labor relation1
TRANSCRIPT
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Labor Relations
BROTHERHOOD LABOR UNITY MOVEMENT vs HON. ZAMORA (1991)
FACTS:
Petitioners-members of Brotherhood Labor Unit Movement of the Philippines
(BLUM), worked as cargadores or pahinante since 1961 at the SMC Plant. Sometime in
January 1969, the petitioner workersnumbering 140 organized themselves and engaged in
union activities. Believing that they are entitled to overtime and holiday pay, the petitioners aired their
gripes and grievances but it was not heeded by the respondents. One of the union member
was dismissed from work. Hence, the petitioners filed a complaint of unfair labor practiceagainst respondent SMC on the ground of illegal dismissal.
On the other hand, SMC argued that the complainant are not or have never been their
employees but they are the employees of the Guaranteed Labor Contractor, an independentlabor contracting firm
Labor Arbiter Nestor Lim rendered a decision in favor of the complainants which was
affirmed by the NLRC
On appeal, the Secretary set aside the NLRC ruling stressing the absence of an employer-
employee relationship
Issue: Whether an employer-employee relationship exists between petitioners and respondent
San Miguel Corporation
HELD: YES
In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the elements that are
generally considered are the following: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) thepayment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer's power to control the
employee with respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished. It is
the called "control test" that is the most important element
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In the CAB, petitioners worked continuously and exclusively for an average of 7 years for the
company. Considering the length of time that the petitioners have worked, there is justification to
conclude that they were engaged to perform activities necessary or desirable in the usualbusiness of trade of the respondent. Hence, petitioners are considered regular employees.
Even assuming that there is a contract of employment executed between SMC and the said labor
contractor, the court ruled that Guaranteed and Reliable Labor contractors have neithersubstantial capital nor investment to qualify as an independent contractor under the law. The
premises, tools and equipments used by the petitioners in their jobs are all supplied by the
respondent SMC. It is only the manpower or labor force which the alleged contractors supply,suggesting the existence of a "labor only" contracting scheme prohibited by law
It is important to emphasize that that in a truly independent contractor-contractee relationship,the fees are paid directly to the manpower agency in lump sum without indicating or implyingthat the basis of such lump sum is the salary per worker multiplied by the number of workers
assigned to the company.
In the CAB, the alleged independent contractors were paid a lump sum representing only the
salaries the workers were entitled to, arrived at by adding the salaries of each worker which
depend on the volume of work they had accomplished individually. Therefore, there is noindependent contractor-contractee relationship.
WHEREFORE, PETITION IS GRANTED.
HAWAIIAN-PHILIPPINE COMPANY vs GULMATICO (1994)
FACTS:
Respondent-Union, the National Federation of Sugar Workers-Food and General Trades,filed an action against petitioner Hawaiian Phil Co. for claims under RA 809 (The Sugar Act
of 1952). Respondent Union alleged that they have never availed of the benefits due them
under the law.
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Under the said act: the proceeds of any increase in participation granted to planters
under this Act and above their present share shall be divided between the planter and his
laborers in the following proportions. 60% of the increase participation for the laborers and40% for the planters.
Petitioner argued that respondent Labor Arbiter Gulmatico has no jurisdiction over the
case considering their case does not fall under those enumerated in Article 217 of the LaborCode which provides the jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. Further,petitioner contends that it has no ER-EE relationship with the respondent sugar workers and
that respondent union has no cause of action because it is the planters-employers who is
liable to pay the workers share under LOI No. 854.
Issue1: Whether public respondent Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case
against petitioner
HELD: NO
While jurisdiction over controversies involving agricultural workers has been transferred from
the Court of Agrarian Relations to the Labor Arbiters under the Labor Code, said transferred
jurisdiction is however, not without limitations. The controversy must fall under one of the casesenumerated under the Labor Code which arise out of or are in connection with an ER-EErelationship
In the CAB, there is no ER-EE relationship between petitioner company and respondent union.
Hence, respondent Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case againstpetitioner.
Issue1: Whether respondent union has a cause of action
HELD: NO
To have a cause of action, the claimant must show that he has a legal right and the respondent a
correlative duty in respect thereof, which the latter violated by some wrongful act or omission.
In the instant case, it would show that the payment of the workers share is liability of the
planters-employers, and not of the petitioner milling company. It is disputed that petitioner
milling company has already distributed to its planters their respective shares. Hence, it hasfulfilled its part and has nothing more to do with the subsequent contribution by the planters of
the workers share.
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WHEREFORE, PETITION IS GRANTED.
DAYAG vs HON. CENIZARES, JR. (1998)
FACTS:
Petitioners were hired to work as tower crane operators by one Alfredo Young, a buildingcontractor doing business in the name of Youngs construction. In 1991, they were
transferred to Cebu City to work for Youngs Shoemart Cebu Project. Petitioner WilliamDayag asked permission to go to Manila to attend family matters and was allowed to do so
but was not paid for January 23-30 due to his accountability for the loss of certain
construction tools. The other petitioners left due to harassment by Young. Thereafter,petitioners banded together and filed a complaint against Young before the NCR Arbitration
Branch NLRC which was assigned to Labor Arbiter Cenizares.
Young filed a Motion to transfer the case to the Regional Arbitration Branch, Region
VII of the NLRC. He contended that the case should be filed in Cebu City because there iswhere the workplace of the petitioners.
Petitioners opposed the same, arguing that all of them are from Metro Manila and thatthey could not afford trips to Cebu. Besides, they claimed that respondents main office is inCorinthian Garden in QC.
Labor Arbiter Cenizares GRANTED Youngs motion to transfer the case in Cebu.
Petitioners appealed to NLRC but it was dismissed. Hence, they filed a MFR and this
time the Commission SET ASIDE its previous decision and remanded the case to theoriginal arbitration branch of the NCR for further proceedings.
Young filed his own MFR and the NLRC reinstated its first decision directing the
transfer of the case to Cebu City.
Issue: Whether the Labor Arbiter acted with grave abuse of discretion when it entertained
Youngs motion to transfer
HELD: NO
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The SC ruled that litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not
technicalities. Petitioners were able to file an opposition on the motion to transfer case which
was considered by Labor Arbiter Cenizares. Hence, there is no showing that they have beenunduly prejudiced by the motions failure to give notice and hearing.
However, Young cannot derive comfort from this petition. The SC held that the question of
venue relates more to the convenience of the parties rather than upon the substance and merits ofthe case. This is to assure convenience for the plaintiff and his witness and to promote the ends
of justice under the principle that the State shall afford protection to labor. The reason for this
is that the worker, being the economically-disadvantaged party, the nearest governmentalmachinery to settle the dispute must be placed at his immediate disposal, and the other party is
not to be given the choice of another competent agency sitting in another place as this will
unduly burden the former
In the instant case, the ruling specifying the NCR Arbitration Branch as the venue of the present
action cannot be considered oppressive to Young because his residence in Corinthian Gardens
also serves as his correspondent office. Hearing the case in Manila would clearly expedite theproceedings and bring speedy resolution to the instant case.
WHEREFORE, PETITION IS GRANTED.
NATIONAL UNION OF BANK EMPLOYEES vs LAZARO (1988)
FACTS:
The Commercial Bank and Trust Company entered into a collective bargainingagreement with Commercial Bank and Trust Company Union, representing the file and rank
of the bank with a membership of over 1,000 employees
In 1980, the union, together with the National Union of Bank EEs submitted to bankmanagement proposals for the negotiation of a new collective bargaining agreement. The
following day, however, the bank suspended negotiations with the union. The bank entered
into a merger with BPI which assumed all assets and liabilities.
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The Union went to the CFI Manila, presided over by respondent Judge Lazaro, and filed
a complaint for specific performance, damages, and preliminary injunction against private
respondents.
Private Respondent filed a Motion toDismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of
the court. Respondent Judge dismissed the case on the ground that the complaint partook of
unfair labor practice dispute and jurisdiction over which is vested in the labor arbiter.
