ART 219- LABOR DISPUTE10. SAN MIGUEL VS BERSAMIRASan Miguel Corp Employees Union v. Bersamira - Labor dispute is defined under the LC as any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. As the case is indisputably linked with a labor dispute because it dwells on the terms, tenure and conditions of their employment, jurisdiction belongs to the labor tribunals. Ratio: A labor dispute can nevertheless exist “regardlessof whether the disputants stand in the proximaterelationship of employerand employee”. The existence of a labor dispute is not negativedby the fact that the plaintiffs and defendants do not stand in the proximate relation of employer andemployee.

“Labor dispute”- "any controversy or matterconcerning terms and conditions of employment or theassociation or representation of persons in negotiating,fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms andconditions of employment, regardless of whether thedisputants stand in the proximate relation of employerand employee." (Art. 212(1), LC)-Conclusion: Controversy is a labor dispute.Layno vs. de la Cruz (1965) is not controlling( its members be hired as stevedores in the placeof the members of a rival union… not a labor dispute.) As to jurisdiction, Rule: Labor Arbiters have original andexclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the followingcases involving all workers including "1. unfair laborpractice cases; 2. those that workers may file involvingwages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment; ... and 5. cases arising from any violation of Article 265 of this Code, including questions involvingthe legality of striker and lockouts. ..."Conclusion: Labor arbiter has jurisdictionAs to jurisdiction, SMC proposition: regular Courts fordamages under Arts. 19, 20 & 21Conclusion: claim for damages is interwoven with alabor dispute existing between the parties and wouldhave to be ventilated before the administrativemachinery established for the expeditious settlement of those disputesImplication: to rule otherwise will result to “split jurisdiction”, obnoxious to the orderly administrationof justice

11. GOLD CITY VS NLRC

GOLD CITY INTEGRATED PORT SERVICES, INC. VS. NLRC 189 SCRA 811 FACTS 1. Private respondent Jose Bacalso was employed as an admeasurer by petitioner Gold City. 2. He was suspected by management of undermeasuring cargo. Hence, the cargo control officer ordered two other admeasurers to re-measure three pallets of bananas which had already been measured by private respondent. 3. As it turned out, the re-measurement revealed that respondent had under-measured the bananas by 1.427 cubic meters. 4. Feeling insulted by the re-measurement, private respondent confronted and quarreled with Mabalacad, on of the two admeasurers, in the office of Chief Admeasurer Guangco. Guangco told the two to stop fighting and behave properly but this order was ignored and a fistfight ensued. 5. Thereafter, private respondent was charged with assaulting a co-employee and falsifying reports and records of the company. He was then preventively suspended pending investigation of the grievance committee. 6. The committee recommended a forty-five day suspension but apparently, Guanco and Mabalacad did not consider suspension an adequate sanction. 7. Subsequently, private respondent received a notice of termination upon the grounds of assaulting a co-employee and of insubordination. 8. Private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter, which granted such motion but did not order respondent’s reinstatement. 9. On appeal, the NLRC modified the ruling of the Labor Arbiter. ISSUE 1. Whether or not private respondent was denied due process in the course of his dismissal. 2. Whether or not private respondent was dismissed for a just cause. HELD It must be noted that petitioner did not properly inform private respondent of all the infractions of company regulations which subsequently became the justification for his dismissal. After being preventively suspended, he was charged with assaulting a coemployee and falsifying reports and records of the company relating to his duties. But it came to pass that when private respondent received his notice of termination, the causes therefor were stated as assault on a co-employee and insubordination. The Court considers that there was here at least a partial deprivation of private respondent’s right to procedural due process. He could not be expected adequately to defend himself as he was not fully or correctly informed of the charges against him which management intend to prove. It is less than fair for management to charge an employee with one offense and then to dismiss him for having committed another offense with which he had not been charged against and which he was therefore unable adequately to defend himself. Willful disobedience of the employer’s lawful orders, as a just cause for the dismissal of an employee, envisages the concurrence of at least two requisites: that the employee’s assailed conduct must have been willful or intentional, the willfulness being

characterized by a “wrongful and perverse attitude”; and the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. Both requisites are present in the instant case. It does not follow, however, that private respondent’s services were lawfully terminated. We believe that not every case of insubordination id reasonably penalized with dismissal. For one thing, Article 282 (a) of the Labor Code refers to “serious misconduct or willful disobedience. There must be reasonably proportionality between the willful disobedience by the employee and the penalty imposed therefor.

COLLECTIVE BARGAININGKIOK LOY VS NLRC In a certification election held, the Pambansang Kilusang Paggawa, a legitimate late labor federation, won and was subsequently certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Sweden Ice Cream Plant. The Union furnished the Company with two copies of its proposed collective bargaining agreement. At the same time, it requested the Company for its counter proposals but the requests were ignored and remained unacted upon by the Company. As a result, the Union filed a "Notice of Strike", with the BLR on the ground of unresolved economic issues in collective bargaining. In the labor arbiter: due to series of postponements, and non-appearance at the hearing conducted it ruled that the Company has waived its right to present further evidence and, therefore, considered the case submitted for resolution. NLRC: ruled that respondent Sweden Ice Cream is guilty of unjustified refusal to bargain, in violation of Section (g) Article 248 (now Article 249) Issue: WON respondent is guilty of unjustified refusal to bargain?

Held: YESThe Court affirmed the NLRC, and ruled that, petitioner Company is GUILTY of unfair labor practice, because the jurisdictional preconditions of Collective Bargaining establish such as:1. possession of the majority representation;2. proof of majority representation;3. a demand to bargain under Article 251, par. (a) Collective bargaining which is defined as negotiations towards a collective agreement, is one of the democratic frameworks under the New Labor Code, designed to stabilize the relation between labor and management and to create a climate of sound and stable industrial peace. It is a mutual responsibility of the employer and the Union and is characterized as a legal obligation.

In the case at bar, (1) respondent Union was a duly certified bargaining agent; (2) it made a definite request to bargain, accompanied with a copy of the proposed Collective Bargaining Agreement, to the Company not only once but

twice which were left unanswered and unacted upon; and (3) the Company made no counter proposal whatsoever all of which conclusively indicate lack of a sincere desire to negotiate.

From the overall conduct of the company, it is indubitably shown that it disregarded its obligation to bargain in good faith.

WORKER ENLIGHTENMENTDAVAO INTEGRATED VS OLVIDAWORKER ENLIGHTENMENT, ARTICLES 211 (d), 277 (a), 241 (p) (1) To promote the enlightenment of workers concerning their rights and obligations as union members and as employees; (2) All unions are authorized to collect reasonable membership fees, union dues, assessments and fines and other contributions for labor education and research, mutual death and hospitalization benefits, welfare fund, strike fund and credit and cooperative undertakings. (3) It shall be the duty of any labor organization and its officers to inform its members on the provisions of its constitution and bylaws, collective bargaining agreement, the prevailing labor relations system and all their rights and obligations under existing labor laws. For this purpose, registered labor organizations may assess reasonable dues to finance labor relations seminars and other labor education activities. Any violation of the above rights and conditions of membership shall be a ground for cancellation of union registration or expulsion of officers from office, whichever is appropriate. At least thirty percent (30%) of the members of a union or any member or members specially concerned may report such violation to the Bureau. The Bureau shall have the power to hear and decide any reported violation to mete the appropriate penalty. Criminal and civil liabilities arising from violations of above rights and conditions of membership shall continue to be under the jurisdiction of ordinary courts. VICTORIA V. INCIONG (1988) • Victoria was employed in Far East Broadcasting Company. He later together with other employees organized an employee’s union. They sought recognition from the company but the latter maintained that they cannot as they are not under the scope of the Industrial Peace Act. Despite conciliation efforts and advise by the NCMB that they cannot be recognized as the broadcasting company is not included in the Industrial Peace Act, they staged a strike. This prompted the company to file for damages and preliminary injunction. Petitioner was subsequently dismissed from the company and he alleged that he was illegally dismissed since prior clearance is needed from the Secretary before the dismissal of employees or cessation of business. HELD: Technically speaking, no clearance was obtained by private respondent from the then Secretary of Labor, the last step towards full compliance with the requirements of law on the matter of dismissal of

employees. However, the rationale behind the clearance requirement was fully met. The Secretary of Labor was apprised of private respondent's intention to terminate the services of petitioner. This in effect is an application for clearance to dismiss petitioner from employment. The affirmance of the restrictive condition in the dispositive portion of the labor arbiter's decision in NLRC Case Nos. 0021 and 0285 by the Secretary of Labor and the Office of the President of the Philippines, signifies a grant of authority to dismiss petitioner in case the strike is declared illegal by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Consequently and as correctly stated by the Solicitor General, private respondent acted in good faith when it terminated the employment of petitioner upon a declaration of illegality of the strike by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Moreover, the then Secretary of Labor manifested his conformity to the dismissal, not once, but twice. In this regard, the mandatory rule on clearance need not be applied. The strike staged by the union in 1972 was a futile move. The law then enforced, Republic Act 875 specifically excluded respondent company from its coverage. Even if the parties had gone to court to compel recognition, no positive relief could have been obtained since the same was not sanctioned by law. Because of this, there was no necessity on the part of private respondent to show specific acts of petitioner during the strike to justify his dismissal. This is a matter of responsibility and of answerability. Petitioner as a union leader, must see to it that the policies and activities of the union in the conduct of labor relations are within the precepts of law and any deviation LABOR 2 DISINI NOTES (PART 2: LABOR RELATIONS) 6 MA. ANGELA AGUINALDO ATENEO LAW 2010 from the legal boundaries shall be imputable to the leader. He bears the responsibility of guiding the union along the path of law and to cause the union to demand what is not legally demandable, would foment anarchy which is a prelude to chaos. Petitioner should have known and it was his duty to impart this imputed knowledge to the members of the union that employees and laborers in non- profit organizations are not covered by the provisions of the Industrial Peace Act and the Court of Industrial Relations [in the case at bar, the Court of First Instance] has no jurisdiction to entertain petitions of labor unions or organizations of said non-profit organizations for certification as the exclusive bargaining representatives of said employees and laborers.

