55.Caltex Refinery Employees Association v BrillantesGR. No. 123783, September 16, 1997Facts: Anticipating the expiration of their CBA, petitioner and private respondent negotiated the terms and conditions of employment to be contained in a new CBA. The negotiation between the two parties was participated in by the NCMB and Office of Secretary of labor. Some items in the new CBA were amicably arrived at and agreed upon, but others were unresolved. To settle the issues, meetings were conducted but to no avail. Petitioner declared a deadlock and followed by filing of Notice of Strike. DOLE assumed jurisdiction enjoining the strike or lockout. In defiance of the order, petitioner continued with their mass action. Secretary of Labor then issued orders- directing both parties to execute a new CBA embodying the appropriate dispositions spelled out including those subject of previous agreements; and that no more motions will be further entertained.Issue: Whether or not the Secretary of Labor and Employment committed grave abuse of discretion in resolving the instant labor dispute.Ruling:The Court held that the Secretary of Labor cannot be indicated for grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners claim is anchored only on the simple fact that public respondent adopted largely the proposals of private respondent. It should be understood that bargaining is not equivalent to an adversarial litigation where rights and obligations are delineated and remedies applied. It is simply a process of finding a reasonable solution to a conflict and harmonizing opposite positions into a fair and reasonable compromise. When parties agree to submit unresolved issues to the Secretary for resolution, they should not expect their positions to be adopted in toto. It is understood that they defer to wisdom and objectivity in insuring industrial peace. And unless they can clearly demonstrate bias, arbitrariness, capriciousness or personal hostility on the part of such public officer, the Court will not interfere or substitute the officers judgment with its own. This is particularly true in resolving of controversies in CBAs where the question is rarely one of legal right or wrong, but one of wisdom, cogency and compromise as to what is possible, fair and reasonable under the circumstances.

56.University of the East v PepanioGR No. 193897, January 13, 2013Abad. J.:Facts:In 1992, DECS issued a Revised Manual Regulations for Private Schools which required college faculty members to have a masters degree as a minimum educational qualification for acquiring regular status. Petitioner UE and UE Faculty executed a 5year CBA which provided an only semester-to-semester appointments to faculty who do not possess the minimum qualifications. A further order was issued that teaching or academic personnel who do not meet the minimum qualification shall not acquire tenure or regular status. Respondents Bueno and Pepanio are not qualified for probationary or regular status because they lacked postgraduate degrees. A new CBA was entered extending probationary provided it would be later complied. Subsequently, UE allowed respondents extension for two more semesters however the latter failed to oblige. Bueno later demanded UE to consider her as regular employee based on 6 year of full load service. LA held that both Bueno and Pepanio were regular employees.Issue: Whether or not UE illegally dismissed Bueno and Pepanio.Ruling:The policy requiring postgraduate degrees of college teachers was provided in the Manual of Regulations, in which the UE recognized. As the Court held in Esparpizo v Univ of Baguio, a school CBA must be read in conjunction with statutory and administrative regulations governing faculty qualifications. Such regulations form part of a valid CBA without need for the parties to make express reference to it. While the contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions, as they may see fit, the right to contract is still subject to the limitation that the agreement must not be contrary to law or public policy.The requirement of a masteral degree for tertiary education teachers is not unreasonable. The operation of educational institution involves public interest. Herein, UE gave respondents more than ample opportunities to acquire the postgraduate degree required of them. But they do not take advantage of such opportunities. Justice, fairness and due process demand that an employer should not be penalized for situations where it had little or no participation or control.

57. ULP of Employer/InterferenceInsular Life Assurance Employees Asso. v. Insular Life, G.R. No. L-2529, January 30, 1971FACTS:The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU, FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU, and Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU (hereinafter referred to as the Unions), while still members of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW), entered into separate collective bargaining agreements with the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and the FGU Insurance Group (hereinafter referred to as the Companies).

The Unions jointly submitted proposals to the Companies, modifying their respective CBA but after months of negotiation, the Companies refused to submit their respective counter-proposals, which prompted the former to send notice of strike for deadlock on collective bargaining to the DOLE. Even after the notice being given, the Union tried to negotiate with the Company which became futile and 4 months after filing the notice to strike, the Unions decided to pursue it. A few days before the day of strike, the Companies promoted 87 unionist to supervisors with increase in salary nor change in their respective responsibilities. During the duration of the strike, the Companies sent personal letters to the striker, which contain the following: First letter promised benefits to entice the strikers to return to work; the second letter threatened the strikers that the will be replaced if they do not return to work. Also the members of the managements of the Companies tried to penetrate the picket line by sending 3 bus-loads of employees, including a photographer, forcing their way into the gate where the picket was formed, thus causing injuries to the strikers and to the strike-breakers due to the resistance of the former. After which, the Companies filed criminal cases against the strikers coupled with injuction, the latter being granted by the court. Incidentally, all of the more than 120 criminal charges filed against the members of the Unions, except three (3), were dismissed by the fiscal's office and by the courts. These three cases involved "slight physical injuries" against one striker and "light coercion" against two others.

The strikers, due to the threat of being replaced and the injunction issued by the court, decided to report back to work. However, the Companies required them to secure clearances from the Prosecutors Office and be screened by the management committee headed by the Unions former officers, Garcia and Enage (they were hired by the Companies as deputy corporate-secretary and assistant to the head of the personnel department). The screening committee initially rejected 83 strikers with pending criminal charges and 34 officials of the Unions were adamantly refused to be readmitted on the ground that they committed acts inimical to the interest of the Companies, thus were dismissed. However, all non-strikers with pending criminal charges which arose from the breakthrough incident were readmitted immediately by the Companies.

A complaint for ULP was filed against the Companies but the Court of Industrial Relations dismissed the same for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether the Companies committed ULP. RULING: Yes, the Companies committed ULP through the following:1. In sending out individually to the strikers the letters;2. For discriminating against the striking members of the Unions in the matter of readmission of employees after the strike;3. For dismissing officials and members of the Unions without giving them the benefit of investigation and the opportunity to present their side in regard to activities undertaken by them in the legitimate exercise of their right to strike.

INTERFERENCE:It is an unfair labor practice for an employer operating under a collective bargaining agreement to negotiate or to attempt to negotiate with his employees individually in connection with changes in the agreement. And the basis of the prohibition regarding individual bargaining with the strikers is that although the union is on strike, the employer is still under obligation to bargain with the union as the employees' bargaining representative. The circumstance that the strikers later decided to return to work ostensibly on account of the injunctive writ issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila cannot alter the intrinsic quality of the letters, which were calculated, or which tended, to interfere with the employees' right to engage in lawful concerted activity in the form of a strike. Interference constituting unfair labor practice will not cease to be such simply because it was susceptible of being thwarted or resisted, or that it did not proximately cause the result intended.

The test of whether an employer has interfered with and coerced employees is whether the employer has engaged in conduct which it may reasonably be said tends to interfere with the free exercise of employees' rights and it is not necessary that there be direct evidence that any employee was in fact intimidated or coerced by statements of threats of the employer if there is a reasonable inference that anti-union conduct of the employer does have an adverse effect on self-organization and collective bargaining. Under the TOTALITY OF CONDUCT DOCTRINE, the expressions of opinion by an employer which, though innocent in themselves, frequently were held to be culpable because of the circumstances under which they were uttered, the history of the particular employer's labor relations or anti-union bias or because of their connection with an established collateral plan of coercion or interference.

58. ULP of Employer/InterferenceStandard Chartered Bank Employees Union v. Confesor, G.R. No. 114974, June 16, 2004

FACTS: Standard Chartered Bank (the Bank) is a foreign banking corporation doing business in the Philippines. The exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of the Bank is the Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union (the Union). Both parties entered into a CBA that can be renogiated after 3 years of its effectivity. After the 3rd year, in preparation for renotiation, respective proposal were submitted and the Union requested that no lawyer should be part of the negotiating panel and the Bank requested that Umali, an officer of the federation to which the Union was a member of, be excluded from the panel as well. Except for the provisions on signing bonus and uniforms, the negotiations became futile, both as to economic and non-economic provisions.

