termination of the original employment contract, the foreignprincipal directly negotiated with the employee and entered into a newand separate employment contract.

Contrary to the Court of Appeals finding, the alleged continuouscommunication was with the Taiwanese broker Wang, not with theforeign employer.

The finding of the Court of Appeals solely on the basis of the telefaxmessage written by Wang to Sunace, that Sunace continuallycommunicated with the foreign "principal" (sic) and therefore was awareof and had consented to the execution of the extension of the contract ismisplaced. The message does not provide evidence that Sunace wasprivy to the new contract executed after the expiration on February 1,1998 of the original contract. That Sunace and the Taiwanese brokercommunicated regarding Montehermozo’s allegedly withheld savings

does not necessarily mean that Sunace ratified the extension of thecontract.

As can be seen from that letter communication, it was just an informationgiven to Sunace that Montehermozo had taken already her savings fromher foreign employer and that no deduction was made on her salary. Itcontains nothing about the extension or Sunace’s consent thereto.

Parenthetically, since the telefax message is dated February 21, 2000, itis safe to assume that it was sent to enlighten Sunace who had beendirected, by Summons issued on February 15, 2000, to appear onFebruary 28, 2000 for a mandatory conference following Montehermozo’sfiling of the complaint on February 14, 2000.

Respecting the decision of Court of Appeals following as agent of itsforeign principal, [Sunace] cannot profess ignorance of such an extensionas obviously, the act of its principal extending [Montehermozo’s]employment contract necessarily bound it, it too is a misapplication, amisapplication of the theory of imputed knowledge.

The theory of imputed knowledge ascribes the knowledge of the agent,Sunace, to the principal, employer, not the other way around. Theknowledge of the principal-foreign employer cannot, therefore, beimputed to its agent Sunace.

There being no substantial proof that Sunace knew of and consented tobe bound under the 2-year employment contract extension, it cannot besaid to be privy thereto. As such, it and its "owner" cannot be heldsolidarily liable for any of Montehermozo’s claims arising from the 2 -yearemployment extension. As the New Civil Code provides, Contracts takeeffect only between the parties, their assigns, and heirs, except in case

where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are nottransmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.Furthermore, as Sunace correctly points out, there was an impliedrevocation of its agency relationship with its foreign principal when, afterthe termination of the original employment contract, the foreign principaldirectly negotiated with Montehermozo and entered into a new andseparate employment contract in Taiwan. Article 1924 of the New CivilCode states that the agency is revoked if the principal directly managesthe business entrusted to the agent, dealing directly with third persons.



People v Panis

142 SCRA 664 (1986)

Facts:

Four informations were filed on January 9, 1981, in the Court of First

Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City alleging that Serapio Abug,

private respondent herein, "without first securing a license from theMinistry of Labor as a holder of authority to operate a fee-charging

employment agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and

criminally operate a private fee-charging employment agency by

charging fees and expenses (from) and promising employment in

Saudi Arabia" to four separate individuals named therein, in violation

of Article 16 in relation to Article 39 of the Labor Code.

Abug filed a motion to quash on the ground that the informations did

not charge an offense because he was accused of illegally recruitingonly one person in each of the four informations. Under the proviso in

Article 13(b), he claimed, there would be illegal recruitment only

"whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or

offered any employment for a fee."

The posture of the petitioner is that the private respondent is being

prosecuted under Article 39 in relation to Article 16 of the Labor Code;

hence, Article 13(b) is not applicable. However, as the first two cited

articles penalize acts of recruitment and placement without proper

authority, which is the charge embodied in the informations,application of the definition of recruitment and placement in Article

13(b) is unavoidable.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of violating Article 13(b) of P. D.

442, otherwise known as the Labor Code.

Held:

Article 13(b) of P. D. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code, states

that, "(b) 'Recruitment and placement' refers to any act of canvassing,

'enlisting, contracting, transporting, hiring, or procuring workers, and

includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for

employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided,

That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for

a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged

in recruitment and placement."

As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition

on the basic rule nor to provide an exception thereto but merely to

create a presumption. The presumption is that the individual or entity

is engaged in recruitment and placement whenever he or it is dealing

with two or more persons to whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer

or promise of employment is made in the course of the "canvassing,

enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of)

workers."

At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give more force to

the campaign against illegal recruitment and placement, which has

victimized many Filipino workers seeking a better life in a foreign land,

and investing hard-earned savings or even borrowed funds in pursuit

of their dream, only to be awakened to the reality of a cynical

deception at the hands of their own countrymen.



THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs. CAROL M. DELA PIEDRA, accused-appellantG.R. No. 121777 (350 SCRA 163) January 24, 2001KAPUNAN, J.

FACTS: On the afternoon of January 30, 1994, Maria LourdesModesto and Nancy Araneta together with her friends Jennelyn Baez,and Sandra Aquino went to the house of Jasmine Alejandro, after

having learned that a woman is there to recruit job applicants forSingapore. Carol dela Piedra was already briefing some people whenthey arrived. Jasmine, on the other hand, welcomed and asked themto sit down.

They listened to the “recruiter” who was then talking about thebreakdown of the fees involved: P30,000 for the visa and the roundtrip ticket, and P5,000 as placement fee and for the processing of thepapers. The initial payment was P2,000, while P30,000 will be bysalary deduction. The recruiter said that she was “recruiting” nursesfor Singapore.

Araneta, her friends and Lourdes then filled up bio-data formsand were required to submit pictures and a transcript of records. Afterthe interview, Lourdes gave the initial payment of P2,000 to Jasmine,who assured her that she was authorized to receive the money.

Meanwhile, in the morning of the said date, Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA),received a telephone call from an unidentified woman inquiring aboutthe legitimacy of the recruitment conducted by a certain Mrs. CarolFigueroa. Ramos, whose duties include the surveillance of suspected

illegal recruiters, immediately contacted a friend, a certain MayethBellotindos, so they could both go the place where the recruitmentwas reportedly being undertaken. Upon arriving at the reported areaat around 4:00 p.m., Bellotindos entered the house and pretended tobe an applicant. Ramos remained outside and stood on thepavement, from where he was able to see around six (6) persons inthe sala. Ramos even heard a woman, identified as Carol Figueroa,talk about the possible employment she has to provide in Singaporeand the documents that the applicants have to comply with. Fifteen(15) minutes later, Bellotindos came out with a bio-data form in hand.

Thereafter, Ramos conferred with a certain Capt. Mendoza ofthe Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) to organize the arrest of the

alleged illegal recruiter. A surveillance team was then organized toconfirm the report. After which, a raid was executed.

Consequently, Carol was charged and convicted by the trialcourt of illegal recruitment.

Upon appeal, accused questions her conviction for illegalrecruitment in large scale and assails, as well, the constitutionality of

the law defining and penalizing said crime. First, accused submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining “recruitment and placement”is void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due process clause.

The provision in question reads:

ART. 13. Definitions.—(a) x x x.

(b) “Recruitment and placement” refers to any act ofcanvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includesreferrals, contract services, promising or advertising

for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit ornot: Provided, That any person or entity which, inany manner, offers or promises for a feeemployment to two or more persons shall bedeemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not sec. 13 (b) of P.D. 442, as amended,otherwise known as the illegal recruitment law is unconstitutional as itviolates the due process clause.