Issue: Whether courts may take cognizance of claims for damages arising from labor controversy
HELD: NO
The SC sustained the dismissal of the case and held that the act complained of involves
collecting bargaining which is categorized to be an unfair labor practice. Under the Labor Code,all cases involving unfair labor practices shall be under the jurisdiction of the labor arbiters.
As correctly held by the respondent court, an unfair labor practice controversy is within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the exclusive appellate jurisdictionof the NLRC. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and not necessarily by the nature of action. In the
CAB, PD No. 442, as amended by Batas Blg. 70, has vested jurisdiction upon the Labor Arbiters,a jurisdiction the courts may not assume.
WHEREFORE, PETITION DENIED
DY vs NLRC (1986)
FACTS:
Private Respondent Carlito H. Vailoces was the manager of the Rural Bank of Ayungon
(Negros Oriental). He was also a director and stockholder of the bank.
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In 1983, a special stockholders meeting was called for the purpose of electing the
members of the banks Board of Directors. Petitioner Lorenzo Dy was elected president.
Vailoces was not re-elected as bank manager.
Vailoces filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages with the Ministry of Labor
and Employment against Lorenzo Dy asserting that Dy, after obtaining control of the
majority stock of the bank, called an illegal stockholders meeting and elected a Board ofDirectors controlled by him; and that he was illegally dismissed as manager, without givinghim the opportunity to be heard first.
Dy denied the charge of illegal dismissal and pointed out that Vailoces position was an
elective one, and he was not re-elected as bank manager because of the Boards loss ofconfidence in him brought about by his absenteeism and negligence in the performance of his
duties
The Executive Labor Arbiter ruled that Vailoces was illegally dismissed because he was
not afforded due process of law. NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter because ofthe appeal of the petitioners was filed late.
Issue: Whether the election of the Directors were validly held
HELD: YES
Under PD No. 902-A, Controversies in the election or appointments of directors, trustees,
officers or managers of such corporations, partnerships or associations, are explicitly declared to
be within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
In the CAB, it shows that the controversy between the parties is intra-corporate in nature because
it revolves around the election of directors, officers or managers of the Rural Bank of Ayungon,
the relation between and among its stockholders, and between them and the corporation. It iswell settled that the decision of a tribunal not vested with appropriate jurisdiction is null and
void.
Therefore, the judgment of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are void for lack of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, PETITION IS GRANTED
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ESPINO vs NLRC and PAL (1995)
FACTS:
Petitioner Leslie W. Espino was the Exec. Vice President-Chief Operating Officer of
respondent Phil Airlines (PAL) when his service was terminated in 1990 as a result of the
findings of the panels created by then President Corazon C. Aquino to investigate theadministrative charges filed against him. It appears that petitioner and other several senior
officers of PAL were charged for their involvement in 4 cases, labeled as Goldair,
Robelle, Kabash/Primavera, and Middle East.
The PAL Board of Directors issued separate resolutions wherein Espino was consideredresign from the service effective immediately for loss of confidence
Espino filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PAL with the NLRC, ArbitrationBranch, NCR.
PAL argued that board resolutions cannot be reviewed by the NLRC and that the recourse
of the petitioner Espino should have been addressed by way of appeal, to the OP.
Labor Arbiter Cresencio J. Ramos rendered a decision in favor of petitioner Espino
PAL asserted that the Labor Arbiters decision is null and void for lack of jurisdictionover the subject matter as it is the SEC, and not the NLRC which has jurisdiction over
involving dismissal or removal of corporate officers.
NLRC promulgated a resolution and this time ruled in favor of PAL on the ground oflack of jurisdiction
Petitioner Espino contended that it is the NLRC that has jurisdiction over the case as it
involves the termination of a regular employee and involves claim for backwages and otherbenefits and damages
Issue: Whether the NLRC has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the petitioner for illegal
dismissal
HELD: NO
Under P.D. No. 902-A, it is the Securities and Exchange Commission and not the NLRC that has
original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving the removal from employment of
corporate officers. Under the said decree, the SEC has the exclusive and original jurisdiction tohear and decide cases involving Controversies in the election or appointments of directors,
trustees, officers or managers of such corporations, partnerships or associations.
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It has been ruled that a corporate officers dismissal is always a corporate act and/or an intra -
corporate controversy and that nature is not altered by the reason or wisdom which the Board of
Directors may have in taking such action. Evidently, this intra-corporate controversy must beplace under the specialized competence and expertise of the SEC.
The fact that petitioner sought payment of his backwages, other benefits, as well as damages and
attorney's fees in his complaint for illegal dismissal will not operate to prevent the SEC fromexercising its jurisdiction under PD 902-A. As to the contention of Espino that PAL is estopped
from questioning the jurisdiction of the NLRC, it is well-settled that jurisdiction over the subject
matter is conferred by law and the question of lack of jurisdiction may be raised anytime even onappeal.
WHERFORE, PETITION IS DENIED
MAINLAND CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. vs MOVILLA (1995)
FACTS:
Ernest Movilla, who was a CPA during his lifetime, was hired by Mainland in 1977.Thereafter, he was promoted to the position of Administrative Officer. He has a monthly
salary of P4,700.00/month and he was registered with SSS as an employee of petitioner
corporation
In 1991, The DOLE conducted a routine inspection on petitioner corporation and found
that it committed some irregularities in the conduct of its business. On the basis of its
findings, DOLE ordered petitioner corporation to pay its 13 employees, which included
Movilla, an amount representing their salaries, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay
differentials, unpaid wages and 13th month pay. All the employees listed in the DOLEsorder were paid by petitioner except Movilla.
Movilla filed a case against petitioner with the DOLE in Davao City. However, in 1992,Movilla died while the case was being tried. Hence, he was substituted by his heirs, private
respondents herein.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint on the ground that the controversy is intra-corporate in nature hence it is the SEC who has jurisdiction over and not the Labor Arbiter.
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Respondent Abraham Tumala, Jr. was salesman petitioner company in Davao City. In the
annual Sumakwel contest conductedby the company, he was declared the winner of the
Lapu-Lapu Award for his performance as top salesman of the year, an award whichentitled him to a prize of a house and lot. Petitioner company, despite demands, have unjustly
refused to deliver said prize.
It was alleged that in 1980, petitioner company, in a manner oppressive to labor andwithout prior clearance from the Ministry of Labor, arbitrarily and illegally terminated hisemployment. Hence, Tumala filed a complaint in the CFI Davao and prayed that petitioner be
ordered to deliver his prize of house and lot or its cash equivalent, and to pay his back
salaries and separation benefits.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on grounds of lack of jurisdiction. Respondent
Tumala maintains that the controversy is triable exclusively by the court of general
jurisdiction
Issue: Whether it is the court of general jurisdiction and not the Labor Arbiter that has exclusivejurisdiction over the recovery of unpaid salaries, separation and damages
HELD: NO
SC ruled that the Labor Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction over thesubject matter is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court; and it is given
by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must be conferred by law in words that do not admit of
doubt.
Under the Labor Code, the NLRC has the exclusive jurisdiction over claims, money or
otherwise, arising from ER-EE relations, except those expressly excluded therefrom. The claim
for the said prize unquestionable arose from an ER-EE relation and, therefore, falls within thecoverage of P.D. 1691, which speaks of all claims arising from ER-EE relations, unless
expressly excluded by this Code. To hold that Tumalas claim for the prize should be passed
upon by the regular courts of justice would be to sanction split jurisdiction and multiplicity of
suits which are prejudicial to the orderly of administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, PETITION IS GRANTED.
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SAN MIGUEL CORP. vs NLRC (1988)
FACTS:
Petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) sponsored an Innovation Program which grant
cash rewards to all SMC employees who submit to the corporation ideas and suggestions
found to beneficial to the corporation.
Private Respondent Rustico Vega, who is a mechanic in the Bottling Department of the
SMC submitted an innovation proposal which supposed to eliminate certain defects in the
quality and taste of the product San Miguel Beer Grande.
Petitioner Corporation did not accept the said proposal and refused Mr. Vegassubsequent demands for cash award under the innovation program. Hence, Vega filed a
complaint with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment in Cebu. He argued that hisproposal had been accepted by the methods analyst and was implemented by the SMC and itfinally solved the problem of the Corporation in the production of Beer Grande.