The Union filed a notice to strike due to deadlock before the NCMD and the Bank filed a complaint of ULP with damages before the NLRC alleging that the Union violated its duty to bargain, as it did not bargain in good faith. It contended that the Union demanded sky high economic demands, indicative of blue-sky bargaining.[27] Further, the Union violated its no strike- no lockout clause by filing a notice of strike before the NCMB. Considering that the filing of notice of strike was an illegal act, the Union officers should be dismissed. Finally, the Bank alleged that as a consequence of the illegal act, the Bank suffered nominal and actual damages and was forced to litigate and hire the services of the lawyer.

The Secretary of Labor (SOLE) assumed jurisdiction and consolidating all the cases related to the issue. The SOLE issued an order dismissing the ULP cases filed by both parties and directing them to execute a CBA containing the economic and non-economic provisions stated in the order, while all the provisions in the expired CBA which were not modified nor discussed are deemed retained.

ISSUE: Whether the Bank committed unfair labor practice when 1. It interfered with the Unions choice of negotiator; 2. There was surface bargaining (violation of the duty to bargain collectively when the Bank merely went through the motions of collective bargaining without the intent to reach an agreement; and3. Refusal to furnish the Union with relevant data.

RULING: There was no ULP, petition was dismissed.

1. If an employer interferes in the selection of its negotiators or coerces the Union to exclude from its panel of negotiators a representative of the Union, and if it can be inferred that the employer adopted the said act to yield adverse effects on the free exercise to right to self-organization or on the right to collective bargaining of the employees, ULP under Article 248(a) in connection with Article 243 of the Labor Code is committed. In order to show that the employer committed ULP under the Labor Code, substantial evidence is required to support the claim. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[48] In the case at bar, the Union bases its claim of interference on the alleged suggestions of Diokno to exclude Umali from the Unions negotiating panel. The circumstances that occurred during the negotiation do not show that the suggestion made by Diokno (from the Bank) to Divinagracia(from the Union) is an anti-union conduct from which it can be inferred that the Bank consciously adopted such act to yield adverse effects on the free exercise of the right to self-organization and collective bargaining of the employees, especially considering that such was undertaken previous to the commencement of the negotiation and simultaneously with Divinagracias suggestion that the bank lawyers be excluded from its negotiating panel. Moreover, even with the request to exclude Umali from the negotiating panel, the negotiation pushed through.

2. Surface bargaining is defined as going through the motions of negotiating without any legal intent to reach an agreement. The eveidence deduced in this case does not substantiate the allegation that the Bank was surface bargaining. The Bank replied with counter-proposals. Admittedly, the parties were not able to agree and reached a deadlock. However, it is herein emphasized that the duty to bargain does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.

3. The request for the relevant data was not put into writing, when the Labor Code requires sending a written request for the issuance of a copy of the data about the Banks rank and file employees.

59. ULP of Employer/InterferenceT&H Shopfitters v. T&H ShopfittersCorp.Gin Queen Workers Union, G.R. No. 191714, February 26, 2014

FACTS: The officers and/or members of THS-GQ union (respondents), filed their Complaint7for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) by way of union busting, and Illegal Lockout, with moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees, against T&H Shopfitters Corporation (T&H Shopfitters) and Gin Queen Corporation (GQ) (collectively referred to as "petitioners"), before the Labor Arbiter. In their desire to improve their working conditions, respondents and other employees of petitioners had a meeting to discuss the formation of a union. The following day, seventeen (17) employees were barred from entering petitioners factory premises located in Castillejos, Zambales, and ordered to transfer to T&H Shopfitters warehouse at Subic Bay Freeport Zone (SBFZ) purportedly because of its expansion. Afterwards, the said seventeen (17) employees were repeatedly ordered to go on forced leave due to the unavailability of work. After which, the they contended that the affected employees were not given regular work assignments, while subcontractors were continuously hired to perform their functions. Meanwhile, the GQ was relocated to a talahiban, and the union officers were made to work as grass cutters. Due to these circumstances, the employees did not report to work which eventually led to issuance of a show-cause letter for termination because of insubordination by GQ.Eventually, the Union was registered and an election was scheduled. Before the election, the Petitioners conducted a field trip wherein the members of the union were purportedly excluded because the petitioners officers campaigned against the union. The efforts of the petitioners paid off because after the election, no union prevailed. Respondents averred that the following week after the certification elections were held, petitioners retrenched THG-GQ Union officers and members assigned at the Zambales plant. Respondents claimed that the work weeks of those employees in the SBFZ plant were drastically reduced to only three (3) days in a month.The LA dismissed the complaint for ULP and all their money claim for lack of merit. But on appeal to NLRC, the decision was reversed; CA sustaince NLRCs decision.ISSUE: Whether ULP acts were committed by petitioners against respondents.RULING: Yes, decision of NLRC and CA affirmed.ULP relates to the commission of acts that transgress the workers right to organize. As specified in Articles 248 [now Article 257] and 249 [now Article 258] of the Labor Code, the prohibited acts must necessarily relate to the workers' right to self-organization. The concept of ULP is embodied in Article 256 (formerly Article 247) of the Labor Code.The questioned acts of petitioners, namely: 1) sponsoring a field trip to Zambales for its employees, to the exclusion of union members, before the scheduled certification election; 2) the active campaign by the sales officer of petitioners against the union prevailing as a bargaining agent during the field trip; 3) escorting its employees after the field trip to the polling center; 4) the continuous hiring of subcontractors performing respondents functions; 5) assigning union members to the Cabangan site to work as grass cutters; and 6) the enforcement of work on a rotational basis for union members, all reek of interference on the part of petitioners.

60. No joining/withdrawal from Union (Yellow Dog Contract)Cathay Pacific Steel v. CA, G.R. No. 164561, August 30, 2006

FACTS: Petitioner is Cathay Pacific Steel Corporation (CAPASCO), a domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing steel products; while the private respondent is Enrique Tamondong III, the Personnel Superintendent of CAPASCO (which was considered by CAPASCO as a managerial) who was previously assigned at the petitioners' Cainta Plant, and CAPASCO Union of Supervisory Employees (CUSE), a duly registered union of CAPASCO. The supervisory personnel of CAPASCO launched a move to organize a union among their ranks, later known as private respondent CUSE. Private respondent Tamondong actively involved himself in the formation of the union and was even elected as one of its officers after its creation. Consequently, petitioner CAPASCO sent a memo to private respondent Tamondong requiring him to explain and to discontinue from his union activities, with a warning that a continuance thereof shall adversely affect his employment in the company, which was ignored by the latter. CAPASCO terminated the employment of private respondent Tamondong on the ground of loss of trust and confidence, citing his union activities as acts constituting serious disloyalty to the company. Tamondong challenged his dismissal for being illegal and as an act involving unfair labor practice by filing a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal and Unfair Labor Practice before the NLRC.

LA ruled in favour of Tamondong; reversed by NLRC for lack of merit; via Petition for Certiorari, CA affirmed LAs decision and ordered the reinstatement and payment of backwages and other benefits by CAPASCO to Tamondong.

ISSUE: 1. Whether Peition for Certiorari is the proper remedy; and 2. Whether Tamondong is a managerial employee or supervisory employee, to accord him the right to self-organization

RULING: Petition for Certiorari is not the petitioners proper remedy and Tamandong is a supervisory employee, who cannot be prohibited from joining and participating in the union activites. Petition dismissed.

1. The essential requisites for a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 are: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board, or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function; (2) such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Third requisite is not present in this case, the questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals was already a disposition on the merits; this Court has no remaining issues to resolve, hence, the proper remedy available to the petitioners is to file Petition for Review under Rule 45 not under Rule 65. Moreover, where the issue or question involves or affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision, and not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision, the same is beyond the province of a petition for certiorari.

2. Tamondong was indeed a supervisory employee and not a managerial employee, thus, eligible to join or participate in the union activities of private respondent CUSE. He did not perform any of the functions of a managerial employee as stated in the definition given to it by the Code. Hence, the Labor Code[33] provisions regarding disqualification of a managerial employee from joining, assisting or forming any labor organization does not apply to herein private respondent Tamondong. At the most, the record merely showed that Tamondong informed and warned rank-and-file employees with respect to their violations of CAPASCO's rules and regulations. Also, the functions performed by private respondent such as issuance of warning] to employees with irregular attendance and unauthorized leave of absences and requiring employees to explain regarding charges of abandonment of work, are normally performed by a mere supervisor, and not by a manager.