(2) Whether or not accused was denied equal protection and thereforeshould be exculpated

HELD:

(1) For the First issue, dela Piedra submits that Article 13 (b) ofthe Labor Code defining “recruitment and placement” is voidfor vagueness and, thus, violates the due process clause.

Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute mustbe sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what

conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.



In support of her submission, dela Piedra invokes Peoplevs. Panis, where the Supreme Court “criticized” the definition of“recruitment and placement.”

The Court ruled, however, that her reliance on the saidcase was misplaced.

The issue in Panis was whether, under the proviso of Article

13 (b), the crime of illegal recruitment could be committed only“whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised oroffered any employment for a fee.” In this case, the Court merelybemoaned the lack of records that would help shed light on themeaning of the proviso. The absence of such recordsnotwithstanding, the Court was able to arrive at a reasonableinterpretation of the proviso by applying principles in criminal lawand drawing from the language and intent of the law itself. Section13 (b), therefore, is not a “perfectly vague act” whose obscurity isevident on its face. If at all, the proviso therein is merely couchedin imprecise language that was salvaged by proper construction.

It is not void for vagueness.

Dela Piedra further argues that the acts that constitute“recruitment and placement” suffer from overbreadth sinceby merely “referring” a person for employment, a person maybe convicted of illegal recruitment.

That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant apparentlyconsiders as customary and harmless acts such as “labor oremployment referral” (“referring” an applicant, according toappellant, for employment to a prospective employer) does notrender the law overbroad. Evidently, Dela Piedra misapprehendsconcept of overbreadth.

A statute may be said to be overbroad where it operates toinhibit the exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively guaranteedby the Constitution, such as the freedom of speech or religion. Agenerally worded statute, when construed to punish conductwhich cannot be constitutionally punished is unconstitutionallyvague to the extent that it fails to give adequate warning of theboundary between the constitutionally permissible and theconstitutionally impermissible applications of the statute.

(2) Anent the second issue, Dela Piedra invokes the equalprotection clause in her defense. She points out that althoughthe evidence purportedly shows that Jasmine Alejandro handedout application forms and even received Lourdes Modesto’spayment, appellant was the only one criminally charged.

Alejandro, on the other hand, remained scot-free. From this, sheconcludes that the prosecution discriminated against her ongrounds of regional origins. Appellant is a Cebuana while

Alejandro is a Zamboangueña, and the alleged crime took placein Zamboanga City.

The Supreme Court held that the argument has no merit.

The prosecution of one guilty person while others equallyguilty are not prosecuted, is not, by itself, a denial of the equalprotection of the laws. The unlawful administration by officers of astatute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to thosewho are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equalprotection unless there is shown to be present in it an element ofintentional or purposeful discrimination. But a discriminatory

purpose is not presumed, there must be a showing of “clear andintentional discrimination.”

In the case at bar, Dela Piedra has failed to show that, incharging her, there was a “clear and intentional discrimination” onthe part of the prosecuting officials.

Furthermore, the presumption is that the prosecutingofficers regularly performed their duties, and this presumptioncan be overcome only by proof to the contrary, not by merespeculation. As said earlier, accused has not presented any

evidence to overcome this presumption. The mere allegationthat dela Piedra, a Cebuana, was charged with the commissionof a crime, while a Zamboangueña, the guilty party in appellant’seyes, was not, is insufficient to support a conclusion that theprosecution officers denied appellant equal protection of thelaws.



PEOPLE vs. LOMA GOCE y OLALIA, DAN GOCE and NELLY D.AGUSTIN [G.R. No. 113161 August 29, 1995 ]

Ponente: REGALADO, J.:

Nature: This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the order of

the trial quashing the information in favor of the private respondent.

Facts:

On January 12, 1988, an information for illegal recruitmentcommitted by a syndicate and in large scale, punishable under

Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor Code (Presidential Decree No. 442) asamended by Section 1(b) of Presidential Decree No. 2018, was filedagainst spouses Dan and Loma Goce and herein accused-appellantNelly Agustin for alleged representing themselves to have the capacityto contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employmentabroad without first having secured the required license or authority

from the Department of Labor.

On January 21, 1987, a warrant of arrest was issued againstthe three accused but not one of them was arrested. Eventually, Nelly

Agustin was apprehended by the Parañaque police. Agustin deniedany participation in the illegal recruitment and maintained that therecruitment was perpetrated only by the Goce couple. Agustin alsodenied any knowledge of the receipts representing placement feepresented by the prosecution. She insisted that the complainantsincluded her in the complaint thinking that this would compel her toreveal the whereabouts of the Goce spouses which she failed to do so

because in truth, so she claims, she does not know the presentaddress of the couple. All she knew was that they had left theirresidence in 1987.

The trial court rendered judgment finding herein appellantguilty as a principal in the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale,and sentencing her to serve the penalty of life imprisonment and fine.In her present appeal, appellant Agustin raises the followingarguments: (1) her act of introducing complainants to the Goce coupledoes not fall within the meaning of illegal recruitment and placement

under Article 13(b) in relation to Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) there

is no proof of conspiracy to commit illegal recruitment amongappellant and the Goce spouses; and (3) there is no proof thatappellant offered or promised overseas employment to thecomplainants.

Issue:

Whether or not the act of introducing complainants to the Goce couplefalls within the meaning of illegal recruitment and placement under Article 13(b) in relation to Article 34 of the Labor Code.

Ruling:

YES. Under said Code, recruitment and placement refers toany act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services,

promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whetherfor profit or not; provided , that any person or entity which, in anymanner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or morepersons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. Onthe other hand, referral is the act of passing along or forwarding of anapplicant for employment after an initial interview of a selectedapplicant for employment to a selected employer, placement officer orbureau.

The testimonial evidence shows that she indeed furthercommitted acts constitutive of illegal recruitment. All four prosecutionwitnesses testified that it was Agustin whom they initially approachedregarding their plans of working overseas. It was from her that theylearned about the fees they had to pay, as well as the papers that theyhad to submit. It was after they had talked to her that they met theaccused spouses who owned the placement agency. As correctly heldby the trial court, being an employee of the Goces, it was thereforelogical for appellant to introduce the applicants to said spouses, theybeing the owners of the agency. As such, appellant was actuallymaking referrals to the agency of which she was a part. She wastherefore engaging in recruitment activity. Agustin played a pivotal rolein the operations of the recruitment agency, working together with theGoce couple.



There is illegal recruitment when one gives the impression ofhaving the ability to send a worker abroad." It is undisputed thatappellant gave complainants the distinct impression that she had thepower or ability to send people abroad for work such that the latterwere convinced to give her the money she demanded in order to beso employed. It cannot be denied that Agustin received from

complainants various sums for purpose of their applications. Her actof collecting from each of the complainants payment for theirrespective passports, training fees, placement fees, medical tests andother sundry expenses unquestionably constitutes an act ofrecruitment within the meaning of the law.

Dispositive Portion:

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the court aquo is hereby AFFIRMED in toto, with costs againstaccused-appellant Nelly D. Agustin.

SO ORDERED.