TEST ON EXISTENCE OF RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE

PAL VS NLRCIn PAL v. NLRC, it was held that the right exists but the employee doesn’t have the veto power. • It just means that the right is qualified and is not absolute. The right only exists for those affecting their rights and welfare. Nonetheless, they don’t have the power to veto. FACTS- On March 15, 1985, the Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) completely revised its 1966 Code of Discipline. TheCode was circulated among the employees and was immediately implemented, and some employees wereforthwith subjected to the disciplinary measures embodied therein.- PALEA alleged that copies of the Code had been circulated in limited numbers; that being penal in naturethe Code must

conform with the requirements of sufficient publication, and that the Code was arbitrary,oppressive, and prejudicial to the rights of the employees. It prayed that implementation of the Code beheld in abeyance; that PAL should discuss the substance of the Code with PALEA; that employeesdismissed under the Code be reinstated and their cases subjected to further hearing; and that PAL bedeclared guilty of unfair labor practice and be ordered to pay damages (pp. 7-14, Record.).HELD- Indeed, industrial peace cannot be achieved if the employees are denied their just participation in thediscussion of matters affecting their rights. Thus, even before Article 211 of the Labor Code (P.D. 442) wasamended by Republic Act No. 6715, it was already declared a policy of the State: "(d) To promote theenlightenment of workers concerning their rights and obligations . . .as employees." This was, of course,amplified by Republic Act No. 6715 when it decreed the "participation of workers in decision and policymaking processes affecting their rights, duties and welfare." PAL's position that it cannot be saddled withthe "obligation" of sharing management prerogatives as during the formulation of the Code, Republic ActNo. 6715 had not yet been enacted (Petitioner's Memorandum, p. 44; Rollo, p. 212), cannot thus besustained. While such "obligation" was not yet founded in law when the Code was formulated, theattainment of a harmonious labor-management relationship and the then already existing state policy of enlightening workers concerning their rights as employees demand no less than the observance of transparency in managerial moves affecting employees' rights. PAL v. NLRCG.R. No. 85985August 13, 1993Facts:PAL completely revised its 1966 Code of Discipline. The Code was circulated among the employees and was immediately implemented, and some employees were forthwith subjected to the disciplinary measures embodied therein.The Philippine Airlines Employees Association (PALEA) filed a complaint before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). PALEA contended that PAL, by itsunilateral implementation of the Code, was guilty of unfair labor practice, specifically Paragraphs E and G of Article 249 and Article 253 of the Labor Code. PALEA alleged that copies of the Code had been circulated in limited numbers; thatbeing penal in nature the Code must conform with the requirements of sufficientpublication, and that the Code was arbitrary, oppressive, and prejudicial to the rights of the employees.It prayed that implementation of the Code be held in abeyance; that PAL should discuss the substance of the Code with PALEA; that employees dismissed under theCode be reinstated and their cases subjected to further hearing; and that PAL bedeclared guilty of unfair labor practice and be ordered to pay damagesPAL asserted its prerogative as an employer to

prescibe rules and regulations regarding employess' conduct in carrying out their duties and functions, and alleging that by implementing the Code, it had not violated the collective bargainingagreement (CBA) or any provision of the Labor Code. Assailing the complaint asunsupported by evidence, PAL maintained that Article 253 of the Labor Code citedby PALEA reffered to the requirements for negotiating a CBA which was inapplicable as indeed the current CBA had been negotiated.Issue:W/N the formulation of a Code of Discipline among employees is a shared responsibility of the employer and the employees.Ruling:Petitioner's assertion that it needed the implementation of a new Code of Discipline considering the nature of its business cannot be overemphasized. In fact, its being a local monopoly in the business demands the most stringent of measuresto attain safe travel for its patrons. Nonetheless, whatever disciplinary measures are adopted cannot be properly implemented in the absence of full cooperation of the employees. Such cooperation cannot be attained if the employees are restive on account, of their being left out in the determination of cardinal and fundamental matters affecting their employment

VASSAR VS ESTRELLAFacts: There was in existence a collective bargaining agreement between private respondents Associated Labor Unions and Vassar Industries, Inc. which expired on May 15, 1977. Prior to such date, 111 of a total number of 150 employees of such firm disaffiliated from the former labor organization and formed their own union. Thereafter, they filed an application for registration of their union with the Bureau of Labor Relations, complying with an the requirements of both the Labor Code and its implementing regulations. While such application was pending, petitioner Union filed a petition for certification as bargaining agent for the rank-and-file employees of the company. The Med-Arbiter, on May 24, 1977, denied their plea on the ground that the union was not duly registered with the Department of Labor. Then came a motion for reconsideration praying that the dismissal be set aside until action be taken on its pending application for registration.

On July 5, 1977, respondent Estrella, then Acting Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, denied, as previously noted, the application for registration "on the ground that there is a registered collective bargaining agent in the company." Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the refusal of respondent Francisco L. Estrella, then the Acting Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, to register petitioner Vassar Industries Employees Union was proper

Held: NO. Petitioner Union should be registered, there being no legal obstacle to such a step and the duty of the Bureau of Labor Relations being clear in this regard. "Once the fact of disaffiliation has been demonstrated beyond doubt, as in this case, a certification election is the most expeditious way of determining which labor organization is to be the exclusive bargaining representative."

In U.E. Automotive Employees and Workers Union v. Noriel, reference was made to the fact that a notable feature of our Constitution is that "freedom of association is explicitly ordained; it is not merely derivative, peripheral or penumbral, as is the case in the United States. It can trace its origin to the Malolos Constitution." In Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Pan American Employees Association: "There is both a constitutional and statutory recognition that laborers have the right to form unions to take care of their interests vis-a-viz their employees. Their freedom to form organizations would be rendered nugatory if they could not choose their own leaders to speak on their behalf and to bargain for them." It cannot be otherwise, for the freedom to choose which labor organization to join is an aspect of the constitutional mandate of protection to labor. Prior to the Industrial Peace Act, there was a statute setting for the guidelines for the registration of labor unions.”

Furthermore, the Court in Philippine Labor Alliance Council v. Bureau of Labor Relations held that: "It is indisputable that the present controversy would not have arisen if there were no mass disaffiliation from petitioning union. Such a phenomenon is nothing new in the Philippine labor movement. Nor is it open to any legal objection. It is implicit in the freedom of association explicitly ordained by the Constitution. There is then the incontrovertible right of any individual to join an organization of his choice. That option belongs to him. A workingman is not to be denied that liberty. He may be, as a matter of fact, more in need of it the institution of collective bargaining as an aspect of industrial democracy is to succeed. No obstacle that may possibly thwart the desirable objective of militancy in labor's struggle for better terms and conditions is then to be placed on his way. Once the fact of disaffiliation has been demonstrated beyond doubt, as in this case, a certification election is the most expeditious way of determining which labor organization is to be the exclusive bargaining representative. It is as simple as that." Singer Sewing Machine vs. DrilonFACTS: The respondent union filed a petition for direct certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of allcollectors of petitioner company. The company opposed the petition on the ground that the union members areactually not employees but are independent contractor based on the collection agency agreement which theysigned. The respondent asserted that they perform the most desirable and necessary activities for the continuousand effective operations of the business of the petitioner. They contended that the collectors are employeesbecause the agent shall utilize only receipt forms

authorized and issued by the company. Monthly collection quotawas also required by the company.ISSUE:W/N ER-EE relationship exists between petitioner and respondentHELD:Applying the control test, there is no ER-EE relationship exists. Hence, if the union members are notemployees, no right for purposes of bargaining, nor to be certified as such bargaining agent can ever berecognized.Not all collecting agents are employees and neither are all collecting agents independent contractors. The requirement that collection agents utilize only receipt forms and report forms issued by the companyand reports shall be submitted at least once a week is not necessarily an indication of control over the means bywhich the job of collection is to be performed. The monthly collection quota is a normal requirement. It is clear that the company and each collectingagent intended that the company take control only over the amount of collection, which is the result of the jobperformed.No such words as to hire and employ are present. Moreover, the agreement did not fix an amount for wagesnor the required working hours. Compensation is earned only on the basis of the tangible results produced such asthe total collections made. There is also nothing in the agreement which implies control by the company over themeans and methods in achieving the end.Since private respondents are not employees of the company, they are not entitled to the constitutionalright to join or form a labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining.Wherefore, the petition for certification election is dismissed.