61. No joining/withdrawal from Union (Yellow Dog Contract)Cainta Catholic School v. Cainta Catholic School Employees Union, G.R. No. 15102, May 4, 2006

FACTS: A CBA was entered into by the parties. In 1993, the School retired 2 of the Union officers, Llagas and Javier, who had rendered more than twenty (20) years of continuous service, pursuant to Section 2, Article X of the CBA, to wit:An employee may be retired, either upon application by the employee himself or by the decision of the Director of the School, upon reaching the age of sixty (60) or after having rendered at least twenty (20) years of service to the School the last three (3) years of which must be continuous. Because of this, the Union filed a notice of strike and 20 days after, the Union did so and picketed at the Schools entrances. The Secretary of Labor (SOLE) issued a return to work order and certified the dispute for compulsory arbitration and status quo ante, including the suspension of the termination of the 2 union officers. A month after, the School filed a petition before the NLRC to declare the strike illegal while the Union filed a complaint for ULP.

NLRC ruled in favour of the School passing on 3 issues [(1) whether the retirement of Llagas and Javier is legal; (2) whether the School is guilty of unfair labor practice; and (3) whether the strike is legal]. Union filed for Petition for Certiorari before the Court with TRO, from which the latter was granted. 10 regular teachers, who were declared to have lost their employment status under the aforesaid NLRC Resolution reported back to work but the School refused to accept them by reason of its pending motion for clarification. This prompted the Union to file a petition for contempt. Consolidating all cases involved, the CA took cognizance and ruled in favour of the Union and its officers but dismissing the petition for contempt for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether a stipulation in a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) that allows management to retire an employee in its employ for a predetermined lengthy period but who has not yet reached the minimum compulsory retirement age provided in the Labor Code valid. (This issue prompted the strike and dismissal of other employees)

RULING: Valid. CAs decision reversed.

The termination of employment of Llagas and Javier is valid because such arose from a management prerogative granted by the mutually-negotiated CBA between the School and the Union. There is no union-bustng in the case at bar because retirement is a different species of termination of employment from dismissal for just or authorized causes under Articles 282 and 283 of the Labor Code. In those two instances, it is indispensable that the employer establish the existence of just or authorized causes for dismissal as spelled out in the Labor Code. Retirement, on the other hand, is the result of a bilateral act of the parties, a voluntary agreement between the employer and the employee whereby the latter after reaching a certain age agrees and/or consents to sever his employment with the former. The Code provides for retirement benefits in the absence of a retirement plan or agreement for retirement benefits of employees in the establishment. And by virtue of their acceptance of the CBA, the Union and its members are obliged to abide by the commitments and limitations they had agreed to cede to management. The questioned retirement provisions cannot be deemed as an imposition foisted on the Union, which very well had the right to have refused to agree to allowing management to retire retire employees with at least 20 years of service. Hence, the exercise by the employer of a valid and duly established prerogative to retire an employee does not constitute unfair labor practice.

Another point is that according to the Schools Faculty Manual, the Dean of Student Affairs exercises managerial functions, thereby classifying Llagas as a managerial employee; while the position of Subject Area Coordinator (javiers position) is classified as a supervisory employment because Javier made recommendations as to what actions to take in hiring, termination, disciplinary actions, and management policies, among others. Having established that Llagas is a managerial employee, she is proscribed from joining a labor union,[38] more so being elected as union officer. In the case of Javier, a supervisory employee, she may join a labor union composed only of supervisory employees.[39] Finding both union officers to be employees not belonging to the rank-and-file, their membership in the Union has become questionable, rendering the Union inutile to represent their cause. Hence, the strike conducted was illegal.

62. No joining/withdrawal from Union (Yellow Dog Contract)Purefoods v. NagkakaisangSamahangManggagawa ng Purefoods, G.R. No. 150896, August 28, 2008

FACTS: The respondents in this case are 3 labor organizations and a federation (PULO), NAGSAMA-Purefoods is the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file workers of Purefoods' meat division throughout Luzon, STFWU for those in the farm in Sto. Tomas, Batangas, and PGFWU for those in the poultry farm in Sta. Rosa, Laguna.

Together with its demands and proposal, the organizations submitted to the company their respective General Membership Resolution approving and supporting the union's affiliation with PULO, adopting the draft CBA proposals of the federation, and authorizing a negotiating panel which included among others a PULO representative. While Purefoods formally acknowledged receipt of the union's proposals, it refused to recognize PULO and its participation, even as a mere observer, in the negotiation. Consequently, notwithstanding the PULO representative's non-involvement, the negotiations of the terms of the CBA still resulted in a deadlock.

A notice of strike was then filed by NAGSAMA-Purefoods on May 15, 1995. In the subsequent conciliation conference, the deadlock issues were settled except the matter of the company's recognition of the union's affiliation with PULO. On the other hand, the regular rank-and-file workers in the Sto. Tomas farm were refused entry in the company premises and 22 STFWU members were terminated from employment after transferring the chickens from Sto.Tomas to Malvar, Batangas. The farm manager, supervisors and electrical workers of the Sto. Tomas farm, who were members of another union, were nevertheless retained by the company in its employ.

Aggrieved, the labor organizations filed a complaint for ULP, illegal lock-out and dismissal, and damages before the NLRC. The LA ruled in favour of the Company, which was reversed by NLRC explaining that the petitioner company's refusal to recognize the labor organizations' affiliation with PULO was unjustified considering that the latter had been granted the status of a federation by the Bureau of Labor Relations; and that this refusal constituted undue interference in, and restraint on the exercise of the employees' right to self-organization and free collective bargaining. The Company filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA, which the appellate court dismissed outright the company's petition for certiorari on the ground that the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was defective since no proof of authority to act for and on behalf of the corporation was submitted by the corporation's senior vice-president who signed the same.

ISSUE: Whether the Company committed ULP and illegally dismissed the union members.

RULING: Yes, dismissal by CA affirmed and ruling in favour of the Unions by the NLRC affirmed.

The closure of the Sto. Tomas farm was made in bad faith. Badges of bad faith are evident from the following acts of the petitioner: it unjustifiably refused to recognize the STFWU's and the other unions' affiliation with PULO; it concluded a new CBA with another union in another farm during the agreed indefinite suspension of the collective bargaining negotiations; it surreptitiously transferred and continued its business in a less hostile environment; and it suddenly terminated the STFWU members, but retained and brought the non-members to the Malvar farm. Petitioner presented no evidence to support the contention that it was incurring losses or that the subject farm's lease agreement was pre-terminated.

The sudden termination of the STFWU members is tainted with ULP because it was done to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization.

63. ULP/Contracting OutShell Oil Workers Union v. Shell Oil Company, G.R. No. L-28607, May 31, 1971

FACTS: The Shell Company of the Philippines decided to dissolve its security guard section, stationed at its Pandacan Installation and consequesntly hired a private security agency to undertake the work of the said securityguards, notwithstanding its being embraced in, and its continuance as such thus assured by an existing collective bargaining contract, resulted in a strike called by petitioner Shell Oil Workers' Union, which was certified a month later by the Court of Industrial Relations.

The Union alleged that the eighteen (18) security guards affected are part of the bargaining unit and covered by the existing collective bargaining contract, and as such, their transfers and eventual dismissals are illegal being done in violation of the existing contract. On the other hand, the Company maintained that in contracting out the security service and redeploying the 18 security guards affected, it was merely performing its legitimate prerogative to adopt the most efficient and economical method of operation; that said guards were transferred to other sections with increase, except for four (4) guards, in rates of pay and with transfer bonus; the said action was motivated by business consideration in line with past established practice and made after notice to and discussion with the Union; that the 18 guards concerned were dismiss for wilfully refusing to obey the transfer order; and that the strike staged by the Union on May 25, 1967 is illegal.

The Court of Industrial Relations declared that no unfair labor practice was committed by Shell Company in dissolving its security guards from an outside agency, as such a step was well within management prerogative. Hence for it, the strike was illegal, there being no compliance with the statutory requisites before an economic strike could be staged.

ISSUES: (1) whether or not the Company commits unfair labor practice in contracting out its security service to an independent professional security agency and assigning the 18 guards to other sections of the Company; and (2) whether or not the strike called by the Union is legal.

