MSF Tire and Rubber, Inc. vs. CA

Facts:

A labor dispute arose between Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation (Philtread) and private respondent, Philtread Tire Workers' Union (Union), filed a notice of strike in the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). Charging Philtread with unfair labor practices for allegedly engaging in union-busting for violation of the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. Philtread, on the other hand, filed a notice of lock-out.

During the pendency of the labor dispute, Philthread entered into a memorandum of agreement (MOA) with Siam Tyre Public Company Limited (Siam Tyre). Under the Memorandum of Agreement, Philtread's plant and equipment would be sold to a new company (petitioner MSF Tire and Rubber, Inc.), 80% of which would be owned by Siam Tyre and 20% by Philtread, while the land on which the plant was located would be sold to another company (Sucat Land Corporation), 60% of which would be owned by Philtread and 40% by Siam Tyre.

Petitioner (MSF) then asked the Union to desist from picketing outside its plant and to remove the banners, streamers, and tent which it had placed outside the plant's fence. Union refused.

Petitioner filed a complaint for injunction with damages against the Union and the latter's officers and directors before the Regional Trial Court. RTC denied Petitioner’s application for injunction and dismissed the complaint. However, upon MR, RTC granted the Injunction and Plaintiff’s complaint reinstated. The Union elevated the case to CA which granted the Union’s petition ordering the RTC to dismiss the civil case for lack of jurisdiction.

Issue:

 Whether Petitioner is an innocent bystander with respect to the labor dispute between Philtread and the Union entitles it to Writ of Injunction from the civil courts?

Held:

No.  An "innocent bystander," who seeks to enjoin a labor strike, must satisfy the court that aside from the grounds specified in Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, it is entirely different from, without any connection whatsoever to, either party to the dispute and, therefore, its interests are totally foreign to the context thereof.

For instance, in PAFLU v.Cloribel, supra, this Court held that Wellington and Galang were entirely separate entities, different from, and without any connection whatsoever to, the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, against whom the strike was directed, other than the incidental fact that they are the bank's landlord and co-lessee housed in the same building, respectively.

Similarly, in Liwayway Publications, Inc. v. Permanent Concrete Workers Union, this Court ruled that Liwayway was an "innocent bystander" and thus entitled to enjoin the union's strike because Liwayway's only

connection with the employer company was the fact that both were situated in the same premises.

In the present case, the "negotiation, contract of sale, and the post transaction" between Philtread, as vendor, and Siam Tyre, as vendee, reveals a legal relation between them which, in the interest of petitioner, the transaction between Philtread and Siam Tyre, was not a simple sale whereby Philtread ceased to have any proprietary rights over its sold assets. This, together with the fact that private respondent uses the same plant or factory; similar or substantially the same working conditions; same machinery, tools, and equipment; and manufacture the same products as Philtread, lead us to safely conclude that private respondent's personality is so closely linked to Philtread as to bar its entitlement to an injunctive writ.

Petition Denied.

Club Filipino vs. Bautista, et. al.

Facts:

Club Filipino is a non-stock, non-profit corporation duly formed, organized and existing under Philippine laws, with petitioner Atty. Roberto F. de Leon as its president. Respondents were former officers and members of the Club Filipino Employees Association (the union).

The union and the company had a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which expired on May 31, 2000. Prior to the expiration of the CBA and within the freedom period, the union made several demands for negotiation but the company replied that it could not muster a quorum, thus no CBA negotiations could be held. No negotiations, however, took place for various reasons proffered by the company, among them the illness of the chairman of the management panel.

Union filed a request for preventive mediation with NCMB. However, the Union still failed to bring the management to the negotiating table. The union and management only met on April 5, 2001, but the meeting concluded with a declaration by both parties of a deadlock in their negotiations.

Union filed a notice of strike with the NCMB on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and failure to bargain. The company filed before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a petition to declare the strike illegal. The company further prayed that all union officers who participated in the illegal strike be considered separated from the service.

The Labor Arbiter declared the strike procedurally infirm and therefore illegal. The labor arbiter noted that the union failed to attach its written CBA proposal and the company’s counter-proposal to the notice of strike and to provide proof of a request for a conference to settle the dispute. NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision. CA set aside the rulings of the NLRC.

Issue:

Whether or not the strike staged by respondents was legal?

Held:

Yes. Rule XXII, Section 4 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code states: In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the notice shall, as far as practicable, further state the unresolved issues in the bargaining negotiations and be accompanied by the written proposals of the union, the counter-proposals of the employer and the proof of a request for conference to settle differences. In cases of unfair labor practices, the notice shall, as far as practicable, state the acts complained of, and efforts taken to resolve the dispute amicably.                    Any notice which does not conform with the requirements of this and the foregoing section shall be deemed as not having been filed and the party concerned shall be so informed by the regional branch of the Board.

