1.) Capitol Medical vs. NLRC, 457 SCRA 235/ G.R. No. 147080 April 26, 2005FACTSThe petitioners refusal to negotiate for a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) resulted in a union-led strike on April 15, 1993. The Capitol Medical Center Employees Association-Alliance of Filipino Workers, the Union, had to contend with another union, the Capitol Medical Center Alliance of Concerned Employees (CMC-ACE), which demanded for a certification election among the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner. Med-Arbiter Brigida Fadrigon granted the petition, and the matter was appealed to the Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE). Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma rendered a Resolution granting the appeal. He, likewise, denied the motion filed by the petitioner and the CMC-ACE. The latter thereafter brought the matter to the Court which rendered judgment affirming the resolution of Undersecretary Laguesma, thus: (1) Dismissing the petition for certification election filed by the Capitol Medical Center Alliance of Concerned Employees-United Filipino Services Workers for lack of merit; and; (2) Directing the management of the Capitol Medical Center to negotiate a CBA with the Capitol Medical Center Employees Association-Alliance of Filipino Workers, the certified bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees. The decision of the Court became final and executory. Thereafter, in a Letter dated October 3, 1997 addressed to Dr. Thelma N. Clemente, the President and Director of the petitioner, the Union requested for a meeting to discuss matters pertaining to a negotiation for a CBA, conformably with the decision of the Court.4 However, in a Letter to the Union dated October 10, 1997, Dr. Clemente rejected the proposed meeting, on her claim that it was a violation of Republic Act No. 6713 and that the Union was not a legitimate one. On October 15, 1997, the petitioner filed a Petition for the Cancellation of the Unions Certificate of Registration with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) on the following grounds: (1) Respondent has failed for several years to submit annually its annual financial statements and other documents as required by law. For this reason, respondent has long lost its legal personality as a union; (2) Respondent also engaged in a strike which has been declared illegal by the NLRC.The Union alleged as grounds for the projected strike the following acts of the petitioner: (a) refusal to bargain; (b) coercion on employees; and (c) interference/restraint to self-organization.A series of conferences was conducted before the NCMB (National Capital Region), but no agreement was reached. On November 6, 1997, the petitioner even filed a Letter with the Board requesting that the notice of strike be dismissed;8 the Union had apparently failed to furnish the Regional Branch of the NCMB with a copy of a notice of the meeting where the strike vote was conducted.On November 20, 1997, the Union submitted to the NCMB the minutes9 of the alleged strike vote purportedly held on November 10, 1997 at the parking lot in front of the petitioners premises, at the corner of Scout Magbanua Street and Panay Avenue, Quezon City. It appears that 178 out of the 300 union members participated therein, and the results were as follows: 156 members voted to strike; 14 members cast negative votes; and eight votes were spoiled.On November 28, 1997, the officers and members of the Union staged a strike.The Labor Arbiter found and declared in his decision that no secret voting ever took place in the parking lot fronting the hospital on November 10, 1997 by and among the 300 members of the respondent Union. Erwin Barbacena, the overseer of the only parking lot fronting the hospital, and security guards Simon Ting-zon and Reggie Barawid, declared in their respective affidavits that no secret voting ever took place on November 10, 1997; 17 employees of the petitioner also denied in their respective statements that they were not members of the respondent Union, and were asked to merely sign attendance papers and unnumbered votes. The NLRC and the CA declared in their respective decisions that the affidavits of the petitioners 17 employees had no probative weight because the said employees merely executed their affidavits out of fear of losing their jobs. The NLRC and the CA anchored their conclusion on their finding that the affidavits of the employees were uniform and pro forma.ISSUES(1) Whether the respondent Capitol Medical Center Employees Association-Alliance of Filipino Workers (the Union, for brevity) was the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner Capitol Medical Center, Inc.?; (2) WON the strike staged by the Union is legal?

HELDNO. The Supreme Court agree with the finding of the Labor Arbiter that no secret balloting to strike was conducted by the respondent Union on November 10, 1997 at the parking lot in front of the hospital, at the corner of Scout Magbanua Street and Panay Avenue, Quezon City. It was agreed with the petitioner that the respondent Union failed to comply with the second paragraph of Section 10, Rule XXII of the Omnibus Rules of the NLRC which reads: Section 10. Strike or lockout vote.A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in meetings or referenda called for the purpose. A decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a majority of the Board of Directors of the employer, corporation or association or the partners obtained by a secret ballot in a meeting called for the purpose. The regional branch of the Board may, at its own initiative or upon the request of any affected party, supervise the conduct of the secret balloting. In every case, the union or the employer shall furnish the regional branch of the Board and notice of meetings referred to in the preceding paragraph at least twenty-four (24) hours before such meetings as well as the results of the voting at least seven (7) days before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period provided in this Rule. Although the second paragraph of Section 10 of the said Rule is not provided in the Labor Code of the Philippines, nevertheless, the same was incorporated in the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code and has the force and effect of law. RULINGThe petition is GRANTED. The Decisions of the Court of Appeals and NLRC are SET ASIDE AND REVERSED. The Decision of the Labor Arbiter is REINSTATED.

A union is mandated to notify the NCMB (National Conciliation Mediation Board) of an impending dispute in a particular bargaining unit via a notice of strike. Thereafter, the NCMB, through its conciliator-mediators, shall call the parties to a conference at the soonest possible time in order to actively assist them in exploring all possibilities for amicable settlement. In the event of the failure in the conciliation/mediation proceedings, the parties shall be encouraged to submit their dispute for voluntary arbitration. However, if the parties refuse, the union may hold a strike vote, and if the requisite number of votes is obtained, a strike may ensue. The purpose of the strike vote is to ensure that the decision to strike broadly rests with the majority of the union members in general and not with a mere minority, and at the same time, discourage wildcat strikes, union bossism and even corruption. A strike vote report submitted to the NCMB at least seven days prior to the intended date of strike ensures that a strike vote was, indeed, taken. In the event that the report is false, the seven-day period affords the members an opportunity to take the appropriate remedy before it is too late. The 15 to 30 day cooling-off period is designed to afford the parties the opportunity to amicably resolve the dispute with the assistance of the NCMB conciliator/mediator, while the seven-day strike ban is intended to give the DOLE an opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really carries the imprimatur of the majority of the union members.The requirement of giving notice of the conduct of a strike vote to the NCMB at least 24 hours before the meeting for the said purpose is designed to (a) inform the NCMB of the intent of the union to conduct a strike vote; (b) give the NCMB ample time to decide on whether or not there is a need to supervise the conduct of the strike vote to prevent any acts of violence and/or irregularities attendant thereto; and (c) should the NCMB decide on its own initiative or upon the request of an interested party including the employer, to supervise the strike vote, to give it ample time to prepare for the deployment of the requisite personnel, including peace officers if need be. Unless and until the NCMB is notified at least 24 hours of the unions decision to conduct a strike vote, and the date, place, and time thereof, the NCMB cannot determine for itself whether to supervise a strike vote meeting or not and insure its peaceful and regular conduct. The failure of a union to comply with the requirement of the giving of notice to the NCMB at least 24 hours prior to the holding of a strike vote meeting will render the subsequent strike staged by the union illegal.