RULING: Yes, the Company committed ULP when it violated the CBA, thus, the strike called by the Union is legal.

While it is true that contracting out of services is a management prerogative, when the same is subjected to provisions of CBA, the latter should govern. Having said that the Company had conducted studies on how to save costs is security services are contracted out, it should have not agreed on the stipulation n the CBA respecting the benefits and privileges of its security guards (evidenced by appendices in the CBA). The Shell Company, in failing to manifest fealty to what was stipulated in an existing collective bargaining contract, was thus guilty of an unfair labor practice.

The strike cannot be declared illegal, there being a violation of the collective bargaining agreement by Shell Company. Even if it were otherwise, however, this Court cannot lend sanction of its approval to the outright dismissal of all union officers, a move that certainly would have the effect of considerably weakening a labor organization, and thus in effect frustrate the policy of the Industrial Peace Act to encourage unionization. However, that the serious acts of violence occurring in the course of the strike could be made the basis for holding responsible a leader or a member of the Union guilty of their commission, what was decided by respondent Court should not be disturbed.

Case # 71Standard Chartered v. Confesor, G.R. No. 114974, June 16, 2004(ULP-Blue sky bargaining)Facts:Standard Chartered Bank (the Bank) is a foreign banking corporation doing business in the Philippines. The exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of the Bank is the Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union (the Union).Within the freedom period of the 5-year CBA signed by the Bank and the Union, the latter, through its President Mr. Divinagracia, sent a letter containing its proposal covering political provisions and (34) economic provisions. The Bank, through its Manager, Mr. Harris, attached its counter-proposal to the non-economic provisions proposed by the Union. During the negotiation, there were provisions on which the Union and the Bank could not agree, hence, the notation DEFERRED/DEADLOCKED was placed therein. Despite the Unions proposal and the necessary revisions on the counter-proposal of the Bank, both failed to agree on the remaining economic provisions of the CBA. The Union declared deadlock and filed Notice of Strike before NCMB and the Bank filed a complaint for ULP and damages before Arbitration Branch of the NLRC against the Union. The Bank alleged that the Union violated its duty to bargain as it did not bargain in good faith and it demanded sky high economic demand, indicative of blue-sky bargaining.Then Sec. of Labor Nieves Confesor, after the parties submitted their respective position papers, issued an Order ordering the Bank and the Union to execute a CBA incorporating the dispositions contained therein effective for two years thereafter or until such time as a new CBA has superseded it, new provisions which are being demanded by either party are deemed denied but without prejudice to such agreements as the parties may have arrived in the meantime. ULP charge by the Bank and the Union against one another is dismissed for lack of merit, hence, this petition for certiorari.

Issue: WON the Union engaged in the Blue-Sky Bargaining.

Held: We, likewise, do not agree that theUnionis guilty of ULP for engaging in blue-sky bargaining or making exaggerated or unreasonable proposals.[59]The Bank failed to show that the economic demands made by theUnionwere exaggerated or unreasonable.The minutes of the meeting show that the Union based its economic proposals on data of rank and file employees and the prevailing economic benefits received by bank employees from other foreign banks doing business in the Philippines and other branches of the Bank in the Asian region.In sum, we find that the public respondent did not act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the questioned order and resolutions.While the approval of the CBA and the release of the signing bonus did not estop theUnionfrom pursuing its claims of ULP against the Bank, we find that the latter did not engage in ULP.We, likewise, hold that theUnionis not guilty of ULP. Petition is DISMISSED.

Case # 72Octavio v. PLDT, G.R. No. 175492, February 27, 2013(Grievance Machinery and Voluntary Arbitration- Jurisdiction)Facts:PLDT hired Octavio as Sales System Analyst I on a probationary status in 2000 and became member of GabayngUnyonsaTelekomunikasyonsamgaSuperbisor (GUTS). Existing CBA then provides that effective 2001, theres an increase of 12% of the basic wage or P2,500.00 whichever is higher. He was regularized in 2001 and was promoted to the position of Sales Analyst 2 in 2002. PLDT and GUTS entered into another CBA which provided for the salary increases of 8% of basic wage orP2,000.00 whichever is higher for the first year (2002).Octavio wrote the president of GUTS, Mr. Fajardo, claiming that he was not given a salary increase in 2001 and 2002. Acting thereon, Mr. Fajardo wrote the PLDT HRD for the entitlement of the members to the across-the-board salary increase. Grievance Committee, however, failed to reach an agreement and in effect, denied Octavios demand for salary increase. Aggrieved, Octavio filed before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC a complaint for payment of salary increases. Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint and upheld the Committee Resolution. On appeal, NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiters Decision finding that Octavios salary had been already been adjusted in accordance with the provisions of the CBA, further ruled that it has no jurisdiction as the same involved the interpretation and implementation of the CBA. According to it, Octavio should have brought his claim before proper body as provided in the latest CBAs provision on grievance machinery and procedure.

Issue: WON NLRC has jurisdiction over Octavios claim.

Held: No.Every Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) shall provide a grievance machinery to which all disputes arising from its implementation or interpretation will be subjected to compulsory negotiations. This essential feature of a CBA provides the parties with a simple, inexpensive and expedient system of finding reasonable and acceptable solutions to disputes and helps in the attainment of a sound and stable industrial peace.

In its Memorandum,20PLDT set forth the grievance machinery and procedure provided under Article X of the CBA of 2002-2004,viz:Step 3.If the grievance is not settled either because of deadlock or the failure of the committee to decide the matter, the grievance shall be transferred to a Board of Arbitrators for the final decision.

Indisputably, the present controversy involves the determination of an employees salary increases as provided in the CBAs. When Octavios claim for salary increases was referred to the Union-Management Grievance Committee, the clear intention of the parties was to resolve their differences on the proper interpretation and implementation of the pertinent provisions of the CBAs. And in accordance with the procedure prescribed therein, the said committee made up of representatives of both the union and the management convened. Unfortunately, it failed to reach an agreement. Octavios recourse pursuant to the CBA was to elevate his grievance to the Board of Arbitrators for final decision. Instead, nine months later, Octavio filed a Complaint before the NLRC.

It is settled that "when parties have validly agreed on a procedure for resolving grievances and to submit a dispute to voluntary arbitration then that procedure should be strictly observed."22Moreover, we have held time and again that "before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a precondition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the courts judicial power can be sought.

Case # 73Goya Inc. v. Goya Employees Union, G.R. No. 170054, January 21, 2013(Grievance Machinery and Voluntary Arbitration- Jurisdiction)Facts: Petitioner Goya, Inc. (Company), a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture, importation, and wholesale of top quality food products, hired contractual employees from PESO Resources Development Corporation (PESO) to perform temporary and occasional services in its factory. This prompted respondent Goya, Inc. Employees UnionFFW (Union) to request for a grievance conference on the ground that the contractual workers do not belong to the categories of employees stipulated in the existing CBA which provides- Probationary, Regular and Casual Employees. When the matter remained unresolved, the grievance was referred to the NCMB for voluntary arbitration.

Failure to agree at amicable settlement, both submitted for resolution before the Voluntary Arbitrator (VA) Bienvenido E. Laguesmathe solitary issue of "WON Company is guilty of unfair labor acts in engaging the services of PESO, a third party service provider, under the existing CBA, laws, and jurisprudence."

The Union asserted that the hiring of contractual employees from PESO is not a management prerogative and in gross violation of the CBA tantamount to unfair labor practice (ULP). It noted that the contractual workers engaged have been assigned to work in positions previously handled by regular workers and Union members, in effect violating CBA with respect to categories of employees.

With the hiring of contractual employees, the Union contended that it would no longer have probationary and casual employees from which it could obtain additional Union members; thus, rendering inutile Section 1, Article III (Union Security) of the CBA.

In countering the Unions allegations, the Company argued that: (a) the law expressly allows contracting and subcontracting arrangements through DOLE Order No. 18-02; (b) the engagement of contractual employees did not, in any way, prejudice the Union, since not a single employee was terminated and neither did it result in a reduction of working hours nor a reduction or splitting of the bargaining unit; and (c) Section 4, Article I of the CBA merely provides for the definition of the categories of employees and does not put a limitation on the Companys right to engage the services of job contractors or its management prerogative to address temporary/occasional needs in its operation.