METROLAB INDUSTRIES V. ROLDAN-CONFESSOR The Secretary, in deciding the dispute between the union and employer, held that executive secretaries are included in the bargaining unit composed of rank-and-file employees. HELD: Although Article 245 of the Labor Code limits the ineligibility to join, form and assist any labor organization to managerial employees, jurisprudence has extended this prohibition to confidential employees or those who by reason of their positions or nature of work are required to assist or act in a fiduciary manner to managerial employees and hence, are likewise privy to sensitive and highly confidential records. The rationale for this inhibition has been stated to be, because if these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict of interests. The union can also become company-dominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union membership. It may likewise be the source of undue advantage wherein these employees may act as spies for either party to a collective bargaining activity. Furthermore, in the collective bargaining process, managerial employees are supposed to be on the side of the employer, to act as its representatives, and to see to it that its interest are well protected. The employer is not assured of such protection if these employees themselves are union members. Collective bargaining in such a situation can become one-sided. It is the same reason that impelled this Court to consider the position of confidential employees as included in the disqualification found in Art. 245 as if the disqualification of confidential employees were written in the provision. If

confidential employees could unionize in order to bargain for advantages for themselves, then they could be governed by their own motives rather than the interest of the employers. Moreover, unionization of confidential employees for the purpose of collective bargaining would mean the extension of the law to persons or individuals who are supposed to act "in the interest of the employers. It is not farfetched that in the course of collective bargaining, they might jeopardize that interest which they are duty-bound to protect…

REYES VS TRAJANOFACTS -The officer-in-charge of the Bureau of Labor Relations (Hon. Cresenciano Trajano) sustained the denial by the Med Arbiter of the right to vote of one hundred forty-one (141) members of the “Iglesia ni Kristo” (INK), all employed in the same company, at a certification election at which two (2) labor organizations were contesting the right to be the exclusive representative of the employees in the bargaining unit. -The certification election was authorized to be conducted by the Bureau of Labor Relations among the employees of Tri-Union Industries Corporation on October 20, 1987. The competing unions were the Tri-Union Employees Union-Organized Labor Association in Line Industries and Agriculture (TUEU-OLALIA), and Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS). Of the 348 workers initially deemed to be qualified voters, only240 actually took part in the election, conducted under the supervision of the Bureau of Labor Relations. Among the 240 employees who cast their votes were 141 members of the INK. The ballots provided for three (3) choices. They provided for votes to be cast, of course, for either of the two (2) contending labor organizations, (a) TUPAS and (b) TUEU-OLALIA; and, conformably with established rule and practice, 1 for (c) a third choice: “NO UNION.” The final tally of the votes showed the following results: TUPAS 1 TUEU-OLALIA 95 NO UNION 1 SPOILED 1 CHALLENGED 141

ISSUE/S 1.WON the members of the INC should not be allowed to vote “because they refused to participate in the previous certification elections.” 2.WON the NLRC was correct in saying that “if the workers who are members of the Iglesia ni Kristo in the exercise of their religious belief opted not to join any labor organization as a consequence of which they themselves can not have a bargainingART. 242. Rights of legitimate labor organizations. -A legitimate labor organization shall have the right: (a) To act as the representative of its members for the purpose of collective bargaining;(b) To be certified as the exclusive representative of all the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining;(c) To be furnished by the employer, upon written request, with its annual audited financial statements, including the balance sheet and the profit and loss statement, within thirty (30) calendar days from the date of receipt of the request, after the union has been duly recognized by the employer or certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the bargaining unit, or within sixty (60) calendar days before the expiration of the existing collective bargaining agreement, or during the collective bargaining negotiation;(d) To own property, real or personal, for the use and benefit of the labor organization and its members;(e) To sue and be sued in its registered name; and(f) To undertake all other activities designed to benefit the organization and its members, including cooperative, housing, welfare and other projects not contrary to law. Notwithstanding any provision of a general or special law to the contrary, the income and the properties of legitimate labor organizations, including grants, endowments, gifts, donations and contributions they may receive from fraternal and similar organizations, local or foreign, which are actually, directly and exclusively used for their lawful purposes, shall be free from taxes, duties and other assessments. The exemptions provided herein may be withdrawn only by a special law expressly repealing this provision.

Art 256 NON ABRIDGEMENT OF RIGHT TO SELF ORGANIZATION

GENERAL RUBBER VS BLRPetitioner is a corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing rubber sandals and oilier rubber products. In 1985, the Samahang Manggagawa sa General Rubber Corporation — ANGLO was formed by the daily paid — rank and file employees as their union for collective bargaining, after the expiration on October 15, 1985 of the collective bargaining agreement previously executed by petitioner with General Rubber Workers Union (Independent) on October 15, 1982. Be it noted however that on July 17, 1985, the monthly — paid employees of the petitioner-corporation, after forming their own collective bargaining unit

the National Association of Trade Unions of Monthly Paid Employees-NATU, filed a petition for direct certification with tile Bureau of Labor Relations which petition was opposed by herein petitioner. On September 2, 1985, the Med-Arbiter issued an Order for the holding of a certification election after finding that a certification election is in order in this case and observing that it is the fairest remedy to determine whether employees of petitioner desire to have a union or not. On appeal, the Bureau of Labor Relations denied both the appeal and motion for reconsideration interposed by petitioner and affirmed the ruling of the Med-Arbiter. Hence, the present petition, imputing serious error's of law and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Bureau of Labor Relations in issuing the assailed order which sanctioned the creation of two (2) bargaining units within petitioner-corporation.ISSUE: WON The Bureau of Labor Relations committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that supervisors, employees perform- ing managerial, confidential and technical functions and office personnel, who are negotiated by petitioner to be excluded from the existing bargaining unit because they are performing vital functions to management, can form and join a labor organization and be members of the new bargaining unit.HELD:We deem it necessary to examine the respective functions of the employees. It appears therefrom that they perform supervisory functions. Verily they make recommendation petitions as to what Managerial actions to take in disciplinary cases. However, that fact alone does not make them managerial employees already, It is more a question of how effective are those recommendations which aspect has not been clearly established in this case. As defined in the Labor Code, a "managerial employee is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees, or to effectively recommend such managerial actions." Thus, employees who do not fall within this definition are considered rank-and-file employees.. It has been the policy of the Bureau to encourage the formation of an employer unit "unless circumstances otherwise require. The proliferation of unions in an employer unit is discouraged as a matter of policy unless there are compelling reasons which would deny a certain class of employees the right to self-organization for purposes of collective bargaining, This case does not fall squarely within the exception. It is undisputed that the monthlies who are rank-and-file have been historically excluded from the bargaining unit composed of daily-paid rank-and-filers that is, since 1963 when the existing rank- and- file union was recognized. In fact, the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which expired last 15 October 1985 provides as follows:ARTICLE I

SCOPESection 1. Appropriate bargaining unit. — This Agreement covers all regular employees and workers employed by the company at its factory in Malabon, Metro Manila. The words "employee," "laborer" and "workers" when used in this Agreement shall be deemed to refer to those employees within the bargaining unit. Employees who occupy managerial, confidential or technical positions, supervisors, contract employees, monthly-paid employees, security as wen as office personnel are excluded from the appropriate bargaining unit (emphasis supplied).In view of the above, the monthly-paid rank-and-file employees ran form a union of their own, separate and distinct from the existing rank-and-file union composed of daily-paid workers. (Rollo, pp. 1920)Thus, it can be readily seen from the above findings of the Bureau of labor Relations that the members of private respondent are not managerial employees as claimed by petitioners but merely considered as rank-and-file employees who have every right to self-organization or to be heard through a duly certified collective bargaining union. The Supervisory power of the members of private respondent union consists merely in recommending as to what managerial actions to take in disciplinary cases. These members of private respondent union do not fit the definition of managerial employees which We laid down in the case of Bulletin Publishing Corporation v. Sanchez (144 SCRA 628). These members of private respondent union are therefore not prohibited from forming their own collective bargaining unit since it has not been shown by petitioner that "the responsibilities (of these monthly-paid-employees) inherently require the exercise of discretion and independent judgment as supervisors" or that "they possess the power and authority to lay down or exercise management policies." Similarly, he held in the same case that "Members of supervisory unions who do not fall within the definition of managerial employees shall become eligible to loin or assist the rank-and-file labor organization, and if none exists, to form or assist in the forming of such rank-and-file organizations.Perhaps it is unusual for the petitioner to have to deal with two (2) collective bargaining unions but there is no one to blame except petitioner itself for creating the situation it is in. From the beginning of the existence in 1963 of a bargaining limit for the employees up to the present, petitioner had sought to indiscriminately suppress the members of the private respondent"s right to self-organization provided for by law. Petitioner, in justification of its action, maintained that the exclusion of the members of the private respondent from the bargaining union of the rank-and-file or from forming their own union was agreed upon by petitioner corporation with the previous bargaining representatives namely: the General "Rubber Workers Union PTGWO the General Workers Union — NAFLU and the General Rubber Workers Union (independent). Such posture has no leg to stand on. It has not been shown that private respondent was privy to this agreement. And even if it were so, it can never bind subsequent federations and unions particularly private respondent-union because it is a curtailment of the right to self-organization guaranteed by the labor laws. However, to prevent any difficulty. and to avoid confusion to all concerned and, more importantly, to fulfill the policy of the New Labor Code as well as to be consistent with Our ruling in the Bulletin case, supra, the monthly-

paid rank-and-file employees should be allowed to join the union of the daily-paid-rank-and-file employees of petitioner so that they can also avail of the CBA benefits or to form their own rank-and-file union, without prejudice to the certification election that has been ordered.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