PEOPLE V. ORTIZ-MIYAKE 279 SCRA 197

FACTS:

Lanie Ortiz-Miyake was charged with illegal recruitment inlarge scale, following a complaint filed by Elenita Marasigan,Imelda Generillo and Rosamar del Rosario. Marasigan hadalso charged her with estafa by means of false pretenses.

Only Marasigan was able to testify, however, as the other twocomplainants were abroad. Marasigan said Ortiz-Miyakepromised her a job as factory worker in Taiwan. The formergave her P5,000 initially as placement fee, which amountsubsequently became P23,000 paid in installments upon thedemands of the accused. Accused gave assurances thatMarasigan would have no problem getting a visa and a planeticket. She was unable to go to Taiwan, as there was no ticketbooked for her and, in fact, the supposed agency did not evenknow Miyake.

On the other hand, Generillo was represented by her mother,while del Rosario’s sister testified in court on the latter’sbehalf. As they were not personally present, however, duringthe transactions with Miyake, they could only claim they gavecertain amounts that were supposed to go to Miyake, andconcluded that since their relatives had not been able to leaveas promised by Miyake, then they were necessarily victims ofillegal recruitment by the accused. A POEA representativealso testified that Miyake had no authorization to recruitworkers for overseas employment. [Miyake claiming she onlyoffered discounted plane tickets to the supposed victims]

TC convicted the accused, largely basing their decision on theprevious decision rendered by Paranaque MeTC, where thetwo complainants now absent had filed charges of estafaagainst Miyake. The Court there had convicted Miyake.

ISSUE: W/N Miyake can be held liable for illegal recruitment on alarge scale

HELD/RATIO: Ortiz-Miyake guilty only of simple illegal recruitment(and estafa).

LC: recruitment and placement is ". . . any act of canvassing,enlisting, contracting transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuringworkers and includes referrals, contract services, promising oradvertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether forprofit or not; becomes illegal if one has no authorization for

performing such acts; becomes large scale if done againstthree or more persons whether individually or as a group

Right of accused to confront del Rosario and Generillo was notafforded her. Testimonies of sister and mother, respectively,mere hearsay. Although testimonies from the previous casecould have been used, the decision convicting the accused ofanother crime (in that previous case, estafa) cannot besustained for being violative of the accused’s right to confrontwitnesses.

Conviction of illegal recruitment does not preclude convictionfor estafa. Burden of proof was only successfully establishedas to victim Marasigan. Since “large scale” not established,conviction is only for simple illegal recruitment (and estafa).



Stolt Nielsen Transportation Group & Chung Gai v. SulpecioMedequillo

Actual deployment of the seafarer is a suspensive condition for thecommencement of the employment. We agree with petitioners onsuch point. However, even without actual deployment, the perfectedcontract gives rise to obligations on the part of petitioners.

FACTS. On 6 March 1995, Sulpecio Madequillo (respondent) filed acomplaint before the Adjudication Office of the Philippine OverseasEmployment Administration (POEA) against Stolt Nielsen et al forillegal dismissal under a first contract and for failure to deploy under asecond contract. Sulpecio alleged that :

1. On 6 November 1991(First Contract), he was hired byStolt-Nielsen Marine Services, Inc on behalf of itsprincipal Chung-Gai Ship Management of Panamaas Third Assistant Engineer on board the vessel“Stolt Aspiration” for a period of nine (9) months;

2. He would be paid with a monthly basic salary of $808.00and a fixed overtime pay of $404.00 or a total of$1,212.00 per month during the employment periodcommencing on 6 November 1991;

3. On 8 November 1991, he joined the vessel MV “Stolt Aspiration”;

4. On February 1992 or for nearly three (3) months ofrendering service and while the vessel was atBatangas, he was ordered by the ship’s master todisembark the vessel and repatriated back to Manilafor no reason or explanation;

5. Upon his return to Manila, he immediately proceeded tothe petitioner’s office where he was transferredemployment with another vessel named MV “StoltPride” under the same terms and conditions of theFirst Contract;

6. On 23 April 1992, the Second Contract was noted andapproved by the POEA;

7. The POEA, without knowledge that he was not deployedwith the vessel, certified the Second EmploymentContract on 18 September 1992.

8. Despite the commencement of the Second Contract on

21 April 1992, petitioners failed to deploy him with

the vessel MV “Stolt Pride”; 9. He made a follow-up with the petitioner but the same

refused to comply with the Second EmploymentContract.

10. On 22 December 1994, he demanded for hispassport, seaman’s book and other employmentdocuments. However, he was only allowed to claimthe said documents in exchange of his signing a

document;11. He was constrained to sign the document

involuntarily because without these documents, hecould not seek employment from other agencies.

He prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages as well asattorney’s fees for his illegal dismissal and in view of the Petitioners’bad faith in not complying with the Second Contract.

The case was transferred to the Labor Arbiter of the DOLE upon theeffectivity of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.

Labor Arbiter: respondent was constructively dismissed by thepetitioners. The petitioners appealed. NLRC affirmed withmodifications. The NLRC upheld the finding of unjustified terminationof contract for failure on the part of the petitioners to present evidencethat would justify their non-deployment of the respondent. It deniedthe claim of the petitioners that the monetary award should be limitedonly to three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term of thecontract. It ruled that the factual incidents material to the casetranspired within 1991-1992 or before the effectivity of Republic ActNo. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995

which provides for such limitation.

However, the NLRC upheld the reduction of the monetary award withrespect to the deletion of the overtime pay due to the non-deploymentof the respondent.

Stolt’s main defense: the first employment contract betweenthem and the private respondent is different from andindependent of the second contract subsequently executedupon repatriation of respondent to Manila.

Issue: WON



Held/ Ratio:

(1) The second contract novated the first.

Novation is the extinguishment of an obligation by thesubstitution or change of the obligation by a subsequent one whichextinguishes or modifies the first, either by changing the object orprincipal conditions, or, by substituting another in place of the debtor,

or by subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor. In orderfor novation to take place, the concurrence of the following requisitesis indispensable:

1. There must be a previous valid obligation,2. There must be an agreement of the partiesconcerned to a new contract,3. There must be the extinguishment of the oldcontract, and4. There must be the validity of the new contract.19

On the issue on novation, the SC adopted the findings of the LA and

the CA:It is evident that novation took place in this particularcase. The parties impliedly extinguished the firstcontract by agreeing to enter into the secondcontract to placate Medequillo, Jr. who wasunexpectedly dismissed and repatriated to Manila…The records also reveal that the 2nd contractextinguished the first contract by changing its objector principal. These contracts were for overseasemployment aboard different vessels. The firstcontract was for employment aboard the MV “Stolt

Aspiration” while the second contract involvedworking in another vessel, the MV “Stolt Pride.”Petitioners and Madequillo, Jr. accepted the termsand conditions of the second contract. Contrary topetitioners’ assertion, the first contract was a“previous valid contract” since it had not yet beenterminated at the time of Medequillo, Jr.’srepatriation to Manila. The legality of his dismissalhad not yet been resolved with finality. Undoubtedly,he was still employed under the first contract whenhe negotiated with petitioners on the second

contract. As such, the NLRC correctly ruled that

petitioners could only be held liable under thesecond contract.

With the finding that respondent “was still employed under thefirst contract when he negotiated with petitioners on the secondcontract” novation became an unavoidable conclusion.

