G.R. No. 78909 June 30, 1989MATERNITY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, represented by ANTERA L. DORADO, President,petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND THE REGIONAL DlRECTOR OF LABOR, REGION X,respondents.MEDIALDEA,J.:This is a petition forcertiorariseeking the annulment of the Decision of the respondent Secretary of Labor dated September 24, 1986, affirming with modification the Order of respondent Regional Director of Labor, Region X, dated August 4, 1986, awarding salary differentials and emergency cost of living allowances (ECOLAS) to employees of petitioner, and the Order denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration dated May 13, 1987, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.Petitioner is a semi-government hospital, managed by the Board of Directors of the Cagayan de Oro Women's Club and Puericulture Center, headed by Mrs. Antera Dorado, as holdover President. The hospital derives its finances from the club itself as well as from paying patients, averaging 130 per month. It is also partly subsidized by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the Cagayan De Oro City government.Petitioner has forty-one (41) employees. Aside from salary and living allowances, the employees are given food, but the amount spent therefor is deducted from their respective salaries (pp. 77-78,Rollo).On May 23, 1986, ten (10) employees of the petitioner employed in different capacities/positions filed a complaint with the Office of the Regional Director of Labor and Employment, Region X, for underpayment of their salaries and ECOLAS, which was docketed as ROX Case No. CW-71-86.On June 16, 1986, the Regional Director directed two of his Labor Standard and Welfare Officers to inspect the records of the petitioner to ascertain the truth of the allegations in the complaints (p. 98,Rollo). Payrolls covering the periods of May, 1974, January, 1985, November, 1985 and May, 1986, were duly submitted for inspection.On July 17, 1986, the Labor Standard and Welfare Officers submitted their report confirming that there was underpayment of wages and ECOLAs of all the employees by the petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, deficiency on wage and ecola as verified and confirmed per review of the respondent payrolls and interviews with the complainant workers and all other information gathered by the team, it is respectfully recommended to the Honorable Regional Director, this office, that Antera Dorado, President be ORDERED to pay the amount of SIX HUNDRED FIFTY FOUR THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY SIX & 01/100 (P654,756.01), representing underpayment of wages and ecola to the THIRTY SIX (36) employees of the said hospital as appearing in the attached Annex "F" worksheets and/or whatever action equitable under the premises. (p. 99,Rollo)Based on this inspection report and recommendation, the Regional Director issued an Order dated August 4, 1986, directing the payment of P723,888.58, representing underpayment of wages and ECOLAs to all the petitioner's employees, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Maternity and Children Hospital is hereby ordered to pay the above-listed complainants the total amount indicated opposite each name, thru this Office within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. Thenceforth, the respondent hospital is also ordered to pay its employees/workers the prevailing statutory minimum wage and allowance.SO ORDERED. (p. 34,Rollo)Petitioner appealed from this Order to the Minister of Labor and Employment, Hon. Augusto S. Sanchez, who rendered a Decision on September 24, 1986, modifying the said Order in that deficiency wages and ECOLAs should be computed only from May 23, 1983 to May 23, 1986, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, the August 29, 1986 order is hereby MODIFIED in that the deficiency wages and ECOLAs should only be computed from May 23, 1983 to May 23, 1986. The case is remanded to the Regional Director, Region X, for recomputation specifying the amounts due each the complainants under each of the applicable Presidential Decrees. (p. 40,Rollo)On October 24, 1986, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Secretary of Labor in his Order dated May 13, 1987, for lack of merit (p. 43Rollo).The instant petition questions the all-embracing applicability of the award involving salary differentials and ECOLAS, in that it covers not only the hospital employees who signed the complaints, but also those (a) who are not signatories to the complaint, and (b) those who were no longer in the service of the hospital at the time the complaints were filed.Petitioner likewise maintains that the Order of the respondent Regional Director of Labor, as affirmed with modifications by respondent Secretary of Labor, does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which the award was based. In its "Rejoinder to Comment", petitioner further questions the authority of the Regional Director to award salary differentials and ECOLAs to private respondents, (relying on the case of Encarnacion vs. Baltazar, G.R. No. L-16883, March 27, 1961, 1 SCRA 860, as authority for raising the additional issue of lack of jurisdiction at any stage of the proceedings, p. 52,Rollo), alleging that the original and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims is properly lodged in the Labor Arbiter, based on Article 217, paragraph 3 of the Labor Code.The primary issue here is whether or not the Regional Director had jurisdiction over the case and if so, the extent of coverage of any award that should be forthcoming, arising from his visitorial and enforcement powers under Article 128 of the Labor Code. The matter of whether or not the decision states clearly and distinctly statement of facts as well as the law upon which it is based, becomes relevant after the issue on jurisdiction has been resolved.This is a labor standards case, and is governed by Art. 128-b of the Labor Code, as amended by E.O. No. 111. Labor standards refer to the minimum requirements prescribed by existing laws, rules, and regulations relating to wages, hours of work, cost of living allowance and other monetary and welfare benefits, including occupational, safety, and health standards (Section 7, Rule I, Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the Regional Office, dated September 16, 1987).1Under the present rules, a Regional Director exercisesbothvisitorial and enforcement power over labor standards cases, and is therefore empowered to adjudicate money claims,providedthere stillexistsan employer-employee relationship, and the findings of the regional office isnot contestedby the employer concerned.Prior to the promulgation of E.O. No. 111 on December 24, 1986, the Regional Director's authority over money claims was unclear. The complaint in the present case was filed on May 23, 1986 when E.O. No. 111 was not yet in effect, and the prevailing view was that stated in the case ofAntonio Ong, Sr. vs. Henry M. Parel, et al., G.R. No. 76710,dated December 21, 1987, thus:. . . the Regional Director, in the exercise of his visitorial and enforcement powers under Article 128 of the Labor Code, has no authority to award money claims, properly falling within the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. . . .. . . If the inspection results in a finding that the employer has violated certain labor standard laws, then the regional director must order the necessary rectifications. However, this does not include adjudication of money claims, clearly within the ambit of the labor arbiter's authority under Article 217 of the Code.The Ong case relied on the ruling laid down inZambales Base Metals Inc. vs. The Minister of Labor, et al.,(G.R. Nos. 73184-88, November 26, 1986, 146 SCRA 50) that the "Regional Director was not empowered to share in the original and exclusive jurisdiction conferred on Labor Arbiters by Article 217."We believe, however, that even in the absence of E. O. No. 111, Regional Directors already had enforcement powers over money claims, effective under P.D. No. 850, issued on December 16, 1975, which transferred labor standards cases from the arbitration system to the enforcement system.To clarify matters, it is necessary to enumerate a series of rules and provisions of law on the disposition of labor standards cases.Priorto the promulgation of PD 850, labor standards cases were an exclusive function of labor arbiters, under Article 216 of thethenLabor Code (PD No. 442, as amended by PD 570-a), which read in part:Art. 216.Jurisdiction of the Commission. The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by the Labor Arbiters and compulsory arbitrators.The Labor Arbiters shall haveexclusive jurisdictionto hear and decide the following cases involving all workers whether agricultural or non-agricultural.xxx xxx xxx(c) All money claims of workers, involving non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay, maternity leave and other money claims arising from employee-employer relations, except claims for workmen's compensation, social security and medicare benefits;(d) Violations of labor standard laws;xxx xxx xxx(Emphasis supplied)The Regional Director exercised visitorial rights only under then Article 127 of the Code as follows:ART. 127. Visitorial Powers. The Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives, including, but not restricted, to the labor inspectorate, shall have access to employers' records and premises at any time of the day or night whenever work is being undertaken therein, and the right to copy therefrom, to question any employee and investigate any fact, condition or matter which may be necessary to determine violations or in aid in the enforcement of this Title and of any Wage Order or regulation issued pursuant to this Code.With the promulgation of PD 850, Regional Directors were given enforcement powers,in additionto visitorial powers. Article 127, as amended, provided in part:SEC. 10. Article 127 of the Code is hereby amended to read as follows:Art. 127. Visitorial and enforcement powers. xxx xxx xxx(b) The Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representativesshall have the power to order and administer, after due notice and hearing,compliance with the labor standards provisionsof this Code based on the findings of labor regulation officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection, and to issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their order.xxx xxx xxxLabor Arbiters, on the other hand, lost jurisdiction over labor standards cases. Article 216, as then amended by PD 850, provided in part:SEC. 22. Article 216 of the Code is hereby amended to read as follows:Art. 216. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. (a) The Labor Arbiters shall haveexclusive jurisdiction to hear and decidethe following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:xxx xxx xxx(3) All money claims of workers involving non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime or premium compensation, maternity or service incentive leave, separation pay and other money claims arising from employer-employee relations, except claims for employee's compensation, social security and medicare benefitsand as otherwise provided in Article 127 of this Code.xxx xxx xxx(Emphasis supplied)Under the then Labor Code therefore (PD 442 as amended by PD 570-a, as further amended by PD 850), there were three adjudicatory units: The Regional Director, the Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor Arbiter. It became necessary to clarify and consolidate all governing provisions on jurisdiction into one document.2On April 23, 1976, MOLE Policy Instructions No. 6 was issued, and provides in part (on labor standards cases) as follows:POLICY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 6TO: All ConcernedSUBJECT: DISTRIBUTION OF JURISDICTION OVER LABOR CASESxxx xxx xxx1. The following cases are under theexclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Director.a) Labor standards cases arising from violations of labor standard lawsdiscovered in the course of inspection or complaints where employer-employee relations still exist;xxx xxx xxx2. The following cases are under theexclusive original jurisdictionof theConciliation Sectionof the Regional Office:a) Labor standards cases where employer-employee relationsnolonger exist;xxx xxx xxx6. The following cases arecertifiableto the Labor Arbiters:a) Cases not settled by the Conciliation Section of the Regional Office, namely:1) labor standard cases where employer-employee relationsno longer exist;xxx xxx xxx(Emphasis supplied)MOLE Policy Instructions No. 7 (undated) was likewise subsequently issued, enunciating the rationale for, and the scope of, the enforcement power of the Regional Director, the first and second paragraphs of which provide as follows:POLICY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 7TO: All Regional DirectorsSUBJECT: LABOR STANDARDS CASESUnder PD 850, labor standards cases have beentaken from the arbitration system andplaced under the enforcement system, except where a) questions of law are involved as determined by the Regional Director, b) the amount involved exceeds P100,000.00 or over 40% of the equity of the employer, whichever is lower, c) the case requires evidentiary matters not disclosed or verified in the normal course of inspection, or d)there is no more employer-employee relationship.The purpose is clear: to assure the worker the rights and benefits due to him under labor standards lawswithout having to go through arbitration. The worker need not litigate to get what legally belongs to him. The whole enforcement machinery of the Department of Labor exists to insure its expeditious delivery to him free of charge. (Emphasis supplied)Under the foregoing, a complaining employee who was denied his rights and benefits due him under labor standards law need not litigate. The Regional Director, by virtue of his enforcement power, assured "expeditious delivery to him of his rights and benefits free of charge",provided of course, he was still in the employ of the firm.After PD 850, Article 216 underwent a series of amendments (aside from being re-numbered as Article 217) and with it a corresponding change in the jurisdiction of, and supervision over, the Labor Arbiters:1. PD 1367 (5-1-78) gave Labor Arbiters exclusive jurisdiction overunresolvedissues in collective bargaining, etc., and those cases arising from employer-employee relationsduly indorsedby the Regional Directors. (It also removed his jurisdiction over moral or other damages) In other words, the Labor Arbiter entertained casescertifiedto him. (Article 228, 1978 Labor Code.)2. PD 1391 (5-29-78) all regional units of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) were integrated into the Regional Offices Proper of the Ministry of Labor; effectively transferring direct administrative control and supervision over the Arbitration Branch to the Director of the Regional Office of the Ministry of Labor. "Conciliable cases" which were thus previously under the jurisdiction of the defunct Conciliation Section of the Regional Office for purposes of conciliation or amicable settlement, became immediately assignable to the Arbitration Branch for jointconciliation and compulsory arbitration. In addition, the Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction even over termination and labor-standards cases thatmay be assignedto them for compulsory arbitration by the Director of the Regional Office. PD 1391 merged conciliation and compulsory arbitration functions in the person of the Labor Arbiter. The procedure governing the disposition of cases at the Arbitration Branch paralleled those in the Special Task Force and Field Services Division, with one major exception: the Labor Arbiter exercised full and untrammelled authority in the disposition of the case, particularly in the substantive aspect, his decisions and orders subject to review only on appeal to the NLRC.33. MOLE Policy Instructions No. 37 Because of the seemingly overlapping functions as a result of PD 1391, MOLE Policy Instructions No. 37 was issued on October 7, 1978, and provided in part:POLICY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 37TO: All ConcernedSUBJECT: ASSIGNMENT OF CASES TO LABOR ARBITERSPursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1391 and to insure speedy disposition of labor cases, the following guidelines are hereby established for the information and guidance of all concerned.1. Conciliable Cases.Cases which are conciliable per se i.e., (a) labor standards cases where employer-employee relationshipno longer exists; (b) cases involving deadlock in collective bargaining, except those falling under P.D. 823, as amended; (c) unfair labor practice cases; and (d) overseas employment cases, except those involving overseas seamen, shall be assigned by the Regional Director to the Labor Arbiterfor conciliation and arbitration without coursing them through the conciliation section of the Regional Office.2. Labor Standards Cases.Cases involving violation of labor standards laws where employer- employee relationshipstill existsshall be assigned to the Labor Arbiters where:a) intricate questions of law are involved; orb) evidentiary matters not disclosed or verified in the normal course of inspection by labor regulations officers are required for their proper disposition.3. Disposition of Cases.When a case is assigned to a Labor Arbiter, all issues raised therein shall be resolved by him including those which are originally cognizable by the Regional Director to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. In other words, the whole case, and not merely issues involved therein, shall be assigned to and resolved by him.xxx xxx xxx(Emphasis supplied)4. PD 1691(5-1-80) original and exclusive jurisdiction overunresolvedissues in collective bargaining and money claims, whichincludesmoral or other damages.Despite the original and exclusive jurisdiction of labor arbiters over money claims, however, the Regional Director nonethelessretainedhis enforcement power, and remained empowered to adjudicateuncontestedmoney claims.5. BP 130 (8-21-8l) strengthened voluntary arbitration. The decree also returned the Labor Arbiters as part of the NLRC, operating as Arbitration Branch thereof.6. BP 227(6-1- 82) original and exclusive jurisdiction over questions involving legality of strikes and lock-outs.The present petition questions the authority of the Regional Director to issue the Order, dated August 4, 1986, on the basis of his visitorial and enforcement powers under Article 128 (formerly Article 127) of the present Labor Code. It is contended that based on the rulings in theOng vs. Parel (supra)and theZambales Base Metals, Inc. vs. TheMinister of Labor (supra)cases, a Regional Director is precluded from adjudicating money claims on the ground that this is an exclusive function of the Labor Arbiter under Article 217 of the present Code.On August 4, 1986, when the order was issued, Article 128(b)4read as follows:(b) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to order and administer, after due notice and hearing, compliance with the labor standards provisions of this Code based on the findings of labor regulation officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection, and to issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of theirorder, except in cases where the employer contests the findingsof the labor regulations officer and raises issues which cannot be resolved without considering evidentiary matters that are not verifiable in the normal course of inspection. (Emphasis supplied)On the other hand, Article 217 of the Labor Code as amended by P.D. 1691, effective May 1, 1980; Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, effective