2.) Lapanday Workers Union & et. al. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 248 SCRA 95/ G.R. Nos. 95494-97.September 7, 1995FACTSPetitioner Lapanday Agricultural Workers Union (Union for brevity) and petitioners-workers of Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation and CADECO Agro Development Philippines, Inc., seek to reverse the consolidated Decision, dated August 29, 1990, rendered by public respondent NLRC, declaring their strike illegal and ordering the dismissal of their leaders. Private respondents are sister companies engaged in the production of bananas. Their agricultural establishments are located in Davao City.On the other hand, petitioner Lapanday Workers Union (Union) is the duly certified bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of private respondents. The Union is affiliated with the KMU-ANGLO (Alliance of Nationalist and Genuine Labor Organization). The other petitioners are all members of the Union.The records show that petitioner Union has a collective bargaining agreement with private respondents, covering the period from December 5, 1985 to November 30, 1988. A few months before the expiration of their CBA, private respondents initiated certain management policies which disrupted the relationship of the parties. Private respondents contracted Philippine Eagle Protectors and Security Agency, Inc., to provide security services for their business premises. Their contract also called for the protection of the lives and limbs of private respondents officers, employees and guests within company premises. The Union branded the security guards posted within the company premises as private respondents goons and special forces. It also accused the guards of intimidating and harassing their members. The Union filed on August 25, 1988, a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). It accused the company of unfair labor practices consisting of coercion of employees, intimidation of union members and union-busting.2 These were the same issues raised by the Union during the August 2, 1988 labor-management meeting.On August 29, 1988, the NCMB called a conciliation conference. The conference yielded the following agreement:(1) Union officers, including the officials of KMU-ANGLO, and the Executive Director of the NCMB would attend the HDIR seminar on September 5, 1988; and; (2) A committee shall convene on September 10, 1988, to establish guidelines governing the guards.The Union officials did attend the September 5, 1988 seminar. While they no longer objected to the continuation of the seminar, they reiterated their demand for the deletion of the discussion pertaining to the KMU-ANGLO. On September 14, 1988, private respondents filed separate charges against the Union and its members for illegal strike, unfair labor practice and damages, with prayer for injunction. On October 3, 1988, a strike vote was conducted among the members of the Union and those in favor of the strike won overwhelming support from the workers. The result of the strike vote was then submitted to the NCMB on October 10, 1988. Two days later, or on October 12, 1988, the Union struck.On the bases of the foregoing facts, Labor Arbiter Antonio Villanueva ruled that the Union staged an illegal strike. Petitioners now claim that public respondent NLRC gravely abused its discretion in: a) declaring that their activities, from September 9, 1988 to October 12, 1988, were strike activities; and b) declaring that the strike staged on October 12, 1988 was illegal.The critical issue is the legality of the strike held on October 12, 1988. The applicable laws are Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code, as amended by E.O. No. 111, dated December 24, 1986.Paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended by E.O. 111.ISSUES: (1) WON the strike conducted by the union on October 12, 1988 is valid? (2) WON union members who were merely instigated to participate in the illegal strike should be treated differently from their leaders?HELD 1) NO. Applying the law to the case at bar, the court ruled that strike conducted by the union on October 12, 1988 is plainly illegal as it was held within the seven (7) day waiting period provided for by paragraph (f), Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended. The haste in holding the strike prevented the Department of Labor and Employment from verifying whether it carried the approval of the majority of the union members;2) YES. The Supreme Court, likewise, agreed with the public respondent that the union members who were merely instigated to participate in the illegal strike should be treated differently from their leaders. Part of their benign consideration for labor is the policy of reinstating rank-and-file workers who were merely misled in supporting illegal strikes. Nonetheless, these reinstated workers shall not be entitled to backwages as they should not be compensated for services skipped during the illegal strike. RULING: The petition is dismissed for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the public respondent.

3) San Miguel Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 403 SCRA 418/ G.R. No. 119293. June 10, 2003FACTSPetitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) and respondent Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM), exclusive bargaining agent of petitioners daily-paid rank and file employees, executed a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) under which they agreed to submit all disputes to grievance and arbitration proceedings. The CBA also included a mutually enforceable no-strike no-lockout agreement. On April 11, 1994, IBM, through its vice-president Alfredo Colomeda, filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a notice of strike, docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-04-180-94, against petitioner for allegedly committing: (1) illegal dismissal of union members, (2) illegal transfer, (3) violation of CBA, (4) contracting out of jobs being performed by union members, (5) labor-only contracting, (6) harassment of union officers and members, (7) non-recognition of duly-elected union officers, and (8) other acts of unfair labor practice.4The next day, IBM filed another notice of strike, this time through its president Edilberto Galvez, raising similar grounds: (1) illegal transfer, (2) labor-only contracting, (3) violation of CBA, (4) dismissal of union officers and members, and (5) other acts of unfair labor practice. This was docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-04-182-94. The Galvez group subsequently requested the NCMB to consolidate its notice of strike with that of the Colomeda group, to which the latter opposed, alleging Galvezs lack of authority in filing the same.Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion for Severance of Notices of Strike with Motion to Dismiss, on the grounds that the notices raised non-strikeable issues and that they affected four corporations which are separate and distinct from each other. After several conciliation meetings, NCMB Director Reynaldo Ubaldo found that the real issues involved are non-strikeable. Hence on May 2, 1994, he issued separate letter-orders to both union groups, converting their notices of strike into preventive mediation. During the conciliation meetings, it was clearly established that the real issues involved are illegal dismissal, labor only contracting and internal union disputes, which affect not only the interest of the San Miguel Corporation but also the interests of the MAGNOLIA-NESTL CORPORATION, the SAN MIGUEL FOODS, INC., and the SAN MIGUEL JUICES, INC.Considering that San Miguel Corporation is the only impleaded employer-respondent, and considering further that the aforesaid companies are separate and distinct corporate entities, we deemed it wise to reduce and treat your Notice of Strike as Preventive Mediation case for the four (4) different companies in order to evolve voluntary settlement of the disputes . . . . (Emphasis supplied) Two days after the declaration of strike, or on June 6, 1994, petitioner filed with public respondent NLRC an amended Petition for Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order, Free Ingress and Egress Order and Deputization Order. After due hearing and ocular inspection, the NLRC on June 13, 1994 resolved to issue a temporary restraining order (TRO) directing free ingress to and egress from petitioners plants, without prejudice to the unions right to peaceful picketing and continuous hearings on the injunction case.ISSUEWON the request by the petitioner for the issuance of injunction or restraining order may be validly granted?

HELDYES. Pursuant to Article 218 (e), the coercive measure of injunction may also be used to restrain an actual or threatened unlawful strike. In the case of San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, where the same issue of NLRCs duty to enjoin an unlawful strike was raised, we ruled that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the petition for injunction to restrain the union from declaring a strike based on non- strikeable grounds. Further, in IBM v. NLRC we held that it is the legal duty and obligation of the NLRC to enjoin a partial strike staged in violation of the law. Failure to issue promptly an injunction by the public respondent was likewise held therein to be an abuse of discretion. Respondent however resorted to force without exhausting all available means within its reach. Such infringement of the aforecited CBA provisions constitutes further justification for the issuance of an injunction against the strike. As we said long ago: Strikes held in violation of the terms contained in a collective bargaining agreement are illegal especially when they provide for conclusive arbitration clauses. These agreements must be strictly adhered to and respected if their ends have to be achieved. As to petitioners allegation of violation of the no-strike provision in the CBA, jurisprudence has enunciated that such clauses only bar strikes which are economic in nature, but not strikes grounded on unfair labor practices. The notices filed in the case at bar alleged unfair labor practices, the initial determination of which would entail fact-finding that is best left for the labor arbiters. Nevertheless, our finding herein of the invalidity of the notices of strike dispenses with the need to discuss this issue. In the case at bar, petitioner sought a permanent injunction to enjoin the respondents strike. A strike is considered as the most effective weapon in protecting the rights of the employees to improve the terms and conditions of their employment. However, to be valid, a strike must be pursued within legal bounds. One of the procedural requisites that Article 263 of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules prescribe is the filing of a valid notice of strike with the NCMB. Imposed for the purpose of encouraging the voluntary settlement of disputes, this requirement has been held to be mandatory, the lack of which shall render a strike illegal. RULINGThe instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision and resolution of the NLRC in Injunction Case No. 00468-94 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner and private respondent are hereby directed to submit the issues raised in the dismissed notices of strike to grievance procedure and proceed with arbitration proceedings as prescribed in their CBA, if necessary.