VA Laguesma dismissed the Unions charge of ULP for being purely speculative and for lacking in factual basis, but the Company was directed to observe and comply with its commitment under the CBA. While the Union moved for partial reconsideration of the VA Decision,the Company immediately filed a petition for reviewbefore the Court of Appeals (CA) to set aside the directive to observe and comply with the CBA commitment pertaining to the hiring of casual employees when necessitated by business circumstances, professing that such order was not covered by the sole issue submitted for voluntary arbitration. CA dismissed, hence, this petition.

Issue: WON the Voluntary Arbitrator had jurisdiction to rule on the engagement of PESO, a third party service provider, under existing CBA, laws and jurisprudence.

Held: Yes.We confirm that the VA ruled on a matter that is covered by the sole issue submitted for voluntary arbitration. Resultantly, the CA did not commit serious error when it sustained the ruling that the hiring of contractual employees from PESO was not in keeping with the intent and spirit of the CBA. Indeed, the opinion of the VA is germane to, or, in the words of the CA, "interrelated and intertwined with," the sole issue submitted for resolution by the parties. This being said, the Companys invocation of Sections 4 and 5, Rule IVand Section 5, Rule VIof the Revised Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings dated October 15, 2004 issued by the NCMB is plainly out of order. Petition is DENIED.

Case # 74Ace Navigation Co., Inc. v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 197309, October 10, 2012(Grievance Machinery and Voluntary Arbitration- Procedure)Facts: In 2008, seaman Teodorico Fernandez (Fernandez), assisted by his wife, Glenita Fernandez, filed with the NLRC a complaint for disability benefitsagainst Ace Navigation Co., Inc., Vela International Marine Ltd., and/or Rodolfo Pamintuan (petitioners).The petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint contending that the labor arbiter had no jurisdiction over thedispute. They argued that exclusive original jurisdiction is with the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators,pursuant to Section 29 of the POEA Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC ), since the parties are covered by the AMOSUP-TCC or AMOSUP-VELA (as later cited by the petitioners) collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Under Section 14 of the CBA, adispute between a seafarer and the company shall be settled through the grievance machinery and mandatory voluntaryarbitration.Fernandez opposed the motion. He argued that inasmuch as his complaint involves a money claim, original andexclusive jurisdiction over the case is vested with the labor arbiter.Labor Arbiter Rioflorido denied the motion to dismiss, holding that under Section 10 of RA No.8042, the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, the labor arbiter has original and exclusive jurisdiction overmoney claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract, notwithstanding anyprovision of law to the contrary. The petitioners appealed to the NLRC, but the labor agency denied the appeal. Accordingly, it remanded the case to the labor arbiter for further proceedings. The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the NLRCdenied the motion, prompting the petitioners to elevate the case to the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.CA denied the petition on procedural and substantive grounds. The CA clarified that while the law allows parties tosubmit to voluntary arbitration other labor disputes, including matters falling within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiters under Article 217 of the Labor Code as this Court recognized in Viverov. CA, the parties submission agreement must be expressed in unequivocal language. It found no such unequivocal language in theAMOSUP/TCC CBA that the parties agreed to submit money claims or, more specifically, claims for disability benefits tovoluntary arbitration.Taking note of Section 29 of the POEA-SEC, the CA explained that the relevant POEA-SEC provisions should likewisebe qualified by the ruling in the Vivero case, the Labor Code, and other applicable laws and jurisprudence.In sum, the CA stressed that the jurisdiction of voluntary arbitrators is limited to the seafarers claims which do not fall within the labor arbiters original and exclusive jurisdiction or even in cases where the labor arbiter has jurisdiction, the parties have agreed in unmistakable terms (through their CBA) to submit the case to voluntary arbitration.The petitioners moved for reconsideration of the CA decision, but the appellate court denied the motion.

ISSUE: Who has the original and exclusive jurisdiction over Fernandezs disability claim the labor arbiter under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, as amended, or the voluntary arbitration mechanism as prescribed in the parties CBA and the POEA-SEC?

RULING:We find merit in the petition. The States labor relations policy laid down in the Constitution and fleshed out in the enabling statute, the Labor Code (Art. 260, 261 and 262) and the POEA-SEC provide that the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators has original and exclusive jurisdiction over Fernandezs disability claim. There is no dispute that theclaim arose out of Fernandezs employment with the petitioners and that their relationship is covered by a CBA AMOSUP/TCC or the AMOSUP-VELA CBA. The CBA provides for a grievance procedure for the resolution of grievances ordisputes which occur during the employment relationship and, like the grievance machinery created under Article 261 of theLabor Code, it is a two-tiered mechanism, with voluntary arbitration as the last step.Contrary to the CAs reading of the CBAs Article 14, there is unequivocal or unmistakable language in the agreement which mandatorily requires the parties to submit to the grievance procedure any dispute or cause of action they may haveagainst each other.What might have caused the CA to miss the clear intent of the parties in prescribing a grievance procedure in their CBA is, as the petitioners have intimated, the use of the auxiliary verb "may" in Article 14.7(a) of the CBA which providesthat "if by reason of the nature of the Dispute, the parties are unable to amicably settle the dispute, either party mayrefer the case to a MANDATORY ARBITRATION COMMITTEE." While the CA did not qualify its reading of the subject provision of the CBA, it is reasonable to conclude that it viewedas optional the referral of a dispute to the mandatory arbitration committee when the parties are unable to amicably settle thedispute.We find this a strained interpretation of the CBA provision. The CA read the provision separately, or in isolation of theother sections of Article 14, especially 14.7(h), which, in clear, explicit language, states that the "referral of all unresolveddisputes from the Grievance Resolution Committee to the Mandatory Arbitration Committee shall be unwaivableprerequisite or condition precedent for bringing any action, claim, or cause of action, legal or otherwise, before anycourt, tribunal, or panel in any jurisdiction" and that the failure by a party or seaman to so refer the dispute to theprescribed dispute resolution mechanism shall bar any legal or other action. Read in its entirety, the CBAs Article 14 (Grievance Procedure) unmistakably reflects the parties agreement tosubmit any unresolved dispute at the grievance resolution stage to mandatory voluntary arbitration under Article 14.7(h) of the CBA. And, it should be added that, in compliance with Section 29 of the POEA-SEC which requires that in cases of claims and disputes arising from a seafarers employment, the parties covered by a CBA shall submit the claim or dispute to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators.Since the parties used unequivocal language in their CBA for the submission of their disputes to voluntaryarbitration, we find that the CA committed a reversible error in its ruling. It bears stressing at this point that we areupholding the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators over the present dispute, not only because of the clear language of the parties CBA on the matter; more importantly, we so uphold the voluntaryarbitrators jurisdiction, in recognition of the States express preference for voluntary modes of dispute settlement,such as conciliation and voluntary arbitration as expressed in the Constitution, the law and the rules.It is settled that when the parties have validly agreed on a procedure for resolving grievances and to submit adispute to voluntary arbitration then that procedure should be strictly observed.

Case # 75Club Filipino v. Bautista, G.R. No. 168406, July 13, 2009(Strikes and Lockouts- Effect of a legal v. illegal strike)Facts: Petitioner Club Filipino, Inc. (the company) is a non-stock, non profit corporation duly formed, organized and existing under Philippine laws, with petitioner Atty. Roberto F. de Leon as its president. Respondents Ronnie Sualog, Joel Calida, Johnny Arinto and Roberto de Guzman, on the other hand, were former officers and members of the Club Filipino Employees Association (the union).

Prior to the expiration of the CBA on May 31, 2000 and within the freedom period, the union made several demands for negotiation but the company replied that it could not muster a quorum, thus no CBA negotiations could be held. Due to various reasons proffered by the company, respondents, as officers of the union, filed a request for preventive mediation with the NCMB but this, however, failed to bring the management to the negotiating table. Both only met with a declaration of a deadlock.

April 2001, the union filed a notice of strike with the NCMB on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and failure to bargain. Company submitted first part of its economic counter-proposal. Meanwhile, May 2001, the union conducted a strike vote under the supervision of the DOLE.

In response to the companys counter-proposal, the union sent the company its improved proposal, but the company refused to improve on its offer. This prompted the union to stage a strike on May 26, 2001 on the ground of a CBA bargaining deadlock.