KNITJOY VS CALLEJAFACTS: In the bargaining of knitjoy, the CBA has been consistently limited to the regular rank and file employees paid on daily rate basis. The rank and file paid on a monthly basis were never included within the scope . Prior to the expiration of the CBA, FF WORKERS was split into 2 factions. In the certification election, themonthly paid employees are excluded. The negotiation is only with the rank and file employees.ISSUE: WON there is a violation of ollective right of employees to self organization.HELD:yes. The suggested bias of the labor code on one company one policy must yield to the right of the employees to form union or associations not contrary to law, to self organization and to enter into collective bargaining negotiations.

Pan American World Airways System vs. Pan American Employees AssociationFACTS:Petitioner herein claims that the one hour meal period should not be considered as overtime work, because the evidence showed that complainants could rest completely, and were not in any manner under the control of the company during that period. The court below found, on the contrary, that during the so-called meal period, the mechanics were required to stand by for emergency work; that if they happened not to be available when called, they were reprimanded by the lead man; that as in fact it happened on many occasions, the mechanics had been called from their meals or told to hurry up eating to perform work during this period.

ISSUE:Whether or not the 1 hour meal period of the mechanics is considered working time.

HELD: Yes. The Industrial Court’s order for permanent adoption of a straight 8-hour shift including the meal period was but a consequence of its finding that the meal hour was not one of complete rest but was actually a work hour, since for its duration, the laborers had to be on ready call.

ALLIANCE OF NATIONALIST VS SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAWAFACTS: In December 1993, SAMANA BAY (SamahanNg Mga Manggagawang Nagkakaisa sa Manila BaySpinning Mills and J.P. Coats) decided to disaffiliatefrom ANGLO (Alliance of Nationalist and GenuineLabor Organization) due to the latter’s dereliction of duty to promote the welfare of SAMANA BAY andthe alleged case of corruption. ANGLO overthrew allofficers of the respondent, and appointed new set of officers, for non-remittance of federation dues.ANGLO contended that the disaffiliation was voidsince the freedom period has not yet set in.MED ARBITER: Declared the disaffiliation void butmaintained that the dismissal of officers was illegal;ON APPEAL TO DOLE: Disaffiliation was VALID,Directed the Company (Manila Bay Spinning Mills) toremit the dues directly to SAMANA; MR of ANGLOwas DENIED. SC: Dismissed the petition.Issue: Whether or not the disaffiliation of SAMANA wasvalid.HELD: Yes.As a rule, a labor union may disaffiliatefrom the mother union only within the freedomperiod.(PD 1391 – “No petition for certificationelection, for intervention and disaffiliation shallbe entertained or given due course except withinthe 60-day freedom period…”) However, under ARTICLE 239-A, disaffiliation may be carried out bya vote of 2/3 of its general membership in ameeting duly called for that purpose to dissolvethe organization.In addition, with respect to theremoval of the officers, a local union does not oweits existence to the federation with which it isaffiliated. Having its own personality, the mother federation has no license to act independently of thelocal union. Any act performed by ANGLO affectingthe interest and affairs of SAMANA, including theouster of herein individual private respondent, isrendered without force and effect.

BAUTISTA VS INCIONGFACTS: Bautista is a union organizer of (ALU) asscoiated labor organization. He filed his sick leave but when he returened to work, his services was terminated. The director ruled that there is no emplyer-employee relationship.ISSUE: WON THE RESPONDENT CAN BE THE EMPLOYER AND A LABOR UNION AT THE SAME TIME

HELD: YES. The mere fact that the respondent is a labor union does not mean that it cannot be considered an employer of the persons who work for it. Existence of er-ee relationship: the selection and engagement, power of control with respect to the means and methods, payment of wages, dismissal. Case facts: payroll, sss contributions , union hired him. The petitioner is awarded back wages and separation pay for there exist er-ee relatyionship between bautista and ALU.

KAPATIRAN SA MEAT VS CALLEJAHELD: After deliberating on the petition and the documents annexed thereto, We find no merit in the Petition. The public respondent did not err in dismissing the

petitioner's appeal in BLR Case No. A-12-389-87. This Court's decision in Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54, upholding the right of members of the IGLESIA NI KRISTO sect not to join a labor union for being contrary to their religious beliefs, does not bar the members of that sect from forming their own union. The public respondent correctly observed that the "recognition of the tenets of the sect ... should not infringe on the basic right of self-organization granted by the constitution to workers, regardless of religious affiliation." The fact that TUPAS was able to negotiate a new CBA with ROBINA within the 60-day freedom period of the existing CBA, does not foreclose the right of the rival union, NEW ULO, to challenge TUPAS' claim to majority status, by filing a timely petition for certification election on October 13, 1987 before TUPAS' old CBA expired on November 15, 1987 and before it signed a new CBA with the company on December 3, 1987. As pointed out by Med-Arbiter Abdullah, a "certification election is the best forum in ascertaining the majority status of the contending unions wherein the workers themselves can freely choose their bargaining representative thru secret ballot." Since it has not been shown that this order is tainted with unfairness, this Court will not thwart the holding of a certification election.

FEU VS TRAJANOFACTS: The petitioner, Far Eastern University-Dr. Nicanor Reyes Memorial Foundation, Inc., has a work force of about 350 rank and file employees, majority of whom are members of private respondent Alliance of Filipino Workers.

On February 13, 1986, private respondent filed a Petition for Consent and/or Certification Election with The Ministry of Labor and Employment. The petitioner opposed the petition on the ground that a similar petition involving the same issues and the same parties is pending resolution before the Supreme Court,

Apparently as early as May 10, 1976, private respondent filed a similar petition for certification election with the Ministry of Labor and Employment but the petition was denied on the ground that the petitioner was a non-stock, non-profit medical institution, therefore, its employees may not form, join, or organize a union pursuant to Article 244 of the Labor Code. Private respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court assailing the constitutionality of Article 244 of the Labor Code. Pending resolution of the aforesaid petition Batas Pambansa Bilang 70 was enacted amending Article 244 of the Labor Code, thus granting even employees of non-stock, non-profit institutions the right to form, join and organize labor unions of their choice. In the

exercise of such right, private respondent filed another petition for certification election with the Ministry of Labor and Employment.

ISSUE: W/N rank and file employees of non-profit organization are covered by the right to self-organization

HELD: YES. At the time private respondent filed its petition for certification election on February 13, 1986, Article 244 of the Labor Code was already amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 70, to wit:

Art. 244. Coverage and employees’ right to self-organization. — All persons employed in commercial, industrial and charitable, medical or educational institutions whether operating for profit or not, shall have the right to self-organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining. Ambulant intermittent and itinerant workers, self-employed people, rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor organizations for the purpose of enhancing and defending their interests and for their mutual aid and protection. (underscoring supplied).

Under the aforequoted provision, there is no doubt that rank and file employees of non-profit medical institutions (as herein petitioner) are now permitted to form, organize or join labor unions of their choice for purposes of collective bargaining. Since private respondent had complied with the requisites provided by law for calling a certification election (p. 15, Rollo), it was incumbent upon respondent Director to conduct such certification election to ascertain the bargaining representative of petitioner’s employees .

FILOIL REFINERY VS FILOIL EMPLOYEES ASSOC.HELD: As stated for the Court by the now Chief Justice in AG & P Co. of Manila, Inc. vs. C.I.R., section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act "explicitly provides that "employees" and this term includes supervisors "shall have the right to selforganization, and to form, join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining through representations of their own choosing and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection" and that "individuals employed as supervisors ... may form separate organizations of their own". Indeed, it is well settled that "in relation to his employer," a foreman or supervisor "is an employee within the meaning of the Act" ... For this reason, supervisors are entitled to engage in union activities and any discrimination against them by reason thereof constitutes an unfair labor practice."Supervisors and confidential employees, even though they may exercise the prerogativesof management as regards the rank and file employees are indeed employees in relation to their employer, the company which is owned by the stockholders and bondholders (capital) and should therefore by entitled under the law to bargain collectively with the top management with respect to their terms and conditions of employment.