August 21, 1981; and Batas Pambansa Blg. 227, effective June 1, 1982,inter alia, provides:ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have theoriginal and exclusivejurisdiction to hear and decide within thirty (30) working days after submission of the case by the parties for decision, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:1. Unfair labor practice cases;2. Those that workers may file involving wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;3. All money claims of workers, including those based on non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for employees' compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits;4. Cases involving household services; and5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 265 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and lock-outs. (Emphasis supplied)The Ong and Zambales cases involved workerswho were still connected with the company. However, in the Ong case, the employer disputed the adequacy of the evidentiary foundation (employees' affidavits) of the findings of the labor standards inspectors while in the Zambales case, the money claims which arose from alleged violations of labor standards provisions were not discovered in the course of normal inspection. Thus, the provisions of MOLE Policy Instructions Nos. 6, (Distribution of Jurisdiction Over Labor Cases) and 37 (Assignment of Cases to Labor Arbiters) giving Regional Directors adjudicatory powers over uncontested money claims discovered in the course of normal inspection, provided an employer-employee relationship still exists, are inapplicable.In the present case, petitioner admitted the charge of underpayment of wages to workersstill in its employ; in fact, it pleaded for time to raise funds to satisfy its obligation. Therewas thus no contest against the findingsof the labor inspectors.Barely less than a month after the promulgation on November 26, 1986 of the Zambales Base Metals case, Executive Order No. 111 was issued on December 24, 1986,5amending Article 128(b) of the Labor Code, to read as follows:(b) THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 217 OF THIS CODE TO THE CONTRARY NOTWITHSTANDING AND IN CASES WHERE THE RELATIONSHIP OF EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE STILL EXISTS, the Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to order and administer, after due notice and hearing, compliance with the labor standards provisions of this Code AND OTHER LABOR LEGISLATION based on the findings of labor regulation officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection, and to issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their orders, except in cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor regulation officer and raises issues which cannot be resolved without considering evidentiary matters that are not verifiable in the normal course of inspection. (Emphasis supplied)As seen from the foregoing, EO 111 authorizes a Regional Director to order compliance by an employer with labor standards provisions of the Labor Code and other legislation. It is Our considered opinion however, that the inclusion of the phrase, " The provisions of Article 217 of this Code to the contrary notwithstanding and in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists" ... in Article 128(b), as amended, above-cited, merelyconfirms/reiteratesthe enforcement adjudication authority of the Regional Director overuncontestedmoney claimsin cases where an employer-employee relationship still exists.6Viewed in the light of PD 850 and read in coordination with MOLE Policy Instructions Nos. 6, 7 and 37, it is clear that it has always been the intention of our labor authorities to provide our workers immediate access (when still feasible, as where an employer-employee relationship still exists) to their rights and benefits, without being inconvenienced by arbitration/litigation processes that prove to be not only nerve-wracking, but financially burdensome in the long run.Note further the second paragraph of Policy Instructions No. 7 indicating that the transfer of labor standards cases from the arbitration system to the enforcement system is. . to assure the workers the rights and benefits due to him under labor standard laws, without having to go through arbitration. . .so that. . the workers would not litigate to get what legally belongs to him. .. ensuring delivery . . free of charge.Social justice legislation, to be truly meaningful and rewarding to our workers, must not be hampered in its application by long-winded arbitration and litigation. Rights must be asserted and benefits received with the least inconvenience. Labor laws are meant to promote, not defeat, social justice.This view is in consonance with the present "Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standard Cases in the Regional Offices "7issued by the Secretary of Labor, Franklin M. Drilon on September 16, 1987.Thus, Sections 2 and 3 of Rule II on "Money Claims Arising from Complaint Routine Inspection", provide as follows:Section 2. Complaint inspection. All such complaints shall immediately be forwarded to the Regional Director who shall refer the case to the appropriate unit in the Regional Office for assignment to a Labor Standards and Welfare Officer (LSWO) for field inspection. When the field inspection does not produce the desired results, the Regional Director shall summon the parties for summary investigation to expedite the disposition of the case. . . .Section 3. Complaints where no employer-employee relationship actually exists. Where employer-employee relationship no longer exists by reason of the fact that it has already been severed, claims for payment of monetary benefitsfall within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the labor arbiters. . . . (Emphasis supplied)Likewise, it is also clear that the limitation embodied in MOLE Policy Instructions No. 7 to amounts not exceeding P100,000.00 has been dispensed with, in view of the following provisions of pars. (b) and (c), Section 7 on "Restitution", the same Rules, thus:xxx xxx xxx(b) Plant-level restitutions may be effected for money claims not exceeding Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00). . . .(c) Restitutions in excess of the aforementioned amount shall be effected at the Regional Office or at the worksite subject to the prior approval of the Regional Director.which indicate the intention to empower the Regional Director to award money claimsin excessof P100,000.00;providedof course the employer does not contest the findings made, based on the provisions of Section 8 thereof:Section 8. Compromise agreement. Should the parties arrive at an agreement as to the whole or part of the dispute, said agreement shall be reduced in writing and signed by the parties in the presence of the Regional Director or his duly authorized representative.E.O. No. 111 was issued on December 24, 1986 or three (3) months after the promulgation of the Secretary of Labor's decision upholding private respondents' salary differentials and ECOLAs on September 24, 1986. The amendment of the visitorial and enforcement powers of the Regional Director (Article 128-b) by said E.O. 111 reflects the intention enunciated in Policy Instructions Nos. 6 and 37 to empower the Regional Directors to resolveuncontested money claims in cases where an employer-employee relationship still exists. This intention must be given weight and entitled to great respect. As held inProgressive Workers' Union, et. al. vs. F.P. Aguas, et. al. G.R. No. 59711-12, May 29, 1985, 150 SCRA 429:. . The interpretation by officers of laws which are entrusted to their administration is entitled to great respect. We see no reason to detract from this rudimentary rule in administrative law, particularly when later events have proved said interpretation to be in accord with the legislative intent. ..The proceedings before the Regional Director must, perforce, be upheld on the basis of Article 128(b) as amended by E.O. No. 111, dated December 24, 1986, this executive order "to be considered in the nature of a curative statute with retrospective application." (Progressive Workers' Union, et al. vs. Hon. F.P. Aguas, et al. (Supra); M. Garcia vs. Judge A. Martinez, et al., G.R. No. L- 47629, May 28, 1979, 90 SCRA 331).We now come to the question of whether or not the Regional Director erred in extending the award to all hospital employees. We answer in the affirmative.The Regional Director correctly applied the award with respect to those employees whosignedthe complaint, as well as those whodid not signthe complaint,but were still connected with the hospital at the time the complaint was filed(See Order, p. 33 dated August 4, 1986 of the Regional Director, Pedrito de Susi, p. 33,Rollo).The justification for the award to this group of employees who were not signatories to the complaint is that the visitorial and enforcement powers given to the Secretary of Labor is relevant to, and exercisable over establishments, not over the individual members/employees, because what is sought to be achieved by its exercise is the observance of, and/or compliance by, such firm/establishment with the labor standards regulations. Necessarily, in case of an award resulting from a violation of labor legislation by such establishment, the entire members/employees should benefit therefrom. As aptly stated by then Minister of Labor Augusto S. Sanchez:. . It would be highly derogatory to the rights of the workers, if after categorically finding the respondent hospital guilty of underpayment of wages and ECOLAs, we limit the award to only those who signed the complaint to the exclusion of the majority of the workers who are similarly situated. Indeed, this would be not only render the enforcement power of the Minister of Labor and Employment nugatory, but would be the pinnacle of injustice considering that it would not only discriminate