The company filed before the NLRC a petition to declare the strike illegal. The company further prayed that all union officers who participated in the illegal strike be considered separated from the service.

The labor arbiter declared the strike "procedurally [infirm] and therefore illegal, the union failed to attach its written CBA proposal and the companys counter-proposal to the notice of strike and to provide proof of a request for a conference to settle the dispute. On appeal, NLRC affirmed the LA's decision.

CA, via petition for certiorari, set aside the rulings holding that the NLRC and the labor arbiter "took a selective view of the attendant facts of the case" and in "negating thereby the effects of the notice of strike the union filed." What was more, the NLRCs reasoning was flawed because "a worker ordered dismissed under a tribunals decision has every right to question his or her dismissal." The labor arbiters ruling was likewise wrong because it was based on a "flimsy technicality" that conveniently booted out the union officers from the company, hence, this petition.

Issue: WON the strike staged by respondents on May 26, 2001 was legal.

Held: Yes.Rule XXII, Section 4 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code states:In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the notice shall,as far as practicable, further state the unresolved issues in the bargaining negotiations and be accompanied by the written proposals of the union, the counter-proposals of the employer and the proof of a request for conference to settle differences. In cases of unfair labor practices, the notice shall, as far as practicable, state the acts complained of, and efforts taken to resolve the dispute amicably.Any notice which does not conform with the requirements of this and the foregoing section shall be deemed as not having been filed and the party concerned shall be so informed by the regional branch of the Board.

In the instant case, the union cannot be faulted for its omission. The union could not have attached the counter-proposal of the company in the notice of strike it submitted to the NCMB as there was no such counter-proposal. To recall, the union filed a notice of strike on April 6, 2001 after several requests to start negotiations proved futile. It was only on April 22, 2001, or after two weeks, when the company formally responded to the union by submitting the first part of its counter-proposal. Worse, it took the company another three weeks to complete it by submitting on May 11, 2001 the second part of its counter-proposal. This was almost a year after the expiration of the CBA sought to be renewed.

The Implementing Rules use the words "as far as practicable." In this case, attaching the counter-proposal of the company to the notice of strike of the union was not practicable. It was absurd to expect the union to produce the companys counter-proposal which it did not have.

Another error committed by the labor arbiter was his declaration that respondents, as union officers, automatically severed their employment with the company due to the alleged illegal strike. In the first place, there was no illegal strike. Moreover, it is hornbook doctrine that a mere finding of the illegality of the strike should not be automatically followed by the wholesale dismissal of the strikers from employment.

The law is clear:Any union officer whoknowinglyparticipates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status.Note that the verb "participates" is preceded by the adverb "knowingly." This reflects the intent of the legislature to require "knowledge" as a conditionsine qua nonbefore a union officer can be dismissed from employment for participating in an illegal strike.

WHEREFORE, the petition is herebyDENIED.

Case # 76Visayas Community Medical Center v. Yballe, G.R. No. 196156, January 15,2014(Strikes and Lockouts- Effect of a legal v. illegal strike)Facts: Respondents were hired as staff nurses and midwives by petitioner VCMC, formerly Metro Cebu Community Hospital, Inc (MCCHI). The National Federation of Labor (NFL) is the exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of MCCHI. Perla Nava, president of NagkahiusangMamumuosa MCCHI (NAMA-MCCHI-NFL) wrote to MCCH Administrator expressing the union's desire to renew the CBA, however, MCCHI returned the CBA proposal to secure first the endorsement of NFL legal counsel as the official bargaining representative of MCCHI employees. NFL Legal Counsel Atty. Alforque informed MCCHI that the proposed CBA was never referred to NFL and the latter has not authorized any other legal counsel or any person for collective bargaining negotiations. In view of the existing conflict between federation and its local affiliate, check-off was temporarily suspended by the MCCHI. Atty. Alforque advised Nava that their group is not recognized by NFL. In 1996, upon the request of Atty. Alforque, MCCHI granted one-day union leave with pay for 12 union members. The next day, several union members led by Nava and her group launched a series of mass actions such as wearing black and red armbands/headbands, marching around the hospital premises and putting up placards, posters and streamers. Atty. Alforque immediately disowned the concerted activities being carried out by union members. DOLE Regional Office issued certifications stating that there is nothing in their records which shows that NAMA-MCCH- NFL is a registered labor organization, and that said union submitted only a copy of its Charter Certificate. MCCHI then sent individual notices to all union members asking them to submit written explanation why they should not be terminated for having supported the illegal concerted activities of NAMA-MCCH-NFL which has no legal personality as per DOLE records.NCMB, upon filing of Notice to Strike by NAMA-MCCH-NFL, denied the same for want of legal personality. Despite such rebuff, Nava and her group still conducted and approved a strike vote. More than 100 striking employees were dismissed for continued picketing activities. Unfazed, the striking union members held more mass actions. With the volatile situation, MCCHI filed a petition for injunction with the NLRC in which the same was granted with permanent injunction issued. Due to several complaints for illegal dismissal and ULP by the terminated employees, Executive Labor Arbiter ReynosoBelarmino ruled that MCCHI and its administrators were not guilty of ULP and likewise upheld the termination of complainant union officers who conducted the illegal strike. But NAMA members, who cannot be held responsible for an illegal strike on the sole basis of such membership, are being liable only if they actually participated therein. Respondents and their co-complainants filed before NLRC their respective appeals. NLRC affirmed the decision. Thus, a petition for certiorari was filed before CA who likewise dismissed the same. The present petition was included in the four consolidated cases previously decided by this court. Respondents claim that they have consistently manifested their non-participation in the illegal strike and argue that there is absolutely no reason to delete the awards and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. Petitioner, on the other hand, contends that respondents have surreptitiously changed their position as facts on records established that they signed the collective reply of the union members and acknowledged Nava as their union leader.

Issue: WON respondents who were mere union members were illegally dismissed and if so, entitled to reinstatement and full backwages.

Held: Illegally dismissed. The Supreme Court stressed that the law makes a distinction between union members and union officers. A union member who merely participates in an illegal strike may not be terminated from employment. It is only when he commits illegal acts during a strike that he may be declared to have lost employment status. In contrast, a union officer may be terminated from employment for knowingly participating in an illegal strike or participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike. The law grants the employer the option of declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment. It possesses the right and prerogative to terminate the union officers from service.NAMA-MCCH-NFL is not a legitimate labor organization, thus, the strike staged by its leaders and members was declared illegal. The union leaders who conducted the illegal strike despite knowledge that NAMA-MCCH-NFL is not a duly registered labor union were declared to have been validly terminated by petitioner. However, as to the respondents who were mere union members, it was not shown that they committed any illegal act during the strike. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC were one in finding that respondents actively supported the concerted protest activities, signed the collective reply of union members manifesting that they launched the mass actions to protest managements refusal to negotiate a new CBA, refused to appear in the investigations scheduled by petitioner because it was the unions stand that they would only attend these investigations as a group, and failed to heed petitioners final directive for them to desist from further taking part in the illegal strike. The CA, on the other hand, found that respondents participation in the strike was limited to the wearing of armbands. Since an ordinary striking worker cannot be dismissed for such mere participation in the illegal strike, the CA correctly ruled that respondents were illegally dismissed. However, the CA erred in awarding respondents full back wages and ordering their reinstatement despite the prevailing circumstances.Are respondents then entitled to back wages? This Court, in G & S Transport Corporation v. Infante,ruled in the negative:The alternative relief for union members who were dismissed for having participated in an illegal strike is the payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement under the following circumstances: (a) when reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the passage of a long period of time or because of the realities of the situation; (b) reinstatement is inimical to the employers interest; (c) reinstatement is no longer feasible; (d) reinstatement does not serve the best interests of the parties involved; (e) the employer is prejudiced by the workers continued employment; (f) facts that make execution unjust or inequitable have supervened; or (g) strained relations between the employer and employee. In the Decision dated December 7, 2011, we held that the grant of separation pay to complainants is the appropriate relief under the circumstances, thus:Considering that 15 years had lapsed from the onset of this labor dispute, and in view of strained relations that ensued, in addition to the reality of replacements already hired by the hospital which had apparently recovered from its huge losses, and with many of the petitioners either employed elsewhere, already old and sickly, or otherwise incapacitated, separation pay without back wages is the appropriate relief. x xxIn fine, we sustain the CA in ruling that respondents who are mere union members were illegally dismissed for participating in the illegal strike conducted by the Nava group. However, we set aside the order for their reinstatement and payment of full back wages.