In the instant case, the union cannot be faulted for its omission. The union could not have attached the counter-proposal of the company in the notice of strike it submitted to the NCMB as there was no such counter-proposal. The union filed a notice of strike on April 6, 2001 after several requests to start negotiations proved futile. It was only on April 22, 2001, or after two weeks, when the company formally responded to the union by submitting the first part of its counter-proposal. Worse, it took the company another three weeks to complete it by submitting on May 11, 2001 the second part of its counter-proposal. This was almost a year after the expiration of the CBA sought to be renewed.

In this case, attaching the counter-proposal of the company to the notice of strike of the union was not practicable. It was absurd to expect the union to produce the company’s counter-proposal which it did not have.  One cannot give what one does not have. Indeed, compliance with the requirement was impossible because no counter-proposal existed at the time the union filed a notice of strike. The law does not exact compliance with the impossible.  Nemo tenetur ad impossibile.Another error committed by the labor arbiter was his declaration that respondents, as union officers, automatically severed their employment with the company due to the alleged illegal strike. In the first place, there was no illegal strike. Moreover, it is hornbook doctrine that a mere finding of the illegality of the strike should not be automatically followed by the wholesale dismissal of the strikers from employment.         

The Law said: Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status.

This reflects the intent of the legislature to require “knowledge” as a condition sine qua non before a union officer can be dismissed from employment for participating in an illegal strike.

Petition Denied.

PLDT vs. Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas

Facts:

The members of respondent union learned that a redundancy program would be implemented by the petitioner. Thereupon it filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB alleging Unfair Labor Practice against PLDT. A number of conciliation meetings, conducted by the NCMB, were held between the parties.  However, these efforts proved futile.

The private respondent staged a strike. 383 Union members were terminated from service pursuant to PLDT’s redundancy program. Secretary Patricia Sto. Tomas issued an Order stating:

“Strike staged by the Union is hereby enjoined. All striking workers are hereby directed to return to work within twenty four (24) hours from receipt of this Order, except those who were terminated due to redundancy.”

Motion for Partial Reconsideration was filed by the Private Respondents. Secretary Issued an Order which referred the case to the NLRC for appropriate action.

Private Respondent however, elevated the case to the CA. The latter granted the Petition and Set Aside and nullified the Order of Secretary.

Issue:

1. Whether or not Special Civil Action for Certiorari instituted by Respondents before the CA was procedurally Precise?

2. Whether the subject orders of the Secretary of DOLE excluding from the Return to Work order the workers dismissed due to the redundancy program of petitioner valid or not?

Held:

1. Yes. The institution of the special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was procedurally sound. In a special civil action of certiorari, the only question that may be raised is whether or not the respondent has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

The respondent asserted in the court a quo that the Secretary violated the law and jurisprudence, and exceeded her authority when she expressly prevented from returning to work those who were terminated due to alleged redundancy while the strike was ongoing.

2. Petition must fail. When the Secretary exercises the powers granted by Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, he is, indeed, granted great breadth of discretion.

Art 263.  Strikes, picketing, and lockouts. –

(g) When in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of

automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout.

From the foregoing, it is quite apparent that no matter how broad the exercise of discretion is, the same must be within the confines of law. Thus, the wide latitude of discretion given the Secretary under Art. 263(g) shall and must be within the sphere of law.

As Article 263(g) is clear and unequivocal in stating that ALL striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit ALL workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout, then the unmistakable mandate must be followed by the Secretary.

Members of the private respondent who were dismissed due to

alleged redundancy were still employed by the petitioner and holding

their respective positions.  This is the status quo that must be

maintained.

Capitol Medical Center vs. Trajano

Facts:

Capitol Medical Center is a hospital with address at Panay Avenue corner Scout Magbanua Street, Quezon City. Upon the other hand, Capitol Medical Center Employees Association-Alliance of Filipino Workers,respondent, is a duly registered labor union acting as the certified collective bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of petitioner hospital. 

Respondent union, sent petitioner a letter requesting a negotiation of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Petitioner, challenging the union’s legitimacy, refused to bargain with respondent. Subsequently, Petitioner filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), Department of Labor and Employment, a petition for cancellation of respondent’s certificate of registration.

Respondent Union filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), National Capital Region, a notice of strike. Despite several conferences and efforts of the designated conciliator-mediator, the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement.

Former Labor Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing, issued an Order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute and ordering all striking workers to return to work and the management to resume normal operations.