but also deprive them of legislated benefits.. . . (pp. 38-39,Rollo).This view is further bolstered by the provisions of Sec. 6, Rule II of the "Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards cases in the Regional Offices" (supra) presently enforced, viz:SECTION 6. Coverage of complaint inspection. A complaint inspection shall not be limited to the specific allegations or violations raised by the complainants/workers but shall be a thorough inquiry into and verification of the compliance by employer with existing labor standardsand shall cover all workers similarly situated. (Emphasis supplied)However, there is no legal justification for the award in favor of those employees whowere no longer connectedwith the hospital at the time the complaint was filed, having resigned therefrom in 1984, viz:1. Jean (Joan) Venzon (See Order, p. 33,Rollo)2. Rosario Paclijan3. Adela Peralta4. Mauricio Nagales5. Consesa Bautista6. Teresita Agcopra7. Felix Monleon8. Teresita Salvador9. Edgar Cataluna; and10. Raymond Manija ( p.7,Rollo)The enforcement power of the Regional Director cannot legally be upheld in cases of separated employees. Article 129 of the Labor Code, cited by petitioner (p. 54,Rollo) is not applicable as said article isin aid of the enforcement powerof the Regional Director; hence, not applicable where the employee seeking to be paid underpayment of wages is already separated from the service. His claim is purely a money claim that has to be the subject of arbitration proceedings and therefore within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.Petitioner has likewise questioned the order dated August 4, 1986 of the Regional Director in that it does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which the award is based.We invite attention to the Minister of Labor's ruling thereon, as follows:Finally, the respondent hospital assails the order under appeal as null and void because it does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which the awards were based. Contrary to the pretensions of the respondent hospital, we have carefully reviewed the order on appeal and we found that the same contains a brief statement of the (a) facts of the case; (b) issues involved; (c) applicable laws; (d) conclusions and the reasons therefor; (e) specific remedy granted (amount awarded). (p. 40,Rollo)ACCORDINGLY, this petition should be dismissed, as it is hereby DISMISSED, as regards all persons still employed in the Hospital at the time of the filing of the complaint, but GRANTED as regards those employees no longer employed at that time.SO ORDERED.

Calalang vs. Williams[GR 47800, 2 December 1940]First Division, Laurel (J): 4 concurFacts: The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of 17 July 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on 18 July 1940, recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act 548, which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads. On 2 August 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, with the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street. On 10 August 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as indicated, for a period of 1 year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted. Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before the Supreme court the petition for a writ of prohibition against A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.Issue: Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of Public Works infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people.Held: The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."

G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC.,petitioner,vs.HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration,respondents.SARMIENTO,J.:The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement,"1challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;"2that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;"3and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character.In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution, providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law."4Department Order No. 1, it is contended, was passed in the absence of prior consultations. It is claimed, finally, to be in violation of the Charter's non-impairment clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI members face should the Order be further enforced.On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a Comment informing the Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland.*In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police power of the Philippine State.It is admitted that Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of a police power measure. The only question is whether or not it is valid under the Constitution.The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare."5As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace."Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits."6It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the Charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited,7refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the State "to govern its citizens."8"The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with self- protection, and it is not inaptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society."9It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is "rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to ensure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare."10Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties "Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's will."11It is subject to the far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number.Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations. For all its awesome consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to advance the public good. Thus, when the power is used to further private interests at the expense of the citizenry, there is a clear misuse of the power.12In the light of the foregoing, the petition must be dismissed.As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed vahdity.13In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands.The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers,"14but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution15does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.16The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers rests on substantial distinctions.As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts.The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is no evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with an Identical predicament. The petitioner has proffered no argument that the Government should act similarly with respect to male workers. The Court, of course, is not impressing some male chauvinistic notion that men are superior to women. What the Court is saying is that it was largely a matter of evidence (that women domestic workers are being ill-treated abroad in massive instances) and not upon some fanciful or arbitrary yardstick that the Government acted in this case. It is evidence capable indeed of unquestionable demonstration and evidence this Court accepts. The Court cannot, however, say the same thing as far as men are concerned. There is simply no evidence to justify such an inference. Suffice it to state, then, that insofar as classifications are concerned, this Court is content that distinctions are borne by the evidence. Discrimination in this case is justified.As we have furthermore indicated, executive determinations are generally final on the Court. Under a republican regime, it is the executive branch that enforces policy. For their part, the courts decide, in the proper cases, whether that policy, or the manner by which it is implemented, agrees with the Constitution or the laws, but it is not for them to question its wisdom. As a co-equal body, the judiciary has great respect for determinations of the Chief Executive or his subalterns, especially when the legislature itself has specifically given them enough room on how the law should be effectively enforced. In the case at bar, there is no gainsaying the fact, and the Court will deal with this at greater length shortly, that Department Order No. 1 implements the rule-making powers granted by the Labor Code. But what should be noted is the fact that in spite of such a fiction of finality, the Court is on its own persuaded that prevailing conditions indeed call for a deployment ban.There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind the measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the protection for Filipino female overseas workers"17this Court has no quarrel that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good and welfare.The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself ("Pending review of the administrative and legal measures, in the Philippines and in the host countries . . ."18), meaning to say that should the authorities arrive at a means impressed with a greater degree of permanency, the ban shall be lifted. As a stop-gap measure, it is possessed of a necessary malleability, depending on the circumstances of each case. Accordingly, it provides:9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION. The Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) may, upon recommendation of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), lift the suspension in countries where there are:1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the Philippines, and/or,2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of Filipino workers.19The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic overseas workers. That it does not apply to "all Filipina workers"20is not an argument for unconstitutionality. Had the ban been given universal applicability, then it would have been