Case # 77Santa Rosa Coca Cola Plant Employees Union v. Coca-Cola Bottlers, G.R. Nos. 164302-03, January 24, 2007(Strikes and Lockouts-Picketing; Innocent Bystander)Facts: The Sta. Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union (Union) is the sole and exclusive bargainingrepresentative of the regular daily paid workers and the monthly paid non-commission-earning employees of the Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (Company) in its Sta. Rosa, Laguna plant.

Upon the expiration of the CBA, the Union informed the Company of its desire to renegotiate its terms. The CBA meetings commenced on July 26, 1999, where the Union and the Company discussed the ground rules of the negotiations. The Union insisted that representatives from the AlyansangmgaUnyonsa Coca-Cola be allowed to sit down as observers in the CBA meetings. The Union officers and members also insisted that their wages be based on their work shift rates. For its part, the Company was of the view that the members of the Alyansa were not members of the bargaining unit. The Alyansa was a mere aggregate of employees of the Company in its various plants; and is not a registered labor organization. Thus, an impasse ensued.

On August 30, 1999, the Union, its officers, directors and six shop stewards filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB.

The Union decided to participate in a mass action organized by the Alyansa in front of the Companys premises. Thus, the Union officers and members held a picket along the front perimeter of the plant on September 21, 1999. As a result, all of the 14 personnel of the Engineering Section of the Company did not report for work, and 71 production personnel were also absent. As a result, only one of the three bottling lines operated during the day shift. All the three lines were operated during the night shift with cumulative downtime of five (5) hours due to lack of manning, complement and skills requirement. The volume of production for the day was short by 60,000 physical cases versus budget.

On October 13, 1999, the Company filed a Petition to Declare Strike Illegal

Issue: WON the strike, dubbed by petitioner as picketing, is illegal.

Held: Article 212(o) of the Labor Code defines strike as a temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. In Bangalisan v. CA, the Court ruled that the fact that the conventional term strike was not used by the striking employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling.Picketing involves merely the marching to and fro at the premises of the employer, usually accompanied by the display of placards and other signs making known the facts involved in a labor dispute. As applied to a labor dispute, to picket means the stationing of one or more persons to observe and attempt to observe. The purpose of pickets is said to be a means of peaceable persuasion.

The basic elements of a strike are present in this case. They marched to and fro in front of the companys premises during working hours. Thus, petitioners engaged in a concerted activity which already affected the companys operations. The mass concerted activity constituted a strike.

For a strike to be valid, the following procedural requisites provided by Art 263 of the Labor Code must be observed: (a) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date thereof, or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice; (b) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose, (c) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at leastseven days before the intended strike. These requirements are mandatory and the failure of a union to comply therewith renders the strike illegal. It is clear in this case that petitioners totally ignored the statutory requirements and embarked on their illegal strike.Petition denied.

78. MSF Tire and Rubber, Inc. vs. CAFacts:A labor dispute arose between Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation (Philtread) and private respondent, Philtread Tire Workers' Union (Union), filed a notice of strike in the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). Charging Philtread with unfair labor practices for allegedly engaging in union-busting for violation of the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. Philtread, on the other hand, filed a notice of lock-out.

During the pendency of the labor dispute, Philthread entered into a memorandum of agreement (MOA) with Siam Tyre Public Company Limited (Siam Tyre). Under the Memorandum of Agreement, Philtread's plant and equipment would be sold to a new company (petitioner MSF Tire and Rubber, Inc.), 80% of which would be owned by Siam Tyre and 20% by Philtread, while the land on which the plant was located would be sold to another company (Sucat Land Corporation), 60% of which would be owned by Philtread and 40% by Siam Tyre.

Petitioner (MSF) then asked the Union to desist from picketing outside its plant and to remove the banners, streamers, and tent which it had placed outside the plant's fence. Union refused.

Petitioner filed a complaint for injunction with damages against the Union and the latter's officers and directors before the Regional Trial Court. RTC denied Petitioners application for injunction and dismissed the complaint. However, upon MR, RTC granted the Injunction and Plaintiffs complaint reinstated. The Union elevated the case to CA which granted the Unions petition ordering the RTC to dismiss the civil case for lack of jurisdiction.

Issue:

Whether Petitioner is an innocent bystander with respect to the labor dispute between Philtread and the Union entitles it to Writ of Injunction from the civil courts?

Held:

No. An "innocent bystander," who seeks to enjoin a labor strike, must satisfy the court that aside from the grounds specified in Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, it is entirely different from, without any connection whatsoever to, either party to the dispute and, therefore, its interests are totally foreign to the context thereof.

For instance, inPAFLU v.Cloribel,supra, this Court held that Wellington and Galang were entirely separate entities, different from, and without any connection whatsoever to, the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, against whom the strike was directed, other than the incidental fact that they are the bank's landlord and co-lessee housed in the same building, respectively.

Similarly, inLiwayway Publications,Inc.v.Permanent Concrete Workers Union,this Court ruled that Liwaywaywas an "innocent bystander" and thus entitled to enjoin the union's strike because Liwayway's only connection with the employer company was the fact that both were situated in the same premises.In the present case, the "negotiation, contract of sale, and the post transaction" between Philtread, as vendor, and Siam Tyre, as vendee, reveals a legal relation between them which, in the interest of petitioner, the transaction between Philtread and Siam Tyre, was not a simple sale whereby Philtread ceased to have any proprietary rights over its sold assets. This, together with the fact that private respondent uses the same plant or factory; similar or substantially the same working conditions; same machinery, tools, and equipment; and manufacture the same products as Philtread, lead us to safely conclude that private respondent's personality is so closely linked to Philtread as to bar its entitlement to an injunctive writ.

Petition Denied.

79.Club Filipino vs. Bautista, et. al.Facts:

Club Filipino is a non-stock, non-profit corporation duly formed, organized and existing under Philippine laws, with petitioner Atty. Roberto F. de Leon as its president.Respondents were former officers and members of the Club Filipino Employees Association (the union).

The union and the company had a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which expired on May 31, 2000. Prior to the expiration of the CBA and within the freedom period, the union made several demands for negotiation but the company replied that it could not muster a quorum, thus no CBA negotiations could be held. No negotiations, however, took place for various reasons proffered by the company, among them the illness of the chairman of the management panel.

Union filed a request for preventive mediation with NCMB. However, the Union still failed to bring the management to the negotiating table. The union and management only met on April 5, 2001, but the meeting concluded with a declaration by both parties of a deadlock in their negotiations.

Union filed a notice of strike with the NCMB on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and failure to bargain. The company filed before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a petition to declare the strike illegal. The company further prayed that all union officers who participated in the illegal strike be considered separated from the service.

The Labor Arbiter declared the strike procedurally infirm and therefore illegal. The labor arbiter noted that the union failed to attach its written CBA proposal and the companys counter-proposal to the notice of strike and to provide proof of a request for a conference to settle the dispute. NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision. CA set aside the rulings of the NLRC.

Issue:

Whether or not the strike staged by respondents was legal?

Held:

Yes. Rule XXII, Section 4 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code states: In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the notice shall,as far as practicable, further state the unresolved issues in the bargaining negotiations and be accompanied by the written proposals of the union, the counter-proposals of the employer and the proof of a request for conference to settle differences. In cases of unfair labor practices, the notice shall, as far as practicable, state the acts complained of, and efforts taken to resolve the dispute amicably.Any notice which does not conform with the requirements of this and the foregoing section shall be deemed as not having been filed and the party concerned shall be so informed by the regional branch of the Board.

In the instant case, the union cannot be faulted for its omission. The union could not have attached the counter-proposal of the company in the notice of strike it submitted to the NCMB as there was no such counter-proposal.The union filed a notice of strike on April 6, 2001 after several requests to start negotiations proved futile. It was only on April 22, 2001, or after two weeks, when the company formally responded to the union by submitting the first part of its counter-proposal. Worse, it took the company another three weeks to complete it by submitting on May 11, 2001 the second part of its counter-proposal. This was almost a year after the expiration of the CBA sought to be renewed.