Petitioner filed with this Court a petition for certiorari assailing the Labor Secretary’s Orders before the CA. 

Regional Director, issued an Order denying the petition for cancellation of respondent union’s certificate of registration. CA rendered a Decision affirming the Orders of the Secretary of Labor. 

Issue:

1. Whether Petition for cancellation of respondent’s Union’s certificate of registration involves a prejudicial question that should be settled before the Secretary of Labor could order the parties to bargain collectively?

2. Whether the Secretary of Labor cannot exercise his power under Article 263(g) without observing the requirments of due process?

Held:

1. No. Pendency of a petition for cancellation of union registration does not preclude collective bargaining.

That there is a pending cancellation proceedings against the respondent Union is not a bar to set in motion the mechanics of collective bargaining. If a certification election may still be ordered despite the pendency of a petition to cancel the union’s registration certificate, more so should the collective bargaining process continue despite its pendency.

Majority status of the respondent Union is not affected by the pendency of the Petition for Cancellation pending against it. Unless its certificate of registration and its status as the certified bargaining agent are revoked, the Hospital is, by express provision of the law, duty bound to collectively bargain with the Union.

2. In labor disputes adversely affecting the continued operation of such hospitals, clinics or medical institutions, it shall be the duty of the striking union or locking-out employer to provide and maintain an effective skeletal workforce of medical and other health personnel, whose movement and services shall be unhampered and unrestricted, as are necessary to insure the proper and adequate protection of the life and health of its patients, most especially emergency cases, for the duration of the strike or lockout. In such cases, therefore, the Secretary of Labor and Employment is mandated to immediately assume, within twenty-four (24) hours from knowledge of the occurrence of such a strike or lockout, jurisdiction over the same or certify it to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. For this purpose, the contending parties are strictly enjoined to comply with such orders, prohibitions and/or injunctions as are issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission, under pain of immediate

disciplinary action, including dismissal or loss of employment status or payment by the locking-out employer of backwages, damages and other affirmative relief, even criminal prosecution against either or both of them.

The President of the Philippines shall not be precluded from determining the industries that, in his opinion, are indispensable to the national interest, and from intervening at any time and assuming jurisdiction over any such labor dispute in order to settle or terminate the same.

Discretion to assume jurisdiction may be exercised by the Secretary of Labor and Employment without the necessity of prior notice or hearing given to any of the parties. The rationale for his primary assumption of jurisdiction can justifiably rest on his own consideration of the exigency of the situation in relation to the national interests.

Petition Denied.

Phimco Industries Inc. vs. Brillantes

Facts:

 Phimco Industries Labor Association (PILA) filed a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board, NCR, against PHIMCO after a deadlock in the collective bargaining and negotiation. After several conciliation conferences called by the contending parties failed to resolve their differences PILA, staged a strike.

PILA presented a petition for the intervention of the Secretary of Labor in the resolution of the labor dispute, to which petition PHIMCO opposed. Pending resolution of the said petition PHIMCO sent notice of termination to some 47 workers including several union officers.

Acting Secretary of Labor Jose Brillantes assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and issued his Order;

“All the striking workers, except those who have been handed down termination papers on June 26, 1995, are hereby directed to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of this Order and for the Company to accept them back under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the strike.

The parties are further ordered to cease and desist from committing any act that will aggravate the situation.”

Issue:

Whether the Secretary of Labor acted with grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over subject labor dispute?

Held:

Yes. The Labor Code vests in the Secretary of Labor the discretion to determine what industries are indispensable to the national interest.  Accordingly, upon the determination by the Secretary of Labor that such industry is indispensable to the national interest, he will assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute in the said industry. This power, however, is not without any limitation.

The private respondent did not even make any effort to touch on the indispensability of the match factory to the national interest. It must have been aware that a match factory, though of value, can scarcely be considered as an industry “indispensable to the national interest” as it cannot be in the same category as “generation and distribution of energy, or those undertaken by banks, hospitals, and export-oriented industries.

 It is thus evident from the foregoing that the Secretary’s assumption of jurisdiction grounded on the alleged “obtaining circumstances” and not on a determination that the industry involved in the labor dispute is one indispensable to the “national interest”, the standard set by the legislature, constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction.

Petition Granted.

FEU-NRMF vs. FEU-NRMF Employees Association

Facts:

Petitioner FEU-NRMF and respondent union entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) that will expire on 30 April 1996.

In view of the forthcoming expiry, respondent union, on 21 March 1996, sent a letter-proposal to petitioner FEU-NRMF stating therein their economic and non-economic proposals for the negotiation of the new CBA.