4.) Sarmiento vs. Tuico, 162 SCRA 676/ Nos. L-75271-73 June 27, 1988FACTSThe case arose when on May 7, 1986, petitioner Asian Transmission Corporation terminated the services of Catalino Sarmiento, vice-president of the Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATU), for allegedly carrying a deadly weapon in the company premises. As a result, the BATU filed a notice of strike on May 26, 1986, claiming that the ATC had committed an unfair labor practice. The conciliatory conference held on June 5, 1986, failed to settle the dispute. The ATC then filed a petition asking the Ministry of Labor and Employment to assume jurisdiction over the matter or certify the same to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. Noting that the impending strike would prejudice the national interest as well as the welfare of some 350 workers and their families, the MOLE issued an order on June 3, 1986, certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC. At the same time, it enjoined the management from locking out its employees and the union from declaring a strike or similar concerted action. This order was reiterated on June 13, 1986, upon the representation of the ATC that some 40 workers had declared a strike and were picketing the company premises. Proceedings could not continue in the NLRC, however, because of the acceptance by President Aquino of the resignations of eight of its members, leaving only the vice-chair- man in office. For this reason, the MOLE, on September 9, 1986, set aside the orders of June 9 and 13, 1986, and directly assumed jurisdiction of the dispute, at the same time enjoining the company to accept all returning workers. This order was itself set aside on November 24, 1986, upon motion of both the BATU and the ATC, in view of the appointment of new commissioners in the NLRC. The MOLE then returned the case to the respondent NLRC and directed it to expeditiously resolve all issues relating to the dispute, adding that the union and the striking workers are ordered to return to work immediately. Conformably, the NLRC issued on January 13, 1987 the following resolution, which it affirmed in its resolution of February 12, 1987, denying the motion for reconsideration.Asian Transmission Corporation is an export-oriented enterprise and its annual export amounts to 90% of its sales generating more than twelve (12) million dollars per year. The corporation employs three hundred fifty (350) workers with a total monthly take home pay or approximately P1,300,000.00 a month. ISSUE:Whether or not a return-to-work order may be validly issued by the National Labor Relations Commission pending determination of the legality of the strike; andHELDNO. It is contended by the ATC that the NLRC had no jurisdiction in issuing the return-to-work order and that in any case the same should be annulled for being oppressive and violative of due process. The question of competence is easily resolved. The authority for the order is found in Article 264(g) of the Labor Code, as amended by B.P. Blg. 227.Accordingly, the Court holds that the return-to-work order should benefit only those workers who complied therewith and, regardless of the outcome of the compulsory arbitration proceedings, are entitled to be paid for work they have actually performed. Conversely, those workers who refused to obey the said order and instead waged the restrained strike are not entitled to be paid for work not done or to reinstatement to the positions they have abandoned by their refusal to return thereto as ordered. RULING:The temporary restraining order of August 12, 1986, and September 21, 1986, are CONTINUED IN FORCE until completion of the compulsory arbitration proceedings in the NLRC.