Petitioner denied of having approved Vegas proposal. It stated that said proposal was
turned down for lack of originality and the same, even if implemented, could not achievethe desire result. Further, petitioner Corporation alleged that the Labor Arbiter had nojurisdiction.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction because the claim of
Vega is not a necessary incident of his employment and does not fall under Article 217 ofthe Labor Code. However, in a gesture of compassion and to show the governments concern
for the working man, the Labor Arbiter ordered petitioner to pay Vega P2,000 as financial
assistance. Both parties assailed said decision of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC set aside thedecision of the Labor Arbiter and ordered SMC to pay complainant the amount of P60,000
Issue: Whether the Labor Arbiter and the Commission has jurisdiction over the money claim
filed by private respondent
HELD: NO
The Labor Arbiter and the Commission has no jurisdiction over the money claim of Vega.
The court ruled that the money claim of private respondent Vega arose out of or in connectionwith his employment with petitioner. However, it is not enough to bring Vegas money claim
within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters.
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During the 1st week of December 1976, Suario went to respondent BPI but was verbally
informed that he was already dismissed. He wrote a letter to the respondent bank requesting
for a written and formal advise as to his real status. The lawyers of BPI replied that hisservices is terminated. Therefore, Suario filed a complaint for separation pay, damages and
attorneys fees against the BPI on the ground that he was illegally dismissed.
The Labor Arbiter ordered BPI to pay Suarios claim for separation pay. His claim fordamages and attorneys fee were dismissed for lack of merit
On appeal, NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter
Issue1: Whether NLRC has no authority to entertain claims for moral and other forms ofdamages
HELD:NO
P.D. 1691, a decree which substantially reenacted Article 217 of the Labor Code in its originalform, nullified P.D. 1367 and restored to the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC their jurisdiction toaward all kinds of damages in cases arising from ER-EE relationship.
Issue2: Whether petitioner Suario is entitled to his claim for moral damages
HELD: NO
Although it is already settled that Labor Arbiters are allowed to award moral and other forms of
damages arising from ER-EE relations, it is consistently ruled that in the absence of a wrongfulact or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded
The SC did not find any bad faith or fraud on the part of the bank officials who denied the
petitioners request for 6 months leave of absence without pay. He was merely given personal
assurances which could be reconsidered in later developments. There is no evidence that theymeant to deceive the petitioner.
Therefore, the fact that petitioners request was denied, does not entitle him to damages.
WHEREFORE, PETITION DENIED.
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SOCO vs MERCANTILE CORP. OF DAVAO (1987)
FACTS:
Respondent Mercantile Corp is engaged in the sale and distribution of Ice Cream in
Davao. Petitioner, who was employed as driver of respondents delivery van, was the
President MERCO Employees Labor Union, an affiliate of the Federation of Free Workers
(FFW).
An investigation was conducted due to reports that Soco was carrying on his union
activities during working hours. It appears that on January 1979, Soco was ordered to deliver
ice cream at Imperial Hotel and Your Goody Mart, but he deviated from his usual route andwent to his co-employee, who was then off duty. The personnel officer advised Soco toreport to his office to explain his unauthorized deviation but Soco did not comply. MERCO
wrote to FFW asking for a grievance conference but Soco refused to attend in his belief that
such in unnecessary. Hence, MERCO suspended Soco for 5 days for violation of CompanyRule No. 19(a).
On February 13, 1979, Soco, after making deliveries of ice cream, went to the Office of
the SPFL Union. The Manager of MERCO saw the company vehicle parked along the street.He called two of his co-employees and took out the rotor of the van. When Soco came out of
the building, he was unable to start the engine and called for company assistance. Again, he
was advised to report to the office to explain but refused to do so. He also refused to attend in
the grievance conference. Soco filed a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice against MERCO alleging that the 5 days
suspension imposed on him was on account of his union activities. On the other hand,
MERCO filed an application for clearance to terminate the services of Soco. These 2 caseswere consolidated and tried jointly as agreed by the contending parties
The Regional Director granted MERCOs application to terminate employment of
petitioner and dismissed the Socos complaint for unfair labor practice
On appeal, the Deputy Minister of Labor affirmed
Petitioner Soco argued that under Policy No. 6 of the Ministry of Labor and Employment
(MOLE), the Regional Director has no jurisdiction to hear and decide unfair labor practice
cases because such belongs to the Conciliation Section of the Regional Office of the MOLE.In short, such cases should be first resolved by the Labor Arbiter and not the Regional
Director. Furthermore, Soco asserts that the Deputy Minister of Labor violated the
constitutional provision of security of tenure of employees and that assuming that he violated
the company rule, he cannot be dismissed because his violation only minimal and did nothamper the operations of MERCO.
Issue1: Whether the Regional Director has no authority to decide the unfair labor practice cases
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HELD1: NO
After voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, its too
late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or the power of the court.
In the CAB, in the initial hearing conducted by the Regional Director, it was agreed by the
parties to consolidate the 2 cases considering that both cases concern the same parties and the
issues involved are interrelated. Petitioner Soco obviously accepted the jurisdiction of theRegional Director by presenting his evidence. By having asked for affirmative relief, without
challenging the Regional Director's power to hear and try his complaint for unfair labor practice,
he cannot rightfully now challenge the resolution made in said cases by the same Director, basedon the latter's alleged lack of jurisdiction.
Issue2: Whether petitioner can avail the security of tenure
HELD2:
It is the prerogative of an employer company to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations
necessary or proper for the conduct of its business and to provide certain disciplinary measures
in order to implement said rules and to assure that the same would be complied with. A ruleprohibiting employees from using company vehicles for private purpose without authority from
management is, from our viewpoint, a reasonable one.
The Court is not unmindful of the fact that petitioner has, as he says, been employed withpetitioner Company for eighteen (18) years. On this singular consideration, the Court deems it
proper to afford some equitable relief to petitioner due to the past services rendered by him to
MERCO. Thus, it is but appropriate that petitioner should be given by respondent MERCO,
separation pay, equivalent to one month salary for every year of his service to said Company.
WHEREFORE, PETITION IS DENIED but MERCO is nevertheless, ordered to grant Soco his
separation pay.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE vs NLRC (1993)
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FACTS:
Petitioner DOA and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for security services
to be provided by the latter to the said government entity. In September 13, 1990, severalguards of the Sultan Security Agency filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-
payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay and
overtime pay, as well as for damages against the DOA and the Sultan Security Agency beforethe Regional Arbitration Branch in Cagayan De Oro City
The Labor Arbiter found DOA jointly and severally liable with Sultan Agency for the
payment of money claim of the guards
The Labor Arbiter issued a Writ of Execution commanding the City Sheriff to enforce
and execute the judgment against the DOA and Sultan. The City Sheriff levied on execution
3 motor vehicles of the DOA
Petitioner DOA filed a petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer
for preliminary injunction with the NLRC Cagayan De Oro. It argued that the writ ofexecution was effected without the Labor Arbiter having duly acquired jurisdiction over the
DOA. Hence, its decision was null and void. It also pointed out that the attachment of itsproperty would jeopardize its governmental functions to the prejudice of the public good
NLRC --- dismissed the petition for injunction for lack of basis and a Temporary Stay of
Execution is issued for a period of 2 months but not extendible.
DOA charges NLRC for grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ ofexecution. It argued that money claims against the Department falls under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. Further, the DOA asserts that the NLRC has
disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State.
NLRC, on the other hand, argue that petitioner has impliedly waived its immunity from suit byconcluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency
Issue: Whether the DOA can be sued
HELD:
Under the Constitution, it says that the State cannot be sued without its consent. This simplymeans that a sovereign is exempt from suit on the ground that there can be no legal right asagainst the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. This doctrine is also called
the royal prerogative of dishonesty because it grants the State the prerogative to defeat any
legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its non-suability
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This rule is not really absolute for it does not say that state may not be sued under any
circumstances. The States consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be
made through a general law or special law. On the other hand, Implied consent is when the Stateitself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim, or when it enters into a
contract
In the CAB, the claims of the security guards arising from the Contract for Service, clearlyconstitute money claims. Under Act No. 3083, a general law, the State consents and submits to
be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied.