(2) On the issue of prescription: Recovery of damages under thefirst contract was already time barred.

We need not dwell on the issue of prescription. It was settled by theCourt of Appeals with its ruling that recovery of damages under thefirst contract was already time-barred. Thus:

Accordingly, the prescriptive period ofthree (3) years within which Medequillo Jr. mayinitiate money claims under the 1st contractcommenced on the date of his repatriation. xxx

The start of the three (3) year prescriptive periodmust therefore be reckoned on February 1992,which by Medequillo Jr.’s own admission was thedate of his repatriation to Manila. It was at thispoint in time that Medequillo Jr.’s cause of actionalready accrued under the first contract. He haduntil February 1995 to pursue a case for illegaldismissal and damages arising from the 1stcontract. With the filing of his Complaint-Affidaviton March 6, 1995, which was clearly beyond theprescriptive period, the cause of action under the

1st contract was already time-barred.

(3) MAIN ISSUE: Even with the non-deployment ofSulpecio, he still has right of action againstpetitioner.

The issue that proceeds from the fact of novation is theconsequence of the non-deployment of respondent.

(a) Actual deployment is a suspensive condition for thecommencement of the employment.



The petitioners argue that under the POEA Contract,actual deployment of the seafarer is a suspensivecondition for the commencement of the employment.We agree with petitioners on such point. However, evenwithout actual deployment, the perfected contract givesrise to obligations on the part of petitioners.

The POEA Standard Employment Contract provides that

employment shall commence “upon the actualdeparture of the seafarer from the airport or seaport inthe port of hire.” We adhere to the terms and conditions ofthe contract so as to credit the valid prior stipulations of theparties before the controversy started.

(b) This does not mean however that the seafarer has noremedy in case of non-deployment.

Thus, even if by the standard contract employmentcommences only “upon actual departure of the

seafarer”, this does not mean that the seafarer has noremedy in case of non-deployment without any validreason. Parenthetically, the contention of the petitioners ofthe alleged poor performance of respondent while on boardthe first ship MV “Stolt Aspiration” cannot be sustained to

justify the non-deployment, for no evidence to prove thesame was presented.

We rule that distinction must be made between theperfection of the employment contract and thecommencement of the employer-employee relationship. The

perfection of the contract, which in this case coincided withthe date of execution thereof, occurred when petitioner andrespondent agreed on the object and the cause, as well asthe rest of the terms and conditions therein. Thecommencement of the employer-employee relationship, asearlier discussed, would have taken place had petitionerbeen actually deployed from the point of hire. Thus, evenbefore the start of any employer-employee relationship,contemporaneous with the perfection of the employmentcontract was the birth of certain rights and obligations, thebreach of which may give rise to a cause of action against

the erring party. Thus, if the reverse had happened, that

is the seafarer failed or refused to be deployed asagreed upon, he would be liable for damages .

(c) Penalty of reprimand is the not the proper penalty.

The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing OverseasEmployment35 dated 31 May 1991 provides for theconsequence and penalty against in case of non-

deployment of the seafarer without any valid reason.

The appellate court correctly ruled that the penalty ofreprimand36 provided under Rule IV, Part VI of the POEARules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment andEmployment of Land-based Overseas Workers is notapplicable in this case. The breach of contract happened onFebruary 1992 and the law applicable at that time was the1991 POEA Rules and Regulations Governing OverseasEmployment. The penalty for non-deployment as discussedis suspension or cancellation of license or fine.

(4) Thus, respondent is entitled to an award of actual damagesbased on RA 8042 in relation to the NCC.

Now, the question to be dealt with is how will the seafarerbe compensated by reason of the unreasonable non-deployment ofthe petitioners?

The POEA Rules Governing the Recruitment andEmployment of Seafarers do not provide for the award of damages to

be given in favor of the employees. The claim provided by the samelaw refers to a valid contractual claim for compensation or benefitsarising from employer-employee relationship (eh in this case nga, noE-E-R yet) or for any personal injury, illness or death at levelsprovided for within the terms and conditions of employment ofseafarers. However, the absence of the POEA Rules with regard tothe payment of damages to the affected seafarer does not mean thatthe seafarer is precluded from claiming the same. The sanctionsprovided for non-deployment do not end with the suspension orcancellation of license or fine and the return of all documents at nocost to the worker. As earlier discussed, they do not pretend a

seafarer from instituting an action for damages against the



employer or agency which has failed to deploy him.

We thus decree the application of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers Act) which provides for money claimsby reason of a contract involving Filipino workers for overseasdeployment. The law provides:

Sec. 10. Money Claims . – Notwithstanding any

provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbitersof the National Labor Relations Commission(NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive

jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90)calendar days after the filing of the complaint, theclaims arising out of an employer-employeerelationship or by virtue of any law or contractinvolving Filipino workers for overseasdeployment including claims for actual, moral,exemplary and other forms of damages.

Applying the rules on actual damages, Article 2199 ofthe New Civil Code provides that one is entitled to an adequatecompensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he hasduly proved. Respondent is thus liable to pay petitioner actualdamages in the form of the loss of nine (9) months’ worth of salary asprovided in the contract. This is but proper because of the non-deployment of respondent without just cause.



G.R. No. 173198 People vs. OcdenJune 1,2011I, J.DE CASTRO

FACTS:

During the period from May to December, 1998, in BaguioCity, Dolores Ocden recruited and promised employment as factory

workers in Italy to more than three (3) persons including, but notlimited to the following: Jeffries Golidan, Howard C. Golidan, KarenM. Simeon, Jean S. Maximo, Norma Pedro, Marlyn Mana-a, RizalinaFerrer, and Milan Daring without having first secured the necessarylicense or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment.None of the applicants were able to work in Italy. They asked Ocdento refund their hard-earned money but Ocden failed to return. TheRTC found Ocden guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale andsuffer life imprisonment and a fine of P100,000 and was erroneouslyfiled before CA, but the latter correctly submitted to SC.

ISSUE:

Is Ocden guilty of illegal recruitment?

LAWS INVOLVED:

Art. 13(b) in relation to Articles 38(b), 34 and 39 of the Labor Code.

Sec. 6(m) of RA 8042.

RULING:

The Supreme Court found Ocden guilty of illegal recruitment in

large scale and estafa; and sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and

a fine of P500,000.

Since illegal recruitment under Section 6(m) can be committed

by any person, even by a licensed recruiter, a certification on whether

Ocden had a license to recruit or not, is inconsequential. Ocden

committed illegal recruitment as described in said provision by

receiving placement fees from Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidan’s two

sons, Jeffries and Howard, evidenced by receipts Ocden herself

issued; and failing to reimburse/refund to Mana-a, Ferrer, and

Golidan’s two sons the amounts they had paid when they were not

able to leave for Italy, through no fault of their own.



Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion v Sps. Simplicio and

Mila Cuaresma (in behalf of daughter Jasmin), White Falcon

Services, and Jaime Ortiz (Pres. Of White Falcon)

Sps. Cuaresma (in behalf of Jasmin) v White Falcon and Becmen

Facts:

Jan 1997 – Jasmin was deployed by Becmen to serve as assistantnurse in Al-Birk Hospital in Saudi under a 3 year contract, for

$247/mo.