5.) Stamford Marketing Corp. vs. Julian, 423 SCRA 633/ G.R. No. 145496. February 24, 2004FACTSThe instant controversy stemmed from a letter sent by Zoilo V. De La Cruz, Jr., president of the Philippine Agricultural, Commercial and Industrial Workers Union (PACIWU-TUCP), on November 2, 1994, to Rosario A. Apacible, the treasurer and general manager of herein petitioners Stamford Marketing Corporation, GSP Manufacturing Corporation, Giorgio Antonio Marketing Corporation, Clementine Marketing Corporation, and Ultimate Concept Phils., Inc. Said letter advised Apacible that the rank-and-file employees of the aforementioned companies had formed the Apacible Enterprise Employees Union-PACIWU-TUCP. The union demanded that management recognize its existence. Shortly thereafter, discord reared its ugly head, and rancor came hard on its wake.petitioner Stamford alleged that private respondent Julian was a supervising employee at the Patricks Boutique at Shoemart (SM) Northmall. In October 1994, when she was four (4) to five (5) months pregnant, the management of SM Northmall asked her to go on maternity leave, pursuant to company policy. Julian was then directed to report at Stamfords Head Office for reassignment. She was also asked to submit a medical certificate to enable the company to approximate her delivery date. Julian, however, allegedly failed to comply with these directives and instead, ceased to report for work without having given notice. Stamford then allegedly asked Tejada to take over Julians position, but the former inexplicably refused to comply with the management directive. Instead, like Julian, she abandoned her work with nary a notice or an explanation. On March 17, 1995, PACIWU-TUCP, filed on behalf of fifty (50) employees allegedly illegally dismissed for union membership by the petitioners, a Complaint before the Arbitration Branch of NLRC, Metro Manila. PACIWU-TUCP charged petitioners herein with unfair labor practice. The Complaint alleged that when Apacible received the letter of PACIWU-TUCP, management began to harass the members of the local chapter, a move which culminated in their outright dismissal from employment, without any just or lawful cause. It was a clear case of union-busting, averred PACIWU-TUCP. Petitioners argue that respondents were legally dismissed, pursuant to Article 26411 of the Labor Code in view of the determination by the Labor Arbiter that the strike conducted by respondents are illegal and that illegal acts attended the mass action. The respondents counter that the determination of the illegality of strike is inconsequential as the conclusion by the appellate court on the illegality of dismissal was based on the petitioners non-compliance with the due process requirements on terminating employees, which had nothing to do with the legality of the strike. In the instant case, we find no reason to disagree with the findings of the NLRC that the strike conducted by the respondent union is illegal. First, it has not been shown to the satisfaction of this Court that said union is a legitimate labor organization, entitled under Article 263 (c) to file a notice of strike on behalf of its members. Second, the other requirements under Article 263 (c) and (f) were not complied with by the striking union. On this matter, the record is bare of any showing to the contrary. Hence, what is left for this Court to do is to determine the effects of the illegality of the strike on respondents union officers and members, specifically (a) whether such would justify their dismissal from employment, and (b) whether they ceased to be entitled to the monetary awards and other appropriate reliefs and remedies. While holding the strike illegal, the Court of Appeals nonetheless still ruled that the union officers and members were illegally dismissed for non-observance of due process requirements and union busting by management. It likewise gave no credence to the charge of abandonment against Julian and Tejada. Thus, it awarded separation pay in lieu of reinstatement to all union officers including respondents Julian and Tejada and affirmed all other monetary awards by the Labor Arbiter including backwages.On this point, we affirm the findings of the appellate court that Julian and Tejada did not abandon their employment. Petitioners utterly failed to show proof that Julian and Tejada had the intent to abandon their work and sever their employment relationship with petitioners. It is established that an employee who forthwith takes steps to protest his layoff cannot be said to have abandoned his work.20 However, we cannot sustain the appellate courts ruling that the dismissal of Julian and Tejada was tantamount to unfair labor practice. There is simply nothing on record to show that Julian and Tejada were discouraged or prohibited from joining any union. Hence, the petitioners cannot be held liable for unfair labor practice. ISSUES(1) Whether the respondents union officers and members were validly and legally dismissed from employment considering the illegality of the strike;(2) Whether the respondents union officers and members are entitled to backwages, separation pay and reinstatement, respectively?HELD1) YES. The dismissals per se are not invalid but only ineffectual in accordance with Serrano v. National Labor Relations Commission. In said case, the court held that (1) the employers failure to comply with the notice requirement does not constitute denial of due process, but mere failure to observe a procedure for termination of employment which makes the termination merely ineffectual, and (2) the dismissal shall be upheld but the employer must be sanctioned for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure. 2) As a sanction for non-compliance with notice requirements for lawful termination by the petitioners, only backwages are AWARDED to the union officers computed from the time they were dismissed until the final entry of judgment of this case. The court affirm the findings of the appellate court that Julian and Tejada did not abandon their employment. Petitioners utterly failed to show proof that Julian and Tejada had the intent to abandon their work and sever their employment relationship with petitioners. It is established that an employee who forthwith takes steps to protest his layoff cannot be said to have abandoned his work. RULINGThe assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated April 26, 2000 and its Resolution of October 11, 2000, in CA-G.R. SP No. 53169 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Dismissal of the union officers is declared NOT INVALID, and the award of separation pay to said union officers is hereby DELETED. However, as a sanction for non-compliance with notice requirements for lawful termination by the petitioners, backwages are AWARDED to the union officers computed from the time they were dismissed until the final entry of judgment of this case. The rest of the dispositions of the Court of Appeals in its Decision of April 26, 2000, in CA-G.R. SP No. 53169, are hereby AFFIRMED. ___________________________6) St. Scholastica's College vs. Torres, 210 SCRA 565/ G.R. No. 100158 June 29, 1992FACTSOn 20 July 1990, petitioner St. Scholasticas Collegeor COLLEGE and private respondent Samahan ng Manggagawang Pang-Edukasyon sa Sta. Eskolastika-NAFTEU or UNION initiated negotiations for a first-ever collective bargaining agreement. A deadlock in the negotiations prompted the UNION to file on 4 October 1990 a Notice of Strike with the Department of Labor and Employment or DEPARTMENT.On 5 November 1990, the UNION declared a strike which paralyzed the operations of the COLLEGE. Affecting as it did the interest of the students, public respondent SECRETARY immediately assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and issued on the same day, 5 November 1990, a return-to-work order. The following day, 6 November 1990, the UNION was served the Order. On 7 November 1990, instead of returning to work, the UNION filed a motion for reconsideration of the return-to-work order questioning inter alia the assumption of jurisdiction by the SECRETARY over the labor dispute. On 9 November 1990, the COLLEGE sent individual letters to the striking employees enjoining them to return to work not later than 8:00 oclock A.M. of 12 November 1990 and, at the same time, giving notice to some twenty-three (23) workers that their return would be without prejudice to the filing of appropriate charges against them. In response, the UNION presented a list of six (6) demands to the COLLEGE in a dialogue conducted on 11 November 1990. The most important of these demands was the unconditional acceptance back to work of the striking employees. But these were flatly rejected. Likewise, on 9 November 1990, respondent SECRETARY denied reconsideration of his return-to-work order and sternly warned the striking employees to comply with its terms. On 12 November 1990, the UNION received the Order. On 23 November 1990, the COLLEGE mailed individual notices of termination to the striking employees, which were received on 26 November 1990, or later. The UNION officers and members then tried to return to work but were no longer accepted by the COLLEGE. On 5 December 1990, a Complaint for Illegal Strike was filed against the UNION, its officers and several of its members before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).On 12 April 1991, respondent SECRETARY issued the assailed Order which, inter alia, directed the reinstatement of striking UNION members, premised on his finding that no violent or otherwise illegal act accompanied the conduct of the strike and that a fledgling UNION like private respondent was naturally expected to exhibit unbridled if inexperienced enthusiasm, in asserting its existence.2 Nevertheless, the aforesaid Order held UNION officers responsible for the violation of the return-to-work orders of 5 and 9 November 1990, correspondingly, sustained their termination. Petitioner questions the assumption by respondent SECRETARY of jurisdiction to decide on termination disputes, maintaining that such jurisdiction is vested instead in the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Art. 217 of the Labor Code, thusArt. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission.(a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: x x x x 2. Termination disputes x x x x 5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions on the legality of strikes and lock-outs x x x x Petitioner further contends that following the doctrine laid down in Sarmiento v. Tuico and Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestl Philippines, Inc., workers who refuse to obey a return-to-work order are not entitled to be paid for work not done, or to reinstatement to the positions they have abandoned by reason of their refusal to return thereto as ordered. Private respondent UNION maintains that the reason they failed to immediately comply with the return-to-work order of 5 November 1990 was because they questioned the assumption of jurisdiction of respondent SECRETARY. They were of the impression that being an academic institution, the school could not be considered an industry indispensable to national interest, and that pending resolution of the issue, they were under no obligation to immediately return to work.This position of the UNION is simply flawed. Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code provides that if a strike has already taken place at the time of assumption, all striking x x x employees shall immediately return to work. This means that by its very terms, a return-to-work order is immediately effective and executory notwithstanding the filing of a motion for reconsideration (University of Sto. Tomas v. NLRC).9 It must be strictly complied with even during the pendency of any petition questioning its validity (Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestl Philippines, Inc., supra). After all, the assumption and/or certification order is issued in the exercise of respondent SECRETARYs compulsive power of arbitration and, until set aside, must therefore be immediately complied with.The rationale for this rule is explained in University of Sto. Tomas v. NLRC, supra, citing Philippine Airlines Employees Association v. Philippine Airlines, Inc.,10 thusTo say that its (return-to-work order) effectivity must wait affirmance in a motion for reconsideration is not only to emasculate it but indeed to defeat its import, for by then the deadline fixed for the return to work would, in the ordinary course, have already passed and hence can no longer be affirmed insofar as the time element is concerned. Thus, we held in Sarmiento v. Tuico, supra, that by insisting on staging the restrained strike and defiantly picketing the company premises to prevent the resumption of operations, the strikers have forfeited their right to be readmitted, having abandoned their positions, and so could be validly replaced. The PAL v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, supra, which was cited by petitioner. But the conflict is only apparent, not real.To recall, We ruled in the latter case that the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor and Employment in assumption and/or certification cases is limited to the issues that are involved in the disputes or to those that are submitted to him for resolution. The seeming difference is, however, reconcilable. Since the matter on the legality or illegality of the strike was never submitted to him for resolution, he was thus found to have exceeded his jurisdiction when he restrained the employer from taking disciplinary action against employees who staged an illegal strike. ISSUES(1) Whether striking union members terminated for abandonment of work after failing to comply with return-to-work orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment (SECRETARY, for brevity) should by law be reinstated? (2) Whether respondent SECRETARY has the power to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute with respect to the matter of termination of union members?HELD1) NO. The respective liabilities of striking union officers and members who failed to immediately comply with the return-to-work order is outlined in Art. 264 of the Labor Code which provides that any declaration of a strike or lockout after the Secretary of Labor and Employment has assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute is considered an illegal act. Any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in a strike defying a return-to-work order may, consequently, be declared to have lost his employment status. The court held in Sarmiento v. Tuico, supra, that by insisting on staging the restrained strike and defiantly picketing the company premises to prevent the resumption of operations, the strikers have forfeited their right to be readmitted, having abandoned their positions, and so could be validly replaced. 2) YES. The assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor and Employment over labor disputes involving academic institutions was already upheld in Philippine School of Business Administration v. Noriel 11 where the court ruled thus:There is no doubt that the on-going labor dispute at the school adversely affects the national interest. The school is a duly registered educational institution of higher learning with more or less 9,000 students. The on-going work stoppage at the school unduly prejudices the students and will entail great loss in terms of time, effort and money to all concerned. More important, it is not amiss to mention that the school is engaged in the promotion of the physical, intellectual and emotional well-being of the countrys youth. RULINGThe Petition for Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Order of 12 April 1991 and the Resolution of 31 May 1991 both issued by respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment are SET ASIDE insofar as they order the reinstatement of striking union members terminated by petitioner, and the temporary restraining order We issued on June 26, 1991, is made permanent.

7) MSF Tire and Rubber, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 311 SCRA 784/ G.R. No. 128632 August 5, 1999FACTSA labor dispute arose between Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation (Philtread) and private respondent, Philtread Tire Workers Union (Union), as a result of which the Union filed on May 27, 1994 a notice of strike in the National Conciliation and Mediation BoardNational Capital Region charging Philtread with unfair labor practices for allegedly engaging in union-busting for violation of the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. This was followed by picketing and the holding of assemblies by the Union outside the gate of Philtreads plant at Km. 21, East Service Road, South Superhighway, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Philtread, on the other hand, filed a notice of lock-out on May 30, 1994 which it carried out on June 15, 1994. In an order, dated September 4, 1994,2 then Secretary of Labor Nieves Confesor assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and certified it for compulsory arbitration. She enjoined the Union from striking and Philtread from locking out members of the Union. Philtread entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with Siam Tyre Public Company Limited (Siam Tyre), a subsidiary of Siam Cement. Under the Memorandum of Agreement, Philtreads plant and equipment would be sold to a new company (petitioner MSF Tire and Rubber, Inc.), 80% of which would be owned by Siam Tyre and 20% by Philtread, while the land on which the plant was located would be sold to another company (Sucat Land Corporation), 60% of which would be owned by Philtread and 40% by Siam Tyre. On June 13, 1995, the Union moved to dismiss the complaint alleging lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court. It insisted that the parties were involved in a labor dispute and that petitioner, being a mere alter ego of Philtread, was not an innocent bystander.ISSUEWhether petitioner has shown a clear legal right to the issuance of a writ of injunction under the innocent bystander rule?