However, the money claim must first be brought to the Commission on Audit
WHEREFORE, PETITION IS GRANTED
HAGONOY WATER DISTRICT vs NLRC (1988)
FACTS:
Private Respondent Dante Villanueva was employed as service foreman by petitioner
Hagonoy when he was indefinitely suspended and thereafter dismissed for abandonment ofwork and conflict of interest
Villanueva filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and underpayment of
wages and emergency cost of living allowance against Hagonoy with the Ministry of Laborand Employment in San Fernando, Pampanga
Petitioner Hagonoy moved for dismissal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Being
government entity, its personnel are governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law and
not by the Labor Code. And the protests concerning the lawlessness of dismissal from service
fall within the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission and not the Ministry of Laborand Employment.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on favor of Villanueva
NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. A Writ of Execution was issued by
the Labor Arbiter to garnish petitioner Hagonoys deposits with the planters Development
Bank.
Hagonoy filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution with Application forWrit of
Preliminary Injunction. NLRC denied the application.
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Issue: Whether local water districts are GOCC whose employees are subject to the provisions ofthe Civil Service Law
HELD: YES
The Labor Arbiter, in asserting that it has jurisdiction over the employees of Hagonoy, relied on
P.D. No. 198, known as Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973 which exempts employees ofwater districts from the application of the Civil Service Law. However, the Labor Arbiter failed
to take into account that P.D. 1479 wiped away the said exemption
Moreover, the NLRC relied upon Article 9, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution which providesthat: [T]he Civil Service embraces ... government owned or controlled corporations with
original charters.
At the time the dispute in the CAB arose, and at the time the Labor Arbiter rendered its decision
(which is on March 17, 1986), the applicable law is that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction to
render a decision that he in fact rendered. By the time the NLRC rendered its decision (August
20, 1987), the 1987 Constitution has already come into effect. The SC believes that the 1987Constitution does not operate retroactively as to confer jurisdiction upon the Labor Arbiter to
render a decision, which was before outside the scope of its competence.
Therefore, a decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter without jurisdiction over the case is a
complete nullity, vesting no rights and imposing no liabilities. Villanueva, if he so wishes, may
refile this complaint in an appropriate
WHEREFORE, PETITION IS GRANTED
Sadol vs. Pilipinas Kao, Inc., et al (1990)
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Facts:
Petitioner was dismissed from work by private respondents who are owners of Vega & Co.,
private recruitment agency, with assignment at respondent PKI. He filed a complaint forreinstatement and backwages with the DOLE in Cagayan de Oro City. The Labor Arbiter ruled
in favor of Sadol and ordered respondents to pay petitioners separation pay at one month for
every year of service. Both parties appealed but respondents appeal was filed out of time. Theappeal of respondent was dismissed for having been filed out of time.
Issue: Whether the respondent has lost the right to appeal
HELD: YES
A party, who failed to appeal on time from a decision of the Labor Abiter to the NLRC, may still
participate in a separate appeal timely filed by the adverse party by a Motion for Reconsideration
of the NLRC decision. In the CAB, there is no question that respondents failed to file a timely
appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Hence, having lost the right to appeal, therespondent may choose to file a Motion for Reconsideration instead.
St. Martin Funeral Homes vs. NLRC and B. Aricayos (1998)
Facts:
P. respondent was dismissed from work by petitioner for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00.Hence, a complaint was filed for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. Petitioner argued that
respondent was not its employee. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner declaring that no
employer-employee relationship between the parties and therefore his office had no jurisdictionover the case. On appeal, the NLRC set aside the questioned decision and remanding the case tothe labor arbiter for immediate appropriate proceedings.
Issue: Whether or not the decision of the NLRC are appealable to the Court of Appeals.
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Held: YES
The Supreme Court clarified and stressed that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme
Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment is that the special civil action of certiorari wasand still the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The concurrent original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court can be availed of only under compelling and exceptional
circumstances.
To further explain, (1) the way to review NLRC decision is through the special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65; (2) the jurisdiction of such action belongs both to the SC and CA; but
(3) in line with the doctrine of hierarchy, of courts, the petition should be initially presented tothe lower court of the two courts, that is the Court of Appeals.
Sunshine Transportation Inc. vs NLRC and R. Santos (1996)
Facts:
P. respondent Santos was dismissed from work as a bus driver by Petitioner for failing to submita written explanation why he failed to report for his scheduled trip. Respondent filed a complaint
with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioner
and dismissed the complaint. This was affirmed by the NLRC but granted Santps money claims.Unsatisfied with the decision, petitioner elevated the case to the SC charging the NLRC with
grave abuse of discretion.
Issue: Whether the petitioner may avail the special civil action for certiorari?
Held: NO
A petition for certiorari should be preceded by exhaustion of administrative remedies. Under said
doctrine, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed before the special action for certiorarimay be availed of. In the case at bench, the petitioner make a claim that it filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the challenged decision before it came to us through this action.
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Midas Touch Food Corp. vs NLRC and Iris Fe Isaac (1996)
Facts:
Respondent Iris Fe Isaac was dismissed as operations manager by petitioner for alleged lack of
self confidence. Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter
which rendered a decision in favor of petitioner finding the said dismissal to be valid. However,
petitioner was ordered to pay the complainants there separation pay, etc. Both parties appealed tothe NLRC and the decision of the Labor Arbiter was reversed, this time ruling in favor of Isaac.
Hence, petitioner elevated the case to the SC assailing the decision of the NLRC.
Issue: Whether the petitioner may avail the special civil action for certiorari?
Held: YES
The rule requiring motion for reconsideration before filing a petition for certiorari admits of
certain exceptions, among which is the finding that under the circumstances of the case, a motion
for reconsideration would be useless.
In this case, the Supreme Court found it quite impossible for the NLRC to reverse itself under the
foregoing facts and so, a motion for reconsideration will be deemed useless.
Alindao vs Hon. Hoson (1996)
Facts:
Petitioner applied for employment for Saudi Arabia through private respondent Hisham General
Services Contractor. She paid a placement fee of P15,000.00 without receipt. When she arrivedin Saudi arrived in Saudi Arabia, she was made to work as a domestic helper. Because of unfair
working conditions, she worked at several residences until she saved enough money to return
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home. When she arrived in the Philippines, she filed with POEA a complaint against Hisham for
breach of contract. The POEA rendered a decision suspending Hisham and to pay petitioner her
money claims. Hisham appealed to the NLRC and filed a MFR with the POEA. The NLRCaffirmed the decision of the POEA. Hisham now argues that the order cannot be enforced
because the MFR was still pending with the POEA. Respondent POEA administrator Joson find
the MFR of Hisham to be meritorious. Hence, petitioner elevated this case to the SC
Issue: Whether the petitioner may avail the special civil action for certiorari without first filing a
motion for reconsideration?
Held: YES
It has been held that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with inthe following instances: (1) when the issue raised is one purely of law; (2) where public interestis involved; (3) in cases of urgency; and (4) where special circumstances warrant immediate or
more direct action.
On the other hand, among the accepted exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrativeremedies are: (1) where the question in dispute is purely a legal one; and (2) where the
controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction.
The petition involves a pure question of law and the challenged order is void for want ofjurisdiction on the part of respondent Joson.
Metro Transit Organization vs. CA, et al. (2002)
Facts:
Respondent Ruperto Evangelista, a cash assistant in the treasury division of the petitioner, was
dismissed from work for being alleged to be responsible for the loss of tokens. He was
terminated for lack of trust and confidence. Evangelista filed a case for illegal dismissal. TheLabor Arbiter ruled in his favor and ordered his reinstatement with payment of full backwages.
This was affirmed by the NLRC. Hence, petitioner directly filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The CA, on the other hand, affirmed the ruling of both the
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labor arbiter and NLRC, holding that a motion for reconsideration is necessary before resorting
to a petition for certioarari.
Issue: Whether the petitioner may elevate the case before the CA without first filing a motion forreconsideration with the NLRC?