unreasonable and arbitrary. For obvious reasons, not all of them are similarly circumstanced. What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of persons within an existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or group of persons. To apply the ban, say exclusively to workers deployed by A, but not to those recruited by B, would obviously clash with the equal protection clause of the Charter. It would be a classic case of what Chase refers to as a law that "takes property from A and gives it to B."21It would be an unlawful invasion of property rights and freedom of contract and needless to state, an invalid act.22(Fernando says: "Where the classification is based on such distinctions that make a real difference as infancy, sex, and stage of civilization of minority groups, the better rule, it would seem, is to recognize its validity only if the young, the women, and the cultural minorities are singled out for favorable treatment. There would be an element of unreasonableness if on the contrary their status that calls for the law ministering to their needs is made the basis of discriminatory legislation against them. If such be the case, it would be difficult to refute the assertion of denial of equal protection."23In the case at bar, the assailed Order clearly accords protection to certain women workers, and not the contrary.)It is incorrect to say that Department Order No. 1 prescribes a total ban on overseas deployment. From scattered provisions of the Order, it is evident that such a total ban has hot been contemplated. We quote:5. AUTHORIZED DEPLOYMENT-The deployment of domestic helpers and workers of similar skills defined herein to the following [sic] are authorized under these guidelines and are exempted from the suspension.5.1 Hirings by immediate members of the family of Heads of State and Government;5.2 Hirings by Minister, Deputy Minister and the other senior government officials; and5.3 Hirings by senior officials of the diplomatic corps and duly accredited international organizations.5.4 Hirings by employers in countries with whom the Philippines have [sic] bilateral labor agreements or understanding.xxx xxx xxx7. VACATIONING DOMESTIC HELPERS AND WORKERS OF SIMILAR SKILLS--Vacationing domestic helpers and/or workers of similar skills shall be allowed to process with the POEA and leave for worksite only if they are returning to the same employer to finish an existing or partially served employment contract. Those workers returning to worksite to serve a new employer shall be covered by the suspension and the provision of these guidelines.xxx xxx xxx9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION-The Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) may, upon recommendation of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), lift the suspension in countries where there are:1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the Philippines, and/or,2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of Filipino workers.24xxx xxx xxxThe consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided by law."25Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to labor,"26pursuant to the respondent Department of Labor's rule-making authority vested in it by the Labor Code.27The petitioner assumes that it is unreasonable simply because of its impact on the right to travel, but as we have stated, the right itself is not absolute. The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto.Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcement whereof.28The petitioners's reliance on the Constitutional guaranty of worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits"29is not well-taken. The right granted by this provision, again, must submit to the demands and necessities of the State's power of regulation.The Constitution declares that:Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.30"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection, personally and economically, while away from home. In this case, the Government has evidence, an evidence the petitioner cannot seriously dispute, of the lack or inadequacy of such protection, and as part of its duty, it has precisely ordered an indefinite ban on deployment.The Court finds furthermore that the Government has not indiscriminately made use of its authority. It is not contested that it has in fact removed the prohibition with respect to certain countries as manifested by the Solicitor General.The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must yield to the loftier purposes targetted by the Government.31Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all other freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction, wherelaissez fairehas never been fully accepted as a controlling economic way of life.This Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order has on the business of recruitment. The concern of the Government, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of Government regulation. The interest of the State is to provide a decent living to its citizens. The Government has convinced the Court in this case that this is its intent. We do not find the impugned Order to be tainted with a grave abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary relief prayed for.WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 103144 April 4, 2001PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT and SERVICES CORPORATION,petitioner,vs.THE HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, VIVENCIO DE MESA, RODRIGO MIKIN and CEDRIC LEYSON, respondents.GONZAGA-REYES,J.:This is a petition for certiorari from the Order dated November 25, 1991 issued by public respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment. The November 25, 1991 Order affirmedin totothe August 29, 1988 Order of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (hereinafter the "POEA") which found petitioner liable for three (3) counts of illegal exaction, two (2) counts of contract substitution and one count of withholding or unlawful deduction from salaries of workers in POEA Case No. (L) 85-05-0370.Petitioner Philsa International Placement and Services Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "Philsa") is a domestic corporation engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment. Sometime in January 1985, private respondents, who were recruited by petitioner for employment in Saudi Arabia, were required to pay placement fees in the amount of P5,000.00 for private respondent Rodrigo L. Mikin and P6,500.00 each for private respondents Vivencio A. de Mesa and Cedric P. Leyson.1After the execution of their respective work contracts, private respondents left for Saudi Arabia on January 29, 1985. They then began work for Al-Hejailan Consultants A/E, the foreign principal of petitioner.While in Saudi Arabia, private respondents were allegedly made to sign a second contract on February 4, 1985 which changed some of the provisions of their original contract resulting in the reduction of some of their benefits and privileges.2On April 1, 1985, their foreign employer allegedly forced them to sign a third contract which increased their work hours from 48 hours to 60 hours a week without any corresponding increase in their basic monthly salary. When they refused to sign this third contract, the services of private respondents were terminated by Al-Hejailan and they were repatriated to the Philippines.3Upon their arrival in the Philippines, private respondents demanded from petitioner Philsa the return of their placement fees and for the payment of their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contract. When petitioner refused, they filed a case before the POEA against petitioner Philsa and its foreign principal, Al-Hejailan., with the following causes of action:1. Illegal dismissal;2. Payment of salary differentials;3. Illegal deduction/withholding of salaries;4. Illegal exactions/refund of placement fees; and5. Contract substitution.4The case was docketed as POEA Case No. (L) 85-05 0370.Under the rules of the POEA dated May 21, 1985, complaints involving employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment, including money claims, are adjudicated by the Workers' Assistance and Adjudication Office (hereinafter the "WAAO") thru the POEA Hearing Officers.5On the other hand, complaints involving recruitment violations warranting suspension or cancellation of the license of recruiting agencies are cognizable by the POEA thru its Licensing and Recruitment Office (hereinafter the "LRO").6In cases where a complaint partakes of the nature of both an employer-employee relationship case and a recruitment regulation case, the POEA Hearing Officer shall act as representative of both the WAAO and the LRO and both cases shall be heard simultaneously. In such cases, the Hearing Officer shall submit two separate recommendations for the two aspects of the case.7In the case at bench, the first two causes of action were in the nature of money claims arising from the employer-employee relations and were properly cognizable by the WAAO. The last two causes of action were in the nature of recruitment violations and may be investigated by the LRO. The third cause of action, illegal deduction/withholding of salary, is both a money claim and a violation of recruitment regulations and is thus under the investigatory jurisdiction of both the WAAO and the LRO.Several hearings were conducted before the POEA Hearing Officer on the two aspects of private respondents' complaint. During these hearings, private respondents supported their complaint with the presentation of both documentary and testimonial evidence. When it was its turn to present its evidence, petitioner failed to do so and consequently, private respondents filed a motion to decide the case on the basis of the evidence on record.8On the aspects of the case involving money claims arising from the employer-employee