Petitioner FEU-NRMF sent a letter-reply rejecting respondent union’s demands and proposed to maintain the same provisions of the old CBA. Petitioner FEU-NRMF reasoned that due to financial constraints, it cannot afford to accede to a number of their demands for educational and death benefits, uniforms, longetivity pay, meal allowance and special pay, but nevertheless gave an assurance that it will seriously consider their proposal on salary increase. 

In an effort to arrive at a compromise, subsequent conciliation proceedings were conducted before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board - National Capital Region (NCMB-NCR) but because of the unyielding stance of both parties, the negotiation failed.

Respondent union filed a Notice of Strike before NCMB-NCR on the ground of bargaining deadlock. A strike vote was conducted and the result thereof was submitted to NCMB-NCR. After the expiration of the 30 day cooling off period and the 7 day strike ban, respondent union, staged a strike.

Petitioner FEU-NRMF filed a Petition for the Assumption of Jurisdiction or for Certification of Labor Dispute with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), underscoring the fact that it is a medical institution engaged in the business of providing health care for its patients.

Secretary of Labor, granted the petition and thus issued an Order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute, thereby prohibiting any strike or lockout whether actual or impending, and enjoining the parties from committing any acts which may exacerbate the situation.

 NLRC process server, certified that he attempted to serve a copy of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order to the union officers but since no one was around at the strike area, he just posted copies of the said Order at several conspicuous places within the premises of the hospital.

Claiming that they had no knowledge that the Secretary of Labor already assumed jurisdiction over the pending labor dispute as they were not able to receive a copy of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order, striking employees continued holding a strike.

Subsequently, petitioner FEU-NRMF filed a case before the NLRC, contending that respondent union staged the strike in defiance of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order; hence, it was illegal.

Labor Arbiter rendered Decision declaring the strike illegal and dismissing the union officers for conducting the strike in defiance of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order. Upon Appeal, NLRC issued a Resolution affirming in toto the Decision of the Labor Arbiter and upheld the illegality of the strike and loss of employment status of the union officers. 

When the case was elevated, CA rendered a Decision granting the Petition and reversing the assailed Resolution. The appellate court found that no personal service was validly effected by the process server that could bind the striking employees.

Issues:

Whether the service of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order was validly effected by the process server so as to bind the respondent union and hold them liable for the acts committed subsequent to the issuance of the said Order.

Held:

No. The process server resorted to posting the Order when personal service was rendered impossible since the striking employees were not present at the strike area. This mode of service, however, is not sanctioned by either the NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure or the Revised Rules of Court. 

An Order issued by the Secretary of Labor assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute is not a final judgment for it does not dispose of the labor dispute with finality. Consequently, the rule on service of summons and orders, and not the proviso on service of decisions and final awards, governs the service of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order.

Under the NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure, service of copies of orders should be made by the process server either personally or through registered mail.  However, due to the urgent nature of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order and the public policy underlying the injunction carried by the issuance of the said Order, service of copies of the same should be made in the most expeditious and effective manner, without any delay, ensuring its immediate receipt by the intended parties as may be warranted under the circumstances.  Accordingly, in this case, personal service is the proper mode of serving the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order.

It is also provided under the same rules that in special circumstances, service of summons may be effected in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court.

Parenthetically, the manner upon which personal service may be made is prescribed by the following provisions of the Revised Rules of Court:

Rule 13. Filing and Service of Pleadings, Judgments and Other Papers.

             Section 6. Personal service. – Service of the papers may be made by delivering personally a copy to the party or his counsel, or by leaving it in his office with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof. if no person is found in his office, or his office is not known, or he has no office, then by leaving a copy, between the hours of eight in the morning and six in the evening, at the party’s or counsel’s residence, if known, with a person of sufficient age and discretion then residing therein. 

Clearly, personal service effectively ensures that the notice desired under the constitutional requirement of due process is accomplished.  If, however, efforts to find the party concerned personally would make prompt service impossible, service may be completed by substituted service, that is, by leaving a copy, between the hours of eight in the morning and six in the evening, at the party’s or counsel’s residence, if known, with a person of sufficient age and discretion then residing therein.

Employment is a property right of which one cannot be deprived of without due process. Merely posting copies of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order does not satisfy the rigid requirement for proper service outlined by the above stated rules.  Needless to say, the manner of service made by the process server was invalid and irregular.  Respondent union could not therefore be adjudged to have defied the said Order since it was not properly apprised thereof.  Accordingly, the strike conducted by the respondent union was valid under the circumstances.