Held: NO
Generally, certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is
filed before the respondent tribunal to allow it an opportunity to correct its imputed errors.However, the following have been recognized as exceptions to the rule:
(1) when the issue raised is one purely of law; (2) where public interest is involved; (3) in casesof urgency; and (4) where special circumstances warrant immediate or more direct action.
On the other hand, among the accepted exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies are: (1) where the question in dispute is purely a legal one; and (2) where thecontroverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction.
To dispense with a motion for reconsideration, there must a be concrete, compelling and validreason for the failure to comply with the requirement.
MAI Philippines, Inc. vs. NLRC, et al (1987)
Facts:
The Regional Director declared that petitioner illegally dismissed its Customer EngineeringManager Rodolfo Nolasco. It ordered petitioner to reinstate Nolasco and to pay him his full
backwages. The petitioner complied to pay Nolasco but declined to reinstate him. Nolasco filed
a complaint with the Labor Arbiter to recover damages. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the
complaint for being a duplication of the earlier labor case involving the same parties. Nolascoreceived the notice of the Labor Arbiters decision 12 days after. He filed an appeal before the
NLRC. Petitioner opposed the appeal and contended that it should be dismissed because it was
filed out of time. NLRC ruled that since the order of the Regional Director requiring
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reinstatement of Nolasco with full back wages had already become final and executory, attacks
against that order "on the merits or in substance can no longer be entertained
Issue: Whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion
Held: YES
The NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to take account of the fact, as shown
in the record, that the appeal of Nolasco was late because it was not filed within the reglementary
period
No acceptable reason has been advanced by Nolasco, and none appears upon the record, to
excuse his tardiness in the taking of the appeal. Petitioner's opposition to the appeal should havebeen sustained, and the NLRC should never have taken cognizance of the appeal.
PAL vs. NLRC (1989)
Facts:
Private respondent Dolina completed his training course with PAL as pilot. He was given
temporary appointment for 6 months as Limited First Officer. He applied for regularization asFirst Officer and undergoes the required psychological examination wherein his "Adaptability
Rating" was found to be "unacceptable" and the Pilot Acceptance Qualifications Board finds him
not qualified for regular employment in the Company. Dolina was placed under preventivesuspension; hence he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
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The Labor Arbiter found the dismissal of Dolina justified, hence, PAL discontinued the payment
of Dolinas salary. Dolina objected on the ground that the discontinuance an earlier agreement
that he would be kept in the payroll until the case was finally resolved by arbitration. On appeal,the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter but ordered the company to continue
paying Dolinas salary since the arbitration case was not yet over.
Issue: Whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Dolina was
entitled to his salaries "until this case is finally resolved."
Held: YES
The order of the NLRC to continue paying Dolina his salary was an abuse of discretion. The
clause "pending final resolution of the case by arbitration" should be understood to be limited
only to the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, such that when the latter rendered his decision,
the case was finally resolved by arbitration.
Pacific Mills, Inc. vs. NLRC (1990)
Facts:
In the case of Pacific Mills, Inc. vs. NLRC (1988), the SC dismissed the petition on the ground
that petitioner failed to show that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion. The entry ofjudgment having been effected, the NLRC, in the process of execution, made a computation ofthe award to the private respondents. Petitioner filed a motion to stay execution/reconsideration
citing supervening events that affect the computation of the award as follows:
(1) The computation on separation pay did not consider the length of service of each complainant
as borne out from the records; (2) The computation did not consider the wage exemptions
granted the petitioner-respondent company; (3) The computation included payment of awards toa respondent who had already been recalled to active duty, one who was already paid in a case
separately filed, and another who was already paid; (4) All the capital assets of the petitioner
have already been attached and/or otherwise foreclosed.
The NLRC denied the motion and ordered immediate implementation of the partial writ of
execution
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Issue: Whether the execution of a final judgment of the NLRC may be stayed in view of
supervening events.
Held: YES
Generally, one a judgment becomes final and executory, it canno longer be disturbed, altered ormodified. The principle, however, admits of exceptions as in cases where, because of
supervening events, it becomes imperative, in the higher interest of justice, to direct its
modification in order to harmonize the disposition with the prevailing circumstances orwhenever it is necessary to accomplish the aims of justice.
There can be no question that the supervening events cited by petitioner would certainly affect
the computation of the award in the decision of the NLRC. It is the duty of the NLRC to considerthe same and inquire into the correctness of the execution, as such supervening events may affectsuch execution.
Yupangco Cotton Mills, Inc. vs. CA (2002)
Facts:
Petitioner contended that a sheriff of the NLRC erroneously and unlawfully levied certain
properties which it claims as its own. It filed a 3rd party claim with the Labor Arbiter andrecovery of property and damages with the RTC. The RTC dismissed the case. In the CA, the
court dismissed the petition on the ground of forum shopping and that the proper remedy was
appeal in due course, not certiorari or mandamus. Petitioner filed a MFR and argued that thefiling of a complaint for accion reinvindicatoria with the RTC was proper because it is a remedyspecifically granted to an owner (whose properties were subjected to a writ of execution to
enforce a decision rendered in a labor dispute in which it was not a party). The MFR was denied.
Hence, petitioner filed this appeal.
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Issue: Whether the CA has jurisdiction over the case
Held: YES
A third party whose property has been levied upon by a sheriff to enforce a decision against a
judgment debtor is afforded with several alternative remedies to protect its interests. The thirdparty may avail himself of alternative remedies cumulatively, and one will not preclude the third
party from availing himself of the other alternative remedies in the event he failed in the remedy
first availed of.
Thus, a third party may avail himself of the following alternative remedies:
a) File a third party claim with the sheriff of the Labor Arbiter, and
b) If the third party claim is denied, the third party may appeal the denial to the NLRC.
Even if a third party claim was denied, a third party may still file a proper action with a
competent court to recover ownership of the property illegally seized by the sheriff.
The filing of a third party claim with the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC did not preclude the
petitioner from filing a subsequent action for recovery of property and damages with theRegional Trial Court. And, the institution of such complaint will not make petitioner guilty of
forum shopping.
Nova vs. Judge Sancho Dames II (2001)
Facts:
Complainant Greogorio S. Nova filed with the NLRC complaint for illegal dismissal against
R.A. Broadcasting Corporation represented by its Vice President for Operations Vilma J.
Barcelona and Station Manager Deo Trinidad. The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor ofNova and ordered R.A. Broadcasting to pay his separation pay and full backwages. NLRC
affirmed such decision and denied the MFR filed by R.A. Construction on the ground that it was
filed out of time. The NLRC issued an alias writ of execution and the property of Sps. Barcelona
was scheduled in an auction sale. The said spouses filed with the RTC Camarines Norte actionfor damages with prayer of TRO to restrain the NLRC from conducting the scheduled public
auction. The RTC granted the TRO. Nova argued that under the Labor Code, issuance of the
TRO or preliminary injunction in a case arising from labor dispute is prohibited.
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TOYOTA MOTOR PHIL. CORP vs. TOYOTA MOTOR PHIL. CORP LABOR UNION (1997)
FACTS:
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Toyota Motor Phil Corp. Labor Union filed a petition for certification election with Dept. of
Labor, for all rank-and-file employees of the petitioner Toyota Motor Corp. Petitioner seek the
denial of the holding of the certification election on 2 grounds: (1) the union, being process ofregistration had no legal personality to file the same as it was not a legitimate labor organization
at the time the petition was file; and (2) that the union was composed of both rank-and-file and
supervisory employees in violation of the law. The Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition forcertification election in favor with the grounds stated by petitioner. However, on appeal, theSecretary of Labor set aside the decision of the Me-Arbiter and ordered the holding of the
certification election contending that the union was already a legitimate labor organization at the
time of the filing of the petition evidenced by a certificate of registration.
Issue: Whether the Secretary of Labor committed grave abuse of discretion in directing the
certification election
Held: YES. Petition Granted.
A labor organization composed of both rank-and-file and supervisory employees is no labor
organization at all. It cannot, for any guise or purpose, be a legitimate labor organization. Not
being one, an organization which carries a mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory employeescannot possess any of the rights of a legitimate labor organization, including the right to file apetition for certification election for the purpose of collective bargaining.