relations and illegal dismissal, the POEA rendered a decision dated August 31, 19889, the dispositive portion of which reads:"CONFORMABLY TO THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondent PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT AND SERVICE CORPORATION to pay complainants, jointly and severally with its principal Al-Hejailan, the following amounts, to wit:1. TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE SAUDI RIYALS (SR2,225.00) to each complainant, representing the refund of their unpaid separation pay;2. ONE THOUSAND SAUDI RIYALS (SR1,000.00) for V.A. de Mesa alone, representing the salary deduction from his March salary;3. TWO THOUSAND SAUDI RIYALS (SR2,000.00) each for R.I. Mikin and C.A.P. Leyson only, representing their differential pay for the months of February and March, 1985; and4. Five percent (5%) of the total awards as and by way of attorney's fees.All payments of the abovestated awards shall be made in Philippine Currency equivalent to the prevailing exchange rate according to the Central Bank at the time of payment.All other claims of complainants as well as the counterclaims of respondent are dismissed for lack of merit.SO ORDERED."10Under the Rules and Regulations of the POEA, the decision of the POEA-Adjudication Office on matters involving money claims arising from the employer-employee relationship of overseas Filipino workers may be appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (hereinafter the "NLRC)11. Thus, as both felt aggrieved by the said POEA Decision, petitioner and private respondents filed separate appeals from the August 31, 1988 POEA Decision to the NLRC.In a decision dated July 26, 198912, the NLRC modified the appealed decision of the POEA Adjudication Office by deleting the award of salary deductions and differentials. These awards to private respondents were deleted by the NLRC considering that these were not raised in the complaint filed by private respondents. The NLRC likewise stated that there was nothing in the text of the decision which would justify the award.Private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution dated October 25; 1989.Private respondents then elevated the July 26, 1989 decision of the NLRC to the Supreme Court in a petition for review for certiorari where it was docketed as G.R. No. 89089. However, in a Resolution dated October 25, 1989, the petition was dismissed outright for "insufficiency in form and substance, having failed to comply with the Rules of Court and Circular No. 1-88 requiring submission of a certified true copy of the questioned resolution dated August 23, 1989."13Almost simultaneous with the promulgation of the August 31, 1988 decision of the POEA on private respondents' money claims, the POEA issued a separate Order dated August 29, 198814resolving the recruitment violations aspect of private respondents' complaint. In this Order, the POEA found petitioner guilty of illegal exaction, contract substitution, and unlawful deduction. The dispositive portion of this August 29, 1988 POEA Order reads:"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office finds herein respondent PHILSA International Placement and Services Corporation liable for three (3) counts of illegal exaction, two (2) counts of contract substitution and one count of withholding or unlawful deduction from salaries of workers.Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered to refund the placement fees in the amount of P2,500.00 to Rodrigo L. Mikin, P4,000.00, each, to Vivencio A. de Mesa and Cedric A.P. Leyson plus restitution of the salaries withheld in the amount of SR1,000.00 to Vivencio A. de Mesa.Moreover, respondent's license is hereby suspended for eight (8) months to take effect immediately and to remain as such until full refund and restitution of the above-stated amounts have been effected or in lieu thereof, it is fined the amount of SIXTY THOUSAND (P60,000.00) PESOS plus restitution.SO ORDERED."In line with this August 29, 1988 Order, petitioner deposited the check equivalent to the claims of private respondents and paid the corresponding fine under protest. From the said Order, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was subsequently denied in an Order dated October 10, 1989.Under the POEA Rules and Regulations, the decision of the POEA thru the LRO suspending or canceling a license or authority to act as a recruitment agency may be appealed to the Ministry (now Department) of Labor and Employment.15Accordingly, after the denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed the August 21, 1988 Order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment. However, in an Order dated September 13, 1991,16public respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment affirmedin totothe assailed Order. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was likewise denied in an Order dated November 25, 1991.Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari where petitioner raises the following grounds for the reversal of the questioned Orders:ITHE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING PETITIONER GUILTY OF ILLEGAL EXACTIONS. THE FINDING IS NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE AND IN ANY EVENT, THE LAW ON WHICH THE CONVICTION IS BASED IS VOID.IITHE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN PENALIZING PETITIONER WITH CONTRACT SUBSTITUTION. IN THE PREMISES, THE CONTRACT SUBSTITUTION IS VALID AS IT IMPROVED THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' EMPLOYMENT.III.THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING PETITIONER LIABLE FOR ILLEGAL DEDUCTIONS/WITHHOLDING OF SALARIES FOR THE SUPREME COURT ITSELF HAS ALREADY ABSOLVED PETITIONER FROM THIS CHARGE.With respect to the first ground, petitioner would want us to overturn the findings of the POEA, subsequently affirmed by the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, that it is guilty of illegal exaction committed by collecting placement fees in excess of the amounts allowed by law. This issue, however, is a question of fact which cannot be raised in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.17As we have previously held:"It should be noted, in the first place, that the instant petition is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. An extraordinary remedy, its use is available only and restrictively in truly exceptional cases wherein the action of an inferior court, board or officer performing judicial or quasi-judicial acts is challenged for being wholly void on grounds of jurisdiction. The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It does not include correction of public respondent NLRC's evaluation of the evidence and factual findings based thereon, which are generally accorded not only great respect but even finality."18The question of whether or not petitioner charged private respondents placement fees in excess of that allowed by law is clearly a question of fact which is for public respondent POEA, as a trier of facts, to determine. As stated above, the settled rule is that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the POEA, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence.19On this point, we have carefully examined the records of the case and it is clear that the ruling of public respondent POEA that petitioner is guilty of illegal exaction is supported by substantial evidence. Aside from the testimonial evidence offered by private respondents, they also presented documentary evidence consisting of receipts issued by a duly authorized representative of petitioner which show the payment of amounts in excess of those allowed by the POEA. In contrast, petitioner did not present any evidence whatsoever to rebut the claims of private respondents despite the many opportunities for them to do so.Petitioner insists, however, that it cannot be held liable for illegal exaction as POEA Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of 1983, which enumerated the allowable fees which may be collected from applicants, is void for lack of publication.There is merit in the argument.InTaada vs. Tuvera20, the Court held, as follows:"We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution: Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letter of instructions issued by the administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties."Applying this doctrine, we have previously declared as having no force and effect the following administrative issuances: a) Rules and Regulations issued by the Joint Ministry of Health-Ministry of Labor and Employment Accreditation Committee regarding the accreditation of hospitals, medical clinics and laboratories;21b) Letter of Instruction No. 416 ordering the suspension of payments due and payable by distressed copper mining companies to the national government;22c) Memorandum Circulars issued by the POEA regulating the recruitment of domestic helpers to Hong Kong;23d) Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 issued by the Philippine International Trading Corporation regulating applications for importation from the People's Republic of China;24and e) Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 issued by the Department of Budget and Management discontinuing the payment of other allowances and fringe benefits to government officials and employees.25In all these cited cases, the administrative issuances questioned therein were uniformly struck down as they were not published or filed with the National Administrative Register as required by the Administrative Code of 1987.26POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 must likewise be declared ineffective as the same was never published or filed with the National Administrative Register.POEA Memorandum Order No. 2, Series of 1983 provides for the applicable schedule of placement and documentation fees for private employment agencies or authority