HELDNO. Petitioner asserts that its status as an innocent bystander with respect to the labor dispute between Philtread and the Union entitles it to a writ of injunction from the civil courts and that the appellate court erred in not upholding its corporate personality as independent of Philtreads. In Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v. Cloribel, this Court, through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, stated the innocent bystander rule as follows: The right to picket as a means of communicating the facts of a labor dispute is a phase of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the constitution. If peacefully carried out, it cannot be curtailed even in the absence of employer-employee relationship. The right is, however, not an absolute one. While peaceful picketing is entitled to protection as an exercise of free speech, we believe the courts are not without power to confine or localize the sphere of communication or the demonstration to the parties to the labor dispute, including those with related interest, and to insulate establishments or persons with no industrial connection or having interest totally foreign to the context of the dispute. Thus the right may be regulated at the instance of third parties or innocent bystanders if it appears that the inevitable result of its exercise is to create an impression that a labor dispute with which they have no connection or interest exists between them and the picketing union or constitutes an invasion of their rights.Although, as petitioner contends, the corporate fiction may be disregarded where it is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, defend crime, or where the corporation is used as a mere alter-ego or business conduit,15 it is not these standards but those of the innocent bystander rule which govern whether or not petitioner is entitled to an injunctive writ. Since petitioner is not an innocent bystander, the trial courts order, dated July 2, 1996, is a patent nullity, the trial court having no jurisdiction to issue the writ of injunction. No motion for reconsideration need be filed where the order is null and void.RULINGThe Petition for writ of preliminary injunction is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

8.) Phil. Long Distance Telephone Co. vs. NLRC, 164 SCRA 671/ No. L-80609. August 23, 1988

Labor; Illegal Dismissal; Separation Pay; Rule in the Labor Code that a person dismissed for cause is not entitled to separation pay; Exception is based upon equity considerations; Definition and concept of equity.The rule embodied in the Labor Code is that a person dismissed for cause as defined therein is not entitled to separation pay. The cases above cited constitute the exception, based upon considerations of equity. Equity has been defined as justice outside law, being ethical rather than jural and belonging to the sphere of morals than of law. It is grounded on the precepts of conscience and not on any sanction of positive law. Hence, it cannot prevail against the expressed provision of the labor laws allowing dismissal of employees for cause and without any provision for separation pay.

Grant of separation pay is not merely based on equity but on the provisions of the Constitution on the promotion of social justice and protection of the rights of the workers.Strictly speaking, however, it is not correct to say that there is no express justification for the grant of separation pay to lawfully dismissed employees other than the abstract consideration of equity. The reason is that our Constitution is replete with positive commands for the promotion of social justice, and particularly the protection of the rights of the workers. The enhancement of their welfare is one of the primary concerns of the present charter. In fact, instead of confining itself to the general commitment to the cause of labor in Article II on the Declaration of Principles of State Policies, the new Constitution contains a separate article devoted to the promotion of social justice and human rights with a separate sub-topic for labor. Article XIII expressly recognizes the vital role of labor, hand in hand with management, in the advancement of the national economy and the welfare of the people in general. The categorical mandates in the Constitution for the improvement of the lot of the workers are more than sufficient basis to justify the award of separation pay in proper cases even if the dismissal be for cause.Award of separation pay distinguished; Grant of separation pay to the dismissed employee is just where the separation was due to valid but inequitous causes as failure to comply with work standards; Grant of award is based on the social justice policy even if separation is for cause.There should be no question that where it comes to such valid but not iniquitous causes as failure to comply with work standards, the grant of separation pay to the dismissed employee may be both just and compassionate, particularly if he has worked for some time with the company. For example, a subordinate who has irreconcilable policy or personal differences with his employer may be validly dismissed for demonstrated loss of confidence, which is an allowable ground. A working mother who has to be frequently absent because she has also to take care of her child may also be removed because of her poor attendance, this being another authorized ground. It is not the employees fault if he does not have the necessary aptitude for his work but on the other hand the company cannot be required to maintain him just the same at the expense of efficiency of its operations. He too may be validly replaced. Under these and similar circumstances, however, the award to the employee of separation pay would be sustainable under the social justice policy even if the separation is for cause.Where the cause of separation is more serious than mere inefficiency, the award is not justified.But where the cause of the separation is more serious that mere inefficiency, the generosity of the law must be more discerning. There is no doubt it is compassionate to give separation pay to a salesman if he is dismissed for his inability to fill his quota but surely he does not deserve such generosity if his offense is misappropriation of the receipt of his sales. This is no longer mere incompetence but clear dishonesty. A security guard found sleeping on the job is doubtless subject to dismissal but may be allowed separation pay since his conduct, while inept, is not depraved. But if he was in fact not really sleeping but sleeping with a prostitute during his tour of duty and in the company premises, the situation is changed completely. This is not only inefficiency but immorality and the grant of separation pay would be entirely unjustified.Henceforth, separation pay shall be allowed only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character; Where the reason for the valid dismissal is habitual insubordination or an offense involving moral turpitude, the employer may not be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay or financial assistance.We hold that henceforth separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. Where the reason for the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, the employer may not be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay, of financial assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social justice.A contrary rule would have the effect of rewarding rather than punishing the erring employee for his offense.A contrary rule would, as the petitioner correctly argues, have the effect of rewarding rather than punishing the erring employee for his offense. And we do not agree that the punishment is his dismissal only and that the separation pay has nothing to do with the wrong he has committed. Of course it has. Indeed, if the employee who steals from the company is granted separation pay even as he is validly dismissed, it is not unlikely that he will commit a similar offense in his next employment because he thinks he can expect a like leniency if he is again found out. This kind of misplaced compassion is not going to do labor in general any good as it will encourage the infiltration of its ranks by those who do not deserve the protection and concern of the Constitution.The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance wrongdoing.The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the underprivileged. At best it may mitigate the penalty but it certainly will not condone the offense. Compassion for the poor is an imperative of every humane society but only when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege. Social justice cannot be permitted to be the refuge of scoundrels any more than can equity be an impediment to the punishment of the guilty. Those who invoke social justice may do so only if their hands are clean and their motives blameless and not simply because they happen to be poor. This great policy of our Constitution is not meant for the protection of those who have proved they are not worthy of it, like the workers who have tainted the cause of labor with the blemishes of their own character.Grant of separation pay to the private respondent who has been dismissed for dishonesty, is justified; Reason.Applying the above considerations, we hold that the grant of separation pay in the case at bar is unjustified. The private respondent has been dismissed for dishonesty, as found by the labor arbiter and affirmed by the NLRC and as she herself has impliedly admitted. The fact that she has worked with the PLDT for more than a decade, if it is, to be considered at all, should be taken against her as it reflects a regrettable lack of loyalty that she should have strengthened instead of betraying during all of her 10 years of service with the company. If regarded as a justification for moderating the penalty of dismissal, it will actually become a prize for disloyalty, perverting the meaning of social justice and undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its ranks of all undesirables.Separation pay, if found due under the circumstances of each case, should be computed at the rate of one month salary for every year of service.The Court also rules that the separation pay, if found due under the circumstance of each case, should be computed at the rate of one month salary for every year of service, assuming the length of such service is deemed material. This is without prejudice to the application of special agreements between the employer and the employee stipulating a higher rate of computation and providing for more benefits to the discharged employee.

FACTSMarilyn Abucay, a traffic operator of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, was accused by two complainants of having demanded and received from them the total amount of P3, 800.00 in consideration of her promise to facili- tate approval of their applications for telephone installation.1 Investigated and heard, she was found guilty as charged and accordingly separated from the service. She went to the Ministry of Labor and Employment claiming she had been illegally removed. After consideration of the evidence and arguments of the parties, the company was sustained and the complaint was dismissed for lack of merit. Both the petitioner and the private respondent appealed to the National Labor Relations Board, which upheld the said decision in toto and dismissed the appeals.4 The private respondent took no further action, thereby impliedly accepting the validity of her dismissal. The petitioner, however, is now before us to question the affirmance of the above-quoted award as having been made with grave abuse of discretion.