In the given case, as respondent union's membership list contains the names of at least 27
supervisory employees in Level Five positions, the union could not, prior to purging itself of itssupervisory employee members, attain the status of a legitimate labor organization. Not being
one, it cannot possess the requisite personality to file a petition for certification election. Theunion's composition being in violation of the Labor Code's Prohibition of unions composed of
supervisory and rank-and-file employees, it could not possess the requisite personality to file for
recognition as a legitimate labor organization.
ATLAS LITHOGRAPHIC SERVICE vs. LAGUESMA (1992)
FACTS:
A petition for certification election was filed by private respondents Kampil-Katipunan on
behalf of the supervisors union, a union where the supervisory, administrative personnel,
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production, accounting and confidential employees of the petitioner were affiliated. Petitioner
opposed the petition on the ground that Kampil Katipunan cannot represent the supervisory
employees for the purpose of collective bargaining because said Kampil Katipunan alsorepresents the rank-and-file employees union. The Med-Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of
the private respondent. On appeal, the Secretary of Labor affirmed the decision of the Med-
Arbiter. Petitioner now argue that to allow the supervisory employees to affiliate with theKampil Katipunan is tantamount to allowing the circumvention of the principle of theseparation of unions under Art. 245 of the Labor Code.
Issue: Whether a local union of supervisory employees may be allowed to affiliate with anational federation of labor organizations of rank-and-file employees for purpose of CBA?
Held: NO. Petition Granted
We agree with the petitioner's contention that a conflict of interest may arise in the areas of
discipline, collective bargaining and strikes. Members of the supervisory union might refuse to
carry out disciplinary measures against their co-member rank-and-file employees.
Under Article 245 of the Labor Code as amended by Rep. Act No. 6715 provides:
Art. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization: right of
supervisory employees.Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form anylabor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labororganization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor
organizations of their own.
The Court construes Article 245 to mean that supervisors shall not be given an occasion to
bargain together with the rank-and-file against the interests of the employer regarding terms and
conditions of work. Thus, if the intent of the law is to avoid a situation where supervisors wouldmerge with the rank and-file or where the supervisors' labor organization would represent
conflicting interests, then a local supervisors' union should not be allowed to affiliate with the
national federation of union of rank-and-file employees where that federation actively
participates in union activity in the company.
SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES FEDERATION OF LABOR vs. HON. FERRER-CALLEJA (1989)
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FACTS:
Petitioner SPF filed with the DOLE a petition for certification election among the rank-and-file
employees of private respondent Apex Minong Co. The Med-Arbiter granted the petition anddirected the holding of the certification election. During the pre-election conference, petitioner
union objected to the inclusion in the list of workers prepared by Apex the following: (1)
employees occupying the positions of Supervisor I, II and III; (2) employees underconfidential/special payrolls; and (3) employees who were not paying dues. According to
petitioner, the mentioned employees were disqualified from participating in the certification
election since the Supervisors were managerial employees while the last two were disqualifiedby virtue of their non-membership in the Union and their exclusion from the benefits of the
collective bargaining agreement. After the certification of election was conducted, respondent
Union filed an urgent motion to open the challenged ballots. The Med-Arbiter granted the
motion and directed the challenged ballots be opened and inventoried. Petitioner appealed to the
BLR wherein respondent Director Ferrer-Calleja dismissed said appeal and affirmed the decisionof the Med-Arbiter and ordered that the 197 ballots should be opened and canvassed. As a
consequence of the opening and canvass of the challenged ballots, the Med-Arbiter
Issue: Whether respondent Director committed grave abuse of discretion in not excluding the
197 employees from voting in the certification election
Held: NO
The functions of the questioned positions are not managerial in nature because they only executeapproved and established policies leaving little or no discretion at all whether to implement the
said policies or not. The respondent Director, therefore, did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing the petitioner's appeal from the Med-Arbiter's Order to open and count thechallenged ballots in denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and in certifying the
respondent Union as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file
employees of respondent Apex .
As regards the employees in the confidential payroll, the petitioner has not shown that the nature
of their jobs is classified as managerial except for its allegation that they are considered bymanagement as occupying managerial positions and highly confidential. Neither can payment ornon-payment of union dues be the determining factor of whether the challenged employees
should be excluded from the bargaining unit since the union shop provision in the CBA applies
only to newly hired employees but not to members of the bargaining unit who were not membersof the union at the time of the signing of the CBA. It is, therefore, not impossible for employees
to be members of the bargaining unit even though they are non-union members or not paying
union dues.
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GOLDEN FARMS INC. vs. HON. FERRER-CALLEJA (1989)
FACTS:
The National Federation of Labor (NFL) filed a petition for certification election in behalf of
certain employees and foreman of petitioner before the DOLE. Petitioner opposed said petition
arguing that
The NFL appealed but it was dismissed. Hence, it re-filed the petition for certification which was
also dismissed.
Issue:
Held:
PHILIPPINE PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER CORP. vs. HON. TORRES (1974)
FACTS:
Issue:
Held:
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NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS vs. HON. TORRES (1994)
FACTS:
Petitioner NATU filed a petition for certification election to determine the exclusive bargaining
representative of respondents bank employees occupying supervisory positions. The Bank
moved to dismiss on the ground that said supervisory employees were actuallymanagerial/confidential employees, thus, they are ineligible to join, assist or form a union. The
Med-Arbiter granted the petition and directed the holding of the certification election. The Bank
appealed to the Secretary of Labor. Said court partially granted the appeal ruling that the
Department Managers, Assistant Managers, Branch Managers, Cashiers and Controllers aredeclared managerial employees and cannot join the union of the supervisors.
Issue: Whether
Held:
Petitioner concludes that subject employees are not managerial employees but supervisors. Even
assuming that they are confidential employees, there is no legal prohibition against confidential
employees who are not performing managerial functions to form and join a union. A confidentialemployee is one entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, or with the custody, handling, or
care and protection of the employer's property. While Art. 245 of the Labor Code singles outmanagerial employees as ineligible to join, assist or form any labor organization, under thedoctrine of necessary implication, confidential employees are similarly disqualified.
MERALCO vs. HON. QUISUMBING (1999)
FACTS:
A petition for certification election was filed by the labor organization of staff and technical
employees of MERALCO seeking to represent regular employees of MERALCO. MERALCOcontended that those in the Patrol Division and Treasury Security Service Section, since these
employees are tasked with providing security to the company, they are not eligible to join the
rank and file bargaining unit. The Med-Arbiter ruled that having been excluded from the existing
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Collective Bargaining Agreement for rank and file employees, these employees have the right to
form a union of their own, except those employees performing managerial functions. The
Secretary of Labor affirmed said order.
Issue: Whether security guards may join rank-and-file or supervisors union
Held:
Under the old rules, security guards were barred from joining a labor organization of the rank
and file, under RA 6715, they may now freely join a labor organization of the rank and file or
that of the supervisory union, depending on their rank. By accommodating supervisory
employees, the Secretary of Labor must likewise apply the provisions of RA 6715 to securityguards by favorably allowing them free access to a labor organization, whether rank and file or
supervisory, in recognition of their constitutional right to self-organization.
MARIANO vs. ROYAL INTEROCEAN LINES (1961)
FACTS
Petitioner Ermidia A. Mariano was a stenographer-typist and filing clerk of respondent
when she was dismissed from work. She sent a letter to the managing directors of thecompany in HK through its manager in the Philippines, respondent J.V. Kamerling. In the
letter, she complained about Kamerlings inconsiderate and untactful attitude towards the
employees under him and the clients of the company. Kamerling adviced petitioner that herletter had been forwarded to the managing directors in HK and that said directors believedthat it was impossible to maintain her in the company.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of her dismissal from the managing directors in HK but
received no answer to any of her 5 letters.
The Company finally offered a compromise settlement with the petitioner whereby she
would be paid a sum equivalent to 6 months salary, provided that she would sign a quitclaim
embodying a provision that she would release the company from any liability arising from
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her employment. Not satisfied with the compromise, the petitioner filed a complaint for
unfair labor practice against the company. The CIR rendered judgment holding the company
guilty of unfair labor practice and ordered them to reinstate petitioner to her former position.