In this case, attaching the counter-proposal of the company to the notice of strike of the union was not practicable. It was absurd to expect the union to produce the companys counter-proposal which it did not have.One cannot give what one does not have. Indeed, compliance with the requirement was impossible because no counter-proposal existed at the time the union filed a notice of strike. The law does not exact compliance with the impossible.Nemoteneturadimpossibile.Another error committed by the labor arbiter was his declaration that respondents, as union officers, automatically severed their employment with the company due to the alleged illegal strike. In the first place, there was no illegal strike. Moreover, it is hornbook doctrine that a mere finding of the illegality of the strike should not be automatically followed by the wholesale dismissal of the strikers from employment.The Law said: Any union officer whoknowinglyparticipates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status.

This reflects the intent of the legislature to require knowledge as a conditionsine qua nonbefore a union officer can be dismissed from employment for participating in an illegal strike.

Petition Denied.

80.PLDT vs. Manggagawang Komunikasyon sa PilipinasFacts:

The members of respondent union learned that a redundancy program would be implemented by the petitioner.Thereupon it filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB alleging Unfair Labor Practice against PLDT. A number of conciliation meetings, conducted by the NCMB, were held between the parties. However, these efforts proved futile.

The private respondent staged a strike. 383 Union members were terminated from service pursuant to PLDTs redundancy program. Secretary Patricia Sto. Tomas issued an Order stating:

Strike staged by the Union is hereby enjoined. All striking workers are hereby directed to return to work within twenty four (24) hours from receipt of this Order,except those who were terminated due to redundancy.

Motion for Partial Reconsideration was filed by the Private Respondents. Secretary Issued an Order which referred the case to the NLRC for appropriate action.

Private Respondent however, elevated the case to the CA. The latter granted the Petition and Set Aside and nullified the Order of Secretary.

Issue:

1. Whether or not Special Civil Action for Certiorari instituted by Respondents before the CA was procedurally Precise?

2. Whether the subject orders of the Secretary of DOLE excluding from the Return to Work order the workers dismissed due to the redundancy program of petitioner valid or not?

Held:

1. Yes. The institution of the special civil action forcertioraribefore the Court of Appeals was procedurally sound. In a special civil action ofcertiorari, the only question that may be raised is whether or not the respondent has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

The respondent asserted in the courta quothat the Secretary violated the law and jurisprudence, and exceeded her authority when she expressly prevented from returning to work those who were terminated due to alleged redundancy while the strike was ongoing.2. Petition must fail. When the Secretary exercises the powers granted by Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, he is, indeed, granted great breadth of discretion.

Art 263.Strikes, picketing, and lockouts.

(g) When in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification,allstriking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmitallworkers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout.

From the foregoing, it is quite apparent that no matter how broad the exercise of discretion is, the same must be within the confines of law. Thus, the wide latitude of discretion given the Secretary under Art. 263(g) shall and must be within the sphere of law.

As Article 263(g) is clear and unequivocal in stating that ALL striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit ALL workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout, then the unmistakable mandate must be followed by the Secretary.

Members of the private respondent who were dismissed due to alleged redundancy were still employed by the petitioner and holding their respective positions. This is thestatus quothat must be maintained.

81.Capitol Medical Center vs. TrajanoFacts:Capitol Medical Centeris a hospital with address at Panay Avenue corner Scout Magbanua Street, Quezon City. Upon the other hand, Capitol Medical Center Employees Association-Alliance of Filipino Workers,respondent, is a duly registered labor union acting as the certified collective bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of petitioner hospital.Respondent union, sent petitioner a letter requesting a negotiation of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Petitioner, challenging the unions legitimacy, refused to bargain with respondent. Subsequently, Petitioner filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), Department of Labor and Employment, a petition for cancellation of respondents certificate of registration.

Respondent Union filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), National Capital Region, a notice of strike. Despite several conferences and efforts of the designated conciliator-mediator, the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement.Former Labor Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing, issued an Order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute and ordering all striking workers to return to work and the management to resume normal operations.

Petitioner filed with this Court a petition forcertiorariassailing the Labor Secretarys Orders before the CA.

Regional Director, issued an Order denying the petition for cancellation of respondent unions certificate of registration. CA rendered a Decision affirming the Orders of the Secretary of Labor.

Issue:

1. Whether Petition for cancellation of respondents Unions certificate of registration involves a prejudicial question that should be settled before the Secretary of Labor could order the parties to bargain collectively?

2. Whether the Secretary of Labor cannot exercise his power under Article 263(g) without observing the requirments of due process?

Held:

1. No. Pendency of a petition for cancellation of union registration does not preclude collective bargaining.

That there is a pending cancellation proceedings against the respondent Union is not a bar to set in motion the mechanics of collective bargaining. If a certification election may still be ordered despite the pendency of a petition to cancel the unions registration certificate, more so should the collective bargaining process continue despite its pendency.

Majority status of the respondent Union is not affected by the pendency of the Petition for Cancellation pending against it. Unless its certificate of registration and its status as the certified bargaining agent are revoked, the Hospital is, by express provision of the law, duty bound to collectively bargain with the Union.

2. In labor disputes adversely affecting the continued operation of such hospitals, clinics or medical institutions, it shall be the duty of the striking union or locking-out employer to provide and maintain an effective skeletal workforce of medical and other health personnel, whose movement and services shall be unhampered and unrestricted, as are necessary to insure the proper and adequate protection of the life and health of its patients, most especially emergency cases, for the duration of the strike or lockout.In such cases, therefore, the Secretary of Labor and Employment is mandated to immediately assume, within twenty-four (24) hours from knowledge of the occurrence of such a strike or lockout, jurisdiction over the same or certify it to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. For this purpose, the contending parties are strictly enjoined to comply with such orders, prohibitions and/or injunctions as are issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission, under pain of immediate disciplinary action, including dismissal or loss of employment status or payment by the locking-out employer of backwages, damages and other affirmative relief, even criminal prosecution against either or both of them.

The President of the Philippines shall not be precluded from determining the industries that, in his opinion, are indispensable to the national interest, and from intervening at any time and assuming jurisdiction over any such labor dispute in order to settle or terminate the same.

Discretion to assume jurisdiction may be exercised by the Secretary of Labor and Employment without the necessity of prior notice or hearing given to any of the parties. The rationale for his primary assumption of jurisdiction can justifiably rest on his own consideration of the exigency of the situation in relation to the national interests.

Petition Denied.

82.Phimco Industries Inc. vs. BrillantesFacts:

Phimco Industries Labor Association (PILA) filed a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board, NCR, against PHIMCO after a deadlock in the collective bargaining and negotiation. After several conciliation conferences called by the contending parties failed to resolve their differences PILA, staged a strike.

PILA presented a petition for the intervention of the Secretary of Labor in the resolution of the labor dispute, to which petition PHIMCO opposed. Pending resolution of the said petition PHIMCO sent notice of termination to some 47 workers including several union officers.

Acting Secretary of Labor Jose Brillantes assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and issued his Order; All the striking workers, except those who have been handed down termination papers on June 26, 1995, are hereby directed to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of this Order and for the Company to accept them back under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the strike.The parties are further ordered to cease and desist from committing any act that will aggravate the situation.Issue:Whether the Secretary of Labor acted with grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over subject labor dispute?Held:Yes. The Labor Code vests in the Secretary of Labor the discretion to determine what industries are indispensable to the national interest.Accordingly, upon the determination by the Secretary of Labor that such industry is indispensable to the national interest, he will assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute in the said industry.This power, however, is not without any limitation.The private respondent did not even make any effort to touch on the indispensability of the match factory to the national interest. It must have been aware that a match factory, though of value, can scarcely be considered as an industryindispensable to the national interest as it cannot be in the same category as generation and distribution of energy, or those undertaken by banks, hospitals, and export-oriented industries.It is thus evident from the foregoing that the Secretarys assumption of jurisdiction grounded on the alleged obtaining circumstances and noton a determination that the industry involved in the labor dispute is one indispensable to the national interest, the standard set by the legislature, constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction.Petition Granted.

83.FEU-NRMF vs. FEU-NRMF Employees AssociationFacts:Petitioner FEU-NRMF and respondent union entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) that will exp