TOYOTA MOTORS VS TOYOTA LABOR UNION

FACTS:Toyota Motor Phil Corp. Labor Union filed a petition for certification election with Dept. of Labor, for all rank-and-file employees of the petitioner Toyota Motor Corp.Petitioner seek the denial of the holding of thecertification election on 2 grounds: (1) the union, being “process of registration” had no legal personality to filethe same as it was not a legitimate labor organization atthe time the petition was file; and (2) that the union wascomposed of both rank-and-file and supervisoryemployees in violation of the law. The Med-Arbiterdismissed the petition for certification election in favorwith the grounds stated by petitioner. However, onappeal, the Secretary of Labor set aside the decision of the Me-Arbiter and ordered the holding of thecertification election contending that the union wasalready a legitimate labor organization at the time of thefiling of the petition evidenced by a certificate of registration.Issue:Whether the Secretary of Labor committed graveabuse of discretion in directing the certification electionHeld:YES. Petition Granted.A labor organization composed of both rank-and-file andsupervisory employees is no labor organization at all. Itcannot, for any guise or purpose, be a legitimate labororganization. Not being one, an organization whichcarries a mixture of rank-and-file and supervisoryemployees cannot possess any of the rights of a legitimate labor organization, including the right to file apetition for certification election for the purpose of collective bargaining.In the given case, as respondent union's membership listcontains the names of at least 27 supervisory employeesin Level Five positions, the union could not, prior topurging itself of its supervisory employee members, attainthe status of a legitimate labor organization. Not beingone, it cannot possess the requisite personality to file apetition for certification election. The union's compositionbeing in violation of the Labor Code's Prohibition of unionscomposed of supervisory and rank-and-file employees, itcould not possess the requisite personality to file forrecognition as a legitimate labor organization. DUNLOP VS SEC OF LABORNOTE: A labor organization composed of both rank and file and supervisory employees is no labor organization at all. It cannot posses the rights of a legitimate labor organization (Dunlop v. Sec. of Labor (1998))Supervisors can be an appropriate bargaining unit. [Dunlop Slazenger v. NLRC (1998)]Why can’t supervisors join a union of rank-and-file? » To avoid a situation where supervisors would merge with the rank and file, or where the supervisors' labor organization would represent conflicting interests (Dunlop v. Sec. of Labor (1998)).

PHILIPPINE PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER CORP. vs.HON. TORRES (1974FACTS:Petitioner NATU filed a petition for certification election todetermine the “exclusive bargaining representative” of respondent’s bank employees occupying supervisorypositions. The Bank moved to dismiss on the ground thatsaid supervisory employees were actuallymanagerial/confidential employees, thus, they areineligible to join, assist or form a union. The Med-Arbitergranted the petition and directed the holding of thecertification election. The Bank appealed to the Secretaryof Labor. Said court partially granted the appeal ruling thatthe Department Managers, Assistant Managers, BranchManagers, Cashiers and Controllers are declaredmanagerial employees and cannot join the union of thesupervisorsISSUE: WON SAID EMPLOYEES ARE MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEESHeld:Petitioner concludes that subject employees are notmanagerial employees but supervisors. Even assumingthat they are confidential employees, there is no legalprohibition against confidential employees who are notperforming managerial functions to form and join a union.A confidential employee is one entrusted with confidenceon delicate matters, or with the custody, handling, or careand protection of the employer's property. While Art. 245of the Labor Code singles out managerial employees asineligible to join, assist or form any labor organization,under the doctrine of necessary implication, confidentialemployees are similarly disqualified.

PAGKAKAISA NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA TRIUMPHINTERNATIONAL-UNITED LUMBER AND GENERALWORKERS OF THE PHILS. vs. FERRER-CALLEJA

FACTS:The petitioner is the recognized collectivebargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Triumph International with which the latter has a validand existing collective bargaining agreement effectiveup to September 24, 1989. In 1987, a petition for certification election wasfiled by the respondent union with the Department of Labor and Employment. a motion to dismiss the petition for certificationelection was filed by Triumph International on thegrounds that the respondent union cannot lawfullyrepresent managerial employees and that the petitioncannot prosper by virtue of the contract-bar rule.But the Labor Arbiter issued an order granting thepetition for certification election and directing theholding of a certification election to determine the soleand exclusive bargaining representative of all monthly paid administrative, technical, confidential andsupervisory employees of Triumph International.Issue:Whether or not the public respondent gravely abused its discretion in ordering the immediate holdingof a certification election among the workers sought tobe represented by the respondent union.Held:Where the supervisory employees sought to berepresetned by the union are actually NOT INVOLVED in policy making, and their recommendatory powers arenot even instantly effective since they are subject toreview by at least three

(3) managers (dept. mgr.,personnel mgr. And general manager), then it is evidentthat these employees doe not possess managerialstatus.The fact that their work designations are either managerial or supervisory is of no moment,considering that it is the nature of their functionsand NOT SAID NOMENCLATURES which determinestheir respective status.A careful examination of the records of this case revealsno evidence that rules out the commonality orcommunity of interest among the rank-and-file membersof the petitioners, and the herein declared rank-and-filemembers of the respondent union. Instead of forminganother bargaining unit, the law requires them to bemembers of the existing one.The ends of unionismare better served if all the rank-and-file memberswith substantially the same interests and whoinvoke their right to self-organization are part of a single unit so they can deal with their ER with JUST ONE AND YET POTENT VOICE. The Eesbargaining power with management is strengthened thereby.In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the petitioneris the exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of Triumph International.

PART 3 DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATESMANALAD VS TRAJANOo If candidate is proven to be disqualified, it does not mean that the candidate with 2nd highest number of votes becomes the elected officer (Manalad v. Trajano (1989)).FACTS: The parties herein are employees of United Dockhandlers, Inc. They are members of rival groups in the Associated PortCheckers and Workers' Union (APCWU for short) in said company, the petitioners' faction being led by petitioner Ricardo R.Manalad, with respondent Pablo B. Babula heading the group of private respondents.From their submissions, it appears that sometime in 1982, the petitioners were disqualified from running as candidates in theelection of APCWU officers by the Med-Arbiter. However, on appeal, said order was set aside by the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations on October 31, 1984. The candidates of the petitioners, that is, Manalad, Leano and Puerto, won over those of the private respondents, who were Babula, Mijares and Navarro, for the positions of president, treasurer and auditor,respectively. As a consequence, the latter group filed a petition for review with this Court assailing the aforesaid order of October 31, 1984 of the Bureau of Labor Relations which had declared the aforesaid petitioners eligible to run for said union offices. TheSC in a previous case entitled "Associated Port Checkers and Workers Union, et al. vs. Ricardo R. Manalad, et al." however declared vacant all positions and ordered the winners of the elections to stop acting as officers, and to turn-over all union

funds.Pursuant thereto, the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations issued an order on July 10, 1985 to the effect that he was takingover the management of the affairs of said union, ordering private respondents Babula and all other persons to cease acting asofficers of the union, and requiring them to turn over the union funds to said director. Subsequently, the Court's aforesaidresolution of July 3, 1985 was modified on July 17, 1985 by providing that the special election scheduled on July 20, 1985 shallbe held under the personal supervision of respondent Director Trajano. Private respondents still won the elections, despiteattempts from petitioners to have them disqualified for their alleged refusal to comply with the resolution of the SC.Director Trajano issued a resolution proclaiming private respondents as the winners in the special election and duly electedofficers of APCWU, with the following observation: "The submission that Mr. Babula failed to completely turn over managementof the union to the undersigned is within the competence and authority of the Supreme Court to pass upon considering that themandate for such a turn-over came from the Court.Meanwhile, the three-year term of the private respondents under the disputed July 20, 1985 elections expired on July 20, 1988.However petitioners insist that they be declared the winners in said election (in 1985) with their terms of three (3) years tocommence from the time they assume office in execution of a final and executory resolution of the SC.ISSUE: WON the election of officers should be annulledHELD: It is pointless and unrealistic to insist on annulling an election of officers whose terms had already expired. The SC wouldhave thereby a judgment on a matter which cannot have any practical legal effect upon a controversy, even if existing, andwhich, in the nature of things, cannot be enforced.We agree with the petitioners that disobedience to a resolution of this Court should not be left unpunished. However, before thealleged disobedient party may be cited for contempt, the allegations against him should be clearly established. The contentionsof petitioners, even disregarding some evidential deficiencies, do not adequately establish the basis for contempt. On thecontrary, respondents have satisfactorily answered the averments thereon. At this juncture, it would further be appropriate to remind petitioners that even if the disqualification of private respondents couldbe justified, the candidates of petitioners certainly cannot be declared as the winners in the disputed election. The mere fact thatthey obtained the second highest number of votes does not mean that they will thereby be considered as the elected officers if the true winners are disqualified.