The company filed with the SC a petition to review the decision of the CIR. The SC ruled
in favor of the company. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether the petitioner was guilty of unfair labor practice in dismissing the respondent
Held: NO. Petition Denied.
As the respondent's dismissal has no relation to union activities and the charges filed by her
against the petitioner had nothing to do with or did not arise from her union activities, the
dismissal did not constitute Unfair Labor Practice. Despite the employees right to selforganization, the employer still retains his inherent right to discipline his employees, his normal
prerogrative to hire or dismiss them. In this case, the court ruled that the dismissal of theemployee was unjustified, but the employer did not commit Unfair Labor Practice because theact has no union connection.
WISE AND CO. INC. vs. WISE AND CO. INC. EMPLOYEES UNION (1989)
FACTS:
The management issued a Memorandum Circular introducing a profit-sharing scheme for
its managers and supervisors.
Respondent Union wrote to petitioner to ask that the union members be allowed to
participate in the profit-sharing program. The management denied the request on the ground
that such participation was not provided in the CBA
When renegotiation of the CBA was approaching, the management wrote to the Union
that it was willing to consider including the union members in the profit-sharing schemeprovided that the negotiations would be concluded prior to December 1987
Sometime later, the company distributed the profit-sharing benefit not only to themanagers and supervisors but also to all rank-and-file employees not covered by the CBA
because they were excluded from the definition of bargaining unit.
This caused the respondent Union to file a notice of strike alleging that petitioner wasguilty of unfair labor practice because the union were discriminated against in the grant of
the profit sharing benefits
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Issue: Whether the grant by management of profit sharing benefits to its non-union memberemployees is discriminatory against its workers who are union members and amounts to ULP?
Held: NO. Petition Granted
There can be no discrimination committed by petitioner as the situation of the union employeesare different and distinct from the non-union employees. Discrimination per se is not unlawful.
There can be no discrimination where the employees concerned are not similarly situated.
The grant by petitioner of profit sharing benefits to the employees outside the "bargaining unit"falls under the ambit of its managerial prerogative. It appears to have been done in good faith and
without ulterior motive. More so when as in this case there is a clause in the CBA where the
employees are classified into those who are members of the union and those who are not. In thecase of the union members, they derive their benefits from the terms and conditions of the CBAcontract which constitute the law between the contracting parties. Both the employer and the
union members are bound by such agreement.
PHIL. GRAPHIC ARTS INC. vs. NLRC (1988)
FACTS:
In October 1984, petitioner corporation was forced by economic circumstances to require
its workers to go on mandatory vacation leave in batches of seven or nine for periods ranging
from 15, 30, to 45 days. The workers were paid while on leave but the pay was chargedagainst their respective earned leaves.
As a result, the private respondents filed complaints for unfair labor practice and
discrimination.
Issue: Whether the forced vacation leave without pay constitutes unfair labor practice
Held: NO. Petition Granted
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There was no unfair labor practice in this case. Private respondents never questioned the
existence of an economic crisis but, in fact, admitted its existence. There is basis for the
petitioner's contentions that the reduction of work schedule was temporary, that it was taken onlyafter notice and consultations with the workers and supervisors, that a consensus was reached on
how to deal with deteriorating economic conditions and reduced sales and that the temporary
reduction of working days was a more humane solution instead of a retrenchment and reductionof personnel. The petitioner further points out that this is in consonance with the CBA betweenthe employer and its employees.
Likewise, the forced leave was enforced neither in a malicious, harsh, oppressive, vindictive norwanton manner, or out of malice or spite. Hence, ULP is not committed.
DABUET vs. ROCHE PHARMACEUTICALS (1987)
FACTS:
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The petitioners, all officers of the Roche Products Labor Union, wrote the respondentcompany expressing their grievances and seeking formal conference with management
regarding the previous dismissal of the unions president and vice-president.
At the meeting, instead of discussing the problems affecting the labor union andmanagement, the companys general manager allegedly berated the petitioners for writing the
said letter and called the letter and the person who prepared it stupid.
Feeling that he was the one alluded to, since he had prepared the letter, the counsel forthe labor union filed a case for Grave Slander against the general manager. The charge was
based on the affidavit executed by the petitioners.
In turn, the company and the manager filed a complaint for Perjury against petitioners
alleging that their affidavit contained false statements
The company construed the execution by petitioners of the affidavit as an act of breach
of trust and confidence. Hence, they were suspended and later on dismissed.
Issue: Whether respondent company, in terminating the employment of the petitioners withoutjust and lawful cause, committed an unfair labor practice.
Held: YES. Petition Granted
Respondent company had committed unfair labor practice in dismissing the petitioners without
just and valid cause. Their dismissal, under the circumstances, amounted to interference with,
and restraint or coercion of, the petitioners in the exercise of their right to engage in concerted
activities for their mutual aid and protection
Breach of trust and confidence, the grounds alleged for petitioners' dismissal, "must not be
indiscriminately used as a shield to dismiss an employee arbitrarily.
MADRIGAL & CO. vs. HON. ZAMORA (1987)
FACTS:
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In December 1973, respondent Madrigal Central Office Employees Union sought for the
renewal of its CBA with the petitioner company. It proposed a wage increase of P200.00 a
month, an allowance of P100.00 a month, and other economic benefits.
By an alleged resolution of its stockholders, the petitioner reduced its capital stock from
765,000 shares to 267,366 shares. Petitioner alleged that because of the desire of the
stockholders to phase out the operations of the Madrigal & Co. due to lack of businessincentives and prospect, it had to reduce its capital stock and effected a retrenchment policy(downsizing) of its employees and operations
Petitioner applied for clearance to terminate the services of a number of employees
pursuant to its retrenchment program. Respondent union filed a complaint of illegal lockoutagainst the petitioner.
Respondent Union filed a complaint for ULP.
Issue: Whether the mass-lay off of petitioner due to alleged income loss constitutes ULP
Held: YES. Petition Denied
The petitioners capital reduction efforts, to camouflage the fact that it has been making
profits, and to justify the mass lay-off of its employees, especially union members, were anULP which can neither be countenanced nor condoned.
Petitioner, confronted with the demand of the union for wage increases, decided to evade itsresponsibility towards the employees by a devised capital reduction. While the reduction in
capital stock created a need for retrenchment, it was just a mask for the purge of union members,
who, by then, had agitated for wage increases. In the face of the petitioner company's piling
profits, the unionists had the right to demand for such salary adjustments.
Retrenchment can only be availed of if the company is losing or meeting financial reverses in its
operation. Thus the mass lay-off or dismissal of the employees under the guise of retrenchmentpolicy is a lame excuse and a veritable smoke-screen of its scheme to bust the Union and thus
unduly disturb the employment tenure of the employees concerned, which act is certainly an
ULP.
COMPLEX ELECTRONICS UNION. vs. NLRC (1999)
FACTS:
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Complex Electronics Corporation was a subcontractor of electronic products. Itscustomers were foreign-based companies with different product lines. One of its customers is
the Lite-On Philippines Electronics Co.
Complex received a message from Lite-On Philippines requiring it to lower its price by10%. Complex informed Lite-On that such request was not feasible as they were already
incurring losses at the present prices of their products. Complex informed the employees that
it was left with no alternative but to close down the operations of the Lite-On Line. Thecompany promised that it would follow the law by giving 1 month notice and retrenchment
pay.
Sometime later, the machinery, equipment and materials being used for production at
Complex were pulled-out from the company premises and transferred to the premises ofIonics Circuit, Inc. in Laguna. The following day, Complex totally closed its operation.
The Complex Employees Union filed a complaint for ULP, illegal closure/illegal lockout
and money claims. It claims that business has not ceased at Complex but was merely
transferred to Ionics, a runaway shop, which is an act constituting ULP. To prove that Ionicswas just a runaway shop, petitioner asserts that Complex owns the majority of the shares
comprising the increased capital stock of Ionics. The Union alleged that the reason for theclosure of the establishment was due to the union activities of the employees.