June 1998 - she died. Jessie Fajardo, co-worker, found her dead

inside her dormitory room with mouth foaming and smelling of poison.

Medical report of Al-Birk Hosp stated that the cause of death was

poisoning – halt in blood circulation, respiratory system and brain

damage due to poisoning from unknown substance.

Sep 1998 – her body was repatriated to Manila. The City HealthOfficer of Cabanatuan found that Jasmin died under violent

circumstances not poisoning – abrasions at her inner lip and gums;

lacerated wounds and abrasions on her left and right ears; lacerated

wounds and hematoma (contusions) on her elbows; abrasions and

hematoma on her thigh and legs; intra-muscular hemorrhage at the

anterior chest; rib fracture; puncture wounds; and abrasions on the

labia minora.

Mar 1999 – Jasmin’s body was exhumed by NBI. Toxicology report

tested negative ffor non-volatile, metallic poison and insecticides.

Sps. Cuaresmas received from OWWA the following: 50k death

benefits, 50k loss of life; 20k funeral expenses; 10k medical

reimbursement.

Nov 1999 – Sps. Filed complaint against Becmen and Rajab & Silsilah

Co (principal in Saudi) claiming death and insurance benefits. Sps.

Claim that Jasmin’s death was work-related having occurred at the

employer’s premises; their entitled to iqama insurance ; compensatory

damages amounting to $103k which is the sum of her monthly salary

35 years (she was 25 yo when she died, assuming she would survive

until 60 yo).

Becmen and Rajab claim that Jasmin committed suicide and relied on

the medical report of Al Birk. They deny liability since the Sps. Had

already received their benefits from OWWA. Later, Becmen

manifested that Rajab had terminated their agency, and impleaded

White Falcon as the new agency of Rajab.

Summary of Rulings

LArb – dismissed for lack of merit, giving credence to Al Birk

medical report

NLRC – reversed, found Jasmin a victim of compensable

work-connected criminal aggression; both agencies are

solidarily liable to pay $113; later reduced to $80k

CA – affirmed; later reduced the award to $8k (monthly salary

x remaining contract period)

Issues

WON entitled to insurance – NO

WON death is compensable – NO

WON death was by suicide – NO

WON Becmen and Falcon are liable – YES, solidary liability

Ratio

1. NOT entitled to insurance.

The terms and conditions of Jasmin’s 1996 Employment

Agreement which she and her employer Rajab freely entered

into constitute the law between them. As a rule, stipulations in

an employment contract not contrary to statutes, public policy,

public order or morals have the force of law between the

contracting parties. An examination of said employment

agreement shows that it provides for no other monetary or

other benefits/privileges than the following:



1. 1,300 rials (or US$247.00) monthly salary;

2. Free air tickets to KSA at the start of her

contract and to the Philippines at the end thereof, as

well as for her vacation at the end of each twenty four-

month service;

3. Transportation to and from work;

4. Free living accommodations;

5. Free medical treatment, except for optical

and dental operations, plastic surgery charges and

lenses, and medical treatment obtained outside of KSA;

6. Entry visa fees will be shared equally

between her and her employer, but the exit/re-entry visa

fees, fees for Iqama issuance, renewal, replacement,

passport renewal, sponsorship transfer and otherliabilities shall be borne by her;

7. Thirty days paid vacation leave with round

trip tickets to Manila after twenty four-months of

continuous service;

8. Eight days public holidays per year;

9. The indemnity benefit due her at the end

of her service will be calculated as per labor laws of

KSA.

Thus, the agreement does not include provisions for

insurance, or for accident, death or other benefits that the

Cuaresmas seek to recover, and which the labor tribunals and

appellate court granted variably in the guise of compensatory

damages.

Absence for provisions on social security and other benefits

does not make the contract infirm under PH laws since under

Saudi law, foreign employer is not obliged to provide her these

benefits.

2. Death NOT WORK RELATED, therefore not compensable

(i.e., not liable for lost earnings)

At time of death, Jasmin was not on duty but at her dormitory

room on personal time. Court stated that the foreign employercannot be expected to ensure her safety even while she is not

on duty. What an employee does on free time is beyond the

employer’s sphere of inquiry.

The dormitory room also cannot be considered as “employer’s

premises”.

3. Jasmin DID NOT COMMIT SUICIDE

Court cannot subscribe to the idea that Jasmin committedsuicide while halfway into her employment contract. This is

beyond human comprehension for a 25 yo Filipina especially

since suicide is contrary to Christian belief. Court cited

Filipina’s resilience despite abuse and maltreatment. Based on

past OFW experiences, Filipina’s do not simply commit suicide

but rather endure.

Court also found that Saudi police and autopsy reports are

patently inconclusive. Their report is contradicted by the CityHealth Officer and by NBI. Even the toxicology report tested

negative for poisonous substances.

All these show that Jasmin was manhandled and possibly

raped prior to death.

4. Rajab, Becmen, White Falcon solidarily liable for moral and

exemplary damages



Court admonished Becmen and Falcon for simply dismissing

Jasmin’s case as one of suicide instead of fighting for her

rights. The Agencies prioritized their corporate interest over

that of Jasmin.

RA 8042 Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act provides

that the State shall at all times uphold the dignity of its citizens,

whether in the country or overseas. The rights and interest ofdistressed overseas Filipinos are adequately protected and

safeguarded.

Becmen and Falcon, both licensed recruitment agencies,

miserably failed to abide by RA 8042. Recruitment agencies

are expected to extend assistance to deployed OFWs, be the

first to come the rescue of our distressed OFWs; and have the

primary obligation to protect the rights and ensure the welfare

of our OFWs. It should have been them who sought justice for

Jasmin. Instead, it was the parents who requested an autopsy

in the Ph to confirm the Saudi report. Court stated that the

parents have done all that was within their power to investigate

Jasmin’s case on their own.

Art 19 CC – every person must, in the exercise of his rights

and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give

everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Art 21 CC – any person who willfully causes loss or injury to

another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customsor public policy shall compensate the later for the damage.

Art 24 CC – in all contractual, property or other relations, when

one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral

dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender

age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his

protection.

Rajab, Becmen and Falcon’s acts and omissions are against

public policy because they undermine and subvert the interest

and general welfare of our OFWs.

Whether employed locally or overseas, all Fil workers enjoy

the protective mantel of PH labor and social laws, contract

stipulations to the contrary notwithstanding. This is in keeping

with the Consti provision for the State to afford protection to

labor, promote full employement, ensure equal work

opportunities.

All labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed

in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.

As a result of their misconduct, Cuaresmas are entitled to

moral damages for which Becmen and Falcon are solidarily

liable. Grant of moral damages to the employee by reason

of misconduct on the part of the employer is sanctioned

by Art 2219 (10) CC.

Private employment agencies are held jointly and severally

liable with the foreign-basd employer for any violation of the

recruitment agreement or contract of employement. This is

meanth to assure the aggrieved worker of immediate and

sufficient payment. If the agency is a juridical being, the

corporate officers and directors and partners are also solidarily

liable.

Falcon’s assumption of Becmen’s liability does not absolve

Becmen.

CA decision set aside. Awarded P2.5M as moral damages,

P250k as exemplary damages.