KMP VS TRAJANO

Expulsion RemedyRemedy against erring union officers is not referendum but union expulsion.However, re-election of union officers and non-election of complaining unionmembers is convincing show of faith on union officer’s leadership.EXPULSION REMEDY - If herein union officers were guilty of the alleged acts imputed, BLR pursuant to Article 242 should have meted out the appropriate penalty on them, i.e., to expel them from the Union,as prayed for, and not call for a referendum to decide the issue (Kapisanan v. Trajano (1985)).

Facts: A request for accounts examination of the financial status of KMP Labor Union (UNION), the existing labor union at Franklin Baker company in San Pablo City, was filed by Catalino Silvestre and 13 other employees. Union Account Examiner Florencio Vicedo from Ministry of Labor and Employment conducted the necessary investigation.in the findings, it was found out that there was P1,278 worth of disallowed expenditures (some spent in picture taking in the zoo, payment for long distance calls, sound systems, etc.). Catalino et al filed with the Regional Office of Ministry of Labor and Employment for the expulsion of union officers on the ground that they committed gross violation of the Labor Code (Art. 242) and the constitution and by-laws of the Union.

o Union officers denied the imputation and argued that the disallowed expenditures were made in good faith for the benefit of the members, and that they were willing to reimburse the same from personal funds.

o They also said that they should not be held accountable for non-production of account books since the same weren’t turned over to them. Med-Arbiter ordered the holding of a referendum to decide on the issue of whether to expel or suspend the union officers from their respective positions.

o Union Officers raised their same arguments and asked that resolution on the issue be held in abeyance.

o Catalino, on the other hand, claimed that Med-Arbiter erred in calling a referendum to decide the issue and reiterated that the appropriate action should be expulsion of officers. Director Trajano affirmed the Med-Arbiter’s decision. Petitioners filed MR, reiterating their arguments and claiming that in the general election recently held, all of them (except Ambrocio dela Cruz and Eliseo Celerio) were elected by an overwhelming majority, while Catalino and Cesar Alfaro (the respondents) lost. Director Trajano denied the MR.

Issue: Should Director Trajano’s orders be SET ASIDE? (YES)

Reasoning: If the union officers are guilty of the imputed acts, in light of the ruling in Duyag v Inciong, the appropriate penalty is expulsion from the union and NOT a referendum. The falsification and misrepresentation of the union officers are not supported by substantial evidence. Such expenditures appeared to have been made in good faith and the amount spent for the purpose mentioned in the report, if concurred in or accepted by the members, are reasonable.The results of the elections (putting

them again in office and not the respondents) is a convincing manifestation and demonstration of the union membership's faith in the herein officers' leadership on one hand and a clear condonation of an act they had allegedly committed.

In Pascual v Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, the Court said: “When the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the will of the people.”

RODRIGUEZ VS DIR OF BLR

The Court ruled in the negative. The 30%support requirement needed to report violationsof rights and conditions of union membership, asfound in the last paragraph of Article 241 of theLabor Code, is not mandatory.The assent of 30% of the unionmembers is not a factor in theacquisition of jurisdiction by the Bureauof Labor Relations is furnished by Article226 of the same Labor Code, whichgrants original and exclusive jurisdictionto the Bureau, and the Labor RelationsDivision in the Regional Offices of theDepartment of Labor, over "all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor management relations," making no referencewhatsoever to any such30%-support requirement. Indeed, the officialsmentioned are given the power to act "on all inter-union and intra-unionconflicts (1) "upon request of either or both parties" as well as (2) "at their owninitiative.When the violation directly affects only oneor two members, then only one or twomembers would be enough to report suchviolation.Free and honest elections are indispensable to the enjoyment by employees and workers of their constitutionally protected right to self-organization. If attended by grave irregularities – election should therefore be declared INVALID (Rodriguez vs Director (1988)).

GABRIEL VS SEC OF LABORFACTS: Petitioners compromise the Executive Board of Solidbank union, the collective bargaining agent for the Solidbank Corporation. Private respondents are members of said union. The union’s EB decided to retain the services of their counsel in connection with negotiations for a new CBA. A general membership meeting was called where majority of union members approved a resolution confirming the decision to engage the services of the union’s counsel, Atty. Lacsina. The resolution provided that 10% of the total economic benefits that may be secured be given to the counsel at attorney’s fees. Also it contained an authorization for Solidbank Corporation to check-off said attorney’s fees the first lump sum of payment of benefits under the new CBA. Private respondents issued a complaint for illegal deduction.ISSUE: W/N the union may check-off attorney’s fees.

HELD: No. Article 241 has 3 requisites for the validity of the special assessment for union’s incidental expenses, attorney’s fees and representation expenses. They are:

1. authorization by a written resolution of majority of all the members at the general membership meeting called for the purpose.2. secretary’s record of the minutes of the meeting3. individual written authorization for check-off duly signed by the employees concerned.Such requirements were not complied with as there were no individual written check-off authorizations; thus, the employer cannot legally deduct thus the assessment. The union should be made to shoulder the expenses incurred for the services of a lawyers and accordingly, reimbursement should be charged to the union’s general fund or account. No deduction can be made from the salaries of the concerned employees other than those mandated by law.

VENGCO VS TRAJANO E. MANDATORY ACTIVITY Art. 214: Other than for the mandatory activities under the Code : nospecial assessment, attorneys fees, negotiation fees or any otherextraordinary fees may be checked off from any amount due to an EEwithout an individual written authorization duly signed by the EE. Judicial process of settling dispute laiddown by law.Judicial process of settling disputes laid down by the law. Amicable settlements cannot be considered as a mandatory activity. ART 241 (o) envisions a situation where there is a judicial or administrative proceeding for recovery of wages (Vengco v Trajano (1989)) Note: Article 222 (b) does not except a CBA, later placed under compulsory arbitration, from the ambit of its prohibition. Hence, individual written authorizations for check-offs are not dispensed with, even if the CBA provides so (Galvadores v Trajano (1986)). ENFORCEMENT AND REMEDIES – PROCEDURE AND SANCTIONS JURISDICTION ART. 241, last paragraph Criminal and civil liabilities arising from violations of above rights and conditions of membership shall continue to be under the jurisdiction of ordinary courts. ART. 226 o The BLR and the Labor Relations Division in the regional offices of the Department of Labor shall have original and exclusive authority to act o at their own initiative or o upon request of either or both parties o on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting labormanagement relations in all workplaces o Except those arising from the implementation

or interpretation of collective bargaining agreements which shall be the subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary arbitration. Facts:1.Sometime in the latter part of 1981, the Management of the Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation and the Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation (FOITAF) entered into a compromise agreement wherebythe company will pay to the union members the sum of P150,000.00 for theirclaims arising from the unpaid emergency cost of living allowance (ECOLA)2.Respondent Emmanuel Timbungco who is the union president received themoney which was paid in installments. Thereafter, he distributed the amountamong the union members. Petitioners Ambrocio Vengco, Ramon Moises,Rafael Wagas and 80 others (Vengco, et al., for short) who are union membersnoted that Timbungco was not authorized by the union workers to get themoney; and that ten percent (10%) of the P150,000.00 had been deducted topay for attorney's fees without their written authorization in violation of Article242(o) of the Labor Code.3.Vengco, et al. filed a complaint with the Ministry of Labor praying for: "(1) theexpulsion of Emmanuel Timbungco as president of the union for violation of (the) union constitution and by-laws and the rights and conditions of unionmembers under the Labor Code; (2) an order to require Timbungco to renderan accounting of how the P150,000.00 was distributed; and (3) an order torequire private respondent to publish in the bulletin board the list of themembers and the corresponding amount they each received from theP150,000.00."4.Timbungco alleged among others, that he was authorized by a resolutionsigned by the majority of the union members to receive and distribute theP150,000.00 among the workers; that the computation of the benefits wasbased on the payroll of the company; that the ten percent (10%) attorney'sfees was in relation to the claim of the local union for payment of emergencycost of living allowance before the Ministry of Labor which is totally distinct andseparate from the negotiation of the CBA5.Timbungco was found guilty by the BLR and expelled as president of theorganization.Issue: Whether Respondent is guilty of illegally deducting 10% attorneys fees frompetitioner?Held: No. The deduction of 10% for attorney's fees is illegal and void for failure to comply with therequirements of the law.-Article 241 (o) of the Labor Code provides: Rights and conditions of membership in a labor organi-zation. — The following are the rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization.x x x.(o) Other than for mandatory activities under the Code, no special assessment, attorney's fees, negotiation fees or any other extraordinary fees may be checked off from any amount due an employeewithout an individual written authorization duly signed by an employee. The authorization should specifically state the amount, purpose and beneficiary of the deduction.x x x.-It is very clear that attorney's fees may not be deducted or checked off from any amount due to an employee without his written consent except for mandatory activities under the Code.

-A MANDATORY ACTICTY has been defined as a judicial process of settling dispute laid down by the law.-In the instant case, the AMICABLE SETTLEMENT entered into by the management and the union CAN NOT be considered as a mandatory activity under the Code. It is true that the union filed a claim for emergency cost of living allowance and other benefits before the Ministry of Labor. But this case never reached its conclusion in view of the parties' agreement. It is not also shown from the records that the lawyer was instrumental in forging the said agreement on behalf of the union Members.