holders. Under the said Order, the maximum amount which may be collected from prospective Filipino overseas workers is P2,500.00. The said circular was apparently issued in compliance with the provisions of Article 32 of the Labor Code which provides, as follows:"ARTICLE 32. Fees to be paid by workers. Any person applying with a private fee-charging employment agency for employment assistance shall not be charged any fee until he has obtained employment through its efforts or has actually commenced employment. Such fee shall be always covered with the approved receipt clearly showing the amount paid.The Secretary of Labor shall promulgate a schedule of allowable fees." (italic supplied)It is thus clear that the administrative circular under consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.27Considering that POEA Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not as yet been published or filed with the National Administrative Register, the same is ineffective and may not be enforced.The Office of the Solicitor General argues however that the imposition of administrative sanctions on petitioner was based not on the questioned administrative circular but on Article 32 and Article 34 (a)28of the Labor Code.The argument is not meritorious. The said articles of the Labor Code were never cited, much less discussed, in the body of the questioned Orders of the POEA and Secretary of Labor and Employment. In fact, the said Orders were consistent in mentioning that petitioner's violation of Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 was the basis for the imposition of administrative sanctions against petitioner. Furthermore, even assuming that petitioner was held liable under the said provisions of the Labor Code, Articles 32 and 34 (a) of the Labor Code presupposes the promulgation of a valid schedule of fees by the Department of Labor and Employment. Considering that, as, previously discussed, Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 embodying such a schedule of fees never took effect, there is thus no basis for the imposition of the administrative sanctions against petitioner. Moreover, under Book VI, Chapter II, Section 3 of the Administrative Code of 1987, "(r)ules in force on the date of the effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons." Considering that POEA Administrative Circular No. 2 was never filed with the National Administrative Register, the same cannot be used as basis for the imposition of administrative sanctions against petitioner.The Office of the Solicitor General likewise argues that the questioned administrative circular is not among those requiring publication contemplated byTaada vs. Tuveraas it is addressed only to a specific group of persons and not to the general public.Again, there is no merit in this argument.The fact that the said circular is addressed only to a specified group, namely private employment agencies or authority holders, does not take it away from the ambit of our ruling inTaada vs. Tuvera. In the case ofPhil. Association of Service Exporters vs. Torres,29the administrative circulars questioned therein were addressed to an even smaller group, namely Philippine and Hong Kong agencies engaged in the recruitment of workers for Hong Kong, and still the Court ruled therein that, for lack of proper publication, the said circulars may not be enforced or implemented.Our pronouncement inTaada vs. Tuverais clear and categorical. Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation., The only exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not been shown to fall under any of these exceptions.In this regard, the Solicitor General's reliance on the case ofYaokasin vs. Commissioner of Customs30is misplaced. In the said case, the validity of certain Customs Memorandum Orders were upheld despite their lack of publication as they were addressed to a particular class of persons, the customs collectors, who were also the subordinates of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. As such, the said Memorandum Orders clearly fall under one of the exceptions to the publication requirement, namely those dealing with instructions from an administrative superior to a subordinate regarding the performance of their duties, a circumstance which does not obtain in the case at bench.With respect to the second ground, petitioner would want us to review the findings of fact of the POEA regarding the two counts of alleged contract substitution. Again, this is a question of fact which may not be disturbed if the same is supported by substantial evidence. A reading of the August 29, 1988 Order of the POEA shows that, indeed, the ruling that petitioner is guilty of two (2) counts of prohibited contract substitution is supported by substantial evidence. Thus:"2. As admitted by respondent, there was definitely a contract of substitution in the first count. The first contract was duly approved by the Administration and, therefore, the parties are bound by the terms and condition thereof until its expiration. The mere intention of respondents to increase the number of hours of work, even if there was a corresponding increase in wage is clear violation of the contract as approved by the Administration, and notwithstanding the same, the amendment is evidently contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy and hence, must be shunned (Art. 1306, Civil Code of the Philippines, Book III, Title I, Chapter 1, Article 83, Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended). Moreover, it would appear that the proposed salary increase corresponding to the increase in number of work bonus may just have been a ploy as complainant were (sic) thereafter not paid at the increased rate.As to contract substitution in the second part, a third contract was emphatically intended by respondent to be signed by complainants which, however, was not consummated due to the adamant refusal of complainants to sign thereon. Mere intention of the respondent to commit contract substitution for a second time should not be left unpunished. It is the duty of this Office to repress such acts by teaching agencies a lesson to avoid repetition of the same violation."31With respect to the third ground, petitioner argues that the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioner liable for illegal deductions/withholding of salaries considering that the Supreme Court itself has already absolved petitioner from this charge. Petitioner premises its argument on the fact that the July 26, 1989 Decision of the NLRC absolving it from private respondent de Mesa's claim for salary deduction has already attained finality by reason of the dismissal of private respondents' petition for certiorari of the said NLRC decision by the Supreme Court.Petitioner is correct in stating that the July 26, 1989 Decision of the NLRC has attained finality by reason of the dismissal of the petition for certiorari assailing the same. However, the said NLRC Decision dealt only with the money claims of private respondents arising from employer-employee relations and illegal dismissal and as such, it is only for the payment of the said money claims that petitioner is absolved. The administrative sanctions, which are distinct and separate from the money claims of private respondents, may still be properly imposed by the POEA. In fact, in the August 31, 1988 Decision of the POEA dealing with the money claims of private respondents, the POEA Adjudication Office precisely declared that "respondent's liability for said money claims is without prejudice to and independent of its liabilities for the recruitment violations aspect of the case which is the subject of a separate Order."32The NLRC Decision absolving petitioner from paying private respondent de Mesa's claim for salary deduction based its ruling on a finding that the said money claim was not raised in the complaint.33While there may be questions regarding such finding of the NLRC, the finality of the said NLRC Decision prevents us from modifying or reviewing the same. But the fact that the claim for salary deduction was not raised by private respondents in their complaint will not bar the POEA from holding petitioner liable for illegal deduction or withholding of salaries as a ground for the suspension or cancellation of petitioner's license.Under the POEA Rules and Regulations, the POEA, on its own initiative, may conduct the necessary proceeding for the suspension or cancellation of the license of any private placement agency on any of the grounds mentioned therein.34As such, even without a written complaint from an aggrieved party, the POEA can initiate proceedings against an erring private placement agency and, if the result of its investigation so warrants, impose the corresponding administrative sanction thereof. Moreover, the POEA, in an investigation of an employer-employee relationship case, may still hold a respondent liable for administrative sanctions if, in the course of its investigation, violations of recruitment regulations are uncovered.35It is thus clear that even if recruitment violations were not included in a complaint for money claims initiated by a private complainant, the POEA, under its rules, may still take cognizance of the same and impose administrative sanctions if the evidence so warrants.As such, the fact that petitioner has been absolved by final judgment for the payment of the money claim to private respondent de Mesa does not mean that it is likewise absolved from the administrative sanctions which may be imposed as a result of the unlawful deduction or withholding of private respondents' salary. The POEA thus committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding petitioner administratively liable of one count of unlawful deduction/withholding of salary.To summarize, petitioner should be absolved from the three (3) counts of illegal exaction as POEA Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 could not be the basis of administrative sanctions against petitioner for lack of publication. However, we affirm the ruling of the POEA and the Secretary of Labor and Employment that petitioner should be held administratively liable for two (2) counts of contract substitution and one (1) count of withholding or unlawful deduction of salary.Under the applicable schedule of penalties imposed by the POEA, the penalty for each count of contract substitution is suspension of license for two (2) months or a fine of P10,000.00 while the penalty for withholding or unlawful deduction of salaries is suspension of license for two (2) months or fine equal to the salary withheld but not less than P10,000.00 plus restitution of the amount in both instances.36Applying the said schedule on the instant case, the license of petitioner should be suspended for six (6) months or, in lieu thereof, it should be ordered to pay fine in the amount of P30,000.00. Petitioner should likewise pay the amount of SR1,000.00 to private respondent Vivencio A. de Mesa as restitution for the amount withheld from his salary.