The position of the petitioner is simply stated: It is conceded that an employee illegally dismissed is entitled to reinstatement and backwages as required by the labor laws. However, an employee dismissed for cause is entitled to neither reinstatement nor backwages and is not allowed any relief at all because his dismissal is in accordance with law. In the case of the private respondent, she has been awarded financial assistance equivalent to ten months pay corresponding to her 10-year service in the company despite her removal for cause. She is, therefore, in effect rewarded rather than punished for her dishonesty, and without any legal authorization or justification. The award is made on the ground of equity and compassion, which cannot be a substitute for law. Moreover, such award puts a premium on dishonesty and encourages instead of deterring corruption.

The public respondent claims that the employee is sufficiently punished with her dismissal. The grant of financial assistance is not intended as a reward for her offense but merely to help her for the loss of her employment after working faithfully with the company for ten years. In support of this position, the Solicitor General cites the cases of Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of the Philippines v. Lariosa and Soco v. Mercantile Corporation of Davao, where the employees were dismissed for cause but were nevertheless allowed separation pay on grounds of social and compassionate justice. As the Court put it in the Firestone case:In view of the foregoing, We rule that Firestone had valid grounds to dispense with the services of Lariosa and that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering his reinstatement. However, considering that Lariosa had worked with the company for eleven years with no known previous bad record, the ends of social and compassionate justice would be served if he is paid full separation pay but not reinstatement without backwages by the NLRC.

ISSUEWON the award of separation pay in the form of financial assistance to an employee who had been dismissed for cause as found by the public respondent is proper?

HELDNO. The court hold that the grant of separation pay in the case at bar is unjustified. The private respondent has been dismissed for dishonesty, as found by the labor arbiter and affirmed by the NLRC and as she herself has impliedly admitted. The fact that she has worked with the PLDT for more than a decade, if it is to be considered at all, should be taken against her as it reflects a regrettable lack of loyalty that she should have strengthened instead of betraying during all of her 10 years of service with the company. If regarded as a justification for moderating the penalty of dismissal, it will actually become a prize for disloyalty, perverting the meaning of social justice and undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its ranks of all undesirables.The Court also rules that the separation pay, if found due under the circumstances of each case, should be computed at the rate of one month salary for every year of service, assuming the length of such service is deemed material. This is without prejudice to the application of special agreements between the employer and the employee stipulating a higher rate of computation and providing for more benefits to the discharged employee.

RULINGThe petition is GRANTED. The challenged resolution of September 22, 1987, is AFFIRMED in toto except for the grant of separation pay in the form of financial assistance, which is hereby DISALLOWED. The temporary restraining order dated March 23, 1988, is LIFTED. It is so ordered.

9.) Mercado, Sr. vs. NLRC, 201 SCRA 332/ G.R. No. 79869. September 5, 1991

PROJECT EMPLOYEE OR SEASONAL EMPLOYEE

Labor Law; Evidence; Administrative decision in matters within the executives jurisdiction can only be set aside upon proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law.The invariable rule set by the Court in reviewing administrative decisions of the Executive Branch of the Government is that the findings of fact made therein are respected, so long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant; that it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of the evidence; that the administrative decision in matters within the executives jurisdiction can only be set aside upon proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law.

Findings of the Labor Arbiter in this case are ably supported by evidence.A careful examination of the foregoing statements reveals that the findings of the Labor Arbiter in the case are ably supported by evidence. There is, therefore, no circumstance that would warrant a reversal of the questioned decision of the Labor Arbiter as affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission.

Regular employee, definition of.The first paragraph answers the question of who are regular employees. It states that, regardless of any written or oral agreement to the contrary, an employee is deemed regular where he is engaged in necessary or desirable activities in the usual business or trade of the employer, except for project employees.

Who are deemed casual employees.The second paragraph of Art. 280 demarcates as casual employees, all other employees who do not fall under the definition of the preceding paragraph. The proviso, in said second paragraph, deems as regular employees those casual employees who have rendered at least one year of service regardless of the fact that such service may be continuous or broken.

Project employee, definition of.A project employee has been defined to be one whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee, or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season, as in the present case.

FACTS Assailed in this petition for certiorari is the decision** of the respondent national Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated 8 August 1984 which affirmed the decision of respondent Labor Arbiter Luciano P. Aquino with the slight modification of deleting the award of financial assistance to petitioners, and the resolution of the respondent NLRC dated 17 August 1987, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

This petition originated from a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages; non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave benefits, emergency cost of living allowances and 13th month pay, filed by above-named petitioners.Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they were agricultural workers utilized by private respondents in all the agricultural phases of work on the 7 1/2 hectares of rice land and 10 hectares of sugar land owned by the latter; that Fortunato Mercado, Sr. and Leon Santillan worked in the farm of private respondents since 1949, Fortunato Mercado, Jr. and Antonio Mercado since 1972 and the rest of the petitioners since 1960 up to April 1979, when they were all allegedly dismissed from their employment.

Private respondent Aurora Cruz in her answer to petitioners complaint denied that said petitioners were her regular employees and instead averred that she engaged their services, through Spouses Fortunato Mercado, Sr. and Rosa Mercado, their mandarols, that is, persons who take charge in supplying the number of workers needed by owners of various farms, but only to do a particular phase of agricultural work necessary in rice production and/or sugar cane production, after which they would be free to render services to other farm owners who need their services.The other private respondents denied having any relationship whatsoever with the petitioners and state that they were merely registered owners of the land in question included as co-respondents in this case.

Respondent Labor Arbiter Luciano P. Aquino ruled in favor of private respondents and held that petitioners were not regular and permanent workers of the private respondents, for the nature of the terms and conditions of their hiring reveal that they were required to perform phases of agricultural work for a definite period of time after which their services would be available to any other farm owner.4 Respondent Labor Arbiter deemed petitioners contention of working twelve (12) hours a day the whole year round in the farm, an exaggeration, for the reason that the planting of rice and sugar cane does not entail a whole year as reported in the findings of the Chief of the NLRC Special Task Force.The NLRC ruled in favor of private respondents affirming the decision of the respondent Labor Arbiter, with the modification of the deletion of the award for financial assistance to petitioners.

ISSUEWhether or not petitioners are regular and permanent farm workers and therefore entitled to the benefits which they pray for. And corollary to this, whether or not said petitioners were illegally dismissed by private respondents?

HELD NO. Petitioners being project employees or to use the correct term seasonal employees, their employment legally ends upon completion of the project or the season. The termination of their employment cannot and should not constitute an illegal dismissal.

RULINGThe petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the National Labor Relations Commission affirming that of the Labor Arbiter, under review, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

_____________________________10.) Abasolo vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 346 SCRA 293/ G.R. No. 118475 November 29, 2000

REGULAR SEASONAL EMPLOYEES (PETITIONERS)

Labor Law; Classification of Employment; Nature of ones employment does not depend solely on the will or word of the employer nor on the procedure for hiring and the manner of designating the employee, but on the nature of the activities to be performed by the employee, considering the employers nature of business and the duration and scope of work to be done.The nature of ones employment does not depend solely on the will or word of the employer. Nor on the procedure for hiring and the manner of designating the employee, but on the nature, of the activities to be performed by the employee, considering the employers nature of business and the duration and scope of work to be done. Court has already settled that seasonal workers who are called to work from time to time and are temporarily laid off during offseason are not separated from service in said period but are merely considered on leave until re-employed.In the case at bar, while it may appear that the work of petitioners is seasonal, inasmuch as petitioners have served the company for many years, some for over 20 years, performing services necessary and indispensable to LUTORCOs business, serve as badges of regular employment. Moreover, the fact that petitioners do not work continuously for one whole year but only for the duration of the tobacco season does not detract from considering them in regular employment since in a litany of cases this Court has already settled that seasonal workers who are called to work from time to time and are temporarily laid off during off-season are not separated from service in said period, but are merely considered on leave until re-employed.