Galvadores v. Trajano-An individual written authorization of an the employees must first be obtained before anyassessment can be made against the monetary benefits awarded to them pursuant to Article 242(o) of the Labor Code; and that Respondent Counsel’s entitlement to attorney's fees should be taken from Union funds. No check-offs from any amounts due employees may be effected without individual writtenauthorizations duly signed by the employee specifically stating the amount, purpose andbeneficiary of the deduction.- The required individual authorizations in this case are wanting. In fact, petitioner employeesare vigorously objecting. The question asked in the plebiscite, besides not being explicit,assumed that there was no dispute relative to attorney's fees.- The benefits awarded to PLDT employees still formed part of the collective bargainingnegotiations although placed already under compulsory arbitration. This is not the"mandatory activity" under the Code which dispenses with individual written authorizationsfor check-offs, notwithstanding its "compulsory" nature. It is a judicial process of settlingdisputes laid down by law. Besides, Article 222(b) does not except a CBA, later placed undercompulsory arbitration, from the ambit of its prohibition. The cardinal principle should beborne in mind that employees are protected by law from unwarranted practices that diminishtheir compensation without their knowledge and consent

Villar v. Inciong - It is true that disaffiliation from a labor union is not open to legal objection. It is implicit in the freedom of association ordained by the Constitution. However, a closed shop is a valid form of union security, and such provision in a CBA is not a restriction of the right of freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution. PAFLU had the authority to investigate petitioners on the charges filed by their coemployees in the local union and after finding them guilty as charged, to expel them from the roll of

membership under the constitution of the PAFLU to which the local union was affiliated. - Recognized and salutary is the principle that when a labor union affiliates with a mother union, it becomes bound by the laws and regulations of the parent organization. When a labor union affiliates with a parent organization or mother union, or accepts a charter from a superior body, it becomes subject to the laws of the superior body under whose authority the local union functions. The constitution, by-laws and rules of the parent body, together with the charter it issues pursuant thereto to the subordinate union, constitute an enforceable contract between the parent body and the subordinate union, and between the members of the subordinate union inter se. - Inherent in every labor union, or any organization, is the right of self-preservation. When members of a labor union, therefore, sow the seeds of dissension and strife within the union; when they seek the disintegration and destruction of the very union to which they belong, they thereby forfeit their rights to remain as members of the union which they seek to destroy. - Thus, petitioners, although entitled to disaffiliate from their union and form a new organization of their own, must, however, suffer the consequences of their separation from the union under the security clause of the CBA.

SUGBUANON VS LAGUESMA4. Effect of Non-registration If not registered – union does not become LEGITIMATE labor organization; hence, CANNOT enjoy rights and privileges granted under ART. 242 (Sugbuanon Rural Bank,Inc. v. Laguesma (2000), Protection Technology v. Sec. Of Labor (1995)). 5. IV. Workers with No Right to Self-Organization MANAGERIAL AND CONFIDENTIAL EMPLOYEES ART. 245 NOT eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. ART. 212 (m) “Managerial employee” is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives: To lay down and execute management policies and/ or To hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, discharge, assign, or discipline employees. Sugbuanon Rural Bank vs. Laguesma (2000) “Confidential employees” are those who a. Assist or act in a confidential capacity, in regard b. To persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies [specifically in the field of labor relations]. The two criteria are cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be considered a confidential employee. NOTE: The manager’s right to self-organize is NOT removed, but only limited. It cannot be a labor organization which has a technical meaning of its own, being composed of employees (which excludes managers, as managers are considered employers under labor relations) and for the purpose of collective bargaining. Art. 245 of the Labor Code does not directly prohibit confidential employees from engaging in union activities. However, under the doctrine of necessary implication, the disqualification of managerial employees equally applies to confidential employees RATIONALE: Employees should not be placed in a position involving a potential conflict of interests. FACTS: Sugbuanon Rural Bank employed some 5 supervisory employees. APSOLTEU-TUCP, a legitimate labor organization, then filed a petition for certification election of the said supervisory employees. The bank opposed the petition on the ground that the supervisory employees were actually managerial/confidential employees. In addition, the union was represented in the

petition by ALU-TUCP, and since according to the Bank the latter also sought to represent the rank and file members, granting the petition would violate the principle of separation of unions.

ISSUE: Should the petition for certification election be granted, or denied?

HELD: It should be granted. For one, the supervisory employees cannot be considered managerial or confidential employees. While the nature of the employees’ work (evaluating borrowers’ capacity to pay, approving loans, scheduling terms of repayment of the latter, and endorsing delinquent accounts to legal counsel for collection) indeed constituted the core of the bank’s business, their functions did not fall within the definition of either a managerial employee (lay down and execute management policies related to labor relations) or a confidential employee (they did not act in a confidential capacity to persons who formulate and execute management policies related to labor relations). Secondly, granting the petition would not be violative of the separation of union doctrine. The petition for certification election was filed by APSOTEU-TUCP, a legitimate labor organization. True, it was assisted to some extent by ALU and the national federation TUCP. However, APSOTEU-TUCP had separate legal personality from ALU and TUCP, under the principle that a local union maintains its separate legal personality despite affiliation with a national federation.

ST LUKES VS TORRESTherefore in the absence of the specific provision of law prohibiting retroactivity of the effectivity of the arbitral awards issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, such as herein involved, public respondent is deemed vested with plenary powers to determine the effectivity thereof.”PAMBANSANG KAPATIRAN VS SEC OF LABORFACTS:The rank and file workers of Formey Plastic, Inc. (FORMEY), formed a local union known as PambansangKapatiran ng mga Anak Pawis sa Formey Plastic (KAPATIRAN) under the auspices of the National WorkersBrotherhood (NWB). They ratified their Constitution and By-Laws on 4 April 1993.On 22 April 1993 KAPATIRAN filed a Petition for Certification Election alleging that there was no existing andeffective CBA between FORMEY and any union; neither was there any recognized union within the company.FORMEY moved to dismiss the petition while Kalipunan ng Manggagawang Pilipino (KAMAPI) intervened andlikewise moved to dismiss on the ground that there was already a duly registered CBA covering period Jan. 1,1992 to Dec. 31, 1996,

therefore the contract bar rule will apply.KAPATIRAN opposed both motion to dismiss claiming that the CBA executed between FORMEY and KAMAPIwas fraudulently registered with the DOLE and that it was defective since what was certified as bargaining agentwas KAMAPI which as federation only served as mere agent of the local union and without any legal personalityto sign in behalf of the latter.Med-Arbiter found that there is a valid and existing CBA between FORMEY and KAMAPI which effectivelybarred the filing for petition for certification election. KAPATIRAN appealed imputing grave abuse of discretion tothe Med-Arbiter in applying the contract bar rule. Secretary of Labor upheld the decision of Med-Arbiter.KAPATIRAN filed a motion for reconsideration which was likewise denied.ISSUES:1. Whether or not the petition for certification election was properly filed.2. Whether or not there was a valid CBA between FORMEY and KAMAPI.HELD:1. No, the petition for certification election was not properly filed. The CBA entered into between FORMEYand KAMAPI was made effectively Jan. 1, 1992 and will expire Dec. 31, 1996. The petition forcertification election was filed on April 22, 1993 which was filed before the so-called 60-day freedomperiod.2. Yes, the court affirmed that there was a valid CBA between FORMEY and KAMAPI. Art. 253-A of the labor code provides that “no petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agentshall be entertained and no certification election shall be conducted by the DOLE outside the 60-dayperiod immediately before the date of expiry of such 5 year term of the CBA.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated 15 August1993 sustaining the order of the Med-Arbiter dated 31 May 1993 is AFFIRMED

MALAYANG SAMAHAN VS RAMOSIn February 1990, M. Greenfield, Inc. (MGI), through its officers Saul Tawil, Carlos Javelosa, and Renato Puangco began terminating employees. The corporation closed down one of their plants and so they said they have to retrench the number of employees. Consequently, the Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa M. Greenfield (MSMG-UWP) filed an illegal dismissal case against MGI. The National Labor Relations Commission, chaired by Cresencio Ramos, ruled against the union. But on appeal, the decision of the NLRC was reversed and the corporation was ordered, among others, to pay the employees’ backwages. The union further appealed as they contend that the officers of the corporation should be held solidarily liable.ISSUE: Whether or not the officers of the corporation should be held solidarily liable.HELD: No. A corporation is a juridical entity with legal personality separate and distinct from those acting for and in its behalf and, in general from the people comprising it. The rule is that obligations incurred by the corporation, acting through its directors, officers and employees are its sole liabilities. There is no question that MGI is guilty of illegal dismissal but the officers cannot be held solidarily liable.It’s true that there’s a plethora of illegal dismissal cases where the SC made corporate officers personally liable but these cases usually involve corporate officers who acted in bad faith in illegally dismissing employees. Corporate directors and officers may be solidarily liable with the corporation for the

termination of employment of corporate employees if the same is done with malice or in bad faith.