Issue: Whether Complex Electronics Corp. committed ULP
HELD: NO
Resorting to a runaway shop is ULP. A runaway shop is defined as an industrial plant movedby its owners from one location to another to escape union labor regulations or state laws, but the
term is also used to describe a plant removed to a new location in order to discriminate against
employees at the old plant because of their union activities. It is one wherein the employer
moves its business to another location or it temporarily closes its business for anti-unionpurposes.
In this case, Ionics was not set up for the purpose of transferring the business of Complex. Atthe time the labor dispute arose, Ionics was already existing as an independent company. Itcannot, therefore, be said that the temporary closure in Complex and its subsequent transfer of
business to Ionics was for anti-union purposes.
We, likewise, disagree with the Union that there was in this case an illegal lockout/illegal
dismissal. Lockout is the temporary refusal of employer to furnish work as a result of an
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industrial or labor dispute. It may be manifested by the employer's act of excluding employees
who are union members.
PROGRESSIVE DEVPT CO. vs. CIR (1977)
FACTS:
The Araneta Coliseum Employees Association (ACEA) in behalf of 48 members, filed
for ULP against petitioner Progressive Devpt Corp., its officers, and the Progressive
Employees Union (PEU).
The complainants alleged that they were dismissed because they refused to resign fromthe ACEA and to affiliate with the PEU.
There is evidence that the Progressive Employees Union became inactive after the death
of Atty. Reonista the former counsel of the Progressive Development Corporation. Thisshows that the Progressive Employees Union was organized to camouflage the petitioner
corporation's dislike for the Araneta Coliseum Employees Association and to stave off the
latter's recognition. Further, the PEU did not conclude and enter into a CBA with themanagement.
Issue: Whether the dismissal of the employees constitutes ULP
Held: YES
The dismissal of employees because of their refusal to resign from their union and to join theunion favorable to the employer constitutes ULP. Under the circumstances and equity of the
case, and considering the length of time and the union-busting activities of petitioner, the
individual complainants are granted back wages for five (5) years without qualification or
deduction.
BATAAN SHIPYARD vs. NLRC (1988)
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FACTS:
The National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) is a labor organization in petitioner
Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co., Inc. The Company has thousand employees in itspayroll and more than a hundred of them belong to the said labor organization.
Sometimebefore 1984, the Company filed with the NLRC an application for the
retrenchment of 285 of its employees on the ground that the firm had been incurring heavylosses. In the meantime, some employees who had been on sick leave earlier were considered
retrenched. All of those so retrenched happen to be officers and members of the NAFLU.
Issue: Whether the Company is guilty of discriminatory acts in the selection of employees to beretrenched
Held: YES.
The retrenchment undertaken by the Company is valid. However, the manner in which this is
exercised should not be tainted with abuse of discretion. Labor is a person's means of livelihood.He cannot be deprived of his labor or work without due process of law. The retrenchment of
employees who belong to a particular union, with no satisfactory justification why saidemployees were singled out, constitutes ULP.
In this case, the Company had indeed been discriminatory in selecting the employees who wereto be retrenched. All of the retrenched employees are officers and members of the NAFLU. Itleads Us to conclude that the firm had been discriminating against membership in the NAFLU,
an act which amounts to interference in the employees' exercise of their right of self-
organization. This interference is considered an act of ULP
TANDUAY DISTILLERY LABOR UNION vs. NLRC (1987)
FACTS:
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Tanduay Distillery, Inc. (TDI) and Tanduay Distillery Labor Union (TDLU) entered into
a CBA which contained a union security clause, which provided: All workers who are or
may during the effectivity of this Contract, become members of the Union in accordancewith its Constitution and By-Laws shall, as a condition of their continued employment,
maintain membership in good standing in the Union for the duration of the agreement.
While the CBA was still in effect, a number of the TDLU, joined another union, theKaisahan Ng Manggagawang Pilipino (KAMPIL) and organized its local chapter in TDI.
The TDLU required those who disaffiliated to explain why they should not be punished
for disloyalty. TDLU created a committee to investigate its erring members. The
committee recommended that the disaffiliating members be expelled and that they should beterminated from service in pursuant to the union security clause. Acting on said request, the
company terminated the employment of the disaffiliating union members.
Issue: Whether the dismissal of the disaffiliating members pursuant to a security clause
constitutes ULP
Held: NO
The private respondents cannot escape the effects of the security clause of their own applicable
CBA. Union Security Clauses in CBA, if freely and voluntarily entered into, are valid andbinding. Thus, the dismissal of an employee by the company pursuant to a labor unions demand
in accordance with a union security agreement does not constitute ULP.
The respondent employer did nothing but to put in force their agreement when it separated theherein complainants upon the recommendation of said union. Such a stipulation is not only
necessary to maintain loyalty and preserve the integrity of the union but is allowed by the Magna
Charta of Labor when it provided that while it is recognized that an employee shall have the rightto self-organization, it is at the same time postulated that such right shall not injure the right of
the labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of
membership therein
In Villar v. Inciong, we held that "petitioners, although entitled to disaffiliation from their union
and to form a new organization of their own must however, suffer the consequences of their
separation from the union under the security clause of the CBA"
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MABEZA vs. NLRC (1997)
FACTS:
Petitioner Norma Mabeza contends that she and her co-employees at the Hotel Supreme
in Baguio City were asked by the hotel's management to sign an instrument wherein it statesthat they are in compliance with minimum wage and other labor standard provisions of law.
Petitioner signed the affidavit but refused to go to the City Prosecutor's Office to swear to
the truth of her statement. Her refusal displeased the employer.
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Thereafter, she was ordered to turn over the keys to her living quarters and to remove her
belongings from the hotel. Subsequently, she as charged with of abandonment of job and
stealing of company property; finally she was dismissed for loss of confidence.
Issue: Whether the dismissal constitutes ULP?
Held: YES
The act of compelling employees to sign an instrument indicating that the employer observedlabor standards provisions of law when he might have not, together with the act of terminating or
coercing those who refuse to cooperate with the employer's scheme constitutes unfair labor
practice. The first act clearly preempts the right of the hotel's workers to seek better terms and
conditions of employment through concerted action. In not giving positive testimony in favor ofher employer, petitioner had reserved not only her right to dispute the claim and proffer evidence
in support thereof but also to work for better terms and conditions of employment.
RANCE vs. NLRC (1988)
FACTS:
Polybag Manufacturing Corporation and Polybag Workers Union entered into a CBAwhich provides a union security clause which states that a union member who loses his
membership in the union shall be dismissed from service by the company.
Petitioners, who were members of the Polybag Workers Union, were expelled by saidunion for disloyalty for allegedly joining the National Federation of Labor Union
(NAFLU). Because of the expulsion, petitioners were dismissed by the Corporation upon the
unions demand. Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found the CBA and theunion security clause validand considered the termination of petitioners justified.
Petitioners argue that their dismissal is not valid because they did not affiliate with the
NAFLU. They claim that there is a connivance between respondents Company and Union in
their illegal dismissal in order to avoid the payment of separation pay by respondentcompany.
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Issue: Whether the act of asking help from another union constitutes disloyalty
Held: NO
The mere act of seeking help from the NAFLU cannot constitute disloyalty as contemplated in
the Collective Bargaining Agreement. At most it was an act of self-preservation of workers who,
driven to desperation found shelter in the NAFLU who took the cudgels for them.
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KIOK LOY vs. NLRC (1986)
FACTS:
In a certification election held, the Pambansang Kilusang Paggawa, a legitimate late labor
federation, won and was subsequently certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of
the rank-and-file employees of Sweden Ice Cream Plant.
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The Union furnished the Company with two copies of its proposed collective bargaining
agreement. At the same time, it requested the Company for its counter proposals but the
requests were ignored and remained unacted upon by the Company.
As a result, the Union filed a "Notice of Strike", with the BLR on the ground of
unresolved economic issues in collective bargaining.
In the labor arbiter: due to series of postponements, and non-appearance at the hearingconducted it ruled that the Company has waived its right to present further evidence and,therefore, considered the c