FACTS Private respondent La Union Tobacco Redrying Corporation (LUTORCO), which is owned by private respondent See Lin Chan, is engaged in the business of buying, selling, redrying and processing of tobacco leaves and its by-products. Tobacco season starts sometime in October of every year when tobacco farmers germinate their seeds in plots until they are ready for replanting in November. The harvest season starts in mid-February. Then, the farmers sell the harvested tobacco leaves to redrying plants or do the redrying themselves. The redrying plant of LUTORCO receives tobacco for redrying at the end of February and starts redrying in March until August or September.

Petitioners have been under the employ of LUTORCO for several years until their employment was abruptly interrupted sometime in March 1993 when Compania General de Tabaccos de Filipinas (also known as TABACALERA) took over LUTORCOs tobacco operations. New signboards were posted indicating a change of ownership and petitioners were then asked by LUTORCO to file their respective applications for employment with TABACALERA. Petitioners were caught unaware of the sudden change of ownership and its effect on the status of their employment, though it was alleged that TABACALERA would assume and respect the seniority rights of the petitioners.On March 17, 1993, the disgruntled employees instituted before the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch No. 1, San Fernando, La Union a complaint for separation pay against private respondent LUTORCO on the ground that there was a termination of their employment due to the closure of LUTORCO as a result of the sale and turnover to TABACALERA. Other equally affected employees filed two additional complaints, also for separation pay, which were consolidated with the first complaint.Private respondent corporation raised as its defense that it is exempt from paying separation pay and denied that it terminated the services of the petitioners; and that it stopped its operations due to the absence of capital and operating funds caused by losses incurred from 1990 to 1992 and absence of operating funds for 1993, coupled with adverse financial conditions and downfall of prices. It alleged further that LUTORCO entered into an agreement with TABACALERA to take over LUTORCOs tobacco operations for the year 1993 in the hope of recovering from its serious business losses in the succeeding tobacco seasons and to create a continuing source of income for the petitioners. Lastly, it manifested that LUTORCO, in good faith and with sincerity, is willing to grant reasonable and adjusted amounts to the petitioners, as financial assistance, if and when LUTORCO could recover from its financial crisis.On December 29, 1993, Labor Arbiter Ricardo N. Olairez rendered his decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. In upholding private respondent LUTORCOs position, the Labor Arbiter declared that the petitioners are not entitled to the benefits under Article 283 of the Labor Code since LUTORCO ceased to operate due to serious business losses and, furthermore, TABACALERA, the new employer of the petitioner has assumed the seniority rights of the petitioners and other employment liabilities of the LUTORCO.Petitioners were not terminated from employment but petitioners instead refused to work with TABACALERA, despite the notice to petitioners to return to work in view of LUTORCOs need for workers at its Agoo plant which had approximately 300,000 kilos of Virginia tobacco for processing and redrying. Furthermore, petitioners are not entitled to separation pay because petitioners are seasonal workers. Petitioners vigorously maintain that they are regular workers of respondent LUTORCO since they worked continuously for many years with LUTORCO, some of them even for over 20 years, and that they performed functions necessary and desirable in the usual business of LUTORCO. According to them, the fact that some of them work only during the tobacco season does not affect their status as regular workers since they have been repeatedly called back to work for every season, year after year.18 Thus, petitioners take exception to the factual findings and conclusions of the NLRC, stressing that the conclusions of the NLRC were based solely on the new theory advanced by private respondent LUTORCO only on appeal, that is, that it was only LUTORCOs tobacco re-drying operation that was sold, and hence, diametrically opposed to its theory before the Labor Arbiter, i.e., that it is the entire company (LUTORCO) itself that was sold. Private respondent LUTORCO, on the other hand, insists that petitioners employment was not terminated; that it never ceased to operate, and that it was petitioners themselves who severed their employer-employee relationship when they chose employment with TABACALERA because petitioners found more stability working with TABACALERA than with LUTORCO.19 It likewise insists that petitioners are seasonal workers since almost all of petitioners never continuously worked in LUTORCO for any given year20 and they were required to reapply every year to determine who among them shall be given work for the season.

The public respondent NLRC in the case at bar erred in its total affirmance of the dismissal of the consolidated complaint, for separation pay, against private respondents LUTORCO and See Lin Chan considering that petitioners are regular seasonal employees entitled to the benefits of Article 283 of the Labor Code which applies to closures or cessation of an establishment or undertaking, whether it be a complete or partial cessation or closure of business operation.

ISSUES(1) Whether petitioners employment with LUTORCO was terminated, and (2) Whether petitioners are regular or seasonal workers, as defined by law?

HELD

1) NO. Court has already settled that seasonal workers who are called to work from time to time and are temporarily laid off during offseason are not separated from service in said period but are merely considered on leave until re-employed.

2) Petitioner are regular workers. In the case at bar, while it may appear that the work of petitioners is seasonal, inasmuch as petitioners have served the company for many years, some for over 20 years, performing services necessary and indispensable to LUTORCOs business, serve as badges of regular employment. Moreover, the fact that petitioners do not work continuously for one whole year but only for the duration of the tobacco season does not detract from considering them in regular employment since in a litany of cases this Court has already settled that seasonal workers who are called to work from time to time and are temporarily laid off during off-season are not separated from service in said period, but are merely considered on leave until re-employed. Private respondents reliance on the case of Mercardo v. NLRC is misplaced considering that since in said case of Mercado, although the respondent company therein consistently availed of the services of the petitioners therein from year to year, it was clear that petitioners therein were not in respondent companys regular employ. Petitioners therein performed different phases of agricultural work in a given year. However, during that period, they were free to contract their services to work for other farm owners, as in fact they did. Thus, the Court ruled in that case that their employment would naturally end upon the completion of each project or phase of farm work for which they have been contracted.

The test of whether or not an employee is a regular employee has been laid down in De Leon v. NLRC, in which this Court held:The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The connection can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also if the employee has been performing the job for at least a year, even if the performance is not continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence, the employment is considered regular, but only with respect to such activity and while such activity exists.

RULINGThe petition is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed Resolutions dated July 6, 1994 and September 23, 1994 of public respondent NLRC are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Private respondent La Union Tobacco Redrying Corporation is ORDERED: (a) to pay petitioners separation pay equivalent to one (1) month, or one-half (1/2) month pay for each year that they rendered service, whichever is higher, provided that they rendered service for at least six (6) months in a given year, and; (b) to pay ten percent (10%) of the total amount due to petitioners, as and for attorneys fees. Consequently, public respondent NLRC is ORDERED to COMPUTE the total amount of separation pay which each petitioner who has rendered service to private respondent LUTORCO for at least six (6) months in a given year is entitled to receive in accordance with this decision, and to submit its compliance thereon within forty-five (45) days from notice of this decision. _____________________________

In the case of Philippine Tobacco Flue-Curing & Redrying Corporation v. NLRC this Court, when faced with the question of whether the separation pay of a seasonal worker, who works for only a fraction of a year, should be equated with the separation pay of a regular worker, resolved that question in this wise:The amount of separation pay is based on two factors: the amount of monthly salary and the number of years of service. Although the Labor Code provides different definitions as to what constitutes one year of service, Book Six31 does not specifically define one year of service for purposes of computing separation pay. However, Articles 283 and 284 both state in connection with separation pay that a fraction of at least six months shall be considered one whole year. Applying this case at bar, we hold that the amount of separation pay which respondent members x x x should receive is one-half (1/2) their respective average monthly pay during the last season they worked multiplied by the number of years they actually rendered service, provided that they worked for at least six months during a given year.

Thus, in the said case, the employees were awarded separation pay equivalent to one (1) month, or to one-half (1/2) month pay for every year they rendered service, whichever is higher, provided they rendered service for at least six (6) months in a given year. As explained in the text of the decision in the said case, month pay shall be understood as average monthly pay during the last season they worked. An award of ten percent (10%) of the total amount due petitioners as attorneys fees is legally and morally justifiable under Art. 111 of the Labor Code,33 Sec. 8, Rule VIII, Book III of its Implementing Rules,34 and par. 7, Art. 220835 of the Civil Code.