For a strike to be valid, the following requisites must concur:

1. The thirty-day notice or the fifteen-day notice, in case of unfair labor practices;

2. The two-thirds (2/3) required vote to strike done by secret ballot; and

3. The submission of the strike vote to the Department of Labor and Employment at least seven days prior to the strike.

4. In addition, in case of strikes in hospitals, clinics and medical institutions, it shall be the duty of the striking employees to provide and maintain an effective and skeletal workforce of medical and other health personnel in order to insure the proper and adequate protection of the life and health of its patients.

These procedural requirements, along with the mandatory cooling off and strike ban periods had been fully observed by the respondent union.

As the strike conducted by the respondent union is valid and legal, there is therefore no cogent reason to dismiss the union officers.

Petition Denied.

Union of Filipro Employees vs. NLRC

Facts:

Petitioner Union of the Filipro Employees, the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all rank-and-file employees of Nestle Philippines, filed a Notice of Strike at the Department of Labor raising the issues of CBA deadlock and unfair labor practice.

(NCMB) invited the parties for a conference for the purpose of settling the dispute. Private Respondent NESTLE assailed the legal personality of the proponents of the said notice of strike to represent the Nestle employees.

This notwithstanding, the NCMB proceeded to invite the parties to attend the conciliation meetings and to which private respondent failed to attend contending that it will deal only with a negotiating panel duly constituted and mandated in accordance with the UFE Constitution and By-laws.

The Company terminated from employment all UFE Union officers, headed by its president, Mr. Manuel Sarmiento, and all the members of the negotiating panel for instigating and knowingly participating in a strike staged without any notice of strike filed and a strike vote obtained for the purpose.

Union filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter, in a decision upheld the validity of the dismissal of said union officers. The decision was later on affirmed by the respondent NLRC en banc.

Respondent company contends that, "with the dismissal of UFE officers including all the members of the union negotiating panel as later on confirmed by the NLRC en banc, said union negotiating panel thus ceased to exist and its former members divested of any legal personality, standing and capacity to act as such or represent the union in any manner whatsoever."

Petitioner filed a motion asking the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over the dispute of deadlock in collective bargaining between the parties. Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon certified to the NLRC the said dispute between the UFE and Nestle, Philippines, Secretary Drilon hereby certifies

the sole issue of deadlock in CBA negotiations and directed the NLRC to call all the parties immediately and resolve the CBA deadlock within twenty (20) days from submission of the case for resolution.

NLRC promulgated a resolution granting wage increase and other benefits to Nestle's employees, ruling on non-economic issues, as well as absolving the private respondent of the Unfair Labor Practice charge.

Petitioner finds said resolution to be inadequate and accordingly, does not agree therewith. Hence elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in resolving the issue certified by the Secretary of Labor and formulating a CBA?

Held:

Surpreme Court ruled that NLRC committed no grave abuse of discretion in resolving the issue certified by the Secretary and formulating a CBA which covers the bargaining units consisting of all regular rank-and-file employees of the respondent company.

Public respondent's resolution is proper and in full compliance with the order of the Secretary of Labor.

The assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor over labor disputes causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest is in the nature of a police power measure. It cannot be denied that the private respondent is engaged in an undertaking affected with public interest being one of the largest manufacturers of food products. The compelling consideration of the Secretary's assumption of jurisdiction is the fact that a prolonged strike or lockout is inimical to the national economy and thus, the need to implement some measures to suppress any act which will hinder the company's essential productions is indispensable for the promotion of the common good.

Under this situation, the Secretary's certification order for compulsory arbitration which was intended for the immediate formulation of an already delayed CBA was proper. Corollarily, the NLRC was thereby charged with the task of implementing the certification order for compulsory arbitration. As the implementing body, its authority did not include the power to amend the Secretary's order.

For the same reason, the prayer to declare the respondent company guilty of acts of unfair labor practice when it allegedly resorted to practices designed to delay the collective bargaining negotiations cannot be subsumed in this petition, it being beyond the scope of the certification order.

The NLRC is not sitting as a judicial court but as an administrative body charged with the duty to implement the order of the Secretary. Its function only is to formulate the terms and conditions of the CBA and cannot go beyond the scope of the order. 

In the light of the foregoing, the Court upholds the pronouncement of the NLRC holding the CBA to be signed by the parties effective upon the promulgation of the assailed resolution.

Moreover, the NLRC is in the best position to formulate a CBA which is equitable to all concerned. Because of its expertise in settling labor disputes, it is imbued with competence to appraise and evaluate the evidence and positions presented by the parties. In the absence of a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, the findings of the respondent NLRC on the terms of the CBA should not be disturbed.

Petition Dismissed.