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the September 13, 1991 and November 25, 1991 Orders of public respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment are hereby MODIFIED. As modified, the license of private respondent Philsa International Placement and Services Corporation is hereby suspended for six (6) months or, in lieu thereof, it is hereby ordered to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as fine. Petitioner is likewise ordered to pay the amount of SR1,000.00 to private respondent Vivencio A. de Mesa. All other monetary awards are deleted.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-49582 January 7, 1986CBTC EMPLOYEES UNION,petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE JACOBO C. CLAVE, Presidential Executive Assistant, and COMMERCIAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.DE LA FUENTE,J.:Petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the decision of the respondent Presidential Executive Assistant1affirming that of the Acting Secretary of Labor who reversed the decision of the National Labor Relations Comission which upheld the Voluntary Arbitrator's order directing the private respondent bank to pay its monthly paid employees their "legal holiday pay."Petitioner Commercial Bank and Trust Company Employees' Union (Union for short) lodged a complaint with the Regional Office No. IV, Department of Labor, against private respondent bank (Comtrust) for non-payment of the holiday pay benefits provided for under Article 95 of the Labor Code in relation to Rule X, Book III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code.Failing to arrive at an amicable settlement at conciliation level, the parties opted to submit their dispute for voluntary arbitration. The issue presented was: "Whether the permanent employees of the Bank within the collective bargaining unit paid on a monthly basisare entitled to holiday payeffective November 1, 1974, pursuant to Article 95 (now Article 94) of the Labor Code, as amended and Rule X (now Rule IV), Book III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code. "In addition, the disputants signed a Submission Agreement stipulating as final, unappealable and executory the decision of the Arbitrator, including subsequent issuances for clarificatory and/or relief purposes, notwithstanding Article 262 of the Labor Code which allow appeal in certain instances.2In the course of the hearing, the Arbitrator apprised the parties of an interpretative bulletin on "holiday pay" about to be issued by the Department of Labor. Whereupon, the Union filed a Manifestation3which insofar as relevant stated:6. That complainant union . . . has manifested its apprehension on the contents of the said Interpretative Bulletin in view of a well-nigh irresistible move on the part of the employers to exclude permanent workers similarly situated as the employees of Comtrust from the coverage of the holiday pay benefit despite the express and self-explanatory provisions of the law, its implementing rules and opinions thereon . . . .7. That in the event that said Interpretative Bulletin regarding holiday pay would be adverse to the present claim . . . in that it would in effect exclude the said employees from enjoyment of said benefit, whether wholly or partially, complainant union respectfully reserves the right to take such action as may be appropriate to protect its interests, a question of law being involved. . . . An Interpretative Bulletin which was inexistent at the time the said commitment was made and which may be contrary to the law itself should not bar the right of the union to claim for its holiday pay benefits.On April 22, 1976, the Arbitrator handed down an award on the dispute. Relevant portions thereof read as follows:The uncontroverted facts of this case are as follows:(1) That the complainant Union is the recognized sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative of all the permanent rank-and-file employees of the Bank with an existing Collective Bargaining Agreement covering the period from July 1, 1974 upto June 30, 1977;(2) That ... the standard workweek of the Bank generally consists of five (5) days of eight (8) hours each day which, . . . said five days are generally from Monday thru Friday; and, as a rule, Saturdays, Sundays and the regular holidays are not considered part of the standard workweek.(3) That, in computing the equivalent daily rate of its employees covered by the CBA who are paid on a monthly basis, the following computation is used, as per the provisions of Section 4, Article VII, of the CBA (Annex "A"):Daily Rate =Basic Monthly Salary plus CLA x 12250Basic Hourly Rate =Daily Rate8(4) That the divisor of '250', . . . was arrived at by subtracting the 52 Sundays, 52 Saturdays, the 10 regular holidays and December 31 (secured thru bargaining), or a total of 115 off-days from the 365 days of the year or a difference of 250 days.Considering the above uncontroverted facts, the principal question to be resolved is whether or not the monthly pay of the covered employees already includes what Article 94 of the Labor Code requires as regular holiday pay benefit in the amount of his regular daily wage (100% if unworked or 200% if worked) during the regular holidays enumerated therein, i.e., Article 94(c) of the Labor Code.In its latest Memorandum, filed on March 26, 1976, the Bank relies heavily on the provisions of Section 2, Rule IV, Book 111, of the Rules and Regulations implementing particularly Article 94 (formerly Article 208) of the Labor Code, which Section reads as follows:SECTION 2. Status of employees paid by themonth -Employees who are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of' working days therein with a salary of not less than the statutory or established minimum wage,shall be presumedto be paid for all days in the month whether worked or not.For this purpose, the monthly minimum wage shall not be less than the statutory minimum wage multiplied by 365 days divided by twelve. (Emphasis supplied).While admitting that there has virtually been no change effected by Presidential Decree No. 850, which amended the Labor Code, other than the re-numbering of the original Article 208 of said Code to what is now Article 94, the Bank, however, attaches a great deal of significance in the above-quoted Rule as to render the question at issue 'moot and academic'.On the other hand, the Union maintains, in its own latest Memorandum, filed also on March 26, 1976, that the legal presumption established in the above-quoted Rule is merely a disputable presumption. This contention of the Union is now supported by a pronouncement categorically to that effect by no less than the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in the case ofThe Chartered Bank Employees Association vs. The Chartered Bank. NLRC Case No. (s) RB-IV-1739-75 (RO4-5-3028-75),which reads, in part, as follows:. . . Adisputable presumption was seain that it would be presumed the salary of monthly-paid employees may already include rest days, such as Saturdays, Sundays, special and legal holidays, worked or unworked, in effect connoting thatevidence to the contrary may destroy such a supposed legal presumption.Indeed, the Rule merely sets a presumption. Itdoes not conclusively presumethat the salary of monthly-paid employees already includes unworked holidays. . . .The practice of the Bank of paying its employees a sum equivalent to Base pay plus Premium on Saturdays, Sundays and special and legal holidays, destroys the legal presumption that monthly pay is for an days of the month. For if the monthly pay is payment for all days of the month, then why should the employee be paidagainfor working on such rest days. (Emphasis supplied)There is no reason at present not to adopt the above ruling of the Honorable Comission, especially considering the fact that this Arbitrator, in asking a query on the nature of the presumption established by the above Rule, from the Director of Labor Standards in the PMAP Conference held at the Makati Hotel on March 13, 1976, was given the categorical answer that said presumption is merely disputable. This answer from the Labor Standards Director is significant inasmuch as it is his office, the Bureau of Labor Standards, that is reportedly instrumental in the preparation of the implementing Rules, particularly on Book III of the Labor Code on Conditions of Employment, to which group the present Rule under discussion belongs.So, rather than rendering moot and academic the issue at hand, as suggested by the Bank, the more logical step to take is to determine whether or not there is sufficient evidence to overcome the disputable presumption established by the Rule.It is unquestioned, and as provided for in the CBA itself, that the divisor used in determining thedaily rate of the mont