G.R. No. 117056 February 24, 1998

ABD OVERSEAS MANPOWER CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MARS

INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER, INC. and MOHMINA MACARAYA,

FACTS:

• Dec. 1989 - Mohmina Macaraya applied for an overseas job as a

dressmaker and, accordingly, paid recruitment/placement fee to MARS

International Manpower. She signed up for a 2-yr contract stipulating she

would earn $250.

• MARS submitted her papers to POEA stating, however, that she

would be employed as domestic helper with monthly salary of $200

• Jan. 1990 – Macaraya was deployed to Saudi where she worked

as DH for three months (over her objections), after which she was paid

only 700Riyals by her employ

case for i llegal dismissal and underpayment/nonpayment against MARS,M.S. Al Babtain Recruitment Office and Times Surety and Insurance Co.

• MARS moved that ABD Overseas Manpower Corp. be impleaded

because in Sept. 1990, it became the accredited local recruitment agency

of Al Babtain Recruitment Office

• POEA rendered decision ordering ABD and Al Babtain to jointly

and severally pay Macaraya her salary corresponding to the unexpired

portion of the contract and salary differentials due her (totaling ~$4,700),

ruling that ABD being a transferee agency of Al Babtain stands to be

liable with it solidarily (as transferee agency, shall assume full and

complete responsibility to all contractual obligations of the principals to its

likewise dismissed appeal made by ABD

ISSUE: Can an accredited transferee recruitment agent of a foreign

employer/recruitment office be held liable under POEA Rules and

Regulations (POEA Rules) for the illegal dismissal of an overseas worker

who filed the case prior to the transferee agent's accreditation?

HELD/RATIO:

• Accreditation was established in order to protect interests of the

Filipino workers, such that: Principals may be accredited in this country

only through licensed local agencies. The transfer, however, as in this

case, should not work to allow MARS to evade liability.

• MARS impleaded petitioner in the case after it had been

submitted for decision and one-and-a-half years after it had filed itsanswer. During this hiatus, the case lay dormant in the POEA. It should

be noted that petitioner became the accredited recruitment agency on

September 3, 1990, two months after MARS had filed its answer to the

complaint. The POEA's inaction ad interim provided MARS with an

opportunity to escape liability.

• Basic principles of justice and equity, however, dictate that MARS

should not be totally cleared of its liability to Macaraya under the peculiar

circumstances of this case. POEA Rules may not be used as a shield

against liability by a recruitment agency that has been substituted by aforeign principal as its local recruitment agency after it has clearly

incurred liability in favor of an overseas worker. Consequently,

considering that it was MARS with whom Macaraya entered into a

contract and that it had been accorded due process at the proceedings

before the POEA, it is but just that MARS be the one to be held

accountable for her claims.

• In so ruling, the Court is not in any way invalidating Section 6,

Rule II, Book III of the POEA Rules. The presumption of its validity

remains. Its application in this case should, however, be an exception tothe rule. Petitioner shall pay Macaraya the amount due her under the

assailed POEA decision, without prejudice to its right to be reimbursed by

MARS under the provision of the Civil Code that "(w)hoever pays for

another may demand from the debtor what he has paid."

• NLRC decision thus affirmed, subject to the modification that

respondent MARS shall reimburse petitioner ABD the amount awarded

therein to respondent Mohmina Macaraya.



Under Section 1 (f), Rule II, Book II of the 1991 POEA Rules and

Regulations, the local agency shall assume joint and solidary liability

with the employer for all claims and liabilities which may arise in

connection with the implementation of the contract, including but not

limited to payment of wages, health and disability compensation and

repatriation.

Respondent Commission was correct in declaring that claims ofprivate respondent "for salary differentials accruing earlier than April

of 1993 had indeed prescribed." It must be noted that petitioner

company is privy only to the first contract. Granting arguendo that its

liability extends to the acts of its foreign principal, the Towering

Recruiting Services, which appears to have a hand in the execution of

the second contract, it is Our considered opinion that the same would,

at the most, extend only up to the expiration of the second contract or

until 01 September 1991. Clearly, the money claims subject of the

complaint filed in 1995 had prescribed.

ISSUES:

• WON respondent agency is liable to principal contract only NO

• WON cause of action of petitioner already prescribed NO

RATIO:

On whether respondent is solidarily liable for petitioner's monetary

claims

Section 1 of Rule II of the POEA Rules and Regulations states that:

Section 1. Requirements for Issuance of License. -

(3) Shall assume joint and solidary liability with the employer for all

claims and liabilities which may arise in connection with the

implementation of the contract; including but not limited to payment of

wages, death and disability compensation and repatriation. (emphasis

supplied)

The above provisions are clear that the private employment agency

shall assume joint and solidary liability with the employer.

In the assailed Decision, the CA disregarded the aforecited provision

of the law and the policy of the state when it reversed the findings of

the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter. As the agency which recruited

petitioner, respondent is jointly and solidarily liable with the latter's

principal employer abroad for her (petitioner's) money claims.

Respondent cannot, therefore, exempt itself from all the claims and

liabilities arising from the implementation of their POEA-approved

Contract of Employment.

We cannot agree with the view of the CA that the solidary liability of

respondent extends only to the first contract (i.e. the original, POEA-

approved contract which had a term of until April 1990). The signing of

the "substitute" contracts with the foreign employer/principal before

the expiration of the POEA-approved contract and any continuation of

petitioner's employment beyond the original one-year term, against

the will of petitioner, are continuing breaches of the original POEA-

approved contract. To accept the CA's reasoning will open the

floodgates to even more abuse of our overseas workers at the handsof their foreign employers and local recruiters.

Respondent's contention that it was petitioner herself who violated

their Contract of Employment when she signed another contract in

Bahrain deserves scant consideration. It is the finding of both the

Labor Arbiter and the NLRC - which, significantly, the CA did not

disturb - that petitioner was forced to work long after the term of her

original POEA-approved contract, through the illegal acts of the

foreign employer.

We look upon with great disfavor the unsubstantiated actuations of

innocence or ignorance on the part of local recruitment agencies of

acts of their foreign principals, as if the agencies' responsibility ends

with the deployment of the worker. In the light of the recruitment

agency's legally mandated joint and several liability with the foreign

employer for all claims in connection with the implementation of the

contract, it is the recruitment agency's responsibility to ensure that the

terms and conditions of the employment contract, as approved by the

POEA, are faithfully complied with and implemented properly by its

foreign client/principal. Indeed, it is in its best interest to do so to avoid



being haled to the courts or labor tribunals and defend itself from suits

for acts of its foreign principal.

On whether petitioner's claims for underpaid salaries have prescribed

It should be recalled that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC similarly

found that petitioner is entitled to underpaid salaries, albeit they

differed in the number of months for which salary differentials should

be paid. The CA, on the other hand, held that all of petitioner's

monetary claims have prescribed pursuant to Article 291 of the Labor

Code which provides that:

Art. 291. Money Claims. - All money claims arising from employer-

employee relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be

filed within three years from the time that cause of action accrued;

otherwise, they shall be forever barred. (emphasis supplied)

We do not agree with the CA when it held that the cause of action of

petitioner had already prescribed as the three-year prescriptive periodshould be reckoned from September 1, 1989 when petitioner was

forced to sign another contract against her will. As stated in the

complaint, one of petitioner's causes of action was for underpayment

of salaries. The NLRC correctly ruled the right to claim unpaid salaries

(or in this case, unpaid salary differentials) accrue as they fall due.24

Thus, petitioner's cause of action to claim salary differential for

October 1989 only accrued after she had rendered service for that

month (or at the end of October 1989). Her right to claim salary

differential for November 1989 only accrued at the end of November1989, and so on and so forth.

Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found that petitioner was forced

to work until April 1993. Interestingly, the CA did not disturb this

finding but held only that the extent of respondent's liability was

limited to the term under the original contract or, at most, to the term

of the subsequent contract entered into with the participation of

respondent's foreign principal, i.e. 1991. We have discussed

previously the reasons why (a) the CA's theory of limited liability on

the part of respondent is untenable and (b) the petitioner has a right to

be compensated for all months she, in fact, was forced to work. To

determine for which months petitioner's right to claim salary

differentials has not prescribed, we must count three years prior to the

filing of the complaint on May 31, 1995. Thus, only claims accruing

prior to May 31, 1992 have prescribed when the complaint was filed

on May 31, 1995. Petitioner is entitled to her claims for salary

differentials for the period May 31, 1992 to April 1993, or

approximately eleven (11) months.25



G.R. No. 152214 September 19, 2006

EQUI-ASIA PLACEMENT, INC., petitioner,

vs. DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (DFA) represented by

the HON. DOMINGO L. SIAZON, JR., SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT

OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT (DOLE), represented by HON.

BIENVENIDO LAGUESMA, respondents.

Facts:

On September 2000, Manny dela Rosa Razon, a native of Lemery,

Batangas and an overseas Filipino worker, died of acute cardiac

arrest while asleep (bangungot) at the dormitory of the Samsong

Textile Processing Factory in South Korea. Informed thereof, the

Philippine Overseas Labor Office (POLO) at South Korea immediately

relayed the incident to the Philippine Embassy in South Korea.

Forthwith, the [Labor] Attaché of the Philippine Embassy dispatched a

letter to Eleuterio Gardiner, administrator of the Overseas WorkersWelfare Administration (OWWA), telling him about what happened

and to inform the relatives of Razon.

In turn, the OWWA indorsed the matter, for appropriate action, to

Director R. Casco of the Welfare Employment Office of the Philippine

Overseas Employment Administration (WEO-POEA).

Upon verification by the WEO-POEA on its data base, it was

discovered that Manny Razon was recruited and deployed by Equi-

Asia Placement, and was sent to South Korea in April 2000 to work-train at Yeongjin Machinery, Inc. Thereupon, POEA addressed the

first assailed telegram-directive to the President/GM of the petitioner.

We quote the telegram:

"PLEASE PROVIDE PTA [Prepaid Ticket Advice] FOR THE

REPATRIATION OF REMAINS AND BELONGINGS OF OFW

MANNY DELA ROSA RAZON AS PER REQUEST OF PHILIPPINE

EMBASSY, KOREA, YOU ARE GIVEN TWO (2) DAYS FROM

RECEIPT HEREOF WITHIN WHICH TO PROVIDE SAID TICKET

AND ASSISTANCE, FAILURE TO DO SO WILL CONSTRAIN US TO

IMPOSE APPROPRIATE SANCTION UNDER OUR RULES"

Responding thereto, petitioner, thru its President Daniel Morga, Jr.,

faxed the following message to the Assistance and Welfare Division of

the POEA:

"In connection with your telegram, this is to report to your good office

the following:

2. He violated his employment/training/dispatching contracts on June

25, 2000 by unlawfully escaping/running away (TNT) from his

company assignment without prior KFSMB authorization and

working/staying in unknown company/place;

In view thereof, we cannot heed your requests as embodied in your

telegram. However, his relatives can avail of the benefits provided for

by OWWA in cases involving undocumented/illegal Filipino workers

abroad.

On the same date, Director Casco of the WEO-POEA sent to the

petitioner the second assailed letter-directive, which pertinently reads:

"Mmay we remind you that pursuant to Sections 52, 53, 54 and 55 of

the Implementing Rules Governing RA 8042, otherwise known as the

Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995, the repatriation of

OFW, his/her remains and transport of his personal effects is the

primary responsibility of the principal or agency and to immediately

advance the cost of plane fare without prior determination of thecause of worker's repatriation. The Rules further provide for the

procedure to be followed in cases when the foreign employer/agency

fails to provide for the cost of the repatriation, compliance of which is

punishable by suspension of the license of the agency or such

sanction as the Administration shall deem proper. Hence, you are

required to provide the PTA for the deceased OFW in compliance with

the requirement in accordance with R.A. 8042. You are given forty-

eight (48) hours upon receipt hereof within which to provide said

ticket. Failure in this regard will constrain us to impose the appropriate

sanction under our rules.



Petitioner wrote back Director Casco, thus:

"Please be informed that under the provisions of Section 53 as well

as, and in relation to, Section 55 of the Omnibus Rules and

Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas

Filipinos Act of 1995, the action to be imposed by POEA for non-

compliance therewith within 48 hours are violative of due process

and/or the principle on due delegation of power.

This is so because Sec. 15 of R.A. 8042 clearly contemplates prior

notice and hearing before responsibility thereunder could be

established against the agency that sets up the defense of sole fault –

in avoidance of said responsibility. Besides, the sections in question

unduly grant the powers to require advance payment of the plane

fare, to impose the corresponding penalty of suspension in case of

non-compliance therewith, when the law itself does not expressly

provide for the grant of such powers.

Nonetheless, and apprehensive of the adverse repercussions which

may ensue on account of its non-compliance with the directive,

petitioner advanced under protest the costs for the repatriation of the

remains of Razon.

CA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition.CA stated that

petitioner was mainly accusing the POEA of grave abuse of discretion

when it ordered petitioner to pay, in advance, the costs for the

repatriation of the remains of Razon.CA ruled that POEA did not

commit any grave abuse of discretion as its directives to petitionerwere issued pursuant to existing laws and regulations. It likewise held

that a petition for certiorari, which was the remedy availed of by

petitioner, is not the proper remedy as the same is only available

when "there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy

in the ordinary course of law." Section 62 of the Omnibus Rules and

Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas

Filipinos Act of 1995 or Republic Act 8042 ("Omnibus Rules") states

that "the Labor Arbiters of NLRC shall have the original and exclusive

jurisdiction to hear and decide all claims arising out of employer-

employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving

Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual,

moral, exemplary and other forms of damages, subject to the rules

and procedures of the NLRC." There is, therefore, an adequate

remedy available to petitioner.

Lastly, the Court of Appeals declared that it could not strike down as

unconstitutional Sections 52, 53, 54, and 55 of the Omnibus Rules as

the unconstitutionality of a statute or rules may not be passed uponunless the issue is directly raised in an appropriate proceeding.

Issue: W/N CA erred in dismissing the petition.

Held: No

Ratio:

At the center of this petition are the following provisions of the

omnibus rules:

Section 52. Primary Responsibility for Repatriation. – The repatriation

of the worker, or his/her remains, and the transport of his/her personal

effects shall be the primary responsibility of the principal or agency

which recruited or deployed him/her abroad. All costs attendant

thereto shall be borne by the principal or the agency concerned.