11.) Hacienda Fatima vs. National Federation of Sugarcane Workers-Food and General Trade, 396 SCRA 518/ G.R. No. 149440 January 28, 2003

REGULAR EMPLOYMENT

Labor Law; Employment; Regular Employee; Definition.[T]he test of whether or not an employee is a regular employee has been laid down in De Leon v. NLRC, in which this Court held: The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual trade or business of the employer. The connection can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also if the employee has been performing the job for at least a year, even if the performance is not continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence, the employment is considered regular, but only with respect to such activity and while such activity exists. x x x x x x x x x x x x [T]he fact that [respondents] do not work continuously for one whole year but only for the duration of the x x x season does not detract from considering them in regular employment since in a litany of cases this Court has already settled that seasonal workers who are called to work from time to time and are temporarily laid off during off-season are not separated from service in said period, but merely considered on leave until re-employed.

Dismissals; The burden is on the employer to prove that the termination was for a valid and authorized cause.Where there is no showing of clear, valid and legal cause for the termination of employment, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal and the burden is on the employer to prove that the termination was for a valid and authorized cause. In the case at bar, petitioners failed to prove any such cause for the dismissal of respondents who, as discussed above, are regular employees.

Appeals; Factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdictions, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality.We uphold the CAs affirmation of the above findings. Indeed, factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdictions, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality. Their findings are binding on the Supreme Court. Verily, their conclusions are accorded great weight upon appeal, especially when supported by substantial evidence. Consequently, the Court is not duty-bound to delve into the accuracy of their factual findings, in the absence of a clear showing that these were arbitrary and bereft of any rational basis.

FACTS

Although the employers have shown that respondents performed work that was seasonal in nature, they failed to prove that the latter worked only for the duration of one particular season. In fact, petitioners do not deny that these workers have served them for several years already. Hence, they are regularnot seasonalemployees.

The facts are summarized in the NLRC Decision as follows: Contrary to the findings of the Labor Arbiter that complainants [herein respondents] refused to work and/or were choosy in the kind of jobs they wanted to perform, the records is replete with complainants persistence and dogged determination in going back to work.Indeed, it would appear that respondents did not look with favor workers having organized themselves into a union. Thus, when complainant union was certified as the collective bargaining representative in the certification elections, respondents under the pretext that the result was on appeal, refused to sit down with the union for the purpose of entering into a collective bargaining agreement. Moreover, the workers including complainants herein were not given work for more than one month. In protest, complainants staged a strike which was however settled upon the signing of a Memorandum of Agreement.

The CA affirmed that while the work of respondents was seasonal in nature, they were considered to be merely on leave during the off-season and were therefore still employed by petitioners. Moreover, the workers enjoyed security of tenure. Any infringement upon this right was deemed by the CA to be tantamount to illegal dismissal.The appellate court found neither rhyme nor reason in petitioners argument that it was the workers themselves who refused to or were choosy in their work. As found by the NLRC, the record of this case is replete with complainants persistence and dogged determination in going back to work.6The CA likewise concurred with the NLRCs finding that petitioners were guilty of unfair labor practice.

ISSUES(1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondents, admittedly seasonal workers, were regular employees, contrary to the clear provisions of Article 280 of the Labor Code, which categorically state that seasonal employees are not covered by the definition of regular employees under paragraph 1, nor covered under paragraph 2 which refers exclusively to casual employees who have served for at least one year;(2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in rejecting the ruling in Mercado, x x x, and relying instead on rulings which are not directly applicable to the case at bench, viz., Philippine Tobacco, BacolodMurcia, and Gaco, x x x;(3) Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the NLRCs conclusion that private respondents were illegally dismissed, that petitioner[s were] guilty of unfair labor practice, and that the union be awarded moral and exemplary damages.

HELDThe Petition has no merit.First Issue: Regular EmploymentAt -the outset, we must stress that only errors of law are generally reviewed by this Court in petitions for review on certiorari of CA decisions.9 Questions of fact are not entertained.10 The Court is not a trier of facts and, in labor cases, this doctrine applies with greater force.11 Factual questions are for labor tribunals to resolve.12 In the present case, these have already been threshed out by the NLRC. Its findings were affirmed by the appellate court.Contrary to petitioners contention, the CA did not err when it held that respondents were regular employees.Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, states:Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment.The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.

The fact that respondentswith the exception of Luisa Rombo, Ramona Rombo, Bobong Abriga and Boboy Silvarepeatedly worked as sugarcane workers for petitioners for several years is not denied by the latter. Evidently, petitioners employed respondents for more than one season. Therefore, the general rule of regular employment is applicable. Petitioners move actually amounted to unjustified dismissal of respondents, in violation of the Labor Code.Where there is no showing of clear, valid and legal cause for the termination of employment, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal and the burden is on the employer to prove that the termination was for a valid and authorized cause.16 In the case at bar, petitioners failed to prove any such cause for the dismissal of respondents who, as discussed above, are regular employees.

Second Issue: Unfair Labor PracticeThe NLRC also found herein petitioners guilty of unfair labor practice. It ruled as follows:Indeed, from respondents refusal to bargain, to their acts of economic inducements resulting in the promotion of those who withdrew from the union, the use of armed guards to prevent the organizers to come in, and the dismissal of union officials and members, one cannot but conclude that respondents did not want a union in their haciendaa clear interference in the right of the workers to self-organization.

The finding of unfair labor practice done in bad faith carries with it the sanction of moral and exemplary damages.

RULINGThe Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

12.) Philippine Village Hotel vs. NLRC G R NO 105033

FACTS: Private respondents were employees ofpetitioner Philippine Village Hotel. However, on May19, 1986, petitioner had to close andtotally discontinue its operations due to serious financial andbusiness reverses resulting in the termination of the services of its employees. Thereafter, the Philippine Village Hotel employees and workers union filed against petitioner a complaint for separation pay, unfair labor practice and illegal lock-out. TheLabor Arbiter issued and order finding thelosses suffered by petitioner to be actual, genuine and of such magnitude as to validly terminate the services of private respondents but directed petitioner to give priority to the complainants /herein private respondents0 in1the2 hiring of personnel should theyresume their business operations in the future. The NLRC affirmed the validity of the closure ofpetitioner but ordered petitioner to pay private respondent separationpay at the rate of 1/2 month pay every year of service. However, there is nothing in the records to show that private respondents received their separation pay. Petitioner decided to have a one(1) month dry run operation to ascertain thefeasibility of resuming its business operations. In order to carry outits dry run operation, petitioner hired casual workers, including private respondents, for a one (1) month period, or from February 1, to March 1, 1989 as evidenced bythe latters Contract of employment.After evaluating the individualperformance of allthe employees and uponthe lapse of the contractual one-monthperiod or on March 2,1989 petitioner terminated the services of private respondents. Private respondents and Tupas Local Chapter No. 1362filed a complaint against petitioner for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice with the NLRC+NCR Arbitration Branchwhich was dismissed. on appeal to NLRC, itreversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter andordered to reinstate the above-namedcomplainants to their former or substantially equivalent positions without loss of seniority rights plus full back wages from thetime they were actually dismissed on 02March 1989 up to the timeof their actual reinstatement.

ISSUE: whether or not the private respondents are deemed to beregular employees.

RULING:In the instant case, private respondents were validly terminated by the petitioner when the latter had to close its business due to financial losses. Following the directives of theNLRC to give priority in hiring private respondents should it resume its business, petitioner hired private respondents during theirone (1) month dry-run operation. However, this does not mean thatprivate respondents were deemed to havecontinued their regular employment status, which they had enjoyed before their aforementioned termination due to petitioners financial losses. As stated bythe Labor Arbiter in his decision: It should be bornein mind that when complainants were first terminated asa result of thecompanys cessation from operation in May 1986 theemployer-employee relationship between the parties herein wastotally and completely severed. Such being the case,respon