ATLAS VS LAGUESMAFACTS:A petition for certification election was filed by privaterespondents “Kampil-Katipunan” on behalf of the “supervisors union”, a union where the supervisory,administrative personnel, production, accounting andconfidential employees of the petitioner were affiliated.Petitioner opposed the petition on the ground that KampilKatipunan cannot represent the supervisory employees forthe purpose of collective bargaining because said KampilKatipunan also represents the rank-and-file employeesunion. The Med-Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of theprivate respondent. On appeal, the Secretary of Laboraffirmed the decision of the Med-Arbiter. Petitioner nowargue that to allow the supervisory employees to affiliatewith the Kampil Katipunan is tantamount to allowing thecircumvention of the “principle of the separation of unions” under Art. 245 of the Labor Code.Issue:Whether a local union of supervisory employeesmay be allowed to affiliate with a national federation of labor organizations of rank-and-file employees for purposeof CBA? Held:NO. Petition GrantedWe agree with the petitioner's contention that a conflict of interest may arise in the areas of discipline, collectivebargaining and strikes. Members of the supervisory unionmight refuse to carry out disciplinary measures againsttheir co-member rank-and-file employees.Under Article 245 of the Labor Codeas amended byRep. Act No. 6715 provides: Art. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to joinany labor organization: right of supervisory employees.— Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory employeesshall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.The Court construes Article 245 to mean that supervisorsshall not be given an occasion to bargain together with therank-and-file against the interests of the employerregarding terms and conditions of work. Thus, if the intentof the law is to avoid a situation where supervisors wouldmerge with the rank and-file or where the supervisors'labor organization would represent conflicting interests,then a local supervisors' union should not be allowed toaffiliate with the national federation of union of rank-and-file employees where that federation actively participatesin union activity in the company.

ADAMSON VS CIRB. EFFECT – LEGAL PERSONALITY RULE ON AFFILIATIONA local union of supervisory employees may be allowed to affiliate with a national federation of labor organizations of rank and file employees. What the law prohibits is that supervisory employees join a rank and file union. The national federation would be representing the respective interests of the 2 groups separately. Individuals employed as supervisors shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of employees under their supervision but may form separate organizations of their own.Affiliation by a duly registered local union with a national union or federationdoes not make the local union lose its legal personality. Furthermore,notwithstanding affiliation, the local union remains the basic unit to serve thecommon interest of all its members.Locals remain the basic units of association, free to serve their own and the common interest of all. Inclusion of FFW in the registration is merely to stress that they are its affiliates at the time of registrations. It does not mean that said local unions cannot stand on their own. Affiliation does not mean they lost their own legal personality.

VOLKSCHEL VS BLR DISAFFILIATION OF A LABOR UNION FROM A FEDERATIONNATURE OF RIGHT TO DISAFFILIATE Right of a local union to disaffiliate from its mother union is well-settled. A local union, being a separate and voluntary association, is free to serve the interest of all its members including the freedom to disaffiliate when circumstances warrant. This right is consistent with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association. FACTS:-Volkschel Labor Uniion was once affiliated with ALUMETAL.- Both Volkschel and Alumetal entered into a CBA.-They agreed that ALUMETAL will apply payroll deductions twice a month on the members of the UNION as membership dues and other fees/fines, as may be duly authorized by the UNIONAND ITS MEMBERS. They called this check-off authorization.-Subsequently, a majority of Volkschel’s members decided to disaffiliate from ALUMETAL in order to operate on its own as an independent labor group, pursuant to * Art. 241 of the Labor Code. Moreover, the same want to revoke their check-off authorization in favour of ALUMETAL.- On the other hand, ALUMETAL assailed that the disaffiliation is contrary to law and themembers are still obliged to pay their dues.ISSUES:1. Can a local union like Volkschel disaffiliate from its mother union likeALUMETAL?2. 2. Should the local union still pay union membership dues even upon disaffiliation from itsmother union?HELD:YES. A local union, being a separate and voluntary association, is free to serve the interest of all its members including the freedom to disaffiliate. This

right is consistent withconstitutional guarantee of FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION. (Art. IV, Sec. 7, Phil. Constitution)2.NO. The obligation of an employee to pay union dues is coterminous with his affiliation/membership.*ART. 241 of the Labor Code Incumbent affiliates of existing federations or national unions may disaffiliate onlyfor the purpose of joining a federation ornational union in the industry or region in which is properly belongs or for the purpose of operating as an independent labor group.

ALEX FERRER VS NLRC Petitioners were regular and permanent employees of the Occidental Foundry Corporation (OFC). The Samahang Manggagawa ng Occidental Foundry Corporation-Federation of Free Workers (SAMAHAN) and the OFC entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The agreement provides that a union member who fails to retain a membership of good standing may be dismissed by the employer upon written request by the union. Pursuant to this provision, herein petitioners were dismissed from employment on the ground of failure to retain membership in good standing. It was later on found out that the dismissal was due to an intra-union squabble arising out of the attempt by the petitioners to oust the elected union officials. Upon knowledge of their dismissal, petitioners volunteered to be admitted as members of the Federation of Democratic Labor Unions (FEDLU) who represented them before the DOLE in the complaint for illegal dismissal against the company, SAMAHAN and FFW. Issue: Whether or not petitioners failed to maintain membership in good standing by committing acts of disloyalty against SAMAHAN Held:No. Petitioners sought the help of the FEDLU only after they had learned of the termination of their employment. Their alleged application with federations other than the FFW can hardly be considered as disloyalty to the SAMAHAN, nor may the filing of such applications denote that petitioners failed to maintain in good standing their membership in the SAMAHAN. The SAMAHAN is a different entity from FFW, the federation to which it belonged. Neither may it be inferred that petitioners sought disaffiliation from the FFW for petitioners had not formed a union distinct from that of the SAMAHAN. Parenthetically, the right of a local union to disaffiliate from a federation in the absence of any provision in the federation's constitution preventing disaffiliation of a local union is legal. Such right is consistent with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association. As to the propriety of the dismissal, the court said that while it is true that the CBA between OFC and the SAMAHAN provided for the dismissal of employees who have not maintained their membership in the union, the manner in which the dismissal was enforced left much to be desired in terms of

respect for the right of petitioners to procedural due process. SAMAHAN did not conduct any investigation and hearing where petitioners could have defended themselves. Moreover, the company summarily dismissed petitioners upon request of the union officers without conducting their own investigation.

LIBERTY COTTON WORKERS UNION VS LIBERTY COTTONFacts: On May 17, 1964, thirty-two (32) out of the thirty-six (36) members of the local union, LibertyCotton Mills Union, disaffiliated themselves from respondent PAFLU in accordance with Article X, onUnion Affiliation, of the local union's Constitution and By-Laws.Respondent PAFLU received the resolution of disaffiliation on May 25, 1964 and immediately informedthe respondent company on May 27, 1964 that the disaffiliation was null and void and that it is taking overthe administration of the local union in dealing with the management. Two days later, on May 29, 1964,PAFLU advised the company that the petitioner workers, who were among those who signed thedisaffiliation resolution, were expelled from their union membership in the mother federation because theywere found guilty of acts unbecoming of officers and members of the union and disloyalty to the motherfederation for instigating union disaffiliation, and at the same time requested for their dismissal. On May30, 1964, the company terminated the employment of the petitioner workers pursuant to the Maintenanceof Membership provision of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.In the 1975 case, the Court's decision, among others, limited the liability of the respondent company(Liberty Cotton Mills Inc.) to the immediate reinstatement of the workers (petitioners herein) and directedrespondent PAFLU to pay the petitioner workers the equivalent of three (3) years backwages withoutdeduction or qualification.Issue: Whether or not respondent company Liberty Cotton Mills Inc. should be equally liable with PAFLUfor the payment of backwagesHeld: YesRatio: Respondent company is equally liable for the payment of backwages for having acted in bad faithin effecting the dismissal of the individual petitioners. Bad faith on the part of the respondent companymay be gleaned from the fact that the petitioner workers were dismissed hastily and summarily. At best, itwas guilty of a tortious act, for which it must assume solidary liability, since it apparently chose tosummarily dismiss the workers at the union's instance secure in the union's contractual undertaking thatthe union would hold it "free from any liability" arising from such dismissal.Summary:This is the resolution of the MR filed by Liberty Cotton Mills Worker’s Union praying for immediate reinstatement and declaring a solidary liability on payment of backwages by Liberty CottonInc., and PAFLU.Doctrine: The power to dismiss is a normal prerogative of the employer. However, this is not withoutlimitations. The employer is bound to exercise caution in terminating the services of his employeesespecially so when it is made upon the request of a labor union pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Dismissals must not be arbitrary and capricious. Due process must be observed indismissing an employee because it affects not only his position but also his means of livelihood.Employers should therefore respect and protect the rights of their employees, which include the right tolabor.