Section 53. Repatriation of Workers. – The primary responsibility to

repatriate entails the obligation on the part of principal or agency to

advance the cost of plane fare and to immediately repatriate the

worker should the need for it arise, without a prior determination of thecause of the termination of the worker's employment. However, after

the worker has returned to the country, the principal or agency may

recover the cost of repatriation from the worker if the termination of

employment was due solely to his/her fault.

Every contract for overseas employment shall provide for the primary

responsibility of agency to advance the cost of plane fare, and the

obligation of the worker to refund the cost thereof in case his/her fault

is determined by the Labor Arbiter.



Section 54. Repatriation Procedure. – When a need for repatriation

arises and the foreign employer fails to provide for it cost, the

responsible personnel at site shall simultaneously notify OWWA and

the POEA of such need. The POEA shall notify the agency concerned

of the need for repatriation. The agency shall provide the plane ticket

or the prepaid ticket advice (PTA) to the Filipinos Resource Center or

to the appropriate Philippine Embassy; and notify POEA of such

compliance. The POEA shall inform OWWA of the action of theagency.

Section 55. Action on Non-Compliance. – If the employment agency

fails to provide the ticket or PTA within 48 hours from receipt of the

notice, the POEA shall suspend the license of the agency or impose

such sanctions as it may deem necessary. Upon notice from the

POEA, OWWA shall advance the costs of repatriation with recourse to

the agency or principal. The administrative sanction shall not be lifted

until the agency reimburses the OWWA of the cost of repatriation with

legal interest.

Said provisions, on the other hand, are supposed to implement

Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042 which provides:

SEC. 15. Repatriation of Workers; Emergency Repatriation Fund. –

The repatriation of the worker and the transport of his personal

belongings shall be the primary responsibility of the agency which,

recruited or deployed the worker overseas. All costs attendant to

repatriation shall be borne by or charged to the agency concerned

and/or its principal. Likewise, the repatriation of remains and transportof the personal belongings of a deceased worker and all costs

attendant thereto shall be borne by the principal and/or the local

agency. However, in cases where the termination of employment is

due solely to the fault of the worker, the principal/employer or agency

shall not in any manner be responsible for the repatriation of the

former and/or his belongings.

It bears emphasizing that administrative bodies are vested with two

basic powers, the quasi-legislative and the quasi-judicial. In Abella, Jr.

v. Civil Service Commission, we discussed the nature of these powers

to be –

In exercising its quasi-judicial function, an administrative body

adjudicates the rights of persons before it, in accordance with the

standards laid down by the law. The determination of facts and the

applicable law, as basis for official action and the exercise of judicial

discretion, are essential for the performance of this function. On theseconsiderations, it is elementary that due process requirements, as

enumerated in Ang Tibay, must be observed. These requirements

include prior notice and hearing.

On the other hand, quasi-legislative power is exercised by

administrative agencies through the promulgation of rules and

regulations within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine

of non-delegation of certain powers flowing from the separation of the

great branches of the government. Prior notice to and hearing of

every affected party, as elements of due process, are not requiredsince there is no determination of past events or facts that have to be

established or ascertained. As a general rule, prior notice and hearing

are not essential to the validity of rules or regulations promulgated to

govern future conduct.

In this case, petitioner assails certain provisions of the Omnibus

Rules. However, these rules were clearly promulgated by DFA and

DOLE the exercise of their quasi-legislative powers or the authority to

promulgate rules and regulations. Because of this, petitioner was,

thus, mistaken in availing himself of the remedy of an original actionfor certiorari as obviously, only judicial or quasi-judicial acts are proper

subjects thereof. If only for these, the petition deserves outright

dismissal. Be that as it may, we shall proceed to resolve the

substantive issues raised in this petition for review in order to finally

remove the doubt over the validity of Sections 52, 53, 54, and 55 of

the Omnibus Rules.

It is now well-settled that delegation of legislative power to various

specialized administrative agencies is allowed in the face of

increasing complexity of modern life. Hence, the need to delegate to



administrative bodies, as the principal agencies tasked to execute

laws with respect to their specialized fields, the authority to

promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and

effectuate its policies. All that is required for the valid exercise of this

power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation must be

germane to the objects and purposes of the law; and that the

regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the

standards prescribed by the law. Under the first test or the so-calledcompleteness test, the law must be complete in all its terms and

conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the

delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The second

test or the sufficient standard test, mandates that there should be

adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the

boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from

running riot.

Basically, petitioner is impugning the subject provisions of the

Omnibus Rules for allegedly expanding the scope of Section 15 ofRepublic Act No. 8042 by: first, imposing upon it the primary

obligation to repatriate the remains of Razon including the duty to

advance the cost of the plane fare for the transport of Razon's

remains; and second, by ordering it to do so without prior

determination of the existence of employer-employee relationship

between itself and Razon.

Petitioner's argument that Section 15 does not provide that it shall be

primarily responsible for the repatriation of a deceased OFW is

specious and plain nitpicking. While Republic Act No. 8042 does notexpressly state that petitioner shall be primarily obligated to transport

back here to the Philippines the remains of Razon, nevertheless, such

duty is imposed upon him as the statute clearly dictates that "the

repatriation of remains and transport of the personal belongings of a

deceased worker and all costs attendant thereto shall be borne by the

principal and/or the local agency." The mandatory nature of said

obligation is characterized by the legislature's use of the word "shall."

That the concerned government agencies opted to demand the

performance of said responsibility solely upon petitioner does not

make said directives invalid as the law plainly obliges a local

placement agency to bear the burden of repatriating the remains of a

deceased OFW with or without recourse to the principal abroad.

Nor do we see any reason to stamp Section 53 of the Omnibus Rules

as invalid for allegedly contravening Section 15 of the law which

states that a placement agency shall not be responsible for a worker's

repatriation should the termination of the employer-employeerelationship be due to the fault of the OFW. To our mind, the statute

merely states the general principle that in case the severance of the

employment was because of the OFW's own undoing, it is only fair

that he or she should shoulder the costs of his or her homecoming.

Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042, however, certainly does not

preclude a placement agency from establishing the circumstances

surrounding an OFW's dismissal from service in an appropriate

proceeding. As such determination would most likely take some time,

it is only proper that an OFW be brought back here in our country at

the soonest possible time lest he remains stranded in a foreign landduring the whole time that recruitment agency contests its liability for

repatriation. As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General –

Such a situation is unacceptable.

24. This is the same reason why repatriation is made by law an

obligation of the agency and/or its principal without the need of first

determining the cause of the termination of the worker's employment.

Repatriation is in effect an unconditional responsibility of the agency

and/or its principal that cannot be delayed by an investigation of whythe worker was terminated from employment. To be left stranded in a

foreign land without the financial means to return home and being at

the mercy of unscrupulous individuals is a violation of the OFW's

dignity and his human rights. These are the same rights R.A. No.

8042 seeks to protect.

As for the sufficiency of standard test, this Court had, in the past,

accepted as sufficient standards the following: "public interest,"

"justice and equity," "public convenience and welfare," and "simplicity,

economy and welfare."

labor 02 - 03 (aug 24 sept 